Authorship information:
Suetonius (Suet.12Caes.Julius.56), in his biography of Julius Caesar states
that the Gallic and Civil Wars were written by Caesar, and that the 8th book of
the Gallic Wars was written by (Aulus) Hirtius. Suetonius also indicates that
either Caesar's friend Oppius, or Hirtius likely wrote about the Alexandrian,
African and Spanish wars, but that their authorship was not certain.
Subject of the books:
This is a detailed discription of the war campaigns of Julius Caesar, starting
from the time that he was in charge of the Roman forces in France (Gaul).
Caesar's writting style is that of a detailed factual report, prepared year by
year, of the events. The parts not written by him attempt a similiar style, but
are not as clean (See the notes of Hortius, at the start of the 8th book of the
Gallic Wars). Caesar's writings present himself as a much more balanced and
just leader than Suetonius or Plutarch indicate in their biographies of him.
Also, the accounts of the army during the Spanish campaign show a more brutal
side to his leadership.
Miscellaneous:
The original preface
indicates that the publishers attempted to provide a literal translation of the
text.
Latin versions of
Caesar's works are available on the Internet
The text transcribing
was done with an attempt to duplicate the original published print, except for
a correction of a few printing errors. No attempt was made to update the
spelling to that of more modern American English. Suspected spelling errors in
names and places were retained, since there was no way to insure which was more
correct.
The text indexing is
from the printed book, and may or may not match that found in the Loeb's
Classical Library. In addition, there are two known indexing errors, both of
which exist in the printed copy and the transcriber was unable to resolve their
accuracy: Gallic Wars, Book 7: Skips chapter 89 ; Gallic Wars, Book 8: Skips
chapter 46
Gallic Wars: Book 1 ---
58 B.C.
Gallic Wars: Book 2 ---
57 B.C.
Gallic Wars: Book 3 ---
56 B.C.
Gallic Wars: Book 4 ---
55 B.C.
Gallic Wars: Book 5 ---
54 B.C.
Gallic Wars: Book 6 ---
53 B.C.
Gallic Wars: Book 7 ---
52 B.C.
Gallic Wars: Book 8 ---
51-50 B.C.
Civil Wars: Book 1 ---
50 B.C.
Civil Wars: Book 2 ---
49 B.C.
Civil Wars: Book 3 ---
48-47 B.C.
Alexandrian War
African War
Spanish War
Caius Julius Caesar 58
B.C.
[1.1] All Gaul is
divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit, the Aquitani
another, those who in their own language are called Celts, in our Gauls, the
third. All these differ from each other in language, customs and laws. The
river Garonne separates the Gauls from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine
separate them from the Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest,
because they are furthest from the civilization and refinement of [our]
Province, and merchants least frequently resort to them, and import those
things which tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the
Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war;
for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in valor, as
they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when they either repel
them from their own territories, or themselves wage war on their frontiers. One
part of these, which it has been said that the Gauls occupy, takes its
beginning at the river Rhone; it is bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean,
and the territories of the Belgae; it borders, too, on the side of the Sequani
and the Helvetii, upon the river Rhine, and stretches toward the north. The
Belgae rises from the extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the
river Rhine; and look toward the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends
from the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the ocean
which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun, and the north
star.
[1.2] Among the
Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and wealthy. He, when
Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls, incited by lust of sovereignty,
formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and persuaded the people to go forth
from their territories with all their possessions, [saying] that it would be
very easy, since they excelled all in valor, to acquire the supremacy of the
whole of Gaul. To this he the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii,
are confined on every side by the nature of their situation; on one side by the
Rhine, a very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory
from the Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain, which is
[situated] between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake of
Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the Helvetii.
From these circumstances it resulted, that they could range less widely, and
could less easily make war upon their neighbors; for which reason men fond of
war [as they were] were affected with great regret. They thought, that
considering the extent of their population, and their renown for warfare and
bravery, they had but narrow limits, although they extended in length 240, and
in breadth 180 [Roman] miles.
[1.3] Induced by these
considerations, and influenced by the authority of Orgetorix, they determined
to provide such things as were necessary for their expedition - to buy up as
great a number as possible of beasts of burden and wagons - to make their
sowings as large as possible, so that on their march plenty of corn might be in
store - and to establish peace and friendship with the neighboring states. They
reckoned that a term of two years would be sufficient for them to execute their
designs; they fix by decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is
chosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the office of
embassador to the states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, the son of
Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed the sovereignty
among the people for many years, and had been styled "friend" by the
senate of the Roman people), to seize upon the sovereignty in his own state,
which his father had held before him, and he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an
Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who at that time possessed the chief
authority in the state, and was exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt
the same, and gives him his daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to
accomplish their attempts was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself
would obtain the government of his own state; that there was no doubt that the
Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them that he
will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire the sovereignty for them.
Incited by this speech, they give a pledge and oath to one another, and hope
that, when they have seized the sovereignty, they will, by means of the three
most powerful and valiant nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole
of Gaul.
[1.4] When this scheme
was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they, according to their custom,
compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in chains; it was the law that the
penalty of being burned by fire should await him if condemned. On the day
appointed for the pleading of his cause, Orgetorix drew together from all
quarters to the court, all his vassals to the number of ten thousand persons;
and led together to the same place all his dependents and debtor-bondsmen, of
whom he had a great number; by means of those he rescued himself from [the
necessity of] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was
endeavoring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were mustering a
large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died; and there is not wanting a
suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his having committed suicide.
[1.5] After his death,
the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which they had resolved on, namely,
to go forth from their territories. When they thought that they were at length
prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number
about twelve - to their villages about four hundred - and to the private
dwellings that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to
carry with them; that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be
the more ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forth
from home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground. They persuade
the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, their neighbors, to adopt the
same plan, and after burning down their towns and villages, to set out with
them: and they admit to their party and unite to themselves as confederates the
Boii, who had dwelt on the other side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into
the Norican territory, and assaulted Noreia.
[1.6] There were in all
two routes, by which they could go forth from their country one through the
Sequani narrow and difficult, between Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which
scarcely one wagon at a time could be led; there was, moreover, a very high
mountain overhanging, so that a very few might easily intercept them; the
other, through our Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the
Rhone flows between the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges,
who had lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. The
furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of the
Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the Helvetii. They
thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges, because they did not
seem as yet well-affected toward the Roman people, or compel them by force to
allow them to pass through their territories. Having provided every thing for
the expedition, they appoint a day, on which they should all meet on the bank
of the Rhone. This day was the fifth before the kalends of April [i.e. the 28th
of March], in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B.C. 58.]
[1.7] When it was
reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make their route through our
Province he hastens to set out from the city, and, by as great marches as he
can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole
Province [to furnish] as great a number of soldiers as possible, as there was
in all only one legion in Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be
broken down. When the Helvetii are apprized of his arrival they send to him, as
embassadors, the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy Numeius
and Verudoctius held the chief place), to say "that it was their intention
to march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had"
[according to their own representations,] "no other route: that they
requested, they might be allowed to do so with his consent." Caesar,
inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had been
slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the Helvetii, did
not think that [their request] ought to be granted: nor was he of opinion that
men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of marching through the Province
were given them, would abstain from outrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period
might intervene, until the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished]
should assemble, he replied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to
deliberate; if they wanted any thing, they might return on the day before the
ides of April [on April 12th].
[1.8] Meanwhile, with
the legion which he had with him and the soldiers which had assembled from the
Province, he carries along for nineteen [Roman, not quite eighteen English]
miles a wall, to the height of sixteen feet, and a trench, from the Lake of
Geneva, which flows into the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the
territories of the Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was
finished, he distributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order
that he may the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross
over against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the embassadors
came, and they returned to him; he says, that he can not, consistently with the
custom and precedent of the Roman people, grant any one a passage through the
Province; and he gives them to understand, that, if they should attempt to use
violence he would oppose them. The Helvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried
if they could force a passage (some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous
rafts constructed for the purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the
depth of the river was least, sometimes by day, but more frequently by night),
but being kept at bay by the strength of our works, and by the concourse of the
soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt.
[1.9] There was left
one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on account of its narrowness,
they could not pass without the consent of the Sequani. As they could not of
themselves prevail on them, they send embassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that
through his intercession, they might obtain their request from the Sequani.
Dumnorix, by his popularity and liberality, had great influence among the
Sequani, and was friendly to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had
married the daughter of Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was
anxious for a revolution, and wished to have as many states as possible
attached to him by his kindness toward them. He, therefore, undertakes the
affair, and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through
their territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to each other -
the Sequani not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march - the Helvetii, to pass
without mischief and outrage.
[1.10] It is again told
Caesar, that the Helvetii intended to march through the country of the Sequani
and the Aedui into the territories of the Santones, which are not far distant
from those boundaries of the Tolosates, which [viz. Tolosa, Toulouse] is a
state in the Province. If this took place, he saw that it would be attended
with great danger to the Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman
people, bordering upon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these
reasons he appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to the command of the
fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forced
marches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quarters three
which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five legions marches
rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps into Further Gaul. Here the
Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges, having taken possession of the
higher parts, attempt to obstruct the army in their march. After having routed
these in several battles, he arrives in the territories of the Vocontii in the
Further Province on the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town
of the Hither Province; thence he leads his army into the country of the
Allobroges, and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the
first beyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone.
[1.11] The Helvetii had
by this time led their forces over through the narrow defile and the
territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the territories of the Aedui,
and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, as they could not defend themselves
and their possessions against them, send embassadors to Caesar to ask
assistance, [pleading] that they had at all times so well deserved of the Roman
people, that their fields ought not to have been laid waste - their children
carried off into slavery - their towns stormed, almost within sight of our
army. At the same time the Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui,
apprize Caesar, that it was not easy for them, now that their fields had been
devastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: the
Allobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions on the other side of the
Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar, and assure him that they had
nothing remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar, induced by these
circumstances, decides, that he ought not to wait until the Helvetii, after
destroying all the property of his allies, should arrive among the Santones.
[1.12] There is a river
[called] the Saone, which flows through the territories of the Aedui and
Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible slowness, that it can not be
determined by the eye in which direction it flows. This the Helvetii were
crossing by rafts and boats joined together. When Caesar was informed by spies
that the Helvetii had already conveyed three parts of their forces across that
river, but that the fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he
set out from the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came up
with that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attacking them
encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great part
of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealed themselves in the
nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] was called the Tigurine; for
the whole Helvetian state is divided into four cantons. This single canton
having left their country, within the recollection of our fathers, had slain
Lucius Cassius the consul, and had made his army pass under the yoke. Thus,
whether by chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of the
Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman people, was
the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not only the public but
also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini had slain Lucius Piso the
lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, his
[Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as Cassius himself.
[1.13] This battle
ended, that he might be able to come up with the remaining forces of the
Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across the Saone, and thus leads his
army over. The Helvetii, confused by his sudden arrival, when they found that
he had effected in one day, what they, themselves had with the utmost difficulty
accomplished in twenty namely, the crossing of the river, send embassadors to
him; at the head of which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the
Helvetii, in the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar: - that,
"if the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to
that part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be;
but if he should persist in persecuting them with war that he ought to remember
both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the characteristic valor of
the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one canton by surprise, [at a time]
when those who had crossed the river could not bring assistance to their
friends, that he ought not on that account to ascribe very much to his own valor,
or despise them; that they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to
rely more on valor than on artifice and stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring
it to pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name,
from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their army or
transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity]."
[1.14] To these words
Caesar thus replied: - that "on that very account he felt less hesitation,
because he kept in remembrance those circumstances which the Helvetian
embassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more indignant at them, in
proportion as they had happened undeservedly to the Roman people: for if they
had been conscious of having done any wrong, it would not have been difficult
to be on their guard, but for that very reason had they been deceived, because
neither were they aware that any offense had been given by them, on account of
which they should be afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid
without cause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage,
could he also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had
against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in that they
had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That as to their so
insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their being astonished that
they had so long committed their outrages with impunity, [both these things]
tended to the same point; for the immortal gods are wont to allow those persons
whom they wish to punish for their guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and
longer impunity, in order that they may suffer the more severely from a reverse
of circumstances. Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be
given him by them in order that he may be assured these will do what they
promise, and provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages
which they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the
Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them." Divico replied, that
"the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors, that they were
accustomed to receive, not to give hostages; of that fact the Roman people were
witness." Having given this reply, he withdrew.
[1.15] On the following
day they move their camp from that place; Caesar does the same, and sends
forward all his cavalry, to the number of four thousand (which he had drawn
together from all parts of the Province and from the Aedui and their allies),
to observe toward what parts the enemy are directing their march. These, having
too eagerly pursued the enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the
Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii,
elated with this battle, because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so
large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from their
rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained his men from
battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from rapine,
forage, and depredation. They marched for about fifteen days in such a manner
that there was not more than five or six miles between the enemy's rear and our
van.
[1.16] Meanwhile,
Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn which they had promised in
the name of their state; for, in consequence of the coldness (Gaul, being as
before said, situated toward the north), not only was the corn in the fields
not ripe, but there was not in store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder:
besides he was unable to use the corn which he had conveyed in ships up the
river Saone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire had
diverted their march from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from day to day,
and saying that it was being collected - brought in - on the road." When
he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day was close at hand on
which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers; - having called together
their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp, among them Divitiacus
and Liscus who was invested with the chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style the
Vergobretus, and who is elected annually and has power of life or death over
his countrymen), he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted by
them on so urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at hand, and when
[corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, particularly as, in a
great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken the war; much more
bitterly, therefore does he complain of his being forsaken.
[1.17] Then at length
Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what he had hitherto kept secret: -
that there are some whose influences with the people is very great, who, though
private men, have more power than the magistrates themselves: that these by
seditions and violent language are deterring the populace from contributing the
corn which they ought to supply; [by telling them] that, if they can not any
longer retain the supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government
of Gauls than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should
overpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aedui together
with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men, [said he], are our plans and
whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that they could not be
restrained by him: nay more, he was well aware, that though compelled by
necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at how great a risk he had
done it; and for that reason, he had been silent as long as he could."
[1.18] Caesar perceived
that by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was
indicated; but, as he was unwilling that these matters should be discussed
while so many were present, he speedily dismisses: the council, but detains
Liscus: he inquires from him when alone, about those things which he had said
in the meeting. He [Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar]
makes inquiries on the same points privately of others, and discovered that it
is all true; that "Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring, in
great favor with the people on account of his liberality, a man eager for a
revolution: that for a great many years he has been in the habit of contracting
for the customs and all the other taxes of the Aedui at a small cost, because
when he bids, no one dares to bid against him. By these means he has both
increased his own private property, and amassed great means for giving
largesses; that he maintains constantly at his own expense and keeps about his
own person a great number of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among
the neighboring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of
strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the Bituriges
to a man the most noble and most influential there; that he has himself taken a
wife from among the Helvetii, and has given his sister by the mother's side and
his female relations in marriage into other states; that he favors and wishes
well to the Helvetii on account of this connection; and that he hates Caesar
and the Romans, on his own account, because by their arrival his power was
weakened, and his brother, Divitiacus, restored to his former position of
influence and dignity: that, if any thing should happen to the Romans, he
entertains the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the
Helvetii, but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not
only of royalty, but even of that influence which he already has." Caesar discovered
too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful cavalry engagement which had taken
place a few days before, that the commencement of that flight had been made by
Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in command of the cavalry which the
Aedui had sent for aid to Caesar); that by their flight the rest of the cavalry
were dismayed.
[1.19] After learning
these circumstances, since to these suspicions the most unequivocal facts were
added, viz., that he had led the Helvetii through the territories of the
Sequani; that he had provided that hostages should be mutually given; that he
had done all these things, not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of
his own state's, but even without their [the Aedui] knowing any thing of it
themselves; that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded: by the [chief] magistrate of
the Aedui; he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason, why he
should either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing
[however] stood in the way of all this - that he had learned by experience his
brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Roman people, his great affection
toward him, his distinguished faithfulness, justice, and moderation; for he was
afraid lest by the punishment of this man, he should hurt the feelings of
Divitiacus. Therefore, before he attempted any thing, he orders Divitiacus to
be summoned to him, and, when the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn,
converses with him through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of
Gaul, an intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence in
every thing; at the same time he reminds him of what was said about Dumnorix in
the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, and shows what each had
said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own presence; he begs and exhorts him,
that, without offense to his feelings, he may either himself pass judgment on
him [Dumnorix] after trying the case, or else order the [Aeduan] state to do
so.
[1.20] Divitiacus,
embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many tears, that "he would
not pass any very severe sentence upon his brother; saying, that he knows that
those charges are true, and that nobody suffered more pain on that account than
he himself did; for when he himself could effect a very great deal by his
influence at home and in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on
account of his youth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which
power and strength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus]
popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced both by
fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if any thing very severe from
Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no one would think that it had been done
without his consent, since he himself held such a place in Caesar's friendship:
from which circumstance it would arise, that the affections of the whole of
Gaul would be estranged from him." As he was with tears begging these
things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takes his right hand, and, comforting
him, begs him to make an end of entreating, and assures him that his regard for
him is so great, that he forgives both the injuries of the republic and his
private wrongs, at his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he
brings in his brother; he points out what he censures in him; he lays before
him what he of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns him
for the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that he pardons the
past, for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies over Dumnorix that
he may be able to know what he does, and with whom he communicates.
[1.21] Being on the
same day informed by his scouts, that the enemy had encamped at the foot of a
mountain eight miles from his own camp; he sent persons to ascertain what the
nature of the mountain was, and of what kind the ascent on every side. Word was
brought back, that it was easy. During the third watch he orders Titus
Labienus, his lieutenant with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge
of the mountain with two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the
road; he explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens
to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the
cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very experienced
in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterward in
that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts.
[1.22] At day-break,
when the summit of the mountain was in the possession of Titus Labienus, and he
himself was not further off than a mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as
he afterward ascertained from the captives, had either his arrival or that of
Labienus been discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to
him says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by
Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by the
Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill: [and]
draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not
to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the
enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the
same time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our
men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced,
Caesar learned through spies, that the mountain was in possession of his own
men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck
with fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that
day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp three
miles from theirs.
[1.23] The next day (as
there remained in all only two day's space [to the time] when he must serve out
the corn to his army, and as he was not more than eighteen miles from Bibracte,
by far the largest and best-stored town of the Aedui), he thought that he ought
to provide for a supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and
advanced rapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance is reported to the enemy by
some deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain, of the Gallic horse. The
Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with terror, were
retreating from them, the more so, as the day before, though they had seized on
the higher grounds, they had not joined battle or because they flattered
themselves that they might be cut of from the provisions, altering their plan
and changing their route, began to pursue, and to annoy our men in the rear.
[1.24] Caesar, when he
observes this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and sent the cavalry to
sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle
of the hill a triple line of his four veteran legions in such a manner, that he
placed above him on the very summit the two legions, which he had lately levied
in Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain
should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be brought
together into one place, and the position be protected by those who were posted
in the upper line. The Helvetii having followed with all their wagons,
collected their baggage into one place: they themselves, after having repulsed
our cavalry and formed a phalanx, advanced up to our front line in very close
order.
[1.25] Caesar, having
removed out of sight first his own horse, then those of all, that he might make
the danger of a11 equal, and do away with the hope of flight, after encouraging
his men, joined battle. His soldiers hurling their javelins from the higher
ground, easily broke the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a
charge on them with drawn swords. It was a great hinderance to the Gauls in
fighting, that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the
(Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point of the
iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left
hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many, after having long
tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the buckler from their hand,
and to fight with their person unprotected. At length, worn out with wounds,
they began to give way, and, as there was in the neighborhood a mountain about
a mile off, to betake themselves thither. When the mountain had been gained,
and our men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men
closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having
assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround
them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii who had betaken themselves to the
mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans having faced
about, advanced to the attack in two divisions; the first and second line, to
withstand those who had been defeated and driven off the field; the third to
receive those who were just arriving.
[1.26] Thus, was the
contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful success. When they could
no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the one division, as they had begun
to do, betook themselves to the mountain; the other repaired to their baggage
and wagons. For during the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from
the seventh hour [i.e. 12 (noon) 1 P. M.] to eventide, no one could see an
enemy with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till
late in the night, for they had set wagons in the way as a rampart, and from
the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came on, and some
from between the wagons and the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins
from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight had lasted some time, our
men gained possession of their baggage and camp. There the daughter and one of
the sons of Orgetorix was taken. After the battle about 130,000 men [of the
enemy] remained alive, who marched incessantly during the whole of that night;
and after a march discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the
territories of the Lingones on the fourth day, while our men, having stopped
for three days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of
the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and messengers
to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assist them with corn or
with any thing else; for that if they should assist them, he would regard them
in the same light as the Helvetii. After the three days' interval he began to
follow them himself with all his forces.
[1.27] The Helvetii,
compelled by the want of every thing, sent embassadors to him about a
surrender. When these had met him on the way and had thrown themselves at his
feet, and speaking in suppliant tone had with tears sued for peace, and [when]
he had ordered them to await his arrival, in the place, where they then were,
they obeyed his commands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded
hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. While those
things are being sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about
6000 men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by
fear, lest after delivering up their arms, they should suffer punishment, or
else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed that, amid so vast a
multitude of those who had surrendered themselves, their flight might either be
concealed or entirely overlooked, having at night-fall departed out of the camp
of the Helvetii, hastened to the Rhine and the territories of the Germans.
[1.28] But when Caesar
discovered this, he commanded those through whose territory they had gone, to
seek them out and to bring them back again, if they meant to be acquitted
before him; and considered them, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he
admitted all the rest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages,
arms, and deserters. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi,
to return to their territories from which they had come, and as there was at
home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all the productions of
the earth having been destroyed, he commanded the Allobroges to let them have a
plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them to rebuild the towns and villages
which they had burned. This he did, chiefly, on this account, because he was
unwilling that the country, from which the Helvetii had departed, should be
untenanted, lest the Germans, who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should,
on account of the excellence of the lands, cross over from their own
territories into those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province
of Gaul and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui, that they
might settle the Boii, in their own (i. e. in the Aeduan) territories, as these
were known to be of distinguished valor, to whom they gave lands, and whom they
afterward admitted to the same state of rights and freedom as themselves.
[1.29] In the camp of
the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek characters, and were brought
to Caesar, in which an estimate had been drawn up, name by name, of the number
which had gone forth from their country of those who were able to bear arms;
and likewise the boys, the old men, and the women, separately. Of all which
items the total was:
Of the Helvetii [lit.
of the heads of the Helvetii] 263,000
Of the Tulingi . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,000
Of the Latobrigi .- . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14,000
Of the Rauraci . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23,000
Of the Boii . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,000
The sum of all amounted
to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368,000
Out of these, such as could bear arms, [amounted] to about 92,000. When
the census of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had commanded, the
number was found to be 110,000. [1.30]
When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, embassadors from almost all parts
of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to congratulate Caesar, [saying] that
they were well aware, that, although he had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in
war, for the old wrong done by them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance
had happened no less to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman
people, because the Helvetii, while their affairs were most flourishing, had
quitted their country with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, and
seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance, that
spot for an abode, which they should judge to be the most convenient and most
productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states as tributaries. They
requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an assembly of the whole of
Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with Caesar's permission, [stating]
that they had some things which, with the general consent, they wished to ask
of him. This request having been granted, they appointed a day for the
assembly, and ordained by an oath with each other, that no one should disclose
[their deliberations] except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by
the general assembly.
[1.31] When that
assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who had before been to
Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be allowed to treat with him
privately (in secret) concerning the safety of themselves and of all. That
request having been obtained, they all threw themselves in tears at Caesar's
feet, [saying] that they no less begged and earnestly desired that what they
might say should not be disclosed, than that they might obtain those things
which they wished for; inasmuch as they saw, that, if a disclosure was made,
they should be put to the greatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the Aeduan
spoke and told him: "That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul:
that the Aedui stood at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other.
After these had been violently struggling with one another for the superiority
for many years, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by the
Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [i.e. of the Germans] had at
first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild and savage men had become
enamored of the lands and the refinement and the abundance of the Gauls, more
were brought over, that there were now as many as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that
with these the Aedui and their dependents had repeatedly struggled in arms -
that they had been routed, and had sustained a great calamity - had lost all
their nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such
engagements and calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in
Gaul, both from their own valor and from the Roman people's hospitality and
friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their state, as
hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath, that they would
neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid from the Roman people,
nor refuse to be forever under their sway and empire. That he was the only one
out of all the state of the Aedui, who could not be prevailed upon to take the
oath or to give his children as hostages. On that account he had fled from his
state and had gone to the senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound
neither by oath nor hostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious
Sequani than the vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus the king of the Germans, had
settled in their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, which
was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart from
another third part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of the Harudes
had come to him, for whom room and settlements must be provided. The
consequence would be, that in a few years they would all be driven from the
territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for neither
must the land of Gaul be compared with the land of the Germans, nor must the
habit of living of the latter be put on a level with that of the former.
Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner did he defeat the forces of the Gauls
in a battle which took place at Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it
haughtily and cruelly, to demand as hostages the children of all the principal
nobles, and wreak on them every kind of cruelty, if every thing was not done at
his nod or pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and
that his commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid in Caesar
and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that the Helvetii
have done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek another dwelling place,
other settlements remote from the Germans, and try whatever fortune may fall to
their lot. If these things were to be disclosed to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus
adds] that he doubts not that he would inflict the most severe punishment on
all the hostages who are in his possession, [and says] that Caesar could,
either by his own influence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or
by name of the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number
of Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from the
outrages of Ariovistus.
[1.32] When this speech
had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were present began with loud
lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani
were the only people of all who did none of those things which the others did,
but, with their heads bowed down, gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what
was the reason of this conduct, he inquired of themselves. No reply did the
Sequani make, but silently continued in the same sadness. When he had
repeatedly inquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the same
Divitiacus the Aeduan answered, that - "the lot of the Sequani was more
wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because they
alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; and shuddered at the
cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he were present; for, to
the rest, despite of every thing there was an opportunity of flight given; but
all tortures must be endured by the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within
their territories, and whose towns were all in his power."
[1.33] Caesar, on being
informed of these things, cheered the minds of the Gauls with his words, and
promised that this affair should be an object of his concern, [saying] that he
had great hopes that Ariovistus, induced both by his kindness and his power,
would put an end to his oppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed
the assembly; and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to
think that this affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially
as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the senate
"brethren" and "kinsmen," were held in the thraldom and
dominion of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with
Ariovistus and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman
people he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That,
moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the Rhine,
and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw [would be]
dangerous to the Roman people, and judged, that wild and savage men would not
be likely to restrain themselves, after they had possessed themselves of all
Gaul, from going forth into the province and thence marching into Italy (as the
Cimbri and Teutones had done before them), particularly as the Rhone [was the
sole barrier that] separated the Sequani from our province. Against which
events he thought he ought to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover,
Ariovistus, for his part, had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance, that
he was felt to be quite insufferable.
[1.34] He therefore
determined to send embassadors to Ariovistus to demand of him to name some
intermediate spot for a conference between the two, [saying] that he wished to
treat him on state-business and matters of the highest importance to both of
them. To this embassy Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of
any thing from Caesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted any
thing from him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go
without an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of, nor
could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army together to one
place; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange, what business either Caesar
or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he had conquered in war.
[1.35] When these
answers were reported to Caesar, he sends embassadors to him a second time with
this message. "Since, after having been treated with so much kindness by
himself and the Roman people (as he had in his consulship been styled 'king and
friend' by the senate), he makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the
Roman people, [viz.] that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not
think that it concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of
mutual interest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that he
do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul; in the
next place, that he restore the hostages, which he has from the Aedui, and
grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his consent those hostages
which they have, and that he neither provoke the Aedui by outrage nor make war
upon them or their allies; if he would accordingly do this," [Caesar says]
that "he himself and the Roman people will entertain a perpetual feeling
of favor and friendship toward him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain
[his desires] that he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and
Marcus Piso the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the administration
of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so consistently with the
interests of the republic, protect the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman
people), will not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui."
[1.36] To this
Ariovistus replied, that "the right of war was, that they who had
conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in what manner they
pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont to govern the nations
which they had conquered, not according to the dictation of any other, but
according to their own discretion. If he for his part did not dictate to the
Roman people as to the manner in which they were to exercise their right, he
ought not to be obstructed by the Roman people in his right; that the Aedui,
inasmuch as they had tried the fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been
conquered, had become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great
injustice, in that by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to him;
that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should not make war
wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided by that which had
been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if they did not continue to do
that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers' would avail them naught. As to
Caesar's threatening him, that he would not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui,
[he said] that no one had ever entered into a contest with him [Ariovistus]
without utter ruin to himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose;
he would feel what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond
all others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, could
achieve by their valor."
[1.37] At the same time
that this message was delivered to Caesar, embassadors came from the Aedui and
the Treviri; from the Aedui to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been
brought over into Gaul, were ravaging their territories; that they had not been
able to purchase peace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the
Treviri, [to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the
banks of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas
and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things, Caesar
thought that he ought to use all dispatch, lest, if this new band of Suevi
should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus] might be less
easily withstood. Having therefore, as quickly as he could, provided a supply
of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced marches.
[1.38] When he had
proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to him that Ariovistus was
hastening with all his forces to seize on Vesontio, which is the largest town
of the Sequani, and had advanced three days' journey from its territories.
Caesar thought that he ought to take the greatest precautions lest this should
happen, for there was in that town a most ample supply of every thing which was
serviceable for war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground, as to
afford a great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs
almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it with a pair
of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining space, which is
not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in such a manner that the
roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank on either side. A wall thrown
around it makes a citadel of this [mountain], and connects it with the town.
Hither Caesar hastens by forced marches by night and day, and, after having
seized the town, stations a garrison there.
[1.39] While he is
tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and provisions; from the
inquiries of our men and the reports of the Gauls and traders (who asserted
that the Germans were men of huge stature, of incredible valor and practice in
arms - that oftentimes they, on encountering them, could not bear even their
countenance, and the fierceness of their eyes) - so great a panic on a sudden
seized the whole army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no
slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects
and the rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of
friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging, some of
them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary for them to
depart, they requested that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw;
some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might avoid the
suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose their countenance, nor even
sometimes check their tears: but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their
fate, or deplored with their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed
universally throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of
these men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both soldiers
and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command of the cavalry,
were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered less
alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of
the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay between them and
Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be brought up readily enough.
Some even declared to Caesar, that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved
and the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command,
nor advance in consequence of their fear.
[1.40] When Caesar observed
these things, having called a council, and summoned to it the centurions of all
the companies, he severely reprimanded them, "particularly, for supposing
that it belonged to them to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction
they were marching, or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's]
consulship, had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people;
why should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for
his part was persuaded, that, when his demands were known and the fairness of
the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the Roman people's favor.
But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what
after all were they afraid of? - or why should they despair either of their own
valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial had been made within our fathers'
recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius,
the army was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself.
It had been made lately, too, in Italy, during the rebellion of the slaves,
whom, however, the experience and training which they had received from us,
assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the
advantages which resolution carries with it inasmuch as those whom for some
time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterward vanquished,
when well armed and flushed with success. In short, that these were the same
men whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their own
territories, but also in theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and
yet can not have been a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and
flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might
discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the
war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the
marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon
them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and
was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there
had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even
[Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped. That
those who ascribed their fear to a pretense about the [deficiency of] supplies
and the narrowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to
distrust their general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That
these things were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones
were to furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as
to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being
reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or advance, he was
not at all disturbed at that; for he knew, that in the case of all those whose
army had not been obedient to command, either upon some mismanagement of an
affair, fortune had deserted them, or, that upon some crime being discovered,
covetousness had been clearly proved [against them]. His integrity had been
seen throughout his whole life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii.
That he would therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off
till a more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the
fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of
honor and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no
one else should follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he
had no misgivings, and it should be his praetorian cohort." This legion
Caesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its valor, placed the
greatest confidence.
[1.41] Upon the
delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a surprising manner,
and the highest ardor and eagerness for prosecuting the war were engendered;
and the tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through their
military tribunes, for his having expressed this most favorable opinion of
them; and assured him that they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then,
the other legions endeavored, through their military tribunes and the
centurions of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying]
that they had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the
determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's.
Having accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitered
by Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith [he
found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead his
army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he had said
[he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his march, he was
informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only four and twenty
miles distant from ours.
[1.42] Upon being
apprized of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends embassadors to him, [saying]
that what he had before requested as to a conference, might now, as far as his
permission went, take place, since he [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he
considered that he might now do it without danger. Caesar did not reject the
proposal and began to think that he was now returning to a rational state of
mind as he spontaneously proffered that which he had previously refused to him
when requesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own
and the Roman people's great favors toward him, the issue would be that he
would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made known. The fifth
day after that was appointed as the day of conference. Meanwhile, as
ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded
that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with him to the conference,
[saying] that "he was afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery;
that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that he would not come on any
other condition." Caesar, as he neither wished that the conference should,
by an excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor durst trust his life to the
cavalry of the Gauls, decided that it would be most expedient to take away from
the Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary
soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence, in
order that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there
be any need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the
tenth legion said, not without a touch of humor, "that Caesar did more for
them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion in place of
his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse."
[1.43] There was a
large plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable size. This spot was at
nearly an equal distance from both camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they
came for the conference. Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought
[with him] on horseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also
took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that they
should confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they should bring
with them ten men each to the conference. When they were come to the place,
Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the senate's favors
toward him [Ariovistus], in that he had been styled king, in that [he had been
styled] friend, by the senate - in that very considerable presents had been
sent him; which circumstance he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few,
and had usually been bestowed in consideration of important personal services;
that he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the
request, had obtained these honors through the kindness and munificence of
himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and how just were
the grounds of connection that existed between themselves [the Romans] and the
Aedui, what decrees of the senate had been passed in their favor, and how
frequent and how honorable; how from time immemorial the Aedui had held the
supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even [said Caesar] before they had sought our
friendship; that it was the custom of the Roman people to desire not only that
its allies and friends should lose none of their property, but be advanced in
influence, dignity, and honor: who then could endure that what they had brought
with them to the friendship of the Roman people should be torn from them?"
He then made the same demands which he had commissioned the embassadors to
make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon the Aedui or their
allies, that he should restore the hostages; that if he could not send back to
their country any part of the Germans, he should at all events suffer none of
them any more to cross the Rhine.
[1.44] Ariovistus
briefly replied to the demands of Caesar; but expatiated largely on his own
virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but on
being invited and sent for by the Gauls; that he had not left home and kindred
without great expectations and great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul,
granted by the Gauls themselves; that the hostages had been given by their
good-will; that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are
accustomed to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls,
but the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and had
encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed and beaten by him
in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second trial, he was ready to
encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse
the tribute, which of their own free-will they had paid up to that time. That
the friendship of the Roman people ought to prove to him an ornament and a
safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it with that expectation. But if
through the Roman people the tribute was to be discontinued, and those who
surrendered to be seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman
people no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host of
Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing himself, not
of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in that he did not come
without being invited, and in that he did not make war, but merely warded it
off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people. That never before this
time did a Roman army go beyond the frontiers of the province of Gaul. What
[said he] does [Caesar] desire? - why come into his [Ariovistus] domains? -
that this was his province of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be
pardoned in him, if he were to make an attack upon our territories; so,
likewise, that we were unjust, to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for
Caesar's saying that the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was
not so uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in
the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to the
Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggles which the Aedui
had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious,
that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an army
in Gaul, was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that unless he
depart and withdraw his army from these parts, he shall regard him not as a
friend, but as a foe; and that, even if he should put him to death, he should
do what would please many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he
had assurance of that from themselves through their messengers, and could
purchase the favor and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But
if he would depart and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he would
recompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he
wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him."
[1.45] Many things were
stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]; "why he could not waive the
business, and that neither his nor the Roman people's practice would suffer him
to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to
Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had
been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had
pardoned them and had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute
upon them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded - then was the
sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the Senate
was to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had
conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws."
[1.46] While these
things are being transacted in the conference it was announced to Caesar that
the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching nearer the mound, and were riding up
to our men, and casting stones and weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his
speech and betook himself to his men; and commanded them that they should by no
means return a weapon upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with
the cavalry would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not
think proper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said
that they had been insnared by him under the sanction of a conference. When it
was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what haughtiness Ariovistus
had behaved at the conference, and how he had ordered the Romans to quit Gaul,
and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our men, and how this had broken
off the conference, a much greater alacrity and eagerness for battle was
infused into our army.
[1.47] Two days after,
Ariovistus sends embassadors to Caesar, to state "that he wished to treat
with him about those things which had been begun to be treated of between them,
but had not been concluded;" [and to beg] that "he would either again
appoint a day for a conference; or, if he were not willing to do that, that he
would send one of his [officers] as an embassador to him." There did not
appear to Caesar any good reason for holding a conference; and the more so as
the day before the Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our
men. He thought he should not without great danger send to him as embassador
one of his [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed
[therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C.
Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose
father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus),
both on account of his fidelity and on account of his knowledge of the Gallic
language, which Ariovistus, by long practice, now spoke fluently; and because
in his case the Germans would have no motive for committing violence; and [as
his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He
commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him.
But when Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the
presence of his army, "Why were they come to him? Was it for the purpose
of acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast
them into chains.
[1.48] The same day he
moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill six miles from Caesar's camp.
The day following he led his forces past Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles
beyond him; with this design that he might cut off Caesar from the corn and
provisions, which might be conveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For
five successive days from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp,
and put them in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage
in battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this time
kept his army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The method of
battle in which the Germans had practiced themselves was this. There were 6,000
horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one of whom each of the
horse selected out of the whole army for his own protection. By these [foot]
they were constantly accompanied in their engagements; to these the horse
retired; these on any emergency rushed forward; if any one, upon receiving a
very severe wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood around him: if it was
necessary to advance further than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great,
from practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of the horses,
they could keep pace with their speed.
[1.49] Perceiving that
Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he might not any longer be cut
off from provisions, chose a convenient position for a camp beyond that place
in which the Germans had encamped, at about 600 paces from them, and having
drawn up his army in three lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first
and second lines to be under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place
was distant from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither
Ariovistus sent light troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry;
which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in their
fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered two
lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. The camp being
fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries; and led
back the other four legions into the larger camp.
[1.50] The next day,
according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces from both camps, and having
advanced a little from the larger one, drew up his line of battle, and gave the
enemy an opportunity of fighting. When he found that they did not even then
come out [from their intrenchments,] he led back his army into camp about noon.
Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The
battle was vigorously maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset,
after many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back his
forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore Ariovistus
did not come to an engagement, he discovered this to be the reason - that among
the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots and
divination, whether it were expedient that the battle should be engaged in or
not; that they had said, "that it was not the will of heaven that the
Germans should conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new moon."
[1.51] The day
following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for both camps; [and
then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy, before the lesser
camp, because he was not very powerful in the number of legionary soldiers,
considering the number of the enemy; that [thereby] he might make use of his
auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn up his army in three
lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans
drew their forces out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal
distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii,
Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and wagons, that no
hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who, with
disheveled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to
battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.
[1.52] Caesar appointed
over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every one might have them as
witnesses of his valor. He himself began the battle at the head of the right
wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong.
Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously made an attack
upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that
there was no time for casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore]
their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans,
according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of
our swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the
phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from
above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to
flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the
great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who
commanded the cavalry - as he was more disengaged than those who were employed
in the fight - sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in distress.
[1.53] Thereupon the
engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned their backs, nor did they
cease to flee until they arrived at the river Rhine, about fifty miles from
that place. There some few, either relying on their strength, endeavored to
swim over, or, finding boats, procured their safety. Among the latter was
Ariovistus, who meeting with a small vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it;
our horse pursued and slew all the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one
a Suevan by nation, whom he brought with him from home; the other a Norican,
the sister of king Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent
[thither for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of
their two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus,
as he was being dragged by his guards in the fight, bound with a triple chain,
fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy with his
cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less pleasure than the
victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rank in the province of Gaul,
his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued from the hand of the enemy, and
restored to him, and that fortune had not diminished aught of the joy and
exultation [of that day] by his destruction. He [Procillus] said that, in his
own presence, the lots had been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he
should immediately be put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time:
that by the favor of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found and
brought back to him [Caesar.]
[1.54] This battle
having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to the banks of
that river, began to return home, when the Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the
Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed, slew a great number of them. Caesar
having concluded two very important wars in one campaign, conducted his army
into winter quarters among the Sequani, a little earlier than the season of the
year required. He appointed Labienus over the winter-quarters, and set out in
person for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.
End of Book 1
Caius Julius Caesar 57
B.C.
[2.1] While Caesar was
in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown above, frequent reports
were brought to him, and he was also informed by letters from Labienus, that
all the Belgae, who we have said are a third part of Gaul, were entering into a
confederacy against the Roman people, and giving hostages to one another; that
the reasons of the confederacy were these - first, because they feared that,
after all [Celtic] Gaul was subdued, our army would be led against them;
secondly, because they were instigated by several of the Gauls; some of whom as
[on the one hand] they had been unwilling that the Germans should remain any
longer in Gaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied that the army of the
Roman people should pass the winter in it, and settle there; and others of
them, from a natural instability and fickleness of disposition, were anxious
for a revolution; [the Belgae were instigated] by several, also, because the
government in Gaul was generally seized upon by the more powerful persons and
by those who had the means of hiring troops, and they could less easily effect
this object under our dominion.
[2.2] Alarmed by these
tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legions in Hither Gaul, and, at the
beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct them further
into Gaul. He, himself, as soon as there began to be plenty of forage, came to
the army. He gives a commission to the Senones and the other Gauls who were
neighbors of the Belgae, to learn what is going on among them [i.e. the
Belgae], and inform him of these matters. These all uniformly reported that
troops were being raised, and that an army was being collected in one place.
Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding toward
them, and having provided supplies, moves his camp, and in about fifteen days
arrives at the territories of the Belgae.
[2.3] As he arrived
there unexpectedly and sooner than any one anticipated, the Remi, who are the
nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic] Gaul, sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius,
[two of] the principal persons of the state, as their embassadors: to tell him
that they surrendered themselves and all their possessions to the protection
and disposal of the Roman people: and that they had neither combined with the
rest of the Belgae, nor entered into any confederacy against the Roman people:
and were prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to receive him into
their towns, and to aid him with corn and other things; that all the rest of
the Belgae were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on this side of the
Rhine, had joined themselves to them; and that so great was the infatuation of
them all, that they could not restrain even the Suessiones, their own brethren
and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights, and the, same laws, and who have one
government and one magistracy [in common] with themselves, from uniting with
them.
[2.4] When Caesar
inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful they were, and what
they could do, in war, he received the following information: that the greater
part of the Belgae were sprung, from the Germans, and that having crossed the
Rhine at an early period, they had settled there, on account of the fertility
of the country, and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and
that they were the only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul
was overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their
territories; the effect of which was, that, from the recollection of those
events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military
matters. The Remi said, that they had known accurately every thing respecting
their number, because being united to them by neighborhood and by alliances,
they had learned what number each state had in the general council of the
Belgae promised for that war. That the Bellovaci were the most powerful among
them in valor, influence, and the number of men; that these could muster 100,000
armed men, [and had] promised 60,000 picked men out of that number, and
demanded for themselves the command of the whole war. That the Suessiones were
their nearest neighbors and possessed a very extensive and fertile country;
that among them, even in our own memory, Divitiacus, the most powerful man of
all Gaul, had been king; who had held the government of a great part of these
regions, as well as of Britain; that their king at present was Galba; that the
direction of the whole war was conferred by the consent of all, upon him, on
account of his integrity and prudence; that they had twelve towns; that they
had promised 50,000 armed men; and that the Nervii, who are reckoned the most
warlike among them, and are situated at a very great distance, [had promised]
as many; the Atrebates 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the
Menapii, 9,000; the Caleti, 10,000; the Velocasses and the Veromandui as many;
the Aduatuci 19,000; that the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the
Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans [had promised], they
thought, to the number of 40,000.
[2.5] Caesar, having
encouraged the Remi, and addressed them courteously, ordered the whole senate
to assemble before him, and the children of their chief men to be brought to
him as hostages; all which commands they punctually performed by the day
[appointed]. He, addressing himself to Divitiacus, the Aeduan, with great
earnestness, points out how much it concerns the republic and their common
security, that the forces of the enemy should be divided, so that it might not
be necessary to engage with so large a number at one time. [He asserts] that
this might be affected if the Aedui would lead their forces into the
territories of the Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With these
instructions he dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived that all
the forces of the Belgae, which had been collected in one place, were
approaching toward him, and learned from the scouts whom he had sent out, and
[also] from the Remi, that they were then not far distant, he hastened to lead
his army over the Aisne, which is on the borders of the Remi, and there pitched
his camp. This position fortified one side of his camp by the banks of the
river, rendered the country which lay in his rear secure from the enemy, and
furthermore insured that provisions might without danger be brought to him by
the Remi and the rest of the states. Over that river was a bridge: there he
places a guard; and on the other side of the river he leaves Q. Titurius
Sabinus, his lieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp with
a rampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth.
[2.6] There was a town
of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant from this camp. This the
Belgae on their march began to attack with great vigor. [The assault] was with
difficulty sustained for that day. The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as
that of the Belgae: when after having drawn a large number of men around the
whole of the fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on
all sides, and the wall has been stripped of its defenders, [then], forming a
testudo, they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was easily
effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were casting stones and
darts, no one was able to maintain his position upon the wall. When night had
put an end to the assault, Iccius, who was then in command of the town, one of
the Remi, a man of the highest rank and influence among his people, and one of
those who had come to Caesar as embassador [to sue] for peace, sends messengers
to him, [to report] "That, unless assistance were sent to him he could not
hold out any longer."
[2.7] Thither,
immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the same persons who had
come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some Numidian and Cretan archers,
and some Balearian slingers as a relief to the towns-people, by whose arrival
both a desire to resist together with the hope of [making good their] defense,
was infused into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining the
town, abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after staying a short time before the
town, and laying waste the country of the Remi, when all the villages and
buildings which they could approach had been burned, they hastened with all
their forces to the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of
it]; and their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more
than eight miles in breadth.
[2.8] Caesar at first
determined to decline a battle, as well on account of the great number of the
enemy as their distinguished reputation for valor: daily, however, in cavalry
actions, he strove to ascertain by frequent trials, what the enemy could effect
by their prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men
were not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient and
suitable for marshaling an army (since the hill where the camp was pitched,
rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as far as the
space which the marshaled army could occupy, and had steep declines of its side
in either direction, and gently sloping in front gradually sank to the plain);
on either side of that hill he drew a cross trench of about four hundred paces,
and at the extremities of that trench built forts, and placed there his
military engines, lest, after he had marshaled his army, the enemy, since they
were so powerful in point of number, should be able to surround his men in the
flank, while fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two
legions which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they
might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order of
battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces which
they had brought out of the camp.
[2.9] There was a marsh
of no great extent between our army and that of the enemy. The latter were
waiting to see if our men would pass this; our men, also, were ready in arms to
attack them while disordered, if the first attempt to pass should be made by
them. In the mean time battle was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry
action. When neither army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes
of the horse [proving] favorable to our men, led back his forces into the camp.
The enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it has
been; stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavored to lead
a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they
might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant,
commanded, and might cut off the bridge; but, if they could not do that, they
should lay waste the lands of the Remi, which were of great use to us in
carrying on the war, and might hinder our men from foraging.
[2.10] Caesar, being
apprized of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light-armed Numidians,
slingers and archers, over the bridge, and hastens toward them. There was a severe
struggle in that place. Our men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy,
slew a great part of them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove
back the rest, who, in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over
their bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who
had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their hopes
had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by storm and also
their passing the river, and did not see our men advance to a more
disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when provisions began to
fail them, having called a council, determined that it was best for each to
return to his country, and resolved to assemble from all quarters to defend
those into whose territories the Romans should first march an army; that they
might contend in their own rather than in a foreign country, and might enjoy
the stores of provision which they possessed at home. Together with other
causes, this consideration also led them to that resolution, viz: that they had
learned that Divitiacus and the Aedui were approaching the territories of the
Bellovaci. And it was impossible to persuade the latter to stay any longer, or
to deter them from conveying succor to their own people.
[2.11] That matter
being determined on, marching out of their camp at the second watch, with great
noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor under any command, since each
sought for himself the foremost place in the journey, and hastened to reach
home, they made their departure appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately
learning this through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambuscade, because he had
not yet discovered for what reason they were departing, kept his army and
cavalry within the camp. At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by
the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave the
command of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta.
He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow them closely with
three legions. These, attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles,
slew a great number of them as they were fleeing; while those in the rear with
whom they had come up, halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our
soldiers; the van, because they appeared to be removed from danger, and were
not restrained by any necessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard,
broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus without
any risk [to themselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length
of the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook
themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded.
[2.12] On the day
following, before the enemy could recover from their terror and flight, Caesar
led his army into the territories of the Suessiones, which are next to the
Remi, and having accomplished a long march, hastens to the town named
Noviodunum. Having attempted to take it by storm on his march, because he heard
that it was destitute of [sufficient] defenders, he was not able to carry it by
assault, on account of the breadth of the ditch and the height of the wall,
though few were defending it. Therefore, having fortified the camp, he began to
bring up the vineae, and to provide whatever things were necessary for the
storm. In the mean time the whole body of the Suessiones, after their flight,
came the next night into the town. The vineae having been quickly brought up
against the town, a mound thrown up, and towers built, the Gauls, amazed by the
greatness of the works, such as they had neither seen nor heard of before, and
struck also by the dispatch of the Romans, send embassadors to Caesar
respecting a surrender, and succeed in consequence of the Remi requesting that
they [the Suessiones] might be spared.
[2.13] Caesar, having
received as hostages the first men of the state, and even the two sons of king
Galba himself; and all the arms in the town having been delivered up, admitted
the Suessiones to a surrender, and led his army against the Bellovaci. Who,
when they had conveyed themselves and all their possessions into the town
Galled Bratuspantium, and Caesar with his army was about five miles distant
from that town, all the old men, going out of the town, began to stretch out
their hands to Caesar, and to intimate by their voice that they would throw
themselves on his protection and power, nor would contend in arms against the
Roman people. In like manner, when he had come up to the town, and there pitched
his camp, the boys and the women from the wall, with outstretched hands, after
their custom, begged peace from the Romans.
[2.14] For these
Divitiacus pleads (for after the departure of the Belgae, having dismissed the
troops of the Aedui, he had returned to Caesar). "The Bellovaci had at all
times been in the alliance and friendship of the Aeduan state; that they had
revolted from the Aedui and made war upon the Roman people, being urged thereto
by their nobles, who said that the Aedui, reduced to slavery by Caesar, were
suffering every indignity and insult. That they who had been the leaders of
that plot, because they perceived how great a calamity they had brought upon
the state, had fled into Britain. That not only the Bellovaci, but also the
Aedui, entreated him to use his [accustomed] clemency and lenity toward them
[the Bellovaci]: which if he did, he would increase the influence of the Aedui
among all the Belgae, by whose succor and resources they had been accustomed to
support themselves whenever any wars occurred."
[2.15] Caesar said that
on account of his respect for Divitiacus and the Aeduans, he would receive them
into his protection, and would spare them; but, because the state was of great
influence among the Belgae, and pre-eminent in the number of its population, he
demanded 600 hostages. When these were delivered, and all the arms in the town
collected, he went from that place into the territories of the Ambiani, who,
without delay, surrendered themselves and all their possessions. Upon their
territories bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character and customs when
Caesar inquired he received the following information: - That there was no
access for merchants to them; that they suffered no wine and other things
tending to luxury to be imported; because, they thought that by their use the
mind is enervated and the courage impaired: that they were a savage people and
of great bravery: that they upbraided and condemned the rest of the Belgae who
had surrendered themselves to the Roman people and thrown aside their national
courage: that they openly declared they would neither send embassadors, nor
accept any condition of peace."
[2.16] After he had
made three days march through their territories, he discovered from some
prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp;
that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the other side of that river,
and together with the Atrebates and the Veromandui, their neighbors, were there
awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they had persuaded both these nations
to try the same fortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci
were also expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put their
women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which
there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes.
[2.17] Having learned
these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient
place for the camp. And as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls,
following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learned
from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's
method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great
number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there
would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the
other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under
baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to
pass that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added
weight also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the
Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at
this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they
can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their
neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut
young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on
to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had
made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not
only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore]
the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought
that the advice ought not to be neglected by them.
[2.18] The nature of
the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this: A hill, declining
evenly from the top, extending to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned
above: from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other
side and opposite to the former, and open for about 200 paces at the lower
part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see
through it into the interior. Within these woods the enemy kept themselves in
concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along
the river. The depth of the river was about three feet.
[2.19] Caesar, having
sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but
the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had
reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according
to his custom, led on [as the van six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind
them he had placed the baggage- trains of the whole army; then the two legions
which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train.
Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced
action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook
themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of
the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further
than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the
six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to
fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen
by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the
time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle
and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they
rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse.
The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down
to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods,
the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed
they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the
works.
[2.20] Caesar had every
thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when
it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the
soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance
for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order
of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be
given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of
time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties
two things proved of advantage; [first] the skill and experience of the
soldiers, because, having been trained by former engagements, they could
suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive
information from others; and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several
lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the
camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of the
enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves
executed whatever appeared proper.
[2.21] Caesar, having
given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro into whatever quarter fortune
carried him, to animate the troops, and came to the tenth legion. Having
encouraged the soldiers with no further speech than that "they should keep
up the remembrance of their wonted valor, and not be confused in mind, but
valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy ;" as the latter were not
further from them than the distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the
signal for commencing battle. And having gone to another quarter for the
purpose of encouraging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. Such was the
shortness of the time, and so determined was the mind of the enemy on fighting,
that time was wanting not only for affixing the military insignia, but even for
putting on the helmets and drawing off the covers from the shields. To whatever
part any one by chance came from the works (in which he had been employed), and
whatever standards he saw first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his own
company he should lose the time for fighting.
[2.22] The army having
been marshaled, rather as the nature of the ground and the declivity of the
hill and the exigency of the time, than as the method and order of military
matters required; while the legions in the different places were withstanding
the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by
the very thick hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could
proper reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each
part, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in such an
unfavorable state of affairs, various events of fortune followed.
[2.23] The soldiers of
the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the
army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division
had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and
worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them
as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of
them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the
river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was
renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned
and were opposing them. In like manner, in another quarter two different
legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Veromandui, with whom
they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of
the river. But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being
then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the
seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, with
Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened toward that
place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected
flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment.
[2.24] At the same time
our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had been with those, who, as I have
related, were routed by the first assault of the enemy, as they were betaking
themselves into the camp, met the enemy face to face, and again sought flight
into another quarter; and the camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate, and
from the highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors,
when, after going out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw
the enemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately to flight;
at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who came with the
baggage-train: and they (affrighted), were carried some one way, some another.
By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treviri were much alarmed, (whose
reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come to
Caesar, being sent by their state as auxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp
filled with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost
held surrounded, the camp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing
on all sides divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened
home, and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered,
[and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage-train.
[2.25] Caesar
proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he
perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the
standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the
crowded soldiers were a hinderance to themselves in the fight; that all the
centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard- bearer killed,
the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either
wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius
Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds,
that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the
rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the
rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy
[on the other hand] though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing
in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also
perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve
which could be brought up, having therefore snatched a shield from one of the
soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to
the front of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging
the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and
extend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his
arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, while
every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his
utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked.
[2.26] Caesar, when he
perceived that the seventh legion, which stood close by him, was also hard
pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes of the soldiers to effect a
junction of the legions gradually, and make their charge upon the enemy with a
double front; which having been done, since they brought assistance the one to
the other, nor feared lest their rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they
began to stand their ground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. In the
mean time, the soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army,
as a guard for the baggage-train, upon the battle being reported to them,
quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill; and
Titus Labienus, having gained possession of the camp of the enemy, and observed
from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as
a relief to our men, who, when they had learned from the flight of the horse
and the sutlers in what position the affair was, and in how great danger the
camp and the legion and the commander were involved, left undone nothing [which
tended] to dispatch.
[2.27] By their
arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who
had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the
fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely
dismayed, attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen too, that they might by
their valor blot the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the
legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last
hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them
had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies;
when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who
survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and
returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies]; so that it
ought not to be concluded, that men of such great courage had injudiciously
dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very
disadvantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered these
actions easy, although in themselves very difficult.
[2.28] This battle
being ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii being almost reduced to
annihilation, their old men, whom together with the boys and women we have
stated to have been collected together in the fenny places and marshes, on this
battle having been reported to them, since they were convinced that nothing was
an obstacle to the conquerors, and nothing safe to the conquered, sent
embassadors to Caesar by the consent of all who remained, and surrendered
themselves to him; and in recounting the calamity of their state, said that
their senators were reduced from 600 to three; that from 60,000 men they [were
reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms; whom Caesar, that he might appear
to use compassion toward the wretched and the suppliant, most carefully spared;
and ordered them to enjoy their own territories and towns, and commanded their
neighbors that they should restrain themselves and their dependents from
offering injury or outrage [to them].
[2.29] When the
Aduatuci, of whom we have written above, were coming up with all their forces
to the assistance of the Nervii, upon this battle being reported to them, they
returned home after they were on the march; deserting all their towns and
forts, they conveyed together all their possessions into one town, eminently
fortified by nature. While this town had on all sides around it very high rocks
and precipices, there was left on one side a gently ascending approach, of not
more than 200 feet in width; which place they had fortified with a very lofty
double wall: besides, they had placed stones of great weight and sharpened
stakes upon the walls. They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who,
when they were marching into our province and Italy, having deposited on this
side the river Rhine such of their baggage-trains as they could not drive or
convey with them, left 6,000 of their men as a guard and defense for them.
These having, after the destruction of their countrymen, been harassed for many
years by their neighbors, while one time they waged war offensively, and at
another resisted it when waged against them, concluded a peace with the consent
of all, and chose this place as their settlement.
[2.30] And on the first
arrival of our army they made frequent sallies from the town, and contended
with our men in trifling skirmishes; afterward, when hemmed in by a rampart of
twelve feet [in height], and fifteen miles in circuit, they kept themselves
within the town. When, vineae having been brought up and a mound raised, they
observed that a tower also was being built at a distance, they at first began
to mock the Romans from their wall, and to taunt them with the following
speeches. "For what purpose was so vast a machine constructed at so great
a distance? With what hands," or "with what strength did they,
especially [as they were] men of such very small stature" (for our
shortness of stature, in comparison to the great size of their bodies, is
generally a subject of much contempt to the men of Gaul) "trust to place
against their walls a tower of such great weight."
[2.31] But when they
saw that it was being moved, and was approaching their walls, startled by the
new and unaccustomed sight, they sent embassadors to Caesar [to treat] about
peace; who spoke in the following manner: "That they did not believe the
Romans waged war without divine aid, since they were able to move forward
machines of such a height with so great speed, and thus fight from close
quarters; that they resigned themselves and all their possessions to [Caesar's]
disposal: that they begged and earnestly entreated one thing, viz., that if
perchance, agreeable to his clemency and humanity, which they had heard of from
others, he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared, he would not
deprive them of their arms; that all their neighbors were enemies to them and
envied their courage, from whom they could not defend themselves if their arms
were delivered up: that it was better for them, if they should be reduced to
that state, to suffer any fate from the Roman people, than to be tortured to
death by those among whom they had been accustomed to rule."
[2.32] To these things
Caesar replied, "That he, in accordance with his custom, rather than owing
to their desert, should spare the state, if they should surrender themselves
before the battering-ram should touch the wall; but that there was no condition
of surrender, except upon their arms being delivered up; that he should do to
them that which he had done in the case of the Nervii, and would command their
neighbors not to offer any injury to those who had surrendered to the Roman
people." The matter being reported to their countrymen, they said that
they would execute his commands. Having cast a very large quantity of their
arms from the wall into the trench that was before the town, so that the heaps
of arms almost equalled the top of the wall and the rampart, and nevertheless
having retained and concealed, as we afterward discovered, about a third part
in the town, the gates were opened, and they enjoyed peace for that day.
[2.33] Toward evening
Caesar ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to go out of the town,
lest the towns-people should receive any injury from them by night. They [the
Aduatuci], by a design before entered into, as we afterwards understood,
because they believed that, as a surrender had been made, our men would dismiss
their guards, or at least would keep watch less carefully, partly with those
arms which they had retained and concealed, partly with shields made of bark or
interwoven wickers, which they had hastily covered over with skins, (as the
shortness of time required) in the third watch, suddenly made a sally from the
town with all their forces [in that direction] in which the ascent to our
fortifications seemed the least difficult. The signal having been immediately
given by fires, as Caesar had previously commended, a rush was made thither [i.
e. by the Roman soldiers] from the nearest fort; and the battle was fought by
the enemy as vigorously as it ought to be fought by brave men, in the last hope
of safety, in a disadvantageous place, and against those who were throwing
their weapons from a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety depended
on their courage alone. About 4,000 of the men having been slain, the rest were
forced back into the town. The day after, Caesar, after breaking open the
gates, which there was no one then to defend, and sending in our soldiers, sold
the whole spoil of that town. The number of 53,000 persons was reported to him
by those who had bought them.
[2.34] At the same time
he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion against the
Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci,
and the Rhedones, which are maritime states, and touch upon the [Atlantic]
ocean, that all these nations were brought under the dominion and power of the
Roman people.
[2.35] These things
being achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so high an opinion of this war
was spread among the barbarians, that embassadors were sent to Caesar by those
nations who dwelt beyond the Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages
and execute his commands. Which embassies Caesar, because he was hastening into
Italy and Illyricum, ordered to return to him at the beginning of the following
summer. He himself, having led his legions into winter quarters among the
Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, which states were close to those regions
in which he had waged war, set out for Italy; and a thanksgiving of fifteen
days was decreed for those achievements, upon receiving Caesar's letter; [an
honor] which before that time had been conferred on none.
End of Book 2
Caius Julius Caesar 56
B.C.
[3.1] When Caesar was
setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the twelfth legion and part
of the cavalry, against the Nantuates, the Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from
the territories of the Allobroges, and the lake of Geneva, and the River Rhone
to the top of the Alps. The reason for sending him was, that he desired that
the pass along the Alps, through which [the Roman] merchants had been
accustomed to travel with great danger, and under great imposts, should be
opened. He permitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in
these places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba having fought some successful
battles and stormed several of their forts, upon embassadors being sent to him
from all parts and hostages given and a peace concluded, determined to station
two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to winter in person with the other cohorts
of that legion in a village of the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; and this
village being situated in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is
bounded on all sides by very high mountains. As this village was divided into
two parts by a river, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the
other, which had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. He
fortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch.
[3.2] When several days
had elapsed in winter quarters, and he had ordered corn to be brought in he was
suddenly informed by his scouts that all the people had gone off in the night
from that part of the town which he had given up to the Gauls, and that the
mountains which hung over it were occupied by a very large force of the Seduni
and Veragri. It had happened for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed
the design of renewing the war and cutting off that legion. First, because they
despised a single legion, on account of its small number, and that not quite
full (two cohorts having been detached, and several individuals being absent,
who had been dispatched for the purpose of seeking provision); then, likewise,
because they thought that on account of the disadvantageous character of the
situation, even their first attack could not be sustained [by us] when they
would rush from the mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon
us. To this was added, that they were indignant that their children were torn
from them under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded that the Romans
designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite those parts to the
neighboring province [of Gaul], not only to secure the passes, but also a
constant possession.
[3.3] Having received
these tidings, Galba, since the works of the winter-quarters and the
fortifications were not fully completed, nor was sufficient preparation made
with regard to corn and other provisions (since, as a surrender had been made,
and hostages received, he had thought he need entertain no apprehension of
war), speedily summoning a council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions.
In which council, since so much sudden danger had happened contrary to the
general expectation, and almost all the higher places were seen already covered
with a multitude of armed men, nor could [either] troops come to their relief,
or provisions be brought in, as the passes were blocked up [by the enemy];
safety being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of this sort were
delivered: that, "leaving their baggage, and making a sally, they should
hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they had come thither."
To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving that measure to the
last, to await the issue of the matter, and to defend the camp.
[3.4] A short time only
having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given for arranging and executing
those things which they had determined on, the enemy, upon the signal being
given, rushed down [upon our men] from all parts, and discharged stones and
darts, upon our rampart. Our men at first, while their strength was fresh, resisted
bravely, nor did they cast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station.
As soon as any part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be
hard pressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they were
over-matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuance of
the battle, went out of the action, and others with fresh strength came in
their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owing to the
smallness of their number; and not only was permission not given to the wearied
[Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the wounded [was liberty
granted] to quit the post where he had been stationed, and recover.
[3.5] When they had now
been fighting for more than six hours, without cessation, and not only
strength, but even weapons were failing our men, and the enemy were pressing on
more rigorously, and had begun to demolish the rampart and to fill up the
trench, while our men were becoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought
to the last extremity, P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom
we have related to have been disabled by severe wounds in the engagement with
the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man of great
skill and valor, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the only hope of safety
lay in making a sally, and trying the last resource. Whereupon assembling the
centurions, he quickly gives orders to the soldiers to discontinue the fight a
short time, and only collect the weapons flung [at them], and recruit
themselves after their fatigue, and afterward, upon the signal being given,
sally forth from the camp, and place in their valor all their hope of safety.
[3.6] They do what they
were ordered; and, making a sudden sally from all the gates [of the camp],
leave the enemy the means neither of knowing what was taking place, nor of
collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking a turn, [our men] surround on every
side, and slay those who had entertained the hope of gaining the camp and
having killed more than the third part of an army of more than 30,000 men
(which number of the barbarians it appeared certain had come up to our camp),
put to flight the rest when panic-stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even
upon the higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, and
stripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to their camp and
fortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba was unwilling to
tempt fortune again, and remembered that he had come into winter quarters with
one design, and saw that he had met with a different state of affairs; chiefly
however urged by the want of corn and provision, having the next day burned all
the buildings of that village, he hastens to return into the province; and as
no enemy opposed or hindered his march, he brought the legion safe into the
[country of the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and there
wintered.
[3.7] These things
being achieved, while Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was reduced
to a state of tranquillity, the Belgae being overcome, the Germans expelled,
the Seduni among the Alps defeated, and when he had, therefore, in the
beginning of winter, set out for Illyricum, as he wished to visit those
nations, and acquire a knowledge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up in
Gaul. The occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up
his winter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border upon
the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn in those parts, sent
out some officers of cavalry, and several military tribunes among the
neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn and provision; in which
number T. Terrasidius was sent among the Esubii; M. Trebius Gallus among the
Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, T. Silius, amongst the Veneti.
[3.8] The influence of
this state is by far the most considerable of any of the countries on the whole
sea coast, because the Veneti both have a very great number of ships, with
which they have been accustomed to sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest
in their knowledge and experience of nautical affairs; and as only a few ports
lie scattered along that stormy and open sea, of which they are in possession,
they hold as tributaries almost all those who are accustomed to traffic in that
sea. With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by their detaining Silius
and Velanius; for they thought that they should recover by their means the
hostages which they had given to Crassus. The neighboring people led on by their
influence (as the measures of the Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius
and Terrasidius for the same motive; and quickly sending embassadors, by means
of their leading men, they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing except by
general consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they solicit the
other states to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they had
received from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans. All the
sea coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they send a common
embassy to P. Crassus [to say], "If he wished to receive back his
officers, let him send back to them their hostages."
[3.9] Caesar, being
informed of these things by Crassus, since he was so far distant himself,
orders ships of war to be built in the mean time on the river Loire, which
flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from the province; sailors and pilots
to be provided. These matters being quickly executed, he himself, as soon as
the season of the year permits, hastens to the army. The Veneti, and the other
states also, being informed of Caesar's arrival, when they reflected how great
a crime they had committed, in that, the embassadors (a character which had
among all nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by them been detained
and thrown into prison, resolve to prepare for a war in proportion to the
greatness of their danger, and especially to provide those things which
appertain to the service of a navy, with the greater confidence, inasmuch as
they greatly relied on the nature of their situation. They knew that the passes
by land were cut off by estuaries, that the approach by sea was most difficult,
by reason of our ignorance of the localities, [and] the small number of the
harbors, and they trusted that our army would not be able to stay very long
among them, on account of the insufficiency of corn; and again, even if all
these things should turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very
powerful in their navy. They well understood that the Romans neither had any
number of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the harbors, or the
islands of those parts where they would have to carry on the war; and the
navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was in the vast and
open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify their towns, convey
corn into them from the country parts, bring together as many ships as possible
to Venetia, where it appeared Caesar would at first carry on the war. They
unite to themselves as allies for that war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the
Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii; and send
for auxiliaries from Britain, which is situated over against those regions.
[3.10] There were these
difficulties which we have mentioned above, in carrying on the war, but many
things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to that war; - the open insult offered to
the state in the detention of the Roman knights, the rebellion raised after
surrendering, the revolt after hostages were given, the confederacy of so many
states, but principally, lest if, [the conduct of] this part was overlooked,
the other nations should think that the same thing was permitted them.
Wherefore, since he reflected that almost all the Gauls were fond of
revolution, and easily and quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, by
nature, love liberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought to
divide and more widely distribute his army, before more states should join the
confederation.
[3.11] He therefore
sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to the Treviri, who are
nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visit the Remi and the other
Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance and repel the Germans (who were
said to have been summoned by the Belgae to their aid,) if they attempted to
cross the river by force in their ships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed into
Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a great number of the cavalry, lest
auxiliaries should be sent into Gaul by these states, and such great nations be
united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus his lieutenant, with three legions, among
the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii, to take care that their forces
should be kept separate from the rest. He appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over
the fleet and those Gallic vessels which he had ordered to be furnished by the
Pictones and the Santoni, and the other provinces which remained at peace; and
commands him to proceed toward the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself
hastens thither with the land forces.
[3.12] The sites of
their towns were generally such that, being placed on extreme points [of land]
and on promontories, they neither had an approach by land when the tide had
rushed in from the main ocean, which always happens twice in the space of
twelve hours; nor by ships, because, upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were
likely to be dashed upon the shoals. Thus, by either circumstance, was the
storming of their towns rendered difficult; and if at any time perchance the Veneti
overpowered by the greatness of our works, (the sea having been excluded by a
mound and large dams, and the latter being made almost equal in height to the
walls of the town) had begun to despair of their fortunes; bringing up a large
number of ships, of which they had a very great quantity, they carried off all
their property and betook themselves to the nearest towns; there they again
defended themselves by the same advantages of situation. They did this the more
easily during a great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by
storms, and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open sea,
with its strong tides and its harbors far apart and exceedingly few in number.
[3.13] For their ships
were built and equipped after this manner. The keels were somewhat flatter than
those of our ships, whereby they could more easily encounter the shallows and
the ebbing of the tide: the prows were raised very high, and, in like manner
the sterns were adapted to the force of the waves and storms [which they were
formed to sustain]. The ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure
any force and violence whatever; the benches which were made of planks a foot
in breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb; the
anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and for sails they
used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] either through their
want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, or for this reason,
which is more probable, that they thought that such storms of the ocean, and
such violent gales of wind could not be resisted by sails, nor ships of such
great burden be conveniently enough managed by them. The encounter of our fleet
with these ships' was of such a nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone,
and the plying of the oars; other things, considering the nature of the place
[and] the violence of the storms, were more suitable and better adapted on
their side; for neither could our ships injure theirs with their beaks (so
great was their strength), nor on account of their height was a weapon easily
cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less readily locked in by
rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm began to rage and they ran
before the wind, they both could weather the storm more easily and heave to
securely in the shallows, and when left by the tide feared nothing from rocks
and shelves: the risk of all which things was much to be dreaded by our ships.
[3.14] Caesar, after
taking many of their towns, perceiving that so much labor was spent in vain and
that the flight of the enemy could not be prevented on the capture of their
towns, and that injury could not be done them, he determined to wait for his
fleet. As soon as it came up and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of
their ships, fully equipped and appointed with every kind of [naval] implement,
sailed forth from the harbor, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appear
clear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes of the soldiers
and the centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned, what to do, or
what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew that damage could not be done by
their beaks; and that, although turrets were built [on their decks], yet the
height of the stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these; so that weapons
could not be cast up from [our] lower position with sufficient effect, and
those cast by the Gauls fell the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by
our men was of great service, [viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened
upon poles, of a form not unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls. When
the ropes which fastened the sail-yards to the masts were caught by them and
pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, they [the ropes] were
severed; and when they were cut away, the yards necessarily fell down; so that
as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended on their sails and rigging, upon
these being cut away, the entire management of the ships was taken from them at
the same time. The rest of the contest depended on courage; in which our men
decidedly had the advantage; and the more so, because the whole action was
carried on in the sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little
more valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills and higher
grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea were occupied by our
army.
[3.15] The sail yards
[of the enemy], as we have said, being brought down, although two and [in some
cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded each one [of ours], the soldiers
strove with the greatest energy to board the ships of the enemy; and, after the
barbarians observed this taking place, as a great many of their ships were
beaten, and as no relief for that evil could be discovered, they hastened to
seek safety in flight. And, having now turned their vessels to that quarter in
which the wind blew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they could
not move out of their place, which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly
opportune for finishing the business; for our men gave chase and took them one
by one, so that very few out of all the number, [and those] by the intervention
of night, arrived at the land, after the battle had lasted almost from the
fourth hour till sun-set.
[3.16] By this battle
the war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea coast was finished; for both
all the youth, and all, too, of more advanced age, in whom there was any
discretion or rank, had assembled in that battle; and they had collected in
that one place whatever naval forces they had anywhere; and when these were
lost, the survivors had no place to retreat to, nor means of defending their
towns. They accordingly surrendered themselves and all their possessions to
Caesar, on whom Caesar thought that punishment should be inflicted the more
severely, in order that for the future the rights of embassadors might be more
carefully respected by barbarians; having, therefore, put to death all their
senate, he sold the rest for slaves.
[3.17] While these
things are going on among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus with those troops
which he had received from Caesar, arrives in the territories of the Unelli.
Over these people Viridovix ruled, and held the chief command of all those
states which had revolted; from which he had collected a large and powerful
army. And in those few days, the Aulerci and the Sexovii, having slain their
senate because they would not consent to be promoters of the war, shut their
gates [against us] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude
besides of desperate men and robbers assembled out of Gaul from all quarters,
whom the hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away from
husbandry and their daily labor. Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which
was in a position convenient for everything; while Viridovix encamped over
against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringing out his forces, gave
him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus had now not only come into
contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat taunted by the speeches of our
soldiers; and furnished so great a suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy
presumed to approach even to the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this
conduct for the following reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant
ought to engage in battle with so great a force, especially while he who held
the chief command was absent, except on advantageous ground or some favorable
circumstance presented itself.
[3.18] After having
established this suspicion of his cowardice, he selected a certain suitable and
crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom he had with him as auxiliaries. He
induces him by great gifts and promises to go over to the enemy; and informs
[him] of what he wished to be done. Who, when he arrives among them as a
deserter, lays before them the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what
difficulties Caesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far
removed from this - that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his
army out of the camp and set forth to Caesar for the purpose of carrying [him]
assistance, which, when they heard, they a11 cry out together that an
opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise, ought not to be thrown
away: that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things persuaded the
Gauls to this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the previous days; the
positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want of provisions, for a
supply of which they had not taken the requisite precautions; the hope
springing from the Venetic war; and [also] because in most cases men willingly
believe what they wish. Influenced by these things they do not discharge
Viridovix and the other leaders from the council, before they gained permission
from them to take up arms and hasten to [our] camp; which being granted,
rejoicing as if victory were fully certain, they collected faggots and
brushwood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp.
[3.19] The situation of
the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from the bottom for about a mile.
Thither they proceeded with great speed (in order that as little time as
possible might be given to the Romans to collect and arm themselves), and
arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus having encouraged his men, gives them the
signal, which they earnestly desired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason
of the burdens which they were carrying, he orders a sally to be made suddenly
from two gates [of the camp]. It happened, by the advantage of situation, by
the unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valor of our soldiers,
and their experience in former battles, that they could not stand one attack of
our men, and immediately turned their backs; and our men with full vigor
followed them while disordered, and slew a great number of them; the horse
pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped by flight. Thus at the same time,
Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of victory gained by
Sabinus; and all the states immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for
as the temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their
mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.
[3.20] About the same
time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania (which, as has been before
said, both from its extent of territory and the great number of its people, is
to be reckoned a third part of Gaul,) understanding that he was to wage war in
these parts, where a few years before, L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant
had been killed, and his army routed, and from which L. Manilius, the
proconsul, had fled with the loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary
care must be used by him. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries
and cavalry, [and] having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa,
Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that border
on these regions [Aquitania], he led his army into the territories of the
Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates having brought together
great forces and [much] cavalry, in which their strength principally lay, and
assailing our army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry action, then when
their cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing, they suddenly display their
infantry forces, which they had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked
our men [while] disordered, and renewed the fight.
[3.21] The battle was
long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates, relying on their former
victories, imagined that the safety of the whole of Aquitania rested on their
valor; [and] our men, on the other hand, desired it might be seen what they could
accomplish without their general and without the other legions, under a very
young commander; at length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their
backs, and a great number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the
[principal] town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly resisting,
he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting a sally, at another
forming mines, to our rampart and vineae (at which the Aquitani are eminently
skilled, because in many places among them there are copper mines); when they
perceived that nothing could be gained by these operations through the
perseverance of our men, they send embassadors to Crassus, and entreat him to
admit them to a surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver
up their arms, comply.
[3.22] And while the
attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in another part Adcantuannus,
who held the chief command, with 600 devoted followers whom they call soldurii
(the conditions of whose association are these, - that they enjoy all the
conveniences of life with those to whose friendship they have devoted
themselves: if any thing calamitous happen to them, either they endure the same
destiny together with them, or commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the, memory of men,
has there been found any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he
had devoted himself, refused to die); Adcantuannus, [Isay] endeavoring to make
a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, upon a shout
being raised at that part of the, fortification, and a fierce battle had been
fought there, was driven back into the town, yet he obtained from Crassus [the
indulgence] that he should enjoy the same terms of surrender [as the other
inhabitants].
[3.23] Crassus, having
received their arms and hostages, marched into the territories of the Vocates
and the Tarusates. But then, the barbarians being alarmed, because they had
heard that a town fortified by the nature of the place and by art, had been
taken by us in a few days after our arrival there, began to send embassadors
into all quarters, to combine, to give hostages one to another, to raise
troops. Embassadors also are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are
nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them; on
whose arrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and with
a great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole period [of
his war in Spain] and were supposed to have very great skill in military matters,
are chosen leaders. These, adopting the practice of the Roman people, begin to
select [advantageous] places, to fortify their camp, to cut off our men from
provisions, which, when Crassus observes, [and likewise] that his forces, on
account of their small number could not safely be separated; that the enemy
both made excursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard for
their camp; that on that account, corn and provision could not very
conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy was daily
increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle. This matter
being brought to a council, when he discovered that all thought the same thing,
he appointed the next day for the fight.
[3.24] Having drawn out
all his forces at the break of day, and marshaled them in a double line, he
posted the auxiliaries in the center, and waited to see what measures the enemy
would take. They, although on account of their great number and their ancient
renown in war, and the small number of our men, they supposed they might safely
fight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any wound,
by besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if the Romans, on
account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat, they intended to attack
them while encumbered in their march and depressed in spirit [as being assailed
while] under baggage. This measure being approved of by the leaders and the
forces of the Romans drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves in their
camp. Crassus having remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated
by their own delay, and by the reputation [i.e. for cowardice arising thence]
had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the remarks of all were
heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to be made in going to the camp,
after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp of the enemy, to the great
gratification of his own troops.)
[3.25] There, while
some were filling up the ditch, and others, by throwing a large number of
darts, were driving the defenders from the rampart and fortifications, and the
auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not much rely in the battle, by supplying
stones and weapons [to the soldiers], and by conveying turf to the mound,
presented the appearance and character of men engaged in fighting; while also
the enemy were fighting resolutely and boldly, and their weapons, discharged
from their higher position, fell with great effect; the horse, having gone
round the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was not
fortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate, and had an easy
approach.
[3.26] Crassus, having
exhorted the commanders of the horse to animate their men by great rewards and
promises, points out to them what he wished to have done. They, as they had
been commanded, having brought out the four cohorts, which, as they had been
left as a guard for the camp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led
them round by a some what longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of
the enemy, when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quickly
arrived at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and, having demolished
these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seen by them, or it was
known what was going on. And then, a shout being heard in that quarter, our
men, their strength having been recruited, (which usually occurs on the hope of
victory), began to fight more vigorously. The enemy surrounded on all sides,
[and] all their affairs being despaired of, made great attempts to cast
themselves down over the ramparts and to seek safety in flight. These the
cavalry pursued over the very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a fourth
part out of the number of 50,000, which it was certain had assembled out of
Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late at night to the camp.
[3.27] Having heard of
this battle, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered itself to Crassus, and
of its own accord sent hostages, in which number were the Tarbelli, the
Bigerriones, the Preciani, the Vocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates, the
Garites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates, the Cocosates. A few [and
those] most remote nations, relying on the time of the year, because winter was
at hand, neglected to do this.
[3.28] About the same
time Caesar, although the summer was nearly past, yet, since, all Gaul being
reduced, the Morini and the Menapii alone remained in arms, and had never sent
embassadors to him [to make a treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither,
thinking that that war might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the
war on a very different method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they
perceived that the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been
routed and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests and
morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. When Caesar
had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had began to fortify his camp,
and no enemy was in the mean time seen, while our men were dispersed on their
respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from all parts of the forest, and
made an attack on our men. The latter quickly took up arms and drove them back
again to their forests; and having killed a great many, lost a few of their own
men while pursuing them too far through those intricate places.
[3.29] During the
remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests; and that no
attack might be made on the flank of the soldiers, while unarmed and not
foreseeing it, he placed together (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which
was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on either flank. When a great space
had been, with incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the
enemy] and the rear of their baggage train were already seized by our men, and
they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of
such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended, and, through the
continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not any longer remain in their
tents. Therefore, having laid waste all their country, [and] having burned
their villages and houses, Caesar led back his army and stationed them in
winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii, and the other states which had
made war upon him last.
End of Book 3
Caius Julius Caesar 55
B.C.
[4.1] The following
winter (this was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls),
those Germans [called] the Usipetes, and likewise the Tenchtheri, with a great
number of men, crossed the Rhine, not far from the place at which that river
discharges itself into the sea. The motive for crossing [that river] was, that
having been for several years harassed by the Suevi, they were constantly
engaged in war, and hindered from the pursuits of agriculture. The nation of
the Suevi is by far the largest and the most warlike nation of all the Germans.
They are said to possess a hundred cantons, from each of which they yearly send
from their territories for the purpose of war a thousand armed men: the others
who remain at home, maintain [both] themselves and those-engaged in the
expedition. The latter again, in their turn, are in arms the year after: the
former remain at home. Thus neither husbandry, nor the art and practice of war
are neglected. But among them there exists no private and separate land; nor
are they permitted to remain more than one year in one place for the purpose of
residence. They do not live much on corn, but subsist for the most part on milk
and flesh, and are much [engaged] in hunting; which circumstance must, by the
nature of their food, and by their daily exercise and the freedom of their life
(for having from boyhood been accustomed to no employment, or discipline, they
do nothing at all contrary to their inclination), both promote their strength
and render them men of vast stature of body. And to such a habit have they
brought themselves, that even in the coldest parts they wear no clothing
whatever except skins, by reason of the scantiness of which, a great portion of
their body is bare, and besides they bathe in open rivers.
[4.2] Merchants have
access to them rather that they may have persons to whom they may sell those
things which they have taken in war, than because they need any commodity to be
imported to them. Moreover, even as to laboring cattle, in which the Gauls take
the greatest pleasure, and which they procure at a great price, the Germans do
not employ such as are imported, but those poor and ill-shaped animals, which belong
to their country; these, however, they render capable of the greatest labor by
daily exercise. In cavalry actions they frequently leap from their horses and
fight on foot; and train their horses to stand still in the very spot on which
they leave them, to which they retreat with great activity when there is
occasion; nor, according to their practice, is any thing regarded as more
unseemly, or more unmanly, than to use housings. Accordingly, they have the
courage, though they be themselves but few, to advance against any number
whatever of horse mounted with housings. They on no account permit wine to be
imported to them, because they consider that men degenerate in their powers of
enduring fatigue, and are rendered effeminate by that commodity.
[4.3] They esteem it
their greatest praise as a nation, that the lands about their territories lie
unoccupied to a very great extent, inasmuch as [they think] that by this
circumstance is indicated, that a great number of nations can not withstand
their power; and thus on one side of the Suevi the lands are said to lie
desolate for about six hundred miles. On the other side they border on the
Ubii, whose state was large and flourishing, considering the condition of the
Germans, and who are somewhat more refined than those of the same race and the
rest [of the Germans], and that because they border on the Rhine, and are much
resorted to by merchants, and are accustomed to the manners of the Gauls, by
reason of their approximity to them. Though the Suevi, after making the attempt
frequently and in several wars, could not expel this nation from their
territories, on account of the extent and population of their state, yet they
made them tributaries, and rendered them less distinguished and powerful [than
they had ever been].
[4.4] In the same
condition were the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri (whom we have mentioned above),
who, for many years, resisted the power of the Suevi, but being at last driven
from their possessions, and having wandered through many parts of Germany, came
to the Rhine, to districts which the Menapii inhabited, and where they had
lands, houses, and villages on either side of the river. The latter people,
alarmed by the arrival of so great a multitude, removed from those houses which
they had on the other side of the river, and having placed guards on this side
the Rhine, proceeded to hinder the Germans from crossing. They, finding
themselves, after they had tried all means, unable either to force a passage on
account of their deficiency in shipping, or cross by stealth on account of the
guards of the Menapii, pretended to return to their own settlements and
districts; and, after having proceeded three days' march, returned; and their
cavalry having performed the whole of this journey in one night, cut off the
Menapii, who were ignorant of, and did not expect [their approach, and] who,
having moreover been informed of the departure of the Germans by their scouts,
had, without apprehension, returned to their villages beyond the Rhine. Having
slain these, and seized their ships, they crossed the river before that part of
the Menapii, who were at peace in their settlements over the Rhine, were
apprized of [their intention]; and seizing all their houses, maintained
themselves upon their provisions during the rest of the winter.
[4.5] Caesar, when
informed of these matters, fearing the fickle disposition of the Gauls, who are
easily prompted to take up resolutions, and much addicted to change, considered
that nothing was to be intrusted to them; for it is the custom of that people
to compel travelers to stop, even against their inclination, and inquire what
they may have heard, or may know, respecting any matter; and in towns the
common people throng around merchants and force them to state from what countries
they come, and what affairs they know of there. They often engage in
resolutions concerning the most important matters, induced by these reports and
stories alone; of which they must necessarily instantly repent, since they
yield to mere unauthorized reports; and since most people give to their
questions answers framed agreeably to their wishes.
[4.6] Caesar, being
aware of their custom, in order that he might not encounter a more formidable
war, sets forward to the army earlier in the year than he was accustomed to do.
When he had arrived there, he discovered that those things, which he had
suspected would occur, had taken place; that embassies had been sent to the
Germans by some of the states, and that they had been entreated to leave the
Rhine, and had been promised that all things which they desired should be
provided by the Gauls. Allured by this hope, the Germans were then making
excursions to greater distances, and had advanced to the territories of the
Eburones and the Condrusi, who are under the protection of the Treviri. After
summoning the chiefs of Gaul, Caesar thought proper to pretend ignorance of the
things which he had discovered; and having conciliated and confirmed their
minds, and ordered some cavalry to be raised, resolved to make war against the
Germans.
[4.7] Having provided
corn and selected his cavalry, he began to direct his march toward those parts
in which he heard the Germans were. When he was distant from them only a few
days' march, embassadors came to him from their state, whose speech was as
follows: "That the Germans neither make war upon the Roman people first,
nor do they decline, if they are provoked, to engage with them in arms; for
that this was the custom of the Germans handed down to them from their forefathers,
- to resist whatsoever people make war upon them and not to avert it by
entreaty; this, however, they confessed, - that they had come hither
reluctantly, having been expelled from their country. If the Romans were
disposed to accept their friendship, they might be serviceable allies to them;
and let them either assign them lands, or permit them to retain those which
they had acquired by their arms; that they are inferior to the Suevi alone, to
whom not even the immortal gods can show themselves equal; that there was none
at all besides on earth whom they could not conquer."
[4.8] To these remarks
Caesar replied in such terms as he thought proper; but the conclusion of his
speech was, "That he could make no alliance with them, if they continued
in Gaul; that it was not probable that they who were not able to defend their
own territories, should get possession of those of others, nor were there any
lands lying waste in Gaul, which could be given away, especially to so great a
number of men, without doing wrong [to others]; but they might, if they were
desirous, settle in the territories of the Ubii; whose embassadors were then
with him, and were complaining of the aggressions of the Suevi, and requesting
assistance from him; and that he would obtain this request from them."
[4.9] The embassadors
said that they would report these things to their country men; and, after
having deliberated on the matter, would return to Caesar after the third day,
they begged that he would not in the mean time advance his camp nearer to them.
Caesar said that he could not grant them even that; for he had learned that
they had sent a great part of their cavalry over the Meuse to the Ambivariti,
some days before, for the purpose of plundering and procuring forage. He
supposed that they were then waiting for these horse, and that the delay was
caused on this account.
[4.10] The Meuse rises
from mount Le Vosge, which is in the territories of the Lingones; and, having
received a branch of the Rhine, which is called the Waal, forms the island of
the Batavi, and not more than eighty miles from it it falls into the ocean. But
the Rhine takes its source among the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and is
carried with a rapid current for a long distance through the territories of the
Sarunates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Tribuci, and Treviri, and when it
approaches the ocean, divides into several branches; and, having formed many
and extensive islands, a great part of which are inhabited by savage and
barbarous nations (of whom there are some who are supposed to live on fish and
the eggs of sea-fowl), flows into the ocean by several mouths.
[4.11] When Caesar was
not more than twelve miles distant from the enemy, the embassadors return to
him, as had been arranged; who meeting him on the march, earnestly entreated
him not to advance any further. When they could not obtain this, they begged
him to send on a dispatch to those who had marched in advance of the main army,
and forbid them to engage; and grant them permission to send embassadors to the
Ubii, and if the princes and senate of the latter would give them security by
oath, they assured Caesar that they would accept such conditions as might be
proposed by him; and requested that he would give them the space of three days
for negociating these affairs. Caesar thought that these things tended to the
self-same point [as their other proposal]; [namely] that, in consequence of a
delay of three days intervening, their horse, which were at a distance, might
return; however, he said, that he would not that day advance further than four
miles for the purpose of procuring water; he ordered that they should assemble
at that place in as large a number as possible, the following day, that he
might inquire into their demands. In the mean time he sends messengers to the
officers who had marched in advance with all the cavalry, to order them not to
provoke the enemy to an engagement, and if they themselves were assailed, to
sustain the attack until he came up with the army.
[4.12] But the enemy,
as soon as they saw our horse, the number of which was 5000, whereas they
themselves had not more than 800 horse, because those which had gone over the
Meuse for the purpose of foraging had not returned, while our men had no
apprehensions, because their embassadors had gone away from Caesar a little
before, and that day had been requested by them as a period of truce, made an
onset on our men, and soon threw them into disorder. When our men, in their
turn, made a stand, they, according to their practice, leaped from their horses
to their feet, and stabbing our horses in the belly and overthrowing a great
many of our men, put the rest to flight, and drove them forward so much alarmed
that they did not desist from their retreat till they had come in sight of our
army. In that encounter seventy-four of our horse were slain; among them, Piso,
an Aquitanian, a most valiant man, and descended from a very illustrious
family; whose grandfather had held the sovereignty of his state, and had been
styled friend by our senate. He, while he was endeavoring to render assistance
to his brother who was surrounded by the enemy, and whom he rescued from
danger, was himself thrown from his horse, which was wounded under him, but
still opposed [his antagonists] with the greatest intrepidity, as long as he
was able to maintain the conflict. When at length he fell, surrounded on all
sides and after receiving many wounds, and his brother, who had then retired
from the fight, observed it from a distance, he spurred on his horse, threw himself
upon the enemy, and was killed.
[4.13] After this
engagement, Caesar considered that neither ought embassadors to be received to
audience, nor conditions be accepted by him from those who, after having sued
for peace by way of stratagem and treachery, had made war without provocation.
And to wait until the enemy's forces were augmented and their cavalry had
returned, he concluded, would be the greatest madness; and knowing the
fickleness of the Gauls, he felt how much influence the enemy had already acquired
among them by this one skirmish. He [therefore] deemed that no time for
concerting measures ought to be afforded them. After having resolved on those
things and communicated his plans to his lieutenants and quaestor in order that
he might not suffer any opportunity for engaging to escape him, a very
seasonable event occurred, namely, that on the morning of the next day, a large
body of Germans, consisting of their princes and old men, came to the camp to
him to practice the same treachery and dissimulation; but, as they asserted,
for the purpose of acquitting themselves for having engaged in a skirmish the
day before, contrary to what had been agreed and to what indeed, they
themselves had requested; and also if they could by any means obtain a truce by
deceiving him. Caesar, rejoicing that they had fallen into his power, ordered
them to be detained. He then drew all his forces out of the camp, and commanded
the cavalry, because he thought they were intimidated by the late skirmish, to
follow in the rear.
[4.14] Having
marshalled his army in three lines, and in a short time performed a march of
eight miles, he arrived at the camp of the enemy before the Germans could
perceive what was going on; who being suddenly alarmed by all the
circumstances, both by the speediness of our arrival and the absence of their
own officers, as time was afforded neither for concerting measures nor for
seizing their arms, are perplexed as to whether it would be better to lead out
their forces against the enemy, or to defend their camp, or seek their safety
by flight. Their consternation being made apparent by their noise and tumult,
our soldiers, excited by the treachery of the preceding day, rushed into the
camp: such of them as could readily get their arms, for a short time withstood
our men, and gave battle among their carts and baggage wagons; but the rest of
the people, [consisting] of boys and women (for they had left their country and
crossed the Rhine with all their families) began to fly in all directions; in
pursuit of whom Caesar sent the cavalry.
[4.15] The Germans
when, upon hearing a noise behind them, [they looked and] saw that their
families were being slain, throwing away their arms and abandoning their
standards, fled out of the camp, and when they had arrived at the confluence of
the Meuse and the Rhine, the survivors despairing of further escape, as a great
number of their countrymen had been killed, threw themselves into the river and
there perished, overcome by fear, fatigue, and the violence of the stream. Our
soldiers, after the alarm of so great a war, for the number of the enemy
amounted to 430,000, returned to their camp, all safe to a man, very few being
even wounded. Caesar granted those whom he had detained in the camp liberty of
departing. They however, dreading revenge and torture from the Gauls, whose
lands they had harassed, said that they desired to remain with him. Caesar
granted them permission.
[4.16] The German war
being finished, Caesar thought it expedient for him to cross the Rhine, for
many reasons; of which this was the most weighty, that, since he saw the
Germans were so easily urged to go into Gaul, he desired they should have their
fears for their own territories, when they discovered that the army of the
Roman people both could and dared pass the Rhine. There was added also, that
portion of the cavalry of the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri, which I have above
related to have crossed the Meuse for the purpose of plundering and procuring
forage, and was not present at the engagement, had betaken themselves, after
the retreat of their countrymen, across the Rhine into the territories of the
Sigambri, and united themselves to them. When Caesar sent embassadors to them,
to demand that they should give up to him those who had made war against him
and against Gaul, they replied, "That the Rhine bounded the empire of the
Roman people; if he did not think it just for the Germans to pass over into
Gaul against his consent, why did he claim that any thing beyond the Rhine
should be subject to his dominion or power?" The Ubii, also, who alone,
out of all the nations lying beyond the Rhine, had sent embassadors to Caesar,
and formed an alliance and given hostages, earnestly entreated "that he
would bring them assistance, because they were grievously oppressed by the
Suevi; or, if he was prevented from doing so by the business of the
commonwealth, he would at least transport his army over the Rhine; that that
would be sufficient for their present assistance and their hope for the future;
that so great was the name and the reputation of his army, even among the most
remote nations of the Germans, arising from the defeat of Ariovistus and this
last battle which was fought, that they might be safe under the fame and
friendship of the Roman people." They promised a large number of ships for
transporting the army.
[4.17] Caesar, for
those reasons which I have mentioned, had resolved to cross the Rhine; but to
cross by ships he neither deemed to be sufficiently safe, nor considered
consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman people. Therefore,
although the greatest difficulty in forming a bridge was presented to him, on
account of the breadth, rapidity, and depth of the river, he nevertheless
considered that it ought to be attempted by him, or that his army ought not
otherwise to be led over. He devised this plan of a bridge. He joined together
at the distance of two feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened
a little at the lower end, and proportioned in length, to the depth of the
river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these into the river, and fixed
them at the bottom, and then driven them in with rammers, not quite
perpendicularly, dike a stake, but bending forward and sloping, so as to
incline in the direction of the current of the river; he also placed two [other
piles] opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower down, fastened
together in the same manner, but directed against the force and current of the
river. Both these, moreover, were kept firmly apart by beams two feet thick
(the space which the binding of the piles occupied), laid in at their
extremities between two braces on each side, and in consequence of these being
in different directions and fastened on sides the one opposite to the other, so
great was the strength of the work, and such the arrangement of the materials,
that in proportion as the greater body of water dashed against the bridge, so
much the closer were its parts held fastened together. These beams were bound
together by timber laid over them, in the direction of the length of the
bridge, and were [then] covered over with laths and hurdles; and in addition to
this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at the lower side of the
bridge, and these, serving as buttresses, and being connected with every
portion of the work, sustained the force of the stream: and there were others
also above the bridge, at a moderate distance; that if trunks of trees or
vessels were floated down the river by the barbarians for the purpose of
destroying the work, the violence of such things might be diminished by these
defenses, and might not injure the bridge.
[4.18] Within ten days
after the timber began to be collected, the whole work was completed, and the
whole army led over. Caesar, leaving a strong guard at each end of the bridge,
hastens into the territories of the Sigambri. In the mean time, embassadors
from several nations come to him, whom, on their suing for peace and alliance,
he answers in a courteous manner, and orders hostages to be brought to him. But
the Sigambri, at the very time the bridge was begun to be built, made
preparations for a flight (by the advice of such of the Tenchtheri and Usipetes
as they had among them), and quitted their territories, and conveyed away all
their possessions, and concealed themselves in deserts and woods.
[4.19] Caesar, having
remained in their territories a few days, and burned all their villages and
houses, and cut down their corn, proceeded into the territories of the Ubii;
and having promised them his assistance, if they were ever harassed by the
Suevi, he learned from them these particulars: that the Suevi, after they had
by means of their scouts found that the bridge was being built, had called a
council, according to their custom, and sent orders to all parts of their state
to remove from the towns and convey their children, wives, and all their
possessions into the woods, and that all who could bear arms should assemble in
one place; that the place thus chosen was nearly the centre of those regions
which the Suevi possessed; that in this spot they had resolved to await the
arrival of the Romans, and give them battle there. When Caesar discovered this,
having already accomplished all these things on account of which he had
resolved to lead his army over, namely, to strike fear into the Germans, take
vengeance on the Sigambri, and free the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi,
having spent altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had
advanced far enough to serve both honor and interest, he returned into Gaul,
and cut down the bridge.
[4.20] During the short
part of summer which remained, Caesar, although in these countries, as all Gaul
lies toward the north, the winters are early, nevertheless resolved to proceed
into Britain, because he discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gauls
succors had been furnished to our enemy from that country; and even if the time
of year should be insufficient for carrying on the war, yet he thought it would
be of great service to him if he only entered the island, and saw into the
character of the people, and got knowledge of their localities, harbors, and
landing-places, all which were for the most part unknown to the Gauls. For
neither does any one except merchants generally go thither, nor even to them
was any portion of it known, except the sea-coast and those parts which are
opposite to Gaul. Therefore, after having called up to him the merchants from all
parts, he could learn neither what was the size of the island, nor what or how
numerous were the nations which inhabited it, nor what system of war they
followed, nor what customs they used, nor what harbors were convenient for a
great number of large ships.
[4.21] He sends before
him Caius Volusenus with a ship of war, to acquire a knowledge of these
particulars before he in person should make a descent into the island, as he
was convinced that this was a judicious measure. He commissioned him to thoroughly
examine into all matters, and then return to him as soon as possible. He
himself proceeds to the Morini with all his forces. He orders ships from all
parts of the neighboring countries, and the fleet which the preceding summer he
had built for the war with the Veneti, to assemble in this place. In the mean
time, his purpose having been discovered, and reported to the Britons by
merchants, embassadors come to him from several states of the island, to
promise that they will give hostages, and submit to the government of the Roman
people. Having given them an audience, he after promising liberally, and
exhorting them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own
country, and [dispatches] with them Commius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates,
he had created king there, a man whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and who
he thought would be faithful to him, and whose influence ranked highly in those
countries. He orders him to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them
to embrace the protection of the Roman people, and apprize them that he would
shortly come thither. Volusenus, having viewed the localities as far as means
could be afforded one who dared not leave his ship and trust himself to
barbarians, returns to Caesar on the fifth day, and reports what he had there
observed.
[4.22] While Caesar
remains in these parts for the purpose of procuring ships, embassadors come to
him from a great portion of the Morini, to plead their excuse respecting their
conduct on the late occasion; alleging that it was as men uncivilized, and as
those who were unacquainted with our custom, that they had made war upon the
Roman people, and promising to perform what he should command. Caesar, thinking
that this had happened fortunately enough for him, because he neither wished to
leave an enemy behind him, nor had an opportunity for carrying on a war, by
reason of the time of year, nor considered that employment in such trifling
matters was to be preferred to his enterprise on Britain, imposes a large number
of hostages; and when these were brought, he received them to his protection.
Having collected together, and provided about eighty transport ships, as many
as he thought necessary for conveying over two legions, he assigned such
[ships] of war as he had besides to the quaestor, his lieutenants, and officers
of cavalry. There were in addition to these eighteen ships of burden which were
prevented, eight miles from that place, by winds, from being able to reach the
same port. These he distributed among the horse; the rest of the army, he
delivered to Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to
lead into the territories of the Menapii and those cantons of the Morini from
which embassadors had not come to him. He ordered P. Sulpicius Rufus, his
lieutenant, to hold possession of the harbor, with such a garrison as he
thought sufficient.
[4.23] These matters
being arranged, finding the weather favorable for his voyage, he set sail about
the third watch, and ordered the horse to march forward to the further port,
and there embark and follow him. As this was performed rather tardily by them,
he himself reached Britain with the first squadron of ships, about the fourth
hour of the day, and there saw the forces of the enemy drawn up in arms on all
the hills. The nature of the place was this: the sea was confined by mountains
so close to it that a dart could be thrown from their summit upon the shore.
Considering this by no means a fit place for disembarking, he remained at
anchor till the ninth hour, for the other ships to arrive there. Having in the
mean time assembled the lieutenants and military tribunes, he told them both
what he had learned from Volusenus, and what he wished to be done; and enjoined
them (as the principle of military matters, and especially as maritime affairs,
which have a precipitate and uncertain action, required) that all things should
be performed by them at a nod and at the instant. Having dismissed them,
meeting both with wind and tide favorable at the same time, the signal being
given and the anchor weighed, he advanced about seven miles from that place,
and stationed his fleet over against an open and level shore.
[4.24] But the
barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans, sent forward their
cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whom it is their practice to
make great use in their battles, and following with the rest of their forces,
endeavored to prevent our men landing. In this was the greatest difficulty, for
the following reasons, namely, because our ships, on account of their great
size, could be stationed only in deep water; and our soldiers, in places
unknown to them, with their hands embarrassed, oppressed with a large and heavy
weight of armor, had at the same time to leap from the ships, stand amid the
waves, and encounter the enemy; whereas they, either on dry ground, or
advancing a little way into the water, free in all their limbs in places
thoroughly known to them, could confidently throw their weapons and spur on
their horses, which were accustomed to this kind of service. Dismayed by these
circumstances and altogether untrained in this mode of battle, our men did not
all exert the same vigor and eagerness which they had been wont to exert in
engagements on dry ground.
[4.25] When Caesar
observed this, he ordered the ships of war, the appearance of which was
somewhat strange to the barbarians and the motion more ready for service, to be
withdrawn a little from the transport vessels, and to be propelled by their
oars, and be stationed toward the open flank of the enemy, and the enemy to be
beaten off and driven away, with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of
great service to our men; for the barbarians being startled by the form of our
ships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, which was
strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. And while our
men were hesitating [whether they should advance to the shore], chiefly on
account of the depth of the sea, he who carried the eagle of the tenth legion,
after supplicating the gods that the matter might turn out favorably to the
legion, exclaimed, "Leap, fellow soldiers, unless you wish to betray your
eagle to the enemy. I, for my part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth
and my general." When he had said this with a loud voice, he leaped from
the ship and proceeded to bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men,
exhorting one another that so great a disgrace should not be incurred, all
leaped from the ship. When those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily
followed and approached the enemy.
[4.26] The battle was
maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men, however, as they could neither
keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one
from one ship and another from another assembled around whatever standards they
met, were thrown into great confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with
all the shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one by
one, spurred on their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed; many
surrounded a few, others threw their weapons upon our collected forces on their
exposed flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats of the ships of
war and the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, and sent them up to the
succor of those whom he had observed in distress. Our men, as soon as they made
good their footing on dry ground, and all their comrades had joined them, made
an attack upon the enemy, and put them to flight, but could not pursue them
very far, because the horse had not been able to maintain their course at sea
and reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed success.
[4.27] The enemy being
thus vanquished in battle, as soon as they recovered after their flight,
instantly sent embassadors to Caesar to negotiate about peace. They promised to
give hostages and perform what he should command. Together with these
embassadors came Commius the Altrebatian, who, as I have above said, had been
sent by Caesar into Britain. Him they had seized upon when leaving his ship,
although in the character of embassador he bore the general's commission to
them, and thrown into chains: then after the battle was fought, they sent him
back, and in suing for peace cast the blame of that act upon the common people,
and entreated that it might be pardoned on account of their indiscretion.
Caesar, complaining, that after they had sued for peace, and had voluntarily
sent embassadors into the continent for that purpose, they had made war without
a reason, said that he would pardon their indiscretion, and imposed hostages, a
part of whom they gave immediately; the rest they said they would give in a few
days, since they were sent for from remote places. In the mean time they
ordered their people to return to the country parts, and the chiefs assembled
from all quarter, and proceeded to surrender themselves and their states to
Caesar.
[4.28] A peace being
established by these proceedings four days after we had come into Britain, the
eighteen ships, to which reference has been made above, and which conveyed the
cavalry, set sail from the upper port with a gentle gale, when, however, they
were approaching Britain and were seen from the camp, so great a storm suddenly
arose that none of them could maintain their course at sea; and some were taken
back to the same port from which they had started; - others, to their great
danger, were driven to the lower part of the island, nearer to the west; which,
however, after having cast anchor, as they were getting filled with water, put
out to sea through necessity in a stormy night, and made for the continent.
[4.29] It happened that
night to be full moon, which usually occasions very high tides in that ocean;
and that circumstance was unknown to our men. Thus, at the same time, the tide
began to fill the ships of war which Caesar had provided to convey over his
army, and which he had drawn up on the strand; and the storm began to dash the
ships of burden which were riding at anchor against each other; nor was any means
afforded our men of either managing them or of rendering any service. A great
many ships having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, having lost their cables,
anchors, and other tackling, were unfit for sailing, a great confusion, as
would necessarily happen, arose throughout the army; for there were no other
ships in which they could be conveyed back, and all things which are of service
in repairing vessels were wanting, and, corn for the winter had not been
provided in those places, because it was understood by all that they would
certainly winter in Gaul.
[4.30] On discovering
these things the chiefs of Britain, who had come up after the battle was fought
to perform those conditions which Caesar had imposed, held a conference, when
they perceived that cavalry, and ships, and corn were wanting to the Romans,
and discovered the small number of our soldiers from the small extent of the
camp (which, too, was on this account more limited than ordinary, because
Caesar had conveyed over his legions without baggage), and thought that the
best plan was to renew the war, and cut off our men from corn and provisions
and protract the affair till winter; because they felt confident, that, if they
were vanquished or cut off from a return, no one would afterward pass over into
Britain for the purpose of making war. Therefore, again entering into a
conspiracy, they began to depart from the camp by degrees and secretly bring up
their people from the country parts.
[4.31] But Caesar,
although he had not as yet discovered their measures, yet, both from what had
occurred to his ships, and from the circumstance that they had neglected to
give the promised hostages, suspected that the thing would come to pass which
really did happen. He therefore provided remedies against all contingencies;
for he daily conveyed corn from the country parts into the camp, used the
timber and brass of such ships as were most seriously damaged for repairing the
rest, and ordered whatever things besides were necessary for this object to be
brought to him from the continent. And thus, since that business was executed
by the soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the loss of
twelve ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest.
[4.32] While these
things are being transacted, one legion had been sent to forage, according to
custom, and no suspicion of war had arisen as yet, and some of the people
remained in the country parts, others went backward and forward to the camp,
they who were on duty at the gates of the camp reported to Caesar that a
greater dust than was usual was seen in that direction in which the legion had
marched. Caesar, suspecting that which was [really the case], - that some new
enterprise was undertaken by the barbarians, ordered the two cohorts which were
on duty, to march into that quarter with him, and two other cohorts to relieve
them on duty; the rest to be armed and follow him immediately. When he had
advanced some little way from the camp, he saw that his men were overpowered by
the enemy and scarcely able to stand their ground, and that, the legion being
crowded together, weapons were being cast on them from all sides. For as all
the corn was reaped in every part with the exception of one, the enemy,
suspecting that our men would repair to that, had concealed themselves in the
woods during the night. Then attacking them suddenly, scattered as they were,
and when they had laid aside their arms, and were engaged in reaping, they
killed a small number, threw the rest into confusion, and surrounded them with
their cavalry and chariots.
[4.33] Their mode of
fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they drive about in all
directions and throw their weapons and generally break the ranks of the enemy
with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when
they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their
chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers in the mean time withdraw some
little distance from the battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that,
if their masters are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may have a
ready retreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed of
horse, [together with] the firmness of infantry; and by daily practice and
exercise attain to such expertness that they are accustomed, even on a
declining and steep place, to check their horses at full speed, and manage and
turn them in an instant and run along the pole, and stand on the yoke, and
thence betake themselves with the greatest celerity to their chariots again.
[4.34] Under these
circumstances, our men being dismayed by the novelty of this mode of battle,
Caesar most seasonably brought assistance; for upon his arrival the enemy
paused, and our men recovered from their fear; upon which thinking the time
unfavorable for provoking the enemy and coming to an action, he kept himself in
his own quarter, and, a short time having intervened, drew back the legions
into the camp. While these things are going on, and all our men engaged, the
rest of the Britons, who were in the fields, departed. Storms then set in for
several successive days, which both confined our men to the camp and hindered
the enemy from attacking us. In the mean time the barbarians dispatched
messengers to all parts, and reported to their people the small number of our
soldiers, and how good an opportunity was given for obtaining spoil and for
liberating themselves forever, if they should only drive the Romans from their
camp. Having by these means speedily got together a large force of infantry and
of cavalry they came up to the camp.
[4.35] Although Caesar
anticipated that the same thing which had happened on former occasions would
then occur - that, if the enemy were routed, they would escape from danger by
their speed; still, having got about thirty horse, which Commius the
Atrebatian, of whom mention has been made, had brought over with him [from
Gaul], he drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp. When the
action commenced, the enemy were unable to sustain the attack of our men long,
and turned their backs; our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength
permitted, and slew a great number of them; then, having destroyed and burned
every thing far and wide, they retreated to their camp.
[4.36] The same day,
embassadors sent by the enemy came to Caesar to negotiate a peace. Caesar
doubled the number of hostages which he had before demanded; and ordered that
they should be brought over to the continent, because, since the time of the
equinox was near, he did not consider that, with his ships out of repair, the
voyage ought to be deferred till winter. Having met with favorable weather, he
set sail a little after midnight, and all his fleet arrived safe at the
continent, except two of the ships of burden which could not make the same port
which the other ships did, and were carried a little lower down.
[4.37] When our
soldiers, about 300 in number, had been drawn out of these two ships, and were
marching to the camp, the Morini, whom Caesar, when setting forth for Britain,
had left in a state of peace, excited by the hope of spoil, at first surrounded
them with a small number of men, and ordered them to lay down their arms, if
they did not wish to be slain; afterward however, when they, forming a circle,
stood on their defense, a shout was raised and about 6000 of the enemy soon
assembled; which being reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry in the camp as a
relief to his men. In the mean time our soldiers sustained the attack of the
enemy, and fought most valiantly for more than four hours, and, receiving but
few wounds themselves, slew several of them. But after our cavalry came in
sight, the enemy, throwing away their arms, turned their backs, and a great
number of them were killed.
[4.38] The day
following Caesar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, with those legions which he had
brought back from Britain, against the Morini, who had revolted; who, as they
had no place to which they might retreat, on account of the drying up of their
marshes (which they had availed themselves of as a place of refuge the
preceding year), almost all fell into the power of Labienus. In the mean time
Caesar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had led the legions into
the territories of the Menapii, having laid waste all their lands, cut down
their corn and burned their houses, returned to Caesar because the Menapii had
all concealed themselves in their thickest woods. Caesar fixed the winter
quarters of all the legions among the Belgae. Thither only two British states
sent hostages; the rest omitted to do so. For these successes, a thanksgiving
of twenty days was decreed by the senate upon receiving Caesar's letter.
End of Book 4
Caius Julius Caesar 54
B.C.
[5.1] Lucius Domitius
and Appius Claudius being consuls, Caesar, when departing from his winter
quarters into Italy, as he had been accustomed to do yearly, commands the
lieutenants whom he appointed over the legions to take care that during the
winter as many ships as possible should be built, and the old repaired. He
plans the size and shape of them. For dispatch of lading, and for drawing them
on shore, he makes them a little lower than those which we have been accustomed
to use in our sea; and that so much the more, because he knew that, on account
of the frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for the
purpose of transporting burdens and a great number of horses, [he makes them] a
little broader than those which we use in other seas. All these he orders to be
constructed for lightness and expedition, to which object their lowness
contributes greatly. He orders those things which are necessary for equipping
ships to be brought thither from Spain. He himself, on the assizes of Hither
Gaul being concluded, proceeds into Illyricum, because he heard that the part
of the province nearest them was being laid waste by the incursions of the
Pirustae. When he had arrived there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and
orders them to assemble at an appointed place. Which circumstance having been
reported [to them], the Pirustae send embassadors to him to inform him that no
part of those proceedings was done by public deliberation, and assert that they
were ready to make compensation by all means for the injuries [inflicted].
Caesar, accepting their defense, demands hostages, and orders them to be
brought to him on a specified day, and assures them that unless they did so he
would visit their state with war. These being brought to him on the day which
he had ordered, he appoints arbitrators between the states, who should estimate
the damages and determine the reparation.
[5.2] These things
being finished, and the assizes being concluded, he returns into Hither Gaul,
and proceeds thence to the army. When he had arrived there, having made a
survey of the winter quarter, he finds that, by the extraordinary ardor of the
soldiers, amid the utmost scarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of
that kind which we have described above and twenty-eight ships of war, had been
built, and were not far from that state, that they might be launched in a few
days. Having commended the soldiers and those who had presided over the work,
he informs them what he wishes to be done, and orders all the ships to assemble
at port Itius, from which port he had learned that the passage into Britain was
shortest, [being only] about thirty miles from the continent. He left what
seemed a sufficient number of soldiers for that design; he himself proceeds
into the territories of the Treviri with four legions without baggage, and 800
horse, because they neither came to the general diets [of Gaul], nor obeyed his
commands, and were moreover, said to be tampering with the Germans beyond the
Rhine.
[5.3] This state is by
far the most powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, and has great forces of infantry,
and as we have remarked above, borders on the Rhine. In that state, two
persons, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were then contending with each other for
the supreme power; one of whom, as soon as the arrival of Caesar and his
legions was known, came to him; assures him that he and all his party would
continue in their allegiance, and not revolt from the alliance of the Roman
people, and informs him of the things which were going on among the Treviri.
But Indutiomarus began to collect cavalry and infantry, and make preparations
for war, having concealed those who by reason of their age could not be under
arms, in the forest Arduenna, which is of immense size, [and] extends from the
Rhine across the country of the Treviri to the frontiers of the Remi. But after
that, some of the chief persons of the state, both influenced by their
friendship for Cingetorix, and alarmed at the arrival of our army, came to Caesar
and began to solicit him privately about their own interests, since they could
not provide for the safety of the state; Indutiomarus, dreading lest he should
be abandoned by all, sends embassadors to Caesar, to declare that he absented
himself from his countrymen, and refrained from coming to him on this account,
that he might the more easily keep the state in its allegiance, lest on the
departure of all the nobility the commonalty should, in their indiscretion,
revolt. And thus the whole state was at his control; and that he, if Caesar
would permit, would come to the camp to him, and would commit his own fortunes
and those of the state to his good faith.
[5.4] Caesar, though he
discerned from what motive these things were said, and what circumstances deterred
him from his meditated plan, still, in order that he might not be compelled to
waste the summer among the Treviri, while all things were prepared for the war
with Britain, ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with 200 hostages. When they
were brought, [and] among them his son and near relations, whom he had demanded
by name, he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him to continue in his
allegiance; yet, nevertheless, summoning to him the chief men of the Treviri,
he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix: this he both thought should be
done by him in justice to the merits of the latter, and also judged that it was
of great importance that the influence of one whose singular attachment toward
him he had fully seen, should prevail as much as possible among his people.
Indutiomarus was very much offended at this act, [seeing that] his influence
was diminished among his countrymen; and he, who already before had borne a
hostile mind toward us, was much more violently inflamed against us through
resentment at this.
[5.5] These matters
being settled, Caesar went to port Itius with the legions. There he discovers
that forty ships, which had been built in the country of the Meldi, having been
driven back by a storm, had been unable to maintain their course, and had
returned to the same port from which they had set out; he finds the rest ready
for sailing, and furnished with every thing. In the same place, the cavalry of
the whole of Gaul, in number 4,000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons of
all the states; he had determined to leave in Gaul a very few of them, whose
fidelity toward him he had clearly discerned, and take the rest with him as
hostages; because he feared a commotion in Gaul when he should be absent.
[5.6] There was
together with the others, Dumnorix, the Aeduan, of whom we have made previous
mention. Him, in particular, he had resolved to have with him, because he had
discovered him to be fond of change, fond of power, possessing great
resolution, and great influence among the Gauls. To this was added, that
Dumnorix had before said in an assembly of Aeduans, that the sovereignty of the
state had been made over to him by Caesar; which speech the Aedui bore with
impatience and yet dared not send embassadors to Caesar for the purpose of either
rejecting or deprecating [that appointment]. That fact Caesar had learned from
his own personal friends. He at first strove to obtain by every entreaty that
he should be left in Gaul; partly, because, being unaccustomed to sailing, he
feared the sea; partly because he said he was prevented by divine admonitions.
After he saw that this request was firmly refused him, all hope of success
being lost, he began to tamper with the chief persons of the Gauls, to call
them apart singly and exhort them to remain on the continent; to agitate them
with the fear that it was not without reason that Gaul should be stripped of
all her nobility; that it was Caesar's design, to bring over to Britain and put
to death all those whom he feared to slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge his
honor to the rest, to ask for their oath that they would by common deliberation
execute what they should perceive to be necessary for Gaul. These things were
reported to Caesar by several persons.
[5.7] Having learned
this fact, Caesar, because he had conferred so much honor upon the Aeduan
state, determined that Dumnorix should be restrained and deterred by whatever
means he could; and that, because he perceived his insane designs to be
proceeding further and further, care should be taken lest he might be able to
injure him and the commonwealth. Therefore, having stayed about twenty-five
days in that place, because the north wind, which usually blows a great part of
every season, prevented the voyage, he exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in his
allegiance [and] nevertheless learn all his measures: having at length met with
favorable weather, he orders the foot soldiers and the horse to embark in the
ships. But, while the minds of all were occupied, Dumnorix began to take his
departure from the camp homeward with the cavalry of the Aedui, Caesar being
ignorant of it. Caesar, on this matter being reported to him, ceasing from his
expedition and deferring all other affairs, sends a great part of the cavalry
to pursue him, and commands that he be brought back; he orders that if he use
violence and do not submit, that he be slain; considering that Dumnorix would
do nothing as a rational man while he himself was absent, since he had
disregarded his command even when present. He, however, when recalled, began to
resist and defend himself with his hand, and implore the support of his people,
often exclaiming that "he was free and the subject of a free state."
They surround and kill the man as they had been commanded; but the Aeduan
horsemen all return to Caesar.
[5.8] When these things
were done [and] Labienus, left on the continent with three legions and 2,000
horse, to defend the harbors and provide corn, and discover what was going on
in Gaul, and take measures according to the occasion and according to the
circumstance; he himself, with five legions and a number of horse, equal to
that which he was leaving on the continent, set sail at sun-set, and [though
for a time] borne forward by a gentle south-west wind, he did not maintain his
course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried
on too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left.
Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged on with the oars that he
might make that part of the island in which he had discovered the preceding
summer, that there was the best landing-place, and in this affair the spirit of
our soldiers was very much to be extolled; for they with the transports and
heavy ships, the labor of rowing not being [for a moment] discontinued, equaled
the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day;
nor was there seen a [single] enemy in that place, but, as Caesar afterward
found from some prisoners, though large bodies of troops had assembled there, yet
being alarmed by the great number of our ships, more than eight hundred of
which, including the ships of the preceding year, and those private vessels
which each had built for his own convenience, had appeared at one time, they
had quitted the coast and concealed themselves among the higher points.
[5.9] Caesar, having
disembarked his army and chosen a convenient place for the camp, when he
discovered from the prisoners in what part the forces of the enemy had lodged
themselves, having left ten cohorts and 300 horse at the sea, to be a guard to
the ships, hastens to the enemy, at the third watch, fearing the less for the
ships, for this reason because he was leaving them fastened at anchor upon an
even and open shore; and he placed Q. Atrius over the guard of the ships. He
himself, having advanced by night about twelve miles, espied the forces of the
enemy. They, advancing to the river with their cavalry and chariots from the
higher ground, began to annoy our men and give battle. Being repulsed by our cavalry,
they concealed themselves in woods, as they had secured a place admirably
fortified by nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had before prepared
on account of a civil war; for all entrances to it were shut up by a great
number of felled trees. They themselves rushed out of the woods to fight here
and there, and prevented our men from entering their fortifications. But the
soldiers of the seventh legion, having formed a testudo and thrown up a rampart
against the fortification, took the place and drove them out of the woods,
receiving only a few wounds. But Caesar forbade his men to pursue them in their
flight any great distance; both because he was ignorant of the nature of the
ground, and because, as a great part of the day was spent, he wished time to be
left for the fortification of the camp.
[5.10] The next day,
early in the morning, he sent both foot-soldiers and horse in three divisions
on an expedition to pursue those who had fled. These having advanced a little
way, when already the rear [of the enemy] was in sight, some horse came to
Caesar from Quintus Atrius, to report that the preceding night, a very great
storm having arisen, almost all the ships were dashed to pieces and cast upon
the shore, because neither the anchors and cables could resist, nor could the
sailors and pilots sustain the violence of the storm; and thus great damage was
received by that collision of the ships.
[5.11] These things
being known [to him], Caesar orders the legions and cavalry to be recalled and
to cease from their march; he himself returns to the ships: he sees clearly
before him almost the same things which he had heard of from the messengers and
by letter, so that, about forty ships being lost, the remainder seemed capable
of being repaired with much labor. Therefore he selects workmen from the
legions, and orders others to be sent for from the continent; he writes to
Labienus to build as many ships as he could with those legions which were with
him. He himself, though the matter was one of great difficulty and labor, yet
thought it to be most expedient for all the ships to be brought up on shore and
joined with the camp by one fortification. In these matters he employed about
ten days, the labor of the soldiers being unremitting even during the hours of
night. The ships having been brought up on shore and the camp strongly
fortified, he left the same forces as he did before as a guard for the ships;
he sets out in person for the same place that he had returned from. When he had
come thither, greater forces of the Britons had already assembled at that
place, the chief command and management of the war having been intrusted to
Cassivellaunus, whose territories a river, which is called the Thames,
separates, from the maritime states at about eighty miles from the sea. At an
earlier period perpetual wars had taken place between him and the other states;
but, greatly alarmed by our arrival, the Britons had placed him over the whole
war and the conduct of it.
[5.12] The interior
portion of Britain is inhabited by those of whom they say that it is handed
down by tradition that they were born in the island itself: the maritime
portion by those who had passed over from the country of the Belgae for the
purpose of plunder and making war; almost all of whom are called by the names
of those states from which being sprung they went thither, and having waged
war, continued there and began to cultivate the lands. The number of the people
is countless, and their buildings exceedingly numerous, for the most part very
like those of the Gauls: the number of cattle is great. They use either brass
or iron rings, determined at a certain weight, as their money. Tin is produced
in the midland regions; in the maritime, iron; but the quantity of it is small:
they employ brass, which is imported. There, as in Gaul, is timber of every
description, except beech and fir. They do not regard it lawful to eat the
hare, and the cock, and the goose; they, however, breed them for amusement and
pleasure. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, the colds being less
severe.
[5.13] The island is
triangular in its form, and one of its sides is opposite to Gaul. One angle of
this side, which is in Kent, whither almost all ships from Gaul are directed,
[looks] to the east; the lower looks to the south. This side extends about 500
miles. Another side lies toward Spain and the west, on which part is Ireland,
less, as is reckoned, than Britain, by one half: but the passage [from it] into
Britain is of equal distance with that from Gaul. In the middle of this voyage,
is an island, which is called Mona: many smaller islands besides are supposed
to lie [there], of which islands some have written that at the time of the
winter solstice it is night there for thirty consecutive days. We, in our
inquiries about that matter, ascertained nothing, except that, by accurate
measurements with water, we perceived the nights to be shorter there than on
the continent. The length of this side, as their account states, is 700 miles.
The third side is toward the north, to which portion of the island no land is
opposite; but an angle of that side looks principally toward Germany. This side
is considered to be 800 miles in length. Thus the whole island is [about] 2,000
miles in circumference.
[5.14] The most
civilized of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent, which is entirely a
maritime district, nor do they differ much from the Gallic customs. Most of the
inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but live on milk and flesh, and are clad
with skins. All the Britains, indeed, dye themselves with wood, which occasions
a bluish color, and thereby have a more terrible appearance in fight. They wear
their hair long, and have every part of their body shaved except their head and
upper lip. Ten and even twelve have wives common to them, and particularly
brothers among brothers, and parents among their children; but if there be any
issue by these wives, they are reputed to be the children of those by whom
respectively each was first espoused when a virgin.
[5.15] The horse and charioteers
of the enemy contended vigorously in a skirmish with our cavalry on the march;
yet so that our men were conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods
and hills; but, having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost
some of their men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men
were off their guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushed out
of the woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed on duty before
the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts being sent by Caesar
to their relief, and these severally the first of two legions, when these had
taken up their position at a very small distance from each other, as our men
were disconcerted by the unusual mode of battle, the enemy broke through the
middle of them most courageously, and retreated thence in safety. That day, Q.
Laberius Durus, a tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The enemy, since more
cohorts were sent against them, were repulsed.
[5.16] In the whole of
this method of fighting since the engagement took place under the eyes of all
and before the camp, it was perceived that our men, on account of the weight of
their arms, inasmuch as they could neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating,
nor dare quit their standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that
the horse also fought with great danger, because they [the Britons] generally
retreated even designedly, and, when they had drawn off our men a short
distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in
unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry engagement
is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat
and to those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close
order, but in small parties and at great distances, and had detachments placed
[in different parts], and then the one relieved the other, and the vigorous and
fresh succeeded the wearied.
[5.17] The following
day the enemy halted on the hills, a distance from our camp, and presented
themselves in small parties, and began to challenge our horse to battle with
less spirit than the day before. But at noon, when Caesar had sent three
legions, and all the cavalry, with C. Trebonius, the lieutenant, for the purpose
of foraging, they flew upon the foragers suddenly from all quarters, so that
they did not keep off [even] from the standards and the legions. Our men making
an attack on them vigorously, repulsed them; nor did they cease to pursue them
until the horse, relying on relief, as they saw the legions behind them, drove
the enemy precipitately before them, and slaying a great number of them, did
not give them the opportunity either of rallying, or halting, or leaping from
their chariots. Immediately after this retreat, the auxiliaries who had
assembled from all sides, departed; nor after that time did the enemy ever
engage with us in very large numbers.
[5.18] Caesar,
discovering their design, leads his army into the territories of Cassivellaunus
to the river Thames; which river can be forded in one place only and that with
difficulty. When he had arrived there, he perceives that numerous forces of the
enemy were marshaled on the other bank of the river; the bank also was defended
by sharp stakes fixed in front, and stakes of the same kind fixed under the
water were covered by the river. These things being discovered from [some]
prisoners and deserters, Caesar, sending forward the cavalry, ordered the
legions to follow them immediately. But the soldiers advanced with such speed
and such ardor, though they stood above the water by their heads only, that the
enemy could not sustain the attack of the legions and of the horse, and quitted
the banks, and committed themselves to flight.
[5.19] Cassivellaunus,
as we have stated above, all hope [rising out] of battle being laid aside, the
greater part of his forces being dismissed, and about 4,000 charioteers only
being left, used to observe our marches and retire a little from the road, and
conceal himself in intricate and woody places, and in those neighborhoods in
which he had discovered we were about to march, he used to drive the cattle and
the inhabitants from the fields into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for the
sake of plundering and ravaging the more freely, scattered themselves among the
fields, he used to send out charioteers from the woods by all the well-known
roads and paths, and to the great danger of our horse, engage with them; and
this source of fear hindered them from straggling very extensively. The result
was, that Caesar did not allow excursions to be made to a great distance from
the main body of the legions, and ordered that damage should be done to the
enemy in ravaging their lands, and kindling fires only so far as the legionary
soldiers could, by their own exertion and marching, accomplish it.
[5.20] In the mean
time, the Trinobantes, almost the most powerful state of those parts, from
which the young man, Mandubratius embracing the protection of Caesar had come
to the continent of Gaul to [meet] him (whose father, Imanuentius, had
possessed the sovereignty in that state, and had been killed by Cassivellaunus;
he himself had escaped death by flight), send embassadors to Caesar, and
promise that they will surrender themselves to him and perform his commands;
they entreat him to protect Mandubratius from the violence of Cassivellaunus,
and send to their state some one to preside over it, and possess the
government. Caesar demands forty hostages from them, and corn for his army, and
sends Mandubratius to them. They speedily performed the things demanded, and
sent hostages to the number appointed, and the corn.
[5.21] The Trinobantes
being protected and secured from any violence of the soldiers, the Cenimagni,
the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi, sending embassies,
surrendered themselves to Caesar. From them he learns that the capital town of
Cassivellaunus was not far from that place, and was defended by woods and
morasses, and a very large number of men and of cattle had been collected in
it. (Now the Britons, when they have fortified the intricate woods, in which
they are wont to assemble for the purpose of avoiding the incursion of an
enemy, with an intrenchment and a rampart, call them a town.) Thither he
proceeds with his legions: he finds the place admirably fortified by nature and
art; he, however, undertakes to attack it in two directions. The enemy, having
remained only a short time, did not sustain the attack of our soldiers, and
hurried away on the other side of the town. A great amount of cattle was found
there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight.
[5.22] While these
things are going forward in those places, Cassivellaunus sends messengers into
Kent, which, we have observed above, is on the sea, over which districts four
several kings reigned, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Segonax, and
commands them to collect all their forces, and unexpectedly assail and storm
the naval camp. When they had come to the camp, our men, after making a sally,
slaying many of their men, and also capturing a distinguished leader named
Lugotorix, brought back their own men in safety. Cassivellaunus, when this
battle was reported to him as so many losses had been sustained, and his
territories laid waste, being alarmed most of all by the desertion of the
states, sends embassadors to Caesar [to treat] about a surrender through the
mediation of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar, since he had determined to pass
the winter on the continent, on account of the sudden revolts of Gaul, and as
much of the summer did not remain, and he perceived that even that could be
easily protracted, demands hostages, and prescribes what tribute Britain should
pay each year to the Roman people; he forbids and commands Cassivellaunus that
he wage not war against Mandubratius or the Trinobantes.
[5.23] When he had
received the hostages, he leads back the army to the sea, and finds the ships
repaired. After launching these, because he had a large number of prisoners,
and some of the ships had been lost in the storm, he determines to convey back
his army at two embarkations. And it so happened, that out of so large a number
of ships, in so many voyages, neither in this nor in the previous year was any
ship missing which conveyed soldiers; but very few out of those which were sent
back to him from the continent empty, as the soldiers of the former convoy had
been disembarked, and out of those (sixty in number) which Labienus had taken
care to have built, reached their destination; almost all the rest were driven
back, and when Caesar had waited for them for some time in vain, lest he should
be debarred from a voyage by the season of the year, inasmuch as the equinox
was at hand, he of necessity stowed his soldiers the more closely, and, a very
great calm coming on, after he had weighed anchor at the beginning of the
second watch, he reached land at break of day and brought in all the ships in
safety.
[5.24] The ships having
been drawn up and a general assembly of the Gauls held at Samarobriva, because
the corn that year had not prospered in Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was
compelled to station his army in its winter-quarters differently from the
former years, and to distribute the legions among several states: one of them
he gave to C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of the
Morini; a second to Q. Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. Roscius,
into those of the Essui; a fourth he ordered to winter with T. Labienus among
the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he stationed three in Belgium; over
these he appointed M. Crassus, his questor, and L. Munatius Plancus and C.
Trebonius, his lieutenants. One legion which he had raised last on the other
side of the Po, and five cohorts, he sent among the Eburones, the greatest
portion of whom lie between the Meuse and the Rhine, [and] who were under the
government of Ambiorix and Cativolcus. He ordered Q. Titurius Sabinus and L.
Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to take command of these soldiers. The legions
being distributed in this manner, he thought he could most easily remedy the
scarcity of corn and yet the winter-quarters of all these legions (except that
which he had given to L. Roscius, to be led into the most peaceful and tranquil
neighborhood) were comprehended within [about] 100 miles. He himself in the
mean while, until he had stationed the legions and knew that the several
winter-quarters were fortified, determined to stay in Gaul.
[5.25] There was among
the Carnutes a man named Tasgetius, born of very high rank, whose ancestors had
held the sovereignty in his state. To him Caesar had restored the position of
his ancestors, in consideration of his prowess and attachment toward him,
because in all his wars he had availed himself of his valuable services. His
personal enemies had killed him when in the third year of his reign, many even
of his own state being openly promoters [of that act] This event is related to
Caesar. He fearing, because several were involved in the act, that the state
might revolt at their instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with a legion, to
proceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, and winter there, and arrest and
send to him the persons by whose instrumentality he should discover that
Tasgetius was slain. In the mean time, he was apprised by all the lieutenants
and questors to whom he had assigned the legions, that they had arrived in
winter-quarters, and that the place for the quarters was fortified.
[5.26] About fifteen
days after they had come into winter-quarters, the beginning of a sudden
insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix and Cativolcus, who, though they
had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the borders of their kingdom, and had
conveyed corn into our winter-quarters, induced by the messages of Indutiomarus,
one of the Treviri, excited their people, and after having suddenly assailed
the soldiers engaged in procuring wood, came with a large body to attack the
camp. When our men had speedily taken up arms and had ascended the rampart, and
sending out some Spanish horse on one side, had proved conquerors in a cavalry
action, the enemy, despairing of success, drew off their troops from the
assault. Then they shouted, according to their custom, that some of our men
should go forward to a conference, [alleging] that they had some things which
they desired to say respecting the common interest, by which they trusted their
disputes could be removed.
[5.27] C. Arpineius, a
Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q. Titurius, and with him, Q. Junius, a
certain person from Spain, who already on previous occasions, had been
accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Caesar's mission, is sent to them for the
purpose of a conference: before them Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That
he confessed, that for Caesar's kindness toward him, he was very much indebted
to him, inasmuch as by his aid he had been freed from a tribute which he had
been accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, his neighbors; and because his own son
and the son of his brother had been sent back to him, whom, when sent in the
number of hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them in slavery and in
chains; and that he had not done that which he had done in regard to the
attacking of the camp, either by his own judgment or desire, but by the
compulsion of his state; and that his government was of that nature, that the
people had as much authority over him as he over the people. To the state
moreover the occasion of the war was this - that it could not withstand the
sudden combination of the Gauls; that he could easily prove this from his own
weakness, since he was not so little versed in affairs as to presume that with
his forces he could conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common
resolution of Gaul; that that day was appointed for the storming of all
Caesar's winter-quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to the
relief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, especially
when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their common freedom. Since
he had performed his duty to them on the score of patriotism [he said], he has
now regard to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; that he warned, that he
prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality, to consult for his and his
soldiers' safely; that a large force of the Germans had been hired and had
passed the Rhine; that it would arrive in two days: that it was for them to
consider whether they thought fit, before the nearest people perceived it, to
lead off their soldiers when drawn out of winter-quarters, either to Cicero or
to Labienus; one of whom was about fifty miles distant from them, the other
rather more; that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he would give
them a safe passage through his territories; and when he did that, he was both
consulting for his own state, because it would be relieved from the
winter-quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for his
obligations."
[5.28] Arpineius and
Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had heard. They, greatly alarmed by
the unexpected affair, though those things were spoken by an enemy, still
thought they were not to be disregarded; and they were especially influenced by
this consideration, that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and humble
state of the Eburones had dared to make war upon the Roman people of their own
accord. Accordingly, they refer the matter to a council, and a great
controversy arises among them. L. Aurunculeius, and several tribunes of the
soldiers and the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion "that
nothing should be done hastily, and that they should not depart from the camp
without Caesar's orders;" they declared, "that any forces of the
Germans, however great, might be encountered by fortified winter-quarters; that
this fact was a proof [of it]; that they had sustained the first assault of the
Germans most valiantly, inflicting many wounds upon them; that they were not
distressed for corn; that in the mean time relief would come both from the
nearest winter-quarters and from Caesar; lastly, they put the query, "what
could be more undetermined, more undignified, than to adopt measures respecting
the most important affairs on the authority of an enemy?"
[5.29] In opposition to
those things, Titurius exclaimed, "That they would do this too late, when
greater forces of the enemy, after a junction with the Germans, should have
assembled; or when some disaster had been received in the neighboring
winter-quarters; that the opportunity for deliberating was short; that he
believed that Caesar had set forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would not
otherwise have taken the measure of slaying Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones,
if he had been present, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us;
that he did not regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority; that the
Rhine was near; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories were
subjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed, that
after having received so many defeats she was reduced under the sway of the
Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters being extinguished."
Lastly, "who would persuade himself of this, that Ambiorix had resorted to
a design of that nature without sure grounds? That his own opinion was safe on
either side; if there be nothing very formidable, they would go without danger
to the nearest legion; if all Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only
safety lay in dispatch. What issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who
differed from him, have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded,
yet certainly famine, by a protracted siege, was."
[5.30] This discussion
having been held on the two sides, when opposition was offered strenuously by
Cotta and the principal officers, "Prevail," said Sabinus, "if
so you wish it;" and he said it with a louder voice, that a great portion
of the soldiers might hear him; "nor am I the person among you," he
said, "who is most powerfully alarmed by the danger of death; these will
be aware of it, and then, if any thing disastrous shall have occurred, they
will demand a reckoning at your hands; these, who, if it were permitted by you,
united three days hence with the nearest winter-quarters, may encounter the
common condition of war with the rest, and not, as if forced away and separated
far from the rest, perish either by the sword or by famine."
[5.31] They rise from
the council, detain both, and entreat, that "they do not bring the matter
into the greatest jeopardy by their dissension and obstinacy; the affair was an
easy one, if only they all thought and approved of the same thing, whether they
remain or depart; on the other hand, they saw no security in dissension."
The matter is prolonged by debate till midnight. At last Cotta, being
overruled, yields his assent; the opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed
that they will march at day-break; the remainder of the night is spent without
sleep, since every soldier was inspecting his property, [to see] what he could
carry with him, and what, out of the appurtenances of the winter-quarters, he
would be compelled to leave; every reason is suggested to show why they could
not stay without danger, and how that danger would be increased by the fatigue
of the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of day they quit the camp, in
a very extended line and with a very large amount of baggage, in such a manner
as men who were convinced that the advice was given by Ambiorix, not as an
enemy, but as most friendly [toward them].
[5.32] But the enemy,
after they had made the discovery of their intended departure by the noise
during the night and their not retiring to rest, having placed an ambuscade in
two divisions in the woods, in a suitable and concealed place, two miles from
the camp, waited for the arrival of the Romans: and when the greater part of
the line of march had descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly
presented themselves on either side of that valley, and began both to harass
the rear and hinder the van from ascending, and to give battle in a place
exceedingly disadvantageous to our men.
[5.33] Then at length
Titurius, as one who had provided nothing beforehand, was confused, ran to and
fro, and set about arranging his troops; these very things, however, he did
timidly and in such a manner that all resources seemed to fail him: which
generally happens to those who are compelled to take council in the action
itself. But Cotta, who had reflected that these things might occur on the
march, and on that account had not been an adviser of the departure, was
wanting to the common safety in no respect; both in addressing and encouraging the
soldiers, he performed the duties of a general, and in the battle those of a
soldier. And since they [Titurius and Cotta] could less easily perform every
thing by themselves, and provide what was to be done in each place, by reason
of the length of the line of march, they ordered [the officers] to give the
command that they should leave the baggage and form themselves into an orb,
which measure, though in a contingency of that nature it was not to be
condemned, still turned out unfortunately; for it both diminished the hope of
our soldiers and rendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it
appeared that this was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides
that happened, which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for the most
part quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off from the baggage
whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filled with uproar and
lamentation.
[5.34] But judgment was
not wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders ordered [the officers] to
proclaim through the ranks "that no man should quit his place; that the
booty was theirs, and for them was reserved whatever the Romans should leave;
therefore let them consider that all things depended on their victory. Our men
were equal to them in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they
were deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of
safety in their valor, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a
great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, orders
the command to be issued that they throw their weapons from a distance and do
not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an
attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their
daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking
themselves to their standards again.
[5.35] Which command
having been most carefully obeyed, when any cohort had quitted the circle and
made a charge, the enemy fled very precipitately. In the mean time, that part
of the Roman army, of necessity, was left unprotected, and the weapons received
on their open flank. Again, when they had begun to return to that place from
which they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had retreated
and by those who stood next them; but if, on the other hand, they wish to keep
their place, neither was an opportunity left for valor, nor could they, being
crowded together, escape the weapons cast by so large a body of men. Yet,
though assailed by so many disadvantages, [and] having received many wounds,
they withstood the enemy, and, a great portion of the day being spent, though
they fought from day-break till the eighth hour, they did nothing which was
unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of T. Balventius, who the year before
had been chief centurion, a brave man and one of great authority, is pierced
with a javelin; Q. Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, is
slain while he assists his son when surrounded by the enemy; L. Cotta, the
lieutenant, when encouraging all the cohorts and companies, is wounded full in
the mouth by a sling.
[5.36] Much troubled by
these events, Q. Titurius, when he had perceived Ambiorix in the distance
encouraging his men, sends to him his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he
would spare him and his soldiers. He, when addressed, replied, "If he
wishes to confer with him, it was permitted; that he hoped what pertained to
the safety of the soldiers could be obtained from the people; that to him
however certainly no injury would be done, and that he pledged his faith to
that effect." He consults with Cotta, who had been wounded, whether it
would appear right to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix; [saying]
that he hoped to be able to succeed respecting his own and the soldiers'
safety. Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, and in that perseveres.
[5.37] Sabinus orders
those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at the time around him, and the
centurions of the first ranks, to follow him, and when he had approached near
to Ambiorix, being ordered to throw down his arms, he obeys the order and
commands his men to do the same. In the mean time, while they treat upon the
terms, and a longer debate than necessary is designedly entered into by
Ambiorix, being surrounded by degrees, he is slain. Then they, according to
their custom, shout out "Victory," and raise their war-cry, and,
making an attack on our men, break their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting,
is slain, together with the greater part of the soldiers; the rest betake
themselves to the camp, from which they had marched forth, and one of them, L.
Petrosidius, the standard bearer, when he was overpowered by the great number
of the enemy, threw the eagle within the intrenchments and is himself slain
while fighting with the greatest courage before the camp. They with difficulty
sustain the attack till night; despairing of safety, they all to a man destroy
themselves in the night. A few escaping from the battle, made their way to
Labienus at winter-quarters, after wandering at random through the woods, and
inform him of these events
[5.38] Elated by this
victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cavalry to the Aduatuci, who
bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the
infantry to follow him closely. Having related the exploit and roused the
Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats "that
they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating themselves forever and
of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from
them;" [he tells them] "that two lieutenants have been slain, and
that a large portion of the army has perished; that it was not a matter of
difficulty for the legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when
suddenly assaulted; he declares himself ready to cooperate in that design. He
easily gains over the Nervii by this speech.
[5.39] Accordingly,
messengers having been forthwith dispatched to the Centrones, the Grudii, the
Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of whom are under their government,
they assemble as large bodies as they can, and rush unexpectedly to the
winter-quarters of Cicero, the report of the death of Titurius not having as
yet been conveyed to him. That also occurred to him, which was the consequence
of a necessary work - that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for
the purpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifications, were
intercepted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These having been
entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatici and all their allies and
dependents, begin to attack the legion: our men quickly run together to arms
and mount the rampart; they sustained the attack that day with great
difficulty, since the enemy placed all their hope in dispatch, and felt assured
that, if they obtained this victory, they would be conquerors forever.
[5.40] Letters are
immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards being offered [to the
messengers] if they carried them through. All these passes having been beset,
those who were sent are intercepted. During the night as many as 120 towers are
raised with incredible dispatch out of the timber which they had collected for
the purpose of fortification: the things which seemed necessary to the work are
completed. The following day the enemy, having collected far greater forces,
attack the camp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the
same manner as the day before; this same thing is done afterward during the
remaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: not even to
the sick, or wounded, is opportunity given for rest: whatever things are
required for resisting the assault of the next day are provided during the
night: many stakes burned at the end, and a large number of mural pikes are
procured: towers are built up, battlements and parapets are formed of
interwoven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he was in very weak health, did not
leave himself the night-time for repose, so that he was forced to spare himself
by the spontaneous movement and entreaties of the soldiers.
[5.41] Then these
leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy and grounds of
friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with him. When permission was
granted, they recount the same things which Ambiorix had related to Titurius,
namely, "that all Gaul was in arms, that the Germans had passed the Rhine,
that the winter-quarters of Caesar and of the others were attacked." They
report in addition also, about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for
the purpose of obtaining credence; "they are mistaken," say they,
"if they hoped for any relief from those who distrust their own affairs;
that they bear such feelings toward Cicero and the Roman people that they deny
them nothing but winter-quarters, and are unwilling that the practice should
become constant; that through their [the Nervii's] means it is possible for
them [the Romans] to depart from their winter-quarters safely and to proceed
without fear into whatever parts they desire." To these Cicero made only
one reply: "that it is not the custom of the Roman people to accept any
condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to lay down their arms, they
may employ him as their advocate and send embassadors to Caesar: that he
believed, from his [Caesar's] justice, they would obtain the things which they
might request."
[5.42] Disappointed in
this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-quarters with a rampart eleven feet
high, and a ditch thirteen feet in depth. These military works they had learned
from our men in the intercourse of former years, and, having taken some of our
army prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of iron
tools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the turf
with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks, from
which circumstance, the vast number of the men could be inferred; for in less
than three hours they completed a fortification of ten miles in circumference;
and during the rest of the days they began to prepare and construct towers of
the height of the ramparts, and grappling irons, and mantelets, which the same
prisoners had taught them.
[5.43] On the seventh
day of the attack, a very high wind having sprung up, they began to discharge
by their slings hot balls made of burned or hardened clay, and heated javelins,
upon the huts, which, after the Gallic custom, were thatched with straw. These
quickly took fire, and by the violence of the wind, scattered their flames in
every part of the camp. The enemy following up their success with a very loud
shout, as if victory were already obtained and secured, began to advance their
towers and mantelets, and climb the rampart with ladders. But so great was the
courage of our soldiers, and such their presence of mind, that though they were
scorched on all sides, and harassed by a vast number of weapons, and were aware
that their baggage and their possessions were burning, not only did no one quit
the rampart for the purpose of withdrawing from the scene, but scarcely did any
one even then look behind; and they all fought most vigorously and most
valiantly. This day was by far the most calamitous to our men; it had this
result, however, that on that day the largest number of the enemy was wounded
and slain, since they had crowded beneath the very rampart, and the hindmost
did not afford the foremost a retreat. The flame having abated a little, and a
tower having been brought up in a particular place and touching the rampart,
the centurions of the third cohort retired from the place in which they were
standing, and drew off all their men: they began to call on the enemy by
gestures and by words, to enter if they wished; but none of them dared to
advance. Then stones having been cast from every quarter, the enemy were
dislodged, and their tower set on fire.
[5.44] In that legion
there were two very brave men, centurions, who were now approaching the first
ranks, T. Pulfio, and L. Varenus. These used to have continual disputes between
them which of them should be preferred, and every year used to contend for
promotion with the utmost animosity. When the fight was going on most
vigorously before the fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says, "Why do
you hesitate, Varenus? or what [better] opportunity of signalizing your valor
do you seek? This very day shall decide our disputes." When he had uttered
these words, he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that part of the
enemy which appeared the thickest. Nor does Varenus remain within the rampart,
but respecting the high opinion of all, follows close after. Then, when an
inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfio throws his javelin at the enemy, and
pierces one of the multitude who was running up, and while the latter was
wounded and slain, the enemy cover him with their shields, and all throw their
weapons at the other and afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of
Pulfio is pierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This circumstance
turns aside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when attempting to draw
his sword: the enemy crowd around him when [thus] embarrassed. His rival runs
up to him and succors him in this emergency. Immediately the whole host turn from
Pulfio to him, supposing the other to be pierced through by the javelin.
Varenus rushes on briskly with his sword and carries on the combat hand to
hand, and having slain one man, for a short time drove back the rest: while he
urges on too eagerly, slipping into a hollow, he fell. To him, in his turn,
when surrounded, Pulfio brings relief; and both having slain a great number,
retreat into the fortifications amid the highest applause. Fortune so dealt
with both in this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was a succor
and a safeguard to the other, nor could it be determined which of the two
appeared worthy of being preferred to the other.
[5.45] In proportion as
the attack became daily more formidable and violent, and particularly, because,
as a great number of the soldiers were exhausted with wounds, the matter had
come to a small number of defenders, more frequent letters and messages were
sent to Caesar; a part of which messengers were taken and tortured to death in
the sight of our soldiers. There was within our camp a certain Nervian, by name
Vertico, born in a distinguished position, who in the beginning of the blockade
had deserted to Cicero, and had exhibited his fidelity to him. He persuades his
slave, by the hope of freedom, and by great rewards, to convey a letter to
Caesar. This he carries out bound about his javelin; and mixing among the Gauls
without any suspicion by being a Gaul, he reaches Caesar. From him they
received information of the imminent danger of Cicero and the legion.
[5.46] Caesar having
received the letter about the eleventh hour of the day, immediately sends a
messenger to the Bellovaci, to M. Crassus, questor there, whose winter-quarters
were twenty-five miles distant from him. He orders the legion to set forward in
the middle of the night, and come to him with dispatch. Crassus sets out with
the messenger. He sends another to C. Fabius, the lieutenant, ordering him to
lead forth his legion into the territories of the Atrebates, to which he knew
his march must be made. He writes to Labienus to come with his legion to the
frontiers of the Nervii, if he could do so to the advantage of the
commonwealth: he does not consider that the remaining portion of the army,
because it was somewhat further distant, should be waited for; but assembles
about 400 horse from the nearest winter-quarters.
[5.47] Having been
apprised of the arrival of Crassus by the scouts at about the third hour, he
advances twenty miles that day. He appoints Crassus over Samarobriva and
assigns him a legion, because he was leaving there the baggage of the army, the
hostages of the states, the public documents, and all the corn, which he had
conveyed thither for passing the winter. Fabius, without delaying a moment,
meets him on the march with his legion, as he had been commanded. Labienus,
having learned the death of Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, as all
the forces of the Treviri had come against him, beginning to fear lest, if he
made a departure from his winter-quarters, resembling a flight, he should not
be able to support the attack of the enemy, particularly since he knew them to
be elated by their recent victory, sends back a letter to Caesar, informing him
with what great hazard he would lead out his legion from winter-quarters; he
relates at large the affairs which had taken place among the Eburones; he
informs him that all the infantry and cavalry of the Treviri had encamped at a
distance of only three miles from his own camp.
[5.48] Caesar,
approving of his motives, although he was disappointed in his expectation of
three legions, and reduced to two, yet placed his only hopes of the common
safety in dispatch. He goes into the territories of the Nervii by long marches.
There he learns from some prisoners what things are going on in the camp of
Cicero, and in how great jeopardy the affair is. Then with great rewards he
induces a certain man of the Gallic horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This he
sends written in Greek characters, lest the letter being intercepted, our
measures should be discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if he should be
unable to enter, to throw his spear with the letter fastened to the thong,
inside the fortifications of the camp. He writes in the letter, that he having
set out with his legions, will quickly be there: he entreats him to maintain
his ancient valor. The Gaul apprehending danger, throws his spear as he has
been directed. Is by chance stuck in a tower, and, not being observed by our
men for two days, was seen by a certain soldier on the third day: when taken
down, it was carried to Cicero. He, after perusing it, reads it out in an
assembly of the soldiers, and fills all with the greatest joy. Then the smoke
of the fires was seen in the distance, a circumstance which banished all doubt
of the arrival of the legions.
[5.49] The Gauls,
having discovered the matter through their scouts, abandon the blockade, and
march toward Caesar with all their forces; these were about 60,000 armed men.
Cicero, an opportunity being now afforded, again begs of that Vertico, the
Gaul, whom we mentioned above, to convey back a letter to Caesar; he advises
him to perform his journey warily; he writes in the letter that the enemy had
departed and had turned their entire force against him. When this letter was
brought to him about the middle of the night, Caesar apprises his soldiers of
its contents, and inspires them with courage for fighting: the following day,
at the dawn, he moves his camp, and, having proceeded four miles, he espies the
forces of the enemy on the other side of a considerable valley and rivulet. It
was an affair of great danger to fight with such large forces in a
disadvantageous situation. For the present, therefore, inasmuch as he knew that
Cicero was released from the blockade, and thought that he might, on that
account, relax his speed, he halted there and fortifies a camp in the most
favorable position he can. And this, though it was small in itself, [there
being] scarcely 7,000 men, and these too without baggage, still by the
narrowness of the passages, he contracts as much as he can, with this object,
that he may come into the greatest contempt with the enemy. In the mean while
scouts having been sent in all directions, he examines by what most convenient
path he might cross the valley.
[5.50] That day, slight
skirmishes of cavalry having taken place near the river, both armies kept in
their own positions: the Gauls, because they were awaiting larger forces which
had not then arrived; Caesar, [to see] if perchance by pretense of fear he
could allure the enemy toward his position, so that he might engage in battle,
in front of his camp, on this side of the valley; if he could not accomplish
this, that, having inquired about the passes, he might cross the valley and the
river with the less hazard. At daybreak the cavalry of the enemy approaches to
the camp and joins battle with our horse. Caesar orders the horse to give way
purposely, and retreat to the camp: at the same time he orders the camp to be
fortified with a higher rampart in all directions, the gates to be barricaded,
and in executing these things as much confusion to be shown as possible, and to
perform them under the pretense of fear.
[5.51] Induced by all
these things, the enemy lead over their forces and draw up their line in a
disadvantageous position; and as our men also had been led down from the
ramparts, they approach nearer, and throw their weapons into the fortification
from all sides, and sending heralds round, order it to be proclaimed that, if
"any, either Gaul or Roman, was willing to go over to them before the
third hour, it was permitted; after that time there would not be
permission;" and so much did they disregard our men, that the gates having
been blocked up with single rows of turf as a mere appearance, because they did
not seem able to burst in that way, some began to pull down the rampart with
their hands, others to fill up the trenches. Then Caesar, making a sally from
all the gates, and sending out the cavalry, soon puts the enemy to flight, so
that no one at all stood his ground with the intention of fighting; and he slew
a great number of them, and deprived all of their arms.
[5.52] Caesar, fearing
to pursue them very far, because woods and morasses intervened, and also
[because] he saw that they suffered no small loss in abandoning their position,
reaches Cicero the same day with all his forces safe. He witnesses with
surprise the towers, mantelets, and [other] fortifications belonging to the
enemy: the legion having been drawn out, he finds that even every tenth soldier
had not escaped without wounds. From all these things he judges with what
danger and with what great courage matters had been conducted; he commends
Cicero according to his desert, and likewise the legion; he addresses
individually the centurions and the tribunes of the soldiers, whose valor he
had discovered to have been signal. He receives information of the death of
Sabinus and Cotta from the prisoners. An assembly being held the following day,
he states the occurrence; he consoles and encourages the soldiers; he suggests,
that the disaster, which had been occasioned by the misconduct and rashness of
his lieutenant, should be borne with a patient mind, because by the favor of
the immortal gods and their own valor, neither was lasting joy left to the enemy,
nor very lasting grief to them.
[5.53] In the mean
while the report respecting the victory of Caesar is conveyed to Labienus
through the country of the Remi with incredible speed, so that, though he was
about sixty miles distant from the winter-quarter of Cicero, and Caesar had
arrived there after the ninth hour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates
of the camp, by which shout an indication of the victory and a congratulation
on the part of the Remi were given to Labienus. This report having been carried
to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus
the following day, flies by night and leads back all his forces into the
country of the Treviri. Caesar sends back Fabius with his legion to his
winter-quarters; he himself determines to winter with three legions near
Samarobriva in three different quarters, and, because such great commotions had
arisen in Gaul, he resolved to remain during the whole winter with the army
himself. For the disaster respecting the death of Sabinus having been
circulated among them, almost all the states of Gaul were deliberating about
war, sending messengers and embassies into all quarters, inquiring what further
measure they should take, and holding councils by night in secluded places. Nor
did any period of the whole winter pass over without fresh anxiety to Caesar,
or, without his receiving some intelligence respecting the meetings and
commotions of the Gauls. Among these, he is informed by L. Roscius, the
lieutenant whom he had placed over the thirteenth legion, that large forces of
those states of the Gauls, which are called the Armoricae, had assembled for
the purpose of attacking him and were not more than eight miles distant; but
intelligence respecting the victory of Caesar being carried [to them], had
retreated in such a manner that their departure appeared like a flight.
[5.54] But Caesar,
having summoned to him the principal persons of each state, in one case by
alarming them, since he declared that he knew what was going on, and in another
case by encouraging them, retained a great part of Gaul in its allegiance. The
Senones, however, which is a state eminently powerful and one of great
influence among the Gauls, attempting by general design to slay Cavarinus, whom
Caesar had created king among them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the
sovereignty at the period of the arrival of Caesar in Gaul, and whose ancestors
had also previously held it), when he discovered their plot and fled, pursued
him even to the frontiers [of the state], and drove him from his kingdom and
his home; and, after having sent embassadors to Caesar for the purpose of
concluding a peace, when he ordered all their senate to come to him, did not
obey that command. So far did it operate among those barbarian people, that
there were found some to be the first to wage war; and so great a change of
inclinations did it produce in all, that, except the Aedui and the Remi, whom
Caesar had always held in especial honor, the one people for their long
standing and uniform fidelity toward the Roman people, the other for their late
service in the Gallic war, there was scarcely a state which was not suspected
by us. And I do not know whether that ought much to be wondered at, as well for
several other reasons, as particularly because they who ranked above all
nations for prowess in war, most keenly regretted that they had lost so much of
that reputation as to submit to commands from the Roman people.
[5.55] But the Triviri
and Indutiomarus let no part of the entire winter pass without sending
embassadors across the Rhine, importuning the states, promising money, and
asserting that, as a large portion of our army had been cut off, a much smaller
portion remained. However, none of the German States could be induced to cross the
Rhine, since "they had twice essayed it," they said, "in the war
with Ariovistus and in the passage of the Tenchtheri there; that fortune was
not to be tempted any more." Indutiomarus disappointed in this
expectation, nevertheless began to raise troops, and discipline them, and
procure horses from the neighboring people, and allure to him by great rewards
the outlaws and convicts throughout Gaul. And such great influence had he
already acquired for himself in Gaul by these means, that embassies were flocking
to him in all directions, and seeking, publicly and privately, his favor and
friendship.
[5.56] When he
perceived that they were coming to him voluntarily; that on the one side the
Senones and the Carnutes were stimulated by their consciousness of guilt, on
the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuci were preparing war against the
Romans, and that forces of volunteers would not be wanting to him if he began
to advance from his own territories, he proclaims an armed council (this
according to the custom of the Gauls in the commencement of war) at which, by a
common law, all the youth were wont to assemble in arms, whoever of them comes
last is killed in the sight of the whole assembly after being racked with every
torture. In that council he declares Cingetorix, the leader of the other
faction, his own son-in-law (whom we have above mentioned, as having embraced
the protection of Caesar, and never having deserted him) an enemy and
confiscates his property. When these things were finished, he asserts in the
council that he, invited by the Senones and the Carnutes, and several other
states of Gaul, was about to march thither through the territories of the Remi,
devastate their lands, and attack the camp of Labienus: before he does that, he
informs them of what he desires to be done.
[5.57] Labienus, since
he was confining himself within a camp strongly fortified by the nature of the
ground and by art, had no apprehensions as to his own and the legion's danger,
but was devising that he might throw away no opportunity of conducting the war
successfully. Accordingly, the speech of Indutiomarus, which he had delivered
in the council, having been made known [to him] by Cingetorix and his allies,
he sends messengers to the neighboring states and summons horse from all
quarters: he appoints to them a fixed day for assembling. In the mean time,
Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, nearly every day used to parade close to
his [Labienus'] camp; at one time, that he might inform himself of the
situation of the camp; at another time, for the purpose of conferring with or
of intimidating him. Labienus confined his men within the fortifications, and
promoted the enemy's belief of his fear by whatever methods he could.
[5.58] Since
Indutiomarus was daily advancing up to the camp with greater defiance, all the
cavalry of the neighboring states which he [Labienus] had taken care to have
sent for, having been admitted in one night, he confined all his men within the
camp by guards with such great strictness, that that fact could by no means be
reported or carried to the Treviri. In the mean while, Indutiomarus, according
to his daily practice, advances up to the camp and spends a great part of the
day there: his horse cast their weapons, and with very insulting language call
out our men to battle. No reply being given by our men, the enemy, when they
thought proper, depart toward evening in a disorderly and scattered manner,
Labienus unexpectedly sends out all the cavalry by two gates; he gives this
command and prohibition, that, when the enemy should be terrified and put to
flight (which he foresaw would happen, as it did), they should all make for
Indutiomarus, and no one wound any man before he should have seen him slain,
because he was unwilling that he should escape, in consequence of gaining time
by the delay [occasioned by the pursuit] of the rest. He offers great rewards
for those who should kill him: he sends up the cohorts as a relief to the
horse. The issue justifies the policy of the man, and since all aimed at one, Indutiomarus
is slain, having been overtaken at the very ford of the river, and his head is
carried to the camp, the horse, when returning, pursue and slay all whom they
can. This affair having been known, all the forces of the Eburones and the
Nervii which had assembled, depart; and for a short time after this action,
Caesar was less harassed in the government of Gaul.
End of Book 5
Caius Julius Caesar 53
B.C.
[6.1] Caesar, expecting
for many reasons a greater commotion in Gaul, resolves to hold a levy by the
means of M. Silanus C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, his lieutenants: at
the same time he requested Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was
remaining near the city invested with military command for the interests of the
commonwealth, he would command those men whom when consul he had levied by the
military oath in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective corps, and to proceed
to him; thinking it of great importance, as far as regarded the opinion which
the Gauls would entertain for the future, that that the resources of Italy
should appear so great that if any loss should be sustained in war, not only
could it be repaired in a short time, but likewise be further supplied by still
larger forces. And when Pompey had granted this to the interests of the
commonwealth and the claims of friendship, Caesar having quickly completed the
levy by means of his lieutenants, after three regiments had been both formed
and brought to him before the winter [had] expired, and the number of those
cohorts which he had lost under Q. Titurius had been doubled, taught the Gauls,
both by his dispatch and by his forces what the discipline and the power of the
Roman people could accomplish.
[6.2] Indutiomarus
having been slain, as we have stated, the government was conferred upon his
relatives by the Treviri. They cease not to importune the neighboring Germans
and to promise them money: when they could not obtain [their object] from those
nearest them, they try those more remote. Having found some states willing to
accede to their wishes, they enter into a compact with them by a mutual oath,
and give hostages as a security for the money: they attach Ambiorix to them by
an alliance and confederacy. Caesar, on being informed of their acts, since he
saw that war was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci, and
Menapii, with the addition of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine were
under arms, that the Senones did not assemble according to his command, and
were concerting measures with the Carnutes and the neighboring states, that the
Germans were importuned by the Treviri in frequent embassies, thought that he
ought to take measures for the war earlier [than usual].
[6.3] Accordingly,
while the winter was not yet ended, having concentrated the four nearest
legions, he marched unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervii, and before
they could either assemble or retreat, after capturing a large number of cattle
and of men, and wasting their lands and giving up that booty to the soldiers,
compelled them to enter into a surrender and give him hostages. That business
having been speedily executed, he again led his legions back into
winter-quarters. Having proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning of the
spring, as he had been accustomed [to do], when the deputies from the rest,
except the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had come, judging this to be
the commencement of war and revolt, that he might appear to consider all things
of less consequence [than that war], he transfers the council to Lutetia of the
Parisii. These were adjacent to the Senones, and had united their state to them
during the memory of their fathers, but were thought to have no part in the
present plot. Having proclaimed this from the tribunal, he advances the same
day toward the Senones with his legions, and arrives among them by long
marches.
[6.4] Acco, who had
been the author of that enterprise, on being informed of his arrival, orders
the people to assemble in the towns; to them, while attempting this, and before
it could be accomplished, news is brought that the Romans are close at hand:
through necessity they give over their design and send embassadors to Caesar
for the purpose of imploring pardon; they make advances to him through the
Aedui, whose state was from ancient times under the protection of Rome. Caesar
readily grants them pardon, and receives their excuse, at the request of the
Aedui, because he thought that the summer season was one for an impending war,
not for an investigation. Having imposed one hundred hostages, he delivers
these to the Aedui to be held in charge by them. To the same place the Carnutes
send embassadors and hostages, employing as their mediators the Remi, under
whose protection they were: they receive the same answers. Caesar concludes the
council and imposes a levy of cavalry on the states.
[6.5] This part of Gaul
having been tranquilized, he applies himself entirely both in mind and soul to
the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix. He orders Cavarinus to march with him
with the cavalry of the Senones, lest any commotion should arise either out of
his hot temper, or out of the hatred of the state which he had incurred. After
arranging these things, as he considered it certain that Ambiorix would not
contend in battle, he watched his other plans attentively. The Menapii bordered
on the territories of the Eburones, and were protected by one continued extent
of morasses and woods; and they alone out of Gaul had never sent embassadors to
Caesar on the subject of peace. Caesar knew that a tie of hospitality subsisted
between them and Ambiorix: he also discovered that the latter had entered into
an alliance with the Germans by means of the Treviri. Ho thought that these
auxiliaries ought to be detached from him before he provoked him to war; lest
he, despairing of safety, should either proceed to conceal himself in the
territories of the Menapii, or should be driven to coalesce with the Germans
beyond the Rhine. Having entered upon this resolution, he sends the baggage of
the whole army to Labienus, in the territories of the Treviri and orders two
legions to proceed to him: he himself proceeds against the Menapii with five
lightly-equipped legions. They, having assembled no troops, as they relied on
the defense of their position, retreat into the woods and morasses, and convey
thither all their property.
[6.6] Caesar, having
divided his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and M. Crassus his questor,
and having hastily constructed some bridges, enters their country in three divisions,
burns their houses and villages, and gets possession of a large number of
cattle and men. Constrained by these circumstances the Menapii send embassadors
to him for the purpose of suing for peace. He, after receiving hostages,
assures them that he will consider them in the number of his enemies if they
shall receive within their territories either Ambiorix or his embassadors.
Having determinately settled these things, he left among the Menapii, Commius
the Atrebatian, with some cavalry as a guard; he himself proceeds toward the
Treviri.
[6.7] While these
things are being performed by Caesar, the Treviri, having drawn together large
forces of infantry and cavalry, were preparing to attack Labienus and the
legion which was wintering in their territories, and were already not further
distant from him than a journey of two days, when they learn that two legions
had arrived by the order of Caesar. Having pitched their camp fifteen miles
off, they resolve to await the support of the Germans. Labienus, having learned
the design of the enemy, hoping that through their rashness there would be some
opportunity of engaging, after leaving a guard of five cohorts for the baggage,
advances against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large body of
cavalry, and, leaving the space of a mile between them, fortifies his camp.
There was between Labienus and the enemy a river difficult to cross, and with
steep banks: this neither did he himself design to cross, nor did he suppose
the enemy would cross it. Their hope of auxiliaries was daily increasing. He
[Labienus] openly says in a council that "since the Germans are said to be
approaching, he would not bring into uncertainty his own and the army's
fortunes, and the next day would move his camp at early dawn." These words
are quickly carried to the enemy, since out of so large a number of cavalry
composed of Gauls, nature compelled some to favor the Gallic interests.
Labienus, having assembled the tribunes of the soldiers and principal
centurions by night, states what his design is, and, that he may the more
easily give the enemy a belief of his fears, he orders the camp to be moved
with greater noise and confusion than was usual with the Roman people. By these
means he makes his departure [appear] like a retreat. These things, also, since
the camps were so near, are reported to the enemy by scouts before daylight.
[6.8] Scarcely had the
rear advanced beyond the fortifications when the Gauls, encouraging one another
"not to cast from their hands the anticipated booty, that it was a tedious
thing, while the Romans were panic-stricken, to be waiting for the aid of the
Germans, and that their dignity did not suffer them to fear to attack with such
great forces so small a band, particularly when retreating and encumbered,"
do not hesitate to cross the river and give battle in a disadvantageous
position. Labienus suspecting that these things would happen, was proceeding
quietly, and using the same pretense of a march, in order that he might entice
them across the river. Then, having sent forward the baggage some short
distance and placed it on a certain eminence, he says, "Soldiers, you have
the opportunity you have sought: you hold the enemy in an encumbered and
disadvantageous position: display to us, your leaders, the same valor you have
ofttimes displayed to your general: imagine that he is present and actually
sees these exploits." At the same time he orders the troops to face about
toward the enemy and form in line of battle, and, dispatching a few troops of
cavalry as a guard for the baggage, he places the rest of the horse on the
wings. Our men, raising a shout, quickly throw their javelins at the enemy.
They, when, contrary to their expectation, they saw those whom they believed to
be retreating, advance toward them with threatening banners, were not able to
sustain even the charge, and, being put to flight at the first onslaught,
sought the nearest woods; Labienus pursuing them with the cavalry, upon a large
number being slain, and several taken prisoners, got possession of the state a
few days after; for the Germans, who were coming to the aid of the Treviri,
having been informed of their flight, retreated to their homes. The relations
of Indutiomarus, who had been the promoters of the revolt, accompanying them,
quitted their own state with them. The supreme power and government were
delivered to Cingetorix, whom we have stated to have remained firm in his
allegiance from the commencement.
[6.9] Caesar, after he
came from the territories of the Menapii into those of the Treviri, resolved
for two reasons to cross the Rhine; one of which was, because they had sent
assistance to the Treviri against him; the other, that Ambiorix might not have
a retreat among them. Having determined on these matters, he began to build a bridge
a little above that place where he had before conveyed over his army. The plan
having been known and laid down, the work is accomplished in a few days by the
great exertion of the soldiers. Having left a strong guard at the bridge on the
side of the Treviri, lest any commotion should suddenly arise among them, he
leads over the rest of the forces and the cavalry. The Ubii, who before had
sent hostages and come to a capitulation, send embassadors to him, for the
purpose of vindicating themselves, to assure him that "neither had
auxiliaries been sent to the Treviri from their state, nor had they violated
their allegiance;" they entreat and beseech him "to spare them, lest,
in his common hatred of the Germans, the innocent should suffer the penalty of
the guilty: they promise to give more hostages, if he desire them." Having
investigated the case, Caesar finds that the auxiliaries had been sent by the
Suevi; he accepts the apology of the Ubii, and makes the minute inquiries
concerning the approaches and the routes to the territories of the Suevi.
[6.10] In the mean time
he is informed by the Ubii, a few days after, that the Suevi are drawing all
their forces into one place, and are giving orders to those nations which are
under their government to send auxiliaries of infantry and of cavalry. Having
learned these things, he provides a supply of corn, selects a proper place for
his camp, and commands the Ubii to drive off their cattle and carry away all
their possessions from the country parts into the towns, hoping that they,
being a barbarous and ignorant people, when harassed by the want of provisions,
might be brought to an engagement on disadvantageous terms: he orders them to
send numerous scouts among the Suevi, and learn what things are going on among
them. They execute the orders, and, a few days having intervened, report that
all the Suevi, after certain intelligence concerning the army of the Romans had
come, retreated with all their own forces and those of their allies, which they
had assembled, to the utmost extremities of their territories: that there is a
wood there of very great extent, which is called Bacenis; that this stretches a
great way into the interior, and, being opposed as a natural barrier, defends
from injuries and incursions the Cherusci against the Suevi, and the Suevi
against the Cherusci: that at the entrance of that forest the Suevi had
determined to await the coming up of the Romans.
[6.11] Since we have
come to the place, it does not appear to be foreign to our subject to lay
before the reader an account of the manners of Gaul and Germany, and wherein
these nations differ from each other. In Gaul there are factions not only in
all the states, and in all the cantons and their divisions, but almost in each
family, and of these factions those are the leaders who are considered
according to their judgment to possess the greatest influence, upon whose will
and determination the management of all affairs and measures depends. And that
seems to have been instituted in ancient times with this view, that no one of
the common people should be in want of support against one more powerful; for,
none [of those leaders] suffers his party to be oppressed and defrauded, and if
he do otherwise, he has no influence among his party. This same policy exists
throughout the whole of Gaul; for all the states are divided into two factions.
[6.12] When Caesar
arrived in Gaul, the Aedui were the leaders of one faction, the Sequani of the
other. Since the latter were less powerful by themselves, inasmuch as the chief
influence was from of old among the Aedui, and their dependencies were great,
they had united to themselves the Germans and Ariovistus, and had brought them
over to their party by great sacrifices and promises. And having fought several
successful battles and slain all the nobility of the Aedui, they had so far
surpassed them in power, that they brought over, from the Aedui to themselves,
a large portion of their dependents and received from them the sons of their
leading men as hostages, and compelled them to swear in their public character
that they would enter into no design against them; and held a portion of the
neighboring land, seized on by force, and possessed the sovereignty of the
whole of Gaul. Divitiacus urged by this necessity, had proceeded to Rome to the
senate, for the purpose of entreating assistance, and had returned without
accomplishing his object. A change of affairs ensued on the arrival of Caesar,
the hostages were returned to the Aedui, their old dependencies restored, and
new acquired through Caesar (because those who had attached themselves to their
alliance saw that they enjoyed a better state and a milder government), their
other interests, their influence, their reputation were likewise increased, and
in consequence, the Sequani lost the sovereignty. The Remi succeeded to their
place, and, as it was perceived that they equaled the Aedui in favor with
Caesar, those, who on account of their old animosities could by no means
coalesce with the Aedui, consigned themselves in clientship to the Remi. The
latter carefully protected them. Thus they possessed both a new and suddenly
acquired influence. Affairs were then in that position that the Aedui were
considered by far the leading people, and the Remi held the second post of
honor.
[6.13] Throughout all
Gaul there are two orders of those men who are of any rank and dignity: for the
commonality is held almost in the condition of slaves, and dares to undertake
nothing of itself, and is admitted to no deliberation. The greater part, when
they are pressed either by debt, or the large amount of their tributes, or the
oppression of the more powerful, give themselves up in vassalage to the nobles,
who possess over them the same rights without exception as masters over their
slaves. But of these two orders, one is that of the Druids, the other that of
the knights. The former are engaged in things sacred, conduct the public and
the private sacrifices, and interpret all matters of religion. To these a large
number of the young men resort for the purpose of instruction, and they [the
Druids] are in great honor among them. For they determine respecting almost all
controversies, public and private; and if any crime has been perpetrated, if
murder has been committed, if there be any dispute about an inheritance, if any
about boundaries, these same persons decide it; they decree rewards and
punishments; if any one, either in a private or public capacity, has not
submitted to their decision, they interdict him from the sacrifices. This among
them is the most heavy punishment. Those who have been thus interdicted are
esteemed in the number of the impious and the criminal: all shun them, and
avoid their society and conversation, lest they receive some evil from their
contact; nor is justice administered to them when seeking it, nor is any
dignity bestowed on them. Over all these Druids one presides, who possesses
supreme authority among them. Upon his death, if any individual among the rest
is pre-eminent in dignity, he succeeds; but, if there are many equal, the
election is made by the suffrages of the Druids; sometimes they even contend
for the presidency with arms. These assemble at a fixed period of the year in a
consecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, which is reckoned the central
region of the whole of Gaul. Hither all, who have disputes, assemble from every
part, and submit to their decrees and determinations. This institution is
supposed to have been devised in Britain, and to have been brought over from it
into Gaul; and now those who desire to gain a more accurate knowledge of that
system generally proceed thither for the purpose of studying it.
[6.14] The Druids do
not go to war, nor pay tribute together with the rest; they have an exemption
from military service and a dispensation in all matters. Induced by such great
advantages, many embrace this profession of their own accord, and [many] are
sent to it by their parents and relations. They are said there to learn by
heart a great number of verses; accordingly some remain in the course of
training twenty years. Nor do they regard it lawful to commit these to writing,
though in almost all other matters, in their public and private transactions,
they use Greek characters. That practice they seem to me to have adopted for two
reasons; because they neither desire their doctrines to be divulged among the
mass of the people, nor those who learn, to devote themselves the less to the
efforts of memory, relying on writing; since it generally occurs to most men,
that, in their dependence on writing, they relax their diligence in learning
thoroughly, and their employment of the memory. They wish to inculcate this as
one of their leading tenets, that souls do not become extinct, but pass after
death from one body to another, and they think that men by this tenet are in a
great degree excited to valor, the fear of death being disregarded. They
likewise discuss and impart to the youth many things respecting the stars and
their motion, respecting the extent of the world and of our earth, respecting
the nature of things, respecting the power and the majesty of the immortal
gods.
[6.15] The other order
is that of the knights. These, when there is occasion and any war occurs (which
before Caesar's arrival was for the most part wont to happen every year, as
either they on their part were inflecting injuries or repelling those which
others inflected on them), are all engaged in war. And those of them most
distinguished by birth and resources, have the greatest number of vassals and
dependents about them. They acknowledge this sort of influence and power only.
[6.16] The nation of
all the Gauls is extremely devoted to superstitious rites; and on that account
they who are troubled with unusually severe diseases, and they who are engaged
in battles and dangers, either sacrifice men as victims, or vow that they will
sacrifice them, and employ the Druids as the performers of those sacrifices;
because they think that unless the life of a man be offered for the life of a
man, the mind of the immortal gods can not be rendered propitious, and they
have sacrifices of that kind ordained for national purposes. Others have
figures of vast size, the limbs of which formed of osiers they fill with living
men, which being set on fire, the men perish enveloped in the flames. They
consider that the oblation of such as have been taken in theft, or in robbery,
or any other offense, is more acceptable to the immortal gods; but when a
supply of that class is wanting, they have recourse to the oblation of even the
innocent.
[6.17] They worship as
their divinity, Mercury in particular, and have many images of him, and regard
him as the inventor of all arts, they consider him the guide of their journeys
and marches, and believe him to have great influence over the acquisition of
gain and mercantile transactions. Next to him they worship Apollo, and Mars,
and Jupiter, and Minerva; respecting these deities they have for the most part
the same belief as other nations: that Apollo averts diseases, that Minerva
imparts the invention of manufactures, that Jupiter possesses the sovereignty
of the heavenly powers; that Mars presides over wars. To him, when they have
determined to engage in battle, they commonly vow those things which they shall
take in war. When they have conquered, they sacrifice whatever captured animals
may have survived the conflict, and collect the other things into one place. In
many states you may see piles of these things heaped up in their consecrated
spots; nor does it often happen that any one, disregarding the sanctity of the
case, dares either to secrete in his house things captured, or take away those
deposited; and the most severe punishment, with torture, has been established
for such a deed.
[6.18] All the Gauls
assert that they are descended from the god Dis, and say that this tradition
has been handed down by the Druids. For that reason they compute the divisions
of every season, not by the number of days, but of nights; they keep birthdays
and the beginnings of months and years in such an order that the day follows
the night. Among the other usages of their life, they differ in this from
almost all other nations, that they do not permit their children to approach
them openly until they are grown up so as to be able to bear the service of
war; and they regard it as indecorous for a son of boyish age to stand in
public in the presence of his father.
[6.19] Whatever sums of
money the husbands have received in the name of dowry from their wives, making
an estimate of it, they add the same amount out of their own estates. An
account is kept of all this money conjointly, and the profits are laid by:
whichever of them shall have survived [the other], to that one the portion of
both reverts together with the profits of the previous time. Husbands have power
of life and death over their wives as well as over their children: and when the
father of a family, born in a more than commonly distinguished rank, has died,
his relations assemble, and, if the circumstances of his death are suspicious,
hold an investigation upon the wives in the manner adopted toward slaves; and,
if proof be obtained, put them to severe torture, and kill them. Their
funerals, considering the state of civilization among the Gauls, are
magnificent and costly; and they cast into the fire all things, including
living creatures, which they suppose to have been dear to them when alive; and,
a little before this period, slaves and dependents, who were ascertained to
have been beloved by them, were, after the regular funeral rites were completed,
burnt together with them.
[6.20] Those states
which are considered to conduct their commonwealth more judiciously, have it
ordained by their laws, that, if any person shall have heard by rumor and
report from his neighbors any thing concerning the commonwealth, he shall
convey it to the magistrate, and not impart it to any other; because it has
been discovered that inconsiderate and inexperienced men were often alarmed by
false reports, and driven to some rash act, or else took hasty measures in
affairs of the highest importance. The magistrates conceal those things which
require to be kept unknown; and they disclose to the people whatever they
determine to be expedient. It is not lawful to speak of the commonwealth,
except in council.
[6.21] The Germans
differ much from these usages, for they have neither Druids to preside over
sacred offices, nor do they pay great regard to sacrifices. They rank in the
number of the gods those alone whom they behold, and by whose instrumentality
they are obviously benefited, namely, the sun, fire, and the moon; they have
not heard of the other deities even by report. Their whole life is occupied in
hunting and in the pursuits of the military art; from childhood they devote
themselves to fatigue and hardships. Those who have remained chaste for the
longest time, receive the greatest commendation among their people; they think
that by this the growth is promoted, by this the physical powers are increased
and the sinews are strengthened. And to have had knowledge of a woman before
the twentieth year they reckon among the most disgraceful acts; of which matter
there is no concealment, because they bathe promiscuously in the rivers and
[only] use skins or small cloaks of deer's hides, a large portion of the body
being in consequence naked.
[6.22] They do not pay
much attention to agriculture, and a large portion of their food consists in
milk, cheese, and flesh; nor has any one a fixed quantity of land or his own
individual limits; but the magistrates and the leading men each year apportion
to the tribes and families, who have united together, as much land as, and in
the place in which, they think proper, and the year after compel them to remove
elsewhere. For this enactment they advance many reasons - lest seduced by long-continued
custom, they may exchange their ardor in the waging of war for agriculture;
lest they may be anxious to acquire extensive estates, and the more powerful
drive the weaker from their possessions; lest they construct their houses with
too great a desire to avoid cold and heat; lest the desire of wealth spring up,
from which cause divisions and discords arise; and that they may keep the
common people in a contented state of mind, when each sees his own means placed
on an equality with [those of] the most powerful.
[6.23] It is the
greatest glory to the several states to have as wide deserts as possible around
them, their frontiers having been laid waste. They consider this the real
evidence of their prowess, that their neighbors shall be driven out of their
lands and abandon them, and that no one dare settle near them; at the same time
they think that they shall be on that account the more secure, because they
have removed the apprehension of a sudden incursion. When a state either repels
war waged against it, or wages it against another, magistrates are chosen to
preside over that war with such authority, that they have power of life and
death. In peace there is no common magistrate, but the chiefs of provinces and
cantons administer justice and determine controversies among their own people.
Robberies which are committed beyond the boundaries of each state bear no
infamy, and they avow that these are committed for the purpose of disciplining
their youth and of preventing sloth. And when any of their chiefs has said in
an assembly "that he will be their leader, let those who are willing to
follow, give in their names;" they who approve of both the enterprise and
the man arise and promise their assistance and are applauded by the people;
such of them as have not followed him are accounted in the number of deserters
and traitors, and confidence in all matters is afterward refused them. To
injure guests they regard as impious; they defend from wrong those who have
come to them for any purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable; to them the
houses of all are open and maintenance is freely supplied.
[6.24] And there was
formerly a time when the Gauls excelled the Germans in prowess, and waged war
on them offensively, and, on account of the great number of their people and
the insufficiency of their land, sent colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the
Volcae Tectosages, seized on those parts of Germany which are the most fruitful
[and lie] around the Hercynian forest, (which, I perceive, was known by report to
Eratosthenes and some other Greeks, and which they call Orcynia), and settled
there. Which nation to this time retains its position in those settlements, and
has a very high character for justice and military merit; now also they
continue in the same scarcity, indigence, hardihood, as the Germans, and use
the same food and dress; but their proximity to the Province and knowledge of
commodities from countries beyond the sea supplies to the Gauls many things
tending to luxury as well as civilization. Accustomed by degrees to be
overmatched and worsted in many engagements, they do not even compare
themselves to the Germans in prowess.
[6.25] The breadth of
this Hercynian forest, which has been referred to above, is to a quick
traveler, a journey of nine days. For it can not be otherwise computed, nor are
they acquainted with the measures of roads. It begins at the frontiers of the
Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and extends in a right line along the river
Danube to the territories of the Daci and the Anartes; it bends thence to the
left in a different direction from the river, and owing to its extent touches
the confines of many nations; nor is there any person belonging to this part of
Germany who says that he either has gone to the extremity of that forest, though
he had advanced a journey of sixty days, or has heard in what place it begins.
It is certain that many kinds of wild beast are produced in it which have not
been seen in other parts; of which the following are such as differ principally
from other animals, and appear worthy of being committed to record.
[6.26] There is an ox
of the shape of a stag, between whose ears a horn rises from the middle of the
forehead, higher and straighter than those horns which are known to us. From
the top of this, branches, like palms, stretch out a considerable distance. The
shape of the female and of the male is the, same; the appearance and the size
of the horns is the same.
[6.27] There are also
[animals] which are called elks. The shape of these, and the varied color of
their skins, is much like roes, but in size they surpass them a little and are
destitute of horns, and have legs without joints and ligatures; nor do they lie
down for the purpose of rest, nor, if they have been thrown down by any
accident, can they raise or lift themselves up. Trees serve as beds to them;
they lean themselves against them, and thus reclining only slightly, they take
their rest; when the huntsmen have discovered from the footsteps of these
animals whither they are accustomed to betake themselves, they either undermine
all the trees at the roots, or cut into them so far that the upper part of the
trees may appear to be left standing. When they have leant upon them, according
to their habit, they knock down by their weight the unsupported trees, and fall
down themselves along with them.
[6.28] There is a third
kind, consisting of those animals which are called uri. These are a little
below the elephant in size, and of the appearance, color, and shape of a bull.
Their strength and speed are extraordinary; they spare neither man nor wild beast
which they have espied. These the Germans take with much pains in pits and kill
them. The young men harden themselves with this exercise, and practice
themselves in this kind of hunting, and those who have slain the greatest
number of them, having produced the horns in public, to serve as evidence,
receive great praise. But not even when taken very young can they be rendered
familiar to men and tamed. The size, shape, and appearance of their horns
differ much from the horns of our oxen. These they anxiously seek after, and
bind at the tips with silver, and use as cups at their most sumptuous
entertainments.
[6.29] Caesar, after he
discovered through the Ubian scouts that the Suevi had retired into their
woods, apprehending a scarcity of corn, because, as we have observed above, all
the Germans pay very little attention to agriculture, resolved not to proceed
any further; but, that he might not altogether relieve the barbarians from the
fear of his return, and that he might delay their succors, having led back his
army, he breaks down, to the length of 200 feet, the further end of the bridge,
which joined the banks of the Ubii, and at the extremity of the bridge raises
towers of four stories, and stations a guard of twelve cohorts for the purpose
of defending the bridge, and strengthens the place with considerable
fortifications. Over that fort and guard he appointed C. Volcatius Tullus, a
young man; he himself, when the corn began to ripen, having set forth for the
war with Ambiorix (through the forest Arduenna, which is the largest of all
Gaul, and reaches from the banks of the Rhine and the frontiers of the Treviri
to those of the Nervii, and extends over more than 500 miles), he sends forward
L. Minucius Basilus with all the cavalry, to try if he might gain any advantage
by rapid marches and the advantage of time, he warns him to forbid fires being
made in the camp, lest any indication of his approach be given at a distance:
he tells him that he will follow immediately.
[6.30] Basilus does as
he was commanded; having performed his march rapidly, and even surpassed the
expectations of all, he surprises in the fields many not expecting him; through
their information he advances toward Ambiorix himself, to the place in which he
was said to be with a few horse. Fortune accomplishes much, not only in other
matters, but also in the art of war. For as it happened by a remarkable chance,
that he fell upon [Ambiorix] himself unguarded and unprepared, and that his
arrival was seen by the people before the report or information of his arrival
was carried thither; so it was an incident of extraordinary fortune that,
although every implement of war which he was accustomed to have about him was
seized, and his chariots and horses surprised, yet he himself escaped death. But
it was effected owing to this circumstance, that his house being surrounded by
a wood (as are generally the dwellings of the Gauls, who, for the purpose of
avoiding heat, mostly seek the neighborhood of woods and rivers), his
attendants and friends in a narrow spot sustained for a short time the attack
of our horse. While they were fighting, one of his followers mounted him on a
horse; the woods sheltered him as he fled. Thus fortune tended much both toward
his encountering and his escaping danger.
[6.31] Whether Ambiorix
did not collect his forces from cool deliberation, because he considered he
ought not to engage in a battle, or [whether] he was debarred by time and
prevented by the sudden arrival of our horse, when he supposed the rest of the
army was closely following, is doubtful: but certainly, dispatching messengers
through the country, he ordered every one to provide for himself; and a part of
them fled into the forest Arduenna, a part into the extensive morasses; those
who were nearest the ocean concealed themselves in the islands which the tides
usually form; many, departing from their territories, committed themselves and
all their possessions to perfect strangers. Cativolcus, king of one half of the
Eburones, who had entered into the design together with Ambiorix, since, being
now worn out by age, he was unable to endure the fatigue either of war or
flight, having cursed Ambiorix with every imprecation, as the person who had
been the contriver of that measure, destroyed himself with the juice of the
yew-tree, of which there is a great abundance in Gaul and Germany.
[6.32] The Segui and
Condrusi, of the nation and number of the Germans, and who are between the
Eburones and the Treviri, sent embassadors to Caesar to entreat that he would
not regard them in the number of his enemies, nor consider that the cause of
all the Germans on this side the Rhine was one and the same; that they had
formed no plans of war, and had sent no auxiliaries to Ambiorix. Caesar, having
ascertained this fact by an examination of his prisoners, commanded that if any
of the Eburones in their flight had repaired to them, they should be sent back
to him; he assures them that if they did that, he will not injure their
territories. Then, having divided his forces into three parts, he sent the
baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort. This is
nearly in the middle of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had been
quartered for the purpose of wintering. This place he selected as well on other
accounts as because the fortifications of the previous year remained, in order
that he might relieve the labor of the soldiers. He left the fourteenth legion
as a guard for the baggage, one of those three which he had lately raised in
Italy and brought over. Over that legion and camp he places Q. Tullius Cicero
and gives him 200 horse.
[6.33] Having divided
the army, he orders T. Labienus to proceed with three legions toward the ocean
into those parts which border on the Menapii; he sends C. Trebonius with a like
number of legions to lay waste that district which lies contiguous to the
Aduatuci; he himself determines to go with the remaining three to the river
Sambre, which flows into the Meuse, and to the most remote parts of Arduenna,
whither he heard that Ambiorix had gone with a few horse. When departing, he
promises that he will return before the end of the seventh day, on which day he
was aware corn was due to that legion which was being left in garrison. He
directs Labienus and Trebonius to return by the same day, if they can do so
agreeably to the interests of the republic; so that their measures having been
mutually imparted, and the plans of the enemy having been discovered, they
might be able to commence a different line of operations.
[6.34] There was, as we
have above observed, no regular army, nor a town, nor a garrison which could
defend itself by arms; but the people were scattered in all directions. Where
either a hidden valley, or a woody spot, or a difficult morass furnished any
hope of protection or of security to any one, there he had fixed himself. These
places were known to those who dwelt in the neighborhood, and the matter
demanded great attention, not so much in protecting the main body of the army
(for no peril could occur to them altogether from those alarmed and scattered
troops), as in preserving individual soldiers; which in some measure tended to
the safety of the army. For both the desire of booty was leading many too far,
and the woods with their unknown and hidden routes would not allow them to go
in large bodies. If he desired the business to be completed and the race of
those infamous people to be cut off, more bodies of men must be sent in several
directions and the soldiers must be detached on all sides; if he were disposed
to keep the companies at their standards, as the established discipline and
practice of the Roman army required, the situation itself was a safeguard to
the barbarians, nor was there wanting to individuals the daring to lay secret
ambuscades and beset scattered soldiers. But amid difficulties of this nature
as far as precautions could be taken by vigilance, such precautions were taken;
so that some opportunities of injuring the enemy were neglected, though the
minds of all were burning to take revenge, rather than that injury should be
effected with any loss to our soldiers. Caesar dispatches messengers to the
neighboring states; by the hope of booty he invites all to him, for the purpose
of plundering the Eburones, in order that the life of the Gauls might be
hazarded in the woods rather than the legionary soldiers; at the same time, in
order that a large force being drawn around them, the race and name of that
state may be annihilated for such a crime. A large number from all quarters
speedily assembles.
[6.35] These things
were going on in all parts of the territories of the Eburones, and the seventh
day was drawing near, by which day Caesar had purposed to return to the baggage
and the legion. Here it might be learned how much fortune achieves in war, and
how great casualties she produces. The enemy having been scattered and alarmed,
as we related above, there was no force which might produce even a slight
occasion of fear. The report extends beyond the Rhine to the Germans that the
Eburones are being pillaged, and that all were without distinction invited to
the plunder. The Sigambri, who are nearest to the Rhine, by whom, we have
mentioned above, the Tenchtheri and Usipetes were received after their retreat,
collect 2,000 horse; they cross the Rhine in ships and barks thirty miles below
that place where the bridge was entire and the garrison left by Caesar; they
arrive at the frontiers of the Eburones, surprise many who were scattered in
flight, and get possession of a large amount of cattle, of which barbarians are
extremely covetous. Allured by booty, they advance further; neither morass nor
forest obstructs these men, born amid war and depredations; they inquire of
their prisoners in what part Caesar is; they find that he has advanced further,
and learn that all the army has removed. Thereon one of the prisoners says,
"Why do you pursue such wretched and trifling spoil; you, to whom it is
granted to become even now most richly endowed by fortune? In three hours you
can reach Aduatuca; there the Roman army has deposited all its fortunes; there
is so little of a garrison that not even the wall can be manned, nor dare any
one go beyond the fortifications." A hope having been presented them, the
Germans leave in concealment the plunder they had acquired; they themselves
hasten to Aduatuca, employing as their guide the same man by whose information
they had become informed of these things.
[6.36] Cicero, who
during all the foregoing days had kept his soldiers in camp with the greatest
exactness, and agreeable to the injunctions of Caesar, had not permitted even
any of the camp-followers to go beyond the fortification, distrusting on the
seventh day that Caesar would keep his promise as to the number of days,
because he heard that he had proceeded further, and no report as to his return
was brought to him, and being urged at the same time by the expressions of
those who called his tolerance almost a siege, if, forsooth, it was not
permitted them to go out of the camp, since he might expect no disaster, whereby
he could be injured, within three miles of the camp, while nine legions and all
the cavalry were under arms, and the enemy scattered and almost annihilated,
sent five cohorts into the neighboring corn-lands, between which and the camp
only one hill intervened, for the purpose of foraging. Many soldiers of the
legions had been left invalided in the camp, of whom those who had recovered in
this space of time, being about 300, are sent together under one standard; a
large number of soldiers' attendants besides, with a great number of beasts of
burden, which had remained in the camp, permission being granted, follow them.
[6.37] At this very
time, the German horse by chance came up, and immediately, with the same speed
with which they had advanced, attempt to force the camp at the Decuman gate,
nor were they seen, in consequence of woods lying in the way on that side,
before they were just reaching the camp: so much so, that the sutlers who had
their booths under the rampart had not an opportunity of retreating within the
camp. Our men, not anticipating it, are perplexed by the sudden affair, and the
cohort on the outpost scarcely sustains the first attack. The enemy spread
themselves on the other sides to ascertain if they could find any access. Our
men with difficulty defend the gates; the very position of itself and the
fortification secures the other accesses. There is a panic in the entire camp,
and one inquires of another the cause of the confusion, nor do they readily
determine whither the standards should be borne, nor into what quarter each
should betake himself. One avows that the camp is already taken, another
maintains that, the enemy having destroyed the army and commander-in-chief, are
come hither as conquerors; most form strange superstitious fancies from the
spot, and place before their eyes the catastrophe of Cotta and Titurius, who
had fallen in the same fort. All being greatly disconcerted by this alarm, the
belief of the barbarians is strengthened that there is no garrison within, as
they had heard from their prisoner. They endeavor to force an entrance and
encourage one another not to cast from their hands so valuable a prize.
[6.38] P. Sextius
Baculus, who had led a principal century under Caesar (of whom we have made
mention in previous engagements), had been left an invalid in the garrison, and
had now been five days without food. He, distrusting his own safety and that of
all, goes forth from his tent unarmed; he sees that the enemy are close at hand
and that the matter is in the utmost danger; he snatches arms from those
nearest, and stations himself at the gate. The centurions of that cohort which
was on guard follow him; for a short time they sustain the fight together.
Sextius faints, after receiving many wounds; he is with difficulty saved, drawn
away by the hands of the soldiers. This space having intervened, the others
resume courage so far as to venture to take their place on the fortifications
and present the aspect of defenders.
[6.39] The foraging
having in the mean time been completed, our soldiers distinctly hear the shout;
the horse hasten on before and discover in what danger the affair is. But here
there is no fortification to receive them, in their alarm: those last enlisted,
and unskilled in military discipline turn their faces to the military tribune
and the centurions; they wait to find what orders may be given by them. No one
is so courageous as not to be disconcerted by the suddenness of the affair. The
barbarians, espying our standard in the distance, desist from the attack; at
first they suppose that the legions, which they had learned from their
prisoners had removed further off, had returned; afterward, despising their
small number, they make an attack on them at all sides.
[6.40] The
camp-followers run forward to the nearest rising ground; being speedily driven
from this they throw themselves among the standards and companies: they thus so
much the more alarm the soldiers already affrighted. Some propose that, forming
a wedge, they suddenly break through, since the camp was so near; and if any
part should be surrounded and slain, they fully trust that at least the rest
may be saved; others, that they take their stand on an eminence, and all
undergo the same destiny. The veteran soldiers whom we stated to have set out
together [with the others] under a standard, do not approve of this. Therefore
encouraging each other, under the conduct of Caius Trebonius, a Roman knight,
who had been appointed over them, they break through the midst of the enemy,
and arrive in the camp safe to a man. The camp attendants and the horse
following close upon them with the same impetuosity, are saved by the courage
of the soldiers. But those who had taken their stand upon the eminence having
even now acquired no experience of military matters, neither could persevere in
that resolution which they approved of, namely, to defend themselves from their
higher position, nor imitate that vigor and speed which they had observed to
have availed others; but, attempting to reach the camp, had descended into an
unfavorable situation. The centurions, some of whom had been promoted for their
valor from the lower ranks of other legions to higher ranks in this legion, in
order that they might not forfeit their glory for military exploits previously
acquired, fell together fighting most valiantly. The enemy having been
dislodged by their valor, a part of the soldiers arrived safe in camp contrary
to their expectations; a part perished, surrounded by the barbarians.
[6.41] The Germans,
despairing of taking the camp by storm, because they saw that our men had taken
up their position on the fortifications, retreated beyond the Rhine with that
plunder which they had deposited in the woods. And so great was the alarm, even
after the departure of the enemy, that when C. Volusenus, who had been sent
with the cavalry, arrived that night, he could not gain credence that Caesar
was close at hand with his army safe. Fear had so pre-occupied the minds of
all, that their reason being almost estranged, they said that all the other
forces having been cut off, the cavalry alone had arrived there by flight, and
asserted that, if the army were safe, the Germans would not have attacked the
camp; which fear the arrival of Caesar removed.
[6.42] He, on his
return, being well aware of the casualties of war, complained of one thing
[only], namely, that the cohorts had been sent away from the outposts and
garrison [duty], and pointed out that room ought not to have been left for even
the most trivial casualty; that fortune had exercised great influence in the
sudden arrival of their enemy; much greater, in that she had turned the
barbarians away from the very rampart and gates of the camp. Of all which
events, it seemed the most surprising, that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine
with this object, that they might plunder the territories of Ambiorix, being
led to the camp of the Romans, rendered Ambiorix a most acceptable service.
[6.43] Caesar, having
again marched to harass the enemy, after collecting a large number [of auxiliaries]
from the neighboring states, dispatches them in all directions. All the
villages and all the buildings, which each beheld, were on fire: spoil was
being driven off from all parts; the corn not only was being consumed by so
great numbers of cattle and men, but also had fallen to the earth, owing to the
time of the year and the storms; so that if any had concealed themselves for
the present, still, it appeared likely that they must perish through want of
all things, when the army should be drawn off. And frequently it came to that
point, as so large a body of cavalry had been sent abroad in all directions,
that the prisoners declared Ambiorix had just then been seen by them in flight,
and had not even passed out of sight, so that the hope of overtaking him being
raised, and unbounded exertions having been resorted to, those who thought they
should acquire the highest favor with Caesar, nearly overcame nature by their
ardor, and continually, a little only seemed wanting to complete success; but
he rescued himself by [means of] lurking-places and forests, and, concealed by
the night made for other districts and quarters, with no greater guard than
that of four horsemen, to whom along he ventured to confide his life.
[6.44] Having
devastated the country in such a manner, Caesar leads back his army with the
loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum of the Remi, and, having summoned a council
of Gaul to assemble at that place, he resolved to hold an investigation
respecting the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes, and having pronounced a
most severe sentence upon Acco, who had been the contriver of that plot, he
punished him after the custom of our ancestors. Some fearing a trial, fled;
when he had forbidden these fire and water, he stationed in winter quarters two
legions at the frontiers of the Treviri, two among the Lingones, the remaining
six at Agendicum, in the territories of the Senones; and, having provided corn
for the army, he set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes.
End of Book 6
Caius Julius Caesar 52
B.C.
[7.1] Gaul being
tranquil, Caesar, as he had determined, sets out for Italy to hold the
provincial assizes. There he receives intelligence of the death of Clodius;
and, being informed of the decree of the senate, [to the effect] that all the
youth of Italy should take the military oath, he determined to hold a levy
throughout the entire province. Report of these events is rapidly borne into
Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls themselves add to the report, and invent what the
case seemed to require, [namely] that Caesar was detained by commotions in the
city, and could not, amid so violent dissensions, come to his army. Animated by
this opportunity, they who already, previously to this occurrence, were
indignant that they were reduced beneath the dominion of Rome, begin to
organize their plans for war more openly and daringly. The leading men of Gaul,
having convened councils among themselves in the woods, and retired places,
complain of the death of Acco: they point out that this fate may fall in turn
on themselves: they bewail the unhappy fate of Gaul; and by every sort of
promises and rewards, they earnestly solicit some to begin the war, and assert
the freedom of Gaul at the hazard of their lives. They say that special care
should be paid to this, that Caesar should be cut off from his army before
their secret plans should be divulged. That this was easy, because neither
would the legions, in the absence of their general, dare to leave their winter
quarters, nor could the general reach his army without a guard: finally, that
it was better to be slain in battle, than not to recover their ancient glory in
war, and that freedom which they had received from their forefathers.
[7.2] While these
things are in agitation, the Carnutes declare "that they would decline no
danger for the sake of the general safety, and promise" that they would be
the first of all to begin the war; and since they can not at present take
precautions, by giving and receiving hostages, that the affair shall not be
divulged, they require that a solemn assurance be given them by oath and
plighted honor, their military standards being brought together (in which
manner their most sacred obligations are made binding), that they should not be
deserted by the rest of the Gauls on commencing the war.
[7.3] When the
appointed day came, the Carnutes, under the command of Cotuatus and
Conetodunus, desperate men, meet together at Genabum, and slay the Roman
citizens who had settled there for the purpose of trading (among the rest,
Caius Fusius Cita, a distinguished Roman knight, who by Caesar's orders had
presided over the provision department), and plunder their property. The report
is quickly spread among all the states of Gaul; for, whenever a more important
and remarkable event takes place, they transmit the intelligence through their
lands and districts by a shout; the others take it up in succession, and pass
it to their neighbors, as happened on this occasion; for the things which were
done at Genabum at sunrise, were heard in the territories of the Arverni before
the end of the first watch, which is an extent of more than a hundred and sixty
miles.
[7.4] There in like
manner, Vercingetorix the son of Celtillus the Arvernian, a young man of the
highest power (whose father had held the supremacy of entire Gaul, and had been
put to death by his fellow-citizens, for this reason, because he aimed at
sovereign power), summoned together his dependents, and easily excited them. On
his design being made known, they rush to arms: he is expelled from the town of
Gergovia, by his uncle Gobanitio and the rest of the nobles, who were of
opinion, that such an enterprise ought not to be hazarded: he did not however
desist, but held in the country a levy of the needy and desperate. Having
collected such a body of troops, he brings over to his sentiments such of his
fellow-citizens as he has access to: he exhorts them to take up arms in behalf
of the general freedom, and having assembled great forces he drives from the
state his opponents, by whom he had been expelled a short time previously. He
is saluted king by his partisans; he sends embassadors in every direction, he
conjures them to adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his
interests the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice,
and all the others who border on the ocean; the supreme command is conferred on
him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this authority, he demands hostages from
all these states, he orders a fixed number of soldiers to be sent to him
immediately; he determines what quantity of arms each state shall prepare at
home, and before what time; he pays particular attention to the cavalry. To the
utmost vigilance he adds the utmost rigor of authority; and by the severity of his
punishments brings over the wavering: for on the commission of a greater crime
he puts the perpetrators to death by fire and every sort of tortures; for a
slighter cause, he sends home the offenders with their ears cut off, or one of
their eyes put out, that they may be an example to the rest, and frighten
others by the severity of their punishment.
[7.5] Having quickly
collected an army by their punishments, he sends Lucterius, one of the Cadurci,
a man the utmost daring, with part of his forces, into the territory of the
Ruteni; and marches in person into the country of the Bituriges. On his
arrival, the Bituriges send embassadors to the Aedui, under whose protection
they were, to solicit aid in order that they might more easily resist the
forces of the enemy. The Aedui, by the advice of the lieutenants whom Caesar
had left with the army, send supplies of horse and foot to succor the
Bituriges. When they came to the river Loire, which separates the Bituriges
from the Aedui, they delayed a few days there, and, not daring to pass the
river, return home, and send back word to the lieutenants that they had
returned through fear of the treachery of the Bituriges, who, they ascertained,
had formed this design, that if the Aedui should cross the river, the Bituriges
on the one side, and the Arverni on the other, should surround them. Whether
they did this for the reason which they alleged to the lieutenants, or
influenced by treachery, we think that we ought not to state as certain,
because we have no proof. On their departure, the Bituriges immediately unite
themselves to the Arverni.
[7.6] These affairs
being announced to Caesar in Italy, at the time when he understood that matters
in the city had been reduced to a more tranquil state by the energy of Cneius
Pompey, he set out for Transalpine Gaul. After he had arrived there, he was greatly
at a loss to know by what means he could reach his army. For if he should
summon the legions into the province, he was aware that on their march they
would have to fight in his absence; he foresaw too that if he himself should
endeavor to reach the army, he would act injudiciously, in trusting his safety
even to those who seemed to be tranquilized.
[7.7] In the mean time
Lucterius the Cadurcan, having been sent into the country of the Ruteni, gains
over that state to the Arverni. Having advanced into the country of the
Nitiobriges, and Gabali, he receives hostages from both nations, and,
assembling a numerous force, marches to make a descent on the province in the
direction of Narbo. Caesar, when this circumstance was announced to him,
thought that the march to Narbo ought to take the precedence of all his other
plans. When he arrived there, he encourages the timid and stations garrisons
among the Ruteni, in the province of the Volcae Arecomici, and the country
around Narbo which was in the vicinity of the enemy; he orders a portion of the
forces from the province, and the recruits which he had brought from Italy, to
rendezvous among the Helvii who border on the territories of the Arverni.
[7.8] These matters
being arranged, and Lucterius now checked and forced to retreat, because he
thought it dangerous to enter the line of Roman garrisons, Caesar marches into
the country of the Helvii; although mount Cevennes, which separates the Arverni
from the Helvii, blocked up the way with very deep snow, as it was the severest
season of the year; yet having cleared away the snow to the depth of six feet,
and having opened the roads, he reaches the territories of the Arverni, with
infinite labor to his soldiers. This people being surprised, because they
considered themselves defended by the Cevennes as by a wall, and the paths at
this season of the year had never before been passable even to individuals, he
orders the cavalry to extend themselves as far as they could, and strike as
great a panic as possible into the enemy. These proceedings are speedily
announced to Vercingetorix by rumor and his messengers. Around him all the
Arverni crowd in alarm, and solemnly entreat him to protect their property, and
not to suffer them to be plundered by the enemy, especially as he saw that all
the war was transferred into their country. Being prevailed upon by their
entreaties he moves his camp from the country of the Bituriges in the direction
of the Arverni.
[7.9] Caesar, having
delayed two days in that place, because he had anticipated that, in the natural
course of events, such would be the conduct of Vercingetorix, leaves the army
under pretense of raising recruits and cavalry: he places Brutus, a young man,
in command of these forces; he gives him instructions that the cavalry should
range as extensively as possible in all directions; that he would exert himself
not to be absent from the camp longer than three days. Having arranged these
matters, he marches to Vienna by as long journeys as he can, when his own
soldiers did not expect him. Finding there a fresh body of cavalry, which he
had sent on to that place several days before, marching incessantly night and
day, he advanced rapidly through the territory of the Aedui into that of the
Lingones, in which two legions were wintering, that, if any plan affecting his
own safety should have been organized by the Aedui, he might defeat it by the
rapidity of his movements. When he arrived there, he sends information to the
rest of the legions, and gathers all his army into one place before
intelligence of his arrival could be announced to the Arverni. Vercingetorix,
on hearing this circumstance, leads back his army into the country of the
Bituriges; and after marching from it to Gergovia, a town of the Boii, whom
Caesar had settled there after defeating them in the Helvetian war, and had
rendered tributary to the Aedui, he determined to attack it.
[7.10] This action
caused great perplexity to Caesar in the selection of his plans; [he feared]
lest, if he should confine his legions in one place for the remaining portion
of the winter, all Gaul should revolt when the tributaries of the Aedui were
subdued, because it would appear that there was in him no protection for his
friends; but if he should draw them too soon out of their winter quarters, he
might be distressed by the want of provisions, in consequence of the difficulty
of conveyance. It seemed better, however, to endure every hardship than to
alienate the affections of all his allies, by submitting to such an insult.
Having, therefore, impressed on the Aedui the necessity of supplying him with
provisions, he sends forward messengers to the Boii to inform them of his
arrival, and encourage them to remain firm in their allegiance, and resist the
attack of the enemy with great resolution. Having left two legions and the
luggage of the entire army at Agendicum, he marches to the Boii.
[7.11] On the second
day, when he came to Vellaunodunum, a town of the Senones, he determined to
attack it, in order that he might not leave an enemy in his rear, and might the
more easily procure supplies of provisions, and draw a line of circumvallation
around it in two days: on the third day, embassadors being sent from the town
to treat of a capitulation, he orders their arms to be brought together, their
cattle to be brought forth, and six hundred hostages to be given. He leaves
Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to complete these arrangements; he himself sets
out with the intention of marching as soon as possible, to Genabum, a town of
the Carnutes, who having then for the first time received information of the
siege of Vellaunodunum, as they thought that it would be protracted to a longer
time, were preparing a garrison to send to Genabum for the defense of that
town. Caesar arrived here in two days; after pitching his camp before the town,
being prevented by the time of the day, he defers the attack to the next day,
and orders his soldiers to prepare whatever was necessary for that enterprise;
and as a bridge over the Loire connected the town of Genabum with the opposite
bank, fearing lest the inhabitants should escape by night from the town, he
orders two legions to keep watch under arms. The people of Genabum came forth
silently from the city before midnight, and began to cross the river. When this
circumstance was announced by scouts, Caesar, having set fire to the gates,
sends in the legions which he had ordered to be ready, and obtains possession
of the town so completely, that very few of the whole number of the enemy
escaped being taken alive, because the narrowness of the bridge and the roads
prevented the multitude from escaping. He pillages and burns the town, gives
the booty to the soldiers, then leads his army over the Loire, and marches into
the territories of the Bituriges.
[7.12] Vercingetorix,
when he ascertained the arrival of Caesar, desisted from the siege [of
Gergovia], and marched to meet Caesar. The latter had commenced to besiege
Noviodunum; and when embassadors came from this town to beg that he would
pardon them and spare their lives, in order that he might execute the rest of
his designs with the rapidity by which he had accomplished most of them, he
orders their arms to be collected, their horses to be brought forth, and
hostages to be given. A part of the hostages being now delivered up, when the
rest of the terms were being performed, a few centurions and soldiers being
sent into the town to collect the arms and horses, the enemy's cavalry which
had outstripped the main body of Vercingetorix's army, was seen at a distance;
as soon as the townsmen beheld them, and entertained hopes of assistance,
raising a shout, they began to take up arms, shut the gates, and line the
walls. When the centurions in the town understood from the signal-making of the
Gauls that they were forming some new design, they drew their swords and seized
the gates, and recovered all their men safe.
[7.13] Caesar orders
the horse to be drawn out of the camp, and commences a cavalry action. His men
being now distressed, Caesar sends to their aid about four hundred German
horse, which he had determined, at the beginning, to keep with himself. The
Gauls could not withstand their attack, but were put to flight, and retreated
to their main body, after losing a great number of men. When they were routed,
the townsmen, again intimidated, arrested those persons by whose exertions they
thought that the mob had been roused, and brought them to Caesar, and
surrendered themselves to him. When these affairs were accomplished, Caesar
marched to the Avaricum, which was the largest and best fortified town in the
territories of the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertile tract of country;
because he confidently expected that on taking that town, he would reduce
beneath his dominion the state of the Bituriges.
[7.14] Vercingetorix,
after sustaining such a series of losses at Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and
Noviodunum, summons his men to a council. He impresses on them "that the
war must be prosecuted on a very different system from that which had been
previously adopted; but they should by all means aim at this object, that the
Romans should be prevented from foraging and procuring provisions; that this
was easy, because they themselves were well supplied with cavalry, and were
likewise assisted by the season of the year; that forage could not be cut; that
the enemy must necessarily disperse, and look for it in the houses, that all
these might be daily destroyed by the horse. Besides that the interests of
private property must be neglected for the sake of the general safety; that the
villages and houses ought to be fired, over such an extent of country in every
direction from Boia, as the Romans appeared capable of scouring in their search
for forage. That an abundance of these necessaries could be supplied to them,
because they would be assisted by the resources of those in whose territories
the war would be waged: that the Romans either would not bear the privation, or
else would advance to any distance from the camp with considerable danger; and
that it made no difference whether they slew them or stripped them of their
baggage, since, if it was lost, they could not carry on the war. Besides that,
the towns ought to be burned which were not secured against every danger by
their fortifications or natural advantages; that there should not be places of
retreat for their own countrymen for declining military service, nor be exposed
to the Romans as inducements to carry off abundance of provisions and plunder.
If these sacrifices should appear heavy or galling, that they ought to consider
it much more distressing that their wives and children should be dragged off to
slavery, and themselves slain; the evils which must necessarily befall the
conquered.
[7.15] This opinion
having been approved of by unanimous consent, more than twenty towns of the
Bituriges are burned in one day. Conflagrations are beheld in every quarter;
and although all bore this with great regret, yet they laid before themselves
this consolation, that, as the victory was certain, they could quickly recover
their losses. There is a debate concerning Avaricum in the general council,
whether they should decide, that it should be burned or defended. The Bituriges
threw themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, and entreat that they should not
be compelled to set fire with their own hands to the fairest city of almost the
whole of Gaul, which was both a protection and ornament to the state; they say
that "they could easily defend it, owing to the nature of the ground, for,
being inclosed almost on every side by a river and a marsh, it had only one
entrance, and that very narrow." Permission being granted to them at their
earnest request, Vercingetorix at first dissuades them from it, but afterward
concedes the point, owing to their entreaties and the compassion of the soldiers.
A proper garrison is selected for the town.
[7.16] Vercingetorix
follows closely upon Caesar by shorter marches, and selects for his camp a
place defended by woods and marshes, at the distance of fifteen miles from
Avaricum. There he received intelligence by trusty scouts, every hour in the
day, of what was going on at Avaricum, and ordered whatever he wished to be
done; he closely watched all our expeditions for corn and forage, and whenever
they were compelled to go to a greater distance, he attacked them when
dispersed, and inflicted severe loss upon them; although the evil was remedied
by our men, as far as precautions could be taken, by going forth at irregular
times' and by different ways.
[7.17] Caesar pitching
his camp at that side of the town which was not defended by the river and
marsh, and had a very narrow approach, as we have mentioned, began to raise the
vineae and erect two towers: for the nature of the place prevented him from
drawing a line of circumvallation. He never ceased to importune the Boii and
Aedui for supplies of corn; of whom the one [the Aedui], because they were
acting with no zeal, did not aid him much; the others [the Boii], as their
resources were not great, quickly consumed what they had. Although the army was
distressed by the greatest want of corn, through the poverty of the Boii, the
apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the houses, to such a degree, that for
several days the soldiers were without corn, and satisfied their extreme hunger
with cattle driven from the remote villages; yet no language was heard from
them unworthy of the majesty of the Roman people and their former victories.
Moreover, when Caesar addressed the legions, one by one, when at work, and said
that he would raise the siege, if they felt the scarcity too severely, they
unanimously begged him "not to do so; that they had served for several
years under his command in such a manner that they never submitted to insult,
and never abandoned an enterprise without accomplishing it; that they should consider
it a disgrace if they abandoned the siege after commencing it; that it was
better to endure every hardship than to not avenge the names of the Roman
citizens who perished at Genabum by the perfidy of the Gauls." They
intrusted the same declarations to the centurions and military tribunes, that
through them they might be communicated to Caesar.
[7.18] When the towers
had now approached the walls, Caesar ascertained from the captives that
Vercingetorix after destroying the forage, had pitched his camp nearer
Avaricum, and that he himself with the cavalry and light-armed infantry, who
generally fought among the horse, had gone to lay an ambuscade in that quarter,
to which he thought that our troops would come the next day to forage. On
learning these facts, he set out from the camp secretly at midnight, and
reached the camp of the enemy early in the morning. They having quickly learned
the arrival of Caesar by scouts, hid their cars and baggage in the thickest
parts of the woods, and drew up all their forces in a lofty and open space:
which circumstance being announced, Caesar immediately ordered the baggage to
be piled, and the arms to be got ready.
[7.19] There was a hill
of a gentle ascent from the bottom; a dangerous and impassable marsh, not more
than fifty feet broad, begirt it on almost every side. The Gauls, having broken
down the bridges, posted themselves on this hill, in confidence of their
position, and being drawn up in tribes according to their respective states,
held all the fords and passages of that marsh with trusty guards, thus
determined that if the Romans should attempt to force the marsh, they would
overpower them from the higher ground while sticking in it, so that whoever saw
the nearness of the position, would imagine that the two armies were prepared
to fight on almost equal terms; but whoever should view accurately the
disadvantage of position, would discover that they were showing off an empty
affectation of courage. Caesar clearly points out to his soldiers, who were
indignant that the enemy could bear the sight of them at the distance of so
short a space, and were earnestly demanding the signal for action, "with
how great loss and the death of how many gallant men the victory would
necessarily be purchased: and when he saw them so determined to decline no
danger for his renown, that he ought to be considered guilty of the utmost
injustice if he did not hold their life dearer than his personal safety."
Having thus consoled his soldiers, he leads them back on the same day to the
camp, and determined to prepare the other things which were necessary for the
siege of the town.
[7.20] Vercingetorix,
when he had returned to his men, was accused of treason, in that he had moved
his camp nearer the Romans, in that he had gone away with all the cavalry, in
that he had left so great forces without a commander, in that, on his
departure, the Romans had come at such a favorable season, and with such
dispatch; that all these circumstances could not have happened accidentally or
without design; that he preferred holding the sovereignty of Gaul by the grant
of Caesar to acquiring it by their favor. Being accused in such a manner, he
made the following reply to these charges: - "That his moving his camp had
been caused by want of forage, and had been done even by their advice; that his
approaching near the Romans had been a measure dictated by the favorable nature
of the ground, which would defend him by its natural strength; that the service
of the cavalry could not have been requisite in marshy ground, and was useful
in that place to which they had gone; that he, on his departure, had given the
supreme command to no one intentionally, lest he should be induced by the
eagerness of the multitude to hazard an engagement, to which he perceived that
all were inclined, owing to their want of energy, because they were unable to
endure fatigue any longer. That, if the Romans in the mean time came up by
chance, they [the Gauls] should feel grateful to fortune; if invited by the
information of some one they should feel grateful to him, because they were
enabled to see distinctly from the higher ground the smallness of the number of
their enemy, and despise the courage of those who, not daring to fight,
retreated disgracefully into their camp. That he desired no power from Caesar
by treachery, since he could have it by victory, which was now assured to
himself and to all the Gauls; nay, that he would even give them back the
command, if they thought that they conferred honor on him, rather than received
safety from him. That you may be assured," said he, "that I speak
these words with truth; - listen to these Roman soldiers!" He produces
some camp-followers whom he had surprised on a foraging expedition some days
before, and had tortured by famine and confinement. They being previously
instructed in what answers they should make when examined, say, "That they
were legionary soldiers, that, urged by famine and want, they had recently gone
forth from the camp, [to see] if they could find any corn or cattle in the
fields; that the whole army was distressed by a similar scarcity, nor had any
one now sufficient strength, nor could bear the labor of the work; and
therefore that the general was determined, if he made no progress in the siege,
to draw off his army in three days." "These benefits," says
Vercingetorix, "you receive from me, whom you accuse of treason - me, by
whose exertions you see so powerful and victorious an army almost destroyed by
famine, without shedding one drop of your blood; and I have taken precautions
that no state shall admit within its territories this army in its ignominious
flight from this place."
[7.21] The whole
multitude raise a shout and clash their arms, according to their custom, as
they usually do in the case of him of whose speech they approve; [they exclaim]
that Vercingetorix was a consummate general, and that they had no doubt of his
honor; that the war could not be conducted with greater prudence. They
determine that ten thousand men should be picked out of the entire army and
sent into the town, and decide that the general safety should not be intrusted
to the Bituriges alone, because they were aware that the glory of the victory
must rest with the Bituriges, if they made good the defense of the town.
[7.22] To the extraordinary
valor of our soldiers, devices of every sort were opposed by the Gauls; since
they are a nation of consummate ingenuity, and most skillful in imitating and
making those things which are imparted by any one; for they turned aside the
hooks with nooses, and when they had caught hold of them firmly, drew them on
by means of engines, and undermined the mound the more skillfully on this
account, because there are in their territories extensive iron mines, and
consequently every description of mining operations is known and practiced by
them. They had furnished, more over, the whole wall on every side with turrets,
and had covered them with skins. Besides, in their frequent sallies by day and
night, they attempted either to set fire to the mound, or attack our soldiers
when engaged in the works; and, moreover, by splicing the upright timbers of
their own towers, they equaled the height of ours, as fast as the mound had
daily raised them, and countermined our mines, and impeded the working of them
by stakes bent and sharpened at the ends, and boiling pitch and stones of very
great weight, and prevented them from approaching the walls.
[7.23] But this is
usually the form of all the Gallic walls. Straight beams, connected lengthwise
and two feet distant from each other at equal intervals, are placed together on
the ground; these are mortised on the inside, and covered with plenty of earth.
But the intervals which we have mentioned, are closed up in front by large
stones. These being thus laid and cemented together, another row is added
above, in such a manner, that the same interval may be observed, and that the
beams may not touch one another, but equal spaces intervening, each row of
beams is kept firmly in its place by a row of stones. In this manner the whole wall
is consolidated, until the regular height of the wall be completed. This work,
with respect to appearance and variety, is not unsightly, owing to the
alternate rows of beams and stones, which preserve their order in right lines;
and, besides, it possesses great advantages as regards utility and the defense
of cities; for the stone protects it from fire, and the wood from the battering
ram, since it [the wood] being mortised in the inside with rows of beams,
generally forty feet each in length, can neither be broken through nor torn
asunder.
[7.24] The siege having
been impeded by so many disadvantages, the soldiers, although they were
retarded during the whole time by the mud, cold, and constant showers, yet by
their incessant labor overcame all these obstacles, and in twenty-five days
raised a mound three hundred and thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. When
it almost touched the enemy's walls, and Caesar, according to his usual custom,
kept watch at the work, and encouraged the soldiers not to discontinue the work
for a moment: a little before the third watch they discovered that the mound
was sinking, since the enemy had set it on fire by a mine; and at the same time
a shout was raised along the entire wall, and a sally was made from two gates on
each side of the turrets. Some at a distance were casting torches and dry wood
from the wall on the mound, others were pouring on it pitch, and other
materials, by which the flame might be excited, so that a plan could hardly be
formed, as to where they should first run to the defense, or to what part aid
should be brought. However, as two legions always kept guard before the camp by
Caesar's orders, and several of them were at stated times at the work, measures
were promptly taken, that some should oppose the sallying party, others draw
back the towers and make a cut in the rampart; and moreover, that the whole
army should hasten from the camp to extinguish the flames.
[7.25] When the battle
was going on in every direction, the rest of the night being now spent, and
fresh hopes of victory always arose before the enemy: the more so on this
account because they saw the coverings of our towers burnt away, and perceived,
that we, being exposed, could not easily go to give assistance, and they
themselves were always relieving the weary with fresh men, and considered that
all the safety of Gaul rested on this crisis; there happened in my own view a
circumstance which, having appeared to be worthy of record, we thought it ought
not to be omitted. A certain Gaul before the gate of the town, who was casting
into the fire opposite the turret balls of tallow and fire which were passed
along to him, was pierced with a dart on the right side and fell dead. One of
those next him stepped over him as he lay, and discharged the same office: when
the second man was slain in the same manner by a wound from a cross-bow, a
third succeeded him, and a fourth succeeded the third: nor was this post left
vacant by the besieged, until, the fire of the mound having been extinguished, and
the enemy repulsed in every direction, an end was put to the fighting.
[7.26] The Gauls having
tried every expedient, as nothing had succeeded, adopted the design of fleeing
from the town the next day, by the advice and order of Vercingetorix. They hoped
that, by attempting it at the dead of night, they would effect it without any
great loss of men, because the camp of Vercingetorix was not far distant from
the town, and the extensive marsh which intervened, was likely to retard the
Romans in the pursuit. And they were now preparing to execute this by night,
when the matrons suddenly ran out - into the streets, and weeping cast
themselves at the feet of their husbands, and requested of them, with every
entreaty, that they should not abandon themselves and their common children to
the enemy for punishment, because the weakness of their nature and physical
powers prevented them from taking to flight. When they saw that they (as fear
does not generally admit of mercy in extreme danger) persisted in their resolution,
they began to shout aloud, and give intelligence of their flight to the Romans.
The Gauls being intimidated by fear of this, lest the passes should be
pre-occupied by the Roman cavalry, desisted from their design.
[7.27] The next day
Caesar, the tower being advanced, and the works which he had determined to
raise being arranged, a violent storm arising, thought this no bad time for
executing his designs, because he observed the guards arranged on the walls a
little too negligently, and therefore ordered his own men to engage in their
work more remissly, and pointed out what he wished to be done. He drew up his
soldiers in a secret position within the vineae, and exhorts them to reap, at
least, the harvest of victory proportionate to their exertions. He proposed a
reward for those who should first scale the walls, and gave the signal to the
soldiers. They suddenly flew out from all quarters and quickly filled the
walls.
[7.28] The enemy being
alarmed by the suddenness of the attack, were dislodged from the wall and
towers, and drew up, in form of a wedge, in the market place and the open
streets, with this intention that, if an attack should be made on any side,
they should fight with their line drawn up to receive it. When they saw no one
descending to the level ground, and the enemy extending themselves along the
entire wall in every direction, fearing lest every hope of flight should be cut
off, they cast away their arms, and sought, without stopping, the most remote
parts of the town. A part was then slain by the infantry when they were
crowding upon one another in the narrow passage of the gates; and a part having
got without the gates, were cut to pieces by the cavalry: nor was there one who
was anxious for the plunder. Thus, being excited by the massacre at Genabum and
the fatigue of the siege, they spared neither those worn out with years, women,
or children. Finally, out of all that number, which amounted to about forty
thousand, scarcely eight hundred, who fled from the town when they heard the
first alarm, reached Vercingetorix in safety: and he, the night being now far
spent, received them in silence after their flight (fearing that any sedition
should arise in the camp from their entrance in a body and the compassion of
the soldiers), so that, having arranged his friends and the chiefs of the
states at a distance on the road, he took precautions that they should be
separated and conducted to their fellow countrymen, to whatever part of the
camp had been assigned to each state from the beginning.
[7.29] Vercingetorix
having convened an assembly on the following day, consoled and encouraged his
soldiers in the following words: "That they should not be too much
depressed in spirit, nor alarmed at their loss; that the Romans did not conquer
by valor nor in the field, but by a kind of art and skill in assault, with
which they themselves were unacquainted; that whoever expected every event in
the war to be favorable, erred; that it never was his opinion that Avaricum
should be defended, of the truth of which statement he had themselves as
witnesses, but that it was owing to the imprudence of the Bituriges, and the
too ready compliance of the rest, that this loss was sustained; that, however,
he would soon compensate it by superior advantages; for that he would, by his
exertions, bring over those states which severed themselves from the rest of
the Gauls, and would create a general unanimity throughout the whole of Gaul,
the union of which not even the whole earth could withstand, and that he had it
already almost effected; that in the mean time it was reasonable that he should
prevail on them, for the sake of the general safety, to begin to fortify their
camp, in order that they might the more easily sustain the sudden attacks of
the enemy."
[7.30] This speech was
not disagreeable to the Gauls, principally, because he himself was not
disheartened by receiving so severe a loss, and had not concealed himself, nor
shunned the eyes of the people: and he was believed to possess greater
foresight and sounder judgment than the rest, because, when the affair was
undecided, he had at first been of opinion that Avaricum should be burnt, and
afterward that it should be abandoned. Accordingly, as ill success weakens the
authority of other generals, so, on the contrary, his dignity increased daily,
although a loss was sustained: at the same time they began to entertain hopes,
on his assertion, of uniting the rest of the states to themselves, and on this
occasion, for the first time, the Gauls began to fortify their camps, and were
so alarmed that although they were men unaccustomed to toil, yet they were of
opinion that they ought to endure and suffer every thing which should be
imposed upon them.
[7.31] Nor did
Vercingetorix use less efforts than he had promised, to gain over the other
states, and [in consequence] endeavored to entice their leaders by gifts and
promises. For this object he selected fitting emissaries, by whose subtle
pleading or private friendship, each of the nobles could be most easily influenced.
He takes care that those who fled to him on the storming of Avaricum should be
provided with arms and clothes. At the same time that his diminished forces
should be recruited, he levies a fixed quota of soldiers from each state, and
defines the number and day before which he should wish them brought to the
camp, and orders all the archers, of whom there was a very great number in
Gaul, to be collected and sent to him. By these means, the troops which were
lost at Avaricum are speedily replaced. In the mean time, Teutomarus, the son
of Ollovicon, the king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had received the
appellation of friend from our senate, came to him with a great number of his
own horse and those whom he had hired from Aquitania.
[7.32] Caesar, after
delaying several days at Avaricum, and, finding there the greatest plenty of
corn and other provisions, refreshed his army after their fatigue and
privation. The winter being almost ended, when he was invited by the favorable
season of the year to prosecute the war and march against the enemy, [and try]
whether he could draw them from the marshes and woods, or else press them by a
blockade; some noblemen of the Aedui came to him as embassadors to entreat
"that in an extreme emergency he should succor their state; that their
affairs were in the utmost danger, because, whereas single magistrates had been
usually appointed in ancient times and held the power of king for a single
year, two persons now exercised this office, and each asserted that he was appointed
according to their laws. That one of them was Convictolitanis, a powerful and
illustrious youth; the other Cotus, sprung from a most ancient family, and
personally a man of very great influence and extensive connections. His brother
Valetiacus had borne the same office during the last year: that the whole state
was up in arms; the senate divided, the people divided; that each of them had
his own adherents; and that, if the animosity would be fomented any longer, the
result would be that one part of the state would come to a collision with the
other; that it rested with his activity and influence to prevent it."
[7.33] Although Caesar
considered it ruinous to leave the war and the enemy, yet, being well aware
what great evils generally arise from internal dissensions, lest a state so
powerful and so closely connected with the Roman people, which he himself had
always fostered and honored in every respect, should have recourse to violence
and arms, and that the party which had less confidence in its own power should
summon aid from Vercingetorix, he determined to anticipate this movement; and
because, by the laws of the Aedui, it was not permitted those who held the
supreme authority to leave the country, he determined to go in person to the
Aedui, lest he should appear to infringe upon their government and laws, and
summoned all the senate, and those between whom the dispute was, to meet him at
Decetia. When almost all the state had assembled there, and he was informed
that one brother had been declared magistrate by the other, when only a few
persons were privately summoned for the purpose, at a different time and place
from what he ought, whereas the laws not only forbade two belonging to one
family to be elected magistrates while each was alive, but even deterred them
from being in the senate, he compelled Cotus to resign his office; he ordered
Convictolitanis, who had been elected by the priests, according to the usage of
the state, in the presence of the magistrates, to hold the supreme authority.
[7.34] Having
pronounced this decree between [the contending parties], he exhorted the Aedui
to bury in oblivion their disputes and dissensions, and, laying aside all these
things, devote themselves to the war, and expect from him, on the conquest of
Gaul, those rewards which they should have earned, and send speedily to him all
their cavalry and ten thousand infantry, which he might place in different
garrisons to protect his convoys of provisions, and then divided his army into
two parts: he gave Labienus four legions to lead into the country of the
Senones and Parisii; and led in person six into the country of the Arverni, in
the direction of the town of Gergovia, along the banks of the Allier. He gave
part of the cavalry to Labienus and kept part to himself. Vercingetorix, on
learning this circumstance, broke down all the bridges over the river and began
to march on the other bank of the Allier.
[7.35] When each army
was in sight of the other, and was pitching their camp almost opposite that of
the enemy, scouts being distributed in every quarter, lest the Romans should
build a bridge and bring over their troops; it was to Caesar a matter attended
with great difficulties, lest he should be hindered from passing the river
during the greater part of the summer, as the Allier can not generally be
forded before the autumn. Therefore, that this might not happen, having pitched
his camp in a woody place opposite to one of those bridges which Vercingetorix
had taken care should be broken down, the next day he stopped behind with two
legions in a secret place; he sent on the rest of the forces as usual, with all
the baggage, after having selected some cohorts, that the number of the legions
might appear to be complete. Having ordered these to advance as far as they
could, when now, from the time of day, he conjectured they had come to an
encampment, he began to rebuild the bridge on the same piles, the lower part of
which remained entire. Having quickly finished the work and led his legions
across, he selected a fit place for a camp, and recalled the rest of his
troops. Vercingetorix, on ascertaining this fact, went before him by forced
marches, in order that he might not be compelled to come to an action against
his will.
[7.36] Caesar, in five
days' march, went from that place to Gergovia, and after engaging in a slight
cavalry skirmish that day, on viewing the situation of the city, which, being
built on a very high mountain, was very difficult of access, he despaired of
taking it by storm, and determined to take no measures with regard to besieging
it before he should secure a supply of provisions. But Vercingetorix, having
pitched his camp on the mountain near the town, placed the forces of each state
separately and at small intervals around himself, and having occupied all the
hills of that range as far as they commanded a view [of the Roman encampment],
he presented a formidable appearance; he ordered the rulers of the states, whom
he had selected as his council of war, to come to him daily at the dawn,
whether any measure seemed to require deliberation or execution. Nor did he
allow almost any day to pass without testing in a cavalry action, the archers
being intermixed, what spirit and valor there was in each of his own men. There
was a hill opposite the town, at the very foot of that mountain, strongly
fortified and precipitous on every side (which if our men could gain, they
seemed likely to exclude the enemy from a great share of their supply of water,
and from free foraging; but this place was occupied by them with a weak
garrison): however, Caesar set out from the camp in the silence of night, and
dislodging the garrison before succor could come from the town, he got
possession of the place and posted two legions there, and drew from the greater
camp to the less a double trench twelve feet broad, so that the soldiers could
even singly pass secure from any sudden attack of the enemy.
[7.37] While these
affairs were going on at Gergovia, Convictolanis, the Aeduan, to whom we have
observed the magistracy was adjudged by Caesar, being bribed by the Arverni,
holds a conference with certain young men, the chief of whom were Litavicus and
his brothers, who were born of a most noble family. He shares the bribe with
them, and exhorts them to "remember that they were free and born for
empire; that the state of the Aedui was the only one which retarded the most
certain victory of the Gauls; that the rest were held in check by its
authority; and, if it was brought over, the Romans would not have room to stand
on in Gaul; that he had received some kindness from Caesar, only so far,
however, as gaining a most just cause by his decision; but that he assigned
more weight to the general freedom; for, why should the Aedui go to Caesar to
decide concerning their rights and laws, rather than the Romans come to the
Aedui?" The young men being easily won over by the speech of the
magistrate and the bribe, when they declared that they would even be leaders in
the plot, a plan for accomplishing it was considered, because they were
confident their state could not be induced to undertake the war on slight
grounds. It was resolved that Litavicus should have the command of the ten
thousand, which were being sent to Caesar for the war, and should have charge
of them on their march, and that his brothers should go before him to Caesar.
They arrange the other measures, and the manner in which they should have them
done.
[7.38] Litavicus,
having received the command of the army, suddenly convened the soldiers, when
he was about thirty miles distant from Gergovia, and, weeping, said,
"Soldiers, whither are we going? All our knights and all our nobles have
perished. Eporedirix and Viridomarus, the principal men of the state, being
accused of treason, have been slain by the Romans without any permission to
plead their cause. Learn this intelligence from those who have escaped from the
massacre; for I, since my brothers and all my relations have been slain, am
prevented by grief from declaring what has taken place. Persons are brought
forward whom he had instructed in what he would have them say, and make the
same statements to the soldiery as Litavicus had made: that all the knights of
the Aedui were slain because they were said to have held conferences with the
Arverni; that they had concealed themselves among the multitude of soldiers,
and had escaped from the midst of the slaughter. The Aedui shout aloud and
conjure Litavicus to provide for their safety. As if, said he, it were a matter
of deliberation, and not of necessity, for us to go to Gergovia and unite
ourselves to the Arverni. Or have we any reasons to doubt that the Romans,
after perpetrating the atrocious crime, are now hastening to slay us?
Therefore, if there be any spirit in us, let us avenge the death of those who
have perished in a most unworthy manner, and let us slay these robbers."
He points to the Roman citizens, who had accompanied them, in reliance on his
protection. He immediately seizes a great quantity of corn and provisions,
cruelly tortures them, and then puts them to death, sends messengers throughout
the entire state of the Aedui, and rouses them completely by the same falsehood
concerning the slaughter of their knights and nobles; he earnestly advises them
to avenge, in the same manner as he did, the wrongs, which they had received.
[7.39] Eporedirix, the
Aeduan , a young man born in the highest rank and possessing very great
influence at home, and, along with Viridomarus, of equal age and influence, but
of inferior birth, whom Caesar had raised from a humble position to the highest
rank, on being recommended to him by Divitiacus, had come in the number of
horse, being summoned by Caesar by name. These had a dispute with each other
for precedence, and in the struggle between the magistrates they had contended
with their utmost efforts, the one for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotus. Of
these Eporedirix, on learning the design of Litavicus, lays the matter before
Caesar almost at midnight; he entreats that Caesar should not suffer their
state to swerve from the alliance with the Roman people, owing to the depraved
counsels of a few young men which he foresaw would be the consequence if so
many thousand men should unite themselves to the enemy, as their relations
could not neglect their safety, nor the state regard it as a matter of slight
importance.
[7.40] Caesar felt
great anxiety on this intelligence, because he had always especially indulged
the state of the Aedui, and, without any hesitation, draws out from the camp
four light-armed legions and all the cavalry: nor had he time, at such a
crisis, to contract the camp, because the affair seemed to depend upon
dispatch. He leaves Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with two legions to guard the
camp. When he ordered the brothers of Litavicus to be arrested, he discovers
that they had fled a short time before to the camp of the enemy. He encouraged
his soldiers "not to be disheartened by the labor of the journey on such a
necessary occasion," and, after advancing twenty-five miles, all being
most eager, he came in sight of the army of the Aedui, and, by sending on his
cavalry, retards and impedes their march; he then issues strict orders to all
his soldiers to kill no one. He commands Eporedirix and Viridomarus, who they
thought were killed, to move among the cavalry and address their friends. When
they were recognized and the treachery of Litavicus discovered, the Aedui began
to extend their hands to intimate submission, and, laying down their arms, to
deprecate death. Litavicus, with his clansmen, who after the custom of the
Gauls consider it a crime to desert their patrons, even in extreme misfortune,
flees forth to Gergovia.
[7.41] Caesar, after
sending messengers to the state of the Aedui, to inform them that they whom he
could have put to death by the right of war were spared through his kindness,
and after giving three hours of the night to his army for his repose, directed
his march to Gergovia. Almost in the middle of the journey, a party of horse
that were sent by Fabius stated in how great danger matters were, they inform
him that the camp was attacked by a very powerful army, while fresh men were
frequently relieving the wearied, and exhausting our soldiers by the incessant
toil, since on account of the size of the camp, they had constantly to remain
on the rampart; that many had been wounded by the immense number of arrows and
all kinds of missiles; that the engines were of great service in withstanding
them; that Fabius, at their departure, leaving only two gates open, was
blocking up the rest, and was adding breast-works to the ramparts, and was
preparing himself for a similar casualty on the following day. Caesar, after
receiving this information, reached the camp before sunrise owing to the very
great zeal of his soldiers.
[7.42] While these
things are going on at Gergovia, the Aedui, on receiving the first
announcements from Litavicus, leave themselves no time to ascertain the truth
of those statements. Some are stimulated by avarice, others by revenge and
credulity, which is an innate propensity in that race of men to such a degree
that they consider a slight rumor as an ascertained fact. They plunder the
property of the Roman citizens, and either massacre them or drag them away to
slavery. Convictolitanis increases the evil state of affairs, and goads on the
people to fury, that by the commission of some outrage they may be ashamed to
return to propriety. They entice from the town of Cabillonus, by a promise of
safety, Marcus Aristius, a military tribune, who was on his march to his
legion; they compel those who had settled there for the purpose of trading to
do the same. By constantly attacking them on their march they strip them of all
their baggage; they besiege day and night those that resisted; when many were
slain on both sides, they excite a great number to arms.
[7.43] In the mean
time, when intelligence was brought that all their soldiers were in Caesar's
power, they run in a body to Aristius; they assure him that nothing had been
done by public authority; they order an inquiry to be made about the plundered
property; they confiscate the property of Litavicus and his brothers; they send
embassadors to Caesar for the purpose of clearing themselves. They do all this
with a view to recover their soldiers; but being contaminated by guilt, and
charmed by the gains arising from the plundered property, as that act was
shared in by many, and being tempted by the fear of punishment, they began to
form plans of war and stir up the other states by embassies. Although Caesar
was aware of this proceeding, yet he addresses the embassadors with as much
mildness as he can: "That he did not think worse of the state on account
of the ignorance and fickleness of the mob, nor would diminish his regard for
the Aedui." He himself, fearing a greater commotion in Gaul, in order to
prevent his being surrounded by all the states, began to form plans as to the
manner in which he should return from Gergovia and again concentrate his
forces, lest a departure arising from the fear of a revolt should seem like a
flight.
[7.44] While he was
considering these things an opportunity of acting successfully seemed to offer.
For, when he had come into the smaller camp for the purpose of securing the
works, he noticed that the hill in the possession of the enemy was stripped of
men, although, on the former days, it could scarcely be seen on account of the
numbers on it. Being astonished, he inquires the reason of it from the
deserters, a great number of whom flocked to him daily. They all concurred in
asserting, what Caesar himself had already ascertained by his scouts, that the
back of that hill was almost level; but likewise woody and narrow, by which
there was a pass to the other side of the town; that they had serious
apprehensions for this place, and had no other idea, on the occupation of one
hill by the Romans, than that, if they should lose the other, they would be
almost surrounded, and cut off from all egress and foraging; that they were all
summoned by Vercingetorix to fortify this place.
[7.45] Caesar, on being
informed of this circumstance, sends several troops of horse to the place
immediately after midnight; he orders them to range in every quarter with more
tumult than usual. At dawn he orders a large quantity of baggage to be drawn
out of the camp, and the muleteers with helmets, in the appearance and guise of
horsemen, to ride round the hills. To these he adds a few cavalry, with
instructions to range more widely to make a show. He orders them all to seek
the same quarter by a long circuit; these proceedings were seen at a distance
from the town, as Gergovia commanded a view of the camp, nor could the Gauls
ascertain at so great a distance, what certainty there was in the maneuver. He
sends one legion to the same hill, and after it had marched a little, stations
it in the lower ground, and congeals it in the woods. The suspicion of the
Gauls are increased, and all their forces are marched to that place to defend
it. Caesar, having perceived the camp of the enemy deserted, covers the
military insignia of his men, conceals the standards, and transfers his
soldiers in small bodies from the greater to the less camp, and points out to
the lieutenants whom he had placed in command over the respective legions, what
he should wish to be done; he particularly advises them to restrain their men
from advancing too far, through their desire of fighting, or their hope of
plunder, he sets before them what disadvantages the unfavorable nature of the
ground carries with it; that they could be assisted by dispatch alone: that
success depended on a surprise, and not on a battle. After stating these
particulars, he gives the signal for action, and detaches the Aedui at the same
time by another ascent on the right.
[7.46] The town wall
was 1200 paces distant from the plain and foot of the ascent, in a straight
line, if no gap intervened; whatever circuit was added to this ascent, to make
the hill easy, increased the length of the route. But almost in the middle of
the hill, the Gauls had previously built a wall six feet high, made of large
stones, and extending in length as far as the nature of the ground permitted,
as a barrier to retard the advance of our men; and leaving all the lower space
empty, they had filled the upper part of the hill, as far as the wall of the
town, with their camps very close to one another. The soldiers, on the signal
being given, quickly advance to this fortification, and passing over it, make
themselves masters of the separate camps. And so great was their activity in
taking the camps, that Teutomarus, the king of the Nitiobriges, being suddenly
surprised in his tent, as he had gone to rest at noon, with difficulty escaped
from the hands of the plunderers, with the upper part of his person naked, and
his horse wounded.
[7.47] Caesar, having
accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the signal to be sounded
for a retreat; and the soldiers of the tenth legion, by which he was then
accompanied, halted. But the soldiers of the other legions, not hearing the
sound of the trumpet, because there was a very large valley between them, were
however kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants,
according to Caesar's orders; but being animated by the prospect of speedy
victory, and the flight of the enemy, and the favorable battles of former
periods, they thought nothing so difficult that their bravery could not
accomplish it; nor did they put an end to the pursuit, until they drew nigh to
the wall of the town and the gates. But then, when a shout arose in every
quarter of the city, those who were at a distance being alarmed by the sudden
tumult, fled hastily from the town, since they thought that the enemy were
within the gates. The matrons begin to cast their clothes and silver over the
wall, and bending over as far as the lower part of the bosom, with outstretched
hands beseech the Romans to spare them, and not to sacrifice to their
resentment even women and children, as they had done at Avaricum. Some of them
let themselves down from the walls by their hands, and surrendered to our
soldiers. Lucius Fabius a centurion of the eighth legion, who, it was
ascertained, had said that day among his fellow soldiers that he was excited by
the plunder of Avaricum, and would not allow any one to mount the wall before
him, finding three men of his own company, and being raised up by them, scaled
the wall. He himself, in turn, taking hold of them one by one drew them up to
the wall.
[7.48] In the mean time
those who had gone to the other part of the town to defend it, as we have
mentioned above, at first, aroused by hearing the shouts, and, afterward, by
frequent accounts, that the town was in possession of the Romans, sent forward
their cavalry, and hastened in larger numbers to that quarter. As each first
came he stood beneath the wall, and increased the number of his countrymen
engaged in action. When a great multitude of them had assembled, the matrons,
who a little before were stretching their hands from the walls to the Romans,
began to beseech their countrymen, and after the Gallic fashion to show their
disheveled hair, and bring their children into public view. Neither in position
nor in numbers was the contest an equal one to the Romans; at the same time, being
exhausted by running and the long continuation of the fight, they could not
easily withstand fresh and vigorous troops.
[7.49] Caesar, when he
perceived that his soldiers were fighting on unfavorable ground, and that the
enemy's forces were increasing, being alarmed for the safety of his troops,
sent orders to Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants, whom he had left to guard
the smaller camp, to lead out his cohorts quickly from the camp, and post them
at the foot of the hill, on the right wing of the enemy; that if he should see
our men driven from the ground, he should deter the enemy from following too
closely. He himself, advancing with the legion a little from that place where
he had taken his post, awaited the issue of the battle.
[7.50] While the fight
was going on most vigorously, hand to hand, and the enemy depended on their
position and numbers, our men on their bravery, the Aedui suddenly appeared on
our exposed flank, as Caesar had sent them by another ascent on the right, for
the sake of creating a diversion. These, from the similarity of their arms,
greatly terrified our men; and although they were discovered to have their
right shoulders bare, which was usually the sign of those reduced to peace, yet
the soldiers suspected that this very thing was done by the enemy to deceive
them. At the same time Lucius Fabius the centurion, and those who had scaled
the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were cast from the wall. Marcus
Petreius, a centurion of the same legion, after attempting to hew down the
gates, was overpowered by numbers, and, despairing of his safety, having
already received many wounds, said to the soldiers of his own company who
followed him: "Since I can not save you as well as myself, I shall at
least provide for your safety, since I, allured by the love of glory, led you
into this danger, do you save yourselves when an opportunity is given." At
the same time he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and slaying two of them,
drove back the rest a little from the gate. When his men attempted to aid him,
"In vain," he says, "you endeavor to procure me safety, since
blood and strength are now failing me, therefore leave this, while you have the
opportunity, and retreat to the legion." Thus he fell fighting a few
moments after, and saved his men by his own death.
[7.51] Our soldiers,
being hard pressed on every side, were dislodged from their position, with the
loss of forty-six centurions; but the tenth legion, which had been posted in
reserve on ground a little more level, checked the Gauls in their eager
pursuit. It was supported by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, which, being
led from the smaller camp, had, under the command of Titus Sextius, occupied
the higher ground. The legions, as soon as they reached the plain, halted and
faced the enemy. Vercingetorix led back his men from the part of the hill
within the fortifications. On that day little less than seven hundred of the
soldiers were missing.
[7.52] On the next day,
Caesar, having called a meeting, censured the rashness and avarice of his
soldiers, "In that they had judged for themselves how far they ought to
proceed, or what they ought to do, and could not be kept back by the tribunes
of the soldiers and the lieutenants;" and stated, "what the disadvantage
of the ground could effect, what opinion he himself had entertained at
Avaricum, when having surprised the enemy without either general or cavalry, he
had given up a certain victory, lest even a trifling loss should occur in the
contest owing to the disadvantage of position. That as much as he admired the
greatness of their courage, since neither the fortifications of the camp, nor
the height of the mountain, nor the wall of the town could retard them; in the
same degree he censured their licentiousness and arrogance, because they
thought that they knew more than their general concerning victory, and the
issue of actions: and that he required in his soldiers forbearance and
self-command, not less than valor and magnanimity."
[7.53] Having held this
assembly, and having encouraged the soldiers at the conclusion of his speech,
"That they should not be dispirited on this account, nor attribute to the
valor of the enemy, what the disadvantage of position had caused;"
entertaining the same views of his departure that he had previously had, he led
forth the legions from the camp, and drew up his army in order of battle in a
suitable place. When Vercingetorix, nevertheless, would not descend to the
level ground, a slight cavalry action, and that a successful one, having taken
place, he led back his army into the camp. When he had done this, the next day,
thinking that he had done enough to lower the pride of the Gauls, and to
encourage the minds of his soldiers, he moved his camp in the direction of the
Aedui. The enemy not even then pursuing us, on the third day he repaired the
bridge over the river Allier, and led over his whole army.
[7.54] Having then held
an interview with Viridomarus and Eporedirix the Aeduans, he learns that
Litavicus had set out with all the cavalry to raise the Aedui; that it was
necessary that they too should go before him to confirm the state in their
allegiance. Although he now saw distinctly the treachery of the Aedui in many
things, and was of opinion that the revolt of the entire state would be
hastened by their departure; yet he thought that they should not be detained,
lest he should appear either to offer an insult, or betray some suspicion of
fear. He briefly states to them when departing his services toward the Aedui:
in what a state and how humbled he had found them, driven into their towns,
deprived of their lands, stripped of all their forces, a tribute imposed on
them, and hostages wrested from them with the utmost insult; and to what
condition and to what greatness he had raised them, [so much so] that they had
not only recovered their former position, but seemed to surpass the dignity and
influence of all the previous eras of their history. After giving these
admonitions he dismissed them.
[7.55] Noviodunum was a
town of the Aedui, advantageously situated on the banks of the Loire. Caesar
had conveyed hither all the hostages of Gaul, the corn, public money, a great
part of his own baggage and that of his army; he had sent hither a great number
of horses, which he had purchased in Italy and Spain on account of this war.
When Eporedirix and Viridomarus came to this place, and received information of
the disposition of the state, that Litavicus had been admitted by the Aedui
into Bibracte, which is a town of the greatest importance among them, that
Convictolitanis the chief magistrate and a great part of the senate had gone to
meet him, that embassadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix to negotiate
a peace and alliance; they thought that so great an opportunity ought not to be
neglected. Therefore, having put to the sword the garrison of Noviodunum, and
those who had assembled there for the purpose of trading or were on their
march, they divided the money and horses among themselves; they took care that
the hostages of the [different] states should be brought to Bibracte, to the
chief magistrate; they burned the town to prevent its being of any service to
the Romans, as they were of opinion that they could not hold it; they carried
away in their vessels whatever corn they could in the hurry, they destroyed the
remainder, by [throwing it] into the river or setting it on fire, they
themselves began to collect forces from the neighboring country, to place
guards and garrisons in different positions along the banks of the Loire, and
to display the cavalry on all sides to strike terror into the Romans, [to try]
if they could cut them off from a supply of provisions. In which expectation
they were much aided, from the circumstance that the Loire had swollen to such
a degree from the melting of the snows, that it did not seem capable of being
forded at all.
[7.56] Caesar on being
informed of these movements was of opinion that he ought to make haste, even if
he should run some risk in completing the bridges, in order that he might
engage before greater forces of the enemy should be collected in that place.
For no one even then considered it an absolutely necessary act, that changing
his design he should direct his march into the Province, both because the
infamy and disgrace of the thing, and the intervening mount Cevennes, and the
difficulty of the roads prevented him; and especially because he had serious
apprehensions for the safety of Labienus whom he had detached, and those
legions whom he had sent with him. Therefore, having made very long marches by
day and night, he came to the river Loire, contrary to the expectation of all;
and having by means of the cavalry, found out a ford, suitable enough
considering the emergency, of such depth that their arms and shoulders could be
above water for supporting their accoutrements, he dispersed his cavalry in
such a manner as to break the force of the current, and having confounded the
enemy at the first sight, led his army across the river in safety; and finding
corn and cattle in the fields, after refreshing his army with them, he
determined to march into the country of the Senones.
[7.57] While these
things are being done by Caesar, Labienus, leaving at Agendicum the recruits
who had lately arrived from Italy, to guard the baggage, marches with four
legions to Lutetia (which is a town of the Parisii, situated on an island on
the river Seine), whose arrival being discovered by the enemy, numerous forces
arrived from the neighboring states. The supreme command is intrusted to
Camalugenus one of the Aulerci, who, although almost worn out with age, was
called to that honor on account of his extraordinary knowledge of military
tactics. He, when he observed that there was a large marsh which communicated
with the Seine, and rendered all that country impassable, encamped there, and
determined to prevent our troops from passing it.
[7.58] Labienus at
first attempted to raise Vineae, fill up the marsh with hurdles and clay, and
secure a road. After he perceived that this was too difficult to accomplish, he
issued in silence from his camp at the third watch, and reached Melodunum by
the same route by which he came. This is a town of the Senones, situated on an
island in the Seine, as we have just before observed of Lutetia. Having seized
upon about fifty ships and quickly joined them together, and having placed
soldiers in them, he intimidated by his unexpected arrival the inhabitants, of
whom a great number had been called out to the war, and obtains possession of
the town without a contest. Having repaired the bridge, which the enemy had
broken down during the preceding days, he led over his army, and began to march
along the banks of the river to Lutetia. The enemy, on learning the
circumstance from those who had escaped from Melodunum, set fire to Lutetia,
and order the bridges of that town to be broken down: they themselves set out
from the marsh, and take their position on the banks of the Seine, over against
Lutetia and opposite the camp of Labienus.
[7.59] Caesar was now
reported to have departed from Gergovia; intelligence was likewise brought to
them concerning the revolt of the Aedui, and a successful rising in Gaul; and
that Caesar, having been prevented from prosecuting his journey and crossing
the Loire, and having been compelled by the want of corn, had marched hastily
to the province. But the Bellovaci, who had been previously disaffected of
themselves, on learning the revolt of the Aedui, began to assemble forces and
openly to prepare for war. Then Labienus, as the change in affairs was so great,
thought that he must adopt a very different system from what he had previously
intended, and he did not now think of making any new acquisitions, or of
provoking the enemy to an action; but that he might bring back his army safe to
Agendicum. For, on one side, the Bellovaci, a state which held the highest
reputation for prowess in Gaul, were pressing on him; and Camulogenus, with a
disciplined and well-equipped army, held the other side; moreover, a very great
river separated and cut off the legions from the garrison and baggage. He saw
that, in consequence of such great difficulties being thrown in his way, he
must seek aid from his own energy of disposition.
[7.60] Having,
therefore, called a council of war a little before evening, he exhorted his soldiers
to execute with diligence and energy such commands as he should give; he
assigns the ships which he had brought from Melodunum to Roman knights, one to
each, and orders them to fall down the river silently for four miles, at the
end of the fourth watch, and there wait for him. He leaves the five cohorts,
which he considered to be the most steady in action, to guard the camp; he
orders the five remaining cohorts of the same legion to proceed a little after
midnight up the river with all their baggage, in a great tumult. He collects
also some small boats; and sends them in the same direction, with orders to
make a loud noise in rowing. He himself, a little after, marched out in
silence, and, at the head of three legions, seeks that place to which he had
ordered the ships to be brought.
[7.61] When he had
arrived there, the enemy's scouts, as they were stationed along every part of
the river, not expecting an attack, because a great storm had suddenly arisen,
were surprised by our soldiers: the infantry and cavalry are quickly
transported, under the superintendence of the Roman knights, whom he had
appointed to that office. Almost at the same time, a little before daylight,
intelligence was given to the enemy that there was an unusual tumult in the camp
of the Romans, and that a strong force was marching up the river, and that the
sound of oars was distinctly heard in the same quarter, and that soldiers were
being conveyed across in ships a little below. On hearing these things, because
they were of opinion that the legions were passing in three different places,
and that the entire army, being terrified by the revolt of the Aedui, were
preparing for flight, they divided their forces also into three divisions. For
leaving a guard opposite to the camp and sending a small body in the direction
of Metiosedum, with orders to advance as far as the ships would proceed, they
led the rest of their troops against Labienus.
[7.62] By day-break all
our soldiers were brought across, and the army of the enemy was in sight.
Labienus, having encouraged his soldiers "to retain the memory of their
ancient valor, and so many most successful actions, and imagine Caesar himself,
under whose command they had so often routed the enemy, to be present,"
gives the signal for action. At the first onset the enemy are beaten and put to
flight in the right wing, where the seventh legion stood: on the left wing,
which position the twelfth legion held, although the first ranks fell
transfixed by the javelins of the Romans, yet the rest resisted most bravely;
nor did any one of them show the slightest intention of flying. Camulogenus,
the general of the enemy, was present and encouraged his troops. But when the
issue of the victory was still uncertain, and the circumstances which were taking
place on the left wing were announced to the tribunes of the seventh legion,
they faced about their legion to the enemy's rear and attacked it: not even
then did any one retreat, but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus met
the same fate. But those who were left as a guard opposite the camp of
Labienus, when they heard that the battle was commenced, marched to aid their
countrymen and take possession of a hill, but were unable to withstand the
attack of the victorious soldiers. In this manner, mixed with their own
fugitives, such as the woods and mountains did not shelter were cut to pieces
by our cavalry. When this battle was finished, Labienus returns to Agendicum,
where the baggage of the whole army had been left: from it he marched with all
his forces to Caesar.
[7.63] The revolt of
the Aedui being known, the war grows more dangerous. Embassies are sent by them
in all directions: as far as they can prevail by influence, authority, or
money, they strive to excite the state [to revolt]. Having got possession of
the hostages whom Caesar had deposited with them, they terrify the hesitating
by putting them to death. The Aedui request Vercingetorix to come to them and
communicate his plans of conducting the war. On obtaining this request they
insist that the chief command should be assigned to them; and when the affair
became a disputed question, a council of all Gaul is summoned to Bibracte. They
came together in great numbers and from every quarter to the same place. The
decision is left to the votes of the mass; all to a man approve of
Vercingetorix as their general. The Remi, Lingones, and Treviri were absent
from this meeting; the two former because they attached themselves to the
alliance of Rome; the Treviri because they were very remote and were hard
pressed by the Germans; which was also the reason of their being absent during
the whole war, and their sending auxiliaries to neither party. The Aedui are
highly indignant at being deprived of the chief command; they lament the change
of fortune, and miss Caesar's indulgence toward them; however, after engaging
in the war, they do not dare to pursue their own measures apart from the rest.
Eporedirix and Viridomarus, youths of the greatest promise, submit reluctantly
to Vercingetorix.
[7.64] The latter
demands hostages from the remaining states; nay, more, appointed a day for this
proceeding; he orders all the cavalry, fifteen thousand in number, to quickly
assemble here; he says that he will be content with the infantry which he had before,
and would not tempt fortune nor come to a regular engagement; but since he had
abundance of cavalry, it would be very easy for him to prevent the Romans from
obtaining forage or corn, provided that they themselves should resolutely
destroy their corn and set fire to their houses; by which sacrifice of private
property they would evidently obtain perpetual dominion and freedom. After
arranging these matters, he levies ten thousand infantry on the Aedui and
Segusiani, who border on our province: to these he adds eight hundred horse. He
sets over them the brother of Eporedirix, and orders him to wage war against
the Allobroges. On the other side he sends the Gabali and the nearest cantons
of the Arverni against the Helvii; he likewise sends the Ruteni and Cadurci to
lay waste the territories of the Volcae Arecomici. Besides, by secret messages
and embassies, he tampers with the Allobroges, whose minds, he hopes, had not
yet settled down after the excitement of the late war. To their nobles he
promises money, and to their state the dominion of the whole province.
[7.65] The only guards
provided against all these contingencies were twenty-two cohorts, which were
collected from the entire province by Lucius Caesar, the lieutenant, and
opposed to the enemy in every quarter. The Helvii, voluntarily engaging in
battle with their neighbors, are defeated, and Caius Valerius Donotaurus, the
son of Caburus, the principal man of the state, and several others, being
slain, they are forced to retire within their towns and fortifications. The
Allobroges, placing guards along the course of the Rhine, defend their
frontiers with great vigilance and energy. Caesar, as he perceived that the
enemy were superior in cavalry, and he himself could receive no aid from the
Province or Italy, while all communication was cut off, sends across the Rhine
into Germany to those states which he had subdued in the preceding campaigns,
and summons from them cavalry and the light-armed infantry, who were accustomed
to engage among them. On their arrival, as they were mounted on unserviceable
horses, he takes horses from the military tribunes and the rest, nay, even from
the Roman knights and veterans, and distributes them among the Germans.
[7.66] In the mean
time, whilst these things are going on, the forces of the enemy from the
Arverni, and the cavalry which had been demanded from all Gaul, meet together.
A great number of these having been collected, when Caesar was marching into
the country of the Sequani, through the confines of the Lingones, in order that
he might the more easily render aid to the province, Vercingetorix encamped in
three camps, about ten miles from the Romans: and having summoned the
commanders of the cavalry to a council, he shows that the time of victory was
come; that the Romans were fleeing into the Province and leaving Gaul; that
this was sufficient for obtaining immediate freedom; but was of little moment
in acquiring peace and tranquillity for the future; for the Romans would return
after assembling greater forces and would not put an end to the war. Therefore
they should attack them on their march, when encumbered. If the infantry should
[be obliged to] relieve their cavalry, and be retarded by doing so, the march
could not be accomplished: if, abandoning their baggage they should provide for
their safety (a result which, he trusted, was more like to ensue), they would
lose both property and character. For as to the enemy's horse, they ought not
to entertain a doubt that none of them would dare to advance beyond the main
body. In order that they [the Gauls] may do so with greater spirit, he would
marshal all their forces before the camp, and intimidate the enemy. The cavalry
unanimously shout out, "That they ought to bind themselves by a most
sacred oath, that he should not be received under a roof, nor have access to
his children, parents, or wife, who shall not twice have ridden through the
enemy's army."
[7.67] This proposal
receiving general approbation, and all being forced to take the oath, on the
next day the cavalry were divided into three parts, and two of these divisions
made a demonstration on our two flanks; while one in front began to obstruct
our march. On this circumstance being announced, Caesar orders his cavalry also
to form three divisions and charge the enemy. Then the action commences
simultaneously in every part: the main body halts; the baggage is received
within the ranks of the legions. If our men seemed to be distressed, or hard
pressed in any quarter, Caesar usually ordered the troops to advance, and the
army to wheel round in that quarter; which conduct retarded the enemy in the
pursuit, and encouraged our men by the hope of support. At length the Germans,
on the right wing, having gained the top of the hill, dislodge the enemy from
their position and pursue them even as far as the river at which Vercingetorix
with the infantry was stationed, and slay several of them. The rest, on
observing this action, fearing lest they should be surrounded, betake
themselves to flight. A slaughter ensues in every direction, and three of the
noblest of the Aedui are taken and brought to Caesar: Cotus, the commander of
the cavalry, who had been engaged in the contest with Convictolitanis the last
election, Cavarillus, who had held the command of the infantry after the revolt
of Litavicus, and Eporedirix, under whose command the Aedui had engaged in war
against the Sequani, before the arrival of Caesar.
[7.68] All his cavalry
being routed, Vercingetorix led back his troops in the same order as he had
arranged them before the camp, and immediately began to march to Alesia, which
is a town of the Mandubii, and ordered the baggage to be speedily brought forth
from the camp, and follow him closely. Caesar, having conveyed his baggage to
the nearest hill, and having left two legions to guard it, pursued as far as
the time of day would permit, and after slaying about three thousand of the
rear of the enemy, encamped at Alesia on the next day. On reconnoitering the
situation of the city, finding that the enemy were panic-stricken, because the
cavalry in which they placed their chief reliance, were beaten, he encouraged
his men to endure the toil, and began to draw a line of circumvallation round
Alesia.
[7.69] The town itself
was situated on the top of a hill, in a very lofty position, so that it did not
appear likely to be taken, except by a regular siege. Two rivers, on two
different sides, washed the foot of the hill. Before the town lay a plain of
about three miles in length; on every other side hills at a moderate distance,
and of an equal degree of height, surrounded the town. The army of the Gauls
had filled all the space under the wall, comprising a part of the hill which
looked to the rising sun, and had drawn in front a trench and a stone wall six
feet high. The circuit of that fortification, which was commenced by the
Romans, comprised eleven miles. The camp was pitched in a strong position, and
twenty-three redoubts were raised in it, in which sentinels were placed by day,
lest any sally should be made suddenly; and by night the same were occupied by
watches and strong guards.
[7.70] The work having
been begun, a cavalry action ensues in that plain, which we have already
described as broken by hills, and extending three miles in length. The contest
is maintained on both sides with the utmost vigor; Caesar sends the Germans to
aid our troops when distressed, and draws up the legions in front of the camp,
lest any sally should be suddenly made by the enemy's infantry. The courage of
our men is increased by the additional support of the legions; the enemy being
put to flight, hinder one another by their numbers, and as only the narrower
gates were left open, are crowded together in them; then the Germans pursue
them with vigor even to the fortifications. A great slaughter ensues; some
leave their horses, and endeavor to cross the ditch and climb the wall. Caesar
orders the legions which he had drawn up in front of the rampart to advance a
little. The Gauls, who were within the fortifications, were no less panic-stricken,
thinking that the enemy were coming that moment against them, and unanimously
shout "to arms;" some in their alarm rush into the town;
Vercingetorix orders the gates to be shut, lest the camp should be left
undefended. The Germans retreat, after slaying many and taking several horses.
[7.71] Vercingetorix
adopts the design of sending away all his cavalry by night, before the
fortifications should be completed by the Romans. He charges them when
departing "that each of them should go to his respective state, and press
for the war all who were old enough to bear arms; he states his own merits, and
conjures them to consider his safety, and not surrender him who had deserved so
well of the general freedom, to the enemy for torture; he points out to them
that, if they should be remiss, eighty thousand chosen men would perish with
him; that upon making a calculation, he had barely corn for thirty days, but
could hold out a little longer by economy." After giving these
instructions he silently dismisses the cavalry in the second watch, [on that
side] where our works were not completed; he orders all the corn to be brought
to himself; he ordains capital punishment to such as should not obey; he
distributes among them, man by man, the cattle, great quantities of which had
been driven there by the Mandubii; he began to measure out the corn sparingly,
and by little and little; he receives into the town all the forces which he had
posted in front of it. In this manner he prepares to await the succors from Gaul,
and carry on the war.
[7.72] Caesar, on
learning these proceedings from the deserters and captives, adopted the
following system of fortification; he dug a trench twenty feet deep, with
perpendicular sides, in such a manner that the base of this trench should
extend so far as the edges were apart at the top. He raised all his other works
at a distance of four hundred feet from that ditch; [he did] that with this
intention, lest (since he necessarily embraced so extensive an area, and the
whole works could not be easily surrounded by a line of soldiers) a large
number of the enemy should suddenly, or by night, sally against the
fortifications; or lest they should by day cast weapons against our men while
occupied with the works. Having left this interval, he drew two trenches
fifteen feet broad, and of the same depth; the innermost of them, being in low
and level ground, he filled with water conveyed from the river. Behind these he
raised a rampart and wall twelve feet high; to this he added a parapet and battlements,
with large stakes cut like stags' horns, projecting from the junction of the
parapet and battlements, to prevent the enemy from scaling it, and surrounded
the entire work with turrets, which were eighty feet distant from one another.
[7.73] It was
necessary, at one and the same time, to procure timber [for the rampart], lay
in supplies of corn, and raise also extensive fortifications, and the available
troops were in consequence of this reduced in number, since they used to
advance to some distance from the camp, and sometimes the Gauls endeavored to
attack our works, and to make a sally from the town by several gates and in
great force. Caesar thought that further additions should be made to these
works, in order that the fortifications might be defensible by a small number
of soldiers. Having, therefore, cut down the trunks of trees or very thick
branches, and having stripped their tops of the bark, and sharpened them into a
point, he drew a continued trench every where five feet deep. These stakes
being sunk into this trench, and fastened firmly at the bottom, to prevent the
possibility of their being torn up, had their branches only projecting from the
ground. There were five rows in connection with, and intersecting each other;
and whoever entered within them were likely to impale themselves on very sharp
stakes. The soldiers called these "cippi." Before these, which were
arranged in oblique rows in the form of a quincunx, pits three feet deep were
dug, which gradually diminished in depth to the bottom. In these pits tapering
stakes, of the thickness of a man's thigh; sharpened at the top and hardened in
the fire, were sunk in such a manner as to project from the ground not more
than four inches; at the same time for the purpose of giving them strength and
stability, they were each filled with trampled clay to the height of one foot
from the bottom: the rest of the pit was covered over with osiers and twigs, to
conceal the deceit. Eight rows of this kind were dug, and were three feet
distant from each other. They called this a lily from its resemblance to that
flower. Stakes a foot long, with iron hooks attached to them, were entirely
sunk in the ground before these, and were planted in every place at small
intervals; these they called spurs.
[7.74] After completing
these works, saving selected as level ground as he could, considering the
nature of the country, and having inclosed an area of fourteen miles, he
constructed, against an external enemy, fortifications of the same kind in
every respect, and separate from these, so that the guards of the
fortifications could not be surrounded even by immense numbers, if such a
circumstance should take place owing to the departure of the enemy's cavalry;
and in order that the Roman soldiers might not be compelled to go out of the
camp with great risk, ho orders all to provide forage and corn for thirty days.
[7.75] While those
things are carried on at Alesia, the Gauls, having convened a council of their
chief nobility, determine that all who could bear arms should not be called
out, which was the opinion of Vercingetorix, but that a fixed number should be
levied from each state; lest, when so great a multitude assembled together,
they could neither govern nor distinguish their men, nor have the means of
supplying them with corn. They demand thirty-five thousand men from the Aedui
and their dependents, the Segusiani, Ambivareti, and Aulerci Brannovices; an
equal number from the Arverni in conjunction with the Eleuteti Cadurci, Gabali,
and Velauni, who were accustomed to be under the command of the Arverni; twelve
thousand each from the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, Sentones, Ruteni, and
Carnutes; ten thousand from the Bellovaci; the same number from the Lemovici;
eight thousand each from the Pictones, and Turoni, and Parisii, and Helvii;
five thousand each from the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii,
Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges; the same number from the Aulerci Cenomani;
four thousand from the Atrebates; three thousand each from the Bellocassi,
Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices; thirty thousand from the Rauraci, and Boii;
six thousand from all the states together, which border on the Atlantic, and
which in their dialect are called Armoricae (in which number are comprehended
the Curisolites, Rhedones, Ambibari, Caltes, Osismii, Lemovices, Veneti, and
Unelli). Of these the Bellovaci did not contribute their number, as they said
that they would wage war against the Romans on their own account, and at their
own discretion, and would not obey the order of any one: however, at the
request of Commius, they sent two thousand, in consideration of a tie of
hospitality which subsisted between him and them.
[7.76] Caesar had, as
we have previously narrated, availed himself of the faithful and valuable services
of this Commius, in Britain, in former years: in consideration of which merits
he had exempted from taxes his [Commius's] state, and had conferred on Commius
himself the country of the Morini. Yet such was the unanimity of the Gauls in
asserting their freedom, and recovering their ancient renown in war, that they
were influenced neither by favors, nor by the recollection of private
friendship; and all earnestly directed their energies and resources to that
war, and collected eight thousand cavalry, and about two hundred and forty
thousand infantry. These were reviewed in the country of the Aedui, and a
calculation was made of their numbers: commanders were appointed: the supreme
command is intrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedirix the
Aeduans, and Vergasillaunus the Arvernan, the cousin-german of Vercingetorix.
To them are assigned men selected from each state, by whose advice the war
should be conducted. All march to Alesia, sanguine and full of confidence: nor
was there a single individual who imagined that the Romans could withstand the
sight of such an immense host: especially in an action carried on both in front
and rear, when [on the inside] the besieged would sally from the town and
attack the enemy, and on the outside so great forces of cavalry and infantry
would be seen.
[7.77] But those who
were blockaded at Alesia, the day being past, on which they had expected
auxiliaries from their countrymen, and all their corn being consumed ignorant
of what was going on among the Aedui, convened an assembly and deliberated on
the exigency of their situation. After various opinions had been expressed
among them, some of which proposed a surrender, others a sally, while their
strength would support it, the speech of Critognatus ought not to be omitted
for its singular and detestable cruelty. He sprung from the noblest family
among the Arverni, and possessing great influence, says, "I shall pay no
attention to the opinion of those who call a most disgraceful surrender by the
name of a capitulation; nor do I think that they ought to be considered as
citizens, or summoned to the council. My business is with those who approve of
a sally: in whose advice the memory of our ancient prowess seems to dwell in
the opinion of you all. To be unable to bear privation for a short time is
disgraceful cowardice, not true valor. Those who voluntarily offer themselves
to death are more easily found than those who would calmly endure distress. And
I would approve of this opinion (for honor is a powerful motive with me), could
I foresee no other loss, save that of life; but let us, in adopting our design,
look back on all Gaul, which we have stirred up to our aid. What courage do you
think would our relatives and friends have, if eighty thousand men were butchered
in one spot, supposing that they should be forced to come to an action almost
over our corpses? Do not utterly deprive them of your aid, for they have
spurned all thoughts of personal danger on account of your safety; nor by your
folly, rashness, and cowardice, crush all Gaul and doom it to an eternal
slavery. Do you doubt their fidelity and firmness because they have not come at
the appointed day? What then? Do you suppose that the Romans are employed every
day in the outer fortifications for mere amusement? If you can not be assured
by their dispatches, since every avenue is blocked up, take the Romans as
evidence that there approach is drawing near; since they, intimidated by alarm
at this, labor night and day at their works. What, therefore, is my design? To
do as our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, which was
by no means equally momentous who, when driven into their towns, and oppressed
by similar privations, supported life by the corpses of those who appeared
useless for war on account of their age, and did not surrender to the enemy:
and even if we had not a precedent for such cruel conduct, still I should
consider it most glorious that one should be established, and delivered to
posterity. For in what was that war like this? The Cimbri, after laying Gaul
waste, and inflicting great calamities, at length departed from our country,
and sought other lands; they left us our rights, laws, lands, and liberty. But
what other motive or wish have the Romans, than, induced by envy, to settle in
the lands and states of those whom they have learned by fame to be noble and
powerful in war, and impose on them perpetual slavery? For they never have
carried on wars on any other terms. But if you know not these things which are
going on in distant countries, look to the neighboring Gaul, which being
reduced to the form of a province, stripped of its rights and laws, and
subjected to Roman despotism, is oppressed by perpetual slavery."
[7.78] When different
opinions were expressed, they determined that those who, owing to age or ill
health, were unserviceable for war, should depart from the town, and that
themselves should try every expedient before they had recourse to the advice of
Critognatus: however, that they would rather adopt that design, if
circumstances should compel them and their allies should delay, than accept any
terms of a surrender or peace. The Mandubii, who had admitted them into the
town, are compelled to go forth with their wives and children. When these came
to the Roman fortifications, weeping, they begged of the soldiers by every
entreaty to receive them as slaves and relieve them with food. But Caesar,
placing guards on the rampart, forbade them to be admitted.
[7.79] In the mean
time, Commius and the rest of the leaders, to whom the supreme command had been
intrusted, came with all their forces to Alesia, and having occupied the entire
hill, encamped not more than a mile from our fortifications. The following day,
having led forth their cavalry from the camp, they fill all that plain, which,
we have related, extended three miles in length, and drew out their infantry a
little from that place, and post them on the higher ground. The town Alesia
commanded a view of the whole plain. The besieged run together when these auxiliaries
were seen; mutual congratulations ensue, and the minds of all are elated with
joy. Accordingly, drawing out their troops, they encamp before the town, and
cover the nearest trench with hurdles and fill it up with earth, and make ready
for a sally and every casualty.
[7.80] Caesar, having
stationed his army on both sides of the fortifications, in order that, if
occasion should arise, each should hold and know his own post, orders the
cavalry to issue forth from the camp and commence action. There was a
commanding view from the entire camp, which occupied a ridge of hills; and the
minds of all the soldiers anxiously awaited the issue of the battle. The Gauls
had scattered archers and light-armed infantry here and there, among their
cavalry, to give relief to their retreating troops, and sustain the impetuosity
of our cavalry. Several of our soldiers were unexpectedly wounded by these, and
left the battle. When the Gauls were confident that their countrymen were the
conquerors in the action, and beheld our men hard pressed by numbers, both
those who were hemmed in by the line of circumvallation and those who had come
to aid them, supported the spirits of their men by shouts and yells from every
quarter. As the action was carried on in sight of all, neither a brave nor
cowardly act could be concealed; both the desire of praise and the fear of
ignominy, urged on each party to valor. After fighting from noon almost to
sunset, without victory inclining in favor of either, the Germans, on one side,
made a charge against the enemy in a compact body, and drove them back; and,
when they were put to flight, the archers were surrounded and cut to pieces. In
other parts, likewise, our men pursued to the camp the retreating enemy, and
did not give them an opportunity of rallying. But those who had come forth from
Alesia returned into the town dejected and almost despairing of success.
[7.81] The Gauls, after
the interval of a day and after making, during that time, an immense number of
hurdles, scaling-ladders, and iron hooks, silently went forth from the camp at
midnight and approached the fortifications in the plain. Raising a shout
suddenly, that by this intimation those who were beseiged in the town might
learn their arrival, they began to cast down hurdles and dislodge our men from
the rampart by slings, arrows, and stones, and executed the other movements
which are requisite in storming. At the same time, Vercingetorix, having heard
the shout, gives the signal to his troops by a trumpet, and leads them forth from
the town. Our troops, as each man's post had been assigned him some days
before, man the fortifications; they intimidate the Gauls by slings, large
stones, stakes which they had placed along the works, and bullets. All view
being prevented by the darkness, many wounds are received on both sides;
several missiles, are thrown from the engines. But Marcus Antonius, and Caius
Trebonius, the lieutenants, to whom the defense of these parts had been
allotted, draughted troops from the redoubts which were more remote, and sent
them to aid our troops, in whatever direction they understood that they were
hard pressed.
[7.82] While the Gauls
were at a distance from the fortification, they did more execution, owing to
the immense number of their weapons: after they came nearer, they either
unawares empaled themselves on the spurs, or were pierced by the mural darts
from the ramparts and towers, and thus perished. After receiving many wounds on
all sides, and having forced no part of the works, when day drew nigh, fearing
lest they should be surrounded by a sally made from the higher camp on the
exposed flank, they retreated to their countrymen. But those within, while they
bring forward those things which had been prepared by Vercingetorix for a
sally, fill up the nearest trenches; having delayed a long time in executing
these movements, they learned the retreat of their countrymen before they drew
nigh to the fortifications. Thus they returned to the town without
accomplishing their object.
[7.83] The Gauls, having
been twice repulsed with great loss, consult what they should do; they avail
themselves of the information of those who were well acquainted with the
country; from them they ascertain the position and fortification of the upper
camp. There was, on the north side, a hill, which our men could not include in
their works, on account of the extent of the circuit, and had necessarily made
their camp in ground almost disadvantageous, and pretty steep. Caius Antistius
Reginus, and Caius Caninius Rebilus, two of the lieutenants, with two legions,
were in possession of this camp. The leaders of the enemy, having reconnoitered
the country by their scouts, select from the entire army sixty thousand men,
belonging to those states, which bear the highest character for courage; they
privately arrange among themselves what they wished to be done, and in what
manner; they decide that the attack should take place when it should seem to be
noon. They appoint over their forces Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the
four generals, and a near relative of Vercingetorix. He, having issued from the
camp at the first watch, and having almost completed his march a little before
the dawn, hid himself behind the mountain, and ordered his soldiers to refresh
themselves after their labor during the night. When noon now seemed to draw
nigh, he marched hastily against that camp which we have mentioned before; and,
at the same time, the cavalry began to approach the fortifications in the
plain, and the rest of the forces to make a demonstration in front of the camp.
[7.84] Vercingetorix,
having beheld his countrymen from the citadel of Alesia, issues forth from the
town; he brings forth from the camp long hooks, movable pent-houses, mural
hooks, and other things, which he had prepared for the purpose of making a
sally. They engage on all sides at once and every expedient is adopted. They
flocked to whatever part of the works seemed weakest. The army of the Romans is
distributed along their extensive lines, and with difficulty meets the enemy in
every quarter. The shouts which were raised by the combatants in their rear,
had a great tendency to intimidate our men, because they perceived that their
danger rested on the valor of others: for generally all evils which are distant
most powerfully alarm men's minds.
[7.85] Caesar, having
selected a commanding situation, sees distinctly whatever is going on in every
quarter, and sends assistance to his troops when hard pressed. The idea
uppermost in the minds of both parties is, that the present is the time in
which they would have the fairest opportunity of making a struggle; the Gauls
despairing of all safety, unless they should succeed in forcing the lines: the
Romans expecting an end to all their labors if they should gain the day. The
principal struggle is at the upper lines, to which as we have said
Vergasillaunus was sent. The least elevation of ground, added to a declivity,
exercises a momentous influence. Some are casting missiles, others, forming a
testudo, advance to the attack; fresh men by turns relieve the wearied. The
earth, heaped up by all against the fortifications, gives the means of ascent
to the Gauls, and covers those works which the Romans had concealed in the
ground. Our men have no longer arms or strength.
[7.86] Caesar, on
observing these movements, sends Labienus with six cohorts to relieve his
distressed soldiers: he orders him, if he should be unable to withstand them,
to draw off the cohorts and make a sally; but not to do this except through
necessity. He himself goes to the rest, and exhorts them not to succumb to the
toil; he shows them that the fruits of all former engagements depend on that
day and hour. The Gauls within, despairing of forcing the fortifications in the
plains on account of the greatness of the works, attempt the places precipitous
in ascent: hither they bring the engines which they had prepared; by the
immense number of their missiles they dislodge the defenders from the turrets:
they fill the ditches with clay and hurdles, then clear the way; they tear down
the rampart and breast-work with hooks.
[7.87] Caesar sends at
first young Brutus, with six cohorts, and afterward Caius Fabius, his
lieutenant, with seven others: finally, as they fought more obstinately, he
leads up fresh men to the assistance of his soldiers. After renewing the
action, and repulsing the enemy, he marches in the direction in which he had
sent Labienus, drafts four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, and orders part of
the cavalry to follow him, and part to make the circuit of the external
fortifications and attack the enemy in the rear. Labienus, when neither the
ramparts or ditches could check the onset of the enemy, informs Caesar by
messengers of what he intended to do. Caesar hastens to share in the action.
[7.88] His arrival
being known from the color of his robe, and the troops of cavalry, and the
cohorts which he had ordered to follow him being seen, as these low and sloping
grounds were plainly visible from the eminences, the enemy join battle. A shout
being raised by both sides, it was succeeded by a general shout along the
ramparts and whole line of fortifications. Our troops, laying aside their
javelins, carry on the engagement with their swords. The cavalry is suddenly
seen in the rear of the Gauls; the other cohorts advance rapidly; the enemy
turn their backs; the cavalry intercept them in their flight, and a great
slaughter ensues. Sedulius the general and chief of the Lemovices is slain;
Vergasillaunus the Arvernian, is taken alive in the flight, seventy-four military
standards are brought to Caesar, and few out of so great a number return safe
to their camp. The besieged, beholding from the town the slaughter and flight
of their countrymen, despairing of safety, lead back their troops from the
fortifications. A flight of the Gauls from their camp immediately ensues on
hearing of this disaster, and had not the soldiers been wearied by sending
frequent reinforcements, and the labor of the entire day, all the enemy's
forces could have been destroyed. Immediately after midnight, the cavalry are
sent out and overtake the rear, a great number are taken or cut to pieces, the
rest by flight escape in different directions to their respective states.
Vercingetorix, having convened a council the following day, declares, "That
he had undertaken that war, not on account of his own exigences, but on account
of the general freedom; and since he must yield to fortune, he offered himself
to them for either purpose, whether they should wish to atone to the Romans by
his death, or surrender him alive. Embassadors are sent to Caesar on this
subject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and their chieftains delivered
up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in front of the camp, the Gallic
chieftains are brought before him. They surrender Vercingetorix, and lay down
their arms. Reserving the Aedui and Arverni, [to try] if he could gain over,
through their influence, their respective states, he distributes one of the
remaining captives to each soldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder.
[7.90] After making
these arrangements, he marches into the [country of the] Aedui, and recovers
that state. To this place embassadors are sent by the Arveni, who promise that
they will execute his commands. He demands a great number of hostages. He sends
the legions to winter-quarters; he restores about twenty thousand captives to
the Aedui and Arverni; he orders Titus Labienus to march into the [country of
the] Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and to him he attaches Marcus
Sempronius Rutilus; he places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus, with
two legions in the country of the Remi, lest they should sustain any loss from
the Bellovaci in their neighborhood. He sends Caius Antistius Reginus into the
[country of the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextius into the territories of the
Bituriges, and Caius Caninius Rebilus into those of the Ruteni, with one legion
each. He stations Quintus Tullius Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui
at Cabillo and Matisco on the Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself
determines to winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty-days is decreed by
the senate at Rome, on learning these successes from Caesar's dispatches.
End of Book 7
Aulus Hirtius 51-50
B.C.
Preface to book 8
[8.0] Prevailed on by
your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in a most difficult task,
as my daily refusals appear to plead not my inability, but indolence, as an
excuse. I have compiled a continuation of the Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars
in Gaul, not indeed to be compared to his writings, which either precede or
follow them; and recently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the
transactions in Alexandria, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to
which we see no issue, but of Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read
them could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might the
more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in presuming to
intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on all hands, that no
composition was ever executed with so great care, that it is not exceeded in
elegance by these Commentaries, which were published for the use of historians,
that they might not want memoirs of such achievements; and they stand so high
in the esteem of all men, that historians seem rather deprived of, than
furnished with material. At which we have more reason to be surprised than
other men; for they can only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which
he finished them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed
not only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also a
thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had not even the
good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war; and though these were
partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in conversation, yet we listen
with a different degree of attention to those things which strike us with
admiration by their novelty, and those which we design to attest to posterity.
But, in truth, while I urge every apology, that I may not be compared to
Caesar, I incur the charge of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the
judgment of any one be put in competition with him. Farewell.
Book 8 --- (51-50 B.C.)
[8.1] Gaul being entirely
reduced, when Caesar having waged war incessantly during the former summer,
wished to recruit his soldiers after so much fatigue, by repose in winter
quarters, news was brought him that several states were simultaneously renewing
their hostile intention, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason
was assigned; namely, that the Gauls were convinced that they were not able to
resist the Romans, with any force they could collect in one place; and hoped
that if several states made war in different places at the same time, the Roman
army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to prosecute them all: nor
ought any single state to decline any inconveniences that might befall them,
provided that by such delay, the rest should be enabled to assert their
liberty.
[8.2] That this notion
might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his
questor, in charge of his quarters, and set out himself with a guard of horse,
the day before the kalends of January, from the town Bibracte, to the
thirteenth legion, which he had stationed in the country of the Bituriges, not
far from the territories of the Aedui, and joined to it the eleventh legion
which was next it. Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest
of his army into the most plentiful part of the country of the Bituriges; who,
possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to be deterred,
by a single legion quartered among them, from making warlike preparation, and
forming combinations.
[8.3] By Caesar's
sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to an unprovided and
dispersed people, that they were surprised by our horse, while cultivating the
fields without any apprehensions, before they had time to fly to their towns.
For the usual sign of an enemy's invasion, which is generally intimated by the
burning of their towns, was forbidden by Caesar's orders; lest if he advanced
far, forage and corn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires
to make their escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges as
were able to escape the first coming of the Romans, fled to the neighboring
states, relying either on private friendship, or public alliance. In vain; for
Caesar, by hasty marches, anticipated them in every place, nor did he allow any
state leisure to consider the safety of others, in preference to their own. By
this activity, he both retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear,
obliged the wavering to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the
Bituriges, when they perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was
open to his friendship, and that the neighboring states had given hostages,
without incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection,
they did the same.
[8.4] Caesar promises
his soldiers, as a reward for their labor and patience, in cheerfully
submitting to hardships from the severity of the winter, the difficulty of the
roads, and the intolerable cold, two hundred sestertii each, and to every
centurian two thousand, to be given instead of plunder: and sending his legions
back to quarters, he himself returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. While he
was dispensing justice there, the Bituriges send embassadors to him, to entreat
his aid against the Carnutes, who they complained had made war against them.
Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteen days in
winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of quarters on
the Saone, where he had posted them as mentioned in a former Commentary, to
procure supplies of corn. With these two legions he marches in pursuit of the
Carnutes.
[8.5] When the news of
the approach of our army reached the enemy, the Carnutes, terrified by the
suffering of other states, deserted their villages and towns (which were small
buildings, raised in a hurry, to meet the immediate necessity, in which they
lived to shelter themselves against the winter, for, being lately conquered,
they had lost several towns), and dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose
his soldiers to the violent storms that break out, especially at that season,
took up his quarters at Genabum, a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men in
houses, partly belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the tents,
and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he sends to all
parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not without effect, as
our men generally returned loaded with booty. The Carnutes, overpowered by the
severity of the winter, and the fear of danger, and not daring to continue long
in any place, as they were driven from their houses, and not finding sufficient
protection in the woods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a
considerable number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the
neighboring states.
[8.6] Caesar, being
contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the gathering foes, and prevent
any new war from breaking out, and being convinced, as far as reason could
foresee, that no war of consequence could be set on foot in the summer
campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius, with the two legions which he had with
him, in quarters at Genabum: and being informed by frequent embassies from the
Remi, that the Bellovaci (who exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess),
and the neighboring states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and
Comius, the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and assembling at a general
rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade the territories of the
Suessiones, who were put under the patronage of the Remi: and moreover,
considering that not only his honor, but his interest was concerned, that such
of his allies, as deserved well of the republic, should suffer no calamity; he
again draws the eleventh legion out of quarters, and writes besides to Caius
Fabius, to march with his two legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he
sends to Trebonius for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience
of the quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of
the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his own
toils.
[8.7] As soon as his
troops were collected, he marched against the Bellovaci: and pitching his camp
in their territories, detached troops of horse all round the country, to take
prisoners, from whom he might learn the enemy's plan. The horse, having
executed his orders bring him back word, that but few were found in the houses:
and that even these had not stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the
emigration was general from all parts) but had been sent back to watch our
motions. Upon Caesar's inquiring from them, where the main body of the
Bellovaci were posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that
all the Bellovaci, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along
with them the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and that
they had chosen for their camp, an elevated position, surrounded by a dangerous
morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the most remote woods:
that several noblemen were united in the management of the war; but that the
people were most inclined to be governed by Correus, because they knew that he
had the strongest aversion to the name of the Roman people: that a few days
before Comius had left the camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation
bordered on theirs, and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had
come to a resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest
desire of the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions, as was
reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to encounter his
whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a more wretched and
distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger force, they intended to
remain in the position they had chosen, and by ambuscade to prevent the Romans
from getting forage (which at that season was both scarce and much scattered),
corn, and other necessaries.
[8.8] When Caesar was
convinced of the truth of this account from the concurring testimony of several
persons, and perceived that the plans which were proposed were full of
prudence, and very unlike the rash resolves of a barbarous people, he
considered it incumbent on him to use every exertion, in order that the enemy
might despise his small force and come to an action. For he had three veteran
legions of distinguished valor, the seventh, eighth and ninth. The eleventh
consisted of chosen youth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but
who, compared with the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation for
experience and valor. Calling therefore a council, and laying before it the
intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In order if
possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance of only three
legions, he ranged his army in the following manner, that the seventh, eighth,
and ninth legions should march before all the baggage; that then the eleventh
should bring up the rear of the whole train of baggage (which however was but
small, as is usual on such expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a
sight of a greater number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By
this disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them
within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated.
[8.9] When the Gauls,
whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar, saw the legions advance
with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array; either from the danger of an
engagement, or our sudden approach, or with the design of watching our
movements, they drew up their forces before the camp, and did not quit the
rising ground. Though Caesar wished to bring them to battle, yet being
surprised to see so vast a host of the enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with
a valley between them, deep rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be
fortified with a rampart twelve feet high, with breastworks built on it
proportioned to its height and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with
perpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories high,
to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laid across and
covered over; which should be guarded in front by small parapets of osiers;
that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of soldiers. The one of whom,
being more secure from danger by their height might throw their darts with more
daring and to a greater distance; the other which was nearer the enemy, being
stationed on the rampart, would be protected by their galleries from darts falling
on their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a considerable
height.
[8.10] Caesar had a
double design in this fortification; for he both hoped that the strength of his
works, and his [apparent] fears would raise confidence in the barbarians; and
when there should be occasion to make a distant excursion to get forage or
corn, he saw that his camp would be secured by the works with a very small
force. In the mean time there were frequent skirmishes across the marsh, a few
on both sides sallying out between the two camps. Sometimes, however, our
Gallic or German auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the
enemy; or on the other hand the enemy passed it and beat back our men. Moreover
there happened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessity
happen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out of private
houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate country were surrounded by
the enemy; by which, though we suffered but an inconsiderable loss of cattle
and servants, yet it raised foolish hopes in the barbarians; but more
especially, because Comius, who I said had gone to get aid from the Germans,
returned with some cavalry, and though the Germans were only 500, yet the
barbarians were elated by their arrival.
[8.11] Caesar,
observing that the enemy kept for several days within their camp, which was
well secured by a morass and its natural situation, and that it could not be
assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor the place inclosed with lines
without an addition to his army, wrote to Trebonius to send with all dispatch
for the thirteenth legion which was in winter quarters among the Bituriges
under Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants; and then to come to him by forced
marches with the three legions. He himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, and
Lingones, and other states, from whom he had required a vast number, to guard
his foraging parties, and to support them in case of any sudden attack of the
enemy.
[8.12] As this
continued for several days, and their vigilance was relaxed by custom (an
effect which is generally produced by time), the Bellovaci, having made
themselves acquainted with the daily stations of our horse, lie in ambush with
a select body of foot in a place covered with woods; to it they sent their
horse the next day, who were first to decoy our men into the ambuscade, and
then when they were surrounded, to attack them. It was the lot of the Remi to
fall into this snare, to whom that day had been allotted to perform this duty;
for, having suddenly got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and despising their
weakness, in consequence of their superior numbers, they pursued them too
eagerly, and were surrounded on every side by the foot. Being, by this means
thrown into disorder they returned with more precipitation than is usual in
cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus the governor of their state, and
the general of their horse, who, though scarcely able to sit on horseback
through years, neither, in accordance with the custom of the Gauls, pleaded his
age in excuse for not accepting the command, nor would he suffer them to fight
without him. The spirits of the barbarians were puffed up, and inflated at the
success of this battle, in killing the prince, and general of the Remi; and our
men were taught by this loss, to examine the country, and post their guards
with more caution, and to be more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy.
[8.13] In the mean time
daily skirmishes take place continually in view of both camps; these were
fought at the ford and pass of the morass. In one of these contests the
Germans, whom Caesar had brought over the Rhine, to fight, intermixed with the
horse, having resolutely crossed the marsh, and slain the few who made
resistance, and boldly pursued the rest, so terrified them, that not only those
who were attacked hand to hand, or wounded at a distance, but even those who
were stationed at a greater distance to support them, fled disgracefully; and
being often beaten from the rising grounds, did not stop till they had retired
into their camp, or some, impelled by fear, had fled further. Their danger
threw their whole army into such confusion, that it was difficult to judge
whether they were more insolent after a slight advantage or more dejected by a
trifling calamity.
[8.14] After spending
several days in the same camp, the guards of the Bellovaci, learning that Caius
Trebonius was advancing nearer with his legions, and fearing a siege like that
of Alesia, send off by night all who were disabled by age or infirmity, or
unarmed, and along with them their whole baggage. While they are preparing
their disorderly and confused troop for march (for the Gauls are always
attended by a vast multitude of wagons, even when they have very light
baggage), being overtaken by day-light, they drew their forces out before their
camp, to prevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their
baggage had advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it
prudent to attack them when standing on their defense, with such a steep hill
in their favor, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they could quit
their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was divided from the
enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he could not pursue with
expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass, which extended almost to the
enemy's camp, was separated from it only by a small valley, he laid a bridge
over the morass and led his army across, and soon reached the plain on the top
of the hill, which was fortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there
drawn up his army in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from
which he could, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the enemy.
[8.15] The Gauls,
confiding in the natural strength of their position, though they would not
decline an engagement if the Romans attempted to ascend the hill, yet dared not
divide their forces into small parties, lest they should be thrown into
disorder by being dispersed, and therefore remained in order of battle. Caesar,
perceiving that they persisted in their resolution, kept twenty cohorts in
battle array, and, measuring out ground there for a camp, ordered it to be
fortified. Having completed his works, he drew up his legions before the
rampart and stationed the cavalry in certain positions, with their horses
bridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to pursue them, and that
they could not wait the whole night, or continue longer in the same place
without provisions, they formed the following plan to secure a retreat. They
handed to one another the bundles of straw and sticks on which they sat (for it
is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn up in order of battle, as has been
asserted in former commentaries), of which they had great plenty in their camp,
and piled them in the front of their line; and at the close of the day, on a
certain signal, set them all on fire at one and the same time. The continued
blaze soon screened all their forces from the sight of the Romans, which no
sooner happened than the barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation.
[8.16] Though Caesar
could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the intervention of the fire,
yet, suspecting that they had adopted that method to favor their escape, he
made his legions advance, and sent a party of horse to pursue them; but,
apprehensive of an ambuscade, and that the enemy might remain in the same place
and endeavor to draw our men into a disadvantageous situation, he advances
himself but slowly. The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and dense
line of flame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able
to see their horse's heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat, through
fear of an ambuscade. Thus by a flight, full at once of cowardice and address,
they advanced without any loss about ten miles, and encamped in a very strong
position. From which, laying numerous ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they
did considerable damage to the Roman foragers.
[8.17] After this had
happened several times, Caesar discovered from a certain prisoner, that
Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of his bravest
foot and a thousand horse, with which he designed to lie in ambush in a place
to which he suspected the Romans would send to look for forage, on account of
the abundance of corn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design
Caesar drew out more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry
as usual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard of light
infantry, and himself advanced with the legions as fast as he could.
[8.18] The Gauls,
placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a level piece of ground,
not more than a mile in extent, inclosed on every side by a thick wood or a
very deep river, as by a toil, and this they surrounded. Our men, apprised of
the enemy's design, marched in good order to the ground, ready both in heart
and hand to give battle, and willing to hazard any engagement when the legions
were at their back. On their approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an
opportunity of effecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small
party and attacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and
did not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise in
engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to themselves.
[8.19] When by the
judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of our men fought by turns, and
did not suffer themselves to be surrounded, the rest of the enemy broke out
from the woods while Correus was engaged. The battle was maintained in
different parts with great vigor, and continued for a long time undecided, till
at length a body of foot gradually advanced from the woods in order of battle
and forced our horse to give ground: the light infantry, which were sent before
the legions to the assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with
the horse, fought with great courage. The battle was for some time doubtful,
but, as usually happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first charge, became
superior from this very circumstance that, though suddenly attacked from an
ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the mean time the legions were
approaching, and several messengers arrived with notice to our men and the
enemy that the [Roman] general was near at hand, with his forces in battle
array. Upon this intelligence, our men, confiding in the support of the
cohorts, fought most resolutely, fearing, lest if they should be slow in their
operations they should let the legions participate in the glory of the
conquest. The enemy lose courage and attempt to escape by different ways. In
vain; for they were themselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they
thought to entrap the Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having
lost the greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whithersoever
chance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but were
vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the mean time,
Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to quit the field
and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of quarter, but, fighting
courageously and wounding several, provoked our men, elated with victory, to
discharge their weapons against him.
[8.20] After this
transaction, Caesar, having come up immediately after the battle, and imagining
that the enemy, upon receiving the news of so great a defeat, would be so
depressed that they would abandon their camp, which was not above eight miles
distant from the scene of action, though he saw his passage obstructed by the
river, yet he marched his army over and advanced. But the Bellovaci and the
other states, being informed of the loss they had sustained by a few wounded
men who having escaped by the shelter of the woods, had returned to them after
the defeat, and learning that every thing had turned out unfavorable, that
Correus was slain, and the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off,
imagined that the Romans were marching against them, and calling a council in
haste by sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to send embassadors and hostages
to Caesar.
[8.21] This proposal
having met with general approbation, Comius the Atrebatian fled to those Germans
from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries for that war. The rest instantly send
embassadors to Caesar; and requested that he would be contented with that
punishment of his enemy, which if he had possessed the power to inflict on them
before the engagement, when they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from
his usual clemency and mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the power of
the Bellovaci was crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousand of their
choicest foot had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped to bring the fatal
news. That, however, the Bellovaci had derived from the battle one advantage,
of some importance, considering their loss; that Correus, the author of the
rebellion, and agitator of the people, was slain: for that while he lived the
senate had never equal influence in the state with the giddy populace.
[8.22] Caesar reminded
the embassadors who made these supplications, that the Bellovaci had at the
same season the year before, in conjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken
a war, and that they had persevered the most obstinately of all in their
purpose, and were not brought to a proper way of thinking by the submission of
the rest: that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a crime was easily
transferred to the dead; but that no one person could have such influence, as
to be able by the feeble support of the multitude to raise a war and carry it
on without the consent of the nobles, in opposition to the senate, and in
despite of every virtuous man; however he was satisfied with the punishment,
which they had drawn upon themselves.
[8.23] The night
following the embassadors bring back his answer to their countrymen and prepare
the hostages. Embassadors flock in from the other states, which were waiting
for the issue of the [war with the] Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive
his orders; all except Comius, whose fears restrained him from intrusting his
safety to any person's honor. For the year before, while Caesar was holding the
assizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comius was
tampering with the state, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar, thought he
might punish his infidelity without perfidy; but judging that he would not come
to his camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put him on his guard by the
attempt, he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with orders to have him put to
death under pretense of conference. To effect his purpose, he sent with him
some chosen centurions. When they came to the conference, and Volusenus, as had
been agreed on, had taken hold of Comius by the hand, and one of the
centurions, as if surprised at so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him,
he was prevented by the friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head
by the first blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design
to fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had received a
mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they had seen, dreading
that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this transaction, it was said that
Comius made a resolution never to come within sight of any Roman.
[8.24] When Caesar,
having completely conquered the most warlike nations, perceived that there was
now no state which could make preparations for war to oppose him, but that some
were removing and fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he
resolved to detach his army into different parts of the country. He kept with
himself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; Caius Fabius
was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part of Gaul, because
it was rumored that some states had risen in arms, and he did not think that Caius
Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of that country, was strong enough to
protect it with two legions. He ordered Titus Labienus to attend himself, and
sent the twelfth legion which had been under him in winter quarters, to Hither
Gaul, to protect the Roman colonies, and prevent any loss by the inroads of
barbarians similar to that which had happened the year before to the
Tergestines, who were cut off by a sudden depredation and attack. He himself
marched to depopulate the country of Ambiorix, whom he had terrified and forced
to fly, but despaired of being able to reduce under his power; but he thought
it most consistent with his honor to waste his country both of inhabitants,
cattle, and buildings, so that from the abhorrence of his countrymen, if fortune
suffered any to survive, he might be excluded from a return to his state for
the calamities which he had brought on it.
[8.25] After he had
sent either his legions or auxiliaries through every part of Ambiorix's
dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword, fire, and rapine, and had
killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sent Labienus with two legions against
the Treviri, whose state, from its vicinity to Germany, being engaged in
constant war, differed but little from the Germans, in civilization and savage
barbarity; and never continued in its allegiance, except when awed by the
presence of his army.
[8.26] In the mean time
Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having received information by letters and
messages from Duracius, who had always continued in friendship to the Roman
people, though a part of his state had revolted, that a great multitude of the
enemy were in arms in the country of the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum.
When he was approaching it, he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius
was shut up by several thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, general of
the Andes, and that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face the enemy with
his weak legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus, having notice of
Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against the legions, and prepared
to assault the Roman camp. But after spending several days in the attempt, and
losing a considerable number of men, without being able to make a breach in any
part of the works, he returned again to the siege of Limonum.
[8.27] At the same
time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back many states to their allegiance,
and confirms their submission by taking hostages; he was then informed by
letters from Caninius, of the proceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he set
off to bring assistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus, hearing of the approach of
Fabius, and despairing of safety, if at the same time he should be forced to
withstand the Roman army without, and observe, and be under apprehension from
the town's people, made a precipitate retreat from that place with all his
forces. Nor did he think that he should be sufficiently secure from danger,
unless he led his army across the Loire, which was too deep a river to pass
except by a bridge. Though Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy,
nor joined Caninius; yet being informed of the nature of the country, by
persons acquainted with it, he judged it most likely that the enemy would take
that way, which he found they did take. He therefore marched to that bridge
with his army, and ordered his cavalry to advance no farther before the legions
than that they could return to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their
horses. Our horse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear
and attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with
baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having executed the
affair so successfully, they retired to the camp.
[8.28] The night
following, Fabius sent his horse before him, with orders to engage the enemy,
and delay their march till he himself should come up. That his orders might be
faithfully performed, Quintus Atius Varus, general of the horse, a man of
uncommon spirit and skill, encouraged his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed
some of his troops in convenient places, and with the rest gave battle to the
enemy. The enemy's cavalry made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other,
and making a general halt, to assist their horse against ours. The battle was
warmly contested. For our men, despising the enemy whom they had conquered the
day before, and knowing that the legions were following them, animated both by
the disgrace of retreating, and a desire of concluding the battle expeditiously
by their own courage, fought most valiantly against the foot: and the enemy,
imagining that no more forces would come against them, as they had experienced
the day before, thought they had got a favorable opportunity of destroying our
whole cavalry.
[8.29] After the conflict
had continued for some time with great violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in
such a manner, that the foot should by turns assist the horse. Then the
legions, marching in close order, came suddenly in sight of the enemy. At this
sight, the barbarian horse were so astonished, and the foot so terrified, that
breaking through the line of baggage, they betook themselves to flight with a
loud shout, and in great disorder. But our horse, who a little before had
vigorously engaged them, while they made resistance, being elated with joy at
their victory, raising a shout on every side, poured round them as they ran,
and as long as their horses had strength to pursue, or their arms to give a
blow, so long did they continue the slaughter of the enemy in that battle, and
having killed above twelve thousand men in arms, or such as threw away their
arms through fear, they took their whole train of baggage.
[8.30] After this
defeat, when it was ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian (who in the beginning
of the revolt of Gaul had collected from all quarters men of desperate
fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty, called in the exiles of the whole
kingdom, given an asylum to robbers, and intercepted the Roman baggage and
provisions), was marching to the province with five thousand men, being all he
could collect after the defeat, and that Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has
been observed in a former commentary, had designed to make an attack on the
Province in the first revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius
Caninius went in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might be
incurred from the fears or injuries done to the Province by the depredations of
a band of desperate men.
[8.31] Caius Fabius set
off with the rest of the army to the Carnutes and those other states, whose
force he was informed, had served as auxiliaries in that battle, which he
fought against Dumnacus. For he had no doubt that they would be more submissive
after their recent sufferings, but if respite and time were given them, they
might be easily excited by the earnest solicitations of the same Dumnacus. On
this occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate and expeditious in recovering the
states. For the Carnutes, who, though often harassed had never mentioned peace,
submitted and gave hostages: and the other states, which lie in the remotest
parts of Gaul, adjoining the ocean, and which are called Armoricae, influenced
by the example of the Carnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his legions,
without delay comply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled from his own
territories, wandering and skulking about, was forced to seek refuge by himself
in the most remote parts of Gaul.
[8.32] But Drapes in
conjunction with Luterius, knowing that Caninius was at hand with the legions,
and that they themselves could not without certain destruction enter the
boundaries of the province, while an army was in pursuit of them, and being no
longer at liberty to roam up and down and pillage, halt in the country of the
Cadurci, as Luterius had once in his prosperity possessed a powerful influence
over the inhabitants, who were his countrymen, and being always the author of
new projects, had considerable authority among the barbarians; with his own and
Drapes' troops he seized Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalage to him, and
strongly fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed on the inhabitants
to join him.
[8.33] After Caninius
had rapidly marched to this place, and perceived that all parts of the town
were secured by very craggy rocks, which it would be difficult for men in arms
to climb even if they met with no resistance; and moreover, observing that the
town's people were possessed of effects, to a considerable amount, and that if
they attempted to convey them away in a clandestine manner, they could not
escape our horse, or even our legions; he divided his forces into three parts,
and pitched three camps on very high ground, with the intention of drawing
lines round the town by degrees, as his forces could bear the fatigue.
[8.34] When the
townsmen perceived his design, being terrified by the recollection of the
distress at Alesia, they began to dread similar consequences from a siege; and
above all Luterius, who had experienced that fatal event, cautioned them to
make provisions of corn; they therefore resolve by general consent to leave
part of their troops behind, and set out with their light troops to bring in
corn. The scheme having met with approbation, the following night Drapes and
Luterius leaving two thousand men in the garrison, marched out of the town with
the rest. After a few days' stay in the country of the Cadurci (some of whom
were disposed to assist them with corn, and others were unable to prevent their
taking it) they collected a great store. Sometimes also attacks were made on
our little forts by sallies at night. For this reason Caninius deferred drawing
his works round the whole town, lest he should be unable to protect them when
completed, or by disposing his garrisons in several places, should make them too
weak.
[8.35] Drapes and
Luterius, having laid in a large supply of corn, occupying a position at about
ten miles distance from the town, intending from it to convey the corn into the
town by degrees. They chose each his respective department. Drapes stayed
behind in the camp with part of the army to protect it; Luterius conveys the
train with provisions into the town. Accordingly, having disposed guards here
and there along the road, about the tenth hour of the night, he set out by
narrow paths through the woods, to fetch the corn into the town. But their
noise being heard by the sentinels of our camp, and the scouts which we had
sent out, having brought an account of what was going on, Caninius instantly
with the ready-armed cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on the
convoy at the break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fled by
different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived, they fell
with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single man to be taken alive.
Luterius escaped thence with a few followers, but did not return to the camp.
[8.36] After this
success, Caninius learned from some prisoners, that a part of the forces was
encamped with Drapes, not more than ten miles off: which being confirmed by several,
supposing that after the defeat of one general, the rest would be terrified,
and might be easily conquered, he thought it a most fortunate event that none
of the enemy had fled back from the slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes
notice of the calamity which had befallen him. And as he could see no danger in
making the attempt, he sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot, men of
great activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion among the three
camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him. When he had advanced
near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which he had sent before him, that
the enemy's camp, as is the custom of barbarians, was pitched low, near the
banks of a river, and that the higher grounds were unoccupied: but that the
German horse had made a sudden attack on them, and had begun the battle. Upon
this intelligence, he marched up with his legion, armed and in order of battle.
Then, on a signal being suddenly given on every side, our men took possession
of the higher grounds. Upon this the German horse observing the Roman colors,
fought with great vigor. Immediately all the cohorts attack them on every side;
and having either killed or made prisoners of them all, gained great booty. In
that battle, Drapes himself was taken prisoner.
[8.37] Caninius, having
accomplished the business so successfully, without having scarcely a man
wounded, returned to besiege the town; and, having destroyed the enemy without,
for fear of whom he had been prevented from strengthening his redoubts, and
surrounding the enemy with his lines, he orders the work to be completed on
every side. The next day, Caius Fabius came to join him with his forces, and
took upon him the siege of one side.
[8.38] In the mean
time, Caesar left Caius Antonius in the country of the Bellovaci, with fifteen
cohorts, that the Belgae might have no opportunity of forming new plans in
future. He himself visits the other states, demands a great number of hostages,
and by his encouraging language allays the apprehensions of all. When he came
to the Carnutes, in whose state he has in a former commentary mentioned that
the war first broke out; observing, that from a consciousness of their guilt,
they seemed to be in the greatest terror: to relieve the state the sooner from
its fear, he demanded that Guturvatus, the promoter of that treason, and the
instigator of that rebellion, should be delivered up to punishment. And though
the latter did not dare to trust his life even to his own countrymen, yet such
diligent search was made by them all, that he was soon brought to our camp.
Caesar was forced to punish him, by the clamors of the soldiers, contrary to
his natural humanity, for they alleged that all the dangers and losses incurred
in that war, ought to be imputed to Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to
death, and his head cut off.
[8.39] Here Caesar was
informed by numerous letters from Caninius of what had happened to Drapes and
Luterius, and in what conduct the town's people persisted: and though he despised
the smallness of their numbers, yet he thought their obstinacy deserving a
severe punishment, lest Gaul in general should adopt an idea that she did not
want strength but perseverance to oppose the Romans; and lest the other states,
relying on the advantage of situation, should follow their example and assert
their liberty; especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that his
command was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could hold out for
that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend. He therefore
left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants, behind him, with two legions, and
instructions to follow him by regular marches. He hastened as much as he could
with all the cavalry to Caninius.
[8.40] Having arrived
at Uxellodunum, contrary to the general expectation, and perceiving that the
town was surrounded by the works, and that the enemy had no possible means of
retiring from the assault, and being likewise informed by the deserters that
the townsmen had abundance of corn, he endeavoured to prevent their getting
water. A river divided the valley below, which almost surrounded the steep
craggy mountain on which Uxellodunum was built. The nature of the ground
prevented his turning the current: for it ran so low down at the foot of the
mountain, that no drains could be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any
direction. But the descent to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition,
the besieged could neither come to the river nor retire up the precipice
without hazard of their lives. Caesar perceiving the difficulty, disposed
archers and slingers, and in some places, opposite to the easiest descents,
placed engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmen from getting water at the
river, which obliged them afterward to go all to one place to procure water.
[8.41] Close under the
walls of the town, a copious spring gushed out on that part, which for the
space of nearly three hundred feet, was not surrounded by the river. While
every other person wished that the besieged could be debarred from this spring,
Caesar alone saw that it could be effected, though not without great danger.
Opposite to it he began to advance the vineae toward the mountain, and to throw
up a mound, with great labor and continual skirmishing. For the townsmen ran
down from the high ground, and fought without any risk, and wounded several of
our men, yet they obstinately pushed on and were not deterred from moving
forward the vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduity the difficulties of
situation. At the same time they work mines, and move the crates and vineae to
the source of the fountain. This was the only work which they could do without
danger or suspicion. A mound sixty feet high was raised; on it was erected a
turret of ten stories, not with the intention that it should be on a level with
the wall (for that could not be effected by any works), but to rise above the
top of the spring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that
led to the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without danger,
not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle, but a great
number of men also died of thirst.
[8.42] Alarmed at this
calamity, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow, pitch, and dried wood: these
they set on fire, and roll down on our works. At the same time, they fight most
furiously, to deter the Romans, by the engagement and danger, from
extinguishing the flames. Instantly a great blaze arose in the works. For
whatever they threw down the precipice, striking against the vineae and agger,
communicated the fire to whatever was in the way. Our soldiers on the other
hand, though they were engaged in a perilous sort of encounter, and laboring
under the disadvantages of position, yet supported all with very great presence
of mind. For the action happened in an elevated situation, and in sight of our
army; and a great shout was raised on both sides; therefore every man faced the
weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous a manner as he could,
that his valor might be the better known and attested.
[8.43] Caesar,
observing that several of his men were wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend
the mountain on all sides, and, under pretense of assailing the walls, to raise
a shout: at which the besieged being frightened, and not knowing what was going
on in other places, call off their armed troops from attacking our works, and
dispose them on the walls. Thus our men without hazarding a battle, gained time
partly to extinguish the works which had caught fire, and partly to cut off the
communication. As the townsmen still continued to make an obstinate resistance,
and even, after losing the greatest part of their forces by drought, persevered
in their resolution: at last the veins of the spring were cut across by our mines,
and turned from their course. By this their constant spring was suddenly dried
up, which reduced them to such despair that they imagined that it was not done
by the art of man, but the will of the gods; forced, therefore, by necessity,
they at length submitted.
[8.44] Caesar, being
convinced that his lenity was known to all men, and being under no fears of
being thought to act severely from a natural cruelty, and perceiving that there
would be no end to his troubles if several states should attempt to rebel in
like manner and in different places, resolved to deter others by inflicting an
exemplary punishment on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who
had borne arms against him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of their
rebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who I have said was taken by
Caninius, either through indignation and grief arising from his captivity, or
through fear of severer punishments, abstained from food for several days, and
thus perished. At the same time, Luterius, who, I have related, had escaped
from the battle, having fallen into the hands of Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for
he frequently changed his quarters, and threw himself on the honor of several
persons, as he saw that he dare not remain long in one place, and was conscious
how great an enemy he deserved to have in Caesar), was by this Epasnactus, the
Arvernian, a sincere friend of the Roman people, delivered without any
hesitation, a prisoner to Caesar.
[8.45] In the mean
time, Labienus engages in a successful cavalry action among the Treviri; and,
having killed several of them and of the Germans, who never refused their aid
to any person against the Romans, he got their chiefs alive into his power,
and, among them, Surus, an Aeduan, who was highly renowned both for his valor
and birth, and was the only Aeduan that had continued in arms till that time.
Caesar, being informed of this, and perceiving that he had met with good
success in all parts of Gaul, and reflecting that, in former campaigns [Celtic]
Gaul had been conquered and subdued; but that he had never gone in person to
Aquitania, but had made a conquest of it, in some degree, by Marcus Crassus,
set out for it with two legions, designing to spend the latter part of the
summer there. This affair he executed with his usual dispatch and good fortune.
For all the states of Aquitania sent embassadors to him and delivered hostages.
These affairs being concluded, he marched with a guard of cavalry toward Narbo,
and drew off his army into winter quarters by his lieutenants. He posted four
legions in the country of the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, Caius Trebonius,
Publius Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Two he detached to the
Aedui, knowing them to have a very powerful influence throughout all Gaul. Two
he placed among the Turoni, near the confines of the Carnutes, to keep in awe
the entire tract of country bordering on the ocean; the other two he placed in
the territories of the Lemovices, at a small distance from the Arverni, that no
part of Gaul might be without an army. Having spent a few days in the province,
he quickly ran through all the business of the assizes, settled all public
disputes, and distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a good
opportunity of learning how every person was disposed toward the republic
during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood by the fidelity and
assistance of the Province.
[8.47] Having finished
these affairs, he returned to his legions among the Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna:
there he got intelligence that Comius, the Atrebatian had had an engagement
with his cavalry. For when Antonius had gone into winter quarters, and the
state of the Atrebates continued in their allegiance, Comius, who, after that
wound which I before mentioned, was always ready to join his countrymen upon
every commotion, that they might not want a person to advise and head them in
the management of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans, supported
himself and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry, infested the
roads, and intercepted several convoys which were bringing provisions to the
Roman quarters.
[8.48] Caius Volusenus
Quadratus was appointed commander of the horse under Antonius, to winter with
him: Antonius sent him in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added
to that valor which was pre-eminent in him, a great aversion to Comius, on
which account he executed the more willingly the orders which he received.
Having, therefore, laid ambuscades, he had several encounters with his cavalry
and came off successful. At last, when a violent contest ensued, and Volusenus,
through eagerness to intercept Comius, had obstinately pursued him with a small
party; and Comius had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawn Volusenus to a
considerable distance from his troops, he, on a sudden, appealed to the honor
of all about him for assistance not to suffer the wound, which he had
perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and, wheeling his horse about,
rode unguardedly before the rest up to the commander. All his horse following
his example, made a few of our men turn their backs and pursued them. Comius,
clapping spurs to his horse, rode up to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance,
pierced him in the thigh with great force. When their commander was wounded,
our men no longer hesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back
the enemy. When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the great
impetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to death in striving
to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general escaped this misfortune
by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander, being severely wounded, so much
so that he appeared to run the risk of losing his life, was carried back to the
camp. But Comius, having either gratified his resentment, or, because he had
lost the greatest part of his followers, sent embassadors to Antonius, and
assured him that he would give hostages as a security that he would go wherever
Antonius should prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only entreated
that this concession should be made to his fears, that he should not be obliged
to go into the presence of any Roman. As Antonius judged that his request
originated in a just apprehension, he indulged him in it and accepted his
hostages. Caesar, I know, has made a separate commentary of each year's
transactions, which I have not thought it necessary for me to do, because the
following year, in which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcellus were consuls,
produced no remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that no person may be left in
ignorance of the place where Caesar and his army were at that time, have
thought proper to write a few words in addition to this commentary.
[8.49] Caesar, while in
winter quarters in the country of the Belgae, made it his only business to keep
the states in amity with him, and to give none either hopes of, or pretext for
a revolt. For nothing was further from his wishes than to be under the
necessity of engaging in another war at his departure; lest, when he was
drawing his army out of the country, any war should be left unfinished, which
the Gauls would cheerfully undertake, when there was no immediate danger.
Therefore, by treating the states with respect, making rich presents to the
leading men, imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their subjection
lighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by so many unsuccessful
battles) in obedience.
[8.50] When the winter
quarters were broken up he himself, contrary to his usual practice, proceeded
to Italy, by the longest possible stages, in order to visit the free towns and
colonies, that he might recommend to them the petition of Marcus Antonius, his
treasurer, for the priesthood. For he exerted his interest both cheerfully in
favor of a man strongly attached to him, whom he had sent home before him to
attend the election, and zealously to oppose the faction and power of a few
men, who, by rejecting Marcus Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar's influence
when going out of office. Though Caesar heard on the road, before he reached
Italy that he was created augur, yet he thought himself in honor bound to visit
the free towns and colonies, to return them thanks for rendering such service
to Antonius by their presence in such great numbers [at the election], and at
the same time to recommend to them himself, and his honor in his suit for the
consulate the ensuing year. For his adversaries arrogantly boasted that Lucius
Lentulus and Caius Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would strip Caesar
of all honor and dignity: and that the consulate had been injuriously taken
from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superior in votes and interest,
because he was united to Caesar, both by friendship, and by serving as
lieutenant under him.
[8.51] Caesar, on his
arrival, was received by the principal towns and colonies with incredible
respect and affection; for this was the first time he came since the war
against united Gaul. Nothing was omitted which could be thought of for the
ornament of the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was to pass.
All the people with their children went out to meet him. Sacrifices were
offered up in every quarter. The market places and temples were laid out with
entertainments, as if anticipating the joy of a most splendid triumph. So great
was the magnificence of the richer and zeal of the poorer ranks of the people.
[8.52] When Caesar had
gone through all the states of Cisalpine Gaul, he returned with the greatest
haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and having ordered all his legions to march
from winter quarters to the territories of the Treviri, he went thither and
reviewed them. He made Titus Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that he might
be the more inclined to support him in his suit for the consulate. He himself
made such journeys as he thought would conduce to the health of his men by
change of air; and though he was frequently told that Labienus was solicited by
his enemies, and was assured that a scheme was in agitation by the contrivance
of a few, that the senate should interpose their authority to deprive him of a
part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to any story concerning Labienus,
nor could be prevailed upon to do any thing in opposition to the authority of
the senate; for he thought that his cause would be easily gained by the free
voice of the senators. For Caius Curio, one of the tribunes of the people,
having undertaken to defend Caesar's cause and dignity, had often proposed to
the senate, "that if the dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive,
as Pompey's authority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both
should resign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city would
be free, and enjoy its due rights." And he not only proposed this, but of himself
called upon the senate to divide on the question. But the consuls and Pompey's
friends interposed to prevent it; and regulating matters as they desired, they
broke up the meeting.
[8.53] This testimony
of the unanimous voice of the senate was very great, and consistent with their
former conduct; for the preceding year, when Marcellus attacked Caesar's
dignity, he proposed to the senate, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus,
to dispose of Caesar's province, before the expiration of his command, and when
the votes were called for, and Marcellus, who endeavored to advance his own
dignity, by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a division, the full senate
went over to the opposite side. The spirit of Caesar's foes was not broken by
this, but it taught them, that they ought to strengthen their interest by
enlarging their connections, so as to force the senate to comply with whatever
they had resolved on.
[8.54] After this a
decree was passed by the senate, that one legion should be sent by Pompey, and
another by Caesar, to the Parthian war. But these two legions were evidently
drawn from Caesar alone. For the first legion which Pompey sent to Caesar, he gave
Caesar, as if it belonged to himself, though it was levied in Caesar's
province. Caesar, however, though no one could doubt the design of his enemies,
sent the legion back to Cneius Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of the
senate, ordered the fifteenth, belonging to himself, and which was quartered in
Cisalpine Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent the thirteenth into
Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he had drafted the fifteenth. He
disposed his army in winter quarters, placed Caius Trebonius, with four legions
among the Belgae, and detached Caius Fabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for
he thought that Gaul would be most secure, if the Belgae, a people of the
greatest valor, and the Aedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were
kept in awe by his armies.
[8.55] He himself set
out for Italy; where he was informed on his arrival, that the two legions sent
home by him, and which by the senate's decree, should have been sent to the
Parthian war, had been delivered over to Pompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul,
and were retained in Italy. Although from this transaction it was evident to
every one that war was designed against Caesar, yet he resolved to submit to
any thing, as long as there were hopes left of deciding the dispute in an
equitable manner, rather than to have recourse to arms.
End of Book 8
50 B.C. Caius Julius
Caesar
[1.0] Vossius's
supplement to the first book: I will now say nothing concerning the absurd
opinion of those who assert that the following Commentaries on the Civil War
were not written by Caesar himself. Even without the authority of Suetonius,
the diction itself would be sufficient to convince the most skeptical that
Caesar and no other was the author. I am of the opinion of those who think that
the beginning of these Commentaries is lost. For I can not be convinced that
Caesar commenced so abruptly; and History itself gives sufficient evidence that
many circumstances require to be previously stated. For which reason we thought
that it would be well worth our attention to compile from Plutarch, Appian, and
Dion, a narrative of such facts as seemed necessary to fill up the chasm; these
facts are as follows: "When Caesar, after reducing all Transalpine Gaul,
had passed into Cisalpine Gaul, he determined for many reasons to send
embassadors to Rome to request for him the consulate, and a prolongation of the
command of his province. Pompey, who was estranged from Caesar, although he was
not as yet at open enmity with him, determined neither to aid him by his
influence nor openly oppose him on this occasion. But the consuls Lentulus and
Marcellus, who had previously been on unfriendly terms with Caesar, resolved to
use all means in their power to prevent him from gaining his object. Marcellus
in particular did not hesitate to offer Caesar other insults. Caesar had lately
planned the colony of Novumcomum in Gaul: Marcellus, not content with taking
from it the right of citizenship, ordered the principal man of the colony to be
arrested and scourged at Rome, and sent him to make his complaints to Caesar:
an insult of this description had never before been offered to a Roman citizen.
While these transactions are taking place, Caius Curio, tribune of the commons,
comes to Caesar in his province. Curio had made many and energetic struggles,
in behalf of the republic and Caesar's cause: at length when he perceived that
all his efforts were vain, he fled through fear of his adversaries, and
informed Caesar of all the transactions that had taken place, and of the
efforts made by his enemies to crush him. Caesar received Curio with great
kindness, as he was a man of the highest rank, and had great claims on himself
and the republic, and thanked him warmly for his numerous personal favors. But
Curio, as war was being openly prepared against Caesar, advised him to
concentrate his troops, and rescue the republic now oppressed by a few daring
men. Caesar, although he was not ignorant of the real state of affairs, was
however of opinion that particular regard should be paid to the tranquillity of
the republic, lest any one should suppose that he was the originator of the
war. Therefore, through his friends, he made this one request, that two
legions, and the province of Cisalpine Gaul, and Illyricum, should be left him.
All these acts were performed by Caesar, with the hope that his enemies might
be induced by the justice of his demands, to preserve the peace of the
republic. Even Pompey himself did not dare to oppose them. But when Caesar
could not obtain his request from the consuls, he wrote to the senate a letter,
in which he briefly stated his exploits and public services, and entreated that
he should not be deprived of the favor of the people, who had ordered, that he,
although absent, should be considered a candidate at the next elections; and he
stated also that he would disband his army, if the senate and people of Rome
would pass a resolution to that effect, provided that Pompey would do the same.
That, as long as the latter should retain the command of his army, no just
reason could exist that he [Caesar] should disband his troops and expose
himself to the insults of his enemies. He intrusts this letter to Curio to bear
to its destination; the latter traveled one hundred and sixty miles with
incredible dispatch, and reached the city in three days' time, before the
beginning of January, and before the consuls could pass any decree concerning
Caesar's command. Curio, after accomplishing his journey, kept the letter, and
did not give it up, until there was a crowded meeting of the senate, and the
tribunes of the commons were present; for he was afraid, lest, if he gave it up
previously, the consuls should suppress it.
[1.1] When Caesar's
letter was delivered to the consuls, they were with great difficulty, and a
hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on to suffer it to be read in the
senate; but the tribunes could not prevail, that any question should be put to
the senate on the subject of the letter. The consuls put the question on the
regulation of the state. Lucius Lentulus the consul promises that he will not
fail the senate and republic, "if they declared their sentiments boldly
and resolutely, but if they turned their regard to Caesar, and courted his
favor, as they did on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for himself, and
not submit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means of regaining
Caesar's favor and friendship." Scipio spoke to the same purport,
"that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, if the senate
would support him; but if they should hesitate and act without energy, they
would in vain implore his aid, if they should require it hereafter."
[1.2] This speech of
Scipio's, as the senate was convened in the city, and Pompey was near at hand,
seemed to have fallen from the lips of Pompey himself. Some delivered their
sentiments with more moderation, as Marcellus first, who in the beginning of
his speech, said, "that the question ought not to be put to the senate on
this matter, till levies were made throughout all Italy, and armies raised
under whose protection the senate might freely and safely pass such resolutions
as they thought proper;" as Marcus Calidius afterward, who was of opinion,
"that Pompey should set out for his province, that there might be no cause
for arms; that Caesar was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced
from him, that Pompey was retaining those troops, and keeping them near the
city to do him injury:" as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almost word
for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus, who peremptorily refused
to propose Calidius's motion. Marcellus, overawed by his reproofs, retracted
his opinion. Thus most of the senate, intimidated by the expressions of the
consul, by the fears of a present army, and the threats of Pompey's friends,
unwillingly and reluctantly adopted Scipio's opinion, that Caesar should
disband his army by a certain day, and should he not do so, he should he
considered as acting against the state. Marcus Antonius, and Quintus Cassius,
tribunes of the people, interposed. The question was immediately put on their
interposition. Violent opinions were expressed; whoever spoke with the greatest
acrimony and cruelty was most highly commended by Caesar's enemies.
[1.3] The senate having
broken up in the evening, all who belonged to that order were summoned by
Pompey. He applauded the forward, and secured their votes for the next day; the
more moderate he reproved and excited against Caesar. Many veterans, from all
parts, who had served in Pompey's armies, were invited to his standard by the
hopes of rewards and promotions. Several officers belonging to the two legions,
which had been delivered up by Caesar, were sent for. The city and the comitium
were crowded with tribunes, centurions, and veterans. All the consul's friends,
all Pompey's connections, all those who bore any ancient enmity to Caesar, were
forced into the senate house. By their concourse and declarations the timid
were awed, the irresolute confirmed, and the greater part deprived of the power
of speaking their sentiments with freedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to
go to Caesar: as did likewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of
these affairs, and require only six days' time to finish the business. Opinions
were expressed by some to the effect that commissioners should be sent to
Caesar to acquaint him with the senate's pleasure.
[1.4] All these
proposals were rejected, and opposition made to them all, in the speeches of
the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge against Caesar and chagrin at a
defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon by the magnitude of his debts,
and the hopes of having the government of an army and provinces, and by the
presents which he expected from such princes as should receive the title of
friends of the Roman people, and boasted among his friends, that he would be a
second Sylla, to whom the supreme authority should return. Similar hopes of a
province and armies, which he expected to share with Pompey on account of his
connection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover [he was influenced by] the
fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and an ostentatious display of
himself and his friends in power, who at that time had great influence in the
republic, and courts of judicature. Pompey himself, incited by Caesar's
enemies, because he was unwilling that any person should bear an equal degree
of dignity, had wholly alienated himself from Caesar's friendship, and procured
a reconciliation with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom he had
himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity with him. At the same time,
chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by converting the two legions
from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to [augment] his own power and
authority, he was anxious to bring matters to a war.
[1.5] For these reasons
every thing was done in a hasty and disorderly manner, and neither was time
given to Caesar's relations to inform him [of the state of affairs] nor liberty
to the tribunes of the people to deprecate their own danger, nor even to retain
the last privilege, which Sylla had left them, the interposing their authority;
but on the seventh day they were obliged to think of their own safety, which
the most turbulent tribunes of the people were not accustomed to attend to, nor
to fear being called to an account for their actions, till the eighth month.
Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of the senate (which was never
resorted to even by daring proposers except when the city was in danger of
being set on fire, or when the public safety was despaired of). "That the
consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and proconsuls in the city, should
take care that the state received no injury." These decrees are dated the
eighth day before the ides of January; therefore, in the first five days, on
which the senate could meet, from the day on which Lentulus entered into his
consulate, the two days of election excepted, the severest and most virulent
decrees were passed against Caesar's government, and against those most
illustrious characters, the tribunes of the people. The latter immediately made
their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who was then at Ravenna,
awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if matters could be
brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the part of his
enemies.
[1.6] During the
succeeding days the senate is convened outside the city. Pompey repeated the
same things which he had declared through Scipio. He applauded the courage and
firmness of the senate, acquainted them with his force, and told them that he
had ten legions ready; that he was moreover informed and assured that Caesar's
soldiers were disaffected, and that he could not persuade them to defend or
even follow him. Motions were made in the senate concerning other matters; that
levies should be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent as
propraetor into Mauritania; that money should be granted to Pompey from the
public treasury. It was also put to the vote that king Juba should be [honored
with the title of] friend and ally. But Marcellus said that he would not allow
this motion for the present. Philip, one of the tribunes, stopped [the
appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions respecting the other matters passed. The
provinces, two of which were consular, the remainder praetorian, were decreed
to private persons; Scipio got Syria, Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and
Marcellus were omitted, from a private motive, and their lots were not even
admitted. To the other provinces praetors were sent, nor was time granted as in
former years, to refer to the people on their appointment, nor to make them
take the usual oath, and march out of the city in a public manner, robed in the
military habit, after offering their vows: a circumstance which had never
before happened. Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had lictors
in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents of former times. Levies
were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from the municipal
towns, and violently taken from the temples. All distinctions between things
human and divine, are confounded.
[1.7] These things
being made known to Caesar, he harangued his soldiers; he reminded them
"of the wrongs done to him at all times by his enemies, and complained
that Pompey had been alienated from him and led astray by them through envy and
a malicious opposition to his glory, though he had always favored and promoted
Pompey's honor and dignity. He complained that an innovation had been
introduced into the republic, that the intercession of the tribunes, which had
been restored a few years before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and
suppressed by force of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the tribunes of every
other power, had, nevertheless, left the privilege of intercession
unrestrained; that Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost, had
taken away the privileges which they formerly had; that whenever the senate
decreed, 'that the magistrates should take care that the republic sustained no
injury' (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged to repair to
arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when the tribunes
attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, and possessed themselves
of the temples and eminences of the city; (and these instances of former times,
he showed them were expiated by the fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that
nothing of this kind was attempted now, nor even thought of: that no law was
promulgated, no intrigue with the people going forward, no secession made; he
exhorted them to defend from the malice of his enemies the reputation and honor
of that general under whose command they had for nine years most successfully
supported the state; fought many successful battles, and subdued all Gaul and
Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which was present (for in
the beginning of the disturbances he had called it out, his other legions not
having yet arrived), all cry out that they are ready to defend their general,
and the tribunes of the commons, from all injuries.
[1.8] Having made
himself acquainted with the disposition of his soldiers, Caesar set off with
that legion to Ariminum, and there met the tribunes, who had fled to him for protection;
he called his other legions from winter quarters; and ordered them to follow
him. Thither came Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a
lieutenant-general under Caesar. He, after concluding the rest of his speech,
and stating for what purpose he had come, told Caesar that he had commands of a
private nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear himself to
Caesar, lest he should impute those actions which he did for the republic, to a
design of affronting him; that he had ever preferred the interest of the state
to his own private connections; that Caesar, too, for his own honor, ought to
sacrifice his desires and resentment to the public good, and not vent his anger
so violently against his enemies, lest in his hopes of injuring them, he should
injure the republic. He spoke a few words to the same purport from himself, in
addition to Pompey's apology. Roscius, the praetor, conferred with Caesar
almost in the same words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey had
empowered him to do so.
[1.9] Though these
things seemed to have no tendency toward redressing his injuries, yet having
got proper persons by whom he could communicate his wishes to Pompey; he
required of them both, that, as they had conveyed Pompey's demands to him, they
should not refuse to convey his demands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they
could terminate a great dispute, and liberate all Italy from her fears.
"That the honor of the republic had ever been his first object, and dearer
to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the favor of the Roman people was
wrested from him by the injurious reports of his enemies; that he was deprived
of a half-year's command, and dragged back to the city, though the people had
ordered that regard should be paid to his suit for the consulate at the next
election, though he was not present; that, however, he had patiently submitted
to this loss of honor, for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters
to the senate, requiring that all persons should resign the command of their
armies, he did not obtain even that request; that levies were made throughout
Italy; that the two legions which had been taken from him, under the pretense
of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that the state was in arms. To what
did all these things tend, unless to his ruin? But, nevertheless, he was ready
to condescend to any terms, and to endure every thing for the sake of the
republic. Let Pompey go to his own province; let them both disband their
armies; let all persons in Italy lay down their arms; let all fears be removed
from the city; let free elections, and the whole republic be resigned to the
direction of the senate and Roman people. That these things might be the more
easily performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by oath, either let
Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might be that all their
disputes would be settled by an interview."
[1.10] Roscius and
Lucius Caesar, having received this message, went to Capua, where they met the
consuls and Pompey, and declared to them Caesar's terms. Having deliberated on
the matter, they replied, and sent written proposals to him by the same
persons, the purport of which was, that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave
Ariminum, and disband his army: if he complied with this, that Pompey would go
to Spain. In the mean time, until security was given that Caesar would perform
his promises, that the consuls and Pompey would not give over their levies.
[1.11] It was not an
equitable proposal, to require that Caesar should quit Ariminum and return to
his province; but that he [Pompey] should himself retain his province and the
legions that belonged to another, and desire that Caesar's army should be
disbanded, while he himself was making new levies: and that he should merely
promise to go to his province, without naming the day on which he would set
out; so that if he should not set out till after Caesar's consulate expired,
yet he would not appear bound by any religious scruples about asserting a
falsehood. But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising to set out
to meet him, made the expectation of peace appear very hopeless. Caesar,
therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminum to Arretium;
he himself staid at Ariminum with two legions, with the intention of raising
levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and Ancona, with a cohort each.
[1.12] In the mean
time, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in possession of Iguvium,
with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town, but that the affections of all
the inhabitants were very well inclined toward himself, he detached Curio with
three cohorts, which he had at Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his
approach, Thermus, distrusting the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts
out of it and made his escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and
returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all
the inhabitants. Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the
affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the thirteenth
legion from the garrison, and set out for Auximum, a town into which Attius had
brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken possession, and from which he
had sent senators round about the country of Picenum, to raise new levies.
[1.13] Upon news of
Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum went in a body to Attius Varus; and
told him that it was not a subject for them to determine upon: yet neither
they, nor the rest of the freemen would suffer Caius Caesar, a general, who had
merited so well of the republic, after performing such great achievements, to
be excluded from their town and walls; wherefore he ought to pay some regard to
the opinion of posterity, and his own danger. Alarmed at this declaration,
Attius Varus drew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced, and
fled. A fear of Caesar's front rank having pursued him, obliged him to halt,
and when the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops: some of them
disperse to their homes, the rest come over to Caesar; and along with them,
Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and brought to Caesar. He
had held the same rank before in Cneius Pompey's army. But Caesar applauded the
soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returned thanks to the people of
Auximum, and promised to be grateful for their conduct.
[1.14] Intelligence of
this being brought to Rome, so great a panic spread on a sudden that when
Lentulus, the consul, came to open the treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by
the senate's decree, immediately on opening the hallowed door he fled from the
city. For it was falsely rumored that Caesar was approaching, and that his
cavalry were already at the gates. Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and
so did most of the magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before,
and was on his march to those legions which he had received from Caesar, and
had disposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies were stopped within the
city. No place on this side of Capua was thought secure. At Capua they first
began to take courage and to rally, and determined to raise levies in the
colonies, which had been sent thither by the Julian law: and Lentulus brought
into the public market place the gladiators which Caesar maintained there for
the entertainment of the people, and confirmed them in their liberty, and gave
them horses and ordered them to attend him; but afterward, being warned by his
friends that this action was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed
them among the slaves of the district of Campania, to keep guard there.
[1.15] Caesar, having
moved forward from Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum. All the
governors in these countries most cheerfully received him, and aided his army
with every necessary. Embassadors came to him even from Cingulum, a town which
Labienus had laid out and built at his own expense, and offered most earnestly
to comply with his orders. He demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the mean
time, the twelfth legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched to
Asculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther occupied that town with
ten cohorts; but, on being informed of Caesar's approach, he fled from the
town, and, in attempting to bring off his cohorts with him, was deserted by a
great part of his men. Being left on the road with a small number, he fell in
with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey into Picenum to confirm the people
[in their allegiance]. Vibullius, being informed by him of the transactions in
Picenum, takes his soldiers from him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise,
from the neighboring countries, as many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new
levies. Among them he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with
six cohorts, which he had in the garrison there; by a junction with which he
made up thirteen cohorts. With them he marched by hasty journeys to Corfinium,
to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that Caesar was advancing with two
legions. Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts from Alba, and the
Marsians, Pelignians, and neighboring states.
[1.16] Caesar, having
recovered Asculum and driven out Lentulus, ordered the soldiers that had
deserted from him to be sought out and a muster to be made; and, having delayed
for one day there to provide corn, he marched to Corfinium. On his approach,
five cohorts, sent by Domitius from the town, were breaking down a bridge which
was over the river, at three miles' distance from it. An engagement taking
place there with Caesar's advanced-guard, Domitius's men were quickly beaten
off from the bridge and retreated precipitately into the town. Caesar, having
marched his legions over, halted before the town and encamped close by the
walls.
[1.17] Domitius, upon
observing this, sent messengers well acquainted with the country, encouraged by
a promise of being amply rewarded, with dispatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg
and entreat him to come to his assistance. That Caesar could be easily inclosed
by the two armies, through the narrowness of the country, and prevented from
obtaining supplies: unless he did so, that he and upward of thirty cohorts, and
a great number of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme danger. In
the mean time he encouraged his troops, disposed engines on the walls, and
assigned to each man a particular part of the city to defend. In a speech to
the soldiers he promised them lands out of his own estate; to every private
soldier four acres, and a corresponding share to the centurions and veterans.
[1.18] In the mean
time, word was brought to Caesar that the people of Sulmo, a town about seven
miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to obey his orders, but were prevented
by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who were in
possession of the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus
Antonius thither, with five cohorts of the eighth legion. The inhabitants, as
soon as they saw our standards, threw open their gates, and all the people,
both citizens and soldiers, went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius
and Attius leaped off the walls. Attius, being brought before Antonius, begged
that he might be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which he had
set out with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar added these cohorts to his own
army, and sent Attius away in safety. The three first days Caesar employed in
fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing in corn from the neighboring
free towns, and waiting for the rest of his forces. Within the three days the
eighth legion came to him, and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies in Gaul,
and about three hundred horse from the king of Noricum. On their arrival he
made a second camp on another part of the town, and gave the command of it to
Curio. He determined to surround the town with a rampart and turrets during the
remainder of the time. Nearly at the time when the greatest part of the work
was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned.
[1.19] Having read
Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gave out in council that
Pompey would speedily come to their assistance; and encouraged them not to
despond, but to provide every thing necessary for the defense of the town. He
held private conferences with a few of his most intimate friends, and
determined on the design of fleeing. As Domitius's countenance did not agree
with his words, and he did every thing with more confusion and fear than he had
shown on the preceding days, and as he had several private meetings with his
friends, contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice, and as
he avoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth could be
no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back in answer, "That
he would not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitius had retreated into
the town of Corfinium without either his advice or consent. Therefore, if any
opportunity should offer, he [Domitius] should come to him with the whole force."
But the blockade and works round the town prevented his escape.
[1.20] Domitius's
design being noised abroad, the soldiers in Corfinium early in the evening
began to mutiny, and held a conference with each other by their tribunes and
centurions, and the most respectable among themselves: "that they were
besieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications were almost finished;
that their general, Domitius, on whose hopes and expectations they had
confided, had thrown them off, and was meditating his own escape; that they
ought to provide for their own safety." At first the Marsians differed in
opinion, and possessed themselves of that part of the town which they thought
the strongest. And so violent a dispute arose between them, that they attempted
to fight and decide it by arms. However, in a little time, by messengers sent
from one side to the other, they were informed of Domitius's meditated flight,
of which they were previously ignorant. Therefore they all with one consent
brought Domitius into public view, gathered round him, and guarded him; and
sent deputies out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were ready to
throw open their gates, to do whatever he should order, and deliver up Domitius
alive into his hands."
[1.21] Upon
intelligence of these matters, though Caesar thought it of great consequence to
become master of the town as soon as possible, and to transfer the cohorts to
his own camp, lest any change should be wrought on their inclinations by
bribes, encouragement, or ficticious messages, because in war great events are
often brought about by trifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the town
should be plundered by the soldiers entering into it, and taking advantage of
the darkness of the night, he commended the persons who came to him, and sent
them back to the town, and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He
disposed his soldiers on the works which he had begun, not at certain
intervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range of sentinels
and stations, so that they touched each other, and formed a circle round the
whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes and general officers to ride
round; and exhorted them not only to be on their guard against sallies from the
town, but also to watch that no single person should get out privately. Nor was
any man so negligent or drowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height was
their expectation raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each to
different objects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what
of Lentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence of another.
[1.22] About the fourth
watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinels and guards from the walls, that
he desired to have an interview with Caesar, if permission were given him.
Having obtained it, he was escorted out of town; nor did the soldiers of
Domitius leave him till they brought him into Caesar's presence. He pleaded
with Caesar for his life, and entreated him to spare him, and reminded him of
their former friendship; and acknowledged that Caesar's favors to him were very
great; in that through his interest he had been admitted into the college of
priests; in that after his praetorship he had been appointed to the government
of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in his suit for the consulate.
Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and told him, "that he had not left
his province to do mischief [to any man], but to protect himself from the
injuries of his enemies; to restore to their dignity the tribunes of the people
who had been driven out of the city on his account, and to assert his own
liberty, and that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by a few factious
men. Encouraged by this address, Lentulus begged leave to return to the town,
that the security which he had obtained for himself might be an encouragement
to the rest to hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified that they
were induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave being granted
him, he departed.
[1.23] When day
appeared, Caesar ordered all the senators and their children, the tribunes of
the soldiers, and the Roman knights to be brought before him. Among the persons
of senatorial rank were Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius
Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus, the quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius,
besides the son of Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of
Roman knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal
towns. When they were brought before him he protected them from the insolence
and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few words that they had not made him a
grateful return, on their part, for his very extraordinary kindness to them,
and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty sestertia, which Domitius had brought
with him and lodged in the public treasury, being brought to Caesar by the
magistrates of Corfinium, he gave them back to Domitius, that he might not
appear more moderate with respect to the life of men than in money matters,
though he knew that it was public money, and had been given by Pompey to pay
his army. He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the oath to himself, and that
day decamped and performed the regular march. He staid only seven days before
Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country of the Marrucinians,
Frentanian's and Larinates.
[1.24] Pompey, being
informed of what had passed at Corfinium, marches from Luceria to Canusium, and
thence to Brundusium. He orders all the forces raised every where by the new
levies to repair to him. He gives arms to the slaves that attended the flocks,
and appoints horses for them. Of these he made up about three hundred horse.
Lucius, the praetor, fled from Alba, with six cohorts: Rutilus, Lupus, the
praetor, from Tarracina, with three. These having descried Caesar's cavalry at
a distance, which were commanded by Bivius Curius, and having deserted the
praetor, carried their colors to Curius and went over to him. In like manner,
during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell in with the main body of
Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius, from Cremona,
engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road and brought to
Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "As hitherto he
had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his march to him at
Brundusium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth and general safety that
he should have an interview with Pompey; and that the same advantage could not
be gained at a great distance when the proposals were conveyed to them by
others, as if terms were argued by them both in person."
[1.25] Having delivered
this message he marched to Brundusium with six legions, four of them veterans:
the rest those which he had raised in the late levy and completed on his march,
for he had sent all Domitius's cohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He
discovered that the consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of
the army, and that Pompey remained at Brundusium with twenty cohorts; but could
not find out, for a certainty, whether Pompey staid behind to keep possession
of Brundusium, that he might the more easily command the whole Adriatic sea,
with the extremities of Italy and the coast of Greece, and be able to conduct
the war on either side of it, or whether he remained there for want of
shipping; and, being afraid that Pompey would come to the conclusion that he
ought not to relinquish Italy, he determined to deprive him of the means of
communication afforded by the harbor of Brundusium. The plan of his work was as
follows: Where the mouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth
on either side, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having gone out so
far that the mole could not be continued in the deep water, he fixed double
floats, thirty feet on either side, before the mole. These he fastened with
four anchors at the four corners, that they might not be carried away by the
waves. Having completed and secured them, he then joined to them other floats
of equal size. These he covered over with earth and mold, that he might not be
prevented from access to them to defend them, and in the front and on both
sides he protected them with a parapet of wicker work; and on every fourth one
raised a turret, two stories high, to secure them the better from being
attacked by the shipping and set on fire.
[1.26] To counteract
this, Pompey fitted out large merchant ships, which he found in the harbor of
Brundusium: on them he erected turrets three stories high, and, having
furnished them with several engines and all sorts of weapons, drove them among
Caesar's works, to break through the floats and interrupt the works; thus there
happened skirmishes every day at a distance with slings, arrows, and other
weapons. Caesar conducted matters as if he thought that the hopes of peace were
not yet to be given up. And though he was very much surprised that Magius, whom
he had sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him; and though his
attempting a reconciliation often retarded the vigorous prosecution of his
plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means to persevere in the same line
of conduct. He therefore sent Caninius Rebilus to have an interview with
Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend and relation. He charges him to exhort
Libo to effect a peace, but, above all things, requires that he should be
admitted to an interview with Pompey. He declared that he had great hopes, if
that were allowed him, that the consequence would be that both parties would
lay down their arms on equal terms; that a great share of the glory and
reputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his advice and
agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from the conference
with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returns with answer that, as
the consuls were absent, no treaty of composition could be engaged in without
them. Caesar therefore thought it time at length to give over the attempt which
he had often made in vain, and act with energy in the war.
[1.27] When Caesar's
works were nearly half finished, and after nine days were spent in them, the
ships which had conveyed the first division of the army to Dyrrachium being
sent back by the consuls, returned to Brundusium. Pompey, either frightened at
Caesar's works or determined from the beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare
for his departure on the arrival of the ships; and the more effectually to
retard Caesar's attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town
at the moment of his departure, he stopped up the gates, built walls across the
streets and avenues, sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixed
palisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground by means of
hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams fastened in the ground and
sharpened at the ends two passages and roads without the walls, which led to
the port. After making these arrangements, he ordered his soldiers to go on
board without noise, and disposed here and there, on the wall and turrets, some
light-armed veterans, archers and slingers. These he designed to call off by a
certain signal, when all the soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys for
them in a secure place.
[1.28] The people of
Brundusium, irritated by the insolence of Pompey's soldiers, and the insults
received from Pompey himself, were in favor of Caesar's party. Therefore, as
soon as they were aware of Pompey's departure, while his men were running up
and down, and busied about their voyage, they made signs from the tops of the
houses: Caesar, being apprised of the design by them, ordered scaling-ladders
to be got ready, and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any
opportunity of coming to an action. Pompey weighed anchor at nightfall. The
soldiers who had been posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by the
signal which had been agreed on, and knowing the roads, ran down to the ships.
Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls: but being cautioned
by the people to beware of the hidden stakes and covered trenches, they halted,
and being conducted by the inhabitants by a long circuit, they reached the
port, and captured with their long boats and small craft two of Pompey's ships,
full of soldiers, which had struck against Caesar's moles.
[1.29] Though Caesar
highly approved of collecting a fleet, and crossing the sea, and pursuing
Pompey before he could strengthen himself with his transmarine auxiliaries,
with the hope of bringing the war to a conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and
length of time necessary to effect it: because Pompey, by collecting all his
ships, had deprived him of the means of pursuing him at present. The only
resource left to Caesar, was to wait for a fleet from the distant regions of
Gaul, Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar. But this, on account of the season
of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome. He was unwilling that, in the
mean time, the veteran army, and the two Spains, one of which was bound to
Pompey by the strongest obligations, should be confirmed in his interest; that
auxiliaries and cavalry should be provided, and Gaul and Italy reduced in his
absence.
[1.30] Therefore, for
the present he relinquished all intention of pursuing Pompey, and resolved to
march to Spain, and commanded the magistrates of the free towns to procure him
ships, and to have them convoyed to Brundusium. He detached Valerius, his
lieutenant, with one legion to Sardinia; Curio, the propraetor, to Sicily with
three legions; and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately
transport his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was at this time governor of
Sardinia: Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by the lots, should have had the
government of Africa. The Caralitani, as soon as they heard that Valerius was
sent against them, even before he left Italy, of their own accord drove Cotta
out of the town; who, terrified because he understood that the whole province
was combined [against him], fled from Sardinia to Africa. Cato was in Sicily,
repairing the old ships of war, and demanding new ones from the states, and
these things he performed with great zeal. He was raising levies of Roman
citizens, among the Lucani and Brutii, by his lieutenants, and exacting a
certain quota of horse and foot from the states of Sicily. When these things
were nearly completed, being informed of Curio's approach, he made a complaint
that he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken an unnecessary
war, without making any preparation, and when questioned by him and other
members in the senate, had assured them that every thing was ready and provided
for the war. After having made these complaints in a public assembly, he fled
from his province.
[1.31] Valerius found
Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted by their governors when they arrived
there with their armies. When Tubero arrived in Africa, he found Attius Varus
in the government of the province, who, having lost his cohorts, as already
related, at Auximum, had straightway fled to Africa, and finding it without a
governor, had seized it of his own accord, and making levies, had raised two
legions. From his acquaintance with the people and country, and his knowledge
of that province, he found the means of effecting this; because a few years
before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had obtained that province.
He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented his entering the port
or town, and did not suffer his son, though laboring under sickness, to set
foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchor and quit the place.
[1.32] When these
affairs were dispatched, Caesar, that there might be an intermission from labor
for the rest of the season, drew off his soldiers to the nearest municipal
towns, and set off in person for Rome. Having assembled the senate, he reminded
them of the injustice of his enemies; and told them, "That he aimed at no
extraordinary honor, but had waited for the time appointed by law, for standing
candidate for the consulate, being contented with what was allowed to every
citizen. That a bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the people (notwithstanding
the resistance of his enemies, and a very violent opposition from Cato, who in
his usual manner, consumed the day by a tedious harangue) that he should be
allowed to stand candidate, though absent, even in the consulship of Pompey;
and if the latter disapproved of the bill, why did he allow it to pass? if he
approved of it, why should he debar him [Caesar] from the people's favor? He
made mention of his own patience, in that he had freely proposed that all
armies should be disbanded, by which he himself would suffer the loss both of
dignity and honor. He urged the virulence of his enemies, who refused to comply
with what they required from others, and had rather that all things should be
thrown into confusion, than that they should lose their power and their armies.
He expatiated on their injustice, in taking away his legions: their cruelty and
insolence in abridging the privileges of the tribunes; the proposals he had
made, and his entreaties of an interview which had been refused him. For which
reasons, he begged and desired that they would undertake the management of the
republic, and unite with him in the administration of it. But if through fear
they declined it, he would not be a burden to them, but take the management of
it on himself. That deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose a
reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had lately asserted in the
senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested in those persons to whom
embassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that sent them. That these
were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that for his part, as he had made it
his study to surpass others in glory, so he was desirous of excelling them in
justice and equity."
[1.33] The senate
approved of sending deputies, but none could be found fit to execute the
commission: for every person, from his own private fears, declined the office.
For Pompey, on leaving the city, had declared in the open senate, that he would
hold in the same degree of estimation, those who staid in Rome and those in
Caesar's camp. Thus three days were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides,
Lucius Metellus, one of the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar's enemies, to
prevent this, and to embarrass every thing else which Caesar should propose.
Caesar having discovered his intention, after spending several days to no
purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any more time, and went
to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting what he had intended.
[1.34] On his arrival
there, he was informed that Vibullius Rufus, whom he had taken a few days
before at Corfinium, and set at liberty, was sent by Pompey into Spain; and
that Domitius also was gone to seize Massilia with seven row-galleys, which
were fitted up by some private persons at Igilium and Cosa, and which he had
manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noble
men of Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey, when leaving Rome had
exhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not erase from their minds the
memory of his former favors. On receiving this message, the Massilians had shut
their gates against Caesar, and invited over to them the Albici, who had
formerly been in alliance with them, and who inhabited the mountains that
overhung Massilia: they had likewise conveyed the corn from the surrounding
country, and from all the forts into the city; had opened armories in the city;
and were repairing the walls, the fleet, and the gates.
[1.35] Caesar sent for
fifteen of the principal persons of Massilia to attend him. To prevent the war
commencing among them, he remonstrates [in the following language]; "that
they ought to follow the precedent set by all Italy, rather than submit to the
will of any one man." He made use of such arguments as he thought would
tend to bring them to reason. The deputies reported his speech to their
countrymen, and by the authority of the state bring him back this answer:
"That they understood that the Roman people was divided into two factions:
that they had neither judgment nor abilities to decide which had the juster
cause; but that the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey and Caius
Caesar, the two patrons of the state: the former of whom had granted to their
state the lands of the Vocae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter had assigned
them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented their revenue.
Wherefore, having received equal favors from both, they ought to show equal
affection to both, and assist neither against the other, nor admit either into
their city or harbors."
[1.36] While this
treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived at Massilia with his fleet, and was
received into the city, and made governor of it. The chief management of the
war was intrusted to him. At his command they send the fleet to all parts; they
seize all the merchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into the harbor;
they apply the nails, timber, and rigging, with which they were furnished to
rig and refit their other vessels. They lay up in the public stores, all the
corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the rest of their lading and
convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event take place. Provoked at
such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions against Massilia, and resolved to
provide turrets, and vineae to assault the town, and to build twelve ships at
Arelas, which being completed and rigged in thirty days (from the time the
timber was cut down), and being brought to Massilia, he put under the command
of Decimus Brutus; and left Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to invest the city.
[1.37] While he was
preparing and getting these things in readiness, he sent Caius Fabius one of
his lieutenants into Spain with three legions, which he had disposed to winter
quarters in Narbo, and the neighboring country; and ordered him immediately to
seize the passes of the Pyrenees, which were at that time occupied by
detachments from Lucius Afranius, one of Pompey's lieutenants. He desired the
other legions, which were passing the winter at a great distance, to follow
close after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using expedition,
dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came up with the army
of Afranius.
[1.38] On the arrival
of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have already mentioned, Pompey had sent into
Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, his lieutenants (one of whom had the
command of Hither Spain, with three legions; the second of the country from the
forest of Castulo to the river Guadiana with two legions; the third from the
river Guadiana to the country of the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like
number of legions) divided among themselves their respective departments.
Petreius was to march from Lusitania through the Vettones, and join Afranius
with all his forces; Varro was to guard all Further Spain with what legions he
had. These matters being settled, reinforcements of horse and foot were
demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from the Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the
barbarous nations which border on the ocean, by Afranius. When they were
raised, Petreius immediately marched through the Vettones to Afranius. They
resolved by joint consent to carry on the war in the vicinity of Herba, on
account of the advantages of its situation.
[1.39] Afranius, as
above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two. There were besides about
eighty cohorts raised in Hither and Further Spain (of which, the troops
belonging to the former province had shields, those of the latter targets), and
about five thousand horse raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions
into Spain, with about six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse,
which had served under him in all his former wars, and the same number from
Gaul, which he himself had provided, having expressly called out all the most
noble and valiant men of each state. The bravest of these were from the
Aquitani and the mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul. He had been
informed that Pompey was marching through Mauritania with his legions to Spain,
and would shortly arrive. He at the same time borrowed money from the tribunes
and centurions, which he distributed among his soldiers. By this proceeding he
gained two points; he secured the interest of the centurions by this pledge in
his hands, and by his liberality he purchased the affections of his army.
[1.40] Fabius sounded
the inclinations of the neighboring states by letters and messengers. He had
made two bridges over the river Segre, at the distance of four miles from each
other. He sent foraging parties over these bridges, because he had already
consumed all the forage that was on his side of the river. The generals of
Pompey's army did almost the same thing, and for the same reason: and the horse
had frequent skirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius's legions had, as
was their constant practice, gone forth as the usual protection to the
foragers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the horse were
following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the cattle, and the mass of
water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off from the main army,
which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timber and hurdles that
were carried down the river, Afranius immediately crossed his own bridge, which
communicated between his camp and the town, with four legions and all the cavalry,
and marched against Fabius's two legions. When his approach was announced,
Lucius Plancus, who had the command of those legions, compelled by the
emergency, took post on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two fronts,
that it might not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged with
superior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and the horse.
When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at a distance by
both sides the colors of two legions, which Caius Fabius had sent round by the
further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting, as the event verified, that
the enemy's generals would take advantage of the opportunity which fortune had
put in their way, to attack our men. Their approach put an end to the battle,
and each general led back his legions to their respective camps.
[1.41] In two days
after Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse, which he had retained
for a body guard. The bridge which had been broken down by the storm was almost
repaired, and he ordered it to be finished in the night. Being acquainted with
the nature of the country, he left behind him six cohorts to guard the bridge,
the camp, and all his baggage, and the next day set off in person for Ilerda,
with all his forces drawn up in three lines, and halted just before the camp of
Afranius, and having remained there a short time under arms, he offered him
battle on equal terms. When this affair was made, Afranius drew out his forces,
and posted them on the middle of a hill, near his camp. When Caesar perceived
that Afranius declined coming to an engagement, he resolved to encamp at
somewhat less than half a mile's distance from the very foot of the mountain;
and that his soldiers while engaged in their works, might not be terrified by
any sudden attack of the enemy, or disturbed in their work, he ordered them not
to fortify it with a wall, which must rise high, and be seen at a distance, but
draw, on the front opposite the enemy, a trench fifteen feet broad. The first
and second lines confined under arms, as was from the first appointed. Behind
them the third line was carrying on the work without being seen; so that the
whole was completed before Afranius discovered that the camp was being
fortified.
[1.42] In the evening
Caesar drew his legions within this trench, and rested them under arms the next
night. The day following he kept his whole army within it, and as it was
necessary to bring materials from a considerable distance, he for the present
pursued the same plan in his work; and to each legion, one after the other, he
assigned one side of the camp to fortify, and ordered trenches of the same
magnitude to be cut: he kept the rest of the legions under arms without baggage
to oppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct the
work, drew out their forces at the very foot of the mountain, and challenged us
to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt his work, relying on the
protection of the three legions, and the strength of the fosse. After staying
for a short time, and advancing no great distance from the bottom of the hill,
they led back their forces to their camp. The third day Caesar fortified his
camp with a rampart, and ordered the other cohorts which he had left in the
upper camp, and his baggage to be removed to it.
[1.43] Between the town
of Ilerda and the next hill, on which Afranius and Petreius were encamped,
there was a plain about three hundred paces broad, and near the middle of it an
eminence somewhat raised above the level: Caesar hoped that if he could get
possession of this and fortify it, he should be able to cut off the enemy from
the town, the bridge, and all the stores which they had laid up in the town. In
expectation of this he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his
army in an advantageous position, he ordered the advanced men of one legion to
hasten forward and seize the eminence. Upon intelligence of this the cohorts
which were on guard before Afranius's camp were instantly sent a nearer way to
occupy the same post. The two parties engage, and as Afranius's men had reached
the eminence first, our men were repulsed, and, on a reinforcement being sent,
they were obliged to turn their backs and retreat to the standards of legions.
[1.44] The manner of
fighting of those soldiers was to run forward with great impetuosity and boldly
take a post, and not to keep their ranks strictly, but to fight in small
scattered parties: if hard pressed they thought it no disgrace to retire and
give up the post, being accustomed to this manner of fighting among the
Lusitanians and other barbarous nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers
are strongly influenced by the customs of those countries in which they have
spent much time. This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to
such a description of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to be
surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward from their
ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and not to quit
their colors, nor, without good reason to give up the post which they had
taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the legion which was
stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but retreated to the next hill.
[1.45] Almost the whole
army being daunted at this, because it had occurred contrary to their
expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged his men and led the ninth legion to
their relief, and checked the insolent and eager pursuit of the enemy, and
obliged them, in their turn, to show their backs, and retreat to Ilerda, and
take post under the walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over
zealous to repair the dishonor which had been sustained, having rashly pursued
the fleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground and went up to the foot
of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And when they wished to
retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the rising ground. The place
was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and was so narrow that even
three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle, would fill it; but no relief could
be sent on the flanks, and the horse could be of no service to them when hard
pressed. From the town, indeed, the precipice inclined with a gentle slope for
near four hundred paces. Our men had to retreat this way, as they had, through
their eagerness, advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was in this
place, which was much to the disadvantage of our troops, both on account of its
narrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain, so that
no weapon was thrown at them without effect; yet they exerted their valor and
patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces were increasing, and cohorts
were frequently sent to their aid from the camp through the town, that fresh
men might relieve the weary. Caesar was obliged to do the same, and relieve the
fatigued by sending cohorts to that post.
[1.46] After the battle
had in this manner continued incessantly for five hours, and our men had
suffered much from superior numbers, having spent all their javelins, they drew
their swords and charged the enemy up the hill, and, having killed a few,
obliged the rest to fly. The cohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some
being driven by their fears into the town, an easy retreat was afforded to our
men. Our cavalry also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping or low
ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the hill, and, riding between
the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure. Such were the various
turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter about seventy of our men
fell: among them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion of the second line of the
fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinary valor, had been promoted from the
lower ranks to that post. About six hundred were wounded. Of Afranius's party
there were killed Titus Caecilius, principal centurion, and four other
centurions, and above two hundred men.
[1.47] But this opinion
is spread abroad concerning this day, that each party thought that they came
off conquerors. Afranius's soldiers, because, though they were esteemed
inferior in the opinion of all, yet they had stood our attack and sustained our
charge, and, at first, had kept the post on the hill which had been the
occasion of the dispute; and, in the first encounter, had obliged our men to
fly: but ours, because, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground and the
disparity of numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours, had
advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced the enemy to fly from the
higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the hill,
about which the contest had been, with strong works and posted a garrison on
it.
[1.48] In two days
after this transaction, there happened an unexpected misfortune. For so great a
storm arose, that it was agreed that there were never seen higher floods in
those countries; it swept down the snow from all the mountains, and broke over the
banks of the river, and in one day carried away both the bridges which Fabius
had built - a circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar's army.
For as our camp, as already mentioned, was pitched between two rivers, the
Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could be forded for the space of
thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined within these narrow limits.
Neither could the states, which had espoused Caesar's cause, furnish him with
corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to forage, return, as they were
stopped by the waters: nor could the convoys, coming from Italy and Gaul, make
their way to the camp. Besides, it was the most distressing season of the year,
when there was no corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe: and the states
were exhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the corn, before
Caesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had been already
consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as a secondary resource
against want, had been removed by the states to a great distance on account of
the war. They who had gone out to get forage or corn, were chased by the light
troops of the Lusitanians, and the targeteers of Hither Spain, who were well
acquainted with the country, and could readily swim across the river, because
it is the custom of all those people not to join their armies without bladders.
[1.49] But Afranius's
army had abundance of everything; a great stock of corn had been provided and
laid in long before, a large quantity was coming in from the whole province:
they had a good store of forage. The bridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity
of getting all these without any danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to
which Caesar had no access, were as yet untouched.
[1.50] Those floods
continued several days. Caesar endeavored to repair the bridges, but the height
of the water did not allow him: and the cohorts disposed along the banks did
not suffer them to be completed; and it was easy for them to prevent it, both
from the nature of the river and the height of the water, but especially
because their darts were thrown from the whole course of the bank on one
confined spot; and it was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a
work in a very rapid flood, and to avoid the darts.
[1.51] Intelligence was
brought to Afranius that the great convoys, which were on their march to
Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the Rutheni, and horse from the
Gauls, with a long train of baggage, according to the Gallic custom of traveling,
had arrived there; there were besides about six thousand people of all
descriptions, with slaves and freed men. But there was no order, or regular
discipline, as every one followed his own humor, and all traveled without
apprehension, taking the same liberty as on former marches. There were several
young noblemen, sons of senators, and of equestrian rank; there were
embassadors from several states; there were lieutenants of Caesar's. The river
stopped them all. To attack them by surprise, Afranius set out in the beginning
of the night, with all his cavalry and three legions, and sent the horse on
before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic horse soon got themselves in
readiness, and attacked them. Though but few, they withstood the vast number of
the enemy, as long as they fought on equal terms; but when the legions began to
approach, having lost a few men, they retreated to the next mountains. The
delay occasioned by this battle was of great importance to the security of our
men; for having gained time, they retired to the higher grounds. There were
missing that day about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable
number of servants and baggage.
[1.52] However, by all
these things, the price of provisions was raised, which is commonly a disaster
attendant, not only on a time of present scarcity, but on the apprehension of
future want. Provisions had now reached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want
of corn had diminished the strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were
increasing every day; and so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, and
fortune had so changed sides, that our men had to struggle with the want of
every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant supply of all things, and were
considered to have the advantage. Caesar demanded from those states which had
acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle, as they had but little corn. He
sent away the camp followers to the more distant states, and endeavored to
remedy the present scarcity by every resource in his power.
[1.53] Afranius and
Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and more circumstantial accounts of
these things to Rome, to their acquaintances. Report exaggerated them so that
the war appeared to be almost at an end. When these letters and dispatches were
received at Rome, a great concourse of people resorted to the house of
Afranius, and congratulations ran high; several went out of Italy to Cneius
Pompey; some of them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence; others,
that they might not be thought to have waited the issue of the war, and to have
come last of all.
[1.54] When Caesar's
affairs were in this unfavorable position, and all the passes were guarded by
the soldiers and horse of Afranius, and the bridges could not be prepared,
Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships of the kind that his knowledge of
Britain a few years before had taught him. First, the keels and ribs were made
of light timber, then, the rest of the hulk of the ships was wrought with
wicker work, and covered over with hides. When these were finished, he drew
them down to the river in wagons in one night, a distance of twenty-two miles
from his camp, and transported in them some soldiers across the river, and on a
sudden took possession of a hill adjoining the bank. This he immediately
fortified, before he was perceived by the enemy. To this he afterward
transported a legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides, he finished it
in two days. By this means, he brought safe to his camp, the convoys, and those
who had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance for the
provisions.
[1.55] The same day he
made a great part of his horse pass the river, who, falling on the foragers by
surprise as they were dispersed without any suspicions, intercepted an incredible
number of cattle and people; and when some Spanish light-armed cohorts were
sent to reinforce the enemy, our men judiciously divided themselves into two
parts, the one to protect the spoil, the other to resist the advancing foe, and
to beat them back, and they cut off from the rest and surrounded one cohort,
which had rashly ventured out of the line before the others, and after putting
it to the sword, returned safe with considerable booty to the camp over the
same bridge.
[1.56] While these affairs
are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians, adopting the advice of Domitius,
prepared seventeen ships of war, of which eleven were decked. To these they add
several smaller vessels, that our fleet might be terrified by numbers; they man
them with a great number of archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been
already made, and these they incited by rewards and promises. Domitius required
certain ships for his own use, which he manned with colonists and shepherds,
whom he had brought along with him. A fleet being thus furnished with every
necessary, he advanced with great confidence against our ships, commanded by
Decimus Brutus. It was stationed at an island opposite to Massilia.
[1.57] Brutus was much
inferior in number of ships; but Caesar had appointed to that fleet the bravest
men selected from all his legions, antesignani and centurions, who had
requested to be employed in that service. They had provided iron hooks and
harpoons, and had furnished themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts,
and missiles. Thus prepared, and being apprised of the enemy's approach, they
put out from the harbor, and engaged the Massilians. Both sides fought with
great courage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy people, bred on the
highlands and inured to arms, fall much short of our men in valor: and being
lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their minds their recent
promises: and the wild shepherds, encouraged by the hope of liberty, were eager
to prove their zeal in the presence of their masters.
[1.58] The Massilians
themselves, confiding in the quickness of their ships, and the skill of their
pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock, and as long as they were permitted
by clear space, lengthening their line they endeavored to surround us, or to
attack single ships with several of theirs, or to run across our ships, and
carry away our oars, if possible; but when necessity obliged them to come
nearer, they had recourse, from the skill and art of the pilots, to the valor
of the mountaineers. But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skillful
pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and were not
yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, were moreover impeded by the
heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which having been built in a hurry and
of green timber, were not so easily maneuvered. Therefore, when Caesar's men
had an opportunity of a close engagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the
enemy's ships with one of theirs. And throwing in the grappling-irons, and
holding both ships fast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and boarded the
enemy's; and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds, they sank some
of their ships, took others with the men on board, and drove the rest into the harbor.
That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including those that were taken.
[1.59] When news of
this battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, the bridge being completed at the
same time, fortune soon took a turn. The enemy, daunted by the courage of our
horse, did not scour the country as freely or as boldly as before: but
sometimes advancing a small distance from the camp, that they might have a
ready retreat, they foraged within narrower bounds: at other times, they took a
longer circuit to avoid our outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained
some loss, or descried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst of their
expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at length they resolved to leave
off foraging for several days, and, contrary to the practice of all nations, to
go out at night.
[1.60] In the mean time
the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were under the government of the
Oscenses, send embassadors to Caesar, and offer to submit to his orders. They
are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani, and Ausetani, and in a few days
more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwell near the river Ebro. He requires of them
all, to assist him with corn, to which they agreed, and having collected all
the cattle in the country, they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort of
the Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of their state, came over to Caesar,
from the place where they were stationed, and carried their colors with them. A
great change is shortly made in the face of affairs. The bridge being finished,
five powerful states being joined to Caesar, a way opened for the receiving of
corn, and the rumors of the assistance of legions which were said to be on
their march, with Pompey at their head, through Mauritania, having died away,
several of the more distant states revolt from Afranius, and enter into league
with Caesar.
[1.61] While the
spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these things, Caesar, that he might not
be always obliged to send his horse a long circuit round by the bridge, having
found a convenient place, began to sink several drains, thirty feet deep, by
which he might draw off a part of the river Segre, and make a ford over it.
When these were almost finished, Afranius and Petreius began to be greatly
alarmed, lest they should be altogether cut off from corn and forage, because
Caesar was very strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to quit their posts,
and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was, moreover, a circumstance that
confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two adverse parties, that, which
had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being conquered by Pompey, still
trembled at his name and sway, though absent: the other which had remained firm
in Pompey's interest, loved him for the favors which they had received: but
Caesar's name was not known to the barbarians. From these they expected
considerable aid, both of horse and foot, and hoped to protract the war till
winter, in a friendly country. Having come to this resolution, they gave orders
to collect all the ships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa, a
town situated on the river Ebro, about twenty miles distant from their camp. At
this part of the river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastened
together, and transported two legions over the river Segre, and fortified their
camp with a rampart, twelve feet high.
[1.62] Notice of this
being given by the scouts, Caesar continued his work day and night, with very
great fatigue to the soldiers, to drain the river, and so far effected his purpose,
that the horse were both able and bold enough, though with some difficulty and
danger, to pass the river; but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part
of their breast above the water, so that their fording it was retarded, not
only by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of the current.
However, almost at the same instant, news was received of the bridge being
nearly completed over the Ebro, and a ford was found in the Segre.
[1.63] Now indeed the
enemy began to think that they ought to hasten their march. Accordingly,
leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrison at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre
with their whole force, and formed one camp with the two legions which they had
led across a few days before. Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down
their rear; since with his cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a
long circuit; so that they would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route.
The horse, which he had detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius and Petreius
had broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly appeared on their
rear, and spreading round them in great numbers, retard and impede their march.
[1.64] At break of day,
it was perceived from the rising grounds which joined Caesar's camp, that their
rear was vigorously pressed by our horse; that the last line sometimes halted
and was broken; at other times, that they joined battle and that our men were
beaten back by a general charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued
them when they wheeled about: but through the whole camp the soldiers gathered
in parties, and declared their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to
escape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarily protracted.
They applied to their tribunes and centurions, and entreated them to inform
Caesar that he need not spare their labor or consider their danger; that they
were ready and able, and would venture to ford the river where the horse had
crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zeal and importunity, though he felt
reluctant to expose his army to a river so exceedingly large, yet judged it
prudent to attempt it and make a trial. Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker
soldiers, whose spirit or strength seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be
selected from each century, and left them, with one legion besides, to guard
the camp: the rest of the legions he drew out without any baggage, and, having
disposed a great number of horses in the river, above and below the ford, he
led his army over. A few of his soldiers being carried away by the force of the
current, were stopped by the horse and taken up, and not a man perished. His
army being safe on the opposite bank, he drew out his forces and resolved to
lead them forward in three battalions: and so great was the ardor of the
soldiers that, notwithstanding the addition of a circuit of six miles and a
considerable delay in fording the river, before the ninth hour of the day they
came up with those who had set out at the third watch.
[1.65] When Afranius,
who was in company with Petreius, saw them at a distance, being affrighted at
so unexpected a sight, he halted on a rising ground and drew up his army.
Caesar refreshed his army on the plain that he might not expose them to battle
while fatigued; and when the enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued
and stopped them. They were obliged to pitch their camp sooner than they had
intended, for there were mountains at a small distance; and difficult and
narrow roads awaited them about five miles off. They retired behind these
mountains that they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and, placing parties in the
narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead their own forces across
the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was their interest to attempt
and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued by the skirmishes all day,
and by the labor of their march, they deferred it till the following day;
Caesar likewise encamped on the next hill.
[1.66] About midnight a
few of their men who had gone some distance from the camp to fetch water, being
taken by our horse, Caesar is informed by them that the generals of the enemy
were drawing their troops out of the camp without noise. Upon this information
Caesar ordered the signal to be given and the military shout to be raised for
packing up the baggage. When they heard the shout, being afraid lest they
should be stopped in the night and obliged to engage under their baggage, or
lest they should be confined in the narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a
stop to their march and kept their forces in their camp. The next day Petreius
went out privately with a few horse to reconnoitre the country. A similar
movement was made from Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa, was detached with a
small party to explore the nature of the country. Each returned with the same
account to his camp, that there was a level road for the next five miles, that
there then succeeded a rough and mountainous country. Whichever should first
obtain possession of the defiles would have no trouble in preventing the
other's progress.
[1.67] There was a
debate in the council between Afranius and Petreius, and the time of marching
was the subject. The majority were of opinion that they should begin their
march at night, "for they might reach the defiles before they should be
discovered." Others, because a shout had been raised the night before in
Caesar's camp, used this as an argument that they could not leave the camp
unnoticed: "that Caesar's cavalry were patrolling the whole night, and
that all the ways and roads were beset; that battles at night ought to be
avoided, because, in civil dissension, a soldier once daunted is more apt to
consult his fears than his oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense of
shame in the eyes of all, and that the presence of the tribunes and centurions
had the same effect: by these things the soldiers would be restrained and awed
to their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to force their way
by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet the post which they
desired might be secured with safety to the main body of the army." This
opinion prevailed in the council, and the next day, at the dawn, they resolved
to set forward.
[1.68] Caesar, having
taken a view of the country, the moment the sky began to grow white, led his
forces from the camp and marched at the head of his army by a long circuit,
keeping to no regular road; for the road which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was
occupied by the enemy's camp, which lay in Caesar's way. His soldiers were
obliged to cross extensive and difficult valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several
places, interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to
one another, and the soldiers were forced to perform a great part of their
march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But not a man
murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would be a period to
all their toils, if they could cut off the enemy from the Ebro and intercept
their convoys.
[1.69] At first,
Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits from their camp to look at us, and in
contumelious language upbraided us, "that we were forced, for want of
necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to Ilerda." For our route
was different from what we proposed, and we appeared to be going a contrary
way. But their generals applauded their own prudence in keeping within their
camp, and it was a strong confirmation of their opinion, that they saw we
marched without wagons or baggage, which made them confident that we could not
long endure want. But when they saw our army gradually wheel to the right, and
observed our van was already passing the line of their camp, there was nobody
so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary to march from the
camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms was raised, and all the army,
except a few which were left to guard the camp, set out and marched the direct
road to the Ebro.
[1.70] The contest
depended entirely on dispatch, which should first get possession of the defile
and the mountains. The difficulty of the roads delayed Caesar's army, but his
cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces, retarded their march. However, the affair
was necessarily reduced to this point, with respect to Afranius's men, that if
they first gained the mountains, which they desired, they would themselves
avoid all danger, but could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor the
cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, being intercepted by
Caesar's army, by no means could assistance be given. Caesar first accomplished
the march, and having found a plain behind large rocks, drew up his army there
in order of battle and facing the enemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was
galled by our cavalry, and seeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill,
made a halt on it. Thence he detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to
the highest mountain which was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with
all expedition, and to take possession of it, with the intention of going to
the same place with all his forces, then altering his route, and crossing the
hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards were making toward it in an oblique
direction, Caesar's horse espied them and attacked them, nor were they able to
withstand the charge of the cavalry even for a moment, but were all surrounded
and cut to pieces in the sight of the two armies.
[1.71] There was now an
opportunity for managing affairs successfully, nor did it escape Caesar, that
an army daunted at suffering such a loss before their eyes, could not stand,
especially as they were surrounded by our horse, and the engagement would take
place on even and open ground. To this he was importuned on all sides. The
lieutenants, centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him, and begged
"that he would not hesitate to begin the battle: that the hearts of all
the soldiers were very anxious for it: that Afranius's men had by several
circumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not assisted their
party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did not sustain the
charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into one place, did not
observe either rank or order. But if he had any apprehensions from the
disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity would be given him of coming to
battle in some other place: for that Afranius must certainly come down, and
would not be able to remain there for want of water."
[1.72] Caesar had
conceived hopes of ending the affair without an engagement, or without striking
a blow, because he had cut off the enemy's supplies. Why should he hazard the
loss of any of his men, even in a successful battle? Why should he expose
soldiers to be wounded, who had deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should
he tempt fortune? especially when it was as much a general's duty to conquer by
tactics as by the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion for those
citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had rather gain his object without
any loss or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was not generally
approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each other that since such an
opportunity of victory was let pass, they would not come to an engagement, even
when Caesar should wish it. He persevered however in his resolution, and
retired a little from that place to abate the enemy's fears. Petreius and
Afranius, having got this opportunity, retired to their camp. Caesar, having
disposed parties on the mountains, and cut off all access to the Ebro,
fortified his camp as close to the enemy as he could.
[1.73] The day
following, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed that they had lost all
prospect of supplies, and of access to the Ebro, consulted as to what other
course they should take. There were two roads, one to Ilerda, if they chose to
return, the other to Tarraco, if they should march to it. While they were
deliberating on these matters, intelligence was brought them that their
watering parties were attacked by our horse: upon which information, they
dispose several parties of horse and auxiliary foot along the road, and
intermix some legionary cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from the camp
to the water, that they might be able to procure water within their lines, both
without fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided this task
between themselves, and went in person to some distance from their camp for the
purpose of seeing it accomplished.
[1.74] The soldiers
having obtained by their absence a free opportunity of conversing with each
other, came out in great numbers, and inquired each for whatever acquaintance
or fellow-citizen he had in our camp, and invited him to him. First they
returned them general thanks for sparing them the day before, when they were
greatly terrified, and acknowledged that they were alive through their
kindness; then they inquired about the honor of our general, and whether they
could with safety intrust themselves to him; and declared their sorrow that
they had not done so in the beginning, and that they had taken up arms against
their relations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conferences, they desired the
general's parole for the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they might not
appear guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their generals. When they were
assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that they would immediately
remove their standards, and sent centurions of the first rank as deputies to
treat with Caesar about a peace. In the mean time some of them invite their
acquaintances, and bring them to their camp, others are brought away by their
friends, so that the two camps seemed to be united into one, and several of the
tribunes and centurions came to Caesar, and paid their respects to him. The
same was done by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to their assistance,
and kept in their camp as hostages. They inquired after their acquaintance and
friends, by whom each might have the means of being recommended to Caesar. Even
Afranius's son, a young man, endeavored, by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant,
to make terms for his own and his father's life. Every place was filled with
mirth and congratulations; in the one army, because they thought they had
escaped so impending danger; in the other, because they thought they had
completed so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in every man's
judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and his conduct was
applauded by all.
[1.75] When these
circumstances were announced to Afranius, he left the work which he had begun,
and returned to his camp, determined as it appeared, whatever should be the
event, to bear it with an even and steady mind. Petreius did not neglect
himself; he armed his domestics; with them and the praetorian cohort of
Spaniards, and a few foreign horse, his dependents, whom he commonly kept near
him to guard his person, he suddenly flew to the rampart, interrupted the
conferences of the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death as
many as he caught. The rest formed into a body, and being alarmed by the
unexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drew their
swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of their camp, defended
themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and made good their retreat to
the camp, where they were protected by the cohorts which were on guard.
[1.76] Petreius, after
accomplishing this, went round every maniple, calling the soldiers by their
names, and entreating with tears that they would not give up him and their
absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice to the vengeance of their enemies.
Immediately they ran in crowds to the general's pavilion, when he required them
all to take an oath that they would not desert nor betray the army nor the
generals, nor form any design distinct from the general interest. He himself
swore first to the tenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to take the same
oath. The tribunes and centurions followed their example; the soldiers were
brought out by centuries, and took the same oath. They gave orders, that
whoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce them; as soon as they were
produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium, but most of them
concealed those that they had entertained, and let them out at night over the
rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals, the cruelty of the
punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed all hopes of surrender for
the present, changed the soldiers' minds, and reduced matters to the former
state of war.
[1.77] Caesar ordered
the enemy's soldiers, who had come into his camp to hold a conference, to be
searched for with the strictest diligence, and sent back. But of the tribunes
and centurions, several voluntarily remained with him, and he afterward treated
them with great respect. The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and
conferred on the Roman knights the honor of tribunes.
[1.78] Afranius's men
were distressed in foraging, and procured water with difficulty. The legionary
soldiers had a tolerable supply of corn, because they had beef ordered to bring
from Ilerda sufficient to last twenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary
forces had none, for they had but few opportunities of procuring any, and their
bodies were not accustomed to bear burdens; and therefore a great number of
them came over to Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these
difficulties; but of the two schemes proposed, the most expedient seemed to be
to return to Ilerda, because they had left some corn there; and there they hoped
to decide on a plan for their future conduct. Tarraco lay at a greater
distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might admit of many changes.
Their design having met with approbation, they set out from their camp. Caesar
having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy and retard their rear, followed close
after with his legions. Not a moment passed in which their rear was not engaged
with our horse.
[1.79] Their manner of
fighting was this: the light cohorts closed their rear, and frequently made a
stand on the level grounds. If they had a mountain to ascend, the very nature
of the place readily secured them from any danger; for the advanced guards,
from the rising grounds, protected the rest in their ascent. When they
approached a valley or declivity, and the advanced men could not impart
assistance to the tardy, our horse threw their darts at them from the rising
grounds with advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous situation; the
only plan left was, that whenever they came near such places, they should give
orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse our horse; and
these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, with the utmost speed,
run all together down to the valley, and having passed it, should face about
again on the next hill. For so far were they from deriving any assistance from
their horse (of which they had a large number), that they were obliged to
receive them into the center of their army, and themselves protect them, as
they were daunted by former battles. And on their march no one could quit the
line without being taken by Caesar's horse.
[1.80] While skirmishes
were fought in this manner, they advanced but slowly and gradually, and
frequently halted to help their rear, as then happened. For having advanced
four miles, and being very much harassed by our horse, they took post on a high
mountain, and there in trenched themselves on the front only, facing the enemy;
and did not take their baggage off their cattle. When they perceived that
Caesar's camp was pitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to
forage, they suddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having
hopes that we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to
march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions that remained.
He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered the foragers to be
called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to follow him. The horse shortly
returned to their daily duty on march, and charged the rear so vigorously, that
they almost forced them to fly; and several privates and some centurions were
killed. The main body of Caesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin
threatened them.
[1.81] Then indeed, not
having opportunity either to choose a convenient position for their camp, or to
march forward, they were obliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from
water, and on ground naturally unfavorable. But for the reasons already given,
Caesar did not attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his
men might be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off by
night or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent the whole
night in extending their work, and turning their camp to ours. The next day, at
dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in that manner, but in
proportion as they advanced their works, and extended their camp, they were
further distant from the water; and one evil was remedied by another. The first
night, no one went out for water. The next day, they left a guard in the camp,
and led out all their forces to water: but not a person was sent to look for
forage. Caesar was more desirous that they should be humbled by these means,
and forced to come to terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he
endeavored to surround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to
check their most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must have
recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be the readier for
a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.
[1.82] In this work,
and the deliberations on it, two days were spent. By the third day a
considerable part of Caesar's work was finished. To interrupt his progress,
they drew out their legions about the eighth hour, by a certain signal, and
placed them in order of battle before their camp. Caesar calling his legions
off from their work, and ordering the horse to hold themselves in readiness,
marshaled his army: for to appear to decline an engagement contrary to the
opinion of the soldiers and the general voice, would have been attended with
great disadvantage. But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from
wishing to engage, and the more especially, because the short space between the
camps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not contribute much to a
decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from each other above two
thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the armies, and one third
left for the soldiers to charge and make their attack. If a battle should be
begun, the nearness of the camps would afford a ready retreat to the conquered
party in the flight. For this reason Caesar had resolved to make resistance if
they attacked him, but not to be the first to provoke the battle.
[1.83] Afranius's five
legions were drawn up in two lines, the auxiliary cohorts formed the third
line, and acted as reserves. Caesar had three lines, four cohorts out of each
of the five legions formed the first line. Three more from each legion followed
them, as reserves: and three others were behind these. The slingers and archers
were stationed in the center of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The
hostile armies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhere
to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced to it;
Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter was deferred, and
both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both returned to their camp.
The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works which he had begun. The enemy
attempted to pass the river Segre by a ford. Caesar, having perceived this,
sent some light armed Germans and a party of horse across the river, and
disposed several parties along the banks to guard them.
[1.84] At length, beset
on all sides, their cattle having been four days without fodder, and having no
water, wood, or corn, they beg a conference; and that, if possible, in a place
remote from the soldiers. When this was refused by Caesar, but a public
interview offered if they chose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to
Caesar. They met in the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both
armies Afranius spoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either
with him or his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their
general, Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty to
him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want of every
necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they were prevented from
procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and were not able to bear
the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but confessed themselves vanquished:
and begged and entreated, if there was any room left for mercy, that they
should not be necessitated to suffer the most severe penalties." These
sentiments were delivered in the most submissive and humble language.
[1.85] Caesar replied,
"That either to complain or sue for mercy became no man less than him: for
that every other person had done their duty: himself, in having declined to
engage on favorable terms, in an advantageous situation and time, that all
things tending to a peace might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having
preserved and protected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding the
injuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; and even
Afranius's soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding a peace, by
which they thought that they would secure the lives of all. Thus, that the
parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that the generals only were averse to
peace: that they paid no regard to the laws either of conference or truce; and
had most inhumanly put to death ignorant persons, who were deceived by a
conference: that therefore, they had met that fate which usually befalls men
from excessive obstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and
most earnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That for
his part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, or his
present advantage, to require terms by which his power might be increased, but
only that those armies, which they had maintained for so many years to oppose
him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been sent into Spain, and a
seventh raised there, and many and powerful fleets provided, and generals of
great military experience sent to command them, for no other purpose than to
oppose him: that none of these measures were adopted to keep the Spains in
peace, or for the use of the province, which, from the length of the peace,
stood in need of no such aid; that all these things were long since designed
against him; that against him a new sort of government was established, that
the same person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of the
city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike provinces for
so many years: that against him the laws of the magistrates had been altered;
that the late praetors and consuls should not be sent to govern the provinces
as had been the constant custom, but persons approved of and chosen by a
faction. That against him the excuse of age was not admitted; but persons of
tried experience in former wars were called up to take the command of the
armies: that with respect to him only, the routine was not observed which had
been allowed to all generals, that, after a successful war, they should return
home and disband their armies, if not with some mark of honor, at least without
disgrace; that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would still
submit to them; nor did he now desire to take their army from them and keep it
to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult matter), but only that
they should not have it to employ against him: and therefore, as he said
before, let them quit the provinces, and disband their army. If this was
complied with, he would injure no person; that these were the last and only
conditions of peace."
[1.86] It was very
acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, as might be easily known from
their signs of joy, that they who expected some injury after this defeat,
should obtain without solicitation the reward of a dismissal. For when a debate
was introduced about the place and time of their dismissal, they all began to
express, both by words and signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they
should be discharged immediately; for although every security might be given,
that they would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it was
deferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it was brought
to this issue: that those who had any settlement or possession in Spain, should
be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var. Caesar gave security that
they should receive no damage, and that no person should be obliged against his
inclination to take the military oath under him.
[1.87] Caesar promised
to supply them with corn from the present time till they arrived at the river
Var. He further adds, that whatever any of them lost in the war, which was in
the possession of his soldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To
his soldiers he made a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation
being made. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterward among
themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afranius and
Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almost breaking out,
asserted that the time had not yet come, and required that Caesar should take
cognizance of it; and both parties were content with his decision. About a
third part of their army being dismissed in two days, Caesar ordered two of his
legions, to go before, the rest to follow the vanquished enemy; that they
should encamp at a small distance from each other. The execution of this
business he gave in charge to Quintus Fufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants.
According to his directions, they marched from Spain to the river Var, and
there the rest of the army was disbanded.
End of Book 1
Caius Julius Caesar 49
B.C.
[2.1] While these
things were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius, Caesar's lieutenant, who
had been left to conduct the assault of Massilia, began to raise a mound,
vineae, and turrets against the town, on two sides; one of which was next the
harbor and docks, the other on that part where there is a passage from Gaul and
Spain to that sea which forces itself up the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia
is washed almost on three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is the
only side which has access by land. A part even of this space, which reaches to
the fortress, being fortified by the nature of the country, and a very deep
valley, required a long and difficult siege. To accomplish these works, Caius
Trebonius sends for a great quantity of carriages and men from the whole Province,
and orders hurdles and materials to be furnished. These things being provided,
he raised a mound eighty feet in height.
[2.2] But so great a
store of every thing necessary for a war had been a long time before laid up in
the town, and so great a number of engines, that no vineae made of hurdles
could withstand their force. For poles twelve feet in length, pointed with
iron, and these too shot from very large engines, sank into the ground through
four rows of hurdles. Therefore the arches of the vineae were covered over with
beams a foot thick, fastened together, and under this the materials of the
agger were handed from one to another. Before this was carried a testudo sixty
feet long, for leveling the ground, made also of very strong timber, and covered
over with every thing that was capable of protecting it against the fire and
stones thrown by the enemy. But the greatness of the works, the height of the
wall and towers, and the multitude of engines retarded the progress of our
works. Besides, frequent sallies were made from the town by the Albici, and
fire was thrown on our mound and turrets. These our men easily repulsed, and,
doing considerable damage to those who sallied, beat them back into the town.
[2.3] In the mean time,
Lucius Nasidius, being sent by Cneius Pompey with a fleet of sixteen sail, a
few of which had beaks of brass, to the assistance of Lucius Domitius and the
Massilians, passed the straits of Sicily without the knowledge or expectation
of Curio, and, putting with his fleet into Messana, and making the nobles and
senate take flight with the sudden terror, carried off one of their ships out
of dock. Having joined this to his other ships, he made good his voyage to
Massilia, and having sent in a galley privately, acquaints Domitius and the
Massilians of his arrival, and earnestly encourages them to hazard another
battle with Brutus's fleet with the addition of his aid.
[2.4] The Massilians,
since their former loss, had brought the same number of old ships from the
docks, and had repaired and fitted them out with great industry: they had a
large supply of seamen and pilots. They had got several fishing-smacks, and
covered them over, that the seamen might be secure against darts: these they
filled with archers and engines. With a fleet thus appointed, encouraged by the
entreaties and tears of all the old men, matrons, and virgins to succor the
state in this hour of distress, they went on board with no less spirit and
confidence than they had fought before. For it happens, from a common infirmity
of human nature, that we are more flushed with confidence, or more vehemently
alarmed at things unseen, concealed, and unknown, as was the case then. For the
arrival of Lucius Nasidius had filled the state with the most sanguine hopes
and wishes. Having got a fair wind, they sailed out of port and went to
Nasidius to Taurois, which is a fort belonging to the Massilians, and there
ranged their fleet and again encouraged each other to engage and communicated
their plan of operation. The command of the right division was given to the
Massilians, that of the left to Nasidius.
[2.5] Brutus sailed to
the same place with an augmented fleet; for to those made by Caesar at Arelas
were added six ships taken from the Massilians, which he had refitted since the
last battle and had furnished with every necessary. Accordingly, having
encouraged his men to despise a vanquished people whom they had conquered when
yet unbroken, he advanced against them full of confidence and spirit. From
Trebonius's camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into the town -
how all the youth which remained in it, and all persons of more advanced years,
with their wives and children, and the public guards, were either extending
their hands from the wall to the heavens, or were repairing to the temples of
the immortal gods, and prostrating themselves before their images, were
entreating them to grant them victory. Nor was there a single person who did
not imagine that his future fortune depended on the issue of that day; for the
choice of their youth and the most respectable of every age, being expressly
invited and solicited, had gone on board the fleet, that if any adverse fate
should befall them they might see that nothing was left for them to attempt,
and, if they proved victorious, they might have hopes of preserving the city,
either by their internal resources or by foreign assistance.
[2.6] When the battle
was begun, no effort of valor was wanting to the Massilians, but, mindful of
the instructions which they had a little before received from their friends,
they fought with such spirit as if they supposed that they would never have
another opportunity to attempt a defense, and as if they believed that those
whose lives should be endangered in the battle would not long precede the fate
of the rest of the citizens, who, if the city was taken, must undergo the same
fortune of war. Our ships being at some distance from each other, room was
allowed both for the skill of their pilots and the maueuvering of their ships;
and if at any time ours, gaining an advantage by casting the iron hooks on
board their ships, grappled with them, from all parts they assisted those who
were distressed. Nor, after being joined by the Albici, did they decline coming
to close engagement, nor were they much inferior to our men in valor. At the
same time, showers of darts, thrown from a distance from the lesser ships,
suddenly inflicted several wounds on our men when off their guard and otherwise
engaged; and two of their three-decked galleys; having descried the ship of
Decimus Brutus, which could be easily distinguished by its flag, rowed up
against him with great violence from opposite sides: but Brutus, seeing into
their designs, by the swiftness of his ship extricated himself with such
address as to get clear, though only by a moment. From the velocity of their
motion they struck against each other with such violence that they were both
excessively injured by the shock; the beak, indeed, of one of them being broken
off, the whole ship was ready to founder, which circumstance being observed,
the ships of Brutus's fleet, which were nearest that station, attack them when
in this disorder and sink them both.
[2.7] But Nasidius's
ships were of no use, and soon left the fight; for the sight of their country,
or the entreaties of their relations, did not urge them to run a desperate risk
of their lives. Therefore, of the number of the ships not one was lost: of the
fleet of the Massilians five were sunk, four taken, and one ran off with
Nasidius: all that escaped made the best of their way to Hither Spain, but one
of the rest was sent forward to Massilia for the purpose of bearing this
intelligence, and when it came near the city, the whole people crowded out to
hear the tidings, and, on being informed of the event, were so oppressed with
grief, that one would have imagined that the city had been taken by an enemy at
the same moment. The Massilians, however, began to make the necessary
preparations for the defense of their city with unwearied energy.
[2.8] The legionary
soldiers who had the management of the works on the right side, observed, from
the frequent sallies of the enemy, that it might prove a great protection to
them to build a turret of brick under the wall for a fort and place of refuge,
which they at first built low and small, [to guard them] against sudden
attacks. To it they retreated, and from it they made defense if any superior
force attacked them; and from it they sallied out either to repel or pursue the
enemy. It extended thirty feet on every side, and the thickness of the walls
was five feet. But afterward, as experience is the best master in every thing
on which the wit of man is employed, it was found that it might be of
considerable service if it was raised to the usual height of turrets, which was
effected in the following manner.
[2.9] When the turret
was raised to the height for flooring, they laid it on the walls in such a
manner that the ends of the joists were covered by the outer face of the wall,
that nothing should project to which the enemy's fire might adhere. They,
moreover, built over the joists with small bricks as high as the protection of
the plutei and vineae permitted them; and on that place they laid two beams
across, angle-ways, at a small distance from the outer walls, to support the
rafters which were to cover the turret, and on the beams they laid joists
across in a direct line, and on these they fastened down planks. These joists
they made somewhat longer, to project beyond the outside of the wall, that they
might serve to hang a curtain on them to defend and repel all blows while they
were building the walls between that and the next floor, and the floor of this
story they faced with bricks and mortar, that the enemy's fire might do them no
damage; and on this they spread mattresses, lest the weapons thrown from
engines should break through the flooring, or stones from catapults should
batter the brick work. They, moreover, made three mats of cable ropes, each of
them the length of the turret walls, and four feet broad, and, hanging them
round the turret on the three sides which faced the enemy, fastened them to the
projecting joists. For this was the only sort of defense which, they had
learned by experience in other places, could not be pierced by darts or engines.
But when that part of the turret which was completed was protected and secured
against every attempt of the enemy, they removed the plutei to other works.
They began to suspend gradually, and raise by screws from the first-floor, the
entire roof of the turret, and then they elevated it as high as the length of
the mats allowed. Hid and secured within these coverings, they built up the
walls with bricks, and again, by another turn of the screw, cleared a place for
themselves to proceed with the building; and, when they thought it time to lay
another floor, they laid the ends of the beams, covered in by the outer bricks
in like manner as in the first story, and from that story they again raised the
uppermost floor and the mat-work. In this manner, securely and without a blow
or danger, they raised it six stories high, and in laying the materials left
loop-holes in such places as they thought proper for working their engines.
[2.10] When they were
confident that they could protect the works which lay around from this turret,
they resolved to build a musculus, sixty feet long, of timber, two feet square,
and to extend it from the brick tower to the enemy's tower and wall. This was
the form of it: first, two beams of equal length were laid on the ground, at
the distance of four feet from each other; and in them were fastened small
pillars, five feet high, which were joined together by braces, with a gentle
slope, on which the timber which they must place to support the roof of the
musculus should be laid: upon this were laid beams, two feet square, bound with
iron plates and nails. To the upper covering of the musculus and the upper
beams, they fastened laths, four fingers square, to support the tiles which
were to cover the musculus. The roof being thus sloped and laid over in rows in
the same manner as the joists were laid on the braces, the musculus was covered
with tiles and mortar, to secure it against fire, which might be thrown from
the wall. Over the tiles hides are spread, to prevent the water let in on them
by spouts from dissolving the cement of the bricks. Again, the hides were
covered over with mattresses, that they might not be destroyed by fire or
stones. The soldiers under the protection of the vineae, finish this whole work
to the very tower; and suddenly, before the enemy were aware of it, moved it
forward by naval machinery, by putting rollers under it, close up to the
enemy's turret, so that it even touched the building.
[2.11] The townsmen,
affrighted at this unexpected stroke, bring forward with levers the largest
stones they can procure, and pitching them from the wall, roll them down on the
musculus. The strength of the timber withstood the shock; and whatever fell on
it slid off, on account of the sloping roof. When they perceived this, they
altered their plan, and set fire to barrels, filled with resin and tar, and
rolled them down from the wall on the musculus. As soon as they fell on it,
they slid off again, and were removed from its side by long poles and forks. In
the mean time, the soldiers, under cover of the musculus, were rooting out with
crow-bars the lowest stones of the enemy's turret, with which the foundation
was laid. The musculus was defended by darts, thrown from engines by our men
from the brick tower, and the enemy were beaten off from the wall and turrets;
nor was a fair opportunity of defending the walls given them. At length several
stones being picked away from the foundation of that turret next the musculus,
part of it fell down suddenly, and the rest, as if following it, leaned
forward.
[2.12] Hereupon, the
enemy distressed at the sudden fall of the turret, surprised at the unforeseen
calamity, awed by the wrath of the gods, and dreading the pillage of their
city, rush all together out of the gate unarmed, with their temples bound with
fillets, and suppliantly stretch out their hands to the officers and the army.
At this uncommon occurrence, the whole progress of the war was stopped, and the
soldiers, turning away from the battle, ran eagerly to hear and listen to them.
When the enemy came up to the commanders and the army, they all fell down at
their feet, and besought them "to wait till Caesar's arrival; they saw
that their city was taken, our works completed, and their tower undermined,
therefore they desisted from a defense; that no obstacle could arise, to
prevent their being instantly plundered at a beck, as soon as he arrived, if
they refused to submit to his orders." They inform them that, "if the
turret had entirely fallen down, the soldiers could not be withheld from
forcing into the town and sacking it, in hopes of getting spoil." These
and several other arguments to the same effect were delivered, as they were a
people of great learning, with great pathos and lamentations.
[2.13] The lieutenants
moved with compassion, draw off the soldiers from the work, desist from the
assault, and leave sentinels on the works. A sort of truce having been made
through compassion for the besieged, the arrival of Caesar is anxiously
awaited; not a dart was thrown from the walls or by our men, but all remit
their care and diligence, as if the business was at an end. For Caesar had
given Trebonius strict charge not to suffer the town to be taken by storm, lest
the soldiers, too much irritated both by abhorrence of their revolt, by the
contempt shown to them, and by their long labor, should put to the sword all
the grown up inhabitants, as they threatened to do. And it was with difficulty
that they were then restrained from breaking into the town, and they were much
displeased, because they imagined that they were prevented by Trebonius from
taking possession of it.
[2.14] But the enemy,
destitute of all honor, only waited a time and opportunity for fraud and
treachery. And after an interval of some days, when our men were careless and
negligent, on a sudden, at noon, when some were dispersed, and others indulging
themselves in rest on the very works, after the fatigue of the day, and their
arms were all laid by and covered up, they sallied out from the gates, and, the
wind being high and favorable to them, they set fire to our works; and the wind
spread it in such a manner that, in the same instant, the agger, plutei,
testudo, tower, and engines all caught the flames and were consumed before we
could conceive how it had occurred. Our men, alarmed at such an unexpected turn
of fortune, lay hold on such arms as they could find. Some rush from the camp;
an attack is made on the enemy: but they were prevented, by arrows and engines
from the walls; from pursuing them when they fled. They retired to their walls,
and there, without fear, set the musculus and brick tower on fire. Thus, by the
perfidy of the enemy and the violence of the storm, the labor of many months
was destroyed in a moment. The Massilians made the same attempt the next day,
having got such another storm. They sallied out against the other tower and
agger, and fought with more confidence. But as our men had on the former
occasion given up all thoughts of a contest, so, warned by the event of the
preceding day, they had made every preparation for a defense. Accordingly, they
slew several, and forced the rest to retreat into the town without effecting
their design.
[2.15] Trebonius began
to provide and repair what had been destroyed, with much greater zeal on the
part of the soldiers; for when they saw that their extraordinary pains and
preparations had an unfortunate issue, they were fired with indignation that,
in consequence of the impious violation of the truce, their valor should be
held in derision. There was no place left them from which the materials for
their mound could be fetched, in consequence of all the timber, far and wide,
in the territories of the Massilians, having been cut down and carried away;
they began therefore to make an agger of a new construction, never heard of
before, of two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and to lay floors over them
of almost the same breadth with the agger, made of timber. But wherever the
space between the walls, or the weakness of the timber, seemed to require it,
pillars were placed underneath and traversed beams laid on to strengthen the
work, and the space which was floored was covered over with hurdles, and the
hurdles plastered over with mortar. The soldiers, covered over head by the
floor, on the right and left by the wall, and in the front by the mantlets,
carried whatever materials were necessary for the building without danger: the
business was soon finished - the loss of their laborious work was soon repaired
by the dexterity and fortitude of the soldiers. Gates for making sallies were
left in the wall in such places as they thought proper.
[2.16] But when the
enemy perceived that those works, which they had hoped could not be replaced
without a great length of time, were put into so thorough repair by a few day's
labor and diligence, that there was no room for perfidy or sallies, and that no
means were left them by which they could either hurt the men by resistance or
the works by fire, and when they found by former examples that their town could
be surrounded with a wall and turrets on every part by which it was accessible
by land, in such a manner that they could not have room to stand on their own
fortifications, because our works were built almost on the top of their walls
by our army, and darts could be thrown from our hands, and when they perceived
that all advantage arising from their engines, on which they had built great
hopes, was totally lost, and that though they had an opportunity of fighting
with us on equal terms from walls and turrets, they could perceive that they
were not equal to our men in bravery, they had recourse to the same proposals
of surrender as before.
[2.17] In Further
Spain, Marcus Varro, in the beginning of the disturbances, when he heard of the
circumstances which took place in Italy, being diffident of Pompey's success,
used to speak in a very friendly manner of Caesar. That though, being
pre-engaged to Cneius Pompey in quality of lieutenant, he was bound in honor to
him, that, nevertheless, there existed a very intimate tie between him and
Caesar; that he was not ignorant of what was the duty of a lieutenant, who bore
an office of trust; nor of his own strength, nor of the disposition of the
whole province to Caesar. These sentiments he constantly expressed in his
ordinary conversation, and did not attach himself to either party. But
afterward, when he found that Caesar was detained before Massilia, that the
forces of Petreius had effected a junction with the army of Afranius, that
considerable reinforcements had come to their assistance, that there were great
hopes and expectations, and heard that the whole Hither province had entered
into a confederacy, and of the difficulties to which Caesar was reduced
afterward at Ilerda for want of provisions, and Afranius wrote to him a fuller
and more exaggerated account of these matters, he began to regulate his
movements by those of fortune.
[2.18] He made levies
throughout the province; and, having completed his two legions, he added to
them about thirty auxiliary cohorts; he collected a large quantity of corn to
send partly to the Masilians, partly to Afranius and Petreius. He commanded the
inhabitants of Gades to build ten ships of war; besides, he took care that
several others should be built in Spain. He removed all the money and ornaments
from the temple of Hercules to the town of Gades, and sent six cohorts thither
from the province to guard them, and gave the command of the town of Gades to
Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, and friend of Domitius, who had come thither
sent by Domitius to recover an estate for him; and he deposited all the arms,
both public and private, in Gallonius's house. He himself [Varro] made severe
harangues against Caesar. He often pronounced from his tribunal that Caesar had
fought several unsuccessful battles, and that a great number of his men had
deserted to Afranius. That he had these accounts from undoubted messengers, and
authority on which he could rely. By these means he terrified the Roman
citizens of that province, and obliged them to promise him for the service of
the state one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, twenty thousand pounds weight
of silver, and a hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat. He laid heavier
burdens on those states which he thought were friendly disposed to Caesar, and
billeted troops on them; he passed judgment against some private persons, and
condemned to confiscation the properties of those who had spoken or made
orations against the republic, and forced the whole province to take an oath of
allegiance to him and Pompey. Being informed of all that happened in Hither
Spain, he prepared for war. This was his plan of operations. He was to retire
with his two legions to Gades, and to lay up all the shipping and provisions
there. For he had been informed that the whole province was inclined to favor
Caesar's party. He thought that the war might be easily protracted in an
island, if he was provided with corn and shipping. Caesar, although called back
to Italy by many and important matters, yet had determined to leave no dregs of
war behind him in Spain, because he knew that Pompey had many dependents and
clients in the hither province.
[2.19] Having therefore
sent two legions into Further Spain under the command of Quintus Cassius,
tribune of the people; he himself advances with six hundred horse by forced
marches, and issues a proclamation, appointing a day on which the magistrates
and nobility of all the states should attend him at Corduba. This proclamation
being published through the whole province, there was not a state that did not
send a part of their senate to Corduba, at the appointed time; and not a Roman
citizen of any note but appeared that day. At the same time the senate at
Corduba shut the gates of their own accord against Varro, and posted guards and
sentinels on the wall and in the turrets, and detained two cohorts (called
Colonicae, which had come there accidentally), for the defense of the town.
About the same time the people of Carmona, which is by far the strongest state
in the whole province, of themselves drove out of the town the cohorts, and
shut the gates against them, although three cohorts had been detached by Varro
to garrison the citadel.
[2.20] But Varro was in
greater haste on this account to reach Gades with his legion as soon as
possible, lest he should be stopped either on his march or on crossing over to
the island. The affection of the province to Caesar proved so great and so
favorable, that he received a letter from Gades, before he was far advanced on
his march: that as soon as the nobility of Gades heard of Caesar's
proclamation, they had combined with the tribune of the cohorts, which were in
garrison there, to drive Gallonius out of the town, and to secure the city and
island for Caesar. That having agreed on the design they had sent notice to
Gallonius, to quit Gades of his own accord while he could do it with safety; if
he did not, they would take measures for themselves; that for fear of this
Gallonius had been induced to quit the town. When this was known, one of
Varro's two legions, which was called Vernacula, carried off the colors from
Varro's camp, he himself standing by and looking on, and retired to Hispalis,
and took post in the market and public places without doing any injury, and the
Roman citizens residing there approved so highly of this act, that every one
most earnestly offered to entertain them in their houses. When Varro, terrified
at these things, having altered his route, proposed going to Italica, he was
informed by his friends that the gates were shut against him. Then indeed, when
intercepted from every road, he sends word to Caesar, that he was ready to
deliver up the legion which he commanded. He sends to him Sextus Caesar, and
orders him to deliver it up to him. Varro, having delivered up the legion, went
to Caesar to Corduba, and having laid before him the public accounts, handed
over to him most faithfully whatever money he had, and told him what quantity
of corn and shipping he had, and where.
[2.21] Caesar made a
public oration at Corduba, in which he returned thanks to all severally: to the
Roman citizens, because they had been zealous to keep the town in their own
power; to the Spaniards, for having driven out the garrison; to the Gaditani,
for having defeated the attempts of his enemies, and asserted their own
liberty; to the Tribunes and Centurions who had gone there as a guard, for
having by their valor confirmed them in their purpose. He remitted the tax
which the Roman citizens had promised to Varro for the public use: he restored
their goods to those who he was informed had incurred that penalty by speaking
too freely, having given public and private rewards to some he filled the rest
with flattering hopes of his future intentions; and having staid two days at
Corduba, he set out for Gades; he ordered the money and ornaments which had
been carried away from the temple of Hercules, and lodged in the houses of
private persons, to be replaced in the temple. He made Quintus Cassius governor
of the province, and assigned him four legions. He himself, with those ships
which Marcus Varro had built, and others which the Gaditani had built by Varro's
orders, arrived in a few days at Tarraco, where embassadors from the greatest
part of the nearer province waited his arrival. Having in the same manner
conferred marks of honor both publicly and privately on some states, he left
Tarraco, and went thence by land to Narbo, and thence to Massilia. There he was
informed that a law was passed for creating a dictator, and that he had been
nominated dictator by Marcus Lepidus the praetor.
[2.22] The Massilians,
wearied out by misfortunes of every sort, reduced to the lowest ebb for want of
corn, conquered in two engagements at sea, defeated in their frequent sallies,
and struggling moreover with a fatal pestilence, from their long confinement
and change of victuals (for they all subsisted on old millet and damaged
barley, which they had formerly provided and laid up in the public stores
against an emergency of this kind), their turret being demolished, a great part
of their wall having given way, and despairing of any aid, either from the
provinces or their armies, for these they had heard had fallen into Caesar's
power, resolved to surrender now without dissimulation. But a few days before,
Lucius Domitius, having discovered the intention of the Massilians, and having
procured three ships, two of which he gave up to his friends, went on board the
third himself, having got a brisk wind, put out to sea. Some ships, which by
Brutus's orders were constantly cruising near the port, having espied him,
weighed anchor, and pursued him. But of these, the ship on board of which he
was, persevered itself, and continuing its flight, and by the aid of the wind
got out of sight: the other two, affrighted by the approach of our galleys put
back again into the harbor. The Massilians conveyed their arms and engines out
of the town, as they were ordered: brought their ships out of the port and
docks, and delivered up the money in their treasury. When these affairs were
dispatched, Caesar, sparing the town more out of regard to their renown and
antiquity than to any claim they could lay to his favor, left two legions in
garrison there, sent the rest to Italy, and set out himself for Rome.
[2.23] About the same
time Caius Curio, having sailed from Sicily to Africa, and from the first
despising the forces of Publius Attius Varus, transported only two of the four
legions which he had received from Caesar, and five hundred horse, and having
spent two days and three nights on the voyage, arrived at a place called
Aquilaria, which is about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and in the summer
season has a convenient harbor, and is inclosed by two projecting promontories.
Lucius Caesar the son, who was waiting his arrival near Clupea with ten ships
which had been taken near Utica in a war with the pirates, and which Publius
Attius had had repaired for this war, frightened at the number of our ships,
fled the sea, and running his three-decked covered galley on the nearest shore,
left her there and made his escape by land to Adrumetum. Caius Considius
Longus, with a garrison of one legion, guarded this town. The rest of Caesar's
fleet, after his flight, retired to Adrumetum. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor,
pursued him with twelve ships, which Curio had brought from Sicily as convoy to
the merchantmen, and seeing a ship left on the shore, he brought her off by a
towing rope, and returned with his fleet to Curio.
[2.24] Curio detached
Marcus before with the fleet to Utica, and marched thither with his army.
Having advanced two days, he came to the river Bagrada, and there left Caius
Caninius Rebilus, the lieutenant, with the legions; and went forward himself
with the horse to view the Cornelian camp, because that was reckoned a very
eligible position for encamping. It is a straight ridge, projecting into the
sea, steep and rough on both sides, but the ascent is more gentle on that part
which lies opposite Utica. It is not more than a mile distant from Utica in a
direct line. But on this road there is a spring, to which the sea comes up, and
overflows; an extensive morass is thereby formed; and if a person would avoid
it, he must make a circuit of six miles to reach the town.
[2.25] Having examined
this place, Curio got a view of Varus's camp, joining the wall and town, at the
gate called Bellica, well fortified by its natural situation, on one side by
the town itself, on the other by a theater which is before the town, the
approaches to the town being rendered difficult and narrow by the very
extensive out-buildings of that structure. At the same time he observed the
roads very full of carriages and cattle, which they were conveying from the
country into the town on the sudden alarm. He sent his cavalry after them to
plunder them and get the spoil. And at the same time Varus had detached as a
guard for them six hundred Numidian horse, and four hundred foot, which king
Juba had sent to Utica as auxiliaries a few days before. There was a friendship
subsisting between his [Juba's] father and Pompey, and a feud between him and
Curio, because he, when a tribune of the people, had proposed a law, in which
he endeavored to make public property of the kingdom of Juba. The horse
engaged; but the Numidians were not able to stand our first charge; but a
hundred and twenty being killed, the rest retreated into their camp near the
town. In the mean time, on the arrival of his men of war, Curio ordered
proclamation to be made to the merchant ships, which lay at anchor before
Utica, in number about two hundred, that he would treat as enemies all that did
not set sail immediately for the Cornelian camp. As soon as the proclamation
was made, in an instant they all weighed anchor and left Utica, and repaired to
the place commanded them. This circumstance furnished the army with plenty of
every thing.
[2.26] After these
transactions, Curio returned to his camp to Bragada; and by a general shout of
the whole army was saluted imperator. The next day he led his army to Utica,
and encamped near the town. Before the works of the camp were finished, the
horse upon guard brought him word that a large supply of horse and foot sent by
king Juba were on their march to Utica, and at the same time a cloud of dust
was observed, and in a moment the front of the line was in sight. Curio,
surprised at the suddenness of the affair, sent on the horse to receive their
first charge, and detain them. He immediately called off his legions from the
work, and put them in battle array. The horse began the battle: and before the
legions could be completely marshaled and take their ground, the king's entire
forces being thrown into disorder and confusion, because they had marched
without any order, and were under no apprehensions, betake themselves to
flight: almost all the enemy's horse being safe, because they made a speedy
retreat into the town along the shore, Caesar's soldiers slay a great number of
their infantry.
[2.27] The next night
two Marsian centurions with twenty-two men belonging to the companies, deserted
from Curio's camp to Attius Varus. They, whether they uttered the sentiments
which they really entertained, or wished to gratify Varus (for what we wish we
readily give credit to, and what we think ourselves, we hope is the opinion of
other men), assured him, that the minds of the whole army were disaffected to
Curio, that it was very expedient that the armies should be brought in view of
each other, and an opportunity of a conference be given. Induced by their
opinion, Varus the next day led his troops out of the camp: Curio did so in
like manner, and with only one small valley between them, each drew up his
forces.
[2.28] In Varus's army
there was one Sextus Quintilius Varus who, as we have mentioned before, was at
Corfinium. When Caesar gave him his liberty, he went over to Africa; now, Curio
had transported to Africa those legions which Caesar had received under his
command a short time before at Corfinium; so that the officers and companies
were still the same, excepting the change of a few centurions. Quintilius,
making this a pretext for addressing them, began to go round Curio's lines, and
to entreat the soldiers "not to lose all recollection of the oath which
they took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor, nor bear arms against
those who had shared the same fortune, and endured the same hardships in a
siege, nor fight for those by whom they had been opprobriously called deserters."
To this he added a few words by way of encouragement, what they might expect
from his own liberality, if they should follow him and Attius. On the delivery
of this speech, no intimation of their future conduct is given by Curio's army,
and thus both generals led back their troops to their camp.
[2.29] However, a great
and general fear spread through Curio's camp, for it is soon increased by the
various discourses of men. For every one formed an opinion of his own; and to
what he had heard from others, added his own apprehensions. When this had
spread from a single author to several persons, and was handed from one
another, there appeared to be many authors for such sentiments as these:
"That it was a civil war; that they were men; and therefore that it was
lawful for them to act freely, and follow which party they pleased." These
were the legions which a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for the
custom of offering free towns to those who joined the opposite party had
changed Caesar's kindness. For the harshest expressions of the soldiers in
general did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those which passed in
the tents the night before; and some of their fellow soldiers heard them with
displeasure. Some additions were also made to them by those who wished to be
thought more zealous in their duty.
[2.30] For these
reasons, having called a council, Curio began to deliberate on the general
welfare. There were some opinions, which advised by all means an attempt to be
made, and an attack on Varus's camp; for when such sentiments prevailed among
the soldiers, they thought idleness was improper. In short, they said
"that it was better bravely to try the hazard of war in a battle, than to
be deserted and surrounded by their own troops, and forced to submit to the
greatest cruelties." There were some who gave their opinion, that they
ought to withdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp; that by a longer
interval of time the soldiers might be brought to a proper way of thinking; and
also, that if any misfortune should befall them, they might have a safer and
readier retreat to Sicily, from the great number of their ships.
[2.31] Curio, censuring
both measures, said, "that the one was as deficient in spirit, as the
other exceeded in it: that the latter advised a shameful flight, and the former
recommended us to engage at a great disadvantage. For on what, says he, can we
rely that we can storm a camp, fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed,
what advantage do we gain if we give over the assault, after having suffered
considerable loss; as if success did not acquire for a general the affection of
his army, and misfortune their hatred? But what does a change of camp imply but
a shameful flight and universal despair, and the alienation of the army? For
neither ought the obedient to suspect that they are distrusted, nor the
insolent to know that we fear them; because our fears augment the
licentiousness of the latter, and diminish the zeal of the former. But if, says
he, we were convinced of the truth of the reports of the disaffection of the
army (which I indeed am confident are either altogether groundless, or at least
less than they are supposed to be), how much better to conceal and hide our
suspicions of it, than by our conduct confirm it? Ought not the defects of an
army to be as carefully concealed as the wounds in our bodies, lest we should
increase the enemy's hopes? but they moreover advise us to set out at midnight,
in order, I suppose, that those who attempt to do wrong may have a fairer
opportunity; for conduct of this kind is restrained either by shame or fear, to
the display of which the night is most averse. Wherefore, I am neither so rash
as to give my opinion that we ought to attack their camp without hopes of
succeeding; nor so influenced by fear as to despond: and I imagine that every
expedient ought first to be tried; and I am in a great degree confident that I
shall form the same opinions as yourselves on this matter."
[2.32] Having broken up
the council, he called the soldiers together, and reminded them "what
advantage Caesar had derived from their zeal at Corfinium; how by their good
offices and influence he had brought over a great part of Italy to his
interest. For, says he, all the municipal towns afterward imitated you and your
conduct; nor was it without reason that Caesar judged so favorably, and the
enemy so harshly of you. For Pompey, though beaten in no engagement, yet was
obliged to shift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent established by
your conduct. Caesar commited me, whom he considered his dearest friend, and
the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was not able to protect
Rome or Italy, to your protection. There are some here present who encourage
you to revolt from us; for what can they wish for more, than at once to ruin
us, and to involve you in a heinous crime? or what baser opinions could they in
their resentment entertain of you, than that you would betray those who
acknowledged themselves indebted to you for every thing, and put yourselves in
the power of those who think they have been ruined by you? Have you not heard
of Caesar's exploits in Spain? that he routed two armies, conquered two
generals, recovered two provinces, and effected all this within forty days
after he came in sight of the enemy? Can those who were not able to stand
against him while they were uninjured, resist him when they are ruined? Will
you, who took part with Caesar while victory was uncertain, take part with the
conquered enemy when the fortune of the war is decided, and when you ought to
reap the reward of your services? For they say that they have been deserted and
betrayed by you, and remind you of a former oath. But did you desert Lucius
Domitius, or did Lucius Domitius desert you? Did he not, when you were ready to
submit to the greatest difficulties, cast you off? Did he not, without your
privacy, endeavor to effect his own escape? When you were betrayed by him, were
you not preserved by Caesar's generosity? And how could he think you bound by your
oath to him, when, after having thrown up the ensigns of power, and abdicated
his government, he became a private person, and a captive in another's power? A
new obligation is left upon you, that you should disregard the oath, by which
you are at present bound; and have respect only to that which was invalidated
by the surrender of your general, and his diminution of rank. But I suppose,
although you are pleased with Caesar, you are offended with me; however, I
shall not boast of my services to you, which still are inferior to my own
wishes or your expectations. But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the
rewards of labor at the conclusion of a war; and what the issue of it is likely
to be, not even you can doubt. But why should I omit to mention my own
diligence and good fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are now arrived?
Are you sorry that I transported the army safe and entire, without the loss of
a single ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack, I routed the
enemy's fleet? That twice in two days I defeated the enemy's horse? That I
carried out of the very harbor and bay two hundred of the enemy's victualers,
and reduced them to that situation that they can receive no supplies either by
land or sea? Will you divorce yourselves from this fortune and these generals;
and prefer the disgrace of Corfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender of
both Spains, and the prestige of the African war? I, for my part, wished to be
called a soldier of Caesar's; you honored me with the title of Imperator. If
you repent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore to me my former name
that you may not appear to have conferred the honor on me as a reproach."
[2.33] The soldiers,
being affected by this oration, frequently attempted to interrupt him while he
was speaking, so that they appeared to bear with excessive anguish the
suspicion of treachery, and when he was leaving the assembly they unanimously
besought him to be of good spirits, and not hesitate to engage the enemy and
put their fidelity and courage to a trial. As the wishes and opinions of all
were changed by this act, Curio, with the general consent, determined, whenever
opportunity offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led out his forces and
ranged them in order of battle on the same ground where they had been posted
the preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to draw out his men, that, if
any occasion should offer, either to tamper with our men or to engage on equal
terms he might not miss the opportunity.
[2.34] There lay between
the two armies a valley, as already mentioned, not very deep, but of a
difficult and steep ascent. Each was waiting till the enemy's forces should
attempt to pass it, that they might engage with the advantage of the ground. At
the same time on the left wing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and
several light-armed infantry intermixed with them, were perceived descending
into the valley. Against them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of the
Marrucini, whose first charge the enemy's horse were unable to stand, but,
setting spurs to their horses, fled back to their friends: the light-infantry
being deserted by those who had come out along with them, were surrounded and
cut to pieces by our men. Varus's whole army, facing that way, saw their men
flee and cut down. Upon which Rebilus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, whom Curio
had brought with him from Sicily knowing that he had great experience in
military matters, cried out, "You see the enemy are daunted, Curio! why do
you hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity?" Curio, having merely
"expressed this, that the soldiers should keep in mind the professions
which they had made to him the day before," then ordered them to follow
him, and ran far before them all. The valley was so difficult of assent that
the foremost men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those behind. But
the minds of Attius's soldiers being prepossessed with fear and the flight and
slaughter of their men, never thought of opposing us; and they all imagined
that they were already surrounded by our horse, and, therefore, before a dart
could be thrown, or our men come near them, Varus's whole army turned their
backs and retreated to their camp.
[2.35] In this flight
one Fabius, a Pelignian common soldier in Curio's army, pursuing the enemy's
rear, with a loud voice shouted to Varus by his name, and often called him, so
that he seemed to be one of his soldiers, who wished to speak to him and give
him advice. When Varus, after been repeatedly called, stopped and looked at
him, and inquired who he was and what he wanted, he made a blow with his sword
at his naked shoulder and was very near killing Varus, but he escaped the
danger by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius was surrounded by the
soldiers near him and cut to pieces; and by the multitude and crowds of those
that fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and the passage stopped, and a
greater number perished in that place without a stroke than in the battle and
flight. Nor were we far from driving them from this camp; and some of them ran
straightway to the town without halting. But both the nature of the ground and
the strength of the fortifications prevented our access to the camp; for
Curio's soldiers, marching out to battle, were without those things which were
requisite for storming a camp. Curio, therefore, led his army back to the camp,
with all his troops safe except Fabius. Of the enemy about six hundred were
killed and a thousand wounded, all of whom, after Curio's return, and several
more, under pretext of their wounds, but in fact through fear, withdrew from
the camp into the town, which Varus perceiving and knowing the terror of his
army, leaving a trumpeter in his camp and a few tents for show, at the third
watch led back his army quietly into the town.
[2.36] The next day
Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and to draw lines about it. In the town there
was a multitude of people, ignorant of war, owing to the length of the peace;
some of them Uticans, very well inclined to Caesar, for his favors to them; the
Roman population was composed of persons differing widely in their sentiments.
The terror occasioned by former battles was very great; and therefore, they
openly talked of surrendering, and argued with Attius that he should not suffer
the fortune of them all to be ruined by his obstinacy. While these things were
in agitation, couriers, who had been sent forward, arrived from king Juba, with
the intelligence that he was on his march, with considerable forces, and
encouraged them to protect and defend their city, a circumstance which greatly
comforted their desponding hearts.
[2.37] The same
intelligence was brought to Curio; but for some time he could not give credit
to it, because he had so great confidence in his own good fortune. And at this
time Caesar's success in Spain was announced in Africa by messages and letters.
Being elated by all these things, he imagined that the king would not dare to
attempt any thing against him. But when he found out, from undoubted authority,
that his forces were less than twenty miles distant from Utica, abandoning his
works, he retired to the Cornelian camp. Here he began to lay in corn and wood,
and to fortify his camp, and immediately dispatched orders to Sicily, that his
two legions and the remainder of his cavalry should be sent to him. His camp
was well adapted for protracting a war, from the nature and strength of the
situation, from its proximity to the sea, and the abundance of water and salt,
of which a great quantity had been stored up from the neighboring salt-pits.
Timber could not fail him from the number of trees, nor corn, with which the
lands abounded. Wherefore, with the general consent, Curio determined to wait
for the rest of his forces, and protract the war.
[2.38] This plan being
settled, and his conduct approved of, he is informed by some deserters from the
town that Juba had staid behind in his own kingdom, being called home by a
neighboring war, and a dispute with the people of Leptis; and that Sabura, his
commander-in-chief, who had been sent with a small force, was drawing near to
Utica. Curio rashly believing this information, altered his design, and
resolved to hazard a battle. His youth, his spirits, his former good fortune
and confidence of success, contributed much to confirm this resolution. Induced
by these motives, early in the night he sent all his cavalry to the enemy's
camp near the river Bagrada, of which Sabura, of whom we have already spoken,
was the commander. But the king was coming after them with all his forces, and
was posted at a distance of six miles behind Sabura. The horse that were sent
perform their march that night, and attack the enemy unawares and unexpectedly;
for the Numidians, after the usual barbarous custom, encamped here and there
without any regularity. The cavalry having attacked them, when sunk in sleep
and dispersed, killed a great number of them; many were frightened and ran
away. After which the horse returned to Curio, and brought some, prisoners with
them.
[2.39] Curio had set
out at the fourth watch with all his forces, except five cohorts which he left
to guard the camp. Having advanced six miles, he met the horse, heard what had
happened and inquired from the captives who commanded the camp at Bagrada. They
replied Sabura. Through eagerness to perform his journey, he neglected to make
further inquiries, but looking back to the company next him, "Don't you
see, soldiers," says he, "that the answer of the prisoners
corresponds with the account of the deserters, that the king is not with him,
and that he sent only a small force which was not able to withstand a few
horse? Hasten then to spoil, to glory; that we may now begin to think of
rewarding you, and returning you thanks." The achievements of the horse
were great in themselves, especially if their small number be compared with the
vast host of Numidians. However, the account was enlarged by themselves, as men
are naturally inclined to boast of their own merit. Besides, many spoils were
produced; the men and horses that were taken were brought into their sight,
that they might imagine that every moment of time which intervened was a delay
to their conquest. By this means the hope of Curio were seconded by the ardor
of the soldiers. He ordered the horse to follow him, and hastened his march, that
he might attack them as soon as possible, while in consternation after their
flight. But the horse, fatigued by the expedition of the preceding night, were
not able to keep up with him, but fell behind in different places. Even this
did not abate Curio's hopes.
[2.40] Juba, being
informed by Sabura of the battle in the night, sent to his relief two thousand
Spanish and Gallic horse, which he was accustomed to keep near him to guard his
person, and that part of his infantry on which he had the greatest dependence,
and he himself followed slowly after with the rest of his forces and forty
elephants, suspecting that as Curio had sent his horse before, he himself would
follow them. Sabura drew up his army, both horse and foot, and commanded them
to give way gradually and retreat through the pretense of fear; that when it
was necessary he would give them the signal for battle, and such orders as he
found circumstances required. Curio, as his idea of their present behavior was
calculated to confirm his former hopes, imagined that the enemy were running
away, and led his army from the rising grounds down to the plain.
[2.41] And when he had
advanced from this place about sixteen miles, his army being exhausted with the
fatigue, he halted. Sabura gave his men the signal, marshaled his army, and
began to go around his ranks and encourage them. But he made use of the foot
only for show; and sent the horse to the charge: Curio was not deficient in
skill, and encouraged his men to rest all their hopes in their valor. Neither
were the soldiers, though wearied, nor the horse, though few and exhausted with
fatigue, deficient in ardor to engage, and courage: but the latter were in
number but two hundred: the rest had dropped behind on the march. Wherever they
charged they forced the enemy to give ground, but they were not able to pursue
them far when they fled, or to press their horses too severely. Besides, the
enemy's cavalry began to surround us on both wings and to trample down our
rear. When any cohorts ran forward out of the line, the Numidians, being fresh,
by their speed avoided our charge, and surrounded ours when they attempted to
return to their post, and cut them off from the main body. So that it did not
appear safe either to keep their ground and maintain their ranks, or to issue
from the line, and run the risk. The enemy's troops were frequently reinforced
by assistance sent from Juba; strength began to fail our men through fatigue;
and those who had been wounded could neither quit the field nor retire to a place
of safety, because the whole field was surrounded by the enemy's cavalry.
Therefore, despairing of their own safety, as men usually do in the last moment
of their lives, they either lamented their unhappy deaths, or recommended their
parents to the survivors, if fortune should save any from the impending danger.
All were full of fear and grief.
[2.42] When Curio
perceived that in the general consternation neither his exhortations nor
entreaties were attended to, imagining that the only hope of escaping in their
deplorable situation was to gain the nearest hills, he ordered the colors to be
borne that way. But a party of horse, that had been sent by Sabura, had already
got possession of them. Now indeed our men were reduced to extreme despair: and
some of them were killed by the cavalry in attempting to escape: some fell to
the ground unhurt. Cneius Domitius, commander of the cavalry, standing round
Curio with a small party of horse, urged Curio to endeavor to escape by flight,
and to hasten to his camp; and assured him that he would not forsake him. But
Curio declared that he would never more appear in Caesar's sight, after losing
the army which had been committed by Caesar, to his charge, and accordingly
fought till he was killed. Very few of the horse escaped from that battle, but
those who had staid behind to refresh their horses having perceived at a
distance the defeat of the whole army, retired in safety to their camp.
[2.43] The soldiers
were all killed to a man. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, who was left behind in
the camp by Curio, having got intelligence of these things, encouraged his men
not to be disheartened. They beg and entreat to be transported to Sicily. He consented,
and ordered the masters of the ships to have all the boats brought close to the
shore early in the evening. But so great was the terror in general, that some
said that Juba's forces were marching up, others that Varus was hastening with
his legions, and that they already saw the dust raised by their coming; of
which not one circumstance had happened: others suspected that the enemy's
fleet would immediately be upon them. Therefore in the general consternation,
every man consulted his own safety. Those who were on board of the fleet, were
in a hurry to set sail, and their flight hastened the masters of the ships of
burden. A few small fishing boats attended their duty and his orders. But as
the shores were crowded, so great was the struggle to determine who of such a
vast number should first get on board, that some of the vessels sank with the
weight of the multitude, and the fears of the rest delayed them from coming to
the shore.
[2.44] From which
circumstances it happened that a few foot and aged men, that could prevail
either through interest or pity, or who were able to swim to the ships, were
taken on board, and landed safe in Sicily. The rest of the troops sent their
centurions as deputies to Varus at night, and surrendered themselves to him. But
Juba the next day having spied their cohorts before the town, claimed them as
his booty, and ordered great part of them to be put to the sword; a few he
selected and sent home to his own realm. Although Varus complained that his
honor was insulted by Juba, yet he dare not oppose him: Juba rode on horseback
into the town, attended by several senators, among whom were Servius Sulpicius
and Licinius Damasippus, and in a few days arranged and ordered what he would
have done in Utica, and in a few days more returned to his own kingdom, with
all his forces.
End of Book 2
Caius Julius Caesar
49-48 B.C.
[3.1] Julius Caesar,
holding the election as dictator, was himself appointed consul with Publius
Servilius; for this was the year in which it was permitted by the laws that he
should be chosen consul. This business being ended, as credit was beginning to
fail in Italy, and the debts could not be paid, he determined that arbitrators
should be appointed: and that they should make an estimate of the possessions
and properties [of the debtors], how much they were worth before the war, and
that they should be handed over in payment to the creditors. This he thought
the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension of an abolition of
debt, the usual consequence of civil wars and dissensions, and to support the
credit of the debtors. He likewise restored to their former condition (the
praetors and tribunes, first submitting the question to the people) some
persons condemned for bribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at
the time when Pompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials were
finished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and another pronouncing
the sentences), because they had offered their service to him in the beginning
of the civil war, if he chose to accept them; setting the same value on them as
if he had accepted them, because they had put themselves in his power. For he
had determined that they ought to be restored rather by the judgment of the people
than appear admitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear
ungrateful in repaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of
their prerogative of exercising this bounty.
[3.2] In accomplishing
these things, and celebrating the Latin festival, and holding all the
elections, he spent eleven days; and having resigned the dictatorship, set out
from the city, and went to Brundusium, where he had ordered twelve legions and
all his cavalry to meet him. But he scarcely found as many ships as would be
sufficient to transport fifteen thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred
horse. This [the scarcity of shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar
from putting a speedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked
very short of their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul,
and the long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a severe
autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundusium, after the very wholesome
countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health of the whole army.
[3.3] Pompey having got
a year's respite to provide forces, during which he was not engaged in war, nor
employed by an enemy, had collected a numerous fleet from Asia, and the
Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia,
and Egypt, and had given directions that a great number should be built in
every other place. He had exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and
all the kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged
the corporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government, to
count down to him a large sum.
[3.4] He had made up
nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy, which he had brought with him;
one veteran legion from Sicily, which being composed of two he called the
Gemella; one from Crete and Macedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by
their former generals and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which
had been levied by the activity of Lentulus. Besides, he had distributed among
his legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly, Boeotia,
Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed the soldiers taken from
Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected two legions from Syria, with Scipio;
from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria, and other states, he got about three
thousand archers, six cohorts of slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and
seven thousand horse; six hundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul;
Ariobarzanes, five hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same
number from Thrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia
there were two hundred, of extraordinary valor, commanded by Rascipolis; five
hundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinius's troops from Alexandria, whom Aulus
Gabinius had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, the son, had
brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised among his own and his
shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus, had given three hundred
from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, the other sent his son. Two
hundred were sent from Syria by Comagenus Antiochus, whom Pompey rewarded
amply. The most of them were archers. To these were added Dardanians and
Bessians, some of them mercenaries; others procured by power and influence:
also, Macedonians, Thessalians, and troops from other nations and states, which
completed the number which we mentioned before.
[3.5] He had laid in
vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other
countries. He had resolved to fix his winter quarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia,
and the other seaports, to hinder Caesar from passing the sea: and for this
purpose had stationed his fleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was
commanded by Pompey, the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius
Triarius: the Syrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by Caius Marcellus, in
conjunction with Caius Coponius: and the Liburnian and Achaian, by Scribonius
Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointed commander-in-chief
of the whole maritime department, and regulated every matter. The chief
direction rested upon him.
[3.6] When Caesar came
to Brundusium, he made a speech to the soldiers: "That since they were now
almost arrived at the termination of their toils and dangers, they should
patiently submit to leave their slaves and baggage in Italy, and to embark
without luggage, that a greater number of men might be put on board: that they
might expect every thing from victory and his liberality." They cried out
with one voice, "he might give what orders he pleased, that they would
cheerfully fulfill them." He accordingly set sail the fourth day of
January, with seven legions on board, as already remarked. The next day he
reached land, between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting
with a safe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other ports
which he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men at a place
called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel.
[3.7] Lucretius
Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships, which
were given into their charge by the orders of Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus
at Corcyra, with a hundred and ten ships. But they had not the confidence to
dare to move out of the harbor; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as
a convoy, only four of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being
disordered and his seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at
the continent, before any account whatsoever of his approach had reached those
regions.
[3.8] Caesar, having
landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the same night to Brundusium, to
transport the rest of his legions and cavalry. The charge of this business was
committed to lieutenant Fufius Kalenus, with orders to be expeditious in
transporting the legions. But the ships having put to sea too late, and not
having taken advantage of the night breeze, fell a sacrifice on their return.
For Bibulus at Corcyra, being informed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in
with some part of our ships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and
having taken about thirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and
set them all on fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners and
masters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment to deter the
rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all the harbors and shores
from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Having disposed his guard with great
care, he lay on board himself in the depth of winter, declining no fatigue or
duty, and not waiting for reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within
Caesar's reach.
[3.9] But after the
departure Of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octavius sailed from Illyricum with
what ships he had to Salona, and having spirited up the Dalmatians, and other
barbarous nations, he drew Issa off from its connection with Caesar; but not
being able to prevail with the council of Salona, either by promises or menaces,
he resolved to storm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural
situation and a hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to
secure it; but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness of
their numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to the last
resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to bear arms; and
cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for their engines. Octavius,
being informed of their determination, surrounded the town with five
encampments, and began to press them at once with a siege and storm. They were
determined to endure every hardship, and their greatest distress was the want
of corn. They, therefore, sent deputies to Caesar, and begged a supply from
him; all other inconveniences they bore by their own resources, as well as they
could: and after a long interval, when the length of the siege had made
Octavius's troops more remiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon,
when the enemy were dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the
walls, to keep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming
themselves into one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised,
they made an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that,
attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and the fourth, and
then the other, and beat them from them all: and having killed a great number,
obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly for refuge to their ships. This
put an end to the blockade. Winter was now approaching, and Octavius,
despairing of capturing the town, after sustaining such considerable losses,
withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium.
[3.10] We have
mentioned, that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's had fallen twice into
Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterward in Spain. Caesar thought him
a proper person, on account of his favors conferred on him, to send with
proposals to Pompey: and he knew that he had an influence over Pompey. This was
the substance of his proposals: "That it was the duty of both, to put an
end to their obstinacy, and forbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any
further; that sufficient loss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a
lesson and instruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future
calamities, by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost
Sicily, Cardinia, and the two Spains, and one hundred and thirty cohorts of
Roman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio, and the
loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of his soldiers in
Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, and the republic: for,
from their own misfortunes, they had sufficient experience of what fortune can
effect in war. That this was the only time to treat for peace; when each had
confidence in his own strength, and both seemed on an equal footing. Since, if
fortune showed ever so little favor to either, he who thought himself superior,
would not submit to terms of accommodation; nor would be content with an equal
division, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That as they could not
agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senate and people
in Rome. That in the mean time, it ought to content the republic and themselves,
if they both immediately took oath in a public assembly that they would disband
their forces within the three following days. That having divested themselves
of the arms and auxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence,
they must both of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate.
To give Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss all his
forces on the land, even his garrisons.
[3.11] Vibullius,
having received this commission from Caesar, thought it no less necessary to
give Pompey notice of Caesar's sudden approach, that he might adopt such plans
as the circumstance required, than to inform him of Caesar's message; and
therefore continuing his journey by night as well as by day, and taking fresh
horses for dispatch, he posted away to Pompey, to inform him that Caesar was
marching toward him with all his forces. Pompey was at this time in Candavia,
and was on his march from Macedonia to his winter quarters in Apollonia and
Dyrrachium; but surprised at the unexpected news, he determined to go to
Apollonia by speedy marches, to prevent Caesar from becoming master of all the
maritime states. But as soon as Caesar had landed his troops, he set off the
same day for Oricum: when he arrived there, Lucius Torquatus, who was governor
of the town by Pompey's appointment, and had a garrison of Parthinians in it,
endeavored to shut the gates and defend the town, and ordered the Greeks to man
the walls, and to take arms. But as they refused to fight against the power of
the Roman people, and as the citizens made a spontaneous attempt to admit
Caesar, despairing of any assistance, he threw open the gates, and surrendered
himself and the town to Caesar, and was preserved safe from injury by him.
[3.12] Having taken
Oricum, Caesar marched without making any delay to Apollonia. Staberius the
governor, hearing of his approach, began to bring water into the citadel, and
to fortify it, and to demand hostages of the town's people. But they refuse to
give any, or to shut their gates against the consul, or to take upon them to
judge contrary to what all Italy and the Roman people had judged. As soon as he
knew their inclinations, he made his escape privately. The inhabitants of
Apollonia sent embassadors to Caesar, and gave him admission into their town.
Their example was followed by the inhabitants of Bullis, Amantia, and the other
neighboring states, and all Epirus: and they sent embassadors to Caesar, and
promised to obey his commands.
[3.13] But Pompey
having received information of the transactions at Oricum and Apollonia, began
to be alarmed for Dyrrachium, and endeavored to reach it, marching day and
night. As soon as it was said that Caesar was approaching, such a panic fell
upon Pompey's army, because in his haste he had made no distinction between
night and day, and had marched without intermission, that they almost every man
deserted their colors in Epirus and the neighboring countries; several threw
down their arms, and their march had the appearance of a flight. But when
Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium, and had given orders for measuring out the
ground for his camp, his army even yet continuing in their fright, Labienus
first stepped forward and swore that he would never desert him, and would share
whatever fate fortune should assign to him. The other lieutenants took the same
oath, and the tribunes and centurions followed their example: and the whole
army swore in like manner. Caesar, finding the road to Dyrrachium already in
the possession of Pompey, was in no great haste, but encamped by the river
Apsus, in the territory of Apollonia, that the states which had deserved his
support might be certain of protection from his out-guards and forts; and there
he resolved to wait the arrival of his other legions from Italy, and to winter
in tents. Pompey did the same; and pitching his camp on the other side of the
river Apsus, collected there all his troops and auxiliaries.
[3.14] Kalenus, having
put the legions and cavalry on board at Brundusium, as Caesar had directed him,
as far as the number of his ships allowed, weighed anchor: and having sailed a
little distance from port, received a letter from Caesar, in which he was
informed, that all the ports and the whole shore was occupied by the enemy's
fleet: on receiving this information he returned into the harbor, and recalled
all the vessels. One of them, which continued the voyage and did not obey
Kalenus's command, because it carried no troops, but was private property, bore
away for Oricum, and was taken by Bibulus, who spared neither slaves nor free
men, nor even children; but put all to the sword. Thus the safety of the whole
army depended on a very short space of time and a great casualty.
[3.15] Bibulus, as has
been observed before, lay with his fleet near Oricum, and as he debarred Caesar
of the liberty of the sea and harbors, so he was deprived of all intercourse
with the country by land; for the whole shore was occupied by parties disposed
in different places by Caesar. And he was not allowed to get either wood or
water, or even anchor near the land. He was reduced to great difficulties, and
distressed with extreme scarcity of every necessary; insomuch that he was
obliged to bring, in transports from Corcyra, not only provisions, but even
wood and water; and it once happened that, meeting with violent storms, they
were forced to catch the dew by night which fell on the hides that covered
their decks; yet all these difficulties they bore patiently and without
repining, and thought they ought not to leave the shores and harbors free from
blockade. But when they were suffering under the distress which I have
mentioned, and Libo had joined Bibulus, they both called from on ship-board, to
Marcus Acilius and Statius Marcus, the lieutenants, one of whom commanded the
town, the other the guards on the coast, that they wished to speak to Caesar on
affairs of importance, if permission should be granted them. They add something
further to strengthen the impression that they intended to treat about an
accommodation. In the mean time they requested a truce, and obtained it from
them; for what they proposed seemed to be of importance, and it was well known
that Caesar desired it above all things, and it was imagined that some
advantage would be derived from Bibulus's proposals.
[3.16] Caesar having
set out with one legion to gain possession of the more remote states, and to
provide corn, of which he had but a small quantity, was at this time at
Buthrotum, opposite to Corcyra. There receiving Acilius and Marcus's letters, informing
him of Libo's and Bibulus's demands, he left his legion behind him, and
returned himself to Oricum. When he arrived, they were invited to a conference.
Libo came and made an apology for Bibulus, "that he was a man of strong
passion, and had a private quarrel against Caesar, contracted when he was
aedile and praetor; that for this reason he had avoided the conference, lest
affairs of the utmost importance and advantage might be impeded by the warmth
of his temper. That it now was and ever had been Pompey's most earnest wish,
that they should be reconciled and lay down their arms, but they were not
authorized to treat on that subject, because they resigned the whole management
of the war, and all other matters to Pompey, by order of the council. But when
they were acquainted with Caesar's demands, they would transmit them to Pompey,
who would conclude all of himself by their persuasions. In the mean time, let
the truce be continued till the messengers could return from him; and let no
injury be done on either side." To this he added a few words of the cause
for which they fought, and of his own forces and resources.
[3.17] To this, Caesar
did not then think proper to make any reply, nor do we now think it worth
recording. But Caesar required "that he should be allowed to send
commissioners to Pompey, who should suffer no personal injury; and that either
they should grant it, or should take his commissioners in charge, and convey
them to Pompey. That as to the truce, the war in its present state was so
divided, that they by their fleet deprived him of his shipping and auxiliaries;
while he prevented them from the use of the land and fresh water; and if they
wished that this restraint should be removed from them, they should relinquish
their blockade of the seas, but if they retained the one, he in like manner
would retain the other; that nevertheless, the treaty of accommodation might
still be carried on, though these points were not conceded, and that they need
not be an impediment to it." They would neither receive Caesar's
commissioners, nor guarantee their safety, but referred the whole to Pompey.
They urged and struggled eagerly to gain the one point respecting a truce. But
when Caesar perceived that they had proposed the conference merely to avoid present
danger and distress, but that they offered no hopes or terms of peace, he
applied his thoughts to the prosecution of the war.
[3.18] Bibulus, being
prevented from landing for several days, and being seized with a violent
distemper from the cold and fatigue, as he could neither be cured on board, nor
was willing to desert the charge which he had taken upon him, was unable to
bear up against the violence of the disease. On his death, the sole command
devolved on no single individual, but each admiral managed his own division
separately, and at his own discretion. Vibullius, as soon as the alarm, which
Caesar's unexpected arrival had raised, was over, began again to deliver
Caesar's message in the presence of Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theophanes, to whom
Pompey used to communicate his most confidential secrets. He had scarcely
entered on the subject when Pompey interrupted him, and forbade him to proceed.
"What need," says he, "have I of life or Rome, if the world
shall think I enjoy them by the bounty of Caesar: an opinion which can never be
removed while it shall be thought that I have been brought back by him to
Italy, from which I set out." After the conclusion of the war, Caesar was
informed of these expressions by some persons who were present at the
conversation. He attempted, however, by other means to bring about a
negotiation of peace.
[3.19] Between Pompey's
and Caesar's camp there was only the river Apsus, and the soldiers frequently
conversed with each other; and by a private arrangement among themselves, no
weapons were thrown during their conferences. Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one
of his lieutenants, to the bank of the river, to make such proposals as should
appear most conducive to peace; and to cry out frequently with a loud voice [asking],
"Are citizens permitted to send deputies to citizens to treat of peace? a
concession which had been made even to fugitives on the Pyrenean mountains, and
to robbers, especially when by so doing they would prevent citizens from
fighting against citizens." Having spoken much in humble language, as
became a man pleading for his own and the general safety and being listened to
with silence by the soldiers of both armies, he received an answer from the
enemy's party that Aulus Varro proposed coming the next day to a conference,
and that deputies from both sides might come without danger, and explain their
wishes, and accordingly a fixed time was appointed for the interview. When the
deputies met the next day, a great multitude from both sides assembled, and the
expectations of every person concerning this subject were raised very high, and
their minds seemed to be eagerly disposed for peace. Titus Labienus walked
forward from the crowd, and in submissive terms began to speak of peace, and to
argue with Vatinius. But their conversation was suddenly interrupted by darts
thrown from all sides, from which Vatinius escaped by being protected by the
arms of the soldiers. However, several were wounded; and among them Cornelius
Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Lucius Tiburtius, centurions, and some privates;
hereupon Labienus exclaimed, "Forbear, then, to speak any more about an
accommodation, for we can have no peace unless we carry Caesar's head back with
us."
[3.20] At the same time
in Rome, Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of the praetors, having undertaken the cause
of the debtors, on entering into his office, fixed his tribunal near the bench
of Caius Trebonius, the city praetor, and promised if any person appealed to
him in regard to the valuation and payment of debts made by arbitration, as
appointed by Caesar when in Rome, that he would relieve them. But it happened,
from the justice of Trebonius's decrees and his humanity (for he thought that
in such dangerous times justice should be administered with moderation and compassion),
that not one could be found who would offer himself the first to lodge an
appeal. For to plead poverty, to complain of his own private calamities, or the
general distresses of the times, or to assert the difficulty of setting the
goods to sale, is the behavior of a man even of a moderate temper; but to
retain their possessions entire, and at the same time acknowledge themselves in
debt, what sort of spirit, and what impudence would it not have argued!
Therefore nobody was found so unreasonable as to make such demands. But Caelius
proved more severe to those very persons for whose advantage it had been
designed; and starting from this beginning, in order that he might not appear
to have engaged in so dishonorable an affair without effecting something, he
promulgated a law that all debts should be discharged in six equal payments, of
six months each, without interest.
[3.21] When Servilius,
the consul, and the other magistrates opposed him, and he himself effected less
than he expected, in order to raise the passions of the people, he dropped it,
and promulgated two others; one, by which he remitted the annual rents of the
houses to the tenants, the other, an act of insolvency: upon which the mob made
an assault on Caius Trebonius, and having wounded several persons, drove him
from his tribunal. The consul Servilius informed the senate of his proceedings,
who passed a decree that Caelius should be removed from the management of the
republic. Upon this decree, the consul forbade him the senate; and when he was
attempting to harangue the people, turned him out of the rostrum. Stung with
the ignominy and with resentment, he pretended in public that he would go to
Caesar, but privately sent messengers to Milo, who had murdered Clodius, and
had been condemned for it; and having invited him into Italy, because he had
engaged the remains of the gladiators to his interest, by making them ample
presents, he joined him, and sent him to Thurinum to tamper with the shepherds.
When he himself was on his road to Casilinum, at the same time that his
military standards and arms were seized at Capua, his slaves seen at Naples,
and the design of betraying the town discovered: his plots being revealed, and
Capua shut against him, being apprehensive of danger, because the Roman
citizens residing there had armed themselves, and thought he ought to be
treated as an enemy to the state, he abandoned his first design, and changed
his route.
[3.22] Milo in the mean
time dispatched letters to the free towns, purporting that he acted as he did
by the orders and commands of Pompey, conveyed to him by Bibulus: and he
endeavored to engage in his interest all persons whom he imagined were under
difficulties by reason of their debts. But not being able to prevail with them,
he set at liberty some slaves from the work-houses, and began to assault Cosa
in the district of Thurinum. There having received a blow of a stone thrown
from the wall of the town which was commanded by Quintus Pedius with one
legion, he died of it; and Caelius having set out, as he pretended for Caesar,
went to Thurii, where he was put to death as he was tampering with some of the
freemen of the town, and was offering money to Caesar's Gallic and Spanish
horse, which he had sent there to strengthen the garrison. And thus these
mighty beginnings, which had embroiled Italy, and kept the magistrates
employed, found a speedy and happy issue.
[3.23] Libo having
sailed from Oricum, with a fleet of fifty ships, which he commanded, came to
Brundusium, and seized an island, which lies opposite to the harbor; judging it
better to guard that place, which was our only pass to sea, than to keep all the
shores and ports blocked up by a fleet. By his sudden arrival, he fell in with
some of our transports, and set them on fire, and carried off one laden with
corn; he struck great terror into our men, and having in the night landed a
party of soldiers and archers, he beat our guard of horse from their station,
and gained so much by the advantage of situation, that he dispatched letters to
Pompey, and if he pleased he might order the rest of the ships to be hauled
upon shore and repaired; for that with his own fleet he could prevent Caesar
from receiving his auxiliaries.
[3.24] Antonius was at
this time at Brundusium, and relying on the valor of his troops, covered about
sixty of the long-boats belonging to the men-of-war with penthouses and
bulwarks of hurdles, and put on board them select soldiers; and disposed them
separately along the shore: and under the pretext of keeping the seamen in
exercise, he ordered two three-banked galleys, which he had built at
Brundusium, to row to the mouth of the port. When Libo saw them advancing
boldly toward him, he sent five four-banked galleys against them, in hopes of
intercepting them. When these came near our ships, our veteran soldiers
retreated within the harbor. The enemy, urged by their eagerness to capture
them, pursued them unguardedly: for instantly the boats of Antonius, on a
certain signal, rowed with great violence from all parts against the enemy; and
at the first charge took one of the four-banked galleys, with the seamen and
marines, and forced the rest to flee disgracefully. In addition to this loss,
they were prevented from getting water by the horse which Antonius had disposed
along the sea-coast. Libo, vexed at the distress and disgrace, departed from
Brundusium, and abandoned the blockade.
[3.25] Several months
had now elapsed, and winter was almost gone, and Caesar's legions and shipping
were not coming to him from Brundusium, and he imagined that some opportunities
had been neglected, for the winds had at least been often favorable, and he
thought that he must trust to them at last. And the longer it was deferred, the
more eager were those who commanded Pompey's fleet to guard the coast, and were
more confident of preventing our getting assistance: they received frequent
reproofs from Pompey by letter, that as they had not prevented Caesar's arrival
at the first, they should at least stop the remainder of his army: and they
were expecting that the season for transporting troops, would become more
unfavorable every day, as the winds grew calmer. Caesar, feeling some trouble
on this account, wrote in severe terms to his officers at Brundusium, [and gave
them orders] that as soon as they found the wind to answer, they should not let
the opportunity of setting sail pass by, if they were even to steer their course
to the shore of Apollonia: because there they might run their ships on ground.
That these parts principally were left unguarded by the enemy's fleet, because
they dare not venture too far from the harbor.
[3.26] They [his
officers], exerting boldness and courage, aided by the instructions of Marcus
Antonius, and Fusius Kalenus, and animated by the soldiers strongly encouraging
them, and declining no danger for Caesar's safety, having got a southerly wind,
weighed anchor, and the next day were carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium,
and being seen from the continent, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian
fleet at Dyrrachium, put out of the port with his ships; and when they had
almost come up with us, in consequence of the breeze dying away, the south wind
sprang up afresh, and rescued us. However, he did not desist from his attempt,
but hoped by the labor and perseverance of his seamen to be able to bear up
against the violence of the storm; and although we were carried beyond
Dyrrachium, by the violence of the wind, he nevertheless continued to chase us.
Our men, taking advantage of fortune's kindness, for they were still afraid of
being attacked by the enemy's fleet, if the wind abated, having come near a
port, called Nymphaeum, about three miles beyond Lissus, put into it (this port
is protected from a south-west wind, but is not secure against a south wind);
and thought less danger was to be apprehended from the storm than from the
enemy. But as soon as they were within the port, the south wind, which had
blown for two days, by extraordinary good luck veered round to the south-west.
[3.27] Here one might
observe the sudden turns of fortune. We who, a moment before, were alarmed for
ourselves, were safely lodged in a very secure harbor: and they who had
threatened ruin to our fleet, were forced to be uneasy on their own account:
and thus, by a change of circumstances, the storm protected our ships, and
damaged the Rhodian fleet to such a degree that all their decked ships, sixteen
in number, foundered, without exception, and were wrecked: and of the
prodigious number of seamen and soldiers, some lost their lives by being dashed
against the rocks, others were taken by our men: but Caesar sent them all safe
home.
[3.28] Two of our
ships, that had not kept up with the rest, being overtaken by the night, and
not knowing what port the rest had made to, came to an anchor opposite Lissus.
Otacilius Crassus, who commanded Pompey's fleet, detached after them several
barges and small craft, and attempted to take them. At the same time, he
treated with them about capitulating, and promised them their lives if they
would surrender. One of them carried two hundred and twenty recruits, the other
was manned with somewhat less than two hundred veterans. Here it might be seen
what security men derive from a resolute spirit. For the recruits, frightened
at the number of vessels, and fatigued with the rolling of the sea, and with
sea-sickness, surrendered to Otacilius, after having first received his oath,
that the enemy would not injure them; but as soon as they were brought before
him, contrary to the obligation of his oath, they were inhumanly put to death
in his presence. But the soldiers of the veteran legion, who had also
struggled, not only with the inclemency of the weather, but by laboring at the
pump, thought it their duty to remit nothing of their former valor: and having
protracted the beginning of the night in settling the terms, under pretense of
surrendering, they obliged the pilot to run the ship aground: and having got a
convenient place on the shore, they spent the rest of the night there, and at
day-break, when Otacilius had sent against them a party of the horse, who
guarded that part of the coast, to the number of four hundred, beside some
armed men, who had followed them from the garrison, they made a brave defense,
and having killed some of them, retreated in safety to our army.
[3.29] After this
action, the Roman citizens, who resided at Lissus, a town which Caesar had
before assigned them, and had carefully fortified, received Antony into their
town, and gave him every assistance. Otacilius, apprehensive for his own
safety, escaped out of the town, and went to Pompey. All his forces, whose
number amounted to three veteran legions, and one of recruits, and about eight
hundred horse being landed, Antony sent most of his ships back to Italy, to
transport the remainder of the soldiers and horse. The pontons, which are a
sort of Gallic ships, he left at Lissus with this object, that if Pompey, imagining
Italy defenseless, should transport his army thither (and this notion was
spread among the common people), Caesar might have some means of pursuing him;
and he sent messengers to him with great dispatch, to inform him in what part
of the country he had landed his army, and what number of troops he had brought
over with him.
[3.30] Caesar and
Pompey received this intelligence almost at the same time; for they had seen
the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrachium. They directed their march after
them by land; but at first they were ignorant to what part they had been
carried; but when they were informed of it, they each adopted a different plan;
Caesar, to form a junction with Antonius as soon as possible; Pompey, to oppose
Antonius's forces on their march to Caesar, and, if possible, to fall upon them
unexpectedly from ambush. And the same day they both led out their armies from
their winter encampment along the river Apsus; Pompey, privately by night;
Caesar, openly by day. But Caesar had to march a longer circuit up the river to
find a ford. Pompey's route being easy, because he was not obliged to cross the
river, he advanced rapidly and by forced marches against Antonius, and being
informed of his approach, chose a convenient situation, where he posted his
forces; and kept his men close within camp, and forbade fires to be kindled,
that his arrival might be the more secret. An account of this was immediately
carried to Antonius by the Greeks. He dispatched messengers to Caesar, and
confined himself in his camp for one day. The next day Caesar, came up with
him. On learning his arrival, Pompey, to prevent his being hemmed in between
two armies, quitted his position, and went with all his forces to Asparagium,
in the territory of Dyrrachium, and there encamped in a convenient situation.
[3.31] During these
times, Scipio, though he had sustained some losses near mount Amanus, had
assumed to himself the title of imperator, after which he demanded large sums
of money from the states and princes. He had also exacted from the
tax-gatherers, two years' rents that they owed; and enjoined them to lend him
the amount of the next year, and demanded a supply of horse from the whole
province. When they were collected, leaving behind him his neighboring enemies,
the Parthians (who shortly before had killed Marcus Crassus, the imperator, and
had kept Marcus Bibulus besieged), he drew his legions and cavalry out of
Syria; and when he came into the province, which was under great anxiety and
fear of the Parthian war, and heard some declarations of the soldiers,
"That they would march against an enemy, if he would lead them on; but
would never bear arms against a countryman and consul;" he drew off his
legions to winter quarters to Pergamus, and the most wealthy cities, and made
them rich presents: and in order to attach them more firmly to his interest,
permitted them to plunder the cities.
[3.32] In the mean
time, the money which had been demanded from the province at large, was most
vigorously exacted. Besides, many new imposts of different kinds were devised
to gratify his avarice. A tax of so much a head was laid on every slave and
child. Columns, doors, corn, soldiers, sailors, arms, engines, and carriages,
were made subject to a duty. Wherever a name could be found for any thing, it
was deemed a sufficient reason for levying money on it. Officers were appointed
to collect it, not only in the cities, but in almost every village and fort:
and whosoever of them acted with the greatest rigor and inhumanity, was
esteemed the best man, and best citizen. The province was overrun with bailiffs
and officers, and crowded with overseers and tax-gatherers; who, besides the
duties imposed, exacted a gratuity for themselves; for they asserted, that
being expelled from their own homes and countries, they stood in need of every
necessary; endeavoring by a plausible pretense, to color the most infamous
conduct. To this was added the most exorbitant interest, as usually happens in
times of war; the whole sums being called in, on which occasion, they alleged
that the delay of a single day was a donation. Therefore, in those two years,
the debt of the province was doubled: but notwithstanding, taxes were exacted,
not only from the Roman citizens, but from every corporation and every state. And
they said that these were loans, exacted by the senate's decree. The taxes of
the ensuing year were demanded beforehand as a loan from the collectors, as on
their first appointment.
[3.33] Moreover, Scipio
ordered the money formerly lodged in the temple of Diana at Ephesus, to be
taken out with the statues of that goddess, which remained there. When Scipio
came to the temple, letters were delivered to him from Pompey, in the presence
of several senators, whom he had called upon to attend him; [informing him]
that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions; that Scipio should hasten to
him with his army, and postpone all other business. As soon as he received the
letter, he dismissed his attendants, and began to prepare for his journey to
Macedonia; and a few days after set out. This circumstance saved the money at
Ephesus.
[3.34] Caesar, having
effected a junction with Antonius's army, and having drawn his legion out of
Oricum, which he had left there to guard the coast, thought he ought to sound
the inclination of the provinces, and march further into the country; and when
embassadors came to him from Thessaly and Aetolia, to engage that the states in
those countries would obey his orders, if he sent a garrison to protect them,
he dispatched Lucius Cassius Longinus, with the twenty-seventh, a legion
composed of young soldiers, and two hundred horse, to Thessaly: and Caius
Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a small party of horse, into Aetolia.
He recommended them to be especially careful to provide corn, because those
regions were nearest to him. He ordered Cneius Domitius Calvinus to march into
Macedonia with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, and five hundred horse;
from which province, Menedemus, the principal man of those regions, on that
side which is called the Free, having come as embassador, assured him of the
most devoted affection of all his subjects.
[3.35] Of these
Calvisius, on his first arrival in Aetolia, being very kindly received,
dislodged the enemy's garrisons in Calydon and Naupactus, and made himself
master of the whole country. Cassius went to Thessaly with his legion. As there
were two factions there, he, found the citizens divided in their inclinations.
Hegasaretus, a man of established power, favored Pompey's interest. Petreius, a
young man of a most noble family, warmly supported Caesar with his own and his
friends' influence.
[3.36] At the same
time, Domitius arrived in Macedonia: and when numerous embassies had begun to
wait on him from many of the states, news was brought that Scipio was
approaching with his legions, which occasioned various opinions and reports;
for in strange events, rumor generally goes before. Without making any delay in
any part of Macedonia, he marched with great haste against Domitius; and when
he was come within about twenty miles of him, wheeled on a sudden toward
Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He effected this with such celerity, that news of
his march and arrival came together; for to render his march expeditious, he
left the baggage of his legions behind him at the river Haliacmon, which
divides Macedonia from Thessaly, under the care of Marcus Favonius, with a
guard of eight cohorts, and ordered him to build a strong fort there. At the
same time, Cotus's cavalry, which used to infest the neighborhood of Macedonia,
flew to attack Cassius's camp, at which Cassius being alarmed, and having
received information of Scipio's approach, and seen the horse, which he
imagined to be Scipio's, he betook himself to the mountains that environ Thessaly,
and thence began to make his route toward Ambracia. But when Scipio was
hastening to pursue him, dispatches overtook him from Favonius, that Domitius
was marching against him with his legions, and that he could not maintain the
garrison over which he was appointed, without Scipio's assistance. On receipt
of these dispatches, Scipio changed his designs and his route, desisted from
his pursuit of Cassius, and hastened to relieve Favonius. Accordingly,
continuing his march day and night, he came to him so opportunely, that the
dust raised by Domitius's army, and Scipio's advanced guard, were observed at
the same instant. Thus, the vigilance of Domitius saved Cassius, and the
expedition of Scipio, Favonius.
[3.37] Scipio, having
staid for two days in his camp, along the river Haliacmon, which ran between
him and Domitius's camp, on the third day, at dawn, led his army across a ford,
and having made a regular encampment the day following, drew up his forces in
front of his camp. Domitius thought he ought not to show any reluctance, but
should draw out his forces and hazard a battle. But as there was a plain six
miles in breadth between the two camps, he posted his army before Scipio's
camp; while the latter persevered in not quitting his intrenchment. However, Domitius
with difficulty restrained his men, and prevented their beginning a battle; the
more so as a rivulet with steep banks, joining Scipio's camp, retarded the
progress of our men. When Scipio perceived the eagerness and alacrity of our
troops to engage, suspecting that he should be obliged the next day, either to
fight, against his inclination, or to incur great disgrace by keeping within
his camp, though he had come with high expectation, yet by advancing rashly,
made a shameful end; and at night crossed the river, without even giving the
signal for breaking up the camp, and returned to the ground from which he came,
and there encamped near the river, on an elevated situation. After a few days,
he placed a party of horse in ambush in the night, where our men had usually
gone to forage for several days before. And when Quintus Varus, commander of
Domitius's horse, came there as usual, they suddenly rushed from their ambush.
But our men bravely supported their charge, and returned quickly every man to his
own rank, and in their turn, made a general charge on the enemy; and having
killed about eighty of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to their
camp with the loss of only two men.
[3.38] After these
transactions, Domitius, hoping to allure Scipio to a battle, pretended to be
obliged to change his position through want of corn, and having given the
signal for decamping, advanced about three miles, and posted his army and
cavalry in a convenient place, concealed from the enemy's view. Scipio being in
readiness to pursue him, detached his cavalry and a considerable number of
light infantry to explore Domitius's route. When they had marched a short way,
and their foremost troops were within reach of our ambush, their suspicions
being raised by the neighing of the horses, they began to retreat: and the rest
who followed them, observing with what speed they retreated, made a halt. Our
men, perceiving that the enemy had discovered their plot, and thinking it in
vain to wait for any more, having got two troops in their power, intercepted
them. Among them was Marcus Opimius, general of the horse, but he made his
escape: they either killed or took prisoners all the rest of these two troops,
and brought them to Domitius.
[3.39] Caesar, having
drawn his garrisons out of the sea-ports, as before mentioned, left three
cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, and committed to them the charge of his
ships of war, which he had transported from Italy. Acilius, as
lieutenant-general, had the charge of this duty and the command of the town; he
drew the ships into the inner part of the harbor, behind the town, and fastened
them to the shore, and sank a merchant-ship in the mouth of the harbor to block
it up; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret, and
faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers, and ordered
them to keep guard against any sudden attack.
[3.40] Cneius, Pompey's
son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having got intelligence of these things,
came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship, that had been sunk, with a windlass,
and by straining at it with several ropes, and attacked the other which had
been placed by Acilius to watch the port with several ships, on which he had
raised very high turrets, so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and
sending fresh men constantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time
attempting the town on all sides by land, with ladders and his fleet, in order
to divide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, and the
immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the men that were
put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape in small boats; and
at the, same time he seized a natural mole on the opposite side, which almost
formed an island over against the town. He carried over land, into the inner
part of the harbor, four galleys, by putting rollers under them, and driving
them on with levers. Then attacking on both sides the ships of war which were
moored to the shore, and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set
the rest on fire. After dispatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius,
whom he had taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinder
provisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, and went
himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, left within the port
by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to storm Lissus, but being
delayed three days by the vigorous defense of the Roman citizens who belonged
to that district, and of the soldiers which Caesar had sent to keep garrison
there, and having lost a few men in the assault, he returned without effecting
his object.
[3.41] As soon as
Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set out for that place with his
army, and having taken the capital of the Parthinians on his march, where there
was a garrison of Pompey's, he reached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day,
and encamped beside him; and the day following having drawn out all his forces
before his camp, he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within
his trenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing some
other plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all his forces by a
long circuit, through a difficult and narrow road to Dyrrachium; hoping, either
that Pompey would be compelled to follow him to Dyrrachium, or that his
communication with it might be cut off, because he had deposited there all his
provisions and material of war. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not
knowing his design, because he imagined he had taken a route in a different
direction from that country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had
obliged him to shift his quarters; but having afterward got true intelligence
from his scouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking
a shorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged his troops to
submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a very small part of the
night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium, when the van of Pompey's
army was visible at a distance, and there he encamped.
[3.42] Pompey, being
cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effect his purpose, took a new
resolution, and intrenched himself strongly on a rising ground, which is called
Petra, where ships of a small size can come in, and be sheltered from some
winds. Here he ordered a part of his men of war to attend him, and corn and
provisions to be brought from Asia, and from all the countries of which he kept
possession. Caesar, imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a
length, and despairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts were
guarded with great diligence by Pompey's adherents; and because his own fleets,
which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were
detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn; and because these
countries were too remote, he fixed granaries in certain places, and regulated
the carriage of the corn for the neighboring states. He likewise gave
directions that search should be made for whatever corn was in Lissus, the
country of the Parthini, and all the places of strength. The quantity was very
small, both from the nature of the land (for the country is rough and
mountainous, and the people commonly import what grain they use); and because
Pompey had foreseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered the
Parthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off all the corn,
which he collected by means of his horse.
[3.43] Caesar, on being
informed of these transactions, pursued measures suggested by the nature of the
country. For round Pompey's camps there were several high and rough hills.
These he first of all occupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them.
Then drawing a fortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each
position allowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey, with
these views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey was strong in
cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and other necessaries from
all sides with less danger; secondly, to prevent Pompey from foraging, and
thereby render his horse ineffectual in the operations of the war; and thirdly,
to lessen his reputation, on which he saw he depended greatly, among foreign
nations, when a report should have spread throughout the world that he was
blockaded by Caesar, and dare not hazard a battle.
[3.44] Neither was
Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium, because he had lodged his
material there, his weapons, arms, and engines; and supplied his army with corn
from it by his ships; nor was he able to put a stop to Caesar's works without
hazarding a battle, which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was
left but to adopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many
hills as he could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with his
troops, and divide Caesar's forces as much as possible; and so it happened: for
having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass of fifteen miles, he
got forage in this space, and within this circuit there were several fields
lately sown, in which the cattle might feed in the mean time. And as our men,
who had completed their works by drawing lines of communication from one fort
to another, were afraid that Pompey's men would sally out from some part, and
attack us in the rear; so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a
circuit within ours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding
them on the rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had a
greater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass to inclose. When
Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey had resolved not to oppose
him with his whole force, or to come to a general engagement, yet he detached
to particular places slingers and archers, with which his army abounded, and
several of our men were wounded, and filled with great dread of the arrows; and
almost all the soldiers made coats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths,
tarpaulins, or raw hides to defend them against the weapons.
[3.45] In seizing the
posts, each exerted his utmost power. Caesar, to confine Pompey within as
narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupy as many hills as he could in as
large a circuit as possible, and several skirmishes were fought in consequence
of it. In one of these, when Caesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post,
and had begun to fortify it, Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and
opposite the same place, and endeavored to annoy the men while at work; and as
the approach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it with archers
and slingers, and afterward by detaching a strong party of light infantry, and
using his engines, he stopped our works; and it was no easy matter for our men
at once to defend themselves, and to proceed with their fortifications. When
Caesar perceived that his troops were wounded from all sides, he determined to
retreat and give up the post; his retreat was down a precipice, on which
account they pushed on with more spirit, and would not allow us to retire,
because they imagined that we resigned the place through fear. It is reported
that Pompey said that day in triumph to his friends about him, "That he
would consent to be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions
effected a retreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they
had rashly advanced."
[3.46] Caesar, being
uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, ordered hurdles to be carried to the
further side of the hill, and to be placed opposite to the enemy, and behind
them a trench of a moderate breadth to be sunk by his soldiers under shelter of
the hurdles; and the ground to be made as difficult as possible. He himself
disposed slingers in convenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These
things being completed, he ordered his legions to file off: Pompey's men
insultingly and boldly pursued and chased us, leveling the hurdles that were
thrown up in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which as
soon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not to
retreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained, when his
men were almost half way down the hill, he encouraged them by Antonius, who
commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to be sounded, and a charge
to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth legion suddenly closing
their files, threw their javelins, and advancing impetuously from the low
ground up the steep, drove Pompey's men precipitately before them, and obliged
them to turn their backs; but their retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles
that lay in a long line before them, and the palisadoes which were in their
way, and the trenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat
without injury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of their
own, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhat on this
side of that place, completed their fortifications.
[3.47] This method of
conducting a war was new and unusual, as well on account of the number of
forts, the extent and greatness of the works, and the manner of attack and
defense, as on account of other circumstances. For all who have attempted to
besiege any person, have attacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak,
or after a defeat; or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they
themselves have had a superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual
design of a siege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar,
with an inferior force, was inclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who had
abundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious number of
ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow from any point,
that would not be favorable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar, having consumed
all the corn far and near, was in very great distress, but his soldiers bore
all with uncommon patience. For they remembered that they lay under the same
difficulties last year in Spain, and yet by labor and patience had concluded a
dangerous war. They recollected too that they had suffered an alarming scarcity
at Alesia, and a much greater at Avaricum, and yet had returned victorious over
mighty nations. They refused neither barley nor pulse when offered them, and
they held in great esteem cattle, of which they got great quantities from
Epirus.
[3.48] There was a sort
of root called chara, discovered by the troops which served under Valerius.
This they mixed up with milk, and it greatly contributed to relieve their want.
They made it into a sort of bread. They had great plenty of it; loaves made of
this, when Pompey's men upbraided ours with want, they frequently threw among
them to damp their hopes.
[3.49] The corn was now
beginning to ripen, and their hope supported their want, as they were confident
of having abundance in a short time. And there were frequently heard
declarations of the soldiers on guard, in discourse with each other, that they
would rather live on the bark of the trees, than let Pompey escape from their
hands. For they were often told by deserters, that they could scarcely maintain
their horses, and that their other cattle was dead: that they themselves were
not in good health from their confinement within so narrow a compass, from the
noisome smell, the number of carcasses, and the constant fatigue to them, being
men unaccustomed to work, and laboring under a great want of water. For Caesar
had either turned the course of all the rivers and streams which ran to the
sea, or had dammed them up with strong works. And as the country was
mountainous, and the valleys narrow at the bottom, he inclosed them with piles
sunk in the ground, and heaped up mold against them to keep in the water. They
were therefore obliged to search for low and marshy grounds, and to sink wells,
and they had this labor in addition to their daily works. And even these
springs were at a considerable distance from some of their posts, and soon
dried up with the heat. But Caesar's army enjoyed perfect health and abundance
of water, and had plenty of all sorts of provisions except corn; and they had a
prospect of better times approaching, and saw greater hopes laid before them by
the ripening of the grain.
[3.50] In this new kind
of war, new methods of managing it were invented by both generals. Pompey's
men, perceiving by our fires at night, at what part of the works our cohorts
were on guard, coming silently upon them discharged their arrows at random
among the whole multitude, and instantly retired to their camp; as a remedy
against which our men were taught by experience to light their fires in one
place, and keep guard in another.Note: The translator felt that some of the
original text was missing at this point.
[3.51] In the mean
time, Publius Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure had left governor of his
camp, came up with two legions to assist the cohort; upon whose arrival
Pompey's forces were easily repulsed. Nor did they stand the sight and charge
of our men, and the foremost falling, the rest turned their backs and quitted
the field. But Sylla called our men in from the pursuit, lest their ardor
should carry them too far, but most people imagine that if he had consented to
a vigorous pursuit, the war might have been ended that day. His conduct however
does not appear to deserve censure; for the duties of a lieutenant-general, and
of a commander-in-chief, are very different; the one is bound to act entirely
according to his instructions, the other to regulate his conduct without
control, as occasion requires. Sylla, being deputed by Caesar to take care of
the camp, and having rescued his men, was satisfied with that, and did not
desire to hazard a battle (although this circumstance might probably have had a
successful issue), that he might not be thought to have assumed the part of the
general. One circumstance laid the Pompeians under great difficulty in making
good a retreat: for they had advanced from disadvantageous ground, and were
posted on the top of a hill. If they attempted to retire down the steep, they
dreaded the pursuit of our men from the rising ground, and there was but a
short time till sunset: for in hopes of completing the business, they had
protracted the battle almost till night. Taking therefore measures suited to
their exigency, and to the shortness of the time, Pompey possessed himself of
an eminence, at such a distance from our fort that no weapon discharged from an
engine could reach him. Here he took up a position, and fortified it, and kept
all his forces there.
[3.52] At the same
time, there were engagements in two other places; for Pompey had attacked
several forts at once, in order to divide our forces; that no relief might be
sent from the neighboring posts. In one place, Volcatius Tullus sustained the
charge of a legion with three cohorts, and beat them off the field. In another,
the Germans, having sallied over our fortifications, slew several of the enemy,
and retreated safe to our camp.
[3.53] Thus six
engagements having happened in one day, three at Dyrrachium, and three at the
fortifications, when a computation was made of the number of slain, we found
that about two thousand fell on Pompey's side, several of them volunteer
veterans and centurions. Among them was Valerius, the son of Lucius Flaccus,
who as praetor had formerly had the government of Asia, and six military
standards were taken. Of our men, not more than twenty were missing in all the
action. But in the fort, not a single soldier escaped without a wound; and in
one cohort, four centurions lost their eyes. And being desirous to produce
testimony of the fatigue they under went, and the danger they sustained, they
counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had been thrown into the
fort; and in the shield of the centurion Scaeva, which was brought to him, were
found two hundred and thirty holes. In reward for this man's services, both to
himself and the public, Caesar presented to him two hundred thousand pieces of
copper money, and declared him promoted from the eighth to the first centurion.
For it appeared that the fort had been in a great measure saved by his
exertions; and he afterward very amply rewarded the cohorts with double pay,
corn, clothing, and other military honors.
[3.54] Pompey, having
made great additions to his works in the night, the following days built
turrets, and having carried his works fifteen feet high, faced that part of his
camp with mantelets; and after an interval of five days, taking advantage of a
second cloudy night, he barricaded all the gates of his camp to hinder a
pursuit, and about midnight, quietly marched off his army, and retreated to his
old fortifications.
[3.55] Aetolia,
Acarnania, and Amphilochis, being reduced, as we have related, by Cassius
Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar thought he ought to attempt the
conquest of Achaia, and to advance further into the country. Accordingly, he
detached Fufius thither, and ordered Quintus Sabinus and Cassius to join him
with their cohorts. Upon notice of their approach, Rutilius Lupus, who
commanded in Achaia, under Pompey, began to fortify the Isthmus, to prevent
Fufius from coming into Achaia. Kalenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and
Orchomenus, by a voluntary submission of those states. Some he subdued by
force, the rest he endeavored to win over to Caesar's interest, by sending
deputies round to them. In these things, principally, Fusius was employed.
[3.56] Every day
afterward, Caesar drew up his army on a level ground, and offered Pompey
battle, and led his legions almost close to Pompey's camp; and his front line
was at no greater distance from the rampart than that no weapon from their
engines could reach it. But Pompey, to save his credit and reputation with the
world, drew out his legions, but so close to his camp, that his rear line might
touch the rampart, and that his whole army, when drawn up, might be protected
by the darts discharged from it.
[3.57] While these
things were going forward in Achaia and at Dyrrachium, and when it was
certainly known that Scipio was arrived in Macedonia, Caesar, never losing
sight of his first intention, sends Clodius to him, an intimate friend to both,
whom Caesar, on the introduction and recommendation of Pompey, had admitted
into the number of his acquaintance. To this man he gave letters and
instructions to Pompey, the substance of which was as follows: "That he
had made every effort toward peace, and imputed the ill success of those
efforts to the fault of those whom he had employed to conduct those
negotiations; because they were afraid to carry his proposals to Pompey at an
improper time. That Scipio had such authority, that he could not only freely
explain what conduct met his approbation, but even in some degree enforce his
advice, and govern him [Pompey] if he persisted in error; that he commanded an
army independent of Pompey, so that besides his authority, he had strength to
compel; and if he did so, all men would be indebted to him for the quiet of
Italy, the peace of the provinces, and the preservation of the empire."
These proposals Clodius made to him, and for some days at the first appeared to
have met with a favorable reception, but afterward was not admitted to an
audience; for Scipio being reprimanded by Favonius, as we found afterward when
the war was ended, and the negotiation having miscarried, Clodius returned to
Caesar.
[3.58] Caesar, that he
might the more easily keep Pompey's horse inclosed within Dyrrachium, and
prevent them from foraging, fortified the two narrow passes already mentioned
with strong works, and erected forts at them. Pompey perceiving that he derived
no advantage from his cavalry, after a few days had them conveyed back to his
camp by sea. Fodder was so exceedingly scarce that he was obliged to feed his
horses upon leaves stripped off the trees, or the tender roots of reeds pounded.
For the corn which had been sown within the lines was already consumed, and
they would be obliged to supply themselves with fodder from Corcyra and
Acarnania, over a long tract of sea; and as the quantity of that fell short, to
increase it by mixing barley with it, and by these methods support their
cavalry. But when not only the barley and fodder in these parts were consumed,
and the herbs cut away, when the leaves too were not to be found on the trees,
the horses being almost starved, Pompey thought he ought to make some attempt
by a sally.
[3.59] In the number of
Caesar's cavalry were two Allobrogians, brothers, named Roscillus and Aegus,
the sons of Abducillus, who for several years possessed the chief power in his
own state; men of singular valor, whose gallant services Caesar had found very
useful in all his wars in Gaul. To them, for these reasons, he had committed
the offices of greatest honor in their own country, and took care to have them
chosen into the senate at an unusual age, and had bestowed on them lands taken
from the enemy, and large pecuniary rewards, and from being needy had made them
affluent. Their valor had not only procured them Caesar's esteem, but they were
beloved by the whole army. But presuming on Caesar's friendship, and elated
with the arrogance natural to a foolish and barbarous people, they despised
their countrymen, defrauded their cavalry of their pay, and applied all the
plunder to their own use. Displeased at this conduct, their soldiers went in a
body to Caesar, and openly complained of their ill usage; and to their other
charges added, that false musters were given in to Caesar, and the surcharged
pay applied to their own use.
[3.60] Caesar, not
thinking it a proper time to call them to account, and willing to pardon many
faults, on account of their valor, deferred the whole matter, and gave them a
private rebuke, for having made a traffic of their troops, and advised them to
expect every thing from his friendship, and by his past favors to measure their
future hopes. This however, gave them great offense, and made them contemptible
in the eyes of the whole army. Of this they became sensible, as well from the
reproaches of others, as from the judgment of their own minds, and a
consciousness of guilt. Prompted then by shame, and perhaps imagining that they
were not liberated from trial, but reserved to a future day, they resolved to
break off from us, to put their fortune to a new hazard, and to make trial of
new connections. And having conferred with a few of their clients, to whom they
could venture to intrust so base an action, they first attempted to assassinate
Caius Volusenus, general of the horse (as was discovered at the end of the
war), that they might appear to have fled to Pompey after conferring an important
service on him. But when that appeared too difficult to put in execution, and
no opportunity offered to accomplish it, they borrowed all the money they
could, as if they designed to make satisfaction and restitution for what they
had defrauded: and having purchased a great number of horses, they deserted to
Pompey along with those whom they had engaged in their plot.
[3.61] As they were
persons nobly descended and of liberal education, and had come with a great
retinue, and several cattle, and were reckoned men of courage, and had been in
great esteem with Caesar, and as it was a new and uncommon event, Pompey
carried them round all his works, and made an ostentatious show of them, for
till that day, not a soldier, either horse or foot had deserted from Caesar to
Pompey, though there were desertions almost every day from Pompey to Caesar:
but more commonly among the soldiers levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and in those
countries, which were in Caesar's possession. But the brothers, having been
acquainted with all things, either what was incomplete in our works, or what
appeared to the best judges of military matters to be deficient, the particular
times, the distance of places, and the various attention of the guards,
according to the different temper and character of the officer who commanded
the different posts, gave an exact account of all to Pompey.
[3.62] Upon receiving
this intelligence, Pompey, who had already formed the design of attempting a
sally, as before mentioned, ordered the soldiers to make ozier coverings for
their helmets, and to provide fascines. These things being prepared, he
embarked on board small boats and row galleys by night, a considerable number
of light infantry and archers, with all their fascines, and immediately after
midnight, he marched sixty cohorts drafted from the greater camp and the
outposts, to that part of our works which extended toward the sea, and were at
the furthest distance from Caesar's greater camp. To the same place he sent the
ships, which he had freighted with the fascines and light-armed troops; and all
the ships of war that lay at Dyrrachium; and to each he gave particular
instructions: at this part of the lines Caesar had posted Lentulus Marcellinus,
the quaestor, with the ninth legion, and as he was not in a good state of
health, Fulvius Costhumus was sent to assist him in the command.
[3.63] At this place,
fronting the enemy, there was a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart ten feet
high, and the top of the rampart was ten feet in breadth. At an interval of six
hundred feet from that there was another rampart turned the contrary way, with
the works lower. For some days before, Caesar, apprehending that our men might
be surrounded by sea, had made a double rampart there, that if he should be
attacked on both sides, he might have the means of defending himself. But the
extent of the lines, and the incessant labor for so many days, because he had
inclosed a circuit of seventeen miles with his works, did not allow time to
finish them. Therefore the transverse rampart which should make a communication
between the other two, was not yet completed. This circumstance was known to
Pompey, being told to him by the Allobrogian deserters, and proved of great
disadvantage to us. For when our cohorts of the ninth legion were on guard by
the sea-side, Pompey's army arrived suddenly by break of day, and their
approach was a surprise to our men, and at the same time, the soldiers that
came by sea, cast their darts on the front rampart; and the ditches were filled
with fascines: and the legionary soldiers terrified those that defended the
inner rampart, by applying the scaling ladders, and by engines and weapons of
all sorts, and a vast multitude of archers poured round upon them from every
side. Besides, the coverings of oziers, which they had laid over their helmets,
were a great security to them against the blows of stones which were the only
weapons that our soldiers had. And therefore, when our men were oppressed in
every manner, and were scarcely able to make resistance, the defect in our
works was observed, and Pompey's soldiers, landing between the two ramparts,
where the work was unfinished, attacked our men in the rear, and having beat
them from both sides of the fortification, obliged them to flee.
[3.64] Marcellinus,
being informed of this disorder, detached some cohorts to the relief of our
men, who seeing them flee from the camp, were neither able to persuade them to
rally at their approach, nor themselves to sustain the enemy's charge. And in
like manner, whatever additional assistance was sent, was infected by the fears
of the defeated, and increased the terror and danger. For retreat was prevented
by the multitude of the fugitives. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer was
dangerously wounded, and began to grow weak, having got sight of our horse, he
said to them, "This eagle have I defended with the greatest care for many
years, at the hazard of my life, and now in my last moments restore it to
Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not, I conjure you, suffer a dishonor to be
sustained in the field, which never before happened to Caesar's army, but
deliver it safe into his hands." By this accident the eagle was preserved,
but all the centurions of the first cohorts were killed, except the principal.
[3.65] And now the
Pompeians, after great havoc of our troops, were approaching Marcellinus's
camp, and had struck no small terror into the rest of the cohorts, when Marcus
Antonius, who commanded the nearest fort, being informed of what had happened,
was observed descending from the rising ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival
checked the Pompeians, and encouraged our men to recover from their extreme
affright. And shortly after, Caesar having got notice by the smoke of all the
forts, which was the usual signal on such occasions, drafted off some cohorts
from the outposts, and went to the scene of action. And having there learned
the loss he had sustained, and perceiving that Pompey had forced our works, and
had encamped along the coast, so that he was at liberty to forage, and had a
communication with his shipping, he altered his plan for conducting the war, as
his design had not succeeded, and ordered a strong encampment to be made near
Pompey.
[3.66] When this work
was finished, Caesar's scouts observed that some cohorts, which to them
appeared like a legion, were retired behind the wood, and were on their march
to the old camp. The situation of the two camps was as follows: a few days
before, when Caesar's ninth legion had opposed a party of Pompey's troops, and
were endeavoring to inclose them, Caesar's troops formed a camp in that place.
This camp joined a certain wood, and was not above four hundred paces distant
from the sea. Afterward, changing his design for certain reasons, Caesar
removed his camp to a small distance beyond that place; and after a few days,
Pompey took possession of it, and added more extensive works, leaving the inner
rampart standing, as he intended to keep several legions there. By this means,
the lesser camp, included within the greater, answered the purpose of a fort
and citadel. He had also carried an intrenchment from the left angle of the
camp to the river, about four hundred paces, that his soldiers might have more
liberty and less danger in fetching water. But he too, changing his design for
reasons not necessary to be mentioned, abandoned the place. In this condition
the camp remained for several days, the works being all entire.
[3.67] Caesar's scouts
brought him word that the standard of a legion was carried to this place. That
the same thing was seen he was assured by those in the higher forts. This place
was a half a mile distant from Pompey's new camp. Caesar, hoping to surprise
this legion, and anxious to repair the loss sustained that day, left two
cohorts employed in the works to make an appearance of intrenching himself, and
by a different route, as privately as he could, with his other cohorts
amounting to thirty-three, among which was the ninth legion, which had lost so
many centurions, and whose privates were greatly reduced in number, he marched
in two lines against Pompey's legion and his lesser camp. Nor did this first
opinion deceive him. For he reached the place before Pompey could have notice
of it; and though the works were strong, yet having made the attack with the
left wing which he commanded in person, he obliged the Pompeians to quit the
rampart in disorder. A barricade had been raised before the gates, at which a
short contest was maintained, our men endeavoring to force their way in, and
the enemy to defend the camp; Titus Pulcio, by whose means we have related that
Caius Antonius's army was betrayed, defending them with singular courage. But
the valor of our men prevailed, and having cut down the barricade, they first
forced the greater camp, and after that the fort which was inclosed within it;
and as the legion on its repulse had retired to this, they slew several
defending themselves there.
[3.68] But Fortune who
exerts a powerful influence as well in other matters, as especially in war,
effects great changes from trifling causes, as happened at this time. For the
cohorts on Caesar's right wing, through ignorance of the place, followed the
direction of that rampart which ran along from the camp to the river, while
they were in search of a gate, and imagined that it belonged to the camp. But
when they found that it led to the river, and that nobody opposed them, they
immediately climbed over the rampart, and were followed by all our cavalry.
[3.69] In the mean time
Pompey, by the great delay which this occasioned, being informed of what had
happened, marched with the fifth legion, which he called away from their work
to support his party; and at the same time his cavalry were advancing up to
ours, and an army in order of battle, was seen at a distance by our men who had
taken possession of the camp, and the face of affairs was suddenly changed. For
Pompey's legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy support, attempted to make a
stand at the Decuman gate, and made a bold charge on our men. Caesar's cavalry,
who had mounted the rampart by a narrow breach, being apprehensive of their
retreat, were the first to flee. The right wing which had been separated from
the left, observing the terror of the cavalry, to prevent their being
overpowered within the lines, were endeavoring to retreat by the same way as
they burst in; and most of them, lest they should be engaged in the narrow
passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feet high into the trenches; and
the first being trodden to death, the rest procured their safety, and escaped
over their bodies. The soldiers of the left wing, perceiving from the rampart
that Pompey was advancing, and their own friends fleeing, being afraid that
they should be inclosed between the two ramparts, as they had an enemy both
within and without, strove to secure their retreat the same way they came. All
was disorder, consternation, and flight; insomuch that, when Caesar laid hold
of the colors of those who were running away, and desired them to stand, some
left their horses behind, and continued to run in the same manner; others
through fear even threw away their colors. Nor did a single man face about.
[3.70] In this
calamity, the following favorable circumstance occurred to prevent the ruin of
our whole army, viz., that Pompey suspecting an ambuscade (because, as I
suppose, the success had far exceeded his hopes, as he had seen his men a
moment before fleeing from the camp), durst not for some time approach the
fortification; and that his horse were retarded from pursuing, because the
passes and gates were in possession of Caesar's soldiers. Thus a trifling
circumstance proved of great importance to each party; for the rampart drawn
from the camp to the river, interrupted the progress and certainty of Caesar's
victory, after he had forged Pompey's camp. The same thing, by retarding the
rapidity of the enemy's pursuit, preserved our army.
[3.71] In the two
actions of this day, Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty rank and file, several
Roman knights of distinction, Felginas Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; Caius
Felginas from Placentia; Aulus Gravius from Puteoli; Marcus Sacrativir from
Capua; and thirty-two military tribunes and centurions. But the greatest part
of all these perished without a wound, being trodden to death in the trenches,
on the ramparts and banks of the river by reason of the terror and flight of
their own men. Pompey, after this battle, was saluted Imperator; this title he
retained, and allowed himself to be addressed by it afterward. But neither in
his letters to the senate, nor in the fasces, did he use the laurel as a mark
of honor. But Labienus, having obtained his consent that the prisoners should
be delivered up to him, had them all brought out, as it appeared, to make a
show of them, and that Pompey might place a greater confidence in him who was a
deserter; and calling them fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most
insulting manner whether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be
put to death in the sight of the whole army.
[3.72] Pompey's party
were so elated with confidence and spirit at this success, that they thought no
more of the method of conducting the war, but thought that they were already
conquerors. They did not consider that the smallness of our numbers, and the
disadvantage of the place and the confined nature of the ground occasioned by
their having first possessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both
from within and without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into
two parts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were the causes
of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that the contest was not
decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; and that our men had
suffered greater loss from their numbers and want of room, than they had
sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did not reflect on the common
casualties of war; how trifling causes, either from groundless suspicions,
sudden affright, or religious scruples, have oftentimes been productive of
considerable losses; how often an army has been unsuccessful either by the
misconduct of the general, or the oversight of a tribune; but as if they had
proved victorious by their valor, and as if no change could ever take place,
they published the success of the day throughout the world by reports and
letters.
[3.73] Caesar,
disappointed in his first intentions, resolved to change the whole plan of his
operations. Accordingly, he at once called in all outposts, gave over the
siege, and collecting his army into one place, addressed his soldiers and
encouraged them "not to be troubled at what had happened, nor to be
dismayed at it, but to weigh their many successful engagements against one
disappointment, and that, too, a trifling one. That they ought to be grateful
to Fortune, through whose favor they had recovered Italy without the effusion
of blood; through whose favor they had subdued the two Spains, though protected
by a most warlike people under the command of the most skillful and experienced
generals; through whose favor they had reduced to submission the neighboring
states that abounded with corn; in fine, that they ought to remember with what
success they had been all transported safe through blockading fleets of the
enemy, which possessed not only the ports, but even the coasts; that if all
their attempts were not crowned with success, the defects of Fortune must be
supplied by industry; and whatever loss had been sustained, ought to be
attributed rather to her caprices than to any faults in him: that he had chosen
a safe ground for the engagement, that he had possessed himself of the enemy's
camp; that he had beaten them out, and overcome them when they offered
resistance; but whether their own terror or some mistake, or whether Fortune
herself had interrupted a victory almost secured and certain, they ought all
now to use their utmost efforts to repair by their valor the loss which had
been incurred; if they did so, their misfortunes would turn to their advantage,
as it happened at Gergovia, and those who feared to face the enemy would be the
first to offer themselves to battle.
[3.74] Having concluded
his speech, he disgraced some standard-bearers, and reduced them to the ranks;
for the whole army was seized with such grief at their loss and with such an
ardent desire of repairing their disgrace, that not a man required the command
of his tribune or centurion, but they imposed each on himself severer labors
than usual as a punishment, and at the same time were so inflamed with
eagerness to meet the enemy, that the officers of the first rank, sensibly
affected at their entreaties, were of opinion that they ought to continue in
their present posts, and commit their fate to the hazard of a battle. But, on
the other hand, Caesar could not place sufficient confidence in men so lately
thrown into consternation, and thought he ought to allow them time to recover
their dejected spirits; and having abandoned his works, he was apprehensive of
being distressed for want of corn.
[3.75] Accordingly,
suffering no time to intervene but what was necessary for a proper attention to
be paid to the sick and wounded, he sent on all his baggage privately in the
beginning of the night from his camp to Apollonia, and ordered them not to halt
till they had performed their journey; and he detached one legion with them as
a convoy. This affair being concluded, having retained only two legions in his
camp, he marched the rest of his army out at three o'clock in the morning by
several gates, and sent them forward by the same route; and in a short space after,
that the military practice might be preserved, and his march known as late as
possible, he ordered the signal for decamping to be given; and setting out
immediately and following the rear of his own army, he was soon out of sight of
the camp. Nor did Pompey, as soon as he had notice of his design, make any
delay to pursue him; but with a view to surprise them while encumbered with
baggage on their march, and not yet recovered from their fright, he led his
army out of his camp, and sent his cavalry on to retard our rear; but was not
able to come up with them, because Caesar had got far before him, and marched
without baggage. But when we reached the river Genusus, the banks being steep,
their horse overtook our rear, and detained them by bringing them to action. To
oppose whom, Caesar sent his horse, and intermixed with them about four hundred
of his advanced light troops, who attacked their horse with such success, that
having routed them all, and killed several, they returned without any loss to
the main body.
[3.76] Having performed
the exact march which he had proposed that day, and having led his army over
the river Genusus, Caesar posted himself in his old camp opposite Asparagium;
and kept his soldiers close within the intrenchments and ordered the horse, who
had been sent out under pretense of foraging, to retire immediately into the
camp, through the Decuman gate. Pompey, in like manner, having completed the
same day's march, took post in his old camp at Asparagium; and his soldiers, as
they had no work (the fortifications being entire), made long excursions, some
to collect wood and forage; others, invited by the nearness of the former camp,
laid up their arms in their tents, and quitted the intrenchments in order to
bring what they had left behind them, because the design of marching being
adopted in a hurry, they had left a considerable part of their wagons and
luggage behind. Being thus incapable of pursuing, as Caesar had foreseen, about
noon he gave the signal for marching, led out his army, and doubling that day's
march, he advanced eight miles beyond Pompey's camp; who could not pursue him,
because his troops were dispersed.
[3.77] The next day
Caesar sent his baggage forward early in the night, and marched off himself
immediately after the fourth watch: that if he should be under the necessity of
risking an engagement, he might meet a sudden attack with an army free from
incumbrance. He did so for several days successively, by which means he was
enabled to effect his march over the deepest rivers, and through the most
intricate roads without any loss. For Pompey, after the first day's delay, and
the fatigue which he endured for some days in vain, though he exerted himself
by forced marches, and was anxious to overtake us, who had got the start of
him, on the fourth day desisted from the pursuit, and determined to follow
other measures.
[3.78] Caesar was
obliged to go to Apollonia, to lodge his wounded, pay his army, confirm his
friends, and leave garrisons in the towns. But for these matters, he allowed no
more time than was necessary for a person in haste. And being apprehensive for
Domitius, lest he should be surprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened with all
speed and earnestness to join him; for he planned the operations of the whole campaign
on these principles: that if Pompey should march after him, he would be drawn
off from the sea, and from those forces which he had provided in Dyrrachium,
and separated from his corn and magazines, and be obliged to carry on the war
on equal terms; but if he crossed over into Italy, Caesar, having effected a
junction with Domitius, would march through Illyricum to the relief of Italy;
but if he endeavored to storm Apollonia and Oricum, and exclude him from the
whole coast, he hoped, by besieging Scipio, to oblige him, of necessity, to
come to his assistance. Accordingly, Caesar dispatching couriers, writes to
Domitius, and acquaints him with his wishes on the subject: and having
stationed a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at
Oricum, besides those who were sick of their wounds, he set forward on his
march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, also, guessing at Caesar's design,
determined to hasten to Scipio, that if Caesar should march in that direction,
he might be ready to relieve him; but that if Caesar should be unwilling to
quit the sea-coast and Corcyra, because he expected legions and cavalry from
Italy, he himself might fall on Domitius with all his forces.
[3.79] For these
reasons, each of them studied dispatch, that he might succor his friends, and
not miss an opportunity of surprising his enemies. But Caesar's engagements at
Apollonia had carried him aside from the direct road. Pompey had taken the
short road to Macedonia, through Candavia. To this was added another unexpected
disadvantage, that Domitius, who for several days had been encamped opposite
Scipio, had quitted that post for the sake of provisions, and had marched to
Heraclea Sentica, a city subject to Candavia; so that fortune herself seemed to
throw him in Pompey's way. Of this, Caesar was ignorant up to this time.
Letters likewise being sent by Pompey through all the provinces and states,
with an account of the action at Dyrrachium, very much enlarged and exaggerated
beyond the real facts, a rumor had been circulated, that Caesar had been
defeated and forced to flee, and had lost almost all his forces. These reports
had made the roads dangerous, and drawn off some states from his alliance:
whence it happened, that the messengers dispatched by Caesar, by several
different roads to Domitius, and by Domitius to Caesar, were not able by any
means to accomplish their journey. But the Allobroges, who were in the retinue
of Aegus and Roscillus, and who had deserted to Pompey, having met on the road
a scouting party of Domitius; either from old acquaintance, because they had
served together in Gaul, or elated with vain glory, gave them an account of all
that had happened, and informed them of Caesar's departure, and Pompey's
arrival. Domitius, who was scarce four hours' march distant, having got
intelligence from these, by the courtesy of the enemy, avoided the danger, and
met Caesar coming to join him at Aeginium, a town on the confines of and
opposite to Thessaly.
[3.80] The two armies
being united, Caesar marched to Gomphi, which is the first town of Thessaly on
the road from Epirus. Now, the Thessalians, a few months before, had of
themselves sent embassadors to Caesar, offering him the free use of every thing
in their power, and requesting a garrison for their protection. But the report,
already spoken of, of the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in
many particulars, had arrived before him. In consequence of which,
Androsthenes, the praetor of Thessaly, as he preferred to be the companion of
Pompey's victory, rather than Caesar's associate in his misfortunes, collected
all the people, both slaves and freemen from the country into the town and shut
the gates, and dispatched messengers to Scipio and Pompey "to come to his
relief, that he could depend on the strength of the town, if succor was
speedily sent; but that it could not withstand a long siege." Scipio, as
soon as he received advice of the departure of the armies from Dyrrachium, had
marched with his legions to Larissa: Pompey was not yet arrived near Thessaly.
Caesar having fortified his camp, ordered scaling-ladders and pent-houses to be
made for a sudden assault, and hurdles to be provided. As soon as they were
ready, he exhorted his soldiers, and told them of what advantage it would be to
assist them with all sorts of necessaries, if they made themselves masters of a
rich and plentiful town: and, at the same time to strike terror into other
states by the example of this, and to effect this with speed, before
auxiliaries could arrive. Accordingly, taking advantage of the unusual ardor of
the soldiers, he began his assault on the town at a little after three o'clock
on the very day on which he arrived, and took it, though defended with very
high walls, before sunset, and gave it up to his army to plunder, and
immediately decamped from before it, and marched to Metropolis, with such
rapidity as to outstrip any messenger or rumor of the taking of Gomphi.
[3.81] The inhabitants
of Metropolis, at first influenced by the same rumors, followed the same
measures, shut the gates and manned their walls. But when they were made
acquainted with the fate of the city of Gomphi by some prisoners, whom Caesar
had ordered to be brought up to the walls, they threw open their gates. As he
preserved them with the greatest care, there was not a state in Thessaly
(except Larissa, which was awed by a strong army of Scipio's), but on comparing
the fate of the inhabitants of Metropolis with the severe treatment of Gomphi, gave
admission to Caesar, and obeyed his orders. Having chosen a position convenient
for procuring corn, which was now almost ripe on the ground, he determined
there to wait Pompey's arrival, and to make it the center of all his warlike
operations.
[3.82] Pompey arrived
in Thessaly a few days after, and having harangued the combined army, returned
thanks to his own men, and exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that as the victory was
now secured, they should endeavor to merit a part of the rewards and booty. And
receiving all the legions into one camp, he shared his honors with Scipio,
ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his tent, and a pavilion to be erected for
him. The forces of Pompey being thus augmented, and two such powerful armies
united, their former expectations were confirmed, and their hopes of victory so
much increased, that whatever time intervened was considered as so much delay
to their return into Italy; and whenever Pompey acted with slowness and
caution, they used to exclaim, that it was the business only of a single day,
but that he had a passion for power, and was delighted in having persons of
consular and praetorian rank in the number of his slaves. And they now began to
dispute openly about rewards and priesthoods, and disposed of the consulate for
several years to come. Others put in their claims for the houses and properties
of all who were in Caesar's camp, and in that council there was a warm debate,
whether Lucius Hirtius, who had been sent by Pompey against the Parthians,
should be admitted a candidate for the praetorship in his absence at the next
election; his friends imploring Pompey's honor to fulfill the engagements which
he had made to him at his departure, that he might not seem deceived through
his authority: while others, embarked in equal labor and danger, pleaded that
no individual ought to have a preference before all the rest.
[3.83] Already
Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther, in their daily quarrels about Caesar's
priesthood, openly abused each other in the most scurrilous language. Lentulus
urging the respect due to his age, Domitius boasting his interest in the city
and his dignity, and Scipio presuming on his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus
charged Lucius Afranius before Pompey with betraying the army in the action
that happened in Spain, and Lucius Domitius declared in the council that it was
his wish that, when the war should be ended, three billets should be given to
all the senators, who had taken part with them in the war, and that they should
pass sentence on every single person who had staid behind at Rome, or who had
been within Pompey's garrisons and had not contributed their assistance in the
military operations; that by the first billet they should have power to acquit,
by the second to pass sentence of death, and by the third to impose a pecuniary
fine. In short, Pompey's whole army talked of nothing but the honors or sums of
money which were to be their rewards, or of vengeance on their enemies; and
never considered how they were to defeat their enemies, but in what manner they
should use their victory.
[3.84] Corn being
provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and a sufficient time having elapsed
since the engagement at Dyrrachium, when Caesar thought he had sufficiently
sounded the disposition of his troops, he thought that he ought to try whether
Pompey had any intention or inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led
his troops out of the camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on
their own ground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterward for
several days in succession, he advanced from his own camp, and led them up to
the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conduct inspired his army
every day with fresh courage. However he adhered to his former purpose respecting
his cavalry, for as he was by many degrees inferior in number, he selected the
youngest and most active of the advanced guard, and desired them to fight
intermixed with the horse, and they by constant practice acquired experience in
this kind of battle. By these means it was brought to pass that a thousand of
his horse would dare even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of
Pompey's, if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their
number. For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action,
and killed one of the two Allobrogians, who had deserted to Pompey, as we
before observed, and several others.
[3.85] Pompey, because
he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army at the very foot of it, ever in
expectation, as may be conjectured, that Caesar would expose himself to this
disadvantageous situation. Caesar, seeing no likelihood of being able to bring
Pompey to an action, judged it the most expedient method of conducting the war,
to decamp from that post and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by
shifting his camp and removing from place to place, he might be more
conveniently supplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get
some opportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marches
harass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These matters being
settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tents struck, it was
observed that shortly before, contrary to his daily practice, Pompey's army had
advanced further than usual from his intrenchments, so that it appeared
possible to come to an action on equal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to
his soldiers, when they were at the gates of the camp, ready to march out.
" We must defer," says he, "our march at present, and set our
thoughts on battle, which has been our constant wish; let us then meet the foe
with resolute souls. We shall not hereafter easily find such an
opportunity." He immediately marched out at the head of his troops.
[3.86] Pompey also, as
was afterward known, at the unanimous solicitation of his friends, had
determined to try the fate of a battle. For he had even declared in council a
few days before that, before the battalions came to battle, Caesar's army would
be put to the rout. When most people expressed their surprise at it, "I
know," says he, "that I promise a thing almost incredible; but hear
the plan on which I proceed, that you may march to battle with more confidence
and resolution. I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute
it, as soon as the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the
flank, and inclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put
them to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By this means
we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions, and almost
without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we far outnumber them in
cavalry." At the same time he gave them notice to be ready for battle on
the day following, and since the opportunity which they had so often wished for
was now arrived, not to disappoint the opinion generally entertained of their
experience and valor.
[3.87] After him
Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt of Caesar's forces, as to extol
Pompey's scheme with the highest encomiums. "Think not, Pompey," says
he, "that this is the army which conquered Gaul and Germany; I was present
at all those battles, and do not speak at random on a subject to which I am a
stranger: a very small part of that army now remains, great numbers lost their
lives, as must necessarily happen in so many battles, many fell victims to the
autumnal pestilence in Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on
the continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundusium are composed
of invalids? The forces which you now behold, have been recruited by levies
lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater part from the colonies beyond the
Po; moreover, the flower of the forces perished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium."
Having so said, he took an oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious;
and he encouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, and
took the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it. After this
had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes and joy, and in
imagination anticipated victory; because they thought that in a matter of such
importance, no groundless assertion could be made by a general of such
experience.
[3.88] When Caesar had
approached near Pompey's camp, he observed that his army was drawn up in the
following manner: On the left wing were the two legions, delivered over by
Caesar at the beginning of the disputes in compliance with the senate's decree,
one of which was called the first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded
in person. Scipio with the Syrian legions commanded the center. The Cilician
legion in conjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over
by Afranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered his
steadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the center and the wing,
and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amounted to forty-five
thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers, who having received favors
from him in former wars, flocked to his standard: these were dispersed through
his whole army. The seven remaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his
camp, and the neighboring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with
steep banks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, and slingers,
on his left wing.
[3.89] Caesar,
observing his former custom, had placed the tenth legion on the right, the
ninth on the left, although it was very much weakened by the battles at
Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so close to the ninth, as to almost
make one of the two, and ordered them to support one another. He drew up on the
field eighty cohorts, making a total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two
cohorts to guard the camp. He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of
the right to P. Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his
post opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the
enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be
surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort from
each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a fourth line, and
opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them with his wishes,
admonished them that the success of that day depended on their courage. At the
same time he ordered the third line, and the entire army not to charge without
his command: that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do so.
[3.90] When he was
exhorting his army to battle, according to the military custom, and spoke to
them of the favors that they had constantly received from him, he took especial
care to remind them "that he could call his soldiers to witness the
earnestness with which he had sought peace, the efforts that he had made by
Vatinius to gain a conference [with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to
treat with Scipio, in what manner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain
permission from Libo to send embassadors; that he had been always reluctant to
shed the blood of his soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one
or other of her armies." After delivering this speech, he gave by a
trumpet the signal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were
very impatient for the onset.
[3.91] There was in
Caesar's army, a volunteer of the name of Crastinus, who the year before had
been first centurion of the tenth legion, a man of pre-eminent bravery. He,
when the signal was given, says, "Follow me, my old comrades, and display
such exertions in behalf of your general as you have determined to do: this is
our last battle, and when it shall be won, he will recover his dignity, and we
our liberty." At the same time he looked back to Caesar, and said,
"General, I will act in such a manner to-day, that you will feel grateful
to me living or dead." After uttering these words he charged first on the
right wing, and about one hundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same
century followed.
[3.92] There was so
much space left between the two lines, as sufficed for the onset of the hostile
armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiers to await Caesar's attack, and not
to advance from their position, or suffer their line to be put into disorder.
And he is said to have done this by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the
impetuosity of the charge of Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line
broken, and that Pompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them
while in disorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force
if the soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in their
course; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after running over
double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted by the fatigue. But
to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient reason: for there is a
certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrity implanted by nature in the hearts
of all men, which is inflamed by a desire to meet the foe. This a general
should endeavor not to repress, but to increase; nor was it a vain institution
of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general
shout be raised; by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror,
and their own army inspired with courage.
[3.93] But our men, when
the signal was given, rushed forward with their javelins ready to be launched,
but perceiving that Pompey's men did not run to meet their charge, having
acquired experience by custom, and being practiced in former battles, they of
their own accord repressed their speed, and halted almost midway; that they
might not come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a
short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins, and
instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor did Pompey's men
fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stood our charge, and
maintained their ranks; and having launched their javelins, had recourse to
their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse, according to their orders,
rushed out at once from his left wing, and his whole host of archers poured
after them. Our cavalry did not withstand their charge: but gave ground a
little, upon which Pompey's horse pressed them more vigorously, and began to
file off in troops, and flank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the
signal to his fourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They
instantly rushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a
man of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but
galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their retreat
the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenseless, were all cut to
pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeled about upon Pompey's left
wing, while his infantry still continued to make battle, and attacked them in
the rear.
[3.94] At the same time
Caesar ordered his third line to advance, which till then had not been engaged,
but had kept their post. Thus, new and fresh troops having come to the
assistance of the fatigued, and others having made an attack on their rear,
Pompey's men were not able to maintain their ground, but all fled, nor was
Caesar deceived in his opinion, that the victory, as he had declared in his
speech to his soldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts, which
he had placed as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalry
were routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; by them the
left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to be the first to flee.
But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that part of his army on which he
reposed his greatest hopes thrown into confusion, despairing of the rest, he
quitted the field, and retreated straightway on horseback to his camp, and
calling to the centurions, whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate,
with a loud voice, that the soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp,"
says he, "defend it with diligence, if any danger should threaten it; I
will visit the other gates, and encourage the guards of the camp." Having
thus said, he retired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the
issue.
[3.95] Caesar having
forced the Pompeians to flee into their intrenchment, and thinking that he
ought not to allow them any respite to recover from their fright, exhorted his
soldiers to take advantage of fortune's kindness, and to attack the camp.
Though they were fatigued by the intense heat, for the battle had continued
till mid-day, yet, being prepared to undergo any labor, they cheerfully obeyed
his command. The camp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left
to guard it, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign
auxiliaries. For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle,
affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms and military
standards, had their thoughts more engaged on their further escape than on the
defense of the camp. Nor could the troops who were posted on the battlements,
long withstand the immense number of our darts, but fainting under their
wounds, quitted the place, and under the conduct of their centurions and
tribunes, fled, without stopping, to the high mountains which joined the camp.
[3.96] In Pompey's camp
you might see arbors in which tables were laid, a large quantity of plate set
out, the floors of the tents covered with fresh sods, the tents of Lucius
Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, and many other things which were proofs of
excessive luxury, and a confidence of victory, so that it might readily be
inferred that they had no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they
indulged themselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxury
Caesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in want of
common necessaries. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced the trenches,
mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit, went hastily out of
the back gate of the camp, and galloped with all speed to Larissa. Nor did he
stop there, but with the same dispatch, collecting a few of his flying troops,
and halting neither day nor night, he arrived at the seaside, attended by only
thirty horse, and went on board a victualing barque, often complaining, as we
have been told, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he was
almost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he had expected
victory, as they began the fight.
[3.97] Caesar having
possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged his soldiers not to be too intent on
plunder, and lose the opportunity of completing their conquest. Having obtained
their consent, he began to draw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians
distrusting the position, as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it,
and all began to retreat toward Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his
troops, and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back
a part to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by a shorter
road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drew up his army.
But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountain, whose foot was
washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops, though they were
greatly exhausted by incessant labor the whole day, and night was now
approaching, by throwing up works cut off the communication between the river
and the mountain, that the enemy might not get water in the night. As soon as
the work was finished, they sent embassadors to treat about a capitulation. A
few senators who had espoused that party, made their escape by night.
[3.98] At break of day,
Caesar ordered all those who had taken post on the mountain, to come down from
the higher grounds into the plain, and pile their arms. When they did this
without refusal, and with outstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the
ground, with tears, implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise,
and having spoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, he
pardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers, that no injury should be
done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used this diligence, he
ordered the legions in his camp to come and meet him, and those which were with
him to take their turn of rest, and go back to the camp: and the same day went
to Larissa
[3.99] In that battle,
no more than two hundred privates were missing, but Caesar lost about thirty
centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus, also, of whom mention was made before,
fighting most courageously, lost his life by the wound of a sword in the mouth;
nor was that false which he declared when marching to battle: for Caesar
entertained the highest opinion of his behavior in that battle, and thought him
highly deserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteen
thousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: for even the
cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered to Sylla. Several others
took shelter in the neighboring states. One hundred and eighty stands of
colors, and nine eagles, were brought to Caesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from
the camp to the mountains, his strength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed
by the horse.
[3.100] About this
time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet at Brundusium and in the same
manner, as Libo had done before, possessed himself of an island opposite the
harbor of Brundusium. In like manner, Valinius, who was then governor of
Brundusium, with a few decked barks, endeavored to entice Laelius's fleet, and
took one five-banked galley and two smaller vessels that had ventured further
than the rest into a narrow part of the harbor: and likewise disposing the
horse along the shore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water.
But Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for his
expedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports from Corcyra and
Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and till he had received
advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forced either by the disgrace
of losing his ships, or by the want of necessaries, to quit the port and
islands.
[3.101] Much about the
same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet of Syrians, Phoenicians, and
Cicilians: and as Caesar's fleet was divided into two parts, Publius Sulpicius
the praetor commanding one division at Vibo near the straits, Pomponius the
other at Messana, Cassius got into Messana with his fleet, before Pomponius had
notice of his arrival, and having found him in disorder, without guards or
discipline, and the wind being high and favorable, he filled several transports
with fir, pitch, and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against
Pomponius's fleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty
of which were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror that though
there was a legion in garrison at Messana, the town with difficulty held out,
and had not the news of Caesar's victory been brought at that instant by the
horse stationed- along the coast, it was generally imagined that it would have
been lost, but the town was maintained till the news arrived very opportunely:
and Cassius set sail from thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our
ships being moored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the same
manner as before. The wind being favorable, he sent into the port about forty
ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on both sides, five
ships were burned to ashes. And when the fire began to spread wider by the
violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions, who had been left to
guard the fleet, being considered as invalids, could not endure the disgrace,
but of themselves went on board the ships and weighed anchor, and having
attacked Cassius's fleet, captured two five-banked galleys, in one of which was
Cassius himself; but he made his escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked
galleys were taken besides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the
action in Thessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gave
credit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar's
lieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed with his
fleet from that coast.
[3.102] Caesar thought
he ought to postpone all business and pursue Pompey, whithersoever he should
retreat; that he might not be able to provide fresh forces, and renew the war;
he therefore marched on every day, as far as his cavalry were able to advance,
and ordered one legion to follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was
issued by Pompey at Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province,
Grecians and Roman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he
issued it with an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long as
possible his design of fleeing further, or to endeavor to keep possession of
Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it is impossible to judge. He
lay at anchor one night, and calling together his friends in Amphipolis, and
collecting a sum of money for his necessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's
approach, set sail from that place, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here
he was detained two days, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went
to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. There he is informed that, by the consent of
all the inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, the castle
had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengers had been
dispatched to all those who were reported to have taken refuge in the
neighboring states, that they should not come to Antioch; that if they did,
that it would be attended with imminent danger to their lives. The same thing
had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been consul the year before, and to
Publius Lentulus a consular senator, and to several others at Rhodes, who
having followed Pompey in his flight, and arrived at the island, were not
admitted into the town or port; and having received a message to leave that
neighborhood, set sail much against their will; for the rumor of Caesar's
approach had now reached those states.
[3.103] Pompey, being
informed of these proceedings, laid aside his design of going to Syria, and
having taken the public money from the farmers of the revenue, and borrowed
more from some private friends, and having put on board his ships a large
quantity of brass for military purposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he
partly selected from the slaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from
the merchants, and such persons as each of his friends thought fit on this
occasion, he sailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was
there with a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whom
a few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, he had
expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance from his. To
him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria, and to be
protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, in consideration of the
friendship and amity which had subsisted between his father and him. But
Pompey's deputies having executed their commission, began to converse with less
restraint with the king's troops, and to advise them to act with friendship to
Pompey, and not to think meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were
several of Pompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in
Syria, and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of the
war had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king.
[3.104] The king's
friends, who were regents of the kingdom during the minority, being informed of
these things, either induced by fear, as they afterward declared, lest Pompey
should corrupt the king's army, and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising
his bad fortune, as in adversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public
gave a favorable answer to his deputies, and desired him to come to the king;
but secretly laid a plot against him, and dispatched Achillas, captain of the
king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius Septimius a military
tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, and deluded by an
acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with the pirates the latter had
commanded a company under him, he embarked in a small boat with a few
attendants, and was there murdered by Achillas and Septimius. In like manner,
Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king's order, and put to death in prison.
[3.105] When Caesar
arrived in Asia, he found that Titus Ampius had attempted to remove the money
from the temple of Diana at Ephesus; and for this purpose had convened all the
senators in the province that he might have them to attest the sum, but was
interrupted by Caesar's arrival, and had made his escape. Thus, on two
occasions, Caesar saved the money of Ephesus. It was also remarked at Elis, in
the temple of Minerva, upon calculating and enumerating the days, that on the
very day on which Caesar had gained his battle, the image of Victory which was
placed before Minerva, and faced her statue, turned about toward the portal and
entrance of the temple; and the same day, at Antioch in Syria, such a shout of
an army and sound of trumpets was twice heard that the citizens ran in arms to
the walls. The same thing happened at Ptolemais; a sound of drums too was heard
at Pergamus, in the private and retired parts of the temple, into which none
but the priests are allowed admission, and which the Greeks call Adyta (the
inaccessible), and likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, in which
there stood a statue consecrated to Caesar; a palm-tree at that time was shown
that had sprouted up from the pavement, through the joints of the stones, and
shot up above the roof.
[3.106] After a few
days' delay in Asia, Caesar, having heard that Pompey had been seen in Cyprus,
and conjecturing that he had directed his course into Egypt, on account of his
connection with that kingdom, set out for Alexandria with two legions (one of
which he ordered to follow him from Thessaly, the other he called in from
Achaia, from Fufius, the lieutenant general), and with eight hundred horse, ten
ships of war from Rhodes, and a few from Asia. These legions amounted but to
three thousand two hundred men; the rest, disabled by wounds received in
various battles, by fatigue and the length of their march, could not follow
him. But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits, did not hesitate to set
forward with a feeble force, and thought that he would be secure in any place.
At Alexandria he was informed of the death of Pompey: and at his landing there,
heard a cry among the soldiers whom the king had left to garrison the town, and
saw a crowd gathering toward him, because the fasces were carried before him;
for this the whole multitude thought an infringement of the king's dignity.
Though this tumult was appeased, frequent disturbances were raised for several
days successively, by crowds of the populace, and a great many of his soldiers
were killed in all parts of the city.
[3.107] Having observed
this, he ordered other legions to be brought to him from Asia, which he had
made up out of Pompey's soldiers; for he was himself detained against his will,
by the etesian winds, which are totally unfavorable to persons on a voyage from
Alexandria. In the mean time, considering that the disputes of the princes
belonged to the jurisdiction of the Roman people, and of him as consul, and
that it was a duty more incumbent on him, as in his former consulate a league
had been made with Ptolemy the late king, under sanction both of a law and a
decree of the senate, he signified that it was his pleasure that king Ptolemy,
and his sister Cleopatra, should disband their armies, and decide their
disputes in his presence by justice, rather than by the sword.
[3.108] A eunuch named
Pothinus, the boy's tutor, was regent of the kingdom on account of his
youthfulness. He at first began to complain among his friends, and to express
his indignation, that the king should be summoned to plead his cause: but
afterward, having prevailed on some of those whom he had made acquainted with
his views to join him he secretly called the army away from Pelusium to
Alexandria, and appointed Achillas, already spoken of, commander-in-chief of
the forces. Him he encouraged and animated by promises both in his own and the
king's name, and instructed him both by letters and messages how he should act.
By the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sons and the more
advanced in years of his two daughters were declared his heirs, and for the
more effectual performance of his intention, in the same will he conjured the
Roman people by all the gods, and by the league which he had entered into at
Rome, to see his will executed. One of the copies of his will was conveyed to
Rome by his embassadors to be deposited in the treasury, but the public
troubles preventing it, it was lodged with Pompey: another was left sealed up,
and kept at Alexandria.
[3.109] While these
things were debated before Caesar, and he was very anxious to settle the royal
disputes as a common friend and arbitrator; news was brought on a sudden that
the king's army and all his cavalry, were on their march to Alexandria. Caesar's
forces were by no means so strong that he could trust to them, if he had
occasion to hazard a battle without the town. His only resource was to keep
within the town in the most convenient places, and get information of
Achillas's designs. However he ordered his soldiers to repair to their arms;
and advised the king to send some of his friends, who had the greatest
influence, as deputies to Achillas, and to signify his royal pleasure.
Dioscorides and Serapion, the persons sent by him, who had both been embassadors
at Rome, and had been in great esteem with Ptolemy the father, went to
Achillas. But as soon as they appeared in his presence, without hearing them,
or learning the occasion of their coming, he ordered them to be seized and put
to death. One of them, after receiving a wound, was taken up and carried off by
his attendants as dead: the other was killed on the spot. Upon this, Caesar
took care to secure the king's person, both supposing that the king's name
would have a great influence with his subjects, and to give the war the
appearance of the scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been
begun by the king's consent.
[3.110] The forces
under Achillas did not seem despicable, either for number, spirit, or military
experience; for he had twenty thousand men under arms. They consisted partly of
Gabinius's soldiers, who were now become habituated to the licentious mode of
living at Alexandria, and had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman
people, and had married wives there, by whom the greatest part of them had
children. To these was added a collection of highwaymen, and freebooters, from
Syria, and the province of Cilicia, and the adjacent countries. Besides several
convicts and transports had been collected: for at Alexandria all our runaway
slaves were sure of finding protection for their persons on the condition that
they should give in their names, and enlist as soldiers: and if any of them was
apprehended by his master, he was rescued by a crowd of his fellow soldiers,
who being involved in the same guilt, repelled, at the hazard of their lives,
every violence offered to any of their body. These by a prescriptive privilege
of the Alexandrian army, used to demand the king's favorites to be put to
death, pillage the properties of the rich to increase their pay, invest the
king's palace, banish some from the kingdom, and recall others from exile.
Besides these, there were two thousand horse, who had acquired the skill of
veterans by being in several wars in Alexandria. These had restored Ptolemy the
father to his kingdom, had killed Bibulus's two sons; and had been engaged in
war with the Egyptians; such was their experience in military affairs.
[3.111] Full of
confidence in his troops, and despising the small number of Caesar's soldiers,
Achillas seized Alexandria, except that part of the town which Caesar occupied
with his troops. At first he attempted to force the palace; but Caesar had
disposed his cohorts through the streets, and repelled his attack. At the same
time there was an action at the port: where the contest was maintained with the
greatest obstinacy. For the forces were divided, and the fight maintained in
several streets at once, and the enemy endeavored to seize with a strong party
the ships of war; of which fifty had been sent to Pompey's assistance, but
after the battle in Thessaly, had returned home. They were all of either three
or five banks of oars, well equipped and appointed with every necessary for a
voyage. Besides these, there were twenty-two vessels with decks, which were
usually kept at Alexandria, to guard the port. If they made themselves masters
of these, Caesar being deprived of his fleet, they would have the command of
the port and whole sea, and could prevent him from procuring provisions and
auxiliaries. Accordingly that spirit was displayed, which ought to be displayed
when the one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and the
other their safety. But Caesar gained the day, and set fire to all those ships,
and to others which were in the docks, because he could not guard so many
places with so small a force; and immediately he conveyed some troops to the
Pharos by his ships.
[3.112] The Pharos is a
tower on an island, of prodigious height, built with amazing works, and takes
its name from the island. This island lying over against Alexandria, forms a
harbor; but on the upper side it is connected with the town by a narrow way
eight hundred paces in length, made by piles sunk in the sea, and by a bridge.
In this island some of the Egyptians have houses, and a village as large as a
town; and whatever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the
channel, or by the storm, have been driven from their course upon the coast,
they constantly plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those who are
masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbor, on account of its
narrowness. Caesar being greatly alarmed on this account, while the enemy were
engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the Pharos, and placed a
garrison in it. By this means he gained this point, that he could be supplied
without danger with corn, and auxiliaries; for he sent to all the neighboring
countries, to demand supplies. In other parts of the town, they fought so
obstinately, that they quitted the field with equal advantage, and neither were
beaten (in consequence of the narrowness of the passes); and a few being killed
on both sides, Caesar secured the most necessary posts, and fortified them in
the night. In this quarter of the town was a wing of the king's palace, in
which Caesar was lodged on his first arrival, and a theater adjoining the house
which served as for citadel, and commanded an avenue to the ports and other
docks. These fortifications he increased during the succeeding days, that he might
have them before him as a rampart, and not be obliged to fight against his
will. In the mean time Ptolemy's younger daughter, hoping the throne would
become vacant, made her escape from the palace to Achillas, and assisted him in
prosecuting the war. But they soon quarreled about the command, which
circumstance enlarged the presents to the soldiers, for each endeavored by
great sacrifices to secure their affection. While the enemy was thus employed,
Pothinus, tutor to the young king, and regent of the kingdom, who was in
Caesar's part of the town, sent messengers to Achillas, and encouraged him not
to desist from his enterprise, nor to despair of success; but his messengers
being discovered and apprehended, he was put to death by Caesar. Such was the
commencement of the Alexandrian war.
End of Book 3
Aulus Hirtius
[1] When the war broke
out at Alexandria, Caesar sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia, for all his
fleet; and summoned archers from Crete, and cavalry from Malchus, king of the
Nabatheans. He likewise ordered military engines to be provided, corn to be
brought, and forces dispatched to him. Meanwhile he daily strengthened his
fortifications by new works; and such parts of the town as appeared less
tenable were strengthened with testudos and mantelets. Openings were made in
the walls, through which the battering-rams might play; and the fortifications
were extended over whatever space was covered with ruins, or taken by force.
For Alexandria is in a manner secure from fire, because the houses are all
built without joists or wood, and are all vaulted, and roofed with tile or
pavement. Caesar's principal aim was, to inclose with works the smallest part
of the town, separated from the rest by a morass toward the south: with these
views, first, that as the city was divided into two parts, the army should be
commanded by one general and one council; in the second place, that he might be
able to succor his troops when hard pressed, and carry aid from the other part
of the city. Above all, he by this means made sure of water end forage, as he
was but ill provided with the one, and wholly destitute of the other. The
morass, on the contrary, served abundantly to supply him with both.
[2] Nor were the
Alexandrians remiss on their side, or less active in the conduct of their
affairs. For they had sent deputies and commissioners into all parts, where the
powers and territories of Egypt extend, to levy troops. They had carried vast
quantities of darts and engines into the town, and drawn together an
innumerable multitude of soldiers. Nevertheless workshops were established in
every part of the city, for the making of arms. They enlisted all the slaves
that were of age; and the richer citizens supplied them with food and pay. By a
judicious disposition of this multitude, they guarded the fortifications in the
remoter parts of the town; while they quartered the veteran cohorts, which were
exempted from all other service, in the squares and open places; that on
whatever side an attack should be made, they might be at hand to give relief,
and march fresh to the charge. They shut up all the avenues and passes by a
triple wall built of square stones, and carried to the height of forty feet.
They defended the lower parts of the town by very high towers of ten stories:
besides which, they had likewise contrived a kind of moving towers, which
consisted of the same number of stories, and which being fitted with ropes and
wheels, could, by means of horses, as the streets of Alexandria were quite even
and level, be conveyed wherever their service was necessary.
[3] The city abounding
in every thing, and being very rich, furnished ample materials for these
several works: and as the people were extremely ingenious, and quick of
apprehension, they so well copied what they saw done by us that our men seemed
rather to imitate their works. They even invented many things themselves, and
attacked our works, at the same time that they defended their own. Their chiefs
every where represented: "That the people of Rome were endeavoring by
degrees to assume the possession of Egypt; that a few years before Gabinius had
come thither with an army; that Pompey had retreated to the same place in his
flight; that Caesar was now among them with a considerable body of troops, nor
had they gained any thing by Pompey's death; that Caesar should not prolong his
stay; that if they did not find means to expel him, the kingdom would be
reduced to a Roman province: and that they ought to do it at once, for he,
blockaded by the storms on account of the season of the year, could receive no
supplies from beyond the sea."
[4] Meanwhile, a
division arising between Achillas, who commanded the veteran army, and Arsinoe,
the youngest daughter of king Ptolemy, as has been mentioned above, while they
mutually endeavored to supplant one another, each striving to engross the
supreme authority, Arsinoe, by the assistance of the eunuch Ganymed, her
governor, at length prevailed, and slew Achillas. After his death, she
possessed the whole power without a rival, and raised Ganymed to the command of
the army; who, on his entrance upon that high office, augmented the largesses
of the troops, and with equal diligence discharged all other parts of his duty.
[5] Alexandria is
almost quite hollow underneath, occasioned by the many aqueducts to the Nile,
that furnish the private houses with water; where being received in cisterns,
it settles by degrees, and becomes perfectly clear. The master and his family
are accustomed to use this: for the water of the Nile being extremely thick and
muddy, is apt to breed many distempers. The common people, however, are forced
to be contented with the latter, because there is not a single spring in the
whole city. The river was in that part of the town which was in the possession
of the Alexandrians. By which circumstance Ganymed was reminded that our men
might be deprived of water; because being distributed into several streets, for
the more easy defense of the works, they made use of that which was preserved
in the aqueducts and the cisterns of private houses.
[6] With this view he
began a great and difficult work; for having stopped up all the canals by which
his own cisterns were supplied, he drew vast quantities of water out of the
sea, by the help of wheels and other engines, pouring it continually into the
canals of Caesar's quarter. The cisterns in the nearest houses soon began to
taste salter than ordinary, and occasioned great wonder among the men, who
could not think from what cause it proceeded. They were even ready to
disbelieve their senses when those who were quartered a little lower in the
town assured them that they found the water the same as before. This put them
upon comparing the cisterns one with another, and by trial they easily
perceived the difference. But in a little time the water in the nearest houses
became quite unfit for use, and that lower down grew daily more tainted and
brackish.
[7] All doubt being
removed by this circumstance, such a terror ensued among the troops that they
fancied themselves reduced to the last extremity. Some complained of Caesar's
delay, that he did not order them immediately to repair to their ships. Others
dreaded a yet greater misfortune, as it would be impossible to conceal their
design of retreating from the Alexandrians, who were so near them; and no less
so to embark in the face of a vigorous and pursuing enemy. There were besides a
great number of the townsmen in Caesar's quarter, whom he had not thought
proper to force from their houses, because they openly pretended to be in his
interest, and to have quitted the party of their follow-citizens. But to offer
here a defense either of the sincerity or conduct of these Alexandrians, would
be only labor in vain, since all who know the genius and temper of the people
must be satisfied that they are the fittest instruments in the world for
treason.
[8] Caesar labored to
remove his soldiers' fears by encouraging and reasoning with them. For he
affirmed "that they might easily find fresh water by digging wells, as all
sea coasts naturally abounded with fresh springs: that if Egypt was singular in
this respect, and differed from every other soil, yet still, as the sea was
open, and the enemy without a fleet, there was nothing to hinder their fetching
it at pleasure in their ships, either from Paraetonium on the left, or from the
island on the right; and as their two voyages were in different directions,
they could not be prevented by adverse winds at the same time; that a retreat
was on no account to be thought of, not only by those that had a concern for
their honor, but even by such as regarded nothing but life; that it was with
the utmost difficulty they could defend themselves behind their works; but if
they once quitted that advantage, neither in number or situation would they be
a match for the enemy: that to embark would require much time, and be attended
with great danger, especially where it must be managed by little boats: that
the Alexandrians, on the contrary, were nimble and active, and thoroughly
acquainted with the streets and buildings; that, moreover, when flushed with
victory, they would not fail to run before, seize all the advantageous posts,
possess themselves of the tops of the houses, and by annoying them in their
retreat, effectually prevent their getting on board; that they must therefore
think no more of retreating, but place all their hopes of safety in
victory."
[9] Having by this
speech re-assured his men, he ordered the centurions to lay aside all other
works, and apply themselves day and night to the digging of wells. The work
once begun, and the minds of all aroused to exertion, they exerted themselves
so vigorously that in the very first night abundance of fresh water was found.
Thus, with no great labor on our side, the mighty projects and painful attempts
of the Alexandrians were entirely frustrated. Within these two days the
thirty-seventh legion, composed of Pompey's veterans that had surrendered to
Caesar, embarking by order of Domitius Calvinus, with arms, darts, provisions,
and military engines, arrived upon the coast of Africa, a little above
Alexandria. These ships were hindered from gaining the port by an easterly
wind, which continued to blow for several days; but all along that coast it is
very safe to ride at anchor. Being detained, however, longer than they
expected, and distressed by want of water, they gave notice of it to Caesar, by
a dispatch sloop.
[10] Caesar, that he
might himself be able to determine what was best to be done, went on board one
of the ships in the harbor, and ordered the whole fleet to follow. He took none
of the land forces with him, because he was unwilling to leave the works
unguarded during his absence. Being arrived at that part of the coast known by
the name of Chersonesus, he sent some mariners on shore to fetch water. Some of
these venturing too far into the country for the sake of plunder, were
intercepted by the enemy's horse. From them the Egyptians learned that Caesar
himself was on board, without any soldiers. Upon this information, they thought
fortune had thrown in their way a good opportunity of attempting something with
success. They therefore manned all the ships that they had ready for sea, and
met Caesar on his return. He declined fighting that day, for two reasons,
first, because he had no soldiers on board, and secondly, because it was past
four in the afternoon. The night, he was sensible, must be highly advantageous
to his enemies, who depended on their knowledge of the coast, while he would be
deprived of the benefit of encouraging his men, which could not be done with
any effect in the dark, where courage and cowardice must remain equally
unknown. Caesar, therefore, drew all his ships toward the shore, where he
imagined the enemy would not follow him.
[11] There was one
Rhodian galley in Caesar's right wing, considerably distant from the rest. The
enemy observing this, could not restrain themselves, but came forward with
four-decked ships, and several open barks, to attack her. Caesar was obliged to
advance to her relief, that he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one of
his galleys sunk before his eyes though, had he left her to perish, he judged
that she deserved it for her rashness. The attack was sustained with great
courage by the Rhodians, who, though at all times distinguished by their valor
and experience in engagements at sea yet exerted themselves in a particular
manner on this occasion, that they might not draw upon themselves the charge of
having occasioned a misfortune to the fleet. Accordingly they obtained a complete
victory, took one four-banked galley, sunk another, disabled a third, and slew
all that were on board, besides a great number of the combatants belonging to
the other ships. Nay, had not night interposed, Caesar would have made himself
master of their whole fleet. During the consternation that followed upon this
defeat, Caesar, finding the contrary winds to abate, took the transports in
tow, and advanced with the victorious fleet to Alexandria.
[12] The Alexandrians,
disheartened at this loss, since they found themselves now worsted, not by the
superior valor of the soldiers, but by the skill and ability of the mariners,
retired to the tops of their houses, and blocked up the entrances of their
streets, as if they feared our fleet might attack them even by land. But soon
after, Ganymed assuring them in council, that he would not only restore the
vessels they had lost, but even increase their number, they began to repair
their old ships with great expectation and confidence, and resolved to apply
more than ever to the putting their fleet in a good condition. And although
they had lost above a hundred and ten ships in the port and arsenal, yet they
did not relinquish the idea of repairing their fleet; because, by making
themselves masters of the sea, they saw they would have it in their power to
hinder Caesar's receiving any reinforcements or supplies. Besides, being
mariners, born upon the sea-coast, and exercised from their infancy in naval
affairs, they were desirous to return to that wherein their true and proper
strength lay, remembering the advantages they had formerly gained, even with
their little ships. They therefore applied themselves with all diligence to the
equipping a fleet.
[13] Vessels were
stationed at all the mouths of the Nile; for receiving and gathering in the
customs. Several old ships were likewise lodged in the king's private arsenals
which had not put to sea for many years. These last they refitted, and recalled
the former to Alexandria. Oars were wanting; they uncovered the porticos,
academies, and public buildings, and made use of the planks they furnished for
oars. Their natural ingenuity, and the abundance of all things to be met with
in the city, supplied every want. In fine, they had no long navigation to
provide for, and were only solicitous about present exigences, foreseeing they
would have no occasion to fight but in the port. In a few days, therefore,
contrary to all expectation, they had fitted out twenty-two quadriremes, and
five quinqueremes. To these they added a great number of small open barks; and
after testing the efficiency of each in the harbor, put a sufficient number of
soldiers on board, and prepared every thing necessary for an engagement. Caesar
had nine Rhodian galleys (for of the ten which were sent, one was shipwrecked
on the coast of Egypt), eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from
Asia. Of these, ten were quadriremes, and five quinqueremes; the rest were
smaller, and for the most part without decks. Yet, trusting to the valor of his
soldiers, and being acquainted with the strength of the enemy, he prepared for
an engagement.
[14] When both sides
were come to have sufficient confidence in their own strength, Caesar sailed
round Pharos, and formed in line of battle opposite to the enemy. He placed the
Rhodian galleys on his right wing, and those of Pontus on his left. Between
these he left a space of four hundred paces, to allow for extending and working
the vessels. This disposition being made, he drew up the rest of the fleet as a
reserve, giving them the necessary orders, and distributing them in such a
manner that every ship followed that to which she was appointed to give succor.
The Alexandrians brought out their fleet with great confidence, and drew it up,
placing their twenty-two quadriremes in front, and disposing the rest behind
them in a second line, by way of reserve. They had besides a great number of
boats and smaller vessels, which carried fire and combustibles, with the
intention of intimidating us by their number, cries, and flaming darts. Between
the two fleets were certain flats, separated by very narrow channels, and which
are said to be on the African coast, as being in that division of Alexandria
which belongs to Africa. Both sides waited which should first pass these
shallows, because whoever entered the narrow channels between them, in case of
any misfortune, would be impeded both in retreating and working their ships to
advantage.
[15] Euphranor
commanded the Rhodian fleet, who for valor and greatness of mind deserved to be
ranked among our own men rather than the Grecians. The Rhodians had raised him
to the post of admiral, on account of his known courage and experience. He,
perceiving Caesar's design, addressed him to this effect: "You seem afraid
of passing the shallow first, lest you should be thereby forced to come to an
engagement, before you can bring up the rest of the fleet. Leave the matter to
us; we will sustain the fight (and we will not disappoint your expectations),
until the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It is both dishonorable and
afflicting that they should so long continue in our sight with an air of
triumph." Caesar, encouraging him in his design, and bestowing many
praises upon him, gave the signal for engaging. Four Rhodian ships having passed
the shallows, the Alexandrians gathered round and attacked them. They
maintained the fight with great courage, disengaging themselves by their art
and address, and working their ships with so much skill, that notwithstanding
the inequality of number, none of the enemy were suffered to run alongside, or
break their oars. Meantime the rest of the fleet came up; when, on account of
the narrowness of the place, art became useless, and the contest depended
entirely upon valor. Nor was there at Alexandria a single Roman or citizen who
remained engaged in the attack or defense, but mounted the tops of the houses
and all the eminences that would give a view of the fight, addressing the gods
by vows and prayers for victory.
[16] The event of the
battle was by no means equal; a defeat would have deprived us of all resources
either by land or sea; and even if we were victorious, the future would be
uncertain. The Alexandrians, on the contrary, by a victory gained every thing;
and if defeated, might yet again have recourse to fortune. It was likewise a
matter of the highest concern to see the safety of all depend upon a few, of
whom, if any were deficient in resolution and energy, they would expose their
whole party to destruction. This Caesar had often represented to his troops
during the preceding days, that they might be thereby induced to fight with the
more resolution, when they knew the common safety to depend upon their bravery.
Every man said the same to his comrade, companion, and friend, beseeching him
not to disappoint the expectation of those who had chosen him in preference to
others for the defense of the common interest. Accordingly, they fought with so
much resolution, that neither the art nor address of the Egyptians, a maritime
and seafaring people, could avail them, nor the multitude of their ships be of
service to them; nor the valor of those selected for this engagement be
compared to the determined courage of the Romans. In this action a quinquereme
was taken, and a bireme, with all the soldiers and mariners on board, besides
three sunk, without any loss on our side. The rest fled toward the town, and
protecting their ships under the mole and forts, prevented us from approaching.
[17] To deprive the
enemy of this resource for the future, Caesar thought it by all means necessary
to render himself master of the mole and island; for having already in a great
measure completed his works within the town, he was in hopes of being able to
defend himself both in the island and city. This resolution being taken, he put
into boats and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of light-armed
infantry, and such of the Gallic cavalry as he thought fittest for his purpose,
and sent them against the island; while, at the same time, to create a
diversion, he attacked it on the other with his fleet, promising great rewards
to those who should first render themselves masters of it. At first, the enemy
firmly withstood the impetuosity of our men; for they both annoyed them from
the tops of the houses, and gallantly maintained their ground along the shore;
to which being steep and craggy, our men could find no way of approach; the
more accessible avenues being skillfully defended by small boats, and five
galleys, prudently stationed for that purpose. But when after examining the approaches,
and sounding the shallows, a few of our men got a footing upon the shore, and
were followed by others, who pushed the islanders, without intermission; the
Pharians at last betook themselves to flight. On their defeat, the rest
abandoning the defense of the port, quitted their ships, and retired into the
town, to provide for the security of their houses
[18] But they could not
long maintain their ground there: though, to compare small things with great,
their buildings were not unlike those of Alexandria, and their towers were
high, and joined together so as to form a kind of wall; and our men had not
come prepared with ladders, fascines, or any weapons for assault. But fear
often deprives men of intellect and counsel, and weakens their strength, as
happened upon this occasion. Those who had ventured to oppose us on even
ground, terrified by the loss of a few men, and the general rout, durst not
face us from a height of thirty feet; but throwing themselves from the mole
into the sea, endeavored to gain the town, though above eight hundred paces
distant. Many however were slain, and about six hundred taken.
[19] Caesar, giving up
the plunder to the soldiers, ordered the houses to be demolished, but fortified
the castle at the end of the bridge next the island, and placed a garrison in
it. This the Pharians had abandoned; but the other, toward the town, which was
considerably stronger, was still held by the Alexandrians. Caesar attacked it
next day; because by getting possession of these two forts, he would be
entirely master of the port, and prevent sudden excursions and piracies.
Already he had, by means of his arrows and engines, forced the garrison to
abandon the place, and retire toward the town. He had also landed three cohorts
which was all the place would contain; the rest of his troops were stationed in
their ships. This being done, he orders them to fortify the bridge against the
enemy, and to fill with stones and block up the arch on which the bridge was
built, through which there was egress for the ships. When one of these works
was accomplished so effectually, that no boat could pass out at all, and when
the other was commenced, the Alexandrians sallied, in crowds from the town, and
drew up in an open place, over against the intrenchment we had cast up at the
head of the bridge. At the same time they stationed at the mole the vessels
which they had been wont to make pass under the bridge, to set fire to our
ships of burden. Our men fought from the bridge and the mole; the enemy from
the space, opposite to the bridge, and from their ships, by the side of the
mole.
[20] While Caesar was
engaged in these things, and in exhorting his troops, a number of rowers and
mariners, quitting their ships, threw themselves upon the mole, partly out of curiosity,
partly to have a share in the action. At first, with stones and slings, they
forced the enemy's ships from the mole; and seemed to do still greater
execution with their darts. But when, some time after, a few Alexandrians found
means to land, and attack them in flank, as they had left their ships without
order or discipline, so they soon began to flee, with precipitation. The
Alexandrians, encouraged by this success, landed in great numbers, and
vigorously pressed upon our men, who were, by this time, in great confusion.
Those that remained in the galleys perceiving this, drew up the ladders and put
off from the shore, to prevent the enemy's boarding them. Our soldiers who
belonged to the three cohorts, which were at the head of the mole to guard the
bridge, astonished at this disorder, the cries they heard behind them, and the
general rout of their party, unable besides to bear up against the great number
of darts which came pouring upon them, and fearing to be surrounded, and have
their retreat cut off, by the departure of their ships, abandoned the
fortifications which they had commenced at the bridge, and ran, with all the
speed they could, toward the galleys: some getting on board the nearest
vessels, overloaded and sank them: part, resisting the enemy, and uncertain
what course to take, were cut to pieces by the Alexandrians. Others, more
fortunate, got to the ships that rode at anchor; and a few, supported by their
bucklers, making a determined struggle, swam to the nearest vessels.
[21] Caesar,
endeavoring to re-animate his men, and lead them back to the defense of the
works, was exposed to the same danger as the rest; when, finding them
universally to give ground, he retreated to his own galley, whither such a
multitude followed and crowded after him, that it was impossible either to work
or put her off. Foreseeing what must happen, he flung himself into the sea, and
swam to the ships that lay at some distance. Hence dispatching boats to succor
his men, he, by that means, preserved a small number. His own ship, being sunk
by the multitude that crowded into her, went down with all that were on board.
About four hundred legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that number of
sailors and rowers, were lost in this action. The Alexandrians secured the fort
by strong works, and a great number of engines; and having cleared away the
stones with which Caesar had blocked up the port, enjoyed henceforward a free
and open navigation.
[22] Our men were so
far from being disheartened at this loss, that they seemed rather roused and
animated by it. They made continual sallies upon the enemy, to destroy or check
the progress of their works; fell upon them as often as they had an
opportunity; and never failed to intercept them, when they ventured to advance
beyond their fortifications. In short, the legions were so bent upon fighting,
that they even exceeded the orders and exhortations of Caesar. They were
inconsolable for their late disgrace, and impatient to come to blows with the
enemy; insomuch, that he found it necessary rather to restrain and check their
ardor, than incite them to action.
[23] The Alexandrians,
perceiving that success confirmed the Romans, and that adverse fortune only
animated them the more, as they knew of no medium between these on which to
ground any further hopes, resolved, as far as we can conjecture, either by the
advice of the friends of their king who were in Caesar's quarter, or of their
own previous design, intimated to the king by secret emissaries, to send
embassadors to Caesar to request him, "To dismiss their king and suffer
him to rejoin his subjects; that the people, weary of subjection to a woman, of
living under a precarious government, and submitting to the cruel laws of the
tyrant Ganymed, were ready to execute the orders of the king: and if by his
sanction they should embrace the alliance and protection of Caesar, the
multitude would not be deterred from surrendering by the fear of danger."
[24] Though Caesar knew
the nation to be false and perfidious, seldom speaking as they really thought,
yet he judged it best to comply with their desire. He even flattered himself,
that his condescension in sending back their king at their request, would
prevail on them to be faithful; or, as was more agreeable to their character,
if they only wanted the king to head their army, at least it would be more for
his honor and credit to have to do with a monarch than with a band of slaves
and fugitives. Accordingly, he exhorted the king, "To take the government
into his own hands, and consult the welfare of so fair and illustrious a
kingdom, defaced by hideous ruins and conflagrations. To make his subjects
sensible of their duty, preserve them from the destruction that threatened
them, and act with fidelity toward himself and the Romans, who put so much
confidence in him, as to send him among armed enemies." Then taking him by
the hand, he dismissed the young prince who was fast approaching manhood. But
his mind being thoroughly versed in the art of dissimulation, and no way degenerating
from the character of his nation, he entreated Caesar with tears not to send
him back; for that his company was to him preferable to a kingdom. Caesar,
moved at his concern, dried up his tears; and telling him, if these were his
real sentiments, they would soon meet again, dismissed him. The king, like a
wild beast escaped out of confinement, carried on the war with such acrimony
against Caesar, that the tears he shed at parting seemed to have been tears of
joy. Caesar's lieutenants, friends, centurions, and soldiers, were delighted
that this had happened; because his easiness of temper had been imposed upon by
a child: as if in truth Caesar's behavior on this occasion had been the effect
of easiness of temper, and not of the most consummate prudence.
[25] When the
Alexandrians found that on the recovery of their king, neither had they become
stronger, nor the Romans weaker; that the troops despised the youth and
weakness of their king; and that their affairs were in no way bettered by his
presence: they were greatly discouraged; and a report ran that a large body of
troops was marching by land from Syria and Cilicia to Caesar's assistance (of
which he had not as yet himself received information); still they determined to
intercept the convoys that came to him by sea. To this end, having equipped
some ships, they ordered them to cruise before the Canopic branch of the Nile,
by which they thought it most likely our supplies would arrive. Caesar, who was
informed of it, ordered his fleet to get ready, and gave the command of it to
Tiberius Nero. The Rhodian galleys made part of this squadron, headed by
Euphranor their admiral, without whom there never was a successful engagement
fought. But fortune, which often reserves the heaviest disasters for those who
have been loaded with her highest favors, encountered Euphranor upon this
occasion, with an aspect very different from what she had hitherto worn. For
when our ships were arrived at Canopus, and the fleets drawn up on each side
had begun the engagement, Euphranor, according to custom, having made the first
attack, and pierced and sunk one of the enemy's ships; as he pursued the next a
considerable way, without being sufficiently supported by those that followed
him, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. None of the fleet advanced to his
relief, either out of fear for their own safety, or because they imagined he
would easily be able to extricate himself by his courage and good fortune.
Accordingly he alone behaved well in this action, and perished with his
victorious galley.
[26] About the same
time Mithridates of Pergamus, a man of illustrious descent, distinguished for
his bravery and knowledge of the art of war, and who held a very high place in
the friendship and confidence of Caesar, having been sent in the beginning of
the Alexandrian war, to raise succors in Syria and Cilicia, arrived by land at
the head of a great body of troops, which his diligence, and the affection of
these two provinces, had enabled him to draw together in a very short time. He
conducted them first to Pelusium, where Egypt joins Syria. Achillas, who was
perfectly well acquainted with its importance, had seized and put a strong
garrison into it. For Egypt is considered as defended on all sides by strong
barriers; on the side of the sea by the Pharos, and on the side of Syria by
Pelusium, which are accounted the two keys of that kingdom. He attacked it so
briskly with a large body of troops, fresh men continually succeeding in the
place of those that were fatigued, and urged the assault with so much firmness
and perseverance, that he carried it the same day on which he attacked it, and
placed a garrison in it. Thence he pursued his march to Alexandria, reducing
all the provinces through which he passed, and conciliating them to Caesar, by
that authority which always accompanies the conqueror.
[27] Not far from
Alexandria lies Delta, the most celebrated province of Egypt, which derives its
name from the Greek letter so called. For the Nile, dividing into two channels,
which gradually diverge as they approach the sea, into which they at last
discharge themselves, at a considerable distance from one another, leaves an
intermediate space in form of a triangle. The king understanding that
Mithridates was approaching this place, and knowing he must pass the river,
sent a large body of troops against him, sufficient, as he thought, if not to
overwhelm and crush him, at least to stop his march, for though he earnestly
desired to see him defeated, yet he thought it a great point gained, to hinder
his junction with Caesar. The troops that first passed the river, and came up
with Mithridates, attacked him immediately, hastening to snatch the honor of
victory from the troops that were marching to their aid. Mithridates at first
confined himself to the defense of his camp, which he had with great prudence
fortified according to the custom of the Romans: but observing that they
advanced insolently and without caution, he sallied upon them from all parts,
and put a great number of them to the sword; insomuch that, but for their
knowledge of the ground, and the neighborhood of the vessels in which they had
passed the river, they must have been all destroyed. But recovering by degrees
from their terror, and joining the troops that followed them, they again
prepared to attack Mithridates.
[28] A messenger was
sent by Mithridates to Caesar, to inform him of what had happened. The king
learns from his followers that the action had taken place. Thus, much about the
same time, Ptolemy set out to crush Mithridates, and Caesar to relieve him. The
king made use of the more expeditious conveyance of the Nile, where he had a
large fleet in readiness. Caesar declined the navigation of the river, that he
might not be obliged to engage the enemy's fleet; and coasting along the
African shore, found means to join the victorious troops of Mithridates, before
Ptolemy could attack him. The king had encamped in a place fortified by nature,
being an eminence surrounded on all sides by a plain. Three of its sides were
secured by various defenses. One was washed by the river Nile, the other was
steep and inaccessible, and the third was defended by a morass.
[29] Between Ptolemy's
camp and Caesar's route lay a narrow river with very steep banks, which
discharged itself into the Nile. This river was about seven miles from the
king's camp; who, understanding that Caesar was directing his march that way,
sent all his cavalry, with a choice body of light-armed foot, to prevent Caesar
from crossing, and maintain an unequal fight from the banks, where courage had
no opportunity to exert itself, and cowardice ran no hazard. Our men, both
horse and foot, were extremely mortified, that the Alexandrians should so long
maintain their ground against them. Wherefore, some of the German cavalry,
dispersing in quest of a ford, found means to swim the river where the banks
were lowest; and the legionaries at the same time cutting down several large
trees, that reached from one bank to another, and constructing suddenly a
mound, by their help got to the other side. The enemy were so much in dread of
their attack, that they betook themselves to flight; but in vain: for very few
returned to the king, almost all being cut to pieces in the pursuit.
[30] Caesar, upon this
success, judging that his sudden approach must strike great terror into the
Alexandrians, advanced toward their camp with his victorious army. But finding
it well intrenched, strongly fortified by nature, and the ramparts covered with
armed soldiers, he did not think proper that his troops, who were very much
fatigued both by their march and the late battle, should attack it; and
therefore encamped at a small distance from the enemy. Next day he attacked a
fort, in a village not far off, which the king had fortified and joined to his
camp by a line of communication, with a view to keep possession of the village.
He attacked it with his whole army, and took it by storm; not because it would
have been difficult to carry it with a few forces; but with the design of
falling immediately upon the enemy's camp, during the alarm which the loss of
this fort must give them. Accordingly, the Romans, in continuing the pursuit of
those that fled from the fort, arrived at last before the Alexandrian camp, and
commenced a most furious action at a distance. There were two approaches by
which it might be attacked; one by the plain, of which we have spoken before,
the other by a narrow pass, between their camp and the Nile. The first, which
was much the easiest, was defended by a numerous body of their best troops; and
the access on the side of the Nile gave the enemy great advantage in
distressing and wounding our men; for they were exposed to a double shower of
darts: in front from the rampart, behind from the river; where the enemy had
stationed a great number of ships, furnished with archers and slingers, that
kept up a continual discharge.
[31] Caesar, observing
that his troops fought with the utmost ardor, and yet made no great progress,
on account of the disadvantage of the ground; and perceiving they had left the
highest part of their camp unguarded, because, it being sufficiently fortified
by nature, they had all crowded to the other attacks, partly to have a share in
the action, partly to be spectators of the issue; he ordered some cohorts to wheel
round the camp, and gain that ascent: appointing Carfulenus to command them, a
man distinguished for bravery and acquaintance with the service. When they had
reached the place, as there were but very few to defend it, our men attacked
them so briskly that the Alexandrians, terrified by the cries they heard behind
them, and seeing themselves attacked both in front and rear, fled in the utmost
consternation on all sides. Our men, animated by the confusion of the enemy,
entered the camp in several places at the same time, and running down from the
higher ground, put a great number of them to the sword. The Alexandrians,
endeavoring to escape, threw themselves in crowds over the rampart in the
quarter next the river. The foremost tumbling into the ditch, where they were
crushed to death, furnished an easy passage for those that followed. It is
ascertained that the king escaped from the camp, and was received on board a
ship; but by the crowd that followed him, the ship in which he fled was
overloaded and sunk.
[32] After this speedy
and successful action, Caesar, in consequence of so great a victory, marched
the nearest way by land to Alexandria with his cavalry, and entered triumphant
into that part of the town which was possessed by the enemy's guards. He was
not mistaken in thinking that the Alexandrians, upon hearing of the issue of
the battle, would give over all thoughts of war. Accordingly, as soon as he
arrived, he reaped the just fruit of his valor and magnanimity. For all the
multitude of the inhabitants, throwing down their arms, abandoning their works,
and assuming the habit of suppliants, preceded by all those sacred symbols of
religion with which they were wont to mollify their offended kings, met Caesar
on his arrival and surrendered. Caesar, accepting their submission, and
encouraging them, advanced through the enemy's works into his own quarter of
the town, where he was received with the universal congratulations of his
party, who were no less overjoyed at his arrival and presence, than at the
happy issue of the war.
[33] Caesar, having
thus made himself master of Alexandria and Egypt, lodged the government in the
hands of those to whom Ptolemy had bequeathed it by will, conjuring the Roman
people not to permit any change. For the eldest of Ptolemy's two sons being
dead, Caesar settled the kingdom upon the youngest, in conjunction with
Cleopatra, the elder of the two sisters, who had always continued under his
protection and guardianship. The younger, Arsinoe, in whose name Ganymed, as we
have seen, tyrannically reigned for some time he thought proper to banish the
kingdom, that she might not raise any new disturbance, through the agency of
seditious men, before the king's authority should be firmly established. Taking
the sixth veteran legion with him into Syria, he left the rest in Egypt to
support the authority of the king and queen, neither of whom stood well in the
affections of their subjects, on account of their attachment to Caesar, nor
could be supposed to have given any fixed foundation to their power, in an
administration of only a few days' continuance. It was also for the honor and
interest of the republic that if they continued faithful our forces should
protect them; but if ungrateful that they should be restrained by the same power.
Having thus settled the kingdom, he marched by land into Syria.
[34] While these things
passed in Egypt, king Deiotarus applied to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar
had intrusted the government of Asia and the neighboring provinces, beseeching
him "not to suffer the Lesser Armenia which was his kingdom, or
Cappadocia, which belonged to Ariobarzanes, to be seized and laid waste by
Pharnaces, because, unless they were delivered from these insults, it would be
impossible for them to execute Caesar's orders, or raise the money they stood
engaged to pay." Domitius, who was not only sensible of the necessity of
money to defray the expenses of the war, but likewise thought it dishonorable
to the people of Rome and the victorious Caesar, as well as infamous to himself,
to suffer the dominions of allies and friends to be usurped by a foreign
prince, sent embassadors to Pharnaces, to acquaint him, "That he must
withdraw immediately from Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer insult the
majesty and right of the Roman people, while engaged in a civil war." But
believing that his deputation would have greater weight, if he was ready to
second it himself at the head of an army; he repaired to the legions which were
then in Asia, ordering two of them into Egypt, at Caesar's desire, and carrying
the thirty-sixth: along with him. To the thirty-sixth legion Deiotarus added
two more, which he had trained up for several years, according to our
discipline; and a hundred horse. The like number of horse were furnished by
Ariobarzanes. At the same time, he sent P. Sextius to C. Plaetorius the
questor, for the legion which had been lately levied in Pontus; and Quinctius
Partisius into Cilicia, to draw thence a body of auxiliary troops. All these
forces speedily assembled at Comana, by orders of Domitius.
[35] Meanwhile his
embassadors bring back the following answer from Pharnaces: "That he had
quitted Cappadocia; but kept possession of the Lesser Armenia, as his own, by
right of inheritance: that he was willing, however, to submit every thing to
the decision of Caesar, to whose commands he would pay immediate
obedience." C. Domitius, sensible that he had quitted Cappadocia, not
voluntarily, but out of necessity; because he could more easily defend Armenia,
which lay contiguous to his own kingdom, than Cappadocia, which was more
remote: and because believing, at first, that Domitius had brought all the
three legions along with him, upon hearing that two were gone to Caesar, he
seemed more determined to keep possession; and insisted "upon his quitting
Armenia likewise, as the same right existed in both cases; nor was it just to
demand that the matter should be postponed till Caesar's return, unless things
were put in the condition in which they were at first." Having returned this
answer, he advanced toward Armenia, with the forces above-mentioned, directing
his march along the hills; for from Pontus, by way of Comana, runs a woody
ridge of hills, that extends as far as Lesser Armenia, dividing it from
Cappadocia. The advantages he had in view, by such a march, were, that he would
thereby effectually prevent all surprises, and be plentifully supplied with
provisions from Cappadocia.
[36] Meantime Pharnaces
sends several embassies to Domitius to treat of peace, bearing royal gifts. All
these he firmly rejected, telling the deputies: "That nothing was more
sacred with him, than the majesty of the Roman people, and recovering the
rights of their allies." After long and continued marches, he reached
Nicopolis (which is a city of Lesser Armenia, situated in a plain, having
mountains, however, on its two sides, at a considerable distance), and encamped
about seven miles from the town. Between his camp and Nicopolis, lay a
difficult and narrow pass, where Pharnaces placed a chosen body of foot, and
all his horse, in ambuscade. He ordered a great number of cattle to be
dispersed in the pass, and the townsmen and peasants to show themselves, that
if Domitius entered the defile as a friend, he might have no suspicion of an
ambuscade, when he saw the men and flocks dispersed, without apprehension, in
the fields; or if he should come as an enemy, that the soldiers, quitting their
ranks to pillage, might be cut to pieces when dispersed.
[37] While this design
was going forward, he never ceased sending embassadors to Domitius, with
proposals of peace and amity, fancying, by this means, the more easy to ensnare
him. The expectation of peace kept Domitius in his camp; so that Pharnaces,
having missed the opportunity, and fearing the ambuscade might be discovered,
drew off his troops. Next day Domitius approached Nicopolis, and encamped near
the town. While our men were working at the trenches, Pharnaces drew up his
army in order of battle, forming his front into one line, according to the
custom of the country, and securing his wings with a triple body of reserves.
In the same manner, the center was formed in single files, and two intervals
were left on the right and left. Domitius, ordering part of the troops to
continue under arms before the rampart, completed the fortifications of his
camp.
[38] Next night,
Pharnaces, having intercepted the couriers who brought Domitius an account of
the posture of affairs at Alexandria, understood that Caesar was in great
danger, and requested Domitius to send him succors speedily, and come himself
to Alexandria by the way of Syria. Pharnaces, upon this intelligence, imagined
that protracting the time would be equivalent to a victory, because Domitius,
he supposed, must very soon depart. He therefore dug two ditches, four feet
deep, at a moderate distance from each other, on that side where lay the
easiest access to the town and our forces might, most advantageously, attack
him; resolving not to advance beyond them. Between these, he constantly drew up
his army, placing all his cavalry upon the wings without them, which greatly
exceeded ours in number, and would otherwise have been useless.
[39] Domitius, more
concerned at Caesar's danger than his own, and believing he could not retire
with safety, should he now desire the conditions he had rejected, or march away
without any apparent cause, drew his forces out of the camp, and ranged them in
order of battle. He placed the thirty-sixth legion on the right, that of Pontus
on the left, and those of Deiotarus in the main body; drawing them up with a
very narrow front, and posting the rest of the cohorts to sustain the wings.
The armies being thus drawn up on each side, they advanced to the battle.
[40] The signal being
given at the same time by both parties, they engage. The conflict was sharp and
various, for the thirty-sixth legion falling upon the king's cavalry, that was
drawn up without the ditch, charged them so successfully, that they drove them
to the very walls of the town, passed the ditch, and attacked their infantry in
the rear. But on the other side, the legion of Pontus having given way, the
second line, which advanced to sustain them, making a circuit round the ditch,
in order to attack the enemy in flank, was overwhelmed and borne down by a
shower of darts, in endeavoring to pass it. The legions of Deiotarus made
scarcely any resistance; thus the victorious forces of the king turned their
right wing and main body against the thirty-sixth legion, which yet made a
brave stand; and though surrounded by the forces of the enemy, formed
themselves into a circle, with wonderful presence of mind, and retired to the
foot of a mountain, whither Pharnaces did not think fit to pursue them, on
account of the disadvantage of the place. Thus the legion of Pontus being almost
wholly cut off, with great part of those of Deiotarus, the thirty-sixth legion
retreated to an eminence, with the loss of about two hundred and fifty men.
Several Roman knights, of illustrious rank, fell in this battle. Domitius,
after this defeat, rallied the remains of his broken army, and retreated, by
safe ways, through Cappadocia, into Asia.
[41] Pharnaces, elated
with this success, as he expected that Caesar's difficulties would terminate as
he [Pharnaces] wished, entered Pontus with all his forces. There, acting as
conqueror and a most cruel king, and promising himself a happier destiny than
his father, he stormed many towns, and seized the effects of the Roman and
Pontic citizens, inflicted punishments, worse than death, upon such as were
distinguished by their age or beauty, and having made himself master of all
Pontus, as there was no one to oppose his progress, boasted that he had
recovered his father's kingdom.
[42] About the same
time, we received a considerable check in Illyricum; which province, had been
defended the preceding months, not only without insult, but even with honor.
For Caesar's quaestor, Q. Cornificius, had been sent there as propraetor, the
summer before, with two legions; and though it was of itself little able to
support an army, and at that time in particular was almost totally ruined by
the war in the vicinity, and the civil dissensions; yet, by his prudence, and
vigilance, being very careful not to undertake any rash expedition, he defended
and kept possession of it. For he made himself master of several forts, built
on eminences, whose advantageous situation tempted the inhabitants to make
descents and inroads upon the country; and gave the plunder of them to his
soldiers (and although this was but inconsiderable, yet as they were no
strangers to the distress and ill condition of the province, they did not cease
to be grateful; the rather as it was the fruit of their own valor). And when,
after the battle of Pharsalia, Octavius had retreated to that coast with a
large fleet; Cornificius, with some vessels of the inhabitants of Jadua, who
had always continued faithful to the commonwealth, made himself master of the
greatest part of his ships, which, joined to those of his allies, rendered him
capable of sustaining even a naval engagement. And while Caesar, victorious,
was pursuing Pompey to the remotest parts of the earth; when he [Cornificius]
heard that the enemy had, for the most part, retired into Illyricum, on account
of its neighborhood to Macedonia, and were there collecting such as survived
the defeat [at Pharsalia], he wrote to Gabinius, "To repair directly
thither, with the new raised legions, and join Cornificius, that if any danger
should assail the province, he might ward it off, but if less forces sufficed,
to march into Macedonia, which he foresaw would never be free from commotions,
so long as Pompey lived."
[43] Gabinius, whether
he imagined the province better provided than it really was, or depended much
upon the auspicious fortune of Caesar, or confided in his own valor and
abilities, he having often terminated with success difficult and dangerous
wars, marched into Illyricum, in the middle of winter, and the most difficult
season of the year; where, not finding sufficient subsistence in the province,
which was partly exhausted, partly disaffected, and having no supplies by sea,
because the season of the year had put a stop to navigation, he found himself
compelled to carry on the war, not according to his own inclination, but as
necessity allowed. As he was therefore obliged to lay siege to forts and
castles, in a very rude season, he received many checks, and fell under such
contempt with the barbarians, that while retiring to Salona, a maritime city,
inhabited by a set of brave and faithful Romans, he was compelled to come to an
engagement on his march; and after the loss of two thousand soldiers,
thirty-eight centurions, and four tribunes, got to Salona with the rest; where
his wants continually increasing, he died a few days after. His misfortunes and
sudden death gave Octavius great hopes of reducing the province. But fortune,
whose influence is so great in matters of war, joined to the diligence of
Cornificius, and the valor of Vatinius, soon put an end to his triumphs.
[44] Vatinius, who was
then at Brundusium, having intelligence of what passed in Illyricum, by letters
from Cornificius, who pressed him to come to the assistance of the province,
and informed him, that Octavius had leagued with the barbarians, and in several
places attacked our garrisons, partly by sea with his fleet, partly by land
with the troops of the barbarians; Vatinius, I say, upon notice of these
things, though extremely weakened by sickness, insomuch that his strength of
body no way answered his resolution and greatness of mind; yet, by his valor,
surmounted all opposition, the force of his distemper, the rigor of the winter
and the difficulties of a sudden preparation. For having himself but a very few
galleys, he wrote to Q. Kalenus, in Achaia, to furnish him with a squadron of
ships. But these not coming with that dispatch which the danger our army was in
required, because Octavius pressed hard upon them, he fastened beaks to all the
barks and vessels that lay in the port, whose number was considerable enough,
though they were not sufficiently large for an engagement. Joining these to
what galleys he had, and putting on board the veteran soldiers, of whom he had
a great number, belonging to all the legions, who had been left sick at
Brundusium, when the army went over to Greece, he sailed for Illyricum; where,
having subjected several maritime states that had declared for Octavius, and
neglecting such as continued obstinate in their revolt, because he would suffer
nothing to retard his design of meeting the enemy, he came up with Octavius
before Epidaurus; and obliging him to raise the siege, which he was carrying on
with vigor, by sea and land, joined the garrison to his own forces.
[45] Octavius,
understanding that Vatinius's fleet consisted mostly of small barks, and
confiding in the strength of his own, stopped at the Isle of Tauris. Vatinius
followed him thither, not imagining he would halt at that place, but being
determined to pursue him wherever he went. Vatinius, who had no suspicion of an
enemy, and whose ships were moreover dispersed by a tempest, perceived, as he
approached the isle, a vessel filled with soldiers that advanced toward him, in
full sail. Upon this he gave orders for furling the sails, lowering the
sail-yards, and arming the soldiers; and hoisting a flag, as a signal for
battle, intimated to the ships that followed to do the same. Vatinius's men
prepared themselves in the best manner their sudden surprise would allow, while
Octavius advanced in good order, from the port. The two fleets drew up;
Octavius had the advantage in arrangement, and Vatinius in the bravery of his
troops.
[46] Vatinius, finding
himself inferior to the enemy, both in the number and largeness of his ships,
resolved to commit the affair to fortune, and therefore in his own quinquereme,
attacked Octavius in his four-banked galley. This he did with such violence,
and the shock was so great, that the beak of Octavius's galley was broken. The
battle raged with great fury likewise in other places, but chiefly around the
two admirals; for as the ships on each side advanced to sustain those that
fought, a close and furious conflict ensued in a very narrow sea, where the
nearer the vessels approached the more had Vatinius's soldiers the advantage.
For, with admirable courage, they leaped into the enemy's ships, and forcing
them by this means to an equal combat, soon mastered them by their superior
valor. Octavius's galley was sunk, and many others were taken or suffered the
same fate; the soldiers were partly slain in the ships, partly thrown overboard
into the sea. Octavius got into a boat, which sinking under the multitude that
crowded after him, he himself, though wounded, swam to his brigantine; where,
being taken up, and night having put an end to the battle, as the wind blew
very strong, he spread all his sails and fled. A few of his ships, that had the
good fortune to escape, followed him.
[47] But Vatinius,
after his success, sounded a retreat, and entered victorious the port whence
Octavius had sailed to fight him, without the loss of a single vessel. He took,
in this battle, one quinquereme, two triremes, eight two-banked galleys, and a
great number of rowers. The next day was employed in repairing his own fleet,
and the ships he had taken from the enemy: after which, he sailed for the
island of Issa, imagining Octavius had retired thither after his defeat. In
this island was a flourishing city, well affected to Octavius, which however,
surrendered to Vatinius, upon the first summons. Here he understood that
Octavius, attended by a few small barks, had sailed, with a fair wind, for
Greece, whence he intended to pass on to Sicily, and afterward to Africa.
Vatinius, having in so short a space successfully terminated the affair,
restored the province, in a peaceable condition, to Cornificius, and driven the
enemy's fleet out of those seas, returned victorious to Brundusium, with his
army and fleet in good condition.
[48] But during the
time that Caesar besieged Pompey at Dyrrachium, triumphed at Old Pharsalia, and
carried on the war, with so much danger, at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who
had been left in Spain as propraetor of the further province, either through
his natural disposition, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the province,
on account of a wound he had treacherously received there when quaestor, drew
upon himself the general dislike of the people. He discerned this temper among
them, partly from a consciousness that he deserved it, partly from the manifest
indications they gave of their discontent. To secure himself against their
disaffection, he endeavored to gain the love of the soldiers; and having, for
this purpose, assembled them together, promised them a hundred sesterces each.
Soon after, having made himself master of Medobriga, a town in Lusitania, and
of Mount Herminius, whither the Medobrigians had retired, and being upon that
occasion saluted imperator by the army, he gave them another hundred sesterces
each. These, accompanied by other considerable largesses, in great number,
seemed, for the present, to increase the good-will of the army, but tended
gradually and imperceptibly to the relaxation of military discipline.
[49] Cassius, having
sent his army into winter quarters, fixed his residence at Corduba, for the
administration of justice. Being greatly in debt, he resolved to pay it by
laying heavy burdens upon the province: and, according to the custom of
prodigals, made his liberalities a pretense to justify the most exorbitant
demands. He taxed the rich at discretion, and compelled them to pay, without
the least regard to their remonstrances; frequently making light and trifling
offenses the handle for all manner of extortions. All methods of gain were
pursued, whether great and reputable, or mean and sordid. None that had any
thing to lose could escape accusation; insomuch, that the plunder of their
private fortunes was aggravated by the dangers they were exposed to from
pretended crimes.
[50] For which reasons
it happened that when Longinus as proconsul did those same things which he had
done as quaestor, the provincials formed similar conspiracies against his life.
Even his own dependents concurred in the general hatred; who, though the
ministers of his rapine, yet hated the man by whose authority they committed
those crimes. The odium still increased upon his raising a fifth legion, which
added to the expense and burdens of the province. The cavalry was augmented to
three thousand, with costly ornaments and equipage: nor was any respite given
to the province.
[51] Meanwhile he
received orders from Caesar, to transport his army into Africa and march
through Mauritania, toward Numidia, because king Juba had sent considerable
succors to Pompey, and was thought likely to send more. These letters filled
him with an insolent joy, by the opportunity they offered him of pillaging new
provinces, and a wealthy kingdom. He therefore hastened into Lusitania, to
assemble his legions, and draw together a body of auxiliaries; appointing
certain persons to provide corn, ships, and money, that nothing might retard
him at his return; which was much sooner than expected: for when interest
called, Cassius wanted neither industry nor vigilance.
[52] Having got his
army together, and encamped near Corduba, he made a speech to the soldiers,
wherein he acquainted them with the orders he had received from Caesar and
promised them a hundred sesterces each, when they should arrive in Mauritania:
the fifth legion, he told them, was to remain in Spain. Having ended his
speech, he returned to Corduba. The same day, about noon, as he went to the
hall of justice, one Minutius Silo, a client of L. Racilius, presented him with
a paper, in a soldier's habit, as if he had some request to make. Then retiring
behind Racilius (who walked beside Cassius), as if waiting for an answer, he
gradually drew near, and a favorable opportunity offering, seized Cassius with
his left hand, and wounded him twice with a dagger in his right. A shout was
then raised and an attack made on him by the rest of the conspirators, who all
rushed upon him in a body. Munatius Plancus killed the lictor, that was next
Longinus; and wounded Q. Cassius his lieutenant. T. Vasius and L. Mergilio
seconded their countryman Plancus; for they were all natives of Italica. L.
Licinius Squillus flew upon Longinus himself, and gave him several slight
wounds as he lay upon the ground.
[53] By this time, his
guards came up to his assistance (for he always had several beronians and
veterans, armed with darts, to attend him), and surrounded the rest of the
conspirators, who were advancing to complete the assassination. Of this number
were Calphurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tusculus. Cassius was carried home; and
Minutius Silo, stumbling upon a stone, as he endeavored to make his escape, was
taken, and brought to him. Racilius retired to the neighboring house of a
friend, till he should have certain in formation of the fate of Cassius. L.
Laterensis, not doubting but he was dispatched, ran in a transport of joy to the
camp, to congratulate the second and the new-raised legions upon it, who, he
knew, bore a particular hatred to Cassius; and who, immediately upon this
intelligence, placed him on the tribunal, and proclaimed him praetor. For there
was not a native of the province, nor a soldier of the newly-raised legion, nor
a person who by long residence was naturalized in the province, of which class
the second legion consisted, who did not join in the general hatred of Cassius.
[54] Meantime
Laterensis was informed that Cassius was still alive; at which, being rather
grieved than disconcerted, he immediately so far recovered himself, as to go
and wait upon him. By this time, the thirtieth legion having notice of what had
passed, had marched to Corduba, to the assistance of their general. The
twenty-first and fifth followed their example. As only two legions remained in
the camp, the second, fearing they should be left alone, and their sentiments
should be consequently manifested, did the same. But the new-raised legion
continued firm, nor could be induced by any motives of fear to stir from its
place.
[55] Cassius ordered
all the accomplices of the conspiracy to be seized, and sent back the fifth
legion to the camp, retaining the other three. By the confession of Minutius,
he learned, that L. Racilius, L. Laterensis, and Annius Scapula, man of great
authority and credit in the province, and equally in his confidence with
Laterensis and Racilius, were concerned in the plot: nor did he long defer his
revenge, but ordered them to be put to death. He delivered Minutius to be
racked by his freed-men; likewise Calphurnius Salvianus; who, turning evidence,
increased the number of the conspirators; justly, as some think; but others
pretend that he was forced. L. Mergilio was likewise put to the torture.
Squillus impeached many others, who were all condemned to die, except such as
redeemed their lives by a fine; for he pardoned Calphurnius for ten, and Q.
Sextius for fifty thousand sesterces, who, though deeply guilty, yet having, in
this manner, escaped death, showed Cassius to be no less covetous than cruel.
[56] Some days after,
he received letters from Caesar, by which he learned that Pompey was defeated,
and had fled with the loss of all his troops, which news equally affected him
with joy and sorrow. Caesar's success gave him pleasure; but the conclusion of
the war would put an end to his rapines: insomuch, that he was uncertain which
to wish for, victory or an unbounded licentiousness. When he was cured of his
wounds, he sent to all who were indebted to him, in any sums, and insisted upon
immediate payment. Such as were taxed too low, had orders to furnish larger
sums. He likewise instituted a levy of Roman citizens, and as they were
enrolled from all the corporations and colonies, and were terrified by service
beyond the sea, he called upon them to redeem themselves from the military
oath. This brought in vast revenue, but greatly increased the general hatred.
He afterward reviewed the army, sent the legions and auxiliaries, designed for
Africa, toward the straits of Gibraltar, and went himself to Seville, to
examine the condition of the fleet. He staid there some time, in consequence of
an edict he had published, ordering all who had not paid the sums in which they
were amerced, to repair to him thither; which created a universal murmuring and
discontent.
[57] In the mean time,
L. Titius, a military tribune of the native legion, sent him notice of a report
that the thirteenth legion, which Q. Cassius his lieutenant was taking with
him, when it was encamped at Ilurgis, had mutinied and killed some of the
centurions that opposed them, and were gone over to the second legion, who
marched another way toward the Straits. Upon this intelligence he set out by
night with five cohorts of the twenty-first legion, and came up with them in
the morning. He staid there that day to consult what was proper to be done, and
then went to Carmona, where he found the thirtieth and twenty-first legions,
with four cohorts of the fifth, and all the cavalry assembled. Here he learned
that the new-raised legion had surprised four cohorts, near Obucula, and forced
them along with them to the second legion, where all joining, they had chosen
T. Thorius, a native of Italica, for their general. Having instantly called a
council, he sent Marcellus to Corduba to secure that town, and Q. Cassius, his
lieutenant, to Seville. A few days after, news was brought that the Roman
citizens at Corduba had revolted, and that Marcellus, either voluntarily or
through force (for the reports were various), had joined them; as likewise the
two cohorts of the fifth legion that were in garrison there. Cassius, provoked
at these mutinies, decamped, and the next day came to Segovia, upon the river
Xenil. There, summoning an assembly, to sound the disposition of the troops, he
found that it was not out of any regard to him, but to Caesar, though absent,
that they continued faithful, and were ready to undergo any danger for the,
recovery of the province.
[58] Meantime Thorius marched
the veteran legions to Corduba; and, that the revolt might not appear to spring
from a seditious inclination in him or the soldiers, as likewise to oppose an
equal authority to that of Q. Cassius, who was drawing together a great force
in Caesar's name; he publicly gave out that his design was to recover the
province for Pompey; and perhaps he did this through hatred of Caesar, and love
of Pompey, whose name was very powerful among those legions which M. Varro had
commanded. Be this as it will, Thorius at least made it his pretense; and the
soldiers were so infatuated with the thought, that they had Pompey's name
inscribed upon their bucklers. The citizens of Corduba, men, women, and
children, came out to meet the legions, begging "they would not enter
Corduba as enemies, seeing they joined with them in their aversion to Cassius,
and only desired they might not be obliged to act against Caesar."
[59] The soldiers,
moved by the prayers and tears of so great a multitude, and seeing they stood
in no need of Pompey's name and memory to spirit up a revolt against Cassius,
and that he was as much hated by Caesar's followers as Pompey's; neither being
able to prevail with Marcellus or the people of Corduba to declare against
Caesar, they erased Pompey's name from their bucklers, chose Marcellus their
commander, called him praetor, joined the citizens of Corduba, and encamped
near the town. Two days after, Cassius encamped on an eminence, on this side
the Guadalquivir, about four miles from Corduba, and within view of the town;
whence he sent letters to Bogud, in Mauritania, and M. Lepidus, proconsul of
Hither Spain, to come to his assistance as soon as possible, for Caesar's sake.
Meanwhile he ravaged the country, and set fire to the buildings around Corduba.
[60] The legions under
Marcellus, provoked at this indignity, ran to him, and begged to be led against
the enemy, that they might have an opportunity of engaging with them before
they could have time to destroy with fire and sword the rich and noble possessions
of the inhabitants of Corduba. Marcellus, though averse to a battle, which,
whoever was victorious, must turn to Caesar's detriment, yet unable to restrain
the legions, led them across the Guadalquivir, and drew them up. Cassius did
the same upon a rising ground, but as he would not quit his advantageous post,
Marcellus persuaded his men to return to their camp. He had already begun to
retire when Cassius, knowing himself to be stronger in cavalry, fell upon the
legionaries with his horse, and made a considerable slaughter in their rear
upon the banks of the river. When it was evident from this loss, that crossing
the river was an error and attended with great loss, Marcellus removed his camp
to the other side of the Guadalquivir, where both armies frequently drew up,
but did not engage, on account of the inequality of the ground.
[61] Marcellus was
stronger in foot, for he commanded veteran soldiers of great experience in war.
Cassius depended more on the fidelity than the courage of his troops. The two
camps being very near each other, Marcellus seized a spot of ground, where he
built a fort, very convenient for depriving the enemy of water. Longinus,
apprehending he should be besieged in a country where all were against him,
quitted his camp silently in the night, and, by a quick march, reached Ulia, a
town on which he thought he could rely. There he encamped so near the walls,
that both by the situation of the place (for Ulia stands on an eminence), and
the defenses of the town, he was on all sides secure from an attack. Marcellus
followed him and encamped as near the town as possible. Having taken a view of
the place he found himself reduced, by necessity, to do what was most agreeable
to his own inclination; namely, neither to engage Cassius, which the ardor of
his soldiers would have forced him to, had it been possible, nor to suffer him,
by his excursions, to infest the territories of other states, as he had done
those of Corduba. He therefore raised redoubts in proper places, and continued
his works quite round the town, inclosing both Ulia and Cassius within his
lines. But before they were finished, Cassius sent out all his cavalry, who he
imagined might do him great service by cutting off Marcellus's provisions and
forage, and could only be a useless encumbrance to him, by consuming his
provisions if he was shut up in his camp.
[62] A few days after,
king Bogud, having received Cassius's letters, came and joined him with all his
forces, consisting of one legion, and several auxiliary cohorts. For as
commonly happens in civil dissensions, some of the states of Spain at that time
favored Cassius, but a yet greater number, Marcellus. Bogud came up to the
advanced works of Marcellus, where many sharp skirmishes happened with various
success: however, Marcellus still kept possession of his works.
[63] Meanwhile Lepidus
came to Ulia, from the hither province, with thirty-five legionary cohorts, and
a great body of horse and auxiliaries, with the intention of adjusting the
differences between Cassius and Marcellus. Marcellus submitted without
hesitation: but Cassius kept within his works, either because he thought his
cause the justest, or from an apprehension that his adversary's submission had
prepossessed Lepidus in his favor. Lepidus encamped at Ulia, and forming a
complete junction with Marcellus, prevented a battle, invited Cassius into his
camp, and pledged his honor to act without prejudice. Cassius hesitated long,
but at last desired that the circumvallation should be leveled, and free egress
given him. The truce was not only concluded, but the works demolished, and the
guards drawn off; when king Bogud attacked one of Marcellus's forts, that lay
nearest to his camp, unknown to any (except perhaps Longinus, who was not
exempt from suspicion on this occasion), and slew a great number of his men.
And had not Lepidus interposed, much mischief would have been done.
[64] A free passage
being made for Cassius, Marcellus joined camps with Lepidus; and both together
marched for Corduba, while Cassius retired with his followers to Carmona. At
the same time, Trebonius, the proconsul, came to take possession of the
province. Cassius having notice of his arrival, sent his legions and cavalry
into winter quarters, and hastened, with all his effects, to Melaca, where he
embarked immediately, though it was the winter season, that he might not, as he
pretended, intrust his safety to Marcellus, Lepidus, and Trebonius; as his
friends gave out, to avoid passing through a province, great part of which had
revolted from him; but as was more generally believed, to secure the money he
had amassed by his numberless extortions. The wind favoring him as far as could
be expected at that season of the year, he put into the Ebro, to avoid sailing
in the night: and thence continuing his voyage, which he thought he might do
with safety, though the wind blew considerably fresher, he was encountered by
such a storm, at the mouth of the river, that being neither able to return on
account of the stream, nor stem the fury of the waves, the ship sank, and he
perished.
[65] When Caesar
arrived in Syria, from Egypt, and understood from those who attended him there
from Rome, and the letters he received at the same time, that the government at
Rome was badly and injudiciously conducted, and all the affairs of the
commonwealth managed indiscreetly; that the contests of the tribunes were
producing perpetual seditions, and that, by the ambition and indulgence of the
military tribunes, many things were done contrary to military usage, which tend
to destroy all order and discipline, all which required his speedy presence to
redress them; thought it was yet first incumbent upon him to settle the state
of the provinces through which he passed; that, freeing them from domestic
contentions, and the fear of a foreign enemy, they might become amenable to law
and order. This he hoped soon to effect in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia, because
these provinces were not involved in war. In Bithynia and Pontus indeed he
expected more trouble, because he understood Pharnaces still continued in the
latter, and was not likely to quit it easily, being flushed with the victory he
had obtained over Domitius Calvinus. He made a short stay in most states of
note, distributing rewards both publicly and privately to such as deserved
them, settling old controversies, and receiving into his protection the kings,
princes, and potentates, as well of the provinces as of the neighboring
countries. And having settled the necessary regulations for the defense and
protection of the country, he dismissed them, with most friendly feelings to
himself and the republic.
[66] After a stay of
some days in these parts, he named Sextus Caesar, his friend and relation, to
the command of Syria and the legions appointed to guard it; and sailed himself
for Cilicia, with the fleet he had brought from Egypt. He summoned the states
to assemble at Tarsus, the strongest and finest city of the province; where,
having settled everything that regarded either that province or the neighboring
countries, through his eagerness to march to carry on the war he delayed no
longer, but advancing through Cappadocia with the utmost expedition, where he
stopped two days at Mazaca, he arrived at Comana, renowned for the ancient and
sacred temple of Bellona, where she is worshiped with so much veneration, that
her priest is accounted next in power and dignity to the king. He conferred
this dignity on Lycomedes of Bithynia, who was descended from the ancient kings
of Cappadocia, and who demanded it in right of inheritance; his ancestors
having lost it upon occasion of the scepter being transferred to another line.
As for Ariobarzanes, and his brother Ariarates, who had both deserved well of
the commonwealth, he confirmed the first in his kingdom, and put the other under
his protection; after which, he pursued his march with the same dispatch.
[67] Upon his
approaching Pontus, and the frontiers of Gallograecia, Deiotarus, tetrarch of
that province (whose title, however, was disputed by the neighboring tetrarchs)
and king of Lesser Armenia, laying aside the regal ornaments, and assuming the
habit not only of a private person, but even of a criminal, came in a suppliant
manner to Caesar, to beg forgiveness for assisting Pompey with his army, and
obeying his commands, at a time when Caesar could afford him no protection:
urging, that it was his business to obey the governors who were present,
without pretending to judge of the disputes of the people of Rome.
[68] Caesar, after
reminding him "of the many services he had done him, and the decrees he
had procured in his favor when consul; that his defection could claim no excuse
for want of information, because one of his industry and prudence could not but
know who was master of Italy and Rome, where the senate, the people, and the
majesty of the republic resided; who, in fine, was consul after Marcellus and
Lentulus; told him, that he would notwithstanding forgive his present fault in
consideration of his past services, the former friendship that had subsisted
between them, the respect due to his age, and the solicitation of those
connected with him by hospitality, and his friends who interceded in his
behalf: adding, that he would defer the controversy relating to the tetrarchate
to another time." He restored him the royal habit, and commanded him to
join him with all his cavalry, and the legion he had trained up after the Roman
manner.
[69] When he was
arrived in Pontus, and had drawn all his forces together, which were not very
considerable either for their number or discipline (for except the sixth
legion, composed of veteran soldiers, which he had brought with him from
Alexandria, and which, by its many labors and dangers, the length of its
marches and voyages, and the frequent wars in which it had been engaged, was
reduced to less than a thousand men, he had only the legion of Deiotarus, and
two more that had been in the late battle between Domitius and Pharnaces)
embassadors arrived from Pharnaces, "to entreat that Caesar would not come
as an enemy, for he would submit to all his commands." They represented
particularly that "Pharnaces had granted no aid to Pompey, as Deiotarus
had done, whom he had nevertheless pardoned."
[70] Caesar replied,
"That Pharnaces should meet with the utmost justice, if he performed his
promises: but at the same time he admonished the embassadors, in gentle terms,
to forbear mentioning Deiotarus, and not to overrate the having refused aid to
Pompey. He told them that he never did any thing with greater pleasure than
pardon a suppliant, but that he would never look upon private services to
himself as an atonement for public injuries done the province; that the refusal
of Pharnaces to aid Pompey had turned chiefly to his own advantage, as he had
thereby avoided all share in the disaster of Pharsalia; that he was however
willing to forgive the injuries done to the Roman citizens in Pontus, because
it was now too late to think of redressing them; as he could neither restore
life to the dead, nor manhood to those he had deprived of it, by a punishment
more intolerable to the Romans than death itself. But that he must quit Pontus
immediately, send back the farmers of the revenues, and restore to the Romans
and their allies what he unjustly detained from them. If he should do this, he
might then send the presents which successful generals were wont to receive
from their friends" (for Pharnaces had sent him a golden crown). With this
answer he dismissed the embassadors.
[71] Pharnaces promised
every thing: but hoping that Caesar, who was in haste to be gone, would readily
give credit to whatever he said, that he might the sooner set out upon more
urgent affairs (for every body knew that his presence was much wanted at Rome),
he performed but slowly, wanted to protract the day of his departure, demanded other
conditions, and in fine endeavored to elude his engagements. Caesar, perceiving
his drift, did now, out of necessity, what he was usually wont to do through
inclination, and resolved to decide the affair as soon as possible by a battle.
[72] Zela is a town of
Pontus, well fortified, though situated in a plain; for a natural eminence, as
if raised by art, sustains the walls on all sides. All around is a great number
of large mountains, intersected by valleys. The highest of these, which is
celebrated for the victory of Mithridates, the defeat of Triarius, and the
destruction of our army, is not above three miles from Zela, and has a ridge
that almost extends to the town. Here Pharnaces encamped, with all his forces,
repairing the fortifications of a position which had proved so fortunate to his
father.
[73] Caesar having
encamped about five miles from the enemy, and observing that the valleys which
defended the king's camp would likewise defend his own, at the same distance,
if the enemy, who were much nearer, did not seize them before him; ordered a
great quantity of fascines to be brought within the intrenchments. This being
quickly performed, next night, at the fourth watch, leaving the baggage in the
camp, he set out with the legions; and arriving at daybreak unsuspected by the
enemy, possessed himself of the same post where Mithridates had defeated
Triarius. Hither he commended all the fascines to be brought, employing the
servants of the army for that purpose, that the soldiers might not be called
off from the works; because the valley, which divided the eminence, where he
was intrenching himself from the enemy, was not above a mile wide.
[74] Pharnaces
perceiving this, next morning ranged all his troops in order of battle before
his camp. Caesar, on account of the disadvantage of the ground, believed that
he was reviewing them according to military discipline; or with a view to
retard his works, by keeping a great number of his men under arms; or through
the confidence of the king, that he might not seem to defend his position by
his fortifications rather than by force. Therefore, keeping only his first line
in order of battle, he commanded the rest of the army to go on with their
works. But Pharnaces, either prompted by the place itself, which had been so
fortunate to his father; or induced by favorable omens, as we were afterward
told; or discovering the small number of our men that were in arms (for he took
all that were employed in carrying materials to the works to be soldiers); or
confiding in his veteran army, who valued themselves upon having defeated the
twenty-second legion; and at the same time, despising our troops, whom he knew
he had worsted, under Domitius; was determined upon a battle, and to that end
began to cross the valley. Caesar, at first, laughed at his ostentation, in
crowding his army into so narrow a place, where no enemy, in his right senses,
would have ventured: while, in the mean time, Pharnaces continued his march,
and began to ascend the steep hill on which Caesar was posted.
[75] Caesar, astonished
at his incredible rashness and confidence, and finding himself suddenly and
unexpectedly attacked, called off his soldiers from the works, ordered them to
arms, opposed the legions to the enemy, and ranged his troops in order of
battle. The suddenness of the thing occasioned some terror at first; and our
ranks not being yet formed, the scythed chariots disordered and confused the
soldiers: however, the multitude of darts discharged against them, soon put a
stop to their career. The enemy's army followed them close, and began the
battle with a shout. Our advantageous situation, but especially the assistance
of the gods, who preside over all the events of war, and more particularly
those where human conduct can be of no service, favored us greatly on this
occasion.
[76] After a sharp and
obstinate conflict, victory began to declare for us on the right wing, where
the sixth legion was posted. The enemy there were totally overthrown, but, in
the center and left, the battle was long and doubtful; however, with the
assistance of the gods, we at last prevailed there also, and drove them with
the utmost precipitation down the hill which they had so easily ascended
before. Great numbers being slain, and many crushed by the flight of their own
troops, such as had the good fortune to escape were nevertheless obliged to
throw away their arms; so that having crossed, and got upon the opposite
ascent, they could not, being unarmed, derive any benefit from the advantage of
the ground. Our men flushed with victory, did not hesitate to advance up the
disadvantageous ground, and attack their fortifications, which they soon
forced, notwithstanding the resistance made by the cohorts left by Pharnaces to
guard it. Almost the whole army was cut to pieces or made prisoners. Pharnaces
himself escaped, with a few horse; and had not the attack on the camp given him
an opportunity of fleeing without pursuit, he must certainly have fallen alive
into Caesar's hands.
[77] Though Caesar was
accustomed to victory, yet he felt incredible joy at the present success;
because he had so speedily put an end to a very great war. The remembrance,
too, of the danger to which he had been exposed, enhanced the pleasure, as he
had obtained an easy victory in a very difficult conjuncture. Having thus
recovered Pontus, and abandoned the plunder of the enemy's camp to the
soldiers, he set out next day with some light horse. He ordered the sixth
legion to return to Italy to receive the honors and rewards they had merited; and
sent home the auxiliary troops of Deiotarus, and left two legions with Caelius
Vincianus to protect the kingdom of Pontus.
[78] Through
Gallograecia and Bithynia he marched into Asia, and examined and decided all
the controversies of the provinces as he passed, and established the limits and
jurisdictions of the several kings, states, and tetrarchs. Mithridates of
Pergamus, who had so actively and successfully served him in Egypt, as we have
related above, a man of royal descent and education (for Mithridates, king of
all Asia, out of regard to his birth, had carried him along with him when very
young, and kept him in his camp several years), was appointed king of
Bosphorus, which had been under the command of Pharnaces. And thus he guarded
the provinces of the Roman people against the attempts of barbarous and hostile
kings, by the interposition of a prince firmly attached to the interests of the
republic. He bestowed on him likewise the tetrarchy of Gallograecia, which was
his by the law of nations and family claims, though it had been possessed for
some years by Deiotarus. Thus Caesar, staying nowhere longer than the necessity
of the seditions in the city required, and having settled all things relating
to the provinces with the utmost success and dispatch, returned to Italy much
sooner than was generally expected.
End of Book
Aulus Hirtius
[1] Caesar, advancing
by moderate journeys, and continuing his march without intermission, arrived at
Lilybaeum, on the 14th day before the calends of January. Designing to embark
immediately, though he had only one legion of new levies, and not quite six
hundred horse, he ordered his tent to be pitched so near the sea-side that the
waves lashed the very foot of it. This he did with a view that none should
think he had time to delay, and that his men might be kept in readiness at a
day or an hour's warning. Though the wind at that time was contrary, he
nevertheless detained the soldiers and mariners on board, that he might lose no
opportunity of sailing; the rather, because the forces of the enemy were
announced by the inhabitants of the province, to consist of innumberable
cavalry not to be numbered; four legions headed by Juba, together with a great
body of light-armed troops; ten legions under the command of Scipio; a hundred
and twenty elephants, and fleets in abundance. Yet he was not alarmed, nor lost
his confident hopes and spirits. Meantime the number of galleys and transports
increased daily; the new-levied legions flocked in to him from all parts; among
the rest the fifth, a veteran legion, and about two thousand horse.
[2] Having got together
six legions and about two thousand horse, he embarked the legions as fast as
they arrived, in the galleys, and the cavalry in the transports. Then sending
the greatest part of the fleet before, with orders to sail for the island of
Aponiana, not far from Lilybaeum; he himself continued a little longer in
Sicily, and exposed to public sale some confiscated estates. Leaving all other
affairs to the care of Allienus the praetor, who then commanded in the island;
and strictly charging him to use the utmost expedition in embarking the
remainder of the troops; he set sail the sixth day before the calends of
January, and soon came up with the rest of the fleet. As the wind was
favorable, and afforded a quick passage, he arrived the fourth day within sight
of Africa, attended by a few galleys: for the transports, being mostly
dispersed and scattered by the winds, with the exception of a few were driven
different ways. Passing Clupea and Neapolis with the fleet, he continued for
some time to coast along the shore, leaving many towns and castles behind him.
[3] After he came
before Adrumetum, where the enemy had a garrison, commanded by C. Considius,
and where Cn. Piso appeared upon the shore toward Clupea, with the cavalry of
Adrumetum, and about three thousand Moors, he stopped awhile, facing the port,
till the rest of the fleet should come up, and then landed his men, though
their number at that time did not exceed three thousand foot and a hundred and
fifty horse. There, encamping before the town, he continued quiet, without
offering any act of hostility, and restrained all from plunder. Meantime the
inhabitants manned the walls, and assembled in great numbers before the gate,
to defend themselves, their garrison within amounting to two legions. Caesar,
having ridden round the town, and thoroughly examined its situation, returned
to his camp. Some blamed his conduct on this occasion, and charged him with a
considerable oversight, in not appointing a place of meeting to the pilots and
captains of the fleet, or delivering them sealed instructions, according to his
usual custom; which being opened at a certain time, might have directed them to
assemble at a specified place. But in this Caesar acted not without design; for
as he knew of no port in Africa that was clear of the enemy's forces, and where
the fleet might rendezvous in security, he chose to rely entirely upon fortune,
and land where occasion offered.
[4] In the mean time,
L. Plancus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, desired leave to treat with Considius,
and try, if possible, to bring him to reason. Leave being granted accordingly,
he wrote him a letter, and sent it into the town by a captive. When the captive
arrived, and presented the letter, Considius, before he received it, demanded
whence it came, and being told from Caesar, the Roman general, answered,
"That he knew no general of the Roman forces but Scipio." Then,
commending the messenger to be immediately slain in his presence, he delivered
the letter, unread and unopened, to a trusty partisan, with orders to carry it
directly to Scipio.
[5] Caesar had now
continued a day and a night before the town, without receiving any answer from
Considius; the rest of the forces were not yet arrived; his cavalry was not
considerable; he had not sufficient troops with him to invest the place, and
these were new levies: neither did he think it advisable, upon his first
landing, to expose the army to wounds and fatigue; more especially, as the town
was strongly fortified, and extremely difficult of access, and a great body of
horse was said to be upon the point of arrival to succor the inhabitants; he
therefore thought it advisable not to remain and besiege the town, lest while
he pursued that design, the enemy's cavalry should come behind and surround
him.
[6] But as he was
drawing off his men, the garrison made a sudden sally; and the cavalry which
had been sent by Juba to receive their pay, happening just then to come up,
they took possession of the camp Caesar had left, and began to harass his rear.
This being perceived, the legionaries immediately halted; and the cavalry,
though few in number, boldly charged the vast multitude of the enemy. An
incredible event occurred, that less than thirty Gallic horse repulsed two
thousand Moors, and drove them into the town. Having thus repulsed the enemy
and compelled them to retire behind their walls, Caesar resumed his intended
march: but observing that they often repeated their sallies, renewing the
pursuit from time to time, and again fleeing when attacked by the horse, he
posted a few of the veteran cohorts which he had with him, with part of the cavalry,
in the rear, and so proceeded slowly on his march. The further he advanced from
the town, the less eager were the Numidians to pursue. Meantime, deputies
arrived from the several towns and castles on the road, offering to furnish him
with corn, and to perform whatever he might command. Toward the evening of that
day, which was the calends of January, he fixed his camp at Ruspina.
[7] Thence he removed
and came before Leptis, a free city and governed by its own laws. Here he was
met by deputies from the town, who, in the name of the inhabitants, offered
their free submission. Whereupon, placing centurions and a guard before the
gates, to prevent the soldiers from entering, or offering violence to any of
the inhabitants, he himself encamped toward the shore, not far distant from the
town. Hither by accident arrived some of the galleys and transports; by whom he
was informed that the rest of the fleet, uncertain what course to pursue, had
been steering for Utica. In the mean time Caesar could not depart from the sea,
nor seek the inland provinces, on account of the error committed by the fleet.
He likewise sent the cavalry back to their ships, probably to hinder the
country from being plundered, and ordered fresh water to be carried to them on
board. Meanwhile the Moorish horse rose suddenly, Caesar's party not expecting
it, on the rowers who had been employed in carrying water, as they came out of
the ships, and wounded many with their darts and killed some. For the manner of
these barbarians is, to lie in ambush with their horses among the valleys, and
suddenly launch upon an enemy; they seldom choosing to engage hand to hand in a
plain.
[8] In the mean time,
Caesar dispatched letters and messengers into Sardinia and the neighboring
provinces, with orders, as soon as they read the letters, to send supplies of
men, corn, and warlike stores; and having unloaded part of the fleet, detached
it, with Rabirius Posthumus, into Sicily, to bring over the second embarkation.
At the same time he ordered out ten galleys, to get intelligence of the
transports that had missed their way, and to maintain the freedom of the sea.
He also ordered C. Sallustius Prispus, the praetor, at the head of a squadron,
to sail to Percina, then in the hands of the enemy, because he heard there was
great quantity of corn in that island: he gave these orders and instructions in
such a manner as to leave no room for excuse or delay. Meanwhile, having
informed himself, from the deserters and natives, of the condition of Scipio
and his followers; and understanding that they were at the whole charge of
maintaining Juba's cavalry; he could not but pity the infatuation of men, who
thus chose to be tributaries to the king of Numidia, rather than securely enjoy
their fortunes at home with their fellow-citizens.
[9] Caesar moved his
camp on the third day before the nones of January; and leaving six cohorts at
Leptis, under the command of Saserna, returned with the rest of the forces to
Ruspina, whence he had come the day before. Here he deposited the baggage of
the army; and marching out with a light body of troops to forage, ordered the
inhabitants to follow with their horses and carriages. Having by this means got
together a great quantity of corn, he came back to Ruspina. I think that he
acted with this intention, that by keeping possession of the maritime cities,
and providing them with garrisons, he might secure a retreat for his fleet.
[10] Leaving therefore
P. Saserna, the brother of him who commanded at Leptis, to take charge of the
town, with one legion, he orders all the wood that could be found to be carried
into the place; and set out in person from Ruspina, with seven cohorts, part of
the veteran legions who had behaved so well in the fleet under Sulpicius and
Vatinius; and marching directly for the port, which lies at about two miles'
distance, embarked with them in the evening, without imparting his intentions
to the army, who were extremely inquisitive concerning the general's design.
His departure occasioned the utmost sadness and consternation among the troops;
for being few in number, mostly new levies, and those not all suffered to land,
they saw themselves exposed, upon a foreign coast, to the mighty forces of a
crafty nation, supported by an innumerable cavalry. Nor had they any resource
in their present circumstances, or expectation of safety in their own conduct;
but derived all their hope from the alacrity, vigor, and wonderful cheerfulness
that appeared in their general's countenance; for he was of an intrepid spirit,
and behaved with undaunted resolution and confidence. On his conduct,
therefore, they entirely relied, and hoped to a man, that by his skill and
talents, all difficulties would vanish before them.
[11] Caesar, having
continued the whole night on board, prepared to set sail about day-break; when,
all on a sudden, the part of the fleet that had caused so much anxiety,
appeared unexpectedly in view. Wherefore, ordering his men to quit their ships
immediately, and receive the rest of the troops in arms upon the shore, he made
the new fleet enter the port with the utmost diligence; and landing all the
forces, horse and foot, returned again to Ruspina. Here he established his
camp; and taking with him thirty cohorts, without baggage, advanced into the
country to forage. Thus was Caesar's purpose at length discovered: that he
meant, unknown to the enemy, to have sailed to the assistance of the transports
that had missed their way, lest they should unexpectedly fall in with the
African fleet. And he did not wish his own soldiers who were left behind in
garrison to know this, lest they should be intimidated by the smallness of
their numbers, and the multitude of the enemy.
[12] Caesar had not
marched above three miles from his camp, when he was informed by his scouts,
and some advanced parties of horse, that the enemy's forces were in view. As
soon as this announcement was made, a great cloud of dust began to appear. Upon
this intelligence, Caesar ordered all his horse, of which he had at that time
but a very small number, to advance, as likewise his archers, only a few of
whom had followed him from the camp; and the legions to march quietly after him
in order of battle; while he went forward at the head of a small party. Soon
after, having discovered the enemy at some distance, he commanded the soldiers
to repair to their arms, and prepare for battle. Their number in all did not
exceed thirty cohorts, with four hundred horse, and one hundred and fifty
archers.
[13] Meanwhile the
enemy, under the command of Labienus, and the two Pacidii, drew up, with a very
large front, consisting not so much of foot as of horse, whom they intermixed
with light-armed Numidians and archers; forming themselves in such close order,
that Caesar's army, at a distance, mistook them all for infantry; and
strengthening their right and left with many squadrons of horse. Caesar drew up
his army in a single line, being obliged to do so by the smallness of his
numbers; covering his front with his archers, and placing his cavalry on the
right and left wings, with particular instructions not to suffer themselves to
be surrounded by the enemy's numerous horse; for he imagined that he would have
to fight only with infantry.
[14] As both sides
stood in expectation of the signal, and Caesar would not stir from his post, as
he saw that with such few troops against so great a force he must depend more
on stratagem than strength, on a sudden the enemy's horse began to extend
themselves, and move in a lateral direction, so as to encompass the hills and
weaken Caesar's horse, and at the same time to surround them. The latter could
scarcely keep their ground against their numbers. Meanwhile, both the main
bodies advancing to engage, the enemy's cavalry, intermixed with some
light-armed Numidians, suddenly sprang forward, from their crowded troops, and
attacked the legions with a shower of darts. Our men, preparing to return the
charge, their horse retreated a little, while the foot continued to maintain
their ground, till the others, having rallied, came on again, with fresh vigor,
to sustain them.
[15] Caesar perceived
that his ranks were in danger of being broken by this new way of fighting, for
our foot, in pursuing the enemy's horse, having advanced a considerable way
beyond their colors, were wounded in the flank by the nearest Numidian darts,
while the enemy's horse easily escaped our infantry's javelins by flight; he
therefore gave express orders that no soldier should advance above four feet
beyond the ensigns. Meanwhile, Labienus's cavalry, confiding in their numbers
endeavored to surround those of Caesar: who being few in number, and
overpowered by the multitude of the enemy, were forced to give ground a little,
their horses being much wounded. The enemy pressed on more and more; so that in
an instant, the legions, being surrounded on all sides by the enemy's cavalry,
were obliged to form themselves into a circle, and fight, as if inclosed with
barriers.
[16] Labienus, with his
head uncovered, advanced on horseback to the front of the battle, sometimes encouraging
his own men, sometimes addressing Caesar's legions thus: "So ho! you raw
soldiers there!" says he, "why so fierce? Has he infatuated you too
with his words? Truly he has brought you into a fine condition! I pity you
sincerely." Upon this, one of the soldiers said: "I am none of your
raw warriors, Labienus, but a veteran of the tenth legion." " Where's
your standard?" replied Labienus. " I'll soon make you sensible who I
am," answered the soldier. Then pulling off his helmet, to discover
himself, he threw a javelin, with all his strength at Labienus, which wounding
his horse severely in the breast - "Know, Labienus," says he,
"that this dart was thrown by a soldier of the tenth legion."
However, the whole army was not a little daunted, especially the new levies;
and began to cast their eyes upon Caesar, minding nothing, for the present, but
to defend themselves from the enemy's darts.
[17] Caesar meanwhile,
perceiving the enemy's design, endeavored to extend his line of battle, as much
as possible, directing the cohorts to face about alternately to the right and
left. By this means, he broke the enemy's circle with his right and left wings;
and attacking one part of them, thus separated from the other, with his horse
and foot, at last put them to flight. He pursued them but a little way, fearing
an ambuscade, and returned again to his own men. The same was done by the other
division of Caesar's horse and foot, so that the enemy being driven back, and
severely wounded on all sides, he retreated toward his camp, in order of
battle.
[18] Meantime M.
Petreius, and Cn. Piso, with eleven hundred select Numidian horse, and a
considerable body of foot, arrived to the assistance of the enemy; who,
recovering from their terror, upon this reinforcement, and again resuming
courage, fell upon the rear of the legions, as they retreated, and endeavored
to hinder them from reaching their camp. Caesar, perceiving this, ordered his
men to wheel about, and renew the battle in the middle of the plain. As the
enemy still pursued their former plan, and avoided a closing engagement, and
the horses of Caesar's cavalry had not yet recovered the fatigue of their late
voyage, and were besides weakened with thirst, weariness, wounds, and of course
unfit for a vigorous and long pursuit, which even the time of the day would not
allow, he ordered both horse and foot to fall at once briskly upon the enemy,
and not slacken the pursuit till they had driven them quite beyond the furthest
hills, and taken possession of them themselves. Accordingly, upon a signal
being given, when the enemy were throwing their javelins in a faint and
careless manner, he suddenly charged them with his horse and foot; who in a
moment driving them from the field, and over the adjoining hill, kept
possession of that post for some time, and then retired slowly, in order of
battle, to their camp. The enemy, who, in this last attack, had been very
roughly handled, then at length retreated to their fortifications.
[19] Meanwhile the
action being over, a great number of deserters, of all kinds, flocked to
Caesar's camp, besides multitudes of horse and foot that were made prisoners.
From them we learned that it was the design of the enemy to have astonished our
raw troops, with their new and uncommon manner of fighting; and after
surrounding them with their cavalry, to have cut them to pieces, as they had
done Curio; and that they had marched against us expressly with that intention.
Labienus had even said, in the council of war, that he would lead such a
numerous body of auxiliaries against his adversaries, as should fatigue us with
the very slaughter, and defeat us even in the bosom of victory; for he relied
more on the number than the valor of his troops. He had heard of the mutiny of
the veteran legions at Rome, and their refusal to go into Africa; and was
likewise well assured of the fidelity of his troops, who had served three years
under him in Africa. He had a great number of Numidian cavalry and light-armed
troops, besides the Gallic and German horse, whom he had drawn together out of
the remains of Pompey's army, and carried over with him from Brundusium: he had
likewise the freed men raised in the country, and trained to use bridled
horses; and also the immense number of Juba's forces, his hundred and twenty elephants,
his innumerable cavalry and legionaries, amounting to above twelve thousand.
Emboldened by the hope such mighty forces raised in him, on the day before the
nones of January, three days after Caesar's arrival, he came against him, with
sixteen hundred Gallic and German horse, nine hundred under Petreius, eight
thousand Numidians, four times that number of light-armed foot, with a
multitude of archers and slingers. The battle lasted from the fifth hour till
sunset, during which time Petreius, receiving a dangerous wound, was obliged to
quit the field.
[20] Meantime Caesar
fortified his camp with much greater care, reinforced the guards, and threw up
two intrenchments; one from Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from his camp
to the sea likewise, to secure the communication, and receive supplies without
danger. He landed a great number darts and military engines, armed part of the
mariners, Gauls, Rhodians, and others, that after the example of the enemy he
might have a number of light-armed troops to intermix with his cavalry. He
likewise strengthened his army with a great number of Syrian and Iturean
archers whom he drew from the fleet into his camp: for he understood that
within three days Scipio was expected to unite his forces to Labienus and Petreius,
and his army was said to consist of eight legions and three thousand horse. At
the same time he established workshops, made a great number of darts and
arrows, provided himself with leaden bullets and palisades, wrote to Sicily for
hurdles and wood to make rams, because he had none in Africa, and likewise gave
orders for sending corn; for the harvest in that country was like to be
inconsiderable, the enemy having taken all the laborers into their service the
year before, and stored up the grain in a few fortified towns, after
demolishing the rest, forcing the inhabitants into the garrisoned places, and
exhausting the whole country.
[21] In this necessity,
by paying court to private individuals, he obtained a small supply, and
husbanded it with care. In the mean time he went round the works in person
daily, and kept about four cohorts constantly on duty, on account of the
multitude of the enemy. Labienus sent his sick and wounded, of which the number
was very considerable, in wagons to Adrumetum. Meanwhile Caesar's transports,
unacquainted with the coast, or where their general had landed wandered up and
down in great uncertainty; and being, attacked, one after another, by the
enemy's coasters, were, for the most part, either taken or burned. Caesar, being
informed of this, stationed his fleet along the coast and islands for the
security of his convoys.
[22] Meanwhile M. Cato,
who commanded in Utica, never ceased urging and exhorting young Pompey, in
words to this effect: "Your father, when he was at your age, and observed
the commonwealth oppressed by wicked and daring men, and the party of order
either slain or driven into banishment from their country and relations,
incited by the greatness of his mind and the love of glory, though then very
young, and only a private man, had yet the courage to rally the remains of his
father's army, and assert the freedom of Italy and Rome, which was almost
crushed forever. He also recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia, Mauritania, with
amazing dispatch, and by that means gained an illustrious and extensive
reputation among all nations, and triumphed while very young and only a Roman
knight. Nor did he enter upon the administration of public affairs,
distinguished by the shining exploits of his father, or the fame and reputation
of his ancestors, or the honors and dignities of the state. Will you, on the
contrary, possessed of these honors, and the reputation acquired by your
father, sufficiently distinguished by your own industry and greatness of mind,
not bestir yourself, join your father's friends, and give the earnestly
required assistance to yourself, the republic, and every man of worth?"
[23] The youth, roused
by the remonstrances of that grave and worthy senator, got together about
thirty sail, of all sorts, of which some few were ships of war, and sailing
from Utica to Mauritania, invaded the kingdom of Bogud. And leaving his baggage
behind him, with an army of two thousand men, partly freedmen, partly slaves,
some armed, some not, approached the town of Ascurum, in which the king had a
garrison. On the arrival of Pompey, the inhabitants suffered him to advance to
the very walls and gates; when, suddenly sallying out, they drove back his
troops in confusion and dismay to the sea and their ships. This ill-success determined
him to leave that coast, nor did he afterward land in any place, but steered
directly for the Balearean Isles.
[24] Meantime Scipio,
leaving a strong garrison at Utica, began his march, with the forces we have
described above, and encamped first at Adrumetum; and then, after a stay of a
few days, setting out in the night, he joined Petreius and Labienus, lodging
all the forces in one camp, about three miles distant from Caesar's. Their
cavalry made continual excursions to our very works, and intercepted those who
ventured too far in quest of wood or water, and obliged us to keep within our
intrenchments. This soon occasioned a great scarcity of provision among
Caesar's men, because no supplies had yet arrived from Sicily and Sardinia. The
season, too, was dangerous for navigation, and he did not possess above six
miles in each direction, in Africa, and was moreover greatly distressed for
want of forage. The veteran soldiers and cavalry, who had been engaged in many
wars both by sea and land, and often struggled with wants and misfortunes of
this kind, gathering sea-weed, and washing it in fresh water, by that means
subsisted their horses and cattle.
[25] While things were
in this situation, king Juba, being informed of Caesar's difficulties, and the
few troops he had with him, resolved not to allow him time to remedy his wants
or increase his forces. Accordingly he left his kingdom, at the head of a large
body of horse and foot, and marched to join his allies. Meantime P. Sitius, and
king Bogud, having intelligence of Juba's march, joined their forces, entered
Numidia, and laying siege to Cirta, the most opulent city in the county,
carried it in a few days, with two others belonging to the Getulians. They had
offered the inhabitants leave to depart in safety, if they would peaceably
deliver up the town; but these conditions being rejected, they were taken by
storm, and the citizens all put to the sword. They continued to advance, and
incessantly harassed the cities and country; of which Juba having intelligence,
though he was upon the point of joining Scipio and the other chiefs, determined
that it was better to march to the relief of his own kingdom, than run the
hazard of being driven from it while he was assisting others, and, perhaps,
after all, miscarry too in his designs against Caesar. He therefore retired,
with his troops, leaving only thirty elephants behind him, and marched to the
relief of his own cities and territories.
[26] Meanwhile Caesar,
as there was a doubt in the province concerning his arrival, and no one
believed that he had come in person, but that some of his lieutenants had come
over with the forces lately sent, dispatched letters to all the several states,
to inform them of his presence. Upon this, many persons of rank fled to his
camp, complaining of the barbarity and cruelty of the enemy. Caesar deeply
touched by their tears and complaints, although before he had remained inactive,
resolved to take the field as soon as the weather would permit, and he could
draw his troops together. He immediately dispatched letters into Sicily, to
Allienus and Rabirius Posthumus the praetors [to tell them] that without delay
or excuse, either of the winter or the winds, they must send over the rest of
the troops, to save Africa from utter ruin; because, without some speedy
remedy, not a single house would be left standing, nor any thing escape the
fury and ravages of the enemy. And he himself was so anxious and impatient,
that from the day the letters were sent, he complained without ceasing of the
delay of the fleet, and had his eyes night and day turned toward the sea. Nor
was it wonderful; for he saw the villages burned, the country laid waste, the
cattle destroyed, the towns plundered, the principal citizens either slain or
put in chains, and their children dragged into servitude under the name of
hostages; nor could he, amid all this scene of misery, afford any relief to
those who implored his protection, on account of the small number of his
forces. In the mean time he kept the soldiers incessantly at work upon the
intrenchments, built forts and redoubts, and carried on his lines quite to the
sea.
[27] Meanwhile Scipio
made use of the following contrivance for training and disciplining his
elephants. He drew up two parties in order of battle; one of slingers, who were
to act as enemies, and discharge small stones against the elephants: and
fronting them, the elephants themselves, in one line, and his whole army behind
him in battle-array; that when the enemy, by their discharge of stones, had
frightened the elephants, and forced them to turn upon their own men, they
might again be made to face the enemy, by the volleys of stones from the army behind
them. The work however, went on but slowly, because these animals, after many
years' training, are dangerous to both parties when brought into the field.
[28] While the two
generals were thus employed near Ruspina, C. Virgilius, a man of praetorian
rank, who commanded in Thapsus, a maritime city, observing some of Caesar's
transports that had missed their way, uncertain where Caesar had landed or held
his camp; and thinking that a fair opportunity offered of destroying them,
manned a galley that was in the port with soldiers and archers, and joining
with it a few armed barks, began to pursue Caesar's ships. Though he was
repulsed on several occasions he still pursued his design, and at last fell in
with one, on board of which were two young Spaniards, of the name of Titius,
who were tribunes of the fifth legion, and whose father had been made a senator
by Caesar. There was with them a centurion of the same legion, T. Salienus by
name, who had invested the house of M. Messala, Caesar's lieutenant, at Messana,
and made use of very seditious language; nay, had even seized the money and
ornaments destined for Caesar's triumph, and for that reason dreaded his
resentment. He, conscious of his demerits, persuaded the young men to surrender
themselves to Virgilius, by whom they were sent under a strong guard to Scipio,
and three days after put to death. It is said, that the elder Titius begged of
the centurions who were charged with the execution, that he might be first put
to death; which being easily granted, they both suffered according to their
sentence.
[29] The cavalry that
mounted guard in the two camps were continually skirmishing with one another.
Sometimes too the German and Gallic cavalry of Labienus entered into discourse
with those of Caesar, after promising not to injure one another. Meantime
Labienus, with a party of horse, endeavored to surprise the town of Leptis,
which Saserna guarded with three cohorts; but was easily repulsed, because the
town was strongly fortified, and well provided with warlike engines; he however
renewed the attempt several times. One day, as a strong squadron of the enemy
had posted themselves before the gate, their officer being slain by an arrow
discharged from a cross-bow, and pinned to his own shield, the rest were terrified
and took to flight; by which means the town was delivered from any further
attempts.
[30] At the same time
Scipio daily drew up his troops in order of battle, about three hundred paces
from his camp; and after continuing in arms the greatest part of the day,
retreated again to his camp in the evening. This he did several times, no one
mean while offering to stir out of Caesar's camp, or approach his forces; which
forbearance and tranquillity gave him such a contempt of Caesar and his army,
that drawing out all his forces, and his thirty elephants, with towers on their
backs, and extending his horse and foot as wide as possible, he approached
quite up to Caesar's intrenchments.
[31] Upon perceiving
this, Caesar, quietly, and without noise or confusion, recalled to his camp all
that were gone out either in quest of forage, wood, or to work upon the
fortifications: he likewise ordered the cavalry that were upon guard not to
quit their post until the enemy were within reach of dart; and if they then
persisted in advancing, to retire in good order within the intrenchments. He
ordered the rest of the cavalry to be ready and armed, each in his own place.
These orders were not given by himself in person, or after viewing the
disposition of the enemy from the rampart; but such was his consummate
knowledge of the art of war, that he gave all the necessary directions by his
officers, he himself sitting in his tent, and informing himself of the motions
of the enemy by his scouts. He very well knew, that, whatever confidence the
enemy might have in their numbers, they would yet never dare to attack the camp
of a general who had so often repulsed, terrified, and put them to flight; who
had frequently pardoned and granted them their lives; and whose very name had
weight and authority enough to intimidate their army. He was besides well
intrenched with a high rampart and deep ditch, the approaches to which were
rendered so difficult by the sharp spikes which he had disposed in a very
skillful manner, that they were even sufficient of themselves to keep off the
enemy. He had also a large supply of cross-bows, engines, and all sorts of
weapons necessary for a vigorous defense, which he had prepared on account of
the fewness of his troops, and the inexperience of his new levies. It was not
owing to being influenced by the fear of the enemy or their numerical strength,
that he allowed himself to appear daunted in their estimation. And it was not
owing to his having any doubts of gaining the victory that he did not lead his
troops to action, although they were raw and few, but he thought that it was a
matter of great importance, what sort the victory should be: for he thought
that it would disgrace him, if after so many noble exploits, and defeating such
powerful armies, and after gaining so many glorious victories, he should appear
to have gained a bloody victory over the remnants who had rallied after their
flight. He determined, in consequence of this, to endure the pride and
exultation of his enemies, until some portion of his veteran legion should
arrive in the second embarkation.
[32] Scipio, after a
short stay before the intrenchments, as if in contempt of Caesar, withdrew
slowly to his camp: and having called the soldiers together, enlarged upon the
terror and despair of the enemy, when encouraging his men, he assured them of a
complete victory in a short time. Caesar made his soldiers again return to the
works, and under pretense of fortifying his camp, inured the new levies to
labor and fatigue. Meantime the Numidians and Getulians deserted daily from
Scipio's camp. Part returned home; part came over to Caesar, because they
understood he was related to C. Marius, from whom their ancestors had received
considerable favors. Of these he selected some of distinguished rank, and sent
them home, with letters to their countrymen, exhorting them to levy troops for
their own defense, and not to listen to the suggestions of his enemies.
[33] While these things
were passing near Ruspina, deputies from Acilla, a free town, and all the
neighboring towns, arrived in Caesar's camp, and promised "to be ready to
execute Caesar's commands, and to do so withal, and that they only begged and
requested of him to give them garrisons, that they might do so in safety and
without danger to themselves, that they would furnish them with corn and
whatever supplies they had, to secure the common safety. Caesar readily
complied with their demands, and having assigned a garrison, sent C. Messius,
who had been aedile, to command in Acilla. Upon intelligence of this, Considius
Longus, who was at Adrumetum with two legions and seven hundred horse, leaving
a garrison in that city, hastened to Acilla at the head of eight cohorts: but
Messius, having accomplished his march with great expedition, arrived there
before him. When Considius, therefore, approached, and found Caesar's garrison
in possession of the town, not daring to make any attempt, he returned again to
Adrumetum. But some days after, Labienus having sent him a reinforcement of
horse, he began to besiege the town.
[34] Much about the
same time, C. Sallustius Crispus, who, as we have seen, had been sent a few
days before to Cercina with a fleet, arrived in that island. Upon his arrival,
C. Decimus the quaestor, who, with a strong party of his own domestics, had
charge of the magazines erected there, went on board a small vessel and fled.
Sallustius meanwhile was well received by the Cercinates, and finding great
store of corn in the island, loaded all the ships then in the port, whose
number was very considerable, and dispatched them to Caesar's camp. At the same
time Allienus, the proconsul, put on board of the transports at Lilybaeum the
thirteenth and fourteenth legions, with eight hundred Gallic horse and a
thousand archers and slingers, and sent the second embarkation to Africa, to
Caesar. This fleet meeting with a favorable wind, arrived in four days at
Ruspina, where Caesar had his camp. Thus he experienced a double pleasure on
this occasion, receiving at one and the same time, both a supply of provisions
and a reinforcement of troops, which animated the soldiers, and delivered them
from the apprehensions of want. Having landed the legions and cavalry, he
allowed them some time to recover from the fatigue and sickness of their
voyage, and then distributed them into the forts, and along the works.
[35] Scipio and the
other generals were greatly surprised at this conduct, and could not conceive
why Caesar, who had always been forward and active in war, should all of a
sudden change his measures; which they therefore suspected must proceed from
some very powerful reasons. Uneasy and disturbed to see him so patient, they
made choice of two Getulians, on whose fidelity they thought they could rely;
and promising them great rewards, sent them, under the name of deserters, to
get intelligence of Caesar's designs. When they were brought before him, they
begged they might have leave to speak without personal danger, which being
granted, "It is now a long time, great general," said they, "since
many of us Getulians, clients of C. Marius, and almost all Roman citizens of
the fourth and sixth legions, have wished for an opportunity to come over to
you; but have hitherto been prevented by the guards of Numidian horse, from
doing it without great risk. Now we gladly embrace the occasion, being sent by
Scipio under the name of deserters, to discover what ditches and traps you have
prepared for his elephants, how you intended to oppose these animals, and what
dispositions you are making for battle." They were praised by Caesar, and
liberally rewarded, and sent to the other deserters. We had soon a proof of the
truth of what they had advanced; for the next day a great many soldiers of
these legions, mentioned by the Getulians, deserted to Caesar's camp.
[36] While affairs were
in this posture at Ruspina, M. Cato, who commanded in Utica, was daily
enlisting freed-men, Africans, slaves, and all that were of age to bear arms,
and sending them without intermission to Scipio's camp. Meanwhile deputies from
the town of Tisdra came to Caesar to inform him, that some Italian merchants
had brought three hundred thousand bushels of corn into that city, and to
demand a garrison as well for their own defense as to secure the corn. Caesar
thanked the deputies, promised to send the garrison they desired, and having
encouraged them, sent them back to their fellow-citizens. Meantime P. Sitius
entered Numidia with his troops, and took by storm a castle situated on a
mountain, where Juba had laid up a great quantity of provisions, and other
things necessary for carrying on the war.
[37] Caesar, having
increased his forces with two veteran legions, and all the cavalry and
light-armed troops that had arrived in the second embarkation, detached six
transports to Lilybaeum, to bring over the rest of the army. He himself on the
sixth day before the calends of February, ordering the scouts and lictors to
attend him at six in the evening, drew out all the legions at midnight, and
directed his march toward Ruspina, where he had a garrison, and which had first
declared in his favor, no one knowing or having the least suspicion of his
design. Thence he continued his route, by the left of the camp, along the sea,
and passed a little declivity, which opened into a fine plain, extending fifteen
miles, and bordering upon a chain of mountains of moderate height, that formed
a kind of theater. In this ridge were some hills that rose higher than the
rest, on which forts and watchtowers had formerly been erected, and at the
furthest of which, Scipio's guards and out-posts were stationed.
[38] After Caesar
gained the ridge, which I have just mentioned, and began to raise redoubts upon
the several eminences (which he executed in less than half an hour), and when
he was not very far from the last, which bordered on the enemy's camp, and
where, as we have said, Scipio had his out-guard of Numidians, he stopped a
moment; and having taken a view of the ground, and posted his cavalry in the
most commodious situation, he ordered the legions to throw up an intrenchment
along the middle of the ridge, from the place at which he was arrived to that
whence he set out. When Scipio and Labienus observed this, they drew all their
cavalry out of the camp, formed them in order of battle, and advancing about a
mile, posted their infantry by way of a second line, somewhat less than half a
mile from their camp.
[39] Caesar was unmoved
by the appearance of the enemy's forces, and encouraged his men to go on with
the work. But when he perceived that they were within fifteen hundred paces of
the intrenchment, and saw that the enemy were coming nearer to interrupt and
disturb the soldiers and oblige him to draw off the legions from the work, he
ordered a squadron of Spanish cavalry, supported by some light-armed infantry,
to attack the Numidian guard upon the nearest eminence, and drive them from
that post. They accordingly, advancing rapidly, attacked the Numidian cavalry:
they took some of them alive, severely wounded several in their flight, and
made themselves masters of the place. This being observed by Labienus, he
wheeled off almost the whole right wing of the horse, that he might the more
effectually succor the fugitives. Caesar waited till he was at a considerable
distance from his own men, and then detached his left wing to intercept the
enemy.
[40] In the plain where
this happened was a large villa, with four turrets, which prevented Labienus
from seeing that he was intercepted by Caesar's cavalry. He had therefore no
apprehension of the approach of Caesar's horse till he found himself charged in
the rear; which struck such a sudden terror into the Numidian cavalry that they
immediately betook themselves to flight. The Gauls and Germans who stood their
ground, being surrounded on all sides, were entirely cut off. This being
perceived by Scipio's legions, who were drawn up in order of battle before the
camp, they fled in the utmost terror and confusion. Scipio and his forces being
driven from the plain and the hills, Caesar sounded a retreat, and ordered all
the cavalry to retire behind the works. When the field was cleared, he could
not forbear admiring the huge bodies of the Gauls and Germans, who had been
partly induced by the authority of Labienus to follow him out of Gaul, and
partly drawn over by promises and rewards. Some being made prisoners in the
battle with Curio, and having their lives granted them, continued faithful out
of gratitude. Their bodies, of surprising symmetry and size, lay scattered all
over the plain.
[41] Next day, Caesar
drew all his forces together, and formed them in order of battle upon the
plain. Scipio, discouraged by so unexpected a check, and the number of his
wounded and slain, kept within his lines. Caesar, with his army in battle
array, marched along the roots of the hills, and gradually approached his
trenches. Caesar's legions were, by this time, not more than a mile from Uzita,
a town possessed by Scipio, when the latter, fearing lest he should lose the
town, whence he procured water and other conveniences for his army, resolved
therefore to preserve it, at all hazards, and brought forth his whole army, and
drew them up in four lines, forming the first of cavalry, supported by
elephants with castles on their backs. Caesar believing that Scipio approached
with the intention of giving battle, continued where he was posted, not far
from the town. Scipio meanwhile, having the town in the center of his front,
extended his two wings, where were his elephants, in full view of our army.
[42] When Caesar had
waited till sunset, without finding that Scipio stirred from his post, who
seemed rather disposed to defend himself by his advantageous situation, than
hazard a battle in the open field, he did not think proper to advance further
that day, because the enemy had a strong garrison of Numidians in the town,
which besides covered the center of their front: and he foresaw great
difficulty in forming, at the same time, an attack upon the town, and opposing
their right and left, with the advantage of the ground; especially as the
soldiers had continued under arms and fasted since morning. Having therefore
led back his troops to their camp, he resolved next day to extend his lines
nearer the town.
[43] Meantime
Considius, who was besieging eight mercenary cohorts of Numidians and Getulians
in Acilla, where P. Messius commanded, after continuing long before the place,
and seeing all his works burned and destroyed by the enemy, upon the report of
the late battle of the cavalry, set fire to is corn, destroyed his wine, oil,
and other stores, which were necessary for the maintenance of his army; and
abandoning the siege of Acilla, divided his forces with Scipio, and retired
through the kingdom of Juba, to Adrumetum.
[44] Meanwhile one of
the transports, belonging to the second embarkation, which Allienus had sent
from Sicily, in which were Q. Cominius, and L. Ticida, a Roman knight, being
separated from the rest of the fleet, in a storm, and driven to Thapsus, was
taken by Virgilius, and all the persons on board sent to Scipio. A three-banked
galley likewise, belonging to the same fleet, being forced by the winds to
Aegimurum, was intercepted by the squadron under Varus and M. Octavius. In this
vessel were some veteran soldiers, with a centurion, and a few new levies, whom
Varus treated without insult, and sent under a guard to Scipio. When they came
into his presence, and appeared before his tribunal: "I am
satisfied," said he, "it is not by your own inclination, but at the
instigation of your wicked general, that you impiously wage war on your fellow-citizens,
and every man of worth. If, therefore, now that fortune has put you in our
power, you will take this opportunity to unite with the good citizens, in the
defense of the commonwealth, I am determined to give you life and money:
therefore speak openly your sentiments."
[45] Scipio having
ended his speech, and expecting a thankful return to so gracious an offer,
permitted them to reply; one of their number, a centurion of the fourteenth
legion, thus addressed him: "Scipio," says he ("for I can not
give you the appellation of general), I return you my hearty thanks for the
good treatment you are willing to show to prisoners of war; and perhaps I might
accept of your kindness were it not to be purchased at the expense of a
horrible crime. What! shall I carry arms, and fight against Caesar, my general,
under whom I have served as centurion; and against his victorious army, to
whose renown I have for more than thirty-six years endeavored to contribute by
my valor? It is what I will never do, and even advise you not to push the war
any further. You know not what troops you have to deal with, nor the difference
betwixt them and yours: of which, if you please, I will give you an
indisputable instance. Do you pick out the best cohort you have in your army,
and give me only ten of my comrades, who are now your prisoners, to engage
them: you shall see by the success, what you are to expect from your
soldiers."
[46] When the centurion
had courageously made this reply, Scipio, incensed at his boldness, and resenting
the affront, made a sign to some of his officers to kill him on the spot, which
was immediately put in execution. At the same time, ordering the other veteran
soldiers to be separated from the new levies, "Carry away." said he,
"these men, contaminated by the pollution of crime, and pampered with the
blood of their fellow-citizens." Accordingly they were conducted without
the rampart, and cruelly massacred. The new-raised soldiers were distributed
among his legions, and Cominius and Ticida forbade to appear in his presence.
Caesar, concerned for his misfortune, broke, with ignominy, the officers whose
instructions were to secure the coast, and advance to a certain distance into
the main sea, to protect and facilitate the approach of the transports, but who
had neglected their duty on that important station.
[47] About this time a
most incredible accident befell Caesar's army; for the Pleiades being set,
about the second watch of the night, a terrible storm arose, attended by hail
of an uncommon size. But what contributed to render this misfortune the greater
was, that Caesar had not, like other generals, put his troops into winter
quarters, but was every three or four days changing his camp, to gain ground on
the enemy; which keeping the soldiers continually employed they were utterly
unprovided with any conveniences to protect them from the inclemency of the
weather. Besides, he had brought over his army from Sicily with such
strictness, that neither officer nor soldier had been permitted to take their
equipages or utensils with them, nor so much as a vessel or a single slave; and
so far had they been from acquiring or providing themselves with any thing in
Africa, that, on account of the great scarcity of provisions, they had even
consumed their former stores. Impoverished by these accidents, very few of them
had tents; the rest had made themselves a kind of covering, either by spreading
their clothes, or with mats and rushes. But these being soon penetrated by the
storm and hail, the soldiers had no resource left, but wandered up and down the
camp, covering their heads with their bucklers to shelter them from the
violence of the weather. In a short time the whole camp was under water, the
fires extinguished, and all their provisions washed away or spoiled. The same
night the shafts of the javelins belonging to the fifth legion, of their own
accord, took fire.
[48] In the mean time,
king Juba, having been informed of the cavalry actions with Scipio, and being
earnestly solicited, by letters from that general, to come to his assistance,
left Sabura at home with part of the army, to carry on the war against Sitius,
and that he might add the weight of his authority to free Scipio's troops from
the dread they had of Caesar, began his march, with three legions, eight
hundred regular horse, a body of Numidian cavalry, great numbers of light-armed
infantry, and thirty elephants. When he arrived he lodged himself, with those
forces which I have described, in a separate camp, at no great distance from
that of Scipio. (Great alarm had prevailed for some time previously in Caesar's
camp, and the report of his approach had increased and produced a general
suspense and expectation among the troops. But his arrival, and the appearance
of his camp, soon dispelled all these apprehensions; and they despised the king
of Mauritania, now that he was present, as much as they had feared him when at
a distance.) After this junction, any one might easily perceive that Scipio's
courage and confidence were increased by the arrival of the king. For next day,
drawing out all his own and the royal forces, with sixty elephants, he ranged
them, in order of battle, with great ostentation advancing a little beyond his
intrenchments, and, after a short stay, retreated to his camp.
[49] Caesar, knowing
that Scipio had received all the supplies he expected, and judging he would no
longer decline coming to an engagement, began to advance along the ridge with
his forces, extend his lines, secure them with redoubts, and possess himself of
the eminences between him and Scipio. The enemy, confiding in their numbers,
seized a neighboring hill, and thereby prevented the progress of our works.
Labienus had formed the design of securing this post, and as it lay nearest his
quarters, soon got thither.
[50] There was a broad
and deep valley, of rugged descent, broken with caves, which Caesar had to pass
before he could come to the hill which he wished to occupy, and beyond which
was a thick grove of old olives. Labienus, perceiving that Caesar must march
this way, and having a perfect knowledge of the country, placed himself in
ambush, with the light-armed foot and part of the cavalry. At the same time he
disposed some horse behind the hills, that when he should fall unexpectedly
upon Caesar's foot, they might suddenly advance from behind the mountain. And
thus Caesar and his army being attacked in front and rear, surrounded with
danger on all sides, and unable either to retreat or advance, would, he
imagined, fall an easy prey to his victorious troops. Caesar, who had no
suspicion of the ambuscade, sent his cavalry before; and arriving at the place,
Labienus's men, either forgetting or neglecting the orders of their general, or
fearing to be trampled to death in the ditch by our cavalry, began to issue in
small parties from the rock, and ascend the hill. Caesar's horse pursuing them,
slew some, and took others prisoners; then making toward the hill drove thence
Labienus's detachment and immediately took possession. Labienus, with a small
party of horse, escaped with great difficulty by flight.
[51] The cavalry having
thus cleared the mountain, Caesar resolved to intrench himself there, and
distributed the work to the legions. He then ordered two lines of communication
to be drawn from the greater camp, across the plain on the side of Uzita, which
stood between him and the enemy, and was garrisoned by a detachment of Scipio's
army, and place them in such a manner as to meet at the right and left angles
of the town. His design in this work was, that when he approached the town with
his troops, and began to attack it, these lines might secure his flanks, and
hinder the enemy's horse from surrounding him, and compelling him to abandon
the siege. It likewise gave his men more frequent opportunities of conversing
with the enemy, and facilitated the means of desertion to such as favored his
cause; many of whom had already come over, though not without great danger to
themselves. He wanted also, by drawing nearer the enemy, to see if they really
intended to come to an action, and in addition to all these reasons, that the
place itself being very low, he might there sink some wells; whereas before he
had a long and troublesome way to send for water. While the legions were
employed in these works, part of the army stood ready drawn up before the
trenches, and had frequent skirmishes with the Numidian horse and light-armed
foot
[52] A little before
evening, when Caesar was drawing off his legions from the works, Juba, Scipio,
and Labienus, at the head of all their horse and light-armed foot, fell
furiously upon his cavalry; who, being overwhelmed by the sudden and general
attack of so great a multitude, were forced to give ground a little. But the
event was very different from what the enemy expected; for Caesar, leading back
his legions to the assistance of his cavalry, they immediately rallied, turned
upon the Numidians, and charging them vigorously while they were dispersed and
disordered with the pursuit, drove them with great loss to the king's camp, and
slew several of them. And had not night intervened, and the dust raised by the
wind obstructed the prospect, Juba and Labienus would both have fallen into
Caesar's hands, and their whole cavalry and light-armed infantry have been cut
off. Meanwhile Scipio's men, of the fourth and sixth legions, left him in
crowds, some deserting to Caesar's camp, others fleeing to such places as were
most convenient for them. Curio's horse likewise, distrusting Scipio and his
troops, followed the same counsel.
[53] While these things
were being carried on by Caesar and his opponents around Uzita, two legions,
the ninth and tenth, sailing in transports from Sicily, when they came before
Ruspina, observing Caesar's ships that lay at anchor about Thapsus, and fearing
it might be the enemy's fleet stationed there to intercept them, imprudently
stood out to sea; and after being long tossed by the winds, and harassed by
thirst and famine, at last arrived at Caesar's camp.
[54] Soon after these
legions were landed, Caesar, calling to mind their former licentious behaviour
in Italy, and the rapines of some of their officers, seized the slight pretext
furnished by C. Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, who, when he
set out for Sicily, filled a ship entirely with his own slaves and horses,
without taking on board one single soldier. Wherefore, summoning all the
military tribunes and centurions to appear before his tribunal next day, he
addressed them in these terms, "I could have wished that those, whose
insolence and former licentious character have given me cause of complaint, had
been capable of amendment, and of making a good use of my mildness, patience,
and moderation. But since they know not how to confine themselves within due
bounds, I intend to make an example of them, according to the law of arms, in
order that others may be taught a better conduct. Because you, C. Avienus, when
you were in Italy, instigated the soldiers of the Roman people to revolt from the
republic and have been guilty of rapines and plunders in the municipal towns;
and because you have never been of any real service, either to the commonwealth
or to your general, and in lieu of soldiers, have crowded the transports with
your slaves and equipage; so that, through your fault, the republic is in want
of soldiers, who at this time are not only useful, but necessary; for all these
causes, I break you with ignominy, and order you to leave Africa this very day.
In like manner I break you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved yourself as a
seditious officer, and as a bad citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C.
Clusinus, have attained the rank of centurions through my indulgence, and not
through your own merit; and since you have been invested with that rank, have
neither shown bravery in war, nor good conduct in peace, and have been more
zealous in raising seditions, and exciting the soldiers against your general
than in observing forbearance and moderation. I therefore think you unworthy of
continuing centurions in my army: I break you, and order you to quit Africa as
soon as possible." Having concluded this speech, he delivered them over to
some centurions, with orders to confine them separately on board a ship,
allowing each of them a single slave to wait on him.
[55] Meantime the
Getulian deserters, whom Caesar had sent home with letters and instructions, as
we related above, arrived among their countrymen: who, partly swayed by their
authority, partly by the name and reputation of Caesar, revolted from Juba; and
speedily and unanimously taking up arms, scrupled not to act in opposition to
their king. Juba, having thus three wars to sustain, was compelled to detach
six cohorts from the army destined to act against Caesar, and send them to defend
the frontiers of his kingdom against the Getulians.
[56] Caesar, having
finished his lines of communication, and pushed them so near the town, as to be
just out of reach of dart, intrenched himself there. He caused warlike engines
in great numbers to be placed in the front of his works, wherewith he played
perpetually against the town; and to increase the enemy's apprehensions, drew
five legions out of his other camp. When this opportunity was presented,
several persons of eminence and distinction earnestly requested an interview
with their friends, and held frequent conferences, which Caesar foresaw would
turn to his advantage. For the chief officers of the Getulian horse, with other
illustrious men of that nation (whose fathers had served under C. Marius, and
from his bounty obtained considerable estates in their country, but after
Sylla's victory had been made tributaries to king Hiempsal), taking advantage
of the night, when the fires were lighted, came over to Caesar's camp near
Uzita, with their horses and servants, to the number of about a thousand.
[57] When Scipio and
his party learned this, and were much annoyed at the disaster, they perceived,
much about the same time, M. Aquinius in discourse with C. Saserna. Scipio sent
him word that he did not do well to correspond with the enemy. Aquinius,
however, paid no attention to this reprimand, but pursued his discourse. Soon
after, one of Juba's guards came to him and told him, in the hearing of
Saserna, "The king forbids you to continue this conversation." He,
being terrified by this order, immediately retired, and obeyed the command of
the king. One can not wonder enough at this step in a Roman citizen, who had
already attained to considerable honors in the commonwealth; that though
neither banished his country, nor stripped of his possessions, he should pay a
more ready obedience to the orders of a foreign prince than those of Scipio;
and choose rather to behold the destruction of his party than return into the
bosom of his country. And still greater insolence was shown by Juba, not to M.
Aquinius, a man of no family, and an inconsiderable senator, but even to Scipio
himself, a man of illustrious birth, distinguished honors, and high dignity in
the state. For as Scipio, before the king's arrival, always wore a purple coat
of mail, Juba is reported to have told him, that he ought not to wear the same
habit as he did. Accordingly, Scipio changed his purple robe for a white one,
submitting to Juba, a most haughty and insolent monarch.
[58] Next day they drew
out all their forces from both camps; and forming them on an eminence not far
from Caesar's camp, continued thus in order of battle. Caesar likewise drew out
his men, and disposed them in battle array before his lines; not doubting but
the enemy, who exceeded him in number of troops, and had been so considerably
reinforced by the arrival of king Juba, would advance to attack him. Wherefore,
having ridden through the ranks, encouraged his men, and gave them the signal
of battle, he stayed, expecting the enemy's charge. For he did not think it
advisable to remove far from his lines: because the enemy having a strong
garrison in Uzita, which was opposite to his right wing, he could not advance
beyond that place without exposing his flank to a sally from the town. He was
also deterred by the following reason, because the ground before Scipio's army
was very rough, and he thought it likely to disorder his men in the charge.
[59] And I think that I
ought not to omit to describe the order of battle of both armies. Scipio drew
up his troops in the following manner: he posted his own legions and those of
Juba in the front; behind them the Numidians, as a body of reserve: but in so
very thin ranks, and so far extended in length, that to see them at a distance
you would have taken the main body for a simple line of legionaries, which was
doubled only upon the wings. He placed elephants at equal distances on the
right and left, and supported them by the light-armed troops and auxiliary
Numidians. All the regular cavalry were on the right; for the left was covered
by the town of Uzita, nor had the cavalry room to extend themselves on that
side. Accordingly, he stationed the Numidian horse, with an incredible
multitude of light-armed foot, about a thousand paces from his right, toward
the foot of a mountain, considerably removed from his own and the enemy's
troops. He did so with this intention, that, when the two armies should engage,
his cavalry at the commencement of the action should take a longer sweep,
inclose Caesar's army and throw them into confusion by their darts. Such was
Scipio's disposition.
[60] Caesar's order of
battle, to describe it from left to right, was arranged in the following
manner: the ninth and eighth legions formed the left wing: the thirteenth,
fourteenth, twenty-eighth, and twenty-sixth, the main body; and the thirtieth
and twenty-eighth the right. His second line on the right consisted partly of
the cohorts of those legions we have already mentioned, partly of the new
levies. His third line was posted to the left, extending as far as the middle
legion of the main body, and so disposed, that the left wing formed a triple
order of battle. The reason of this disposition was, because his right wing
being defended by the works, it behooved him to make his left stronger, that
they might be a match for the numerous cavalry of the enemy; for which reason
he had placed all his horse there, intermixed with light-armed foot; and as he
could not rely much upon them, had detached the fifth legion to sustain them.
He placed archers up and down the field, but principally in the two wings.
[61] The two armies
thus facing one another in order of battle, with a space of no more than three
hundred paces between, continued so posted from morning till night without
fighting, of which perhaps there was never an instance before. But when Caesar
began to retreat within his lines, suddenly all the Numidian and Getulian horse
without bridles, who were posted behind the enemy's army, made a motion to the
right, and began to approach Caesar's camp on the mountain; while the regular
cavalry under Labienus continued in their post to keep our legions in check.
Upon this, part of Caesar's cavalry, with the light-armed foot, advancing
hastily, and without orders, against the Getulians, and venturing to pass the
morass, found themselves unable to deal with the superior multitude of the
enemy; and being abandoned by the light-armed troops, were forced to retreat in
great disorder, after the loss of one trooper, twenty-six light-armed foot, and
many of their horses wounded. Scipio, overjoyed at this success, returned
toward night to his camp. But fortune determined not to give such unalloyed joy
to those engaged in war, for the day after, a party of horse, sent by Caesar to
Leptis in quest of provisions, falling in unexpectedly with some Numidian and
Getulian stragglers, killed or made prisoners about a hundred of them. Caesar,
meanwhile, omitted not every day to draw out his men and labor at the works;
carrying a ditch and rampart quite across the plain, to prevent the incursions
of the enemy. Scipio likewise drew lines opposite to Caesar's, and used great
exertions lest Caesar should cut off his communication with the mountain. Thus
both generals were busied about their intrenchments, yet a day seldom passed,
without some skirmish between the cavalry.
[62] In the mean time,
Varus, upon notice that the seventh and eighth legions had sailed from Sicily,
speedily equipped the fleet he had brought to winter at Utica; and manning it
with Getulian rowers and mariners, went out a cruising and came before
Adrumetum with fifty-five ships. Caesar, ignorant of his arrival, sent L.
Cispius, with a squadron of twenty-seven sail toward Thapsus, to anchor there
for the security of his convoys; and likewise dispatched Q. Aquila to
Adrumetum, with thirteen galleys, upon the same errand. Cispius soon reached
the station appointed to him: but Aquila being attacked by a storm could not
double the cape, which obliged him to put into a creek at some distance, that
afforded convenient shelter. The rest of the fleet which remained at sea before
Leptis, where the mariners having landed and wandered here and there upon the
shore, some having gone into the town for the purpose of purchasing provisions,
was left quite defenseless. Varus, having notice of this from a deserter, and
resolving to take advantage of the enemy's negligence, left Adrumetum in Cothon
at the commencement of the second watch, and arriving early next morning with
his whole fleet before Leptis, burned all the transports that were out at sea,
and took without opposition two five-benched galleys, in which were none to
defend them.
[63] Caesar had an
account brought him of this unlucky accident, as he was inspecting the works of
his camp. Whereupon he immediately took horse, and leaving every thing else,
went full speed to Leptis, which was but two leagues distant, and going on
board a brigantine, ordered all the ships to follow him. He soon came up with
Aquila, whom he found dismayed and terrified at the number of ships he had to
oppose; and continuing his course, began to pursue the enemy's fleet. Meantime
Varus, astonished at Caesar's boldness and dispatch, tacked about with his
whole fleet, and made the best of his way for Adrumetum. But Caesar, after four
miles' sail, recovered one of his galleys, with the crew and a hundred and
thirty of the enemy's men left to guard her; and took a three benched galley
belonging to the enemy which had fallen astern during the engagement, with all
the soldiers and mariners on board. The rest of the fleet doubled the cape, and
made the port of Adrumetum in Cothon. Caesar could not double the cape with the
same wind, but keeping the sea at anchor all night, appeared early next morning
before Adrumetum. He set fire to all the transports without Cothon, and took
what galleys he found there, or forced them into the harbor; and having waited
some time to offer the enemy battle, returned again to his camp.
[64] On board the ship
he had taken was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, and P. Ligarius, who had served
in Spain under Afranius, the same who had prosecuted the war against him in
Spain, and who, instead of acknowledging the conqueror's generosity, in
granting him his liberty, had joined Pompey in Greece; and after the battle of
Pharsalia, had gone into Africa, to Varus, there to continue in the service of
the same cause. Caesar, to punish his perfidy and breach of oath, gave
immediate orders for his execution. But he pardoned P. Vestrius, because his
brother had paid his ransom at Rome, and because he himself proved, that being
taken in Nasidius's fleet, and condemned to die, he had been saved by the
kindness of Varus, since which no opportunity had offered of making his escape.
[65] It is the custom
of the people of Africa to deposit their corn privately in vaults, under
ground, to secure it in time of war, and guard it from the sudden incursions of
an enemy. Caesar, having intelligence of this from a spy, drew out two legions,
with a party of cavalry, at midnight, and sent them about ten miles off; whence
they returned, loaded with corn to the camp. Labienus, being informed of it,
marched about seven miles, through the mountains Caesar had passed the day
before, and there encamped with two legions; where expecting that Caesar would
often come the same way in quest of corn, he daily lay in ambush with a great
body of horse and light-armed foot.
[66] Caesar, being
informed of the ambuscade of Labienus by deserters, delayed there a few days,
till the enemy, by repeating the practice often, had abated a little of their
circumspection. Then suddenly, one morning ordering eight veteran legions with
part of the cavalry to follow him by the Decuman gate, he sent forward the rest
of the cavalry; who, coming suddenly upon the enemy's light-armed foot, that
lay in ambush among the valleys, slew about five hundred, and put the rest to
flight. Meantime Labienus advanced, with all his cavalry, to support the
fugitives, and was on the point of overpowering our small party with his
numbers, when suddenly Caesar appeared with the legions, in order of battle.
This sight checked the ardor of Labienus, who thought proper to sound a
retreat. The day after, Juba ordered all the Numidians who had deserted their
post and fled to their camp to be crucified.
[67] Meanwhile Caesar,
being distressed by want of corn, recalled all his forces to the camp; and
having left garrisons at Leptis, Ruspina, and Acilla, ordered Cispius and
Aquila to blockade with their fleets, the one Adrumetum, the other Thapsus, and
setting fire to his camp at Uzita, he set out, in order of battle, at the
fourth watch, disposed his baggage on the left, and came to Agar, which had
been often vigorously attacked by the Getulians, and as valiantly defended by
the inhabitants. There encamping in the plain before the town, he went with
part of his army round the country in quest of provisions; and having found a
large store of barley, oil, wine, and figs, with a small quantity of wheat,
after allowing the troops some time to refresh themselves, he returned to his
camp. Scipio meanwhile hearing of Caesar's departure, followed him along the
hills, with all his forces, and posted himself about six miles off; in three
different camps.
[68] The town of Zeta,
lying on Scipio's side of the country, was not above ten miles from his camp,
but might be about eighteen from that of Caesar. Scipio had sent two legions
thither to forage; which Caesar having intelligence of from a deserter, removed
his camp from the plain to a hill, for the greater security; and leaving a
garrison there, marched at three in the morning with the rest of his forces,
passed the enemy's camp, and possessed himself of the town. He found that
Scipio's legions were gone further into the country to forage: against whom,
setting out immediately, he found that the whole army had come up to their
assistance, which obliged him to give over the pursuit. He took, on this
occasion, C. Mutius Reginus, a Roman knight, Scipio's intimate friend, and
governor of the town; also P. Atrius, a Roman knight, of the province of Utica,
with twenty-two camels, belonging to king Juba. Then leaving a garrison in the
place, under the command of Oppius, his lieutenant, he returned to his own
camp.
[69] As he drew near
Scipio's camp, by which he was obliged to pass, Labienus and Afranius, who lay
in ambuscade among the nearest hills, with all their cavalry and light-armed
infantry, started up and attacked his rear. When Caesar perceived this, he
detached his cavalry to receive their charge, ordered the legions to throw all
their baggage into a heap, and face about upon the enemy. No sooner was this
order executed than, upon the first charge of the legions, the enemy's horse
and light-armed foot began to give way, and were with incredible ease driven
from the higher ground. But when Caesar, supposing them sufficiently deterred
from any further attempts, began to pursue his march, they again issued from
the hills; and the Numidians, with the light armed infantry, who are
wonderfully nimble, and accustom themselves to fight intermixed with the horse,
with whom they keep an equal pace, either in advancing or retiring, fell a
second time upon our foot. As they repeated this often, pressing upon our
troops when we marched, and retiring when we endeavored to engage, always
keeping at a certain distance, and with singular care avoiding a close fight,
and considering it enough to wound us with their darts, Caesar plainly saw that
their whole aim was to oblige him to encamp in that place, where no water was
to be had; that his soldiers, who had tasted nothing from three in the morning
till four in the afternoon, might perish with hunger, and the cattle with
thirst.
[70] When sunset now
approached, and Caesar found he had not gained a hundred paces in four hours,
and that by keeping his cavalry in the rear he lost many horse, he ordered the
legions to fall behind, and close the march. Proceeding thus with a slow and
gentle pace, he found the legions fitter to sustain the enemy's charge.
Meantime the Numidian horse, wheeling round the hills, to the right and left,
threatened to inclose Caesar's forces with their numbers, while part continued
to harass his rear: and if but three or four veteran soldiers faced about, and
darted their javelins at the enemy, no less than two thousand of them would
tale to flight: but suddenly rallying, returned to the fight, and charged the
legionaries with their darts. Thus Caesar, at one time marching forward, at
another halting, and going on but slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven
that evening, having only ten men wounded. Labienus too retreated to his camp,
after having thoroughly fatigued his troops with the pursuit: in which, besides
a great number wounded, his loss amounted to about three hundred men. And Scipio
withdrew his legions and elephants, whom, for the greater terror, he had ranged
before his camp within view of Caesar's army.
[71] Caesar, to meet
enemies of this sort, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, not like a
general of a veteran army which had been victorious in so many battles, but
like a fencing master training up his gladiators, with what foot they must
advance or retire; when they were to oppose and make good their ground; when to
counterfeit an attack; at what place, and in what manner to launch their
javelins. For the enemy's light-armed troops gave wonderful trouble and
annoyance to our army; because they not only deterred the cavalry from the
encounter, by killing their horses with their javelins, but likewise wearied
out the legionary soldiers by their swiftness: for as often as these
heavy-armed troops advanced to attack them, they evaded the danger by a quick
retreat.
[72] Caesar was
rendered very anxious by these occurrences; because as often as he engaged with
his cavalry, without being supported by the infantry, he found himself by no
means a match for the enemy's horse, supported by their light-armed foot: and
as he had no experience of the strength of their legions, he foresaw still
greater difficulties when these should be united, as the shock must then be
overwhelming. In addition to this, the number and size of the elephants greatly
increased the terror of the soldiers; for which, however, he found a remedy, in
causing some of those animals to be brought over from Italy, that his men might
be accustomed to the sight of them, know their strength and courage, and in
what part of the body they were most vulnerable. For as the elephants are
covered with trappings and ornaments, it was necessary to inform them what
parts of the body remained naked, that they might direct their darts thither.
It was likewise needful to familiarize his horses to the cry, smell, and figure
of these animals; in all of which he succeeded to a wonder; for the soldiers
quickly came to touch them with their hands, and to be sensible of their
tardiness; and the cavalry attacked them with blunted darts, and, by degrees,
brought their horses to endure their presence.
[73] For these reasons
already mentioned, Caesar was very anxious, and proceeded with more slowness
and circumspection than usual, abating considerably in his wonted expedition
and celerity. Nor ought we to wonder; for in Gaul he had under him troops
accustomed to fight in a champaign country, against an open undesigning enemy,
who despised artifice, and valued themselves only on their bravery. But now he
was to habituate his soldiers to the arts and contrivances of a crafty enemy,
and teach them what to pursue, and what to avoid. The sooner therefore to
instruct them in these matters, he took care not to confine his legions to one
place, but under pretense of foraging, engaged them in frequent marches, and
counter-marches; because he thought that the enemy's troops would not lose his
track. Three days after, he drew up his forces with great skill, and marching
past Scipio's camp, waited for him in an open plain; but seeing that he still
declined a battle, he retreated to his camp a little before evening.
[74] Meantime
embassadors arrived from the town of Vacca, bordering upon Zeta, of which we have
observed Caesar had possessed himself. They requested and entreated that he
would send them a garrison, promising to furnish many of the necessaries of
war. At the same time, by the will of the gods, and their kindness to Caesar, a
deserter informed him, that Juba had, by a quick march, before Caesar's troops
could arrive, reached the town and surrounded it, and after taking possession
of it, massacred the inhabitants, and abandoned the place itself to the plunder
of his soldiers.
[75] Caesar, having reviewed
his army the twelfth day before the calends of April, advanced next day, with
all his forces, five miles beyond his camp, and remained a considerable time in
order of battle, two miles from Scipio's. When he saw distinctly that the
enemy, though frequently and for a long time challenged to a battle, declined
it, he led back his troops. Next day he decamped, and directed his march toward
Sarsura, where Scipio had a garrison of Numidians, and a magazine of corn.
Labienus being informed of this motion, began to harass his rear with the
cavalry and light-armed troops: and having made himself master of part of the
baggage, was encouraged to attack the legions themselves, believing they would
fall an easy prey, under the load and encumbrance of a march. However, this
circumstance had not escaped Caesar's attention, for he had ordered three
hundred men out of each legion to hold themselves in readiness for action.
These being sent against Labienus, he was so terrified at their approach, that
he shamefully took to flight, great numbers of his men being killed or wounded.
The legionaries returned to their standards, and pursued their march. Labienus
continued to follow us at a distance along the summit of the mountains on our
right.
[76] Caesar, arriving
before Sarsura, took it in presence of the enemy, who durst not advance to its
relief; and put to the sword the garrison which had been left there by Scipio,
under the command of P. Cornelius, one of Scipio's veterans, who, after a
vigorous defense, was surrounded slain. Having given all the corn in the place
to the army, he marched next day to Tisdra, where Considius was, with a strong
garrison and his cohort of gladiators. Caesar, having taken a view of the town,
and being deterred from besieging it by want of corn, set out immediately, and
after a march of four miles, encamped near a river. He marched from it on the
fourth day, and then returned to his former camp at Agar. Scipio did the same,
and retreated to his old quarters.
[77] Meantime the
inhabitants of Thabena, a nation situated on the extreme confines of Juba's
kingdom, along the seacoast, and who had been accustomed to live in subjection
to that monarch, having massacred the garrison left there by the king, sent
deputies to Caesar to inform him of what they had done, and to beg he would
take under his protection a city which deserved so well of the Roman people.
Caesar, approving their conduct, sent M. Crispus the tribune, with a cohort, a
party of archers, and a great number of engines of war, to charge himself with
the defense of Thabena. At the same time the legionary soldiers, who, either on
account of sickness or for other reasons, had not been able to come over into
Africa with the rest, to the number of four thousand foot, four hundred horse,
and a thousand archers and slingers, reached Caesar by one embarkation. With
these and his former troops, he advanced into a plain eight miles distant from
his own camp, and four from that of Scipio, where he awaited the enemy in order
of battle.
[78] There was a town
below Scipio's camp, of the name of Tegea, where he had a garrison of four
hundred horse. These he drew up on the right and left of the town; and bringing
forth his legions, formed them in order of battle upon a hill somewhat lower
than his camp, and which was about a thousand paces distant from it. After he
had continued a considerable time in one place, without offering to make any
attempt, Caesar sent some squadrons of horse, supported by his light-armed
infantry, archers, and slingers, to charge the enemy's cavalry, who were on
duty before the town. After Caesar's troops advanced and came to the charge
with their horses at a gallop, Placidius began to extend his front, that he
might at once surround us and give us a warm reception. Upon this Caesar
detached three hundred legionaries to our assistance, while at the same time
Labienus was continually sending fresh reinforcements, to replace those that
were wounded or fatigued. Our cavalry, who were only four hundred in number,
not being able to sustain the charge of four thousand, and being besides
greatly harassed by the light-armed Numidians, began at last to give ground:
which Caesar observing, detached the other wing to their assistance: who,
joining those that were like to be overpowered, fell in a body upon the enemy,
put them to flight, slew or wounded great numbers, pursued them three miles
quite to the mountains, and then returned to their own men. Caesar continued in
order of battle till four in the afternoon, and then retreated to his camp
without the loss of a man. In this action Placidius received a dangerous wound
in the head, and had many of his best officers either killed or wounded.
[79] After he found
that he could not by any means induce the enemy to come down to the plain and
make trial of the legions, and that he could not encamp nearer them for want of
water, in consideration of which alone, and not from any confidence in their
numbers, the Africans had dared to despise him; he decamped the day before the
nones of April at midnight, marched sixteen miles beyond Agar to Thapsus, where
Virgilius commanded with a strong garrison, and there fixed his camp, and began
to surround the town the very day on which he arrived, and raised redoubts in
proper places, as well for his own security, as to prevent any succors from
entering the town. In the mean time, Scipio, on learning Caesar's designs, was
reduced to the necessity of fighting, to avoid the disgrace of abandoning
Virgilius and the Thapsitani, who had all along remained firm to his party; and
therefore, following Caesar without delay, he posted himself in two camps eight
miles from Thapsus.
[80] Now there were
some salt-pits, between which and the sea was a narrow pass of about fifteen
hundred paces, by which Scipio endeavored to penetrate and carry succors to the
inhabitants of Thapsus. But Caesar anticipating that this might happen, had the
day before raised a very strong fort at the entrance of it, in which he left a
triple garrison; and encamping with the rest of his troops in the form of a
half moon, carried his works round the town. Scipio, disappointed in his
design, passed the day and night following a little above the morass; but early
next morning advanced within a small distance of the last mentioned camp and
fort, where he began to intrench himself about fifteen hundred paces from the
sea. Caesar being informed of this, drew off his men from the works; and
leaving Asprenas the proconsul, with two legions, at the camp, marched all the
rest of his forces with the utmost expedition to that place. He left part of
the fleet before Thapsus, and ordered the rest to make as near the shore as
possible toward the enemy's rear, observing the signal he should give them,
upon which they were to raise a sudden shout, that the enemy, alarmed and
disturbed by the noise behind them, might be forced to face about.
[81] When Caesar came
to the place, he found Scipio's army in order of battle before the
intrenchments, the elephants posted on the right and left wings, and part of
the soldiers busily employed in fortifying the camp. Upon sight of this
disposition, he drew up his army in three lines, placed the tenth and second
legions on the right wing, the eighth and ninth on the left, five legions in
the center, covered his flanks with five cohorts, posted opposite the
elephants, disposed the archers and slingers in the two wings, and intermingled
the light-armed troops with his cavalry. He himself on foot went from rank to
rank, to rouse the courage of the veterans, putting them in mind of their
former victories, and animating them by his kind expressions. He exhorted the
new levies who had never yet been in battle to emulate the bravery of the
veterans, and endeavor by a victory to attain the same degree of fame, glory,
and renown.
[82] As he ran from
rank to rank, he observed the enemy about the camp very uneasy, hurrying from
place to place, at one time retiring behind the rampart, another coming out
again in great tumult and confusion. As many others in the army began to
observe this, his lieutenants and volunteers begged him to give the signal for
battle, as the immortal gods promised him a decisive victory. While he
hesitated and strove to repress their eagerness and desires, exclaiming that it
was not his wish to commence the battle by a sudden sally, at the same time
keeping back his army, on a sudden a trumpeter in the right wing, without
Caesar's leave, but compelled by the soldiers, sounded a charge. Upon this all
the cohorts began to rush toward the enemy, in spite of the endeavors of the
centurions, who strove to restrain them by force, lest they should charge
withal the general's order, but to no purpose.
[83] Caesar perceiving
that the ardor of his soldiers would admit of no restraint, giving "good
fortune" for the word, spurred on his horse, and charged the enemy's
front. On the right wing the archers and slingers poured their eager javelins without
intermission upon the elephants, and by the noise of their slings and stones,
so terrified these animals, that turning upon their own men, they trod them
down in heaps, and rushed through the half-finished gates of the camp. At the
same time the Mauritanian horse, who were in the same wing with the elephants,
seeing themselves deprived of their assistance, betook themselves to flight.
Whereupon the legions wheeling round the elephants, soon possessed themselves
of the enemy's intrenchments, and some few that made great resistance being
slain, the rest fled with all expedition to the camp they had quitted the day
before.
[84] And here we must
not omit to notice the bravery of a veteran soldier of the fifth legion. For
when an elephant which had been wounded in the left wing, and, roused to fury
by the pain, ran against an unarmed sutler, threw him under his feet, and
kneeling on him with his whole weight, and brandishing his uplifted trunk, with
hideous cries, crushed him to death, the soldier could not refrain from
attacking the animal. The elephant, seeing him advance with his javelin in his
hand, quitted the dead body of the sutler, and seizing him with his trunk,
wheeled him round in the air. But he, amid all the danger, preserving his
presence of mind, ceased not with his sword to strike at the elephant's trunk,
which enclasped him, and the animal, at last overcome with the pain, quitted
the soldier, and fled to the rest with hideous cries,
[85] Meanwhile the
garrison of Thapsus, either designing to assist their friends, or abandoning
the town to seek safety by flight, sallied out by the gate next the sea, and
wading navel deep in the water; endeavored to reach the land. But the servants
and attendants of the camp, attacking them with darts and stones, obliged them
to return to the town. Scipio's forces meanwhile being beaten, and his men
fleeing on all sides, the legions instantly began the pursuit, that they might
have no time to rally. When they arrived at the camp to which they fled, and
where, having repaired it, they hoped to defend themselves they began to think
of choosing a commander, to whose, authority and orders they might submit; but
finding none on whom they could rely, they threw down their arms, and fled to
the king's quarter. Finding this, on their arrival, occupied by Caesar's
forces, they retired to a hill, where, despairing of safety, they cast down
their arms, and saluted them in a military manner. But this stood them in
little stead, for the veterans, transported with rage and anger, not only could
not be induced to spare the enemy, but even killed or wounded several citizens
of distinction in their own army, whom they upbraided as authors of the war. Of
this number was Tullius Rufus the quaestor, whom a soldier designedly ran
through with a javelin; and Pompeius Rufus, who was wounded with a sword in the
arm, and would doubtless have been slain, had he not speedily fled to Caesar
for protection. This made several Roman knights and senators retire from the
battle, lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory assumed an unbounded
license, should be induced by the hopes of impunity to wreck their fury on them
likewise. In short all Scipio's soldiers, though they implored the protection
of Caesar, were in the very sight of that general, and in spite of his
entreaties to his men to spare them, without exception put to the sword.
[86] Caesar, having
made himself master of the enemy's three camps, killed ten thousand, and
putting the rest to flight, retreated to his own quarters with the loss of not
more than fifty men and a few wounded. In his way he appeared before the town
of Thapsus, and ranged all the elephants he had taken in the battle, amounting
to sixty-four, with their ornaments, trappings, and castles, in full view of
the place. This he did in hopes that possibly Virgilius and those that were
besieged with him might give over the idea of resistance on learning the defeat
of their friends. He even called and invited him to submit, reminding him of
his clemency and mildness; but no answer being given, he retired from before
the town. Next day, after returning thanks to the gods, he assembled his army
before Thapsus, praised his soldiers in presence of the inhabitants, rewarded
the victorious, and from his tribunal extended his bounty to every one,
according to their merit and services. Setting out thence immediately he left
the proconsul C. Rebellius, with three legions, to continue the siege, and sent
Cn. Domitius with two to invest Tisdra, where Considius commanded. Then
ordering M. Messala to go before with the cavalry, he began his march to Utica.
[87] Scipio's cavalry,
who had escaped out of the battle, taking the road to Utica, arrived at Parada;
but being refused admittance by the inhabitants, who heard of Caesar's victory,
they forced the gates, lighted a great fire in the middle of the forum, and
threw all the inhabitants into it, without distinction of age or sex, with
their effects; avenging in this manner, by an unheard of cruelty, the affront
they had received. Thence they marched directly to Utica. M. Cato, some time
before, distrusting the inhabitants of that city, on account of the privileges
granted them by the Julian law, had disarmed and expelled the populace,
obliging them to dwell without the Warlike gate, in a small camp surrounded by
a slight intrenchment, around which he had planted guards, while at the same
time he put the senators under arrest. The cavalry attacked their camp, knowing
them to be favorers of Caesar, and intending to wipe out by their destruction,
the disgrace of their own defeat. But the people, animated by Caesar's victory,
repulsed them with stones and clubs. They therefore threw themselves into the
town, killed many of the inhabitants, and pillaged their houses. Cato, unable
to prevail with them to abstain from rapine and slaughter, and undertake the
defense of the town, as he was not ignorant of what they aimed at, gave each a
hundred sesterces to make them quiet. Sylla Faustus did the same out of his own
money; and marching with them from Utica, advanced into the kingdom.
[88] A great many
others that had escaped out of the battle, fled to Utica. These Cato assembled,
with three hundred more who had furnished Scipio with money for carrying on the
war, and exhorted them to set their slaves free, and in conjunction with them
defend the town. But finding that though part assembled, the rest were
terrified and determined to flee, he gave over the attempt, and furnished them
with ships to facilitate their escape. He himself, having settled all his affairs
with the utmost care, and commended his children to L. Caesar his quaestor,
without the least indication which might give cause of suspicion, or any change
in his countenance and behavior, privately carried a sword into his chamber
when he retired to rest, and stabbed himself with it. When the wound not
proving mortal, he fell heavily to the ground, his physician and friends
suspecting what was going on, burst into the room and began to stanch and bind
up his wound, he himself most resolutely tore it open, and met death with the
greatest determination. The Uticans, though they hated his party, yet in
consideration of his singular integrity, his behavior so different from that of
the other chiefs, and because he had strengthened their town with wonderful fortifications,
and increased the towers, interred him honorably. L. Caesar, that he might
procure some advantage by his death, assembled the people, and after haranguing
them, exhorted them to open their gates, and throw themselves upon Caesar's
clemency, from which they had the greatest reason to hope the best. This advice
being followed, he came forth to meet Caesar. Messala having reached Utica,
according to his orders, placed guards at the gates.
[89] Meanwhile Caesar,
leaving Thapsus came to Usceta, where Scipio had laid up a great store of corn,
arms, darts, and other warlike provisions, under a small guard. He soon made
himself master of the place, and marched directly to Adrumetum, which he
entered without opposition. He took an account of the arms, provisions, and
money in the town; pardoned Q. Ligarius, and C. Considius; and leaving
Livineius Regulus there with one legion, set out the same day for Utica. L.
Caesar, meeting him by the way, threw himself at his feet, and only begged for
his life. Caesar, according to his wonted clemency, easily pardoned him, as he
did likewise Caecina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. Cella, father and son, M.
Eppius, M. Aquinius, Cato's son, and the children of Damasippus. He arrived at
Utica in the evening by torch-light, and continued all that night without the
town.
[90] Early on the
morning of the following day he entered the place, summoned an assembly of the
people, and thanked them for the affection they had shown to his cause. At the
same time he censured severely, and enlarged upon the crime of the Roman
citizens and merchants, and the rest of the three hundred, who had furnished
Scipio and Varus with money; but concluded with telling them, that they might
show themselves without fear, as he was resolved to grant them their lives, and
content himself with exposing their effects to sale; but that he would give
them notice when their goods were to be sold, and the liberty of redeeming them
upon payment of a certain fine. The merchants, half dead with fear, and conscious
that they merited death, hearing upon what terms life was offered them,
greedily accepted the condition, and entreated Caesar that he would impose a
certain sum in gross upon all the three hundred. Accordingly, he amerced them
in two hundred thousand sesterces, to be paid to the republic, at six equal
payments, within the space of three years. They all accepted the condition, and
considering that day as a second nativity, joyfully returned thanks to Caesar.
[91] Meanwhile, king
Juba, who had escaped from the battle with Petreius, hiding himself all day in
the villages, and traveling only by night, arrived at last in Numidia. When he
came to Zama, his ordinary place of residence, where were his wives and
children, with all his treasures, and whatever he held most valuable, and which
he had strongly fortified at the beginning of the war; the inhabitants, having
heard of Caesar's victory, refused him admission, because, upon declaring war
against the Romans, he had raised a mighty pile of wood in the middle of the
forum, designing, if unsuccessful, to massacre all the citizens, fling their
bodies and effects upon the pile, then setting fire to the mass, and throwing
himself upon it, destroy all without exception, wives, children, citizens, and
treasures, in one general conflagration. After continuing a considerable time
before the gates, finding that neither threats nor entreaties would avail, he
at last desired them to deliver up his wives and children, that he might carry
them along with him. But receiving no answer, and seeing them determined to
grant him nothing, he quitted the place, and retired to one of his
country-seats with Petreius and a few horse.
[92] Meantime the
Zamians sent embassadors to Caesar at Utica, to inform him of what they had
done, and to request "that he should send them aid before the king could
collect an army and besiege them; that they were determined to defend the town
for him as long as life remained." Caesar commended the embassadors, and
sent them back to acquaint their fellow-citizens that he was coming himself to
their relief. Accordingly, setting out the next day from Utica with his
cavalry, he directed his march toward the kingdom. Many of the king's generals
met him on the way, and sued for pardon; to all of whom a favorable hearing was
given, and they attended him to Zama. The report of his clemency and mildness
spreading into all parts, the whole Numidian cavalry flocked to him at Zama,
and were there relieved from their fears.
[93] During these
transactions, Considius, who commanded at Tisdra, with his own retinue, a
garrison of Getulians, and a company of gladiators, hearing of the defeat of
his party, and terrified at the arrival of Domitius and his legions, abandoned
the town; and privately withdrawing, with a few of the barbarians, and all his
money, fled hastily toward the kingdom. The Getulians, to render themselves
masters of his treasure, murdered him by the way, and fled every man where he
could, Meantime, C. Virgilius, seeing himself shut up by sea and land, without
the power of making a defense; his followers all slain or put to flight; M.
Cato dead by his own hands at Utica; Juba despised and deserted by his own
subjects; Sabura and his forces defeated by Sitius; Caesar received without
opposition at Utica; and that of so vast an army, nothing remained capable of
screening him or his children; thought it his most prudent course, to surrender
himself and the city to the proconsul Caninius, by whom he was besieged.
[94] At the same time
king Juba, seeing himself excluded from all the cities of his kingdom, and that
there remained no hopes of safety; having supped with Petreius, proposed an
engagement, sword in hand, that they might die honorably. Juba, as being the
stronger, easily got the better of his adversary, and laid him dead at his
feet: but endeavoring afterward to run himself through the body, and wanting
strength to accomplish it, he was obliged to have recourse to one of his
slaves, and, by entreaties, prevailed upon him to put him to death.
[95] In the mean time,
P. Sitius, having defeated the army of Sabura, Juba's lieutenant, and slain the
general, and marching with a few troops through Mauritania, to join Caesar,
chanced to fall in with Faustus and Afranius, who were at the head of the party
that had plundered Utica, amounting in all to about fifteen hundred men, and
designing to make the best of their way to Spain. Having expeditiously placed
himself in ambuscade during the night, and attacking them by day-break, he
either killed or made them all prisoners, except a few that escaped from the
van. Afranius and Faustus were taken among the rest, with their wives and
children: but some few days after, a mutiny arising among the soldiers, Faustus
and Afranius were slain. Caesar pardoned Pompeia, the wife of Faustus, with her
children, and permitted her the free enjoyment of all her effects.
[96] Meanwhile Scipio,
with Damasippus and Torquatus, and Plaetorius Rustianus, having embarked on
board some galleys, with the intention of making for the coast of Spain; and
being long and severely tossed by contrary winds, were at last obliged to put
into the port of Hippo, where the fleet commanded by P. Sitius chanced at that
time to be. Scipio's vessels, which were but small, and few in number, were
easily surrounded and sunk, by the larger and more numerous ships of Sitius; on
which occasion Scipio, and all those whom we have mentioned above, as having
embarked with him, perished.
[97] Meanwhile Caesar,
having exposed the king's effects to public sale at Zama, and confiscated the
estates of those who, though Roman citizens, had borne arms against the
republic; after conferring rewards upon such of the Zamians as had adopted the
design of excluding the king, he abolished all the royal tribunes, converted the
kingdom into a province; and appointing Crispus Sallustius to take charge of
it, with the title of proconsul, returned to Utica. There he sold the estates
of the officers who had served under Juba and Petreius, fined the people of
Thapsus twenty thousand sesterces, and the company of Roman merchants there
thirty thousand; he likewise fined the inhabitants of Adrumetum in thirty
thousand, and their company fifty thousand; but preserved the cities and their
territories from insult and plunder. Those of Leptis, whom Juba had pillaged
some time before, and who, upon complaint made to the senate by their deputies,
had obtained arbitrators and restitution, were enjoined to pay yearly three
hundred thousand pounds of oil; because from the beginning of the war, in consequence
of a dissension among their chiefs, they had made an alliance with the king of
Numidia, and supplied him with arms, soldiers, and money. The people of Tisdra,
on account of their extreme poverty, were only condemned to pay annually a
certain quantity of corn.
[98] These things being
settled, he embarked at Utica on the ides of June, and three days after arrived
at Carales in Sardinia. Here he condemned the Sulcitani in a fine of one
hundred thousand sesterces, for receiving and aiding Nasidius's fleet; and
instead of a tenth which was their former assessment, ordered them now to pay
an eighth to the public treasury. He likewise confiscated the estates of some
who had been more active than the rest, and weighing from Carales on the third
day before the calends of July, coasted along the shore, and after a voyage of
twenty-eight days, during which he was several times obliged by contrary winds
to put into port, arrived safe at Rome.
End of Book
Unknown - Aulus Hirtius
(?)
[1] On the defeat of
Pharnaces and reduction of Africa, those who escaped from those battles fled to
young Cn. Pompey, who had taken possession of Further Spain, while Caesar was
detained in Italy in exhibiting games. Pompey began to throw himself on the protection
of every state, in order the more readily to establish the means of defense
against him. Accordingly, with a considerable force which had been collected,
partly by entreaty, partly by force, he began to lay waste the province. Under
these circumstances some states voluntarily sent him supplies, others shut the
gates of their towns against him. If any of these chanced to fall into his
hands by assault, although some citizen in it had deserved well of Cn. Pompey
(his father), yet some cause was alleged against him on account of the
greatness of his wealth, so that, he being dispatched, his fortune might become
the reward of the soldiers. Thus the enemy, being encouraged by a few
advantages, their forces increased much, wherefore those states which were
opposed to Pompey, by continual messages dispatched to Italy, sought protection
for themselves.
[2] When Caesar, now a
third time dictator, and elected a fourth time, having already proceeded many
marches into Spain with prompt dispatch, was coming to finish the war, he was
met on the way by embassadors from Corduba, who had deserted Cn. Pompey; these
informed him that it would be an easy matter to make himself master of the town
by night, because the enemy as yet knew nothing of his arrival in the province,
as the scouts sent out by Cn. Pompey to inform him of Caesar's approach had
been all made prisoners. They alleged besides many other very plausible
reasons. He, therefore, immediately sent intelligence of his arrival to Q.
Pedius, and Q. Fabius Maximus his lieutenants, to whom he had left the command
of the troops in the province, ordering them to send him all the cavalry they
had been able to raise. He came up with them much sooner than they expected,
and had not the protection of the cavalry, according to his desire.
[3] Sextus Pompey, the
brother of Cneius, commanded at this time at Corduba, which was accounted the
capital of the province. Young Cneius Pompey himself was employed in the siege
of Ulia, which had now lasted some months. Notice of Caesar's arrival having
been received, messengers having passed Pompey's guards came to him from that
town and besought him to send them relief as soon as possible. Caesar, knowing
that this people had deserved very well of the Romans, detached, about nine o'clock,
at night eleven cohorts, with a like number of horse, under the command of L.
Julius Paciecus, a man known in that province, and also well acquainted with
it. When he arrived at Pompey's quarter, a dreadful tempest arising, attended
with a violent wind, so great a darkness ensued that you could scarcely have
distinguished even the person next you. This accident proved of great advantage
to Paciecus: for being arrived at Pompey's camp, he ordered the cavalry to
advance two by two, and march directly through the enemy's quarters to the
town; one of their guards calling to know who passed, one of our troopers bade
him be silent, for they were just then endeavoring by stealth to approach the
wall, in order to get possession of the town; and partly by this answer, partly
by favor of the tempest, the sentinels were prevented from examining things
diligently. When they reached the gates, upon a signal being given, they were
admitted; and both horse and foot raising a loud shout, after leaving some
troops to guard the town, sallied in a body upon the enemy's camp. This came
upon them so unexpectedly that the greater number of the men in the camps
thought that they were captured.
[4] Ulia being
relieved, Caesar, to draw Pompey from the siege, marched toward Corduba;
sending the cavalry before, with a select body of heavy-armed foot; who, as
soon as they came within sight of the place, got up behind the troopers. By
this stratagem they could not possibly be perceived by those of Corduba. Upon
their approach to the walls, the enemy sallied in great numbers to attack our
cavalry; when the infantry, whom we have mentioned above, leaping down, fell
upon them with such fury that out of an almost infinite multitude of men, very
few returned to the town. This so alarmed Sextus Pompey that he immediately
sent letters to his brother, requesting him to come speedily to his relief,
lest Caesar should make himself master of Corduba before his arrival. Thus Cn.
Pompey, moved by his brother's letters, quitted the siege of Ulia, which was
upon the point of surrendering, and set out toward Corduba.
[5] Caesar, arriving at
the river Guadalquivir, which he found too deep to be forded, sank several
baskets of stones in it. Thus having formed a bridge, he transported his troops
in three bodies to the camps. As I have just mentioned, the beams of the bridge
stretched over against the tower in two rows. Pompey, arriving soon after with
his troops, encamped directly over against him. Caesar, to cut off his
provisions and communication with the town, ran a line from his camp to the
bridge. Pompey did the same; so that a struggle arose between the two generals,
which should first get possession of the bridge; and this daily brought on
skirmishes, in which sometimes the one, sometimes the other party had the
better. When these merged into a serious engagement, both sides fought hand to
hand; in the heat of the struggle for this position, owing to the narrowness of
the bridge, they were pressed together, and in their efforts to extend themselves
toward the river-side, many fell headlong. Thus the loss was pretty equal; for
on either side lay heaps of slain, and Caesar for many days used all possible
endeavors to bring the enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that he might
bring the war to a conclusion as soon as possible.
[6] But finding that
they carefully avoided a battle, with a view to which chiefly he had quitted
the route of Ulia; he caused great fires to be lighted in the night, repassed
the river with all his forces, and marched toward Ategua, one of their
strongest garrisons. Pompey, being informed of this by the deserters, on the
same day brought back many carriages and machines by narrow paths, and betook
himself to Corduba. Caesar began his attack upon Ategua, and carried lines
quite round the town. Pompey, having intelligence of this, set out upon his
march the same day. In order to guard against his arrival, Caesar possessed
himself of many forts; partly to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards of
infantry for the defense of his camp. Pompey's arrival happened at a time when
the mist was very thick, so that he found means, with some cohorts and troops
of cavalry, to hem in a party of Caesar's horse, and fell upon them in such
manner that very few escaped slaughter.
[7] The following night
Pompey set fire to his camp, passed the river Rio Salado, and, marching through
the valleys, encamped on a rising ground, between the two towns of Ategua and
Ucubis. Caesar cast up a mound and brought forward his machines, with other preparations
which were necessary for storming the town. The country all around is
mountainous, and seems formed for war, being separated from the plain by the
river Rio Salado, ascending on the side toward Ategua, about two miles from the
river. Pompey's camp was upon these mountains, within view of both towns; he
could, however, send no relief to his friends. He had the emblems and standards
of thirteen legions, but of those on whom he trusted for support two were
natives which had deserted from Trebonius; one was formed out of the Roman
colonies in those parts; and a fourth, belonging to Afranius, he had brought
with him from Africa; the rest were for the most part made up of fugitives and
deserters; in light-armed foot and cavalry we far exceeded him in both courage
and numbers.
[8] Another reason why
Pompey was enabled to protract the war was that the country was full of
mountains and extremely well adapted to encampments. For almost the whole
province of Further Spain, though of an extremely fertile soil, and abounding
in springs, is nevertheless very difficult of access. Here too, on account of
the frequent incursions of the natives, all the places remote from great towns,
are fortified with towers and castles, covered as in Africa, not with tiles but
with earth, on these they place sentinels, and their high situation commands an
extensive view of the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest part of the towns
of this province are built on mountains, and places exceedingly strong by
nature, the approaches to which are extremely difficult. Thus sieges are rare
and hazardous in Spain, since it is not easy to reduce their towns by force; as
happened in the present war. For Pompey having established his camp between
Ategua and Ucubis, as related above, and within view of both towns, Caesar
possessed himself of an eminence very conveniently situated, and only about
four miles from his own camp, on which he built a fortress.
[9] Pompey, who, from
the nature of the ground, was covered by the same eminence, which was besides
at a sufficient distance from Caesar's quarters, became sensible of the
importance of this post; and as Caesar was separated from it by the river Rio
Salado, he imagined that the difficulty of sending relief would prevent his
attempting any thing of that kind in its defense. Influenced by this belief, he
set out about midnight and attacked the fort, that he might bring assistance to
the besieged. Our troops, upon their approach, setting up a shout, discharged
their javelins in great numbers, and wounded multitudes of men. After this,
when those in the camp began to resist, and when tidings of it was conveyed to
the great camps to Caesar, he set out with three legions, and when he
approached them, many were killed, owing to their trepidation and flight, and a
great number made prisoners. Among these two * * *; and many others, having
thrown down their arms escaped, so that fourscore shields were found.
[10] The next day
Arguetius arrived from Italy with the cavalry, and five standards taken from
the Saguntines; but was forced to quit his post by Asprenas, who likewise
brought a reinforcement from Italy to Caesar. The same night Pompey set fire to
his camp, and drew toward Corduba. A king, named Indus, who was bringing some
troops to Caesar with a party of cavalry, following the pursuit of the enemy
too briskly, was made prisoner, and slain by the Spanish legionaries.
[11] On the next day,
our cavalry pursued those who were employed in carrying provisions from the
town to Pompey's camp, almost to the very walls of Corduba, and took fifty
prisoners besides horses. On the same day, Q. Marcius, a military tribune in
Pompey's army, deserted to us. At midnight, a keen encounter took place in the
town, and they hurled fire and every means was resorted to by which fire could
be cast. When the attack was ended, C. Fundanius, a Roman knight, quitted the
enemy, and came over to us.
[12] On the next day,
two Spanish legionaries, who pretended to be slaves, were made prisoners by a
party of our horse; but being brought to the camp, they were known by the
soldiers, who had formerly served under Fabius and Pedeius, and deserted from
Trebonius. No pardon was extended to them, and they were slaughtered by our
troops. At the same time, some couriers, sent from Corduba to Pompey, entering
our camp by mistake, were seized, had their hands cut off, and then were
dismissed. About nine at night, the besieged, according to custom, spent a
considerable time in casting fire and darts upon our soldiers, and wounded a
great number of men. At day-break they sallied upon the sixth legion, while we
were busy at the works, and began a sharp contest, in which, however, our men
got the better, though the besieged had the advantage of the higher ground.
Those who had begun the attack, being vigorously opposed on our side,
notwithstanding all the inconveniences we fought under, were at length obliged
to retire into the town, with many wounds.
[13] On the next day
Pompey began a line from the camp to the river Rio Salado; and a small party of
our horse, being attacked by a much larger body of the enemy, were driven from
their post, and three of their number slain. On the same day, A. Valgius, the son
of a senator, whose brother was in Pompey's camp, mounted his horse and went
over to the enemy, leaving all his baggage behind him. A spy, belonging to
Pompey's second legion, was taken and slain. At the same time, a bullet was
shot into the town, with this inscription: "That he should set up a shield
on whatever day they advanced to storm the town." This encouraging some to
hope that they might scale the walls, and possess themselves of the town
without danger, they fell the next day to sapping them, and threw down a
considerable part of the outward wall. * * In this action, being captured and
protected by the townsmen, as if they had been of their own party, they
requested Caesar to dismiss in armor even those who were appointed over the
city by Pompey to guard it. To this Caesar answered, "That it was his
custom to give, not accept of conditions:" which being reported to the
garrison, they set up a shout, and began to pour their darts upon our men from
the whole circuit of the wall; which gave reason to believe that the garrison
intended that day to make a vigorous sally. Wherefore, surrounding the town
with our troops, the conflict was for some time maintained with great violence,
and one of our engines threw down a tower belonging to the enemy, in which were
five of their men, and a boy, whose office it was to observe the engine.
[14] After this Pompey
erected a fort on the other side of the Rio Salado, in which he met with no
interruption from our men, and exulted not a little in the idea of having possessed
himself of a post so near us. Also the following day, extending himself in like
manner still further, he came up with our out-post of cavalry; and charging
them briskly, obliged several squadrons and the light-armed foot to give
ground: many of whom, owing to the smallness of their numbers and their light
armor, were trodden down by the enemy's horse. This passed within view of both
camps, and not a little animated the Pompeians, to see our men pushed so far:
but the latter, being afterward reinforced by a party from our camp, faced
about with the intention of renewing the fight.
[15] It invariably
happens in encounters of cavalry that when the troopers dismount to charge the
infantry, the match proves unequal, as happened on the present occasion. For a
select body of the enemy's light-armed foot, coming unexpectedly upon our
horse, they alighted to sustain the charge. Thus in a very little time, from a
cavalry it became an infantry engagement, and again from an infantry changed to
a cavalry engagement, in which our men were driven back to their very lines;
but being there reinforced, about a hundred and twenty-three of the enemy were
slain, several forced to throw down their arms, many wounded, and the rest
pursued quite to their camp. On our side, three were slain, besides twelve
foot-soldiers and five troopers wounded. Toward the evening of the same day,
the fight, as usual, was renewed before the walls: and the enemy having thrown
many darts, and a great quantity of fire from the battlements, proceeded
afterward to an action of unexampled cruelty and barbarity: for in the very
sight of our troops they fell to murdering the citizens, and tumbling them
headlong from the walls, as is usual among barbarians: no parallel to this is
to be found in the memory of man.
[16] When night came
on, Pompey sent a messenger unknown to us, to exhort the garrison to set fire
to our towers and mound, and make a sally at midnight. Accordingly, having
poured upon us a great quantity of darts and fire, and destroyed a considerable
part of the rampart, they opened the gate which lay over against and within
view of Pompey's camp, and sallied out with all their forces, carrying with
them fascines to fill up the ditch; hooks and fire to destroy and reduce to
ashes the barracks, which the soldiers had built mostly of reeds to defend them
from the winter; and some silver and rich apparel to scatter among the tents,
that while our men should be employed in securing the plunder, they might fight
their way through and escape to Pompey; who, in expectation that they would be
able to effect their design, had crossed the Rio Salado with his army, where he
continued all night in order of battle, to favor their retreat. But though our
men had no apprehension of this design, their valor enabled them to frustrate
the attempt, and repulse the enemy with many wounds. They even made themselves
masters of the spoil, their arms, and some prisoners, who were put to death
next day. At the same time, a deserter from the town informed us that Junius,
who was employed in the mine when the citizens were massacred, exclaimed that
it was a cruel and barbarous action - "that they had never deserved such
treatment at their hands - for that they had received them in their temples and
their homes - that it was in violation of all hospitality." He added many
things besides, which made such an impression upon the garrison that they
desisted from the massacre.
[17] The next day,
Tullius, a lieutenant-general, accompanied by C. Antonius of Lusitania, came to
Caesar, and addressed him to this effect: "Would to Heaven I had been one
of your soldiers rather than a follower of C. Pompey, and given those proofs of
valor and constancy in obtaining victories for you, rather than in suffering
for him. The only advantage we reap from following his banners are wretched
applauses; being reduced to the condition of indigent citizens, and by the
melancholy fate of our country ranked among its enemies; we, who having never
shared with Pompey his good fortune, yet find ourselves involved in his
disgrace; and after sustaining the attack of so many armed legions, employing
ourselves day and night in the works of defense, exposed to the darts and
swords of our fellow-citizens; vanquished, deserted by Pompey, and compelled to
give way to the superior valor of your troops, find ourselves at last obliged
to have recourse to your clemency, and implore that you will not show
yourselves less placable to fellow-citizens, than you have so often been to
foreign nations." "I shall," said Caesar, "prove myself the
same to fellow-citizens, as I have been to conquered nations."
[18] The embassadors
being dismissed, when Tiberius Tullius arrived at the gate of the town, and C.
Antony did not follow him, he returned to the gate and laid hold of him, upon
which drawing a poniard from his breast, he wounded him in the hand, and in
this condition they both fled to Caesar. At the same time the standard-bearer
of the first legion came over to our camp, and reported that the day when the
skirmish happened between the horse, no less than thirty-five of his company
fell; but it was not allowed to mention it in Pompey's camp, or so much as own
the loss of one man. A slave, whose master was in Caesar's camp, and who had
left his wife and son in the city, cut his master's throat, and deceiving the
guards, escaped privately to Pompey's camp; whence by means of a bullet, on
which he inscribed his intelligence, Caesar was informed of the preparations
made for the defense of the place. When we had read the inscription, those who
were employed to throw the bullet returning to the city, two Lusitanian
brothers deserted, and informed us that Pompey in a speech made to his
soldiers, had said: "That as he found it impossible to relieve the town,
he was resolved to withdraw in the night from the sight of the enemy, and
retire toward the sea;" to which one answered "that it was better to
hazard a battle than take refuge in flight," but he who said so was
instantly put to death. At the same time some of his couriers were intercepted,
who were endeavoring to get into the town. Caesar sent the letters to the
inhabitants, and ordered one of the messengers begging his life, to set fire to
the townsmen's wooden turret, promising that if he did this he would grant him
all. The enterprise was not without difficulty: he undertook it, however, but
was slain in the attempt. The same night a deserter informed us that Pompey and
Labienus were greatly offended at the massacre of the citizens.
[19] About nine at
night, one of our wooden towers, which had been severely battered by the
enemy's engines, gave way as far as the third story. A sharp encounter ensued
under the walls, and the besieged, assisted by a favorable wind, burned the
remaining part of that tower and another. Next morning a matron threw herself
from the wall, and came over to the camp, reporting, "that the rest of her
family had intended the same, but were apprehended and put to death;"
likewise, a letter was thrown over, in which was written" L. Minatius to
Caesar; Pompey has abandoned me; if you will grant me my life, I promise to
serve you with the same fidelity and attachment I have hitherto manifested
toward him." At the same time deputies who had been sent before to Caesar
by the garrison, now waited on him a second time, offering to deliver up the
town next day, upon a bare grant of their lives: to which he replied,
"That he was Caesar, and would perform his word." Thus, having made
himself master of the place, on the nineteenth of February he was saluted
imperator.
[20] Pompey, being
informed by some deserters that the town had surrendered, removed his camp
toward Ucubis, where he began to build redoubts, and secure himself with lines.
Caesar also decamped and drew near him. At the same time a Spanish legionary soldier
deserting to our camp, informed us that Pompey had assembled the people of
Ucubis, and given them instructions to inquire diligently who favored his
party, who that of the enemy. Some time after in the town which was taken, the
slave, who, as we have related above, had murdered his master, was apprehended
in a mine and burned alive. About the same time eight Spanish centurions came
over to Caesar, and in a skirmish between our cavalry and that of the enemy, we
were repulsed, and some of our light-armed foot wounded. The same night we took
of the enemy's spies, three slaves and one Spanish soldier. The slaves were
crucified, and the soldier was beheaded.
[21] The day following,
some of the enemy's cavalry and light-armed infantry deserted to us; and about
eleven of their horse falling upon a party of our men that were sent to fetch
water, killed some and took others prisoners; among which last were eight
troopers. On the next day Pompey beheaded seventy-four persons supposed to be
favorers of Caesar's cause, ordering the rest who lay under the same suspicion
to be carried back to the town, of whom a hundred and twenty escaped to Caesar.
[22] Some time after,
the deputies from Bursavola (whom Caesar had taken prisoners at Ategua, and
sent along with his own embassadors to their city, to inform them of the
massacre of the Ateguans, and what they had to apprehend from Pompey, who
suffered his soldiers to murder their hosts, and commit all manner of crimes
with impunity), arriving in the town, none of our deputies, except such as were
natives of the place, durst enter the city, though they were all Roman knights
and senators. But after many messages backward and forward, when the deputies
were upon their return, the garrison pursued and put them all to the sword,
except two who escaped to Caesar, and informed him of what had happened. Some
time after, the inhabitants of Bursavola, sending spies to Ategua to know the
truth of what had happened, and finding the report of our deputies confirmed,
were for stoning to death him who had been the cause of the murder of the
deputies, and were with difficulty restrained from laying violent hands upon
him, which in the end proved the occasion of their own destruction. For having
obtained leave of the inhabitants to go in person to Caesar and justify
himself, he privately drew together some troops, and when he thought himself
strong enough, returned in the night, and was treacherously admitted into the
town, where he made a dreadful massacre of the inhabitants, slew all the
leaders of the opposite party, and reduced the place to subjection. Soon after,
some slaves who had deserted informed us that he had sold all the goods of the
citizens, and that Pompey suffered none of his soldiers to quit the camp but
unarmed, because, since the taking of Ategua, many despairing of success fled
into Baeturia, having given over all expectation of victory; and that if any
deserted from our camp, they were put among the light-armed infantry, whose pay
was only sixteen asses a day.
[23] The day following
Caesar removed his camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to draw a line to the
river Salado. While our men were employed in the work, some of the enemy fell
upon us from the higher ground, and as we were in no condition to make
resistance, wounded great numbers. Here, as Ennius says, "our men
retreated a little." This occurrence, so contrary to our usual custom,
being perceived, two centurions of the fifth legion passed the river, and
restored the battle; when, pressing upon the enemy with astonishing bravery,
one of them fell overwhelmed by the multitude of darts discharged from above.
The other continued the combat for some time, but seeing himself in danger of
being surrounded, endeavored to make good his retreat, but stumbled and fell.
His death being known, the enemy crowded together in still greater numbers,
upon which our cavalry passed the river, and drove them back to their
intrenchments; so that, while they too eagerly desired to slay them within
their lines, they were surrounded by the cavalry and light-armed troops. Many
of these would have been captured alive, had not their valor been pre-eminent,
for they were so confined by the space included in the fortress, that the
cavalry could not well defend itself. Many of our men were wounded in these two
encounters, and among the rest Clodius Aquitius, but as the fight was carried
on mostly from a distance, none of our men fell, except the two centurions who
sacrificed themselves in the cause of glory.
[24] Next day both
parties withdrawing from Soricaria, we continued our works. But Pompey,
observing that our fort had cut off his communication with Aspavia, which is
about five miles distant from Ucubis, judged it necessary to come to a battle.
Yet he did not offer it upon equal terms, but chose to draw up his men upon a
hill, that he might have the advantage of the higher ground. In this respect,
when both parties were seeking the superior position, our men anticipating
them, drove them into the plain, which gave us the advantage. The enemy yielded
on all hands, and we made immense havoc among them. The mountain and not their
valor protected them; of which advantage, and of all relief, our men, though
few in number, would have deprived them had not night intervened. Three hundred
and twenty-four light-armed foot, and about a hundred and thirty-eight
legionary soldiers of their number fell, besides those whose armor and spoils
we carried off. Thus the death of the two centurions, which happened the day
before, was fully revenged.
[25] The day after,
Pompey's cavalry advanced, according to their usual custom, to our lines; for
they only dared venture to draw up on equal ground. They therefore began to
skirmish with our men who were at work, the legionaries calling out to us at
the same time to choose our field of battle, with a view to make us believe
that they desired nothing so much as to come to blows; upon this our men
quitted the eminence where they were encamped, and advanced a great way into
the plain. But none of the enemy had the boldness to present themselves,
excepting Antistius Turpio; who, presuming on his strength, and fancying no one
on our side a match for him, offered us defiance. Upon this, as is recorded of
Memnon and Achilles, Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman knight, born in Italy, advanced
from our ranks to the encounter. The fierce air of Antistius having engaged the
attention of all, the two armies drew up to be spectators of the issue of this
challenge, and expressed as much impatience as if the whole fortune of the war
had depended upon it. The wishes on both sides for success were equal to the
anxiety and concern each felt for his own combatant. They advanced into the
plain with great courage, having each a resplendent buckler of curious
workmanship. And doubtless the combat would have been soon decided, had not
some light-armed foot drawn up near the lines, to serve as a guard to the camp
because of the approach of the enemy's horse, which we have before alluded to.
* * * Our horse, in retreating to their camp, being warmly pursued by the
enemy, suddenly faced about with great cries; which so terrified the Pompeians,
that they immediately betook themselves to flight, and retreated to their camp
with the loss of many of their men.
[26] Caesar, to reward
the valor of the Cassian troop, presented them with thirteen thousand
sesterces, distributed ten thousand more among the light-armed foot, and gave
to the commander of the cavalry five golden collars. The same day, A. Bebius,
C. Flavius, and A. Trebellius, Roman knights of Asta, with their horses richly
caparisoned and adorned with silver, came over to Caesar, and informed him,
that all the rest of the Roman knights in Pompey's camp, had like them
conspired to come and join him, that, on the information of a slave they had
all been seized and cast into custody; that out of this number they only had
escaped. The same day letters were intercepted, sent by Pompey to Ursao, with
the usual greeting, and stating, "That hitherto he had all the success
against the enemy he could desire, and would have ended the war much sooner
than was expected, could he have brought them to engage him upon equal terms;
that he did not think it advisable to venture new-levied troops on a plain;
that the enemy, depending on our supplies, as yet protract the war for they
storm city after city, thence supplying themselves with provisions: that he
would therefore endeavor to protect the towns of his party, and bring the war
to as speedy an issue as possible: that he would send them a reinforcement of
some cohorts, and that having deprived them of provisions he would necessitate
the enemy to come to an engagement.
[27] Some time after,
as our men were carelessly dispersed about the works, a few horse were killed,
who had gone to a grove of olives to fetch wood. Several slave deserted at this
time, and informed us that ever since the action at Soritia on the 7th of
March, the enemy had been under continual alarms, and appointed Attius Varus to
guard the lines. The same day Pompey decamped, and posted himself in an
olive-wood over against Hispalis. Caesar, before he removed, waited till
midnight, when the moon began to appear. At his departure he ordered them to
set fire to the fort of Ucubis, which Pompey had abandoned, and to assemble in
the greater camp. He afterward laid siege to Ventisponte, which surrendered;
and marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned
the city, because the garrison refused to open the gates to him. A soldier who
had murdered his brother in the camp, being intercepted by our men, was
scourged to death. Caesar, still pursuing his march, arrived in the plains of
Munda, and pitched his camp opposite to that of Pompey.
[28] Next day as Caesar
was preparing to set out with the army, notice was sent him by his spies, that
Pompey had been in order of battle ever since midnight. Upon this intelligence
he ordered the standard to be raised. Pompey had taken this resolution in
consequence of his letter to the inhabitants of Ursao, who were his firm
adherents, in which he told them that Caesar refused to come down into the
plain, because his army consisted mostly of new-levied troops. This had greatly
confirmed the city in its allegiance. Thus relying on this opinion, he thought
that he could effect the whole, for he was defended by the nature of his
situation, and by the position for defense of the town, where he had his camp:
for, as we observed before, this country is full of hills which run in a
continued chain, without any plains intervening.
[29] But we must by no
means omit to mention an accident which happened about this time. The two camps
were divided from one another by a plain about five miles in extent, so that
Pompey, in consequence of the town's elevated position, and the nature of the
country, enjoyed a double defense. Across this valley ran a rivulet, which
rendered the approach to the mountain extremely difficult, because it formed a
deep morass on the right. Caesar had no doubt that the enemy would descend into
the plain and come to a battle, when he saw them in array. This appeared
evident to all; the rather because the plain would give their cavalry full room
to act, and the day was so serene and clear that the gods seemed to have sent
it on purpose to favor the engagement. Our men rejoiced at the favorable
opportunity: some however were not altogether exempt from fear when they
considered that their all was at stake, with the uncertainty of what might be
their fate an hour after. He advanced however to the field of battle, fully
persuaded that the enemy would do the same; but they durst not venture above a
mile from the town, being determined to shelter themselves under its walls. Our
men still continued before them in order of battle; but although the equality
of the ground sometimes tempted them to come and dispute the victory, they
nevertheless still kept their post on the mountain, in the neighborhood of the
town. We doubled our speed to reach the rivulet, without their stirring from
the place where they stood.
[30] Their army
consisted of thirteen legions; the cavalry was drawn up upon the wings, with
six thousand light-armed infantry and about the same number of auxiliaries. We
had only eighty heavy-armed cohorts, and eight thousand horse. When we reached
the extremity of the plain, the real seat of disadvantage, the enemy were
awaiting us above, so that it would have been exceedingly dangerous to proceed.
When Caesar perceived this, he pointed out the locality, lest any disagreeable
occurrence should result from the temerity of his troops. The army murmured
greatly, as if they had been kept back from a certain victory, when this was
told them. The delay, however, served to enliven the enemy, thinking that
Caesar's troops shrank from an encounter through fear: they therefore had the
boldness to advance a little way, yet without quitting the advantage of their
post, the approach to which was extremely dangerous. The tenth legion, as
usual, was on the right, the third and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary
troops and cavalry. The battle began with a shout.
[31] But though our men
were superior to the enemy in courage, the latter nevertheless defended
themselves so well by the advantage of the higher ground, and the shouts were
so loud, and the discharge of darts on both sides so great, that we almost began
to despair of victory. For the first onset and shout, by which an enemy is most
apt to be dismayed, were pretty equal in the present encounter. All fought with
equal valor; the place was covered with arrows and darts, and great numbers of
the enemy fell. We have already observed that the tenth legion was on the
right, which, though not considerable for the number of men, was nevertheless
formidable for its courage; and so pressed the enemy on that side that they
were obliged to draw a legion from the right wing to reinforce the left, lest
we should come upon their flank; but they fought so bravely that the
reinforcement could not find an opportunity of entering the ranks. Upon this
motion, our cavalry on the left fell upon Pompey's right wing. Meanwhile the
clashing of armor mingled with the shouts of combatants, and the groans of the
dying and the wounded, terrified the new-raised soldiers. On this occasion, as
Ennius says, "they fought hand to hand, foot to foot, and shield to
shield;" but though the enemy fought with the utmost vigor, they were
obliged to give ground, and retire toward the town. The battle was fought on
the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were entirely routed and put to flight;
insomuch that not a man could have escaped, had they not sheltered themselves
in the place whence they advanced to the charge. The enemy lost on this
occasion upward of thirty thousand men, and among the rest Labienus and Attius
Varus, whose funeral obsequies were performed upon the field of battle. They had
likewise three thousand Roman knights killed, partly Italian, partly
provincial. About a thousand were slain on our side, partly foot, partly horse;
and five hundred wounded. We gained thirteen eagles, and several standards, and
emblems of authority, and made seventeen officers prisoners. Such was the issue
of this action.
[32] The remains of
Pompey's army retreating to Munda, with the intention of defending themselves
in that town, it became necessary to invest it. The dead bodies of the enemy,
heaped together, served as a rampart, and their javelins and darts were fixed
up by way of palisades. Upon these we hung their bucklers to supply the place
of a breastwork, and fixing the heads of the deceased upon swords and lances,
planted them all around the works, to strike the greater terror into the
besieged, and keep awake in them a sense of our prowess. Amid these mournful
objects did they find themselves shut in, when our men began the attack, which
was conducted chiefly by the Gauls. Young Valerius, who had escaped to Corduba
with some horse, informed Sextus Pompey of what had happened; who, upon receipt
of the mournful news, distributing what money he had about him to the troopers,
left the town about nine at night, under pretense of going to find out Caesar,
to treat of an accommodation. On the other side, Cn. Pompey, attended by a few
horse and foot, took the road to Carteia, where his fleet lay, and which was
about a hundred and seventy miles distant from Corduba. When he was arrived
within eight miles of the place, he sent P. Calvitius his camp-marshal before,
to procure a litter to carry him to the town, as he found himself unwell. The
litter came, and when he entered the town, those of his party waited on him
privately, to receive his orders about the management of the war. As they
assembled round the place in great crowds, Pompey quitting his litter put
himself under their protection.
[33] After the
encounter, Caesar seeing the circumvallation of Munda completed, marched to
Corduba. Those of the enemy who had escaped the slaughter, possessing
themselves of a bridge, upon the approach of our men, called out to them with
an air of derision - "What! we who are no more than a handful of men
escaped from the battle, shall we be allowed no place of retreat?" They
immediately prepared to defend the bridge. Caesar passed the river and
encamped. Scapula, who had stirred up the freedmen to a revolt, escaping after
the battle to Corduba, when he found himself besieged, assembled all his
followers, ordered a funeral pile to be erected and a magnificent supper served
up; when, putting on his richest dress, he distributed his plate and money
among his domestics, supped cheerfully, anointed himself several times, and,
last of all, ordered one of his freedmen to dispatch him, and another to set
fire to the pile.
[34] Caesar had no
sooner encamped before the place than a division arose among the inhabitants,
between the parties of Caesar and Pompey, till the dispute almost reached to
our camps. During the contest, some legions, composed partly of deserters,
partly of slaves made free by Pompey, came and surrendered themselves to
Caesar. But the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the town, and with that
view possessed themselves of the walls and some towers, in spite of all
opposition, which obliged the other party to send deputies to Caesar for aid.
Upon this those who had escaped out of the battle set fire to the place, and
our men entering at the same time, slew about twenty-two thousand of them,
besides those who were slain without the walls; thus Caesar obtained the town.
While he was employed in this siege, those who, as we have said, were blockaded
at Munda made a sally, but were driven back into the town with considerable
loss.
[35] Thence Caesar
marched to Hispalis, which sent deputies to sue for pardon. Though the citizens
assured him that they were able to defend the town, he sent Caninius his
lieutenant thither with some troops, and encamped before the place. There was
in the town a strong party of Pompeians, who, displeased to see Caesar's troops
received within the walls, secretly deputed one Philo, a zealous partisan of
Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to beg assistance of Cecilius Niger, one
of the barbarians, who lay encamped near Lenius, with a strong army of
Lusitanians. He is received into the town of Hispalis by night, surprises the
sentinels and garrison, shuts the gates, and begins to defend the place.
[36] During these
transactions deputies arrived from Carteia, with accounts of their having
secured Pompey; hoping by this service to atone for their former fault of
shutting their gates against Caesar. Meantime, the Lusitanians in Hispalis
plundered the town, which, though known to Caesar, did not yet determine him to
press it too hard, lest they should in despair set fire to it, and destroy the
walls. It was resolved in council to suffer the Lusitanians to escape in the
night by a sally, yet so that the thing might not appear designed. In this
sally, they set fire to the ships that were in the river Guadalquivir, and
while our men were employed in extinguishing the flames, endeavored to get off;
but being overtaken by the cavalry, were mostly cut to pieces. Thence Caesar
marched to Asta, which submitted. Munda having been now a long while besieged,
many of those who had escaped out of the battle, despairing of safety,
surrendered to us; and being formed into a legion, conspired among themselves,
that upon a signal being given, the garrison should sally out in the night,
while they at the same time should begin a massacre in the camp. But the plot
being discovered, they were next night, at the changing of the third watch, all
put to death outside the rampart.
[37] The Carteians,
while Caesar was employed in reducing the other towns upon his route, began to
disagree about young Pompey. One party had sent the deputies to Caesar, and
another was in the Pompeian interest. These last prevailing, seized the gates,
and made a dreadful slaughter of their adversaries. Pompey himself was wounded
in the fray, but escaping to his ships, fled with about twenty galleys. Didius,
who was at Gades with Caesar's fleet, hearing of what had happened, immediately
sailed in pursuit of them; stationing at the same time some cavalry and
infantry along the coast, to prevent his escaping by land. Pompey had left
Carteia with so much precipitation, that he took no time to furnish himself
with water, and this circumstance obliging him to stop by the way, Didius came
up with him after four days' sailing, took some of his ships, and burned the
rest.
[38] With a few
friends, Pompey escaped to a place strongly fortified by nature; of which the
troops sent in pursuit of him having certain intelligence by their scouts,
followed day and night. He was wounded in the shoulder and left leg, and had
besides sprained his ankle, all which greatly retarded his flight, and obliged
him to make use of a litter. A Lusitanian having discovered the place of his
retreat, he was quickly surrounded by our cavalry and cohorts. Seeing himself
betrayed, he took refuge in a post fortified by nature, and which could easily
be defended by a few men, the approach to it being extremely difficult. We
attempted to storm it, but were repulsed, and pursued by the enemy; and meeting
with no better success after several trials, we at length resolved to lay siege
to the place, it seeming too hazardous to force it. Accordingly, a terrace was
raised, and lines drawn round the place; which the enemy perceiving, thought it
best to betake themselves to flight.
[39] Pompey as we have
observed above being lame and wounded, was in no condition to make a speedy
retreat; and the rather, because the place was such that he could use neither
horse nor litter. Slaughter was dealt on all hands by our troops, his fortress
having been stormed, and his resources cut off. In this extremity he fled to a
cave, where he could not easily be discovered, unless by the information of the
captives. Here he was slain, his head was brought to Hispalis on the day before
the ides of April, and exhibited before the people when Caesar was at Gades.
[40] After the death of
young Pompey, Didius, proud of his success, retired to the nearest fortress and
hauled some of his vessels on shore to be refitted. The Lusitanians, who had
escaped from the battle, rallying in great bodies, advanced to Didius. Though
the preservation of the fleet principally engaged his attention, he was obliged
to leave his fort in order to restrain the frequent sallies of the enemy. These
daily skirmishes gave them an opportunity of projecting an ambuscade; for which
purpose they divided their troops into three bodies. Some were prepared to set
fire to the fleet, and in the mean time others were to come to their relief.
These were so arranged that they could advance to the battle without any one
seeing them. Didius sallied out according to custom; when upon a signal being
given, one of the parties advanced to set fire to the fleet; and another,
counterfeiting a retreat, drew him insensibly into the ambuscade, where he was
surrounded and slain with most of his followers, fighting valiantly. Some
escaped in boats which they found upon the coast; others endeavored to reach
the galleys by swimming; and, weighing anchor, stood out to sea. A great many
saved themselves in this manner, but the Lusitanians got all the baggage.
Caesar meanwhile returned from Gades to Hispalis.
[41] Fabius Maximus,
whom he had left to continue the siege of Munda, conducted it with great zeal;
so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut up on all sides, sallied out, but
were repulsed with great loss. Our men seized this opportunity to get
possession of the town, and took the rest prisoners, in number about fourteen
thousand. Thence they retreated toward Ursao, a town exceedingly strong both by
nature and art, and capable of resisting an enemy. Besides, there is not,
within eight miles of the place any spring but that which supplies the town,
which was a decided advantage to the besieged. In addition to all this, the wood
necessary for building towers and other machines had to be fetched from a
distance of six miles. And Pompey, to render the siege more difficult, had cut
down all the timber round the place, and collected it within the walls, which
obliged our men to bring all the materials for carrying on the siege from
Munda, the nearest town which they had subdued.
[42] During these
transactions at Munda and Ursao, Caesar, who had returned from Gades to
Hispalis, assembled the citizens, and made the following speech: "That
when he was advanced to the quaestorship, he had chosen their province in
preference to all others, and during his continuance in that office, had done
them every service in his power; that during his praetorship he had obtained
for them from the senate the abolition of the taxes imposed by Metellus,
declared himself their patron, procured their deputies a hearing at Rome, and
made himself many enemies by undertaking the defense both of their private and
public rights. In fine, that when he was consul, he had, though absent,
rendered the province all the services in his power; that instead of making a
suitable return for so many favors, they had always discovered the utmost
ingratitude both toward him and the people of Rome; as well in this last war as
the preceding. "You," says he, "though no strangers to the law
of nations and the rights of Roman citizens, have yet like barbarians often
violated the sacred persons of Roman magistrates. You attempted in open day, in
the public square, to assassinate Cassius. You have been always such enemies to
peace that the senate could never suffer the province to be without legions.
You take favors for offenses, and insults for benefits, are insolent and
restless in peace, and cowardly and effeminate in war. Young Pompey, though
only a private citizen, nay a fugitive, was yet received among you, and
suffered to assume the ensigns of magistracy. After putting many citizens to
death, you still furnished him with forces, and even urged him to lay waste the
country and province. Against whom do you hope to be victorious? Can you be
ignorant that even if I should be destroyed, the people of Rome have still ten
legions, capable not only of opposing you, but even of pulling down heaven?
With whose praises and virtues ...
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