


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MERCHANT SAIL

WILLIAM ARMSTRONG FAIRBURN



THE GIFT OF
Fairburn Marine
Educational Found.

MERCHANT SAIL

VOLUME I

MERCHANT SAIL

BY

William Armstrong Fairburn

[1876-1947]

Naval Architect and Marine Engineer
University of Glasgow, 1897

IN SIX VOLUMES



Volume I

*Early Days of Exploration and the Influence of Shipbuilding in the
Development of the American Colonies; the Merchant Marine during
the Revolution; the Challenging Period between the Wars with
Britain; Raids of the Barbary States on the Commerce of the
Young Republic and the Establishment of the U.S. Navy*

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TO THE STUDENT

*who is seeking, as the author vainly
sought in his youth, to learn the truth
regarding ships and their relation to
the development of the American
colonies and the United States*

"The men in the Convention . . . sat down to lay out a plan of government that would fit man as he is and not as he ought to be."

Our nation was founded by a set of free men who met and without compulsion from any source laid out the scheme of government that to them seemed best. . . . The purposes of the men who planned our government were clear. They wished to establish a central government strong enough to preserve internal order, to provide for defense against external foes, and in general to do those necessary things that the separate states could not do for themselves. At the same time, they wished to arrange matters so that the central government they were establishing could not use its powers to oppress the citizen. The Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith's WEALTH OF NATIONS had been issued only eleven years before and naturally the Founding Fathers were influenced by the ideas of the times. They assumed without discussion that it is desirable for men to be free and that a free competitive economic life is best. They accepted also the idea that man seeks power over his fellow man, and from their experience and knowledge of history they knew that unrestricted power when it is acquired is almost universally abused. They did not trust majorities of the people, if given power, to be just to minorities any more than they trusted individuals. They accepted the evident fact that man, because of his selfishness and his desire to rule over others, is a defective social creature. The men in the Convention were not academic theorists, but practical, experienced men like George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, and they sat down to lay out a plan of government that would fit man as he is and not as he ought to be.

It was the provisions for protecting the citizen from government oppression that formed the distinctive feature of the American plan. It was a newer and greater thing in government than is generally understood. To carry out their purposes, the founders of our government drafted a written Constitution in which their plan of government was outlined. Here are some of the provisions made to guard against tyranny by the central government:

State governments were to be maintained to look after local affairs. The new central government was to have authority only in general matters of interest to the whole country. In regard to the state governments the central government guaranteed only that they should be of republican form.

The central government was given only the powers considered necessary for it to carry out the duties assigned to it. All powers not given to it were expressly reserved to the states or to the people. The central government could do nothing the Constitution did not authorize it to do.

All officers of the government were to be elected by the people or to be appointed by elected officers. The people were to choose their own rulers, and most of these served for only limited terms. Thus, the final power behind the government rested in the hands of the people themselves. There were to be no hereditary governing classes.

The national government was to be divided into three independent branches—legislative, executive, and judicial. The purpose of the division was to keep any one individual or branch of the government from gaining too much power. The Congress was to make the laws and it could make none the Constitution did not authorize it to make. The President was to enforce the laws and he could not enforce any measures Congress had not approved and passed. The

judges held the power to decide whether the authority of Congress or of the President was being exceeded. The Supreme Court judges were appointed for life, so that they would be independent and could make their decisions without fear of Congress or the President.

The Founding Fathers tried also to provide against a tyranny of a majority of the people. They therefore set up a republic; the government was to be carried on by representatives of the people and not directly by the people themselves. The founders knew that temporary majorities of a people are likely to go wrong and that a permanent majority might obtain possession of the government and oppress a minority. They tried to provide against this possible danger from the people in several ways.

The first of these ways was by having the President elected not directly by the people but by a set of electors chosen from each of the states. It is well known that the man who can go out and captivate the crowd and get the votes is often not a wise and safe leader; so it was provided that the President should be chosen by a small body of men who would not be so likely to be influenced by eloquence and hero worship. A second provision against unwise action was to have a higher branch of Congress (the Senate) to pass on and check the actions of a lower branch (the House of Representatives). . . .

A definite check on the use of arbitrary power is in the Bill of Rights, which was adopted in ten Amendments immediately after the Constitution was adopted and is really a part of the original Constitution. In order to make it unmistakably clear that the government has no authority to take away certain rights from the citizen, it was specifically stated in the Bill of Rights that Congress shall pass no laws interfering with various rights and liberties. . . .

The people who founded our government were afraid to clothe men with official power unless it was clearly set down in written form exactly what they were allowed to do and what they were forbidden to do. They realized that the great oppressor of mankind is the organized state; that there is no tyrant to be feared like the one who has the authority of government at his command. . . . [They] had had experience with an arbitrary government operated from a distance. Unlike some of those who have always lived in freedom and security, they understood the value of liberty and prized it above all things.

—John W. Ritchie (BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS.
Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Co., 1941)

From these different causes resulted the foundation in the New World of a Republic, happy within by its constitution, pacific by its character, respected and courted abroad for the abundance of its resources. So far as it is possible to judge of sublunary things, from the extent and fertility of its territory, and the rapid increase of its population, it is destined, at no distant day, to become a vast and exceedingly powerful state. To consolidate their work, and render its duration eternal, the Americans have only two things to avoid. The one is, that moral deprecation which too commonly results from an excessive love of gain; the other is, the losing sight of the principles upon which the edifice is founded. May they at least return to them promptly, if the ordinary course of human events should introduce disorder and decay into that admirable system of government which they have established!

—Charles Botta (HISTORY OF THE WAR OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. First edition, 1809. Eighth edition, translated from the Italian by George A. Otis. New-Haven, Conn.: Nathan Whiting, 1834)

*"One generation goeth, and another generation
cometh; but the earth abideth for ever."*

—*Ecclesiastes 1:4*

The benevolent regards and purposes of men in masses seldom can be supposed to extend beyond their own generation. They may look to posterity as an audience, may hope for its attention, and labour for its praise: they may trust to its recognition of unacknowledged merit, and demand its justice for contemporary wrong. But all this is mere selfishness, and does not involve the slightest regard to, or consideration of, the interest of those by whose numbers we would fain swell the circle of our flatterers, and by whose authority we would gladly support our presently disputed claims. The idea of self-denial for the sake of posterity, of practising present economy for the sake of debtors yet unborn, of planting forests that our descendants may live under their shade, or of raising cities for future nations to inhabit, never, I suppose, efficiently takes place among publicly recognised motives of exertion. Yet these are not the less of our duties; nor is our part fitly sustained upon the earth, unless the range of our intended and deliberate usefulness include, not only the companions but the successors of our pilgrimage. God has lent us the earth for our life; it is a great entail. It belongs as much to those who are to come after us, and whose names are already written in the book of creation, as to us; and we have no right, by anything that we do or neglect, to involve them in unnecessary penalties, or deprive them of benefits which it was in our power to bequeath. And this the more, because it is one of the appointed conditions of the labour of men that, in proportion to the time between the seed-sowing and the harvest, is the fulness of the fruit; and that generally, therefore, the farther off we place our aim, and the less we desire to be ourselves witnesses of what we have laboured for, the more wide and rich will be the measure of our success. Men cannot benefit those that are with them as they can benefit those who come after them; and of all the pulpits from which human voice is ever sent forth, there is none from which it reaches so far as from the grave.

Nor is there, indeed, any present loss, in such respect, for futurity. Every human action gains in honour, in grace, in all true magnificence, by its regard to things that are to come. It is the far sight, the quiet and confident patience, that, above all other attributes, separate man from man, and near him to his Maker; and there is no action nor art, whose majesty we may not measure by this test. Therefore, when we build, let us think that we build for ever. Let it not be for present delight, nor for present use alone; let it be such work as our descendants will thank us for, and let us think, as we lay stone on stone, that a time is to come when those stones will be held sacred because our hands have touched them, and that men will say as they look upon the labour and wrought substance of them, "See! this our fathers did for us."

—John Ruskin (*THE SEVEN LAMPS OF ARCHITECTURE*—"The Lamp of Memory." First edition, 1849. Library Edition, *THE WORKS OF JOHN RUSKIN*, edited by E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1903)

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This work of several volumes, appearing under the title **MERCHANT SAIL**, is not a set of books planned and written during a brief period of time that can be dated. It is a compilation of notes and records accumulated primarily during the period 1891-1908, when the writer was actively engaged in shipbuilding and operation, and added to, thereafter, during the years to date because of deep family interest, knowledge of and contact with ships, shipbuilders and owners, and extensive travel on the Seven Seas. The volumes cover a very complete history of the development of the colonies and of the United States in relation to and through American Merchant Sail. They were not planned and written under subject headings, and the original writing and notes were not intended to be printed in book form. In arranging old personal records covering ship designing, building, and operations, a few copies of a set of large volumes (folded working drawings, photographs, documents, and descriptive matter) were prepared exclusively for family use. During the preparation of these distinctly personal volumes, several facts became conspicuous: the difficulty of obtaining shipbuilding records, drawings, etc., needed to round out the descriptive story and to prepare any historical study and the fact that this difficulty would increase as the years went by; the vast amount of available material pertaining to ships built and operated during the most important transition period in the history of the American marine from wood to steel and from sail to steam—both mercantile and naval; the tremendous volume of written and dictated notes on ships, shipbuilding and ownership, management, and trading that had been accumulated during some two decades of direct association with ships, supplemented by notes continued as a sort of relaxation hobby.

Because of the availability of this material, the Fairburn Marine Educational Foundation has undertaken to prepare for distribution to the country's libraries and marine societies a set of books covering the subject of Merchant Sail, with specific reference to the use of ships in the development, growth, and prosperity of the United States. As the work of the Foundation unfolded, the writer, in relaxation from arduous business cares during the past ten years, has endeavored to make an up-to-date and complete story of American sailing ships by contributing material and tying it in with old manuscripts. Statements written many years ago have not been changed, as they seem as true today as they were many decades ago, when the writer was in close contact with ships and the builders and owners of them in many ports from Galveston, Texas, and New Orleans, La., to the Kennebec, Penobscot, and Passamaquoddy (on the Gulf and East Coast) and from Puget Sound to San Diego on the West Coast. To make the work complete, the research and writings of others have been called upon, at times, for historical and statistical matter, and agents have attempted to obtain records from customhouses, government archives, libraries, etc. Official publications have been used, but throughout a strong effort has been made to have this work authoritative, comprehensive, and complete under the one heading. Associated subjects are covered at length because of their contact with or influence upon American Merchant Sail.

A mass of footnotes does not make a historical work authoritative, for many old writings and statements made long years ago are as much in error as similar modern material, and prejudices have been in evidence throughout the ages. The fact that a statement is old or made by a contemporary or a person of note is no guarantee of its authenticity. Any unbiased student, given an opportunity to dig for facts, will ultimately become convinced that there is much truth in the statement that very often "history is fiction agreed upon." To the writer's personal knowledge, persons in power, influencing press reports and written records, have distorted and

falsified printed and otherwise expressed material during the period from 1890 to date, and this material will be worked into the history of relatively recent times. During prior periods, human nature was not greatly different, so much historic matter, declared to be authoritative and accepted because of the testimony of a contemporary, needs to be discarded in the search for truth. The writer has sought to apply the Rule of Reason to his subject and prepare a work that will be fairly readable, considering the vast amount of statistics that must be used, and as authoritative as any such material can be made—a reference work of value to the student. He has, in fact, endeavored to furnish to the reader and student interested in ships and our country's history such material as he himself sought for, in vain, many decades ago, when as a young boy, even prior to his apprenticeship as a shipbuilder, he was seeking to learn the truth about ships, with the effect of ships on history and of history on ships.

The bibliography, which will be attached to this work, will probably be extensive. Some of the books, with their statistics, were necessary for the completion of the material. Others covering admirable research in history have been drawn upon to save time and duplication of effort and to make the finished presentation more complete. Earnest attempts have been made to give suitable credit for quotations used. Any omission that may occur is regretted and unintentional and may be due to the scrapbook and dictated note method of assembling data. Some credits may have been revised or omitted, as statements in the original manuscript credited to one writer were later found in the work of an earlier author, and on a few occasions some of these were found to be quotations without credit. However, in a historical work, there can be no originality, as a history is merely a presentation of believed fact. This work has been prepared as a humble donation to the people of the United States. The entire edition will be distributed gratis as a public service. All the copies printed by the Fairburn Marine Educational Foundation will be placed on the shelves of public libraries in communities that have a direct contact with the sea and in schools and institutions that are interested in ships and in the education of Americans in regard to Merchant Sail, the influence of ships and the sea on the development of the United States, and the deplorable effect of the country's lack of interest in its mercantile marine dating from the mid-nineteenth century to modern times. Some expressions may be different from the ordinary, and the writer's views are expressed at times. But little that is controversial has had to be covered, and no attempt has been made at "debunking." Too much of that has been done, without warrant, during recent years. It is felt that credit has been given where credit is due, with the measure in proportion to achievement, and this without regard to an organized boosting press, propaganda, local patriotism, or prejudices.

The United States has a glorious history of unequalled accomplishment on the sea up to and including the brief clipper ship era of the 1850's. This period of practical attainment in building and operating ships took America to the zenith of her power as Mistress of the Seas in a strictly mercantile sense. Our country's record on the ocean since before the Civil War has been deplorable, unfortunate, and humiliating. The United States, for long years, has been "a vassal on the seas," where once "she was enthroned." What the government of the country, through ignorance, sectional prejudice, or false economy, has been destroying for almost a century cannot be regained in a year; but it must be apparent to any thinking person, after the distressing experiences of two World Wars, that the destiny of the United States is inseparable from the sea and that survival and freedom demand the sustained operation, through the years, of a large and powerful mercantile marine and navy.

W.A.F.

Center Lovell, Maine
Summer of 1947

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MERCHANT SAIL

I.

EARLY DAYS OF EXPLORATION, DISCOVERY, AND COLONIZATION THE INFLUENCE OF SHIPBUILDING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES

America's First Ship—the VIRGINIA OF SAGADAHOCK and the Establishment of an English Colony on the Kennebec River in 1607

FROM THE DAYS of the first European explorers and settlers, North America—and particularly New England—was heralded as a great source of supply for forest products needed in the construction of wood ships and as a country “well suited for the building, floating, and harbouring of big ships” because of its rivers, tidewaters, topography of land, and raw materials. Capt. George Weymouth (or Weymouth), in the English ship *Archangel* of 60 tons, entered the Kennebec (Sagadahoc) River in 1605 and anchored in the “Long Reach” of water fronting the coming city of Bath. Upon his return to England, he gave a glowing account of the river and surrounding country. It was a veritable “El Dorado” and a most desirable place to settle a colony: “a bold coast, a harbor with capacious anchorage in which the whole royal navy might safely ride, fresh water springs, fine timber trees for shipbuilding from oak for the frames to tall pines for masts, fish and game in great abundance, with a deep navigable river stretching a highway for commerce with the natives far into the interior.” While exploring the territory, Weymouth foolishly kidnapped five Indians (an act that was not conducive to friendly relations between the natives and the white race) and carried them back to England, where three of them lived for a time as servant-slaves in the household of Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who as the leader in attempts to plant settlements on the shores of the northern part of the New World did more than any other one man to colonize New England. Gorges is now generally acknowledged by historians as “the founder of Maine,” but was credited by contemporaries and certain writers of the seventeenth century with being the “father of American colonization.”

Sir Ferdinando Gorges (1566-1647), born in Somersetshire, England, was a military and naval man and “Governor of the Forts and Islands of Plymouth.” Writing during the middle of 1606 about the “Weymouth kidnapped Indians,” Gorges said that these “savages,” in their contacts with others, showed “great civility, far from the rudeness of our common people.” It has been said that all were trained in England to be useful as guides and interpreters for new expeditions to the Sagadahoc territory, and there are records showing that four were so utilized. In any event, as a defense of the kidnapping and his employment of the three Indians at his home, Gorges later maintained that they became the means “under God of putting on foot and giving life to all our plantations,” a statement that is to be doubted. Of the four known to have been sent back to America, two were captured and enslaved by

Spanish buccaneers; a third, who got back to his people, may have helped Martin Pring to locate certain positions described by Waymouth, but he did not guide or prove of any noticeable assistance in the establishment of any settlement in Maine; the fourth, sent over with the Popham expedition, promptly deserted when he had a chance to go ashore and would have nothing more to do with the English. It has been said that, to the Popham colonists, the loss of "their only interpreter" was a severe blow.

Capt. George Waymouth, prior to being given the command of the *Archangel* for an exploratory expedition to North Virginia (New England), had made a futile attempt to find a northwest passage to China and the Indies, having returned to England late in 1604 after being icebound between Baffin Island and Greenland. As were the expeditions of Bartholomew Gosnold in the "barke" *Concord* (with thirty-two men) in 1602 and of Martin Pring in the "shippes" *Speedwell* and *Discoverer* (with forty-four "men and boys") in 1603, the *Archangel* project was financed by an "independent group of adventurers," but seems to have had for its prime object the exploration of a specific section of the Maine coast—from Monhegan, or Muscongus Bay, west to Casco Bay—rather than trading. The leading backers were Henry Wriothsesley, Earl of Southampton, Thomas Arundel, his son-in-law, and Sir Ferdinando Gorges. The venture was planned as of a modest nature, "the whole company being but 29 personnes," and only one month was spent in exploration. The *Archangel* sailed from Darthmouth, England, on March 31, 1605, and was off the New England coast on May 14, south of her objective, so sailed north. Following what Waymouth evidently considered an adequate survey of the limited area he was under orders to explore, he set sail for England from somewhere near the mouth of the Sagadahoc and reached Dartmouth on July 14 after an absence of only three and a half months, or 105 days. During this voyage, time was lost at both ends of the outbound passage because of adverse winds.

The chronicler of this Waymouth voyage was James Rosier, sent by Arundel "to take due notice and make true reports of the discovery therein performed," but Rosier (who had sailed to the North Virginia coast with Gosnold in 1602) shrouds his written narrative of the exploration with mystery as to definite geographical location. He asserts that he has purposely omitted to state the latitudes or true positions (or even to mention conspicuous landmarks or relationships) of the various points of land and water visited "because some forreine Nation (being fully assured of the fruitfullnesse of the cuntrye) have hoped thereby to give some knowledge of the place." The result is that seemingly all islands, ocean inlets, bays, and rivers between Casco and Muscongus bays have had champions claiming that Rosier's admittedly camouflaged descriptions apply to their specific location. Many of Rosier's written statements are clearly intended to deceive; others are fantastic. However, the fact remains that Rosier made a verbal report to Arundel and that Waymouth made his official report to the "adventurers" who had employed him. As a result, all the men who had financed the *Archangel* expedition henceforth concentrated their thoughts and energies on the colonization of the mouth of the river that Waymouth named Sagadahock. (This river, now known as the Kennebec, is also referred to in English and French manuscripts and maps of 1605-1615 as the Sagadahoc, Sachadahoc, Sachadehoc, etc., and as the Quinibequey, Kinibequi, Kinibequi, Kenibequi, Kinnebeck, etc.) It has been truly said: "Waymouth's men brought back with them the first accurate English knowledge of the coast of Maine, which was to be responsible for the first English attempt, in the Popham Colony, to establish a plantation in that region." But Waymouth did more than that; he must have urged the mouth of the Sagadahoc River as the site of a settlement, and in this Rosier presumably concurred, for in the minds of Gorges, Southampton, Arundel, and their colleagues, plans to colonize North Virginia during the period of 1605-1608 were concentrated exclusively on the Sagadahoc.

It is said that Sir Ferdinando Gorges, of Plymouth, England (and the military governor of the port), who was to become increasingly important in his efforts for the colonization of Maine, succeeded during the winter of 1605-1606 in interesting Sir John Popham, the lord chief justice of England, in plans for the founding of settlements in New England—and specifi-

cally at the mouth of the Sagadahoc. In April 1606, a company was formed under a royal charter to plant colonies in northern Virginia in the territory between Lat. 38° and 45° N. on the coast line (or from what is now the southern boundary of Maryland to the north-eastern limit of Maine) and running 100 miles inland, including all islands adjacent. This company receiving the grant from King James I, organized chiefly by Plymouth men, was known as the Plymouth Company. At the same time, a similar charter giving rights to colonize southern Virginia was granted to the London Company, in which "adventurers" principally from London were interested. The members of the Plymouth Company, of whom Sir Ferdinando Gorges was the leading organizing and managing spirit, included George Popham (a kinsman of Sir John Popham) and Raleigh Gilbert (a nephew of Sir Walter Raleigh, after whom he was named). The Earl of Southampton, a backer of the Weymouth exploratory expedition, was one of the petitioners for the charter of the Plymouth Company, in which some West County men from Bristol, Exeter, and Southampton as well as from Plymouth were interested.

In May 1606, Sir John Popham dispatched "a tall ship belonging to Bristol and the River Severn to settle a plantation in the river of Sagadahoc," and a Captain Haines was in command. Three months later (in August), Sir Ferdinando Gorges sent out a ship to the Sagadahoc, with Capt. Henry Challons in charge. We are told that "two of Weymouth's kidnapped savages" were placed aboard to act as guides and interpreters and that this ship with its complement was ordered to join forces with the Captain Haines expedition and build a settlement at the mouth of the "River of Sagadahoc." Neither of these two ships ever reached the New England coast. According to reports, both vessels were intercepted and captured by Spanish corsairs in the Atlantic. In October 1606, Gorges and Chief Justice Popham sent out a third vessel, with Martin Pring as sailing master and with Thomas Hanham (one of the incorporators of the company) and a third of the captured Weymouth Indians aboard. This ship reached the Sagadahoc River, but found no trace of the Haines and Challons parties and sailed back to England in the late fall of the year after the Indian was put ashore among his tribe's people.

Gorges wrote that although Pring failed to locate and augment with men and supplies the Haines and Challons expeditions sent to the Sagadahoc earlier in the year, he, nevertheless, "made a perfect discovery of all those Rivers and Harbors," checked up and reaffirmed Weymouth's findings and good reports; that "he brings with him the most exact discovery of that coast that ever came into my hands, and indeed he was the best able to perform it of any I met withall to this present." This may have been written by the astute Gorges primarily with the thought of the disgruntled financial backers of the three unsuccessful 1606 colonizing voyages and his efforts then under way to send out still another larger and better-equipped expedition in the spring. In any event, it seems surprising that Martin Pring, after two voyages out to the New England coast and return that were certainly successful as far as navigation was concerned, was not employed as sailing master on any of the further ventures to the new western world in which Gorges had an interest or influence. Pring was undoubtedly an able man, and he later acquired fame in the East Indies.

Gorges and Popham, therefore, dispatched three vessels to plant a colony on the Sagadahoc during the period from May to October 1606, and only ill-fortune on the part of the adventurers prevented the settlement from being established some nine or ten months before that of the London Company in the south, whose colonists landed at Jamestown on the James River, Virginia, on May 13, 1607. During that same year, Sir Ferdinando Gorges organized and managed a company (or syndicate of financial backers) to send colonists to the Sagadahoc. The expedition, aimed at establishing a permanent settlement (a "plantation"), was under the command of George Popham, with Sir John Popham a heavy "stockholder" in the venture. Raleigh Gilbert, the second in command (evidently representing the financial interest of his family—and particularly of his brother Sir John Gilbert), was the son of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who, with letters patent from Queen Elizabeth, had landed at St. Johns,

Newfoundland, in August 1583, but his attempt to colonize failed because of his death at sea shortly thereafter. We are told that Gorges "sent out a colony numbering 120"; another report refers to the migration as "comprising one hundred men strong." Two vessels were used to transport the colonists and their belongings and supplies. One was described as "a good ship" *Mary and John* (Capt. Raleigh Gilbert), and the other, the *Gift of God*, said to have been commanded by Capt. George Popham, was evidently a beamy, flat-bottomed, light-draft, smaller craft, or "fly-boat," intended for "exploring along the coast, with its inlets and rivers." The colonists arrived at the apparently well-known "round high fishing Ile of Monhegan" on August 8, 1607, reached Seguin Island (about three miles from the mouth of the river) on August 15, and, locating their settlement on the west bank of the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) River, landed on August 18 at Sabino (about the location now known as Popham Beach). They built a fort and stockade, together with "fifty houses, a church, with steeple, and other structures," and established a settlement known as the "Popham Colony."

Our principal knowledge of the Gorges-Popham 1607 expedition to the Sagadahoc and the establishment of the first colony in New England (the first real settlement north of the James River, Virginia) comes from the pen of "William Strachey, Gent." He was associated with the Jamestown Colony and wrote only from hearsay, his chief source of information being someone who was presumably on board the ship *Mary and John* (said to have been James Davies—but not Capt. Robert Davies, the vessel's navigator and sailing master). It is generally agreed by all historians that the writings and alleged copies of original manuscripts that have come down to us dealing with the Popham settlement on the Sagadahoc are "fragmentary and inadequate." Strachey, after briefly chronicling the bad luck attending the unsuccessful 1606 ventures to colonize at the mouth of the Sagadahoc River in Maine, writes:

Howbeyt, the aforesaid late Lord Chief Justice would not, for all this hard hansell and Spanish mischief, give over his determination for planting of a colony within the afore said so goodly a cuntry, upon the river of Sachadahoc; but against the next yeare prepared a greater number of planters, and better provisions, which in two shippes he

sent thither; a fly-boat called the *Gift of God* wherein a kinsman of his George Popham, commanded; and a good ship, called the *Mary and John*, of London, wherein Raleigh Gilbert commanded; which with one hundred and twenty persons for planters broke ground from Plymouth in June 1607.

Apparently, from Strachey's narrative the *Mary and John* was blown somewhat off her course to the northward and first made land on the eastern shore of Nova Scotia. The settlers spent a week sailing down the coast and on August 7 came to an island where they found "a crosse set up, one of the same which Captain George Weyman, in his discovery, for all after occasions, left upon this island." Evidently, the next day the *Mary and John* reached the "Ile of Monhegan" and met the *Gift of God*, for which landmark that vessel had sailed, having been separated from the larger vessel of the expedition during some bad weather experienced on the earlier part of the crossing. It is significant that Monhegan, apparently first discovered by Weymouth, should have become early in the seventeenth century a rendezvous for English trading ships and fishermen and at times "a harbor of refuge free from the threat of Indians." It was for many years a famous landmark for British vessels and a sort of Western Ocean Tenerife. On August 17, the day before the landing, with both ships safely at anchor at the mouth of the Sagadahoc, some of the colonists went ashore. Strachey tells us:

Captain Popham, in his pynnace, with thirty persons, and Captain Gilbert in his long boat, with eighteen persons more went early in the morning from their shipp into the river Sachedehoc, to view the river, and to search where they might find a fitt place for their plantation. They sayled up into the river neere forty leagues, and found it to be a

very gallant river very deepe, and seldome lesse water than three fathome, when they found sest; whereupon they proceeded no farther, but in their returne homewards they observed many goodly islands therein and many branches of other small rivers falling into yt.

We are told that on the following day (August 18) the colonists landed and "there made choise of a place for their plantacion, at the mouth or entry of the ryver on the west side (for the ryver bendeth yt self towards the nor-east and by east), being almost an island, of a good bigness, so called of a sagamo or chief commander (Sebenoa) under the graund bas-saba." As they went ashore, "three canoes full of Indians came to them, but would not come neere, but rowed away up the river." Strachey says that on August 19 the colonists again "all went ashore" and that after listening to a sermon, "delivered unto them by their preacher," they all heard read "the president's commission, with the lawes to be observed and kept." The governing personnel of the colony, authorized to operate in conformity with the laws of England, is set forth as follows: "George Popham, gent, was nominated president: Captain Raleigh Gilbert, James Davies, Richard Seymour, preacher, Captain Richard Davies, Captain Harlow . . . were all sworne assistants."

There seem to have been many members of the Davies family connected with the expedition (probably because of a direct or indirect financial interest in the venture or the influence of a backer of the enterprise), and all at some time or other are designated as captains. Later, James Davies became interested in the colony at Jamestown, Va., and he is then referred to as "Captain James Davies, of the *Mary and John*." Capt. Robert Davies, who was the master of that ship at least during the return portion of her voyage on the Sagadahoc expedition, also joined the South Virginia colonists, and whether the navigator and sailing master of the *Mary and John* on her outbound voyage to Maine, described as "Captain R. Davies," was Robert or Richard is not clear. In any event, both of the narrators of the expedition to colonize on the Sagadahoc (i.e., William Strachey and James Davies) were later identified with the rival settlement at Jamestown, Va., and Strachey's manuscript is based primarily on the writings of James Davies.

Strachey writes that on August 20 "all went to shoare again and there began to entrench and make a fort and to buyld a storehouse, soe contynewing" during the many days that followed. Davies says that Captain Popham, on August 23, went in a shallop "to the Ryver of Pashipskoke" (Sheepscot) and that "thear they had parle with the salvages again." On August 28 to 31, we are told, Capt. Raleigh Gilbert explored Casco Bay, going as far to the west as Cape Elizabeth and Richmond Island. On September 7, he left with a party of twenty-two and goods to barter and tried to reach the Penobscot, but after landing at Pemaquid and later sailing to the eastward for three days, he got among the islands. Because of not going more to the northeast and following the shore, he failed to locate his intended destination and had to return without doing any trading. On September 23, Captain Gilbert went to explore "the head of the river of Sachadahoc." The report of the trip suggests that he visited Swan Island and was probably north of Vassalboro when he came in contact with a Sagamo named Sebenoa, who said that he was lord of the river of Sachadahoc. He was evidently suspicious of the white men and their intentions, but Gilbert was able to withdraw with his men from a difficult and threatening situation without bloodshed. Once more, he returned to the settlement without accomplishing anything either in trading or in making friends with the Indians.

After writing of certain parleys at the fort between the settlers and an Indian chief, his wife, relatives, and followers, Strachey concludes his narration with the following:

You maie please to understand how, whilst this business was thus followed here, soone after their arrivall, that had dispatch't away Capt. Robert Davies, in the *Mary and John*, to advertise of their safe arrival and forwardnes of their plantacion within this river of Sachadahoc, with letters to the Lord Chief Justice, ymportuninge a supply for the most necessary wants to the subsisting of a colony, to be sent unto them betymes the next yeare.

After Capt. Davies' departure they fully finished

the fort, trencht and fortified yt with twelve pieces of ordnance, and built fifty howses therein, besides a church and a storehouse; and the carpenters framed a pretty Pynnace of about some thirty tonne, which they called the *Virginia*; the chief shipwright being one Digby of London.

Many discoveries had likewise been made both to the mayne and unto the neighbour rivers, and the frontier nations fully discovered by the diligence of Captain Gilbert, had not the wynter proved soe

extreme unseasonable and frosty, for yt being in the yeare 1607, when the extraordinary frost was felt in most parts of Europe, yt was here likewise as vehement, by which noe boat could stir upon any busines. Howbeyt, as tyme and occasion gave leave, there was nothing omitted which could add unto the benefit or knowledge of the planters, for which when Capt. Davies arrived there in the year following (set out from Topsam, the port towne of Exciter, with a shipp laden full of victualls, armes, instruments, and tooles, etc.) albeyt, he found Mr. George Popham, the president, and some other dead yet he found all things in good forwardness, and many kinds of furs obteyned from the Indians by way of trade, good store of sarsparilla gathered, and the new pinnace all finished. By the reason that

Capt. Gilbert received letters that his brother was newly dead, and a faire portion of land fallen unto his share, which required his repaier home, and noe mynes discovered nor hope there of, being the mayne intended benefit expected to uphold the charge of this plantacion, and the feare that all the other wynters would prove like the first, the company by no means would stay any longer in the country, especyally Capt. Gilbert being to leave them, and Mr. Popham, as aforesaid, dead; wherefore they all ymbarqued in this new arrived shipp, and in the new pynnace, the *Virginia*, and sett saile for England. And this was the end of that northerne colony upon the River Sachadehoc.

Finis.

Thus ends the chronicle of a man who is the principal source of our information in regard to New England's pioneer colony and what has been described as "the first real, planned and organized settlement planted on the continent of North America." Strachey, the writer, never saw the Sagadahoc and never set foot in New England, and both he and his main source of information (James Davies, who evidently left the Sagadahoc when the *Mary and John* sailed in the autumn of 1607) became identified with the indifferently planned, badly located, and "miserably operated" first settlement of the London Company, planted on the James River, Virginia, in May 1607. Although the location was less healthy than that of the Popham Colony, the Jamestown settlement was in a much "kinder climate"—at least as far as the winter weather was concerned.

Sir Ferdinando Gorges and his colleagues apparently selected with a good deal of care the emigrants to build the new colony on the Sagadahoc. They were not organized religious dissentients or members of a political body, but were "accepted" because of their evident ability and worth to construct, operate, and defend a "plantation" in a country inhabited by "savages" and to make it not only self-supporting but also profitable to the financial backers of the enterprise through trading (furs), the fisheries, and the export of forest products. The plan of the colony has been preserved as "The draught of St. George's Fort erected by Captayne George Popham Esquire on the entry of the famous River of Sagadahock, in Virginia taken out by John Hunt the Eighth day of October in the yeare of our Lorde 1607." The drawing, with explanatory data, is said to have reached the hands of Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador, who promptly dispatched it to his sovereign, King Philip III (1578-1621), at Madrid in September 1608. It was presumably put in the Spanish Government archives, where it was later found at the Archivo General del Reino, Simancas, Valladolid, by Alexander Brown, and it was first publicly reproduced in 1890. The plan of the Popham Colony and St. George's Fort was an amazingly efficient and elaborate construction job, which was carried forward simultaneously with the building of a ship. The fort mounted nine cannon, well placed in bastions, for defense against ocean, river, or land attack; it was a splendid specimen of military science of the period, and within its walls were buildings to house and take care of all the colonists during a protracted siege. The structures included a sizable church and assembly hall and all the buildings generally connected with the life of a community. St. George's Fort was not planned by incompetent dilettantes and could have been built only by industrious and well-trained mechanics; i.e., by men who thoroughly knew their job and were real workers.

Among the skilled artisans sent out by the English company was "Digby from London, a master shipwright," and under his direction the colonists at once proceeded to build America's first ship, "the *Virginia* of 30 tons burthen." She was launched into the Kennebec in the fall of 1607 and was sufficiently sizable, staunchly built, and seaworthy to make several voyages across the stormy North Atlantic as well as journeys up and down the coast between

northern and southern Virginia. Shipbuilding, therefore, is the most ancient of American industries. Dating back to 1607 and the Kennebec River of Maine, it is as old as the much-publicized settling of Jamestown in Virginia, thirteen years older than Plymouth, Mass., and the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers, and twenty-one years older than the granting of a charter to the Puritans to establish a colony on Massachusetts Bay.

America's pioneer vessel, described as "a faire pynnace of thirty tunnes burthen," is estimated by competent authorities to have been about 40 ft. long, 14 ft. beam, and 9 ft. deep. She evidently had one mast and carried a sizable spritsail, probably one square sail, and a foresail, or jib. Oars were provided for use in light airs and confined waters. The hull was "partly decked over to protect the cargo." She was built not so much for the fisheries (as were practically all the earliest of the northern colonists' vessels) as for "coasting trade with the Indians and deep-sea voyages." Henry Hall, however, in the report on "The Shipbuilding Industry of the United States," says that the *Virginia* was a staunch and excellent two-masted vessel, and he estimates that she was "60 ft. long, 17 ft. broad on the main beam, and 10½ ft. deep in the hold." These dimensions are obviously excessive and would have produced a vessel of fully twice the tonnage measurement stated. Charnock's *HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE* gives the prime data of the *Escape Royal* of 34 tons burthen, built in 1660, whose dimensions were 30 ft. 6 in. long on the keel, 14 ft. 3 in. beam, and 7 ft. 9 in. depth of hold; this vessel was of about the same tonnage as America's pioneer ship, built fifty-three years earlier. George F. Dow, in *THE SAILING SHIPS OF NEW ENGLAND*, describes the *Virginia* as "a two-masted bark of about thirty tons burden"; he says that she was well built and, after her transatlantic voyages, was used for some time in the New England deep-sea fisheries. The drawing of St. George's Fort and the heart of the historic Popham settlement—a most excellent specimen of draftsmanship to scale, made in October 1607—shows in the water near the fort a stern-quartering view of a vessel, under canvas, which is most probably an artist's sketch of the *Virginia*, then building at the Popham Colony. If so, then the first ship built in the New World was a seaworthy craft with plenty of freeboard and the high stern, or poop, of the period; she was fitted with a single mast, a sort of sprit-gaff, with a big mainsail running up to near the top of the mast, and a large foresail.

The *Virginia* was a sizable vessel for her day (especially considering that she was built "in the wilds of a new country" without much equipment), and this fact is proven by a comparison of her measurements with those of "the good ship *Sparrow-Hawk*, which sailed from London for Virginia with forty passengers in the fall of 1626." The *Sparrow-Hawk* was wrecked near Plymouth and safely preserved in the sands of Cape Cod until recent years, when she was dug up and surveyed. This "ship" was found to be a one-masted vessel, with a single spar stepped about midships, and to measure 28 ft. 10 in. long on the keel, 40 ft. long over-all, 12 ft. 10 in. beam, and 9 ft. 7½ in. deep; she was built of English oak, the outside planking being two inches thick and most of it about ten inches wide. She had a square stern and a raking sternpost four inches to the foot. Vessels such as the *Virginia* and the *Sparrow-Hawk* seem to be ridiculously small craft for service in the rough waters of the North Atlantic, with its heavy gales and high seas, but it is interesting to note that the *Virginia* was three times as large as the *Squirrel* (10 tons) used by Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1583 during the first British attempt to plant a colony in the New World (on the shore of Newfoundland) and that the "greate shippe" of his flotilla of five vessels, sent out from Plymouth, England, for exploratory and colonizing purposes, was the *Golden Hind* of only 40 tons.

Some historians say that the *Virginia* was first used by the Popham settlers for voyages up and down the coast to obtain furs, which were shipped to England. It is also recorded that in her early career the *Virginia* extended the scope of her coastwise trading voyages and "took a cargo of salted cod south to the Jamestown settlement." Evidently, in the autumn of 1608, she set sail in company with an unnamed English "shipp" (loaded with some furs and sassafras root) for Plymouth, England, and on this her first voyage across the Atlantic she carried some of the returning colonists. William H. Rowe has written: "A true forerunner

of the American clippers, the little *Virginia* outsailed her English-built companion and arrived in Plymouth Harbor five days in the lead. For some twenty years she plied between England and Virginia until, when returning with a cargo of tobacco, she was wrecked on the Irish coast."

Records show that the *Virginia* (often referred to as the *Virginia of Sagadahoc*) was well known to Jamestown and other South Virginia settlers. In May 1610, she was lying at anchor off what is now Point Comfort, Va., when Lord De La Warr (Delaware) arrived, "the ship having brought over from England a part of the Gates and Somers expedition in August of the previous year." We are told by Henry F. Howe in PROLOGUE TO NEW ENGLAND that "when in the spring of 1609 the London Company gathered its ships in the harbor of Plymouth, under the very eyes of Ferdinando Gorges, who was Plymouth's military governor, the little *Virginia*, built at Sagadahoc, went along with them to Jamestown." We also read that when Sir Thomas Gates and Sir George Somers, after having been wrecked in their flagship *Sea Venture* at Bermuda, arrived at the southern Virginia colony in 1610, "only sixty of the five hundred men were left alive" and that "they found things in such desperate straits that they determined to abandon the effort and return to England." The surviving colonists actually embarked on their four vessels, "one of which was Sagadahoc's *Virginia*," and were on their way to England, having abandoned the Jamestown Colony, when they were intercepted at the mouth of the Chesapeake by Lord De La Warr (with "three ships and abundant supplies"), who influenced the "dispirited settlers" to return and try once more to establish a plantation in a different, more healthy, and safer location.

In addition to making transatlantic and coastwise voyages, the *Virginia* is said to have sailed up the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) River to the head of deep-water navigation (presumably to about the present location of Waterville) for exploratory purposes and trading with the Indians. One historian has written that the *Virginia*—a truly remarkable little craft and America's first ship—"finished its days, with good Englishmen chained in it, among the Barbary pirates." The *Virginia* was the first of a long line of ships that were to go out from the mouth of the Kennebec River and "whiten all the world with their sails." Into the same river waters were launched, some three centuries later, the last wood square-riggers to be built in the world and the last and only deep-sea steel square-rigged ships (shipentines and barks) built on the American continent.

The record of the Popham Colony in 1608 is indefinite, and reports of happenings that have come down to us are confusing with many "authoritative" statements made by historians known to be inaccurate. It would seem that George Popham, the president of the colony and its elected leader (appointed, in fact, at the insistence of Sir John Popham), died during the winter of 1607-1608 and that Raleigh Gilbert, his first "sworne assistant" (selected also in England for the post of second in command), assumed charge of the settlement. We know little of George Popham, and even his age and his relationship to the lord chief justice of England are in doubt. One record says that he died "at the age of fifty-eight years"; another refers to "the death of the seventy-year-old man." Different historians have stated that George Popham was the brother, the son, the cousin, and the nephew of Sir John Popham. He was evidently not the son, as Sir Francis Popham, a younger man, was Sir John's heir, and George is generally referred to as a "kinsman," which seems to be the safest designation. Apparently, the lord chief justice of England, the largest financial backer of the venture, forced the appointment of George Popham as leader of the settlement upon Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who planned the expedition; for Gorges, writing of the president of the colony, described him as "an honest man, but old and of an unwieldy body, and timorously fearful to offend or contest with others that will or do oppose him, but otherwise a discreet, careful man." These are certainly not the attributes of a successful leader of men "planted" in a strange and wild new world and practically confined by ice, snow, cold and wintry gales within the walls of their fort for some two or more months. Yet the fact that the fort and all needed structures were splendidly built in an amazingly short time and that all the work done

was efficiently planned speaks well for the caliber of the men and reflects a measure of credit on the leader.

The first ship to arrive at the Sagadahoc from England in the spring of 1608 found that George Popham was dead and Raleigh Gilbert in charge. This vessel, under Captain Davies (said to have been the *Mary and John*, although Gorges has recorded that he sent two supply ships to the colony in the early spring), fortunately brought some needed provisions as well as stores and equipment, for Gorges is authority for the statement that during the winter the big storehouse containing most of the colony's provisions had been destroyed by fire. The ship must also have brought news that the colony's principal sponsor (and evidently the only man to be relied upon to pay the charges and finance the enterprise) had died on June 10, 1607, at about the time that the expedition had sailed from Plymouth. Apparently, the loss of the two Pophams—the colonists' capitalist-backer and his relative, the resident leader—seriously affected the morale of the settlement, then suffering from a breakdown in leadership. A possible cause of George Popham's death and of conditions in the Sagadahoc colony in regard to its relations with the Indians is found in the writings of Pierre Biard, Jesuit explorer, who, with the sieur de Biencourt, visited the Kenibequi (Kennebec, or Sagadahoc, River and territory) in 1611, following up in the interest of the French Nation an examination of that area made by Samuel de Champlain (1567-1635) in 1605. According to a letter written by the Jesuit priest to his superiors in France from Port Royal, Acadia (Nova Francia), dated January 31, 1612, Pierre Biard and the sieur de Biencourt, with a company of followers, visited the abandoned fort of the English "at the mouth of the Kinnibequi" on October 28, 1611, and were surprised to find the settlement so badly located as far as tillable land was concerned. The colony had evidently been placed with the thought of a fort to protect the river's mouth and fight off invaders approaching from the ocean or river and as a trading center with water transport, but with no consideration being given to agriculture—the growing of crops and cattle—and to making the place self-supporting from the standpoint of a food supply. It was a merchant's stronghold and not a settlement of homebuilders. Biard says, "Each one strove to praise and extol this undertaking of the English and to relate the advantages of the place, . . . but we do not believe that for six leagues around about there is a single acre of arable land, the soil being wholly stony or rocky" (or sandy).

Samuel de Champlain, the competent and famous French explorer, made the same mistake in locating his first colony in the New World as did Popham and Gilbert and their advisers. He placed his colony, St. Croix, at the mouth of the river bearing that name, which is now the division between Maine and New Brunswick, Canada. He also was intrigued with the splendid summer weather of northeastern America, and he likewise imagined that the winter would be generally similar to what the colonists were accustomed to in Europe. In December, the French settlement became icebound and isolated. We are told that the colonists could neither hunt nor fish; their wines and cider froze solid; they could not cut the needed amount of wood for fuel, and because of freezing and starvation thirty-five out of the seventy-nine men, or 44 per cent of France's first would-be colonists, died during the winter. Later, the French criticized the location of the English colony at the mouth of the Sagadahoc, but in 1604 France's pioneer North American explorer made an initial attempt to found a colony in a position even worse than that of the Popham settlement on the Sagadahoc. Whereas the English colony was planted on the mainland and well fortified against the attacks of Indians and unfriendly nations, Champlain's first settlement was placed on a little island, with an area of about seven acres, in Passamaquoddy Bay. Champlain also gave no heed to locating on ground suitable for cultivation. However, he considered—as did the English Maine settlers of 1607—that the prime requisites to be weighed in deciding upon the location of a colony were (1) protection from Indians and all European foes approaching as privateers or pirates; (2) access to the settlement by water (ocean and river) for trading by boat or canoe with the Indians and for contact with the mother country. Snow, ice, and bitter cold, with wintry howling gales and blizzards, were too much for the French at St. Croix, and the colony had

to be abandoned, although the site was retained for many years as a trading post and used as such in favorable seasons.

Capt. John Smith, writing in 1615 of his explorations of the preceding year and his impressions of the Maine coast from Cape Elizabeth to the Penobscot, said:

But all this coast to Pennobscot [including the Sagadahoc area] and as farre as I could see eastward of it, is nothing but such high clifly rocks and stony lles that I wondered such great trees could growe upon so hard foundations. It is a countrie rather to affright, then to delight one. And how to describe a more plaine spectacle of desolation, or

more barren, I know not. Yet the sea there is the strangest fishpond I ever saw; and those barren Isles so furnished with good woods, springs, fruits, fish and foule, that it make me thinke though the coast be rockie, and thus affrightable; the Vallies, Plaines and interior parts may well (notwithstanding) be very fertile.

When this was written, Smith was intimately aware through Gorges and his associates of the failure of the Popham Colony. He had spent many weeks off the mouth of the Sagadahoc and had journeyed "40 or 50 miles" up the river, but it is also possible that he had talked with survivors of the Popham Colony in the Pemaquid-Monhegan region as well as in England and was aware of the criticism of the French (Champlain, 1605; Biard, 1611) of this territory from the standpoint of tillable land and the growing of crops and cattle to support a colony the year round.

The Jesuit priest's story of a claimed experience of the English colonists with the Indians, at Popham on the Sagadahoc, is of particular interest. Biard writes:

In the year (1607) the English commenced to settle on one of the mouths of this river, the Kenibequi. They had then a very honorable leader, and one who demeaned himself excellently toward the natives. They say, however, that the Armouchiquoys (Indians) feared such neighbors, and therefore caused the death of the captain. These people have a way, in use with them, of killing by magic. Now in the second year (1608) the English changed their tactics under another leader. They shamelessly drove away the savages; they beat them, overburdened them and tore them with dogs beyond all measure; consequently the poor abused people irritated at the present and divining worse things for the future, made a resolve, as the saying is, to kill the

wolf's cub before he has stronger teeth and claws. Their opportunity came one day when three long boats had gone fishing. Our conspirators followed on their track, and drawing near with a fine pretense of friendship (for they thus lavish the more caresses when they plan the more treachery), they enter the boats and, at a given signal, each one chooses his man and kills him with slashes of the knife. Thus eleven Englishmen were dispatched. The others, overawed, abandoned their undertaking that same year (1608) and have not followed it up since, being satisfied to come in the summer and fish at that island Emetenic [Monhegan] which is about eight leagues from the fort.

This story, told by a French Roman Catholic priest and a hater of the English Protestants, is of interest, as it not only refers to the massacre of certain of the Popham colonists by the Indians, which other traditional or legendary stories confirm, but also specifically mentions a difference in the attitude toward the Indians of the first president of the colony, George Popham, and of his successor, Raleigh Gilbert. Biard also wrote of the English activities in the waters off the Sagadahoc, for he refers to a Captain Platrier (Plastrier), of Honfleur, who, attempting to sail his ship to the Kenibequi, "was taken prisoner by two English ships which were at an island called Emmetenic" (Monhegan). "His release was obtained by means of some presents [tribute] and the promise which he made to submit to the commands given him not to trade on that entire coast. For these English pretend to be masters of it, and to this intent produced letters of their king"—evidently a copy of the royal charter and patent to the Plymouth Company of Virginia, granted by King James I in April 1606. There are numerous records to show that after the Sagadahoc settlement ceased to exist as a colony, the Pemaquid-Monhegan-Sagadahoc waters were popular as a rendezvous for English fishing and trading vessels and that prior to Capt. John Smith's historic coastal survey and fishing voyage of 1614, many ships, some of which were sent out by Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Sir Francis Popham (the son of Sir John Popham), appeared in these waters.

Raleigh Gilbert, who succeeded George Popham in command of the Popham Colony on the Sagadahoc, is not an heroic figure, and it would seem that the men "did not live and

work happily under his rule." Whether or not it is true that "the Indians killed eleven of the settlers in retribution for cruelties and injustices perpetrated by the English," it was reported that when Captain Davies (probably in the *Mary and John*) reached the Sagadahoc colony in the spring of 1608, he found not only George Popham, its president, but also "some other dead," and one historian has said that "several of the colonists," besides Governor Popham, "had died during the winter from the severe cold and ice, lack of needed food, and the treacherous attacks of the Indians." Raleigh Gilbert was neither a popular nor a competent governor, and he has been overestimated by historians because of his name. He was unquestionably not of the caliber of his heroic father, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, England's pioneer colonist in North America, and it is a mistake to ascribe to him "the admirable knightly virtues of his uncle," Sir Walter Raleigh. As a matter of fact, the Sir Walter of our history books is very much of a mythical character, and a study of his life, whereas it shows a steadfast hatred for Spain, does not reveal heroic, chivalrous qualities. He was certainly no Sir Galahad and no knight *sans peur et sans reproche*.

It was not until the arrival in 1608 of the third ship sent out by Gorges to the Sagadahoc colony that Raleigh Gilbert heard of the death of his brother, Sir John Gilbert. This news, received by Captain Gilbert and by the settlers about August, was the final stroke that operated to break up the colony, for Raleigh Gilbert promptly decided to go back to England to claim his inheritance and protect his rights and interests. Evidently, Gilbert gave but little thought to the leadership or continued existence of the settlement and declined to put what would soon be his own money into the Sagadahoc venture to supplement that which Sir Francis Popham (a son of Chief Justice Popham) was willing to continue to invest in New England. The attitude and actions of Raleigh Gilbert caused Sir Ferdinando Gorges great disappointment and grief, for Gorges was apparently without funds of his own, in any substantial amount, that he could invest to carry forward to consummation the plans that he had outlined and fostered to the limit of his means, opportunities, and obligations. It is extremely doubtful as to whether Raleigh Gilbert was loyal to Gorges, the Pophams, and the investors in the Sagadahoc expedition or to the chartered members and proprietors of the Plymouth Company of Virginia; for it seems that he sought through political intrigue to obtain personal control of the rights of colonization in Maine, New England, and the northern part of the New World by reason of claims based upon the patent issued by Queen Elizabeth to his father on June 11, 1578. Gorges, who succeeded in blocking Raleigh Gilbert's schemes in this direction, evidently had no great love for or confidence in the man and blamed him for much of the trouble that developed in the Popham Colony and for his desertion of the plantation and the influence he had in causing others to return to England—all of which led in the late summer or autumn of 1608 to the abandonment of the settlement. Gorges wrote of Raleigh Gilbert that he was "desirous of supremacy and rule"; that he led "a loose life" and was "prompt to sensuality," with "little zeal in religion"; that he was a "headstrong" man "of small judgement and experience" but "humerous" and "otherwise valiant enough."

Sir John Popham (1531-1607) was born at Somerset, England, and was lord chief justice of England from 1592 to the time of his death (June 10, 1607). In November 1603, he presided at the trial at Winchester of Sir Walter Raleigh, accused of being implicated in the conspiracies during the first months of the reign of King James I, following the death of Queen Elizabeth on March 24, 1603. It is said that this trial was conducted with outrageous unfairness and that Popham personally was hissed by the populace when he roughly denounced Raleigh in court. However, it was the brutality of Sir Edward Cook, attorney general, that turned public opinion in Raleigh's favor, and it is farfetched to say that Popham, acting selfishly for himself and friends, who included Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Raleigh Gilbert, did all he could as lord chief justice to cause the downfall of Sir Walter Raleigh, in order that the proprietary and monopolistic rights in the New World granted to him by Queen Elizabeth in March 1584 might be more easily obtained by an interested group of adventurers. This accusation seems particularly strange when it is known that Popham and Gorges were

related to Raleigh by marriage and that Gilbert was his nephew. After three failures to establish colonies at North Carolina in 1585-1587, Raleigh had voluntarily resigned his rights in Virginia to a company of merchants, "preserving to himself a rent and a fifth of whatever gold might be discovered" (the crown also held the right to "one-fifth of the produce of all mines of precious metals"), and since the early nineties he had considered his royal grant to Virginia as not only valueless but also annoying and somewhat of a liability. Raleigh, at heart, was not a colonizer but a gold-hunter and in this respect more closely resembled the Spanish conquistadors than such sincere traders and colony-minded men as Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Capt. John Smith. It is, therefore, contrary to all facts and a spirit of justice to say that Raleigh—and not Gorges—earned the proud title of "father of American colonization." Sir John Popham probably was prejudiced against Raleigh when the latter stood trial, for practically all in a position to know seemed positive that Raleigh was cognizant of the conspiracies, as charged, and that he was either active in or favorably disposed toward them. The council was convinced that he was guilty, although the evidence presented in open court was insufficient to prove his guilt, and sentence of death was passed.

Due to the clemency of the crown, Raleigh was given easy confinement, but he gained a temporary freedom in early 1617 by fraud and by appealing to the avariciousness of King James. Raleigh sailed March 17, 1617, to South America to find a gold mine, which he well knew was purely imaginary and nonexistent and which he swore was not on any domain settled or explored by the Spaniards. On the expedition, he discovered no gold mine and obtained no treasure, but several Spaniards (and his own son) were killed. Upon his return to England, he was promptly arrested and executed on October 29, 1618, under the original but suspended death sentence of 1603 and under the additional charge of piracy and of deliberately deceiving his sovereign.

Sir Francis Popham, the son and heir of Lord Chief Justice Sir John Popham, evidently did not have the financial resources, the energy, and the colonizing fervor of his father, who had invested large sums of money in the Maine enterprises of Gorges and practically equaled that man in his enthusiasm for the project. Yet, year after year, Sir Francis Popham either alone or in partnership with others—but always under the direction of Sir Ferdinando Gorges—sent out vessels to Monhegan and the Maine coast for fishing and trading. Capt. John Smith tells us that "Sir Francis Popham sent divers times one Captaine Williams to Monahigan onely to trade and make core-fish, but for any Plantations there was no more speeches." In the "Description of New England," written in 1615, Smith speaks of an apparent monopoly that Popham had for trading purposes on part of the Maine coast in the Monhegan-Sagadahoc area: "Right against us in the Main was a ship of Sir Francis Pophammes, that had there such acquaintance, having many years used onely that porte, that the most parte there was had by him." It is said that later Sir Francis Popham joined with Sir Ferdinando Gorges and others in backing colonizing efforts undertaken under the command of Capt. John Smith, but that after a disastrous and expensive false start, Smith set sail on June 24, 1615, in a 60-ton ship only to have his vessel captured by French piratical privateers. Smith's next venture to plant a colony in the New World, in 1617, under Gorges' management and with some Popham money invested in the enterprise, ended in failure; for the three ships with the would-be colonists, together with "several hundred sail," were held "windbound in Plymouth Harbor" for a period said to be three months. As the stores were used up, with the maintenance expense continuing throughout this period of inactivity and with the ships lying idle and useless under the eyes of the financial backers, the merchants who were supporting the enterprise withdrew from the venture, and Gorges (with Popham) was compelled to abandon the expedition. Henceforth Sir Francis Popham seems to have withdrawn from maritime enterprises to America, and Sir Ferdinando Gorges branded Capt. John Smith as too unlucky to be associated with; all business relations between the two men, which had been close and cordial for several years, were terminated, although evidently friendly personal relations continued.

We are told that many of the Popham colonists—the first group of Englishmen who ac-

tually reached their destination and established a settlement in America under the direction of Sir Ferdinando Gorges—found pioneering conditions on the New England coast too tough for them and that they returned home “during the winter.” One English historian says: “Finding supplies insufficient, three-fifths of the colonists returned to England in December 1607.” This, according to the evidence, is obviously untrue. When the *Mary and John* sailed for home from the Sagadahoc (not later than early October 1607), none of the settlers was on board but only the skeleton of a crew, or enough men to handle her at sea sailing east before the prevailing westerly winds. The *Gift of God* left the Popham Colony at the time of the departure of the *Mary and John*, some time before, or shortly thereafter, for neither of the ships wintered in western waters nor did they sail for home in 1607 after October. Moreover, no other ship arrived at the Sagadahoc during the fall of 1607 or left the settlement for England. James P. Baxter has advanced the belief that the *Mary and John* left the Sagadahoc for England in September 1607, which may be correct, although October 8 is a more probable date, and his opinion that the *Gift of God* was sent home in December 1607 after the *Virginia* was completed may not be far from the truth; but when he adds that the *Gift of God* probably carried all but forty-five of the colonists back to England with her, his imagination is running away with his pen, for he has no facts, records, or handed-down tradition to warrant such a statement. The reasons for suggesting October 8, 1607, as the departure date of the *Mary and John* from Sagadahoc are: (1) The diary records of the chroniclers of the happenings at the colony are abruptly terminated with the writing on October 7 covering the events that are said to have transpired on the preceding day, and the narrator was reported as being one of the complement of the *Mary and John*. (2) The draft of St. George's Fort “on the entry of the famous River of Sagadahock” was marked as “brought from the Popham Colony on October 8, 1607.”

Another writer tells us that “several of the settlers found the [Maine] winter too hard for them and so returned to England.” We also read that news of “the demise of two of the colony's chief sponsors” following the death of the leader, Capt. George Popham, when added to the memories of the hardships that the settlers had experienced due “to extreme cold, ice and heavy winds” during a severe winter on an exposed part of the Maine coast (for which, it is admitted, the Englishmen “were ill-prepared”) and the destruction by fire of the large main warehouse containing provisions that had been brought over from England, caused the colonists to lose a great measure of their original enthusiasm. We are further told that “under the leadership of the rather weak Gilbert, who presided over the council following George Popham's death,” the final decision was made to abandon the settlement and return to the “kinder climate” of England. However, this conclusion was reached only after Raleigh Gilbert, following the news of his brother's death, announced his intention of returning to England and accompanied this declaration with words to the effect that the colony could look for no further financial support from the Popham and Gilbert families, which had carried most of the burden up to that time.

Sir Ferdinando Gorges was a consistent and steady advocate of the colonization of North Virginia, or New England, during the last forty-two years of his life. What money he had that could be utilized to further this purpose, the prime and dominating motive of his life, was so used together with such funds as he could influence his friends to risk in such ventures. However, he encountered a tremendous amount of bad luck, and many of his associates (such as even the redoubtable, capable, and level-headed Capt. John Smith) seem to have been particularly unfortunate when they worked for or in co-operation with him. Gorges appears to have been constantly and persistently harassed by money matters. He had difficulty through the years in finding funds to pay the soldiers of his command, and in 1629, we are told, “with his garrison having been without pay for three and a half years, his fort a ruin, and all his applications for aid having been ignored,” he was compelled to resign as Governor of the Forts and Islands of Plymouth—“a position he had held steadily for 33 years,” save for a few weeks in early 1603 when he was “suspended” following the death of

Queen Elizabeth and the accession of James I to the throne. It would seem that during the time that Sir Walter Raleigh was charged with being connected with "conspiracies," many of his friends, relatives, and associates were naturally held "under suspicion." Gorges was not only guiltless of participation therein but also disinterested in politics at the time, and he was promptly reinstated and "restored" as "Captain and Keeper of the Castle and Fort at Plymouth and Captain of St. Nicholas Isle."

Sir Ferdinando Gorges was loyal to his ideal to the end, and he practically bankrupted himself with New England colonization expeditions, trading voyages, and the sending of ships and men to Maine. Following the Popham Colony episode, Gorges engineered voyages to Maine, which were principally financed by Sir Francis Popham, the son of Sir John Popham. In 1615, however, Gorges wrote: "Finding that I could no longer be seconded by others, I became the owner of a ship myself fit for that employment, and under colour of fishing and trade, I got a master and company for her, to which I sent Vines and others, my own servants, with their provisions for trade and discovery, appointing them to leave the ship and ship's company for to follow their businesse at the usuall place"—evidently the English fishing and trading headquarters at Monhegan Isle and Pemaquid. Richard Vines, as agent for Gorges, with his men, spent the winter of 1614-1615 on the Maine coast at the Indian village of Sawatiquatooke (Saco). It is known that some English sailors from a Gorges ship spent the winter of 1618-1619 at Sagadahoc and Monhegan. Capt. Thomas Dermer, who explored the entire American coast from Maine to Virginia, was sent out by Gorges and first arrived at Monhegan in May 1619. This seldom-mentioned, doughty mariner and able explorer, who had been associated with Gorges' ventures since 1615, was mortally wounded in a fight with Indians at Martha's Vineyard in 1620, but this voyage was the last of a series of Gorges-inspired efforts that prepared the way for the founding of the Pilgrim Colony at Plymouth in December 1620 and the settlement of Massachusetts Bay by the Puritans in 1628. Gorges, in his old age (he died in his eighty-first year), was slated to be the royal governor of all New England, but the civil war developing in England prevented the appointment, as he was an ardent Royalist, an "aristocrat," and an Anglican.

There are many conflicting reports as to how many of the Sagadahoc colonists returned to England in 1608 and how many decided to remain in America. Some of the original settlers manned the *Virginia* and sailed her to England, and we are told that they "were somewhat ashamed of themselves and regretful of leaving the Sagadahoc and were anxious to sail again to America." Probably, these same men took the *Virginia* to Jamestown when she was chartered for that voyage and later sailed her to Maine waters, where she loaded fish. Tradition tells us that some of the Sagadahoc colonists went to Pemaquid and "engaged in the fisheries and the building of shallops." Legends were current to the effect that some of these men were connected with the "Plymouth Colony grant" situated up the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) River, with Cushnoc (near the present Augusta) as the trading center. Other reports locate some of them at a later period at Cape Elizabeth (or Richmond Island), and tradition places the number that remained behind all the way from twelve to "about fifty-five." (This latter number seems far too high to be given credence.) However, certain historians affirm that either "many" or "some" of the original Popham colonists remained in New England, evidently preferring the freedom and opportunity of the New World, "with all its terrors," to the old way of life in a congested and class-ridden England. Referring to these hardy souls who declined the chance and urged to return to England when the Popham Colony ceased to exist, Robert P. Tristram Coffin, in *THE KENNEBEC RIVER—CRADLE OF AMERICANS*, says:

There is no record of where they finally settled, but these men, it would seem, were the original settlers in the New World instead of the men of Jamestown as generally claimed. In 1614, Capt. John Smith entered the Kennebec and built seven ships on Monhegan Island, and learned much from the Indians in harpooning whales. He made a map

of the region and named the land New England. By 1615, the coast around the Kennebec was studied with fishing settlements and there was much homesteading in Maine, with English around the Kennebec and French around Mt. Desert, before Plymouth was even thought of.

All of the Europeans (there were hosts of them of many nationalities) who had engaged in the fisheries in the northwestern Atlantic waters and had landed on American shores—Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Maine—for a century or more to dry and cure their catch had made no attempt to spend a winter on the "cold, icebound, windy coast," but had made it a practice to go home each fall and return to American waters in the spring. The Popham settlement was the first colony planted on the shore or a river bank of New England, and it is unfortunate that it was not located by men acquainted with Maine winters as well as with the territory's appealing climate of spring, summer, and fall. It is said that some men of the various Gorges trading and exploratory voyages to Maine spent the winter on that coast around Pemaquid, Damariscove, Monhegan, Sagadahoc, and as far to the southwest as Winter Harbor (at the mouth of the Saco), where there was a large village of friendly Indians who were agriculturists and raised an unusual variety of crops for food. It is definitely known from records that Richard Vines and his men spent the winter of 1614-1615 on the Maine coast, a good part of the time with the Indians on the Saco. In October 1615, Richard Hawkins (said to be president of the Plymouth Company at the time) sailed from England for the Maine coast and, after spending the entire winter with his associates in New England, left for Spain in the early summer of 1616 via the Chesapeake with a cargo of cured fish. Most of the members of Capt. Edward Rocroft's crew were put ashore at Sagadahoc, "with victuals, ammunition and supplies," in the fall of 1618, and they spent the winter there and at Monhegan, being taken off the island in May 1619 by Capt. Thomas Dermer. Richard Vines, apparently a trading and colonizing agent in the employ of Gorges, is said to have spent "several winters" in Maine prior to that of 1618-1619, and Humphrey Damerill is also reported to have lived on this part of the Maine coast during some of the winters as well as the fishing and trading seasons in the second decade of the century. The much-frequented Damerill's Cove, or Damariscove (referred to by Capt. John Smith in 1614 as Dameril's Isles), was named after Damerill; also, at a much later period, Damariscotta. Damariscove Isle is only eight miles from the site of the old Popham Colony at the mouth of the Sagadahoc.

The Popham settlement on the Sagadahoc in 1607-1608 and the importance accorded by Ferdinando Gorges and Francis Popham during the next several years to trading and fishing in the Sagadahoc-Damariscove-Monhegan-Pemaquid area, with publicity given to the territory by Capt. John Smith in his writings of 1615, caused the region to be well known to both fishermen and traders. The Jamestown Colony and its successor settlements on the James and Chesapeake traded with the area for fish (on one occasion at least with the *Virginia*, the Sagadahoc-built ship). When the Pilgrims of the Plymouth, Mass., colony, who had crossed the Atlantic in the *Mayflower* in late 1620, were suffering from famine in 1622, it was to the Sagadahoc and Damariscove that Edward Winslow went to obtain food from the fishing fleet, and he found that "there fished about thirty sail of ships." It is interesting to read of the friendliness and humanity of these Maine fishermen, for Western Ocean fishermen are often described by historians as "avaricious, brutal fighters" and "piratical" in their behavior. Winslow tells us that, among these Maine followers of the sea, he found "a willingness to supply our wants which was done so far as able; and would not take any bills for the same, but did what they could freely, wishing their store had been such as they might in greater measure have expressed their love and supplied our necessities, for which they sorrowed."

The Plymouth Company—primarily because of the personal efforts of Sir Ferdinando Gorges—notwithstanding all its ill-fortune and unprecedentedly bad luck, its resultant faltering moves and periods of seeming somnolence, gained the glory of placing England's claim to New England on a relatively firm basis, and the foundation stone was the Popham Colony, planted at the mouth of the Sagadahoc in 1607. Without the Popham settlement, the building of the *Virginia*, the establishment of fishing and trading stations on the Maine coast, Sir Ferdinando's fervid devotion to the colonizing idea in New England, the frequent visits of vessels of Gorges and his colleagues to the Monhegan-Sagadahoc area, and the explorations of Capt. John Smith, his maps, naming, and description of the territory, with an ardent

advocacy of settlement, it is extremely doubtful that the Pilgrims and Puritans would have been able in the 1620's to plant colonies in the New World, which grew to be permanent and made New England part of the British Empire.

Henry Wriothesley (1573-1624), Earl of Southampton (and one of Shakespeare's patrons), was prominent, with Sir Ferdinando Gorges, in the campaign that transferred or reassigned Sir Walter Raleigh's "dormant monopoly over American trade" in 1606 to the newly formed London (South Virginia) and Plymouth (North Virginia) companies. Southampton had sponsored the Bartholomew Gosnold and Bartholomew Gilbert expedition to the Maine and Massachusetts coast in 1602 and, with Gorges and Arundel, backed the George Weymouth exploratory voyage to the Sagadahoc in 1605. After the abandonment of the Popham Colony in 1608, Southampton seems to have become lukewarm to the possibilities of establishing a plantation in a climate that had as severe winters as the State of Maine, and he is said to have remarked that the Newfoundland, Monhegan, and Sagadahoc areas were splendid for fishing but not for year-round living. Around 1609-1610, Southampton (who seems to have held the same position of military governor in the Isle of Wight that Gorges held at Plymouth) turned his American colonizing attention primarily to the operations of the London (Virginia) Company, and he became its treasurer. After Southampton and other influential and moneyed men—nobles and merchants—became associated with the Company, it seems to have had ample funds to develop aggressively the Jamestown-Chesapeake Virginia colony. Whereas Southampton apparently withdrew his financial support from the Gorges venture in Maine and New England, he always held an emotional interest in northern Virginia and probably contributed at times, to a limited degree, in the financing of fishing and trading expeditions to the Maine coast. In 1611, we are told, Southampton sent Capt. Edward Harlow (who had been with the Popham Sagadahoc colonizing party in 1607-1608) to the Cape Cod, Massachusetts, region of the American coast to explore the "isle" known to be in about Lat. 42° N. (as Monhegan Isle and the mouth of the Sagadahoc were in about 43 $\frac{3}{4}$ ° N.). Capt. John Smith writes of this voyage: "The right Honorable Henry, Earl of South-hampton and those of the Isle of Wight, implored Captaine Edward Harlow to discover an Isle supposed about Cape Cod, but they found their plots had much abused them, for falling with Monahigen, they found onely Cape Cod no Ile but the Maine."

Coffin says, "From the first, Kennebec men had turned to building ships, and the *Virginia* of 1607 had numerous progeny." Fishermen, as they later settled along the American coast from Plymouth to Acadia (Nova Scotia), and the cutters of timber, who became traders, all needed ships, and they built them out of an unsurpassed wealth of forest growth at their very doors. The passing of the Popham Colony did not delay for long the settlement of the splendid Kennebec River region of New England, which was near to the world's finest fishing grounds and was unequalled in the entire world as a site for the building of wood ships. In 1620 the Council for New England, the successor of the Plymouth Company, obtained a grant of the country between Lat. 40° and 48° N. (from the New Jersey coast a little south of New York to the southern part of Newfoundland), and two years later Sir Ferdinando Gorges and his friend John Mason (1586-1635) received a grant from the council of the territory between the Merrimac and the Kennebec (Sagadahoc) rivers (from the coast sixty miles inland) under the name of the Province of Maine. In 1629 (about the time that John Winthrop and his friends obtained a charter as "The Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England") the partners—Gorges and Mason—divided their possession, Gorges taking the portion between the Piscataqua and Kennebec rivers, which is still part of Maine, and Mason acquiring title to the land lying between the Merrimac and the Piscataqua, which he named New Hampshire.

*The Memorable Year of 1607 in Relation to the
History of Discovery and Exploration*

The year 1607 is an historic one, as it marks the establishment of the colonies on the Kennebec River in Maine and the James River in Virginia and the first "permanent" settlement of any Europeans in Virginia or the territory on the continent of North America north of the Carolinas. The colony "planted" that year by the British London Company at Jamestown, Va., is generally considered a permanent one, even though in 1610 the settlers "pulled up stakes" and abandoned their site. They were on their way back to England when encountered near the mouth of the Chesapeake by another London Company expedition, with many ships, men, and supplies, which influenced the surviving and discouraged members of the Jamestown Colony to return and found a settlement in a healthier, safer, and more satisfactory location (Hampton, Va.). The Popham (Sagadahoc) Colony was not a permanent one, although some of the men brought over in the *Mary and John* and *Gift of God* did not go back to England, but stayed in the New World as "free lances" to trade, fish, and build boats and so contributed to the development of that part of the country now known as the State of Maine.

The relationship of this year 1607, so important in the annals of the colonization of the continent of North America, to other dates of discovery and settlement is of interest. It was 115 years after Christopher Columbus, the Genoese, sailing under the flag of Spain in the *Santa Maria* accompanied by the caravels *Pinta* and *Niña*, had discovered in 1492 the West Indian islands (Bahamas) off the coast of a new world—believed for many years to be Asia. (On this voyage, Columbus came to Cuba on October 28 and Hispaniola [Haiti] on December 6, 1492, and on January 16, 1493, sailed for home via the Azores without having seen the mainland.) It was 110 years after John Cabot (Giovanni Caboto—also a Genoese by birth, but a Venetian citizen), sailing for the English king, had landed in 1497 on the continent of North America and planted the royal standard of Henry VII on the North Cape of Nova Scotia. (In 1498, one year later, he skirted the coast from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Chesapeake looking in vain for the civilization and wealth of Asia and the "Spice Islands.") It was 94 years after Ponce de Leon, of Spain, had landed "on the Island of Florida" in his search for wealth and "the fountain of youth." It followed by 42 years the occupation by the Spaniards of St. Augustine (in 1565), which became the first permanent settlement of Europeans in North America. It was 24 years after Sir Humphrey Gilbert had landed in 1583 at Newfoundland and made the pioneer attempt to found an English colony in America. It followed by 5 years Bartholomew Gosnold's exploration (in 1602) of the New England coast and the landing of "a small band" of men by Bartholomew Gilbert, who, however, made no serious effort to found a settlement "because of the hostility of the Indians." It was 3 years after a weak attempt had been made in 1604 to colonize Nova Scotia by Pierre du Guast, sieur de Monts and Samuel de Champlain.

As far as New England is concerned, the year 1607, marking the first attempt at organized colonization and the building of America's first ship, stands in relation to other exploratory voyages along its shores as follows: About four years after John Cabot made his very thorough exploration of the North American coast, there is evidence that Miguel Corte-Real searched the Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island shores (in 1502) looking for his brother Gaspar, who had sailed from Newfoundland in 1501 on an exploratory voyage of the New England coast and was never heard from again. Giovanni da Verrazano, an Italian sailing for France in 1524, is said to have explored the coast of North Carolina and sailed to the northeast, probably as far as Narragansett Bay, but it does not seem that he went as far east as Maine and the south Nova Scotia shore—as claimed by French historians. Estevan

Gomez, a Portuguese, made a generally similar survey of the coast for Spain a year later (1525), but he started at Newfoundland in the north and worked south, looking (as was Verrazano) for a water passage through the North American islands to the Pacific. Other New England coast exploratory voyages of historic importance were chronologically as follows: an English ship *Mary Guildford*, 1527; Diego Maldonado, 1541; Jehan Alphonse, 1542; Andre Thevet, 1556; John Hawkins, 1565; Simon Ferdinando, 1579; John Wallace, 1580; Stephen Bellinger, 1583; Richard Fisher and Richard Strong, 1593; John Walker, 1598; Martin Pring, 1603; George Weymouth, 1605; Thomas Hanham (with Pring), 1606; Henry Hudson, 1609; Samuel Argall, 1610 and 1613; Pierre Biard (the Jesuit priest), 1611; Edward Harlow, 1611; John Smith, 1614; and Adriaen Block, 1614. Of some twenty-nine exploratory voyages of the New England coast made during 1498-1614 (a period of 116 years) and excluding certain secondary cruises and at least seven additional English voyages known to have been made in 1614 and 1615, eighteen were made under the English flag, five under the French colors, two by Portuguese, and two under the Dutch flag (one of which was by the Englishman Henry Hudson, after whom the Hudson River, Hudson Bay, and Hudson Strait are named).

But all of these voyages of discovery and exploration—commencing with the historic pioneer voyage of Christopher Columbus in 1492 and those of John Cabot in 1497 and 1498 and continuing to the colonization of Jamestown, Va., and Sagadahock, Maine, in 1607 and John Smith's exceedingly useful survey and map of the coast of New England and the naming of it and of Massachusetts by Smith in 1614—seem to reveal the relative deadness and ignorance of the "Dark Ages" of the Christian world and the crying need in Christianized and church-dominated Europe for the Renaissance, with its "new birth" of intellectual pursuits, research, investigation, questioning, expression, and adventure. After Gnaeus Julius Agricola, the Roman, discovered Great Britain to be an island by circumnavigating it in 84 A.D., not another so-called civilized European (Roman, Greek, or Christian) made any contribution of note to geographic knowledge until the fifteenth century with the exception of Benjamin of Tudela (Navarre), who in 1160 traveled overland through Assyria and Persia to what was said to be "the frontiers of China"; Marco Polo, of Venice, who made journeys in India and China (1271-1295) that were highly publicized and evidently exaggerated; and Sir John Mandeville (English), who traveled in India in 1336.

The Portuguese were the forerunners in adventurous voyages of exploration on the Seven Seas and led the world in discovery in the fifteenth century. In 1434, Gil Eannes doubled Cape Bojador, Africa (south of the Canaries); in 1485 Diego Cam reached the mouth of the Congo (six degrees south of the equator); in 1487, Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope (about 35° S.) and sailed to a point beyond Algoa Bay (between Port Alfred and East London) on the southeast coast of Africa; eleven years later (1498), another Portuguese, Vasco da Gama, completed the sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope; and in 1500 and 1501, two Portuguese, Gaspar Corte-Real and Pedro Alvarez Cabral, respectively, explored the east coast of the New World, the former in the northeast (Labrador, St. Lawrence, and entrance to Hudson Strait) and the latter in South America (Brazil, which he named Santa Cruz).

The Italian navigators came to the fore for a brief period with Christopher Columbus, the Genoan, in 1492-1502; Amerigo Vespucci, the Florentine, in 1497-1502; John Cabot, the Genoese-Venetian (who sailed for England and lived there), in 1497-1498; Alonso de Ojeda, who discovered the Gulf of Venezuela and New Granada in 1499; and Giovanni Verrazano, who explored the coast of North America in 1524 for the French.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, Spanish navigator-explorers led the world, the most important, chronologically stated, being Vincente Pinzon, who in 1500 discovered the mouth of the Amazon; Ponce de Leon, who in 1513 discovered Florida and sailed up the west coast of the peninsula; Vasco Nunez de Balboa, who in 1513 crossed the Isthmus of Panama and discovered the Great South Sea (Pacific Ocean); Juan Solis, who in 1516 entered

and explored the Rio de la Plata; Juan de Grijalva, who in 1518 found the east coast of Mexico; Hernando Cortes, who in 1519-1521 explored and conquered Mexico; Ferdinand Magellan, who led the expedition that first circumnavigated the globe and was the first man to pass through the Strait of Magellan and enter and cross the Pacific to the Philippines sailing steadily from the Atlantic to the west. In 1523, Gonzales d'Avila discovered the Lakes of Nicaragua; in 1534, Francisco Pizarro completed the conquest of Peru; in 1539, Francisco de Ulloa explored the Gulf of California and proved that Lower California is a peninsula; in 1541, Francisco de Orellana explored the Amazon River; and in 1541, Fernando de Soto discovered the Mississippi River.

In the latter part of the sixteenth century, English navigators commenced by their discoveries to write history and make their impress on the world. In 1576 the doughty Yorkshireman Sir Martin Frobisher explored Labrador and Baffin Bay and discovered Frobisher Bay (two years later he was in Hudson Strait). During the years 1577-1580, Sir Francis Drake circumnavigated the globe, being the first commander to do so, as Magellan had died during his memorable voyage and the only one of the five ships of the original fleet that completed the voyage was not Magellan's flagship; Drake also explored the west coast of North America as far as Oregon. In 1585, John Davis discovered Davis Strait between Greenland and Baffin Land (Canada) while seeking the northwest passage, and in 1592 the same English explorer discovered the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic. In 1595, Sir Walter Raleigh explored Guiana and went four hundred miles up the Orinoco. In 1608, John Smith thoroughly explored and mapped the Chesapeake and its tributaries; in 1609-1610, Henry Hudson sailed up the Hudson River to the head of navigable waters and discovered and explored Hudson Bay in the far north. Hudson is supposed to have visited Delaware Bay, but Sir Thomas Smythe is also credited with discovering it in 1610, and Lord De La Warr (Delaware) is said to have entered it shortly afterwards. All three were Englishmen. In 1616, William Baffin explored Baffin Bay (and Baffin Land) during his quest for a northwest passage to Asia, and in 1631 Luke Foxe discovered Foxe Channel, Foxe Peninsula, and the large Foxe Basin, north of Hudson Bay.

The French were represented in the realm of exploration by Jacques Cartier, who explored the St. Lawrence (1534-1536) and went upriver to where Montreal now stands, being checked in his progress only by the Lachine Rapids. Samuel de Champlain followed him in 1608, traveled farther inland, and discovered Lake Ontario.

The Spaniards vied with the English in explorations at the end of the sixteenth and during the early years of the seventeenth centuries: Mendana de Neyra discovered the Marquesas Islands in 1595; Pedro Fernandez de Queiras the New Hebrides and Luis Vaes de Torres the Torres Strait in 1606.

The Dutch were prominent in the field of navigation during the period 1596-1644. In the former year, Willem Barents explored Barents Sea; in 1614-1617, Joris Spilbergen circumnavigated the globe; during 1616, Dirk Hartog surveyed part of the west coast of Australia, while Willem Schouten and Jacob Lemaire were the first to double Cape Horn; in 1642, Abel Tasman discovered Van Dieman's Land (Tasmania) and New Zealand and two years later explored the large Gulf of Carpentaria on the north of the new island-continent of Australia.

From 1644 to the early nineteenth century, the Danes and Russians led in exploration in the Arctic regions and Capt. James Cook (English) in the Antarctic; a Frenchman, Jean F. de G. la Perouse explored to the north of Japan and discovered the Strait of Perouse, but all the other outstanding explorations and discoveries of this period were made by the British.

One of the most surprising facts of history and the annals of sail and the sea is that the continent of America was not actually discovered by a late fifteenth or early sixteenth century navigator sailing for some Christian monarch of a European country—Spain, England, Portugal, or France—but by a hardy, adventurous viking, or Norse sea rover, who found the New World of the Western Hemisphere well over five centuries earlier. Herjulfson discovered

Labrador and the northeast mainland of the continent of America in 986. Leif (Ericson), the son of the famous Eric the Red, in 1000 cruised along the northeast coast of America from some point in New England through the Straits of Belle Isle to Greenland, where the Norwegians at that time had two large settlements. During 1003-1006, the waters and shores of that section of the continent (Maine, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Breton Island, Prince Edward Island, the estuary of the St. Lawrence, eastern Quebec, Newfoundland, and Labrador) were explored by Karlsefni, the Norse navigator, who made Greenland his base, whereas Ericson had evidently reached the American shore by sailing west from Norway via Scotland.

A claim has been advanced that in 1472 a Dane named John Scolp sailed west across the Atlantic in quest of the Indies and touched on a coast that may have been Newfoundland or Labrador, or it may have been southern Greenland. There is a tradition that in this same year (1472) the Portuguese nobleman, João Corte-Real, the father of Gaspar and Miguel, sailing west on an exploratory voyage, reached the island of Newfoundland. Neither of these legendary voyages, however, is supported by contemporary records or by any evidence that can be deemed as reasonably authoritative.

As far as the history and development of the United States and Canada (North America) are concerned, the year 1607 is much more important as a definite beginning of colonization (north of the peninsula of Florida), shipbuilding, commerce, and European (Christian) civilization in the western world than is 1492 (discovery of the West Indian islands by Columbus) or even 1497 (discovery of North America by Cabot); but it is astounding to contemplate a spread of 607 years between the time that Ericson cruised and explored the northeast coast of America and the year that Popham, with colonists, reached the mouth of the Kennebec (a point that Ericson may have visited) and the London Company's pioneer settlers arrived at the James River, Virginia.

*Discoveries of Christopher Columbus and Contemporaries
and the Papal Bull That Divided the New World
between the Spanish and the Portuguese*

Christopher Columbus (or Cristobal Colon; 1446?-1506), the Genoese navigator and explorer, sailing under the flag of Spain, is credited with discovering what is now called America when he made his landfall on Watling Island in the Bahamas October 12, 1492. He touched at Cuba and Haiti (where he is said to have established a small post) and sailed for home without sighting the mainland and under the impression that he had reached the islands described by Marco Polo as forming the eastern extremity of Asia. Henceforth, for many generations, the Spanish used officially the name Las Indias to describe the islands and lands in the West. In 1454 the Portuguese had been given by Pope Nicholas V the exclusive right of exploration and conquest on the road to the Indies, but it was considered in his bull that the only route was via the Cape of Good Hope.

The exploratory voyage of Columbus had unforeseen consequences, which not only led to controversies and diplomatic difficulties between Spain and Portugal but also threatened to develop into a bloody war. Rodrigo Lenzuoli Borgia, as the newly elected pope (Alexander VI, who held that office from 1492 to 1503), was appealed to by the Roman Catholic sovereigns of both Spain and Portugal for a ruling and a settlement of their respective rights and claims. Pope Alexander VI, the most memorable of the corrupt and secular (political) popes of the Renaissance, was a Spaniard, having been born at Xativa near Valencia in 1431.

His "judicial awards," or bulls, of May 3-4, 1493, on the broad question of the respective geographical limitations of the colonial empires of Spain and Portugal did not entirely please the disputants, but showed them a plan by which they might reach an agreement. He ruled that Spain should own all non-Christian lands that might be discovered west of a straight line drawn from the Arctic to the Antarctic at a distance of 100 leagues west of the islands "known as Azores and Cabo Verde" and Portugal receive all lands discovered east of the line. Evidently, both the nations mentioned in this papal decision liked the monopolistic phase of the ruling, but Portugal felt that Spain was getting more than it was entitled to; hence diplomatic negotiations ensued that resulted on June 7, 1494, in the Treaty of Tordesillas. This defined the respective rights and spheres of influence of the two powers in the New World and in Asia and merely moved Pope Alexander's line from 100 to 370 leagues west of Cabo Verde or the well-known islands lying in eastern Atlantic waters.

The exact location of this line is open to controversy. It seems positive that the mileage west was measured not from Cape Verde, as is often stated, but from the islands that are some distance out in the Atlantic from Cape Verde; one old document refers to the line as being placed "370 leagues west of the Cape Verde and Azore Islands," both of which groups were and are still owned by the Portuguese. This line, which is of great historic interest, is generally considered as being at about the fiftieth degree of longitude west of Greenwich, although modern "authoritative" maps place it all the way from Long. 44° to 52° W. It strikes the South American continent at the mouth of the Amazon or the Rio Para, about a thousand miles west of the east bulge of the continent, and runs out in the south near Porto Alegre—just north of Uruguay—or, it is said, "just west of São Paulo." All of the West Indian islands and all of the continent of North America is territory "beyond the line," from which the Spaniards claimed the right, by papal bulls and treaty (with the only other great maritime power of the times), to exclude all other peoples from settlement, exploitation, and trade. On the terms of the Treaty of Tordesillas were based both the Portuguese claim to Brazil and the Spanish claim not only to the remainder of the Americas but also to the Moluccas (or Spice Islands) in the East Indies when it was proven that the world was round and the Moluccas could be reached by sailing to the westward. (Portugal settled Spain's claim to the Moluccas by paying to Spain 350,000 gold ducats for full and undisputed rights of ownership, but in the deal made, the Philippine Islands remained "under Spanish influence.")

In regard to the Treaty of Tordesillas—which in turn received full papal sanction—and the right or moral of such political action by "Holy Church," the attitude of the church dignitaries has been authoritatively defended during modern times as follows: "The papal bull and the protection of the Roman Church were an effective means of ensuring that a country should reap where she had sown and should maintain the territory she had discovered and conquered by arduous efforts; while other claimants with predatory design were warned back by the ecclesiastical censorship."

It has been stoutly maintained by Portuguese historians that the navigators of their nation (who led the world at the time as both explorers and ocean traders) were well aware of the existence of "a great land to the west" (Brazil) before Columbus made his historic voyage of 1492; hence Portugal's refusal to accept the papal bull of Pope Alexander VI, the Spanish-born Borgia, and the insistence of Portugal that the demarcation line be moved farther west to the point established in 1494 by the Treaty of Tordesillas. Portuguese authorities maintain that wind and currents had carried ships engaged in trade with the East Indies some ten degrees of longitude west of their usual course (i.e., from about 25° to 35°), but that, by orders from the crown, Portuguese navigators had been forbidden to publish charts or accounts of this part of their voyages. It is furthermore maintained that when John—first as prince and later as King John II of Portugal—refused to back Columbus in his voyage of discovery sailing westward across the Atlantic, the Portuguese well knew that there were lands in the West, but they thought of such lands as "wilderness" and unimportant, with no signs of wealth.

We read that Columbus made the proposition to King John II of Portugal (as he did later

to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain) that he would "discover great lands, islands and terra firma, most happy, most rich in gold and silver and pearls and precious stones and infinite peoples; and that, by that way [sailing to the west on about the twenty-fifth degree parallel], he intended to come upon lands of India, and the great island of Cipango and the Kingdom of the Great Khan." But Columbus had his price, and the terms that he demanded of the rulers of both Portugal and Spain, the world's two maritime nations of that day, were the same in 1484 as they were in 1492. Columbus—a man of dreams, humbly born, and well acquainted with poverty, toil, and disappointments—demanded that he be knighted at once and given the right to wear golden spurs and be addressed as don; that he be appointed "Grand Admiral of the Ocean Sea" and perpetual viceroy of all the lands that he might discover or be the means of others' discovering. His monetary compensation was to be one-tenth of all the wealth in gold, jewels, treasure, commodities of trade, and profitable things that might be obtained within the limits of his admiralty. King John declined the offer, with its associated exorbitant demands, and declared Columbus to be unreasonably grasping, "a babbler, and a vainglorious man." These words show the reaction of the Court of Spain to Columbus' proposition in 1490 and again in early 1492.

Bartholomew Columbus (a younger brother of Christopher), it would seem, had journeyed to England and France with maps and attempted to interest the rulers of those countries in the proposed voyage of discovery. We are told that Henry VII of England "mocked at all that Colon said and held his word as hallow." When Christopher Columbus left the Spanish Court in disgust after his last proposition had been declined, he was evidently wending his way to France, and it is said that, because of this fact, Ferdinand and Isabella finally decided to finance the Columbus venture to satisfy themselves that there was nothing in the scheme of the crazy, ambitious, and avaricious Genoese adventurer. If there were any rich islands in the West, Spain had to have them—not France or England and certainly not Portugal if they were found to be west of the Tordesillas treaty line.

Christopher Columbus is popularly but incorrectly credited with the conception of the idea that the world is a globe. Many geographers before him had held that idea, and the Florentine mathematician and physicist Paolo del Pozzo Toscanelli had endeavored in 1474 to interest the Portuguese and Spanish in the plan of reaching Cathay and the islands of the East by sailing to the westward. Fernando, the son of Christopher Columbus, admitted that his father received much of his inspiration from Toscanelli, and there is evidence to show that Columbus sailed on his memorable voyage of discovery with directions for reaching Antilia in his possession that had been sent to him, in response to his request, by Toscanelli. But both Columbus and Toscanelli greatly underestimated the circumference of the globe and the area occupied by what we now know as the Western Hemisphere. Columbus sailed under the impression that the island of Cipango was about 2,500 miles from the Canaries; whereas the distance—across an ocean, a continent, and a greater ocean—was nearer 11,000 miles.

The ruling of Pope Alexander VI and the Treaty of Tordesillas served notice to all nations that Spain and Portugal were going to hold a monopoly of land and trade and divide between themselves the New World and all newly discovered territories that they cared to own, exploit, or "influence"; that other countries would get no share except such "pickings around the fringes" as the two most powerful maritime nations of the day were willing for them to have. But Europe was awakening and resenting the political (and military) actions and the material depravity of the nonspiritual leaders of the Church of Rome, and reformation was under way. During Henry VIII's reign, England became Protestant and under Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603) grew to be a leading naval power. During the first three-quarters of the sixteenth century, exploratory voyages other than those under the flags of Spain and Portugal were more or less furtive affairs, but Sir Francis Drake in 1577-1580 and Sir Walter Raleigh in 1595 boldly sailed under the English flag in the exclusive areas of influence and exploration claimed by Spain and Portugal, and the Dutch soon followed in the practical demonstration and operation of one phase of the Freedom of the Seas. It is not without signifi-

cance to note that to this day Central America and the West Indies and the whole of South America with the exception of Brazil (the eastern bulge of the continent) are essentially Spanish as far as the leading, or upper, class of whites (and their mixed blood descendants) are concerned, and the language is Spanish; whereas in Brazil the ruling blood and the language and inclination are Portuguese.

On later voyages (1493-1504), Columbus explored the West Indian islands, reached the mainland of South America (at the mouth of the Orinoco River), and surveyed the coast of the southern part of Central America, but he never set foot upon, saw, or knew anything of the existence of the continent of North America. It is claimed that the little Spanish trading post planted on Haiti by Columbus developed quickly into a settlement of sorts and "spread to the mainland by the adventure of Alonso de Ojeda and Diego de Valesquez in Darien" in 1509. Columbus, on July 31, 1498, during his third voyage, sighted the island of Trinidad, which he named in honor of the Trinity in fulfillment of a vow, made prior to the commencement of the voyage, that "the first land discovered" should be so named. (Incidentally, Columbus affirmed that the land "was crowned with three hill-tops," which he considered a good omen and a sign of divine grace.) The next day, August 1, Columbus saw for the first time the mainland of South America, the continent that he had sought for so long, but he considered it merely an island and named it Isla Santa. Not until much later, when he realized the tremendous volume of fresh water poured out by the Orinoco, did he begin to apprehend the continental character of the land and that many of his supposed islands were part of the mainland.

In 1500 Pedro Alvarez Cabral, a Portuguese, while on an East Indian voyage, is said not only to have sighted the coast of Brazil at Monte Pascoal in the Aimores but also to have landed and gone through the ceremony of taking formal possession. Juan Ponce de Leon (1460-1521), who had been with Christopher Columbus on his second voyage and had later served as governor of Puerto Rico, obtained a royal Spanish grant authorizing him to discover and settle "Bimini"—a fabulous island that was believed to contain a marvelous fountain, or spring, whose waters would restore youth to old age or, at least, had wonderful curative powers. It appears that, in April 1513, De Leon made the first exploration of the coast of Florida and the first known landing on the mainland. It is said that he sighted the land on March 27 and, as the day was Easter Sunday (Pascua Florida), named it Florida. Ponce de Leon went ashore just north of the present site of St. Augustine April 2, 1513, and on the eighth ceremoniously took possession of "the whole island" in the name of the Spanish king. He afterwards explored the shore of the west coast, going north to around $27\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N. (about the entrance to Tampa Bay), but some historians say that he followed "the shore of the peninsula until the coast trended westward," which is around 30° N. It is extremely doubtful that he explored so far to the north on the Gulf of Mexico side of the peninsula, although St. Augustine is about at this latitude on the Atlantic side. Ponce de Leon, upon his return home to Spain in 1514, being convinced that he had discovered an immense island and the object of his search, obtained a grant from King Ferdinand to colonize "the island of Bimini and the island of Florida," of which he was appointed *adelantado* (civil and military governor). In 1521 the new governor set out to conquer and colonize his possession, but the fierceness of the natives prevented his success, and his forces were driven back to the ships. Ponce de Leon, mortally wounded, died in Cuba in June of the same year.

Following Juan Ponce de Leon's discovery of Florida in 1513, many explorations of great importance were made by the Spaniards. Panfilo de Narvaez rounded Cuba from the south in 1528 and sailed up to Tampa Bay on the west coast of Florida, where he disembarked and journeyed overland to Apalachee; here, on a bay of the northern shore of the Gulf of Mexico, Narvaez built boats and skirted the south shore of the northern part of the New World as far west as about the location of Galveston today, where he was wrecked. (Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca continued overland in 1528-1536 to about Culiacan on the west coast of Mexico.) On Hernando de Soto's famous exploratory land expedition in the southern part of

North America, which began in 1539, Luis de Moscosa built "seven pinnaces," or boats, propelled by oars, on the banks of the Mississippi River at Aminoya in 1542. Soon afterwards, upon the death of De Soto at Guachoya, Moscosa took command of the expedition, went down the Mississippi to its mouth, and then explored the coast line of the continent (1542-1543) all the way from the delta of the river to Tampico, Mexico (about 22° N.).

*Amerigo Vespucci—from Whom the Continent
of America Received Its Name*

It was Amerigo Vespucci, a merchant (or ship chandler) and adventurer, who, because of a queer twist of fate and the power of the written word, whether true or false, furnished the name of the newly discovered Western Hemisphere. Vespucci was born in Florence, Italy, on March 9, 1451, of a prominent family that had evidently lost its means but retained a measure of influence. He became a clerk in the commercial house of the Medici, the ruling family in Florence, and when forty years old he was sent to Spain (Seville and Cadiz) to represent that house. In 1493, Vespucci was connected with a Florentine merchant and ship chandler, Juanoto Berardi, who died in 1495 leaving unfinished a contract entered into with the crown to do certain work and provide stipulated materials and supplies needed for the fitting-out of the vessels for Christopher Columbus' second voyage to the New World. Because of the death and, therefore, inability of Berardi to complete his contract, Amerigo Vespucci was commissioned by King Ferdinand to finish the job of equipping the fleet for sea. Accordingly, Vespucci came in close and friendly contact with Columbus. It is evident that Vespucci became interested in the sea, in exploratory voyages, and in the possible wealth to be gained therefrom. It is said that he took up astronomy and became a chartmaker and an "expert navigator," but Vespucci knew nothing of the practical operation of ships at sea until—by his own admission—he was forty-six years of age. With no source of verification, there is grave doubt as to whether he actually made certain voyages as claimed in a letter written by him in the fall of 1504, when he was fifty-three and a half years old and in the service of the Portuguese.

Because the return from the islands discovered by Columbus had been meager and disappointing, Ferdinand and Isabella, as early as the spring of 1495, revoked the exclusive features in the rights granted to Columbus, and henceforth the West Indies, or the western world, was no longer a monopoly. On June 2, 1497, the bars that had been knocked down were to some extent put up again, but exploration and trading voyages were open to anyone who enjoyed royal favor or possessed (or could pay for) sufficient influence to obtain a license. Contemporaries tell us that at this time "the doors were thrown open" for private explorers, adventurers, and traders who cared to sail to the "rich islands of Las Indias" in the West. It was during this period that Amerigo Vespucci turned his thoughts to the sea and deeply felt the lure of western treasure. It has been claimed, based on Vespucci's later written but unverified word, that he organized a private expedition as a "free lance," under the flag and protection of Spain, and sailed from Cadiz on May 10, 1497, and that he discovered the mainland of a new world on June 16, 1497. This voyage, Vespucci wrote, ended October 15, 1498, and, therefore, occupied a year five months and five days; yet, after admittedly sailing to the southern part of the Caribbean Sea, Vespucci, it is claimed, discovered and landed on the American shore, north of the isthmus that separates the northern from the southern part of the continent of the Western Hemisphere, only one month and six days after clearing from Cadiz—an impossibility considering the ships of the day, the alleged course, and the elements.

Moreover, if Vespucci accomplished so much in such a short time, what was he doing during the rest of the voyage, which, he affirmed, occupied a further sixteen months?

There is evidence that on the first voyage of Alonso de Ojeda to the northeastern portion of South America (known as the "Pearl Coast") in 1499-1500, Amerigo Vespucci, the Florentine ship chandler and navigator, sailed with him in some subordinate capacity—possibly as a scribe or trader. The account of the earlier and pioneer voyage recorded by Vespucci that gave himself credit for discovering the mainland of the continent (some time before Columbus and a few days before John Cabot) followed generally, in part, this Ojeda voyage to the Pearl Coast—the northern coast of South America and Santo Domingo. The Ojeda expedition, which was made with four vessels leaving Spain May 20, 1499, was backed by Bishop Fonseca, Spain's colonial secretary, who supplied Ojeda with a copy of Columbus' chart of the Pearl Coast and sent along Juan de la Cosa, Columbus' old pilot, to guide him.

The account of Vespucci of his first claimed voyage, which, if true, would be historically important, and, as a matter of fact, the records of all his supposed voyages, four in number (the first two under the Spanish and the others under the Portuguese flag), are generally considered, with cause, as untrustworthy. Moreover, some historians have added to the confusion by their attempts "to interpret" and explain the writings and alleged records of the Florentine adventurer. It is significant that after sailing with Ojeda and Cosa in 1499-1500 on a voyage well known to the powerful Archbishop Juan Fonseca (after whom the Bay of Fonseca on the Pacific side of Central America was named), Vespucci left Spain and entered the service of King Emanuel of Portugal, the great rival marine power; that Vespucci wrote no letters and made no claims in regard to voyages said to have been made under the protection of Spain until he was sailing under the flag of Portugal.

It has been said that there is a "grave question" as to who first "discovered" the land that proved to be the continent of "North America"—Amerigo Vespucci or Giovanni Caboto (John Cabot). Evidently, Vespucci never wrote that he had seen or put foot on North American shores, for he claimed that on June 16, 1497, he reached a supposed continental coast in 16° N. and 70° W. from Grand Canary (probably Tenerife, which is about seventeen degrees west of Greenwich). This would have put him off the north shore of Honduras in Central America and at a point farther west than but south of Cuba, Jamaica, and Haiti and far to the south of the tip of the Florida cape, which is at about 25° N. From that point on, Vespucci's report seems to be sufficiently imaginative as to discredit all of his story. He wrote of sailing to the northwest, on a course that would have run through the peninsula of Yucatan and for a distance that would have landed him in the present Mountain States of North America, and of finding there the "finest harbor in the world."

Vespucci said that he sailed on his second voyage in May 1499 with three vessels (the Alonso de Ojeda, or Hojeda, expedition sailed May 20, 1499, with four vessels); that he made land at 5° S., which is at about Cape St. Roque, Brazil, worked up to 15° N. (the northern tip of Nicaragua), returned home via Santo Domingo, and reached Cadiz in September 1500. The third voyage was to the South Atlantic (and, Vespucci claimed, to "13° from the Antarctic pole"), but neither of Vespucci's two different accounts of the voyage nor his figures check one with the other. He claimed, however, that he left Lisbon in March 1501 and was at the coast of the New World on August 7 or 17, 1501. Returning, Vespucci wrote that he made Sierra Leone on June 10, 1502, the Azores the end of July, and Lisbon on September 7, 1502. On his last voyage, he gave some figures for positions, but leaving Lisbon May 10, 1503, with a fleet of six ships, he presumably reached Bahia (Brazil) by way of Fernando Noronha. He claimed that he built a fort at a harbor on the mainland at 18° S. and returned from there to Lisbon, where he arrived June 18, 1504. (There is no harbor on the American coast at 18° S., and San Salvador—or Bahia—is at about the latitude of 13° S.)

If Vespucci had not written two letters in the spring of 1503 and September 1504, respectively, he would be practically unknown today. The first of these letters was addressed to Lorenzo di Piero Francesco de' Medici (a cousin of the Manifico), the head of the firm

under which most of Vespucci's business career had been spent, and supposedly gave an account of the third claimed voyage. The second was sent to Piero Soderini (gonfaloniere of Florence, 1502-1512), an old school friend, and was apparently planned to give a measure of publicity to the author's explorations and achievements, as it contained an account of all four of the writer's alleged expeditions. "These letters," it has been said, "were not intended to be formal accounts of Vespucci's voyages"; they were quite obviously "written without aide-memoires," and "events and dates" were mixed. Moreover, in them "the doings of the writer loomed larger than those of men with whom he was associated." In one letter, Vespucci said specifically that he had in preparation an extended account of his travels, which he referred to as "Quattro Giornate" (Four Journals), but this material was evidently never given publicity. Possibly, Vespucci's return to Spain in 1508 to accept a position as marine librarian and instructor (with duties "to receive charts and reports of new discoveries and to compile from them the government charts," which were the official navigation guides of the Indies) accounts for the fact that the book of Vespucci probably never saw the light of day; for whereas the Spaniards would not have been particularly interested in his third and fourth voyages, they would have been in a position to verify any statements made as to the first and second claimed voyages or to discredit them and cause the writer to lose his job. Amerigo Vespucci died at Seville on February 22, 1512, at the age of sixty-one years.

The letter written by Vespucci in 1503 to Lorenzo di Piero Francesco de' Medici, which dealt only with his first voyage under the Portuguese flag (his third claimed voyage), was printed in Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, German, and Latin. The Latin translation, entitled *MUNDUS NOVUS*, ran through eleven editions in a year. We are told that by 1506 eight editions had been printed in German. Vespucci's *MUNDUS NOVUS* refers to what we now know as Brazil in South America and makes no reference, direct or indirect, to North America. Writing of Brazil and a territory that belonged to Portugal by papal decree, confirmed by the demarcation line established in 1494 by the Treaty of Tordesillas made by Portugal with Spain (the only rival marine power of that period), Vespucci speaks of the lands that he found: ". . . which may be called a new world since among our ancestors there was no knowledge of them. . . . For it goes beyond the ideas of the ancients; since most of them say that beyond the equator to the south there is no continent. . . . But this last voyage of mine has proved that this opinion of theirs was erroneous and in every way contrary to facts, since in those southern regions I have found a continent more thickly inhabited by peoples and animals than our Europe, or Asia, or Africa, and moreover a climate more temperate and agreeable than in any other region known to us."

It was not Vespucci but Pedro Alvarez Cabral who evidently first sighted the mainland of South America where it lay well within the zone assigned to Portugal by the pope and the treaty with Spain and, therefore, promptly claimed the territory for his king and named it the "Island of the True Cross." This name was soon abandoned in favor of Brazil after the valuable dyewood in which the country abounded. This Portuguese "discovery" actually followed that of the Spaniard Vincente Yañez Pinzon, who touched the coast of Brazil early in 1500. Being in "forbidden territory," he reported it, but the Spanish Crown, because of the treaty made with the Portuguese, did not pursue the matter further. Both Pinzon and Cabral, therefore, had been at Brazil sixteen to eighteen months before Vespucci "discovered" it. Vespucci's first voyage under the Portuguese flag (his claimed third of a total of four voyages made) was evidently inspired by the reception in Portugal of news of Cabral's discovery of a new continent bounding the Atlantic to the southwest, as we read that "the tidings" of this discovery "aroused great enthusiasm and further explorations were undertaken." It would seem that Vespucci participated in the first—or, at least, one of the first—of these expeditions, and whether he went as pilot or in some less responsible position, it is difficult to say. Apparently, this voyage revealed for the first time the immense size of the continent to the south, and Vespucci, calendar in hand and notebook ever available, "baptized the different points on the coast with the names of the saints on whose days they were discovered."

Probably, the spacious Bay of Guanabara was sighted or entered by the expedition on January 1, 1502, and believed to be the mouth of a great river; hence its name, River of January, or, in full, São Sebastião do Rio de Janeiro. However, Portuguese writers quite generally give the credit for this discovery to Andre Goncalves, who entered the bay on the date previously mentioned—January 1, 1502. Evidently, Vespucci was a member of the staff under the leader, Goncalves. When Vespucci wrote in the spring of 1503 of a "new world" or of finding a new "continent," he well knew that he had done no such thing in the sense that we interpret his words today, and the term "new world" could be applied only to the territory we now know as southern Brazil. It is also evident that Vespucci never dreamed of the existence of a continent whose land, running from the far north to some point well in the south, comprised a Western Hemisphere.

Vespucci says in the account of his fourth voyage that he left Lisbon with six ships, but other records state that this was an expedition under Duarte Coelho Pereira, generally referred to as "Coelho," who seems to have been an unpublicized Portuguese explorer and navigator of outstanding skill and probably the first to discover Rio de la Plata (with the better-known Juan Diaz de Solis as a lieutenant). Coelho also planted a Portuguese colony on the "bulge" of the Bay of Pernambuco, which he successfully defended against the French allied with "savage tribesmen." The ships of Coelho's expedition became separated in a storm. Coelho went well to the south but evidently not as far as Christovão Jaques, who is said to have gone down the coast to Patagonia and inspired in a measure the later historic voyage of Magellan. Vespucci was in one of the two ships of the fleet that made a landing much farther to the north. Vespucci, who had written just previous to embarking on this voyage of the splendid new world stretching far to the south, apparently left it for the other ships of Coelho's fleet to explore.

It appears that neither the Spaniards nor the Portuguese considered Amerigo Vespucci a man entitled to receive honor at their hands. Authorities say that "a critic examined a hundred thousand documents in the Royal Archives of Portugal covering the years when Vespucci was in Portuguese service, but did not find his name mentioned once." It remained for a twenty-four-year-old German in the little French colony and college of Saint-Dié, in the Vosges, recklessly to give not only honor but also immortality to a man not entitled to them. Saint-Dié had a printing press and decided to publish an up-to-date edition of Ptolemy's GEOGRAPHY. Naturally, the job of overseeing the work was put on the shoulders of Martin Waldseemüller, the professor of geography. When the material was about to be set up in type early in 1507, Duke René, of Lorraine, the patron of the college, found a copy of the French edition of Vespucci's letter written to Soderini in the fall of 1504, which gives a sketchy account of Vespucci's four voyages and makes certain statements or claims. The letter was translated into Latin by Jean Bassin, a canon of the college, who was not particularly careful or scrupulous, and some slight changes were made in the text or errors allowed to creep into it. Bassin, in a misguided spirit of loyalty, deliberately changed the address of the letter from Soderini (an unimportant Italian) to Duke René, the patron of Saint-Dié, and Ringmann, the professor of Latin, wrote some verses in praise of Vespucci. On April 25, 1507, there was published a 52-page pamphlet as the COSMOGRAPHIÆ INTRODUCTIO containing the Latin translation of Vespucci's letter, the eulogistic verses, etc. Waldseemüller, after writing briefly of Europe, Asia, and Africa, says in this work: "But now, these parts have been extensively explored and another fourth part has been discovered by Americus Vespuccius (as will appear in what follows): wherefore I do not see what is rightly to hinder us from calling it Amerige or America, that is the land of Americus, after its discoverer Americus, a man of sagacious mind, since both Europe and Asia have got their names from women."

Waldseemüller published separately a large map on which the name America was placed in what we now know as part of South America and behind a lot of names given to points on the coast of Brazil. Nothing was known in regard to the northern part of the continent, but America was evidently Brazil. It is said that Vespucci died believing that any lands that

might lie north of his *Mundus Novus* and the Caribbean discoveries of Columbus were part of Asia. Waldseemüller died in 1519, in his thirty-seventh year, and although he was very young when he died, he lived long enough to regret deeply his youthful indiscretion. At Strasbourg, in 1513, he published a map that marked Vespucci's claimed new world "Tierra Incognita." Three years later, the territory was given the name of Brazil, which it now bears.

It appears that for many years the Saint-Dié Latin translation of a French translation of Vespucci's letter to Soderini was the only version known. About the middle of the nineteenth century, however, what is said to be a copy of an original Italian printed edition of the letter came to light and operated to increase rather than clarify the confusion. We are told that Vespucci himself, in correspondence and conversation, referred to his *Mundus Novus* as Amerigo, and the spelling during the first two decades of the sixteenth century varied considerably, being given as Amerigo, Americu, Americo, Americi, and America. Evidently, after some early blustering and indefinite statements, Vespucci forgot all about his claims of discoveries on the two voyages that he had asserted were made under the flag of Spain. The Spaniards presumably knew what he had done, if anything at all, and as Vespucci received Spanish letters of naturalization on April 24, 1505, and a position at Seville with the government (piloto-mayor) in 1508, it behooved him not to step on the toes of real Spanish navigators or seek to take glory from Spanish adventurers in the Caribbean territory. It would seem that Vespucci's first voyage was imaginative and that on the three voyages actually made, Vespucci occupied a subordinate position: in 1499-1500 under Alonso de Ojeda, of Spain; in 1501-1502 under Andre Goncalves, of Portugal; and in 1503-1504 under Duarte Coelho Pereira, also of Portugal.

It is of interest to note that John Cabot landed at Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, June 24, 1497, hoisted the English flag, and formally—with due ceremony and in the presence of his ship's crew as witnesses—took possession of the land for King Henry VII. This was eight days after the date that Amerigo Vespucci claimed, in letters written later, he had sighted land that was supposed to be the coast of a continent at 16° N. (in the Caribbean Sea). However, there are no records of any kind, authoritative or otherwise, in support of his contention and no proof of his landing or even of his presence, at the time stated, in that part of the world, which, incidentally, is Central America and not part of the North American continent.

The general weight of opinion of unbiased investigators and historians during the last century (notwithstanding the works of Von Humboldt in 1837 and De Varnhagen in 1865) has been that Amerigo Vespucci "did not make the 1497 voyage" and that "he had no share in the first discovery of the American continent." No matter what the controversy may be in regard to his explorations, it is positive that Amerigo Vespucci never even saw and, therefore, could never have landed upon or "discovered" any part of the continent of North America. Geographers followed Waldseemüller's example and marked the body of land roughly corresponding to the South America of today as America. As discovery of another vast domain to the north was revealed and it was later found that the "two new continents" were joined together and, in fact, one vast land of the Western Hemisphere, the name "America" spread to the whole, and the "continents" became designated and distinguished by applying the words "north" and "south." The Spaniards, however, protested, and it was not until the eighteenth century that they officially used the name "North America."

This attitude was but natural, for the name "America" is in honor of an Italian sailing under the Portuguese flag and was given and originally intended to apply only to the territory of Brazil in South America. The acceptance of such a name for even the southern part of the hemisphere ignores the Spanish discoveries and exploitation of all the Caribbean Sea countries (New Granada, Venezuela, Guiana) and of the entire west coast, including Peru and Chile. The real discoverer of the western world was an Italian in charge of a Spanish exploratory expedition, and Columbus, in his four voyages, was a pioneer and brought the Caribbean, northern South America, and Central America under Spanish rule and exploitation. Why should the name of a Florentine sailing on a Portuguese expedition in some inferior capacity

or other be given to lands discovered by a Genoese sailing under the authority, flag, and protection of Spain? The Spaniards never named the New World after the Italian explorer in their employ, who was a real navigator and discoverer, so why should they willingly accept for the New World the name of an Italian who never discovered any part of it and, in the realm of actual exploration, was mediocre—even if they did employ him during the latter years of his life for shore work as a librarian and chartmaker? Moreover, Spain had led all nations in the exploration of both the northern and southern parts of the new continent and had given the name of New Spain to all of Central America and to lands in North America, where it had planted the Spanish flag, as far north as Utah and Missouri. The Isthmus of Panama, the Spaniards had early named *Castilla del Oro* (Golden Castile). However, New Spain included New Galicia, New Leon, New Estremadura, New Biscay, Sonora, Upper Pimeria, and both Lower and Upper California, and the Spanish *La Florida* extended from a point in Texas (far west of the Mississippi) to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Chesapeake to the Gulf of Mexico.

England made no attempt to name the land that became known as North America after Cabot, the Italian (a Genoese-Venetian) who discovered the New World while sailing under the English royal standard. Aside from the fact that the name "Virginia" was given to North America either by Queen Elizabeth herself or by Raleigh for tactful and policy reasons when he unsuccessfully tried to colonize it, North America was generally named after countries in the Old World—New Spain, New France, New England, New Netherlands, New Sweden. It is not surprising, therefore, that Spain objected to the naming of the entire continent of the Western Hemisphere after an Italian pseudo-explorer while the real discoverers were ignored and that the first name given to the Portuguese-owned Brazil, when discarded by that country, grew through ignorance, coupled with emotional and false publicity, to be the name of the whole new continent. Such a name was deemed by the Spaniards as humiliating to a great maritime nation and to its brave and illustrious men who discovered, explored, and opened up a new world and a new hemisphere for Europeans to exploit and develop.

*The Norse Sea Rovers Discover Greenland and
America and Explore the Northeast Coast
from Labrador to Massachusetts*

It was the Norse sea rovers, or vikings, of olden days who really discovered the continent of America and landed upon and explored its northeast shores. In 865, Naddod had discovered Iceland, and eleven years later (876) Gunnbjörn, it is said, sighted "the far western land" now known as Greenland. In 982-985, Eric the Red spent about three years exploring the country on the southwestern coast of Greenland. Upon his return to Iceland in 985, he called the new western land that he had discovered "Greenland," a name which he thought would have a psychological appeal to the people and make them anxious or at least willing to migrate to it. In 986, Eric sailed west from Iceland with twenty-five ships, but evidently only fourteen of them reached Greenland, where a colony was founded on the southwest coast. Eric built his house at Brattalid just north of the present Julianehaab. Other settlers followed, and in a few years two colonies had been formed: one called Osterbygd, which grew to comprise about "190 farms," and another farther north on the west coast named Godthaab, which later had around 90 farms.

It would seem that, at the height of prosperity, the Norse Greenland colonists numbered about three thousand people. The island was a republic until 1261, when the settlers swore

allegiance to the king of Norway. About the middle of the fourteenth century, communication between Greenland and Norway (or even Iceland) became infrequent. The trade was a crown monopoly and was conducted by an annual ship (*Knarren*). According to records preserved, the last vessel from Greenland returned to Norway in 1410. Thereafter, Greenland was neglected save for an occasional visit of a ship from Iceland, and evidently even such relatively short voyages were terminated prior to 1500. We are told that John Davis (or Davys), a prominent English navigator in the time of Queen Elizabeth, visited the coast of Greenland in 1585 while engaged in an exploratory voyage seeking a northwest passage to China. He sailed through what is now known as Davis Strait, skirted and carefully examined the coast from Cape Farewell to Julianehaab and Godthaab to a point 66° N. in the Arctic Circle, but found no signs of Norse colonists except their burial grounds, although relics of their one-time existence were many. Those settlers or their progeny, who had survived to near the end of the fifteenth century and had declined to leave Greenland on one of the "last boats" going eastward to Iceland or Norway, had been exterminated in about a century of time. The greater part of Greenland lies within the Arctic Circle, so it is evident that the island lying northeast of the American mainland was ill-named.

Labrador, which is part of the mainland comprising the American continent, was discovered in 986 by the viking Bjarni Herjolfsson. In attempting to reach Greenland from Iceland, he found a strange new and much larger land to the west. In 1000, Leif (Ericson—the son of Eric the Red) landed on the Labrador coast, but his explorations resulted in his declaring the country to be worthless and to contain "only rocks and ice." Ericson apparently named Labrador "Helluland" (or Flagstoneland). He also visited Markland (or Woodland), which is now probably eastern Quebec, and Newfoundland, sighted Cape Breton Island and Nova Scotia, and evidently landed at Vinland (now known as Maine and Massachusetts). Some historians affirm that Leif made this memorable voyage by sailing west direct from the southern coast of Norway and first saw the American continent somewhere in Massachusetts; that he explored what is now eastern Canada on his way to the established settlement in Greenland. (Leif is also said to have crossed the Atlantic from Greenland to Scotland on his way to Norway in 999.) Records show that during 1003-1004 another viking, Thorfinn Karlsefni (or Karlsefne), journeyed from the eastern to the western Norse settlements in Greenland, went up the Davis Strait, and turning south skirted Baffin Land and Labrador; passed through the Strait of Belle Isle and sighted Newfoundland, the south and east coast of Quebec, and Anticosti Island; was at Gaspé and went well up the estuary of the St. Lawrence (Straumfiord); skirted the New Brunswick coast, went through Northumberland Strait running between the mainland and Prince Edward Island, and sailed around Cape Breton Island and down the Nova Scotia coast to the Bay of Fundy; thence skirted the coast of Maine and Massachusetts to the part of New England that Leif had named Vinland some four years earlier.

This historic expedition of Thorfinn Karlsefni is said to have occupied the period of 1002-1007. Accounts of his exploits suggest that he sailed from Greenland in 1003 in three vessels with 160 men "and some women," visited Helluland (Flagstoneland, or Labrador), then Markland (a more pleasing and kindly land to the south of the harsh and barren Helluland), and spent the winter of 1003-1004 at Straumfiord (the Firth of Currents)—probably the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but claimed by some to be the Bay of Fundy. As one of his boats deserted him here, Karlsefni proceeded south with the remaining two and found Leif's Vinland, with its "self-sown" wheatfields and vines. Here the Norsemen, with their women, decided to settle and build their huts. The winter of 1004-1005 passed, during which they were much harassed by Indians, with some fatalities. It appears that Karlsefni and his leading men—strongly supported by the few women among them—concluded with great reluctance, in the summer of 1005, that their hopes for establishing and maintaining a colony in Vinland could not be realized because of the hostile aborigines; so they abandoned their settlement and sailed to the northeast. The winter of 1005-1006 was spent at Straumfiord. In the summer of 1006, when the adventurers and would-be colonizers were at Markland (probably Nova Scotia), in-

ternal dissension (said to have been caused by the women) resulted in the decision of Karlsefni to abandon his expedition and return home. We are told that the leader's boat reached her destination safely, but that the second boat was lost in the Irish Sea. It is also said that the boat that deserted the adventurers (and after the first winter at Straumfiord sailed for home) encountered adverse weather, was driven on the Irish coast, and the survivors of the wreck enslaved. It would seem that Thorfinn Karlsefni, the viking and Scandinavian explorer and the leader of an important medieval expedition from Europe to the New World in the West, was the real pioneer in the realm of American colonization.

Scandinavian, or Norse, sea rovers and vikings voyaging to Iceland and Greenland were the first discoverers of any part of the Americas or the New World. They set foot on the mainland of the continent some 511 years before John Cabot unfurled the royal banner on Cape Breton Island and took possession of the country in the name of King Henry VII of England; 514 years before the Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, or any of the maritime peoples of Europe, in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, landed on American soil; 523 years before the Spanish settlement in Hispaniola spread to the mainland by the adventures of Alonso de Ojeda and Diego de Nicuesa in Darien (1509); and 527 years before the Spaniard Juan Ponce de Leon, the first white man to discover Florida (then believed to be the fabulous "Bimini"), landed at St. Augustine April 2, 1513, and took possession of "the whole island of Florida" in the name of the Spanish king, Ferdinand V. Thorfinn Karlsefni, the viking would-be colonizer of New England, spent about a year and one full winter in that territory 603 years before the pioneer English (or European) settlers weathered the severe winter of 1607-1608 at Popham on the Sagadahoc and 616 years before the Pilgrim Fathers courageously withstood their first winter (1620-1621) at the newly established Plymouth Colony.

*Balboa Discovers the Pacific and Magellan, Sailing
West, Reaches and Crosses the Vast "New Ocean"*

Records show that Vasco Nunez de Balboa (1475-1517), the Spanish explorer and conquistador, crossed the Isthmus of Darien (Panama) in 1513 and that he was the first European or white man to discover (September 26) and actually see the eastern waters of the Pacific Ocean, which from the "peak in Darien" seemed to lie in the south and so was named merely the "Great South Sea." Many geographers thought that Balboa had seen only one of several south seas that lie among the islands of the East Indies, and not until Magellan made his voyage to and across the Pacific did navigators and cosmographers realize (or acknowledge) that a great ocean lay between the New World (America) and the continent of Asia (the East Indies, Hindustan, China, "the great Island of Cipango, and the Kingdoms of the Great Khan"). Balboa—like some more modern discoverers—wanted the honor of being the first white man to view the great sea, so he climbed the last ridge of the sierra alone. After looking upon "an illimitable ocean," he called to his men to hasten, and there in sight of the Pacific the bloodstained hands of the men of Spain were raised to heaven as on their knees they sang the "Te Deum Laudamus." We are told that "when the first exaltation had subsided, Balboa addressed his followers, saying: "You see here, gentlemen and children mine, how our desires are being accomplished, and the end of our labors. God and His blessed Mother who have assisted us, so that we should arrive here and behold this sea, will favor us that we may enjoy all that there is in it."

On September 29, 1513, Balboa arrived on the shore of the Pacific, put to flight the natives, and, wading into the water with a banner bearing the image of the Virgin and

Child, formally took possession of the "Great South Sea" (Pacific Ocean) in the name of King Ferdinand and Queen Juana, sovereigns of Castile. The Spanish monarch—after receiving presents from the "great booty" captured by Balboa on the west coast of South America—named him "Adelantado [Admiral] of the South Sea" and Governor of Panama and Coyba. The discovery of the Pacific Ocean occurred a year following the death of Amerigo Vespucci, the Florentine, from whom the continent of the western world received its name.

Soon after Pedro Arias de Avila, better known as Pedrarias (then a friend of Bishop Fonseca, the persecutor of Columbus), had taken up his duties as governor of Darien in 1514, he imprisoned Balboa (whom he greatly disliked) on trumped-up charges; but when King Ferdinand received the gold sent him by Balboa, he pardoned the man and expressed the hope that Balboa would prove his gratitude by finding more treasure and sending it to the royal coffers. Balboa, hearing of "a golden land" on the South American shore of the Pacific, resolved to search for and obtain possession of it, as no further gold could be found on the isthmus except "by the painfully slow process of panning." The expedition proposed by Balboa required ships, so "hundreds of slaves," we are told, were set to work at Acla, "in Careta's country," hewing out planks for four small brigantines, which were to be built at Isla Rica on the shore of the Pacific. The timbers were laboriously hauled across the mountains, with much difficulty and a great "loss of Indian life." When the timbers finally reached the newly established shipyard, "they were worm eaten through and through." Although greatly hampered in getting the timbers, planking, and materials needed (such as ironwork, cordage, and pitch) for building ships and by "floods, high tides and famine," Balboa, it would seem, succeeded in launching two brigantines and sent them off to the pearl fisheries, while work continued on the other two vessels.

About this time, spies falsely informed Pedrarias that Balboa was planning to upset the government, and the jealous and suspicious governor hastened to Acla and dispatched Francisco Pizarro with a body of troops to apprehend Balboa. The trial at Acla before the governor was an outrageous farce. Pedrarias' friends and Balboa's enemies were encouraged to commit perjury, with the result that Balboa and four of his associates were quickly convicted of treason and led to execution with the announcement ringing in their ears and those of the populace: "This is the justice which our Lord the King, and Pedrarias, his lieutenant in his name, command to be done upon this man [and his followers] as a traitor and usurper of the land subject to the royal crown." Thus in 1517, when forty-two years of age, Vasco Nunez de Balboa, the discoverer of the Pacific, while planning and building a fleet of four ships to explore, conquer, and exploit Peru, was officially murdered by a suspicious and envious rival. It is said that when the news reached Spain of the death of Balboa, King Ferdinand was dead and that Bishop Fonseca was overjoyed at the removal of a traitor and a conquistador for whom he had an expressed antipathy. Pizarro, the man sent with a file of soldiers to arrest Balboa, was to have the honor of conquering Peru; but the execution of Balboa delayed the day of the Spanish conquest about fourteen years. It was not until 1532 that Pizarro appeared off the coast of Ecuador and commenced his work of devastation, looting, torturing, murdering, and subjugation of the Incas, which led to making Peru and all the region of the Andes from New Granada south into Spanish provinces.

Ferdinand Magellan, or Fernão da Magalhães (1480-1521), a Portuguese navigator, was the first man to undertake a voyage around the world. The discovery of the "Great South Sea" by Balboa in 1513 and a comparison of the longitudes of Brazil, the Isthmus of Panama, and the East Indies had caused competent cosmographers (among them Ruy Faleiro, a friend of Magellan) to believe that the globe was much larger than had been generally supposed and that an ocean of uncertain expanse lay between the New World of the early sixteenth century explorers in the West—claimed by Spain—and the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, in the Far East—claimed by Portugal. In September 1499, Vasco da Gama had returned to Lisbon from India with stories of a great new rich country that he had discovered and wealth

in his vessel's holds to prove his seemingly incredible reports. A little later, vague information reached Portugal of another new land, "larger and richer than that found by Da Gama," that was lying not far from the Moluccas and had not been reached by any European ship. Magellan, supported by Faleiro, reasoned that this "New World in the East"—which was China—could most probably be found by sailing west and through a strait in Vespucci's *Mundus Novus* that rumor placed south of Brazil. Being unable to obtain in Portugal royal support or even approval of his plan to reach "the Spice Islands and the new worlds in the Far East" by making a voyage to the west, the "determined and haughty" Magellan, actuated by a great idea, "formally renounced his native land" and departed for Spain. There "his intensity carried conviction" at the court, and through Fonseca, the colonial minister, Magellan obtained the backing of the young King Charles, who was impressed by the Portuguese navigator's knowledge and boldness.

Magellan, in stating his plan, said that he hoped to discover a southwest passage and find "a strait at the extreme south of America." When outlining his proposal, he asserted that he was prepared, if necessary, to endeavor to explore as far south as the parallel (or latitude) of 75° and take plenty of time to attain his objective. He thought that the New World ran almost, if not quite, from Arctic ice to Antarctic ice, but he added, "There may be some strait through which we can pass to the Great Sea on the other side of America, and if there is such a water route, I intend to find it." Magellan left Seville on August 10, 1519, with a fleet of five small ships, which were old and of doubtful seaworthiness, and crews that numbered 240 men "of many nations." The *Trinidad* was the flagship, and the other vessels assigned to Magellan for his expedition were the *Vittoria*, *Concepcion*, *San Antonio*, and *Santiago*. The fleet was held up at the mouth of the river for several weeks and did not get to sea until September 20, with conditions existing, it was said, that gave "every prospect of a troublesome and unsuccessful voyage." Not only did the physical condition of "the cranky little ships" give Magellan cause for concern but also the spirit and very questionable loyalty of the greater part of the officers and crew of all the ships. The fleet had not proceeded far before Magellan made an example of an insubordinate captain by clapping him into irons in an endeavor to keep widespread dissatisfaction from turning into mutiny.

The expedition reached Cape St. Augustine near Pernambuco (Brazil) on November 29 and was at the mouth of Rio de la Plata on January 11, 1520. (This river had been discovered in 1516 by Juan Solis, a Spaniard, who had entered and explored it.) Magellan, impressed by its wide estuary, spent twenty-six days in exploration and did not leave it until February 6, at which time he was convinced that it was really nothing more than "a muddy, shallow, fresh water stream that got narrower as well as unnavigable as it reached its source in the mountains." On March 31, the exploring fleet reached Puerto San Julian (about 49° S.), where Magellan had a mutiny on his hands. The hardships already experienced and the leaky condition of the ships caused demands to be made of Magellan that the voyage be abandoned and the ships turned around and started for home while there remained a hope that they might once more get back to Spain. Magellan was indomitable; he was going on, not back, but would "wait out the winter" before continuing the voyage. Apparently, appeals to Castilian pride failed as well as promises of reward if the expedition reached the Spice Islands, and mutinous captains seized three of the ships, leaving to the commander only his flagship and the diminutive *Santiago*. Magellan astounded all with a lightning counter-attack. The *Vittoria's* captain was killed and the ship recaptured. The *San Antonio* was fired on, then boarded and captured by men from the *Trinidad*; whereupon the *Concepcion* surrendered. The chief conspirator was beheaded, and two other leaders in the revolt were set on shore when the fleet sailed. Magellan remained at San Julian until August 24, being laid up for nearly five months (146 days) in what he called "winter quarters." During this period, he named the natives "Patagonians," meaning "big feet," and that part of Argentina is still known as Patagonia.

Bad weather was experienced by the fleet as it sailed to the south, and the little *Santiago* was lost. On October 21, however, Magellan and the four surviving ships reached the Cape of Eleven Thousand Virgins (Cabo Virgenes) at the entrance to the strait that now bears Magellan's name. When it became evident to the fleet that the many miles of "tortuous black water winding between barren plains and Andean steeps and beset by baffling winds and treacherous currents" was the strait for which they were searching, the men, we are told, urged that having accomplished the real mission of the expedition, they should put back for Spain, as the ships were in bad condition and they were "desperately short of provisions." Magellan was adamant. He was going to complete the voyage as he had planned. "I will go on and do my work," he declared, "if I have to eat the leather off the ship's yards" (a statement that became a veritable fact before the voyage was over). As a result of Magellan's firmness, Capt. Estevan Gomez—one of the mutineers who had given trouble at San Julian—again revolted, but this time he quietly sneaked away and headed his ship, the *San Antonio*, back for Spain. Magellan had a hard time getting through the strait, but he persisted and worked his way into the "Great South Sea" by going to only about 53° S. as compared with the southern limit of 75°, to which he had asserted he was prepared to go. Magellan named the land to the south of the strait "Tierra del Fuego" because of the many fires seen thereon, and when his three remaining ships—the *Trinidad*, *Vittoria*, and *Concepcion*—were straightened away after leaving the strait and sailing first to the north (to get away from the Antarctic cold) and then to the northwest, he called the vast new ocean "El Mar Pacifico," as it was so "calm and kindly, with gentle favorable breezes."

For ninety-eight days (according to the journal of Antonio Pigafetta—an Italian gentleman observer aboard and one of the few survivors), Magellan sailed without sighting land other than two barren rocks, and when on March 6, 1521, the ships reached a fertile and inhabited island, nineteen of the men were dead and the survivors ill with scurvy. Magellan called the islands the "Ladrones," as "the natives were such thieves." Fortunately, he obtained quantities of fresh fruit and other foods and on March 16 reached the islands later called the Philippines, where he encountered traders who gave him information in regard to the location of the Moluccas.

At Cebu, in the Philippines, the great explorer unfortunately turned missionary and influenced the native ruler to accept Christianity, following which the usual zeal for converts developed, and the first selected victims for compulsory conversion were Cebu's traditional enemies on Mactan. On April 21, 1521, the Spaniards and a force from Cebu landed at Mactan to preach Christianity with the sword. They were evidently badly beaten by the barbarian and irreligious Mactans, who drove the invaders back to their boats, and Magellan, in bravely covering the retreat of his men, was surrounded and "pierced through and through." Pigafetta wrote of Magellan as "our mirror, our comforter, our true guide" and added: "When they wounded him, he turned back many times to see whether we were all in the boats. Magellan died in the Philippines nineteen months after leaving the coast of Spain, but the trouble and sufferings of the remaining members of the expedition were far from over. The ruler of Cebu did not think so much of the European religion when the God of the Spaniards could not protect their leader from the spears of the Mactans or give the Christians victory over their foes, and he expressed his displeasure by slaying thirty Spaniards at a banquet. We are told that the survivors of what was evidently planned to be a general massacre of the Europeans got away from Cebu "with the echo in their ears of axes cutting down the crosses" that, following the "conversion" of the ruler of Cebu to Christianity, had been set up in the market place to take the place of the heathen idols.

Magellan, on sailing from Spain, had not planned to circumnavigate the globe, but had sought to find and open up a western trade route for Spaniards to the Spice Islands and the new lands in the East that could be reached without rounding the Cape of Good Hope and trespassing on the domain of Portugal and its papal decreed rights. Had he lived, he would

undoubtedly have tried to return east across the Pacific. At the Moluccas, the *Concepcion* was dismasted and burned, and the *Trinidad* and *Vittoria*, "by trade and piracy," were loaded with spices for a return to Spain. Of the 240 men who had left Seville, only 101 remained, and of this number, we are told, 47 went aboard the *Vittoria* under Juan Sebastian del Cano (a one-time mutineer), and 54 men stayed with Gonzalo de Espinosa (Magellan's old "chief constable" and a leader in quelling the mutiny on the South American coast) aboard the flagship *Trinidad*. The vessels would probably have endeavored to cross the Pacific together, according to plan, but the *Trinidad* sprang a bad leak and the *Vittoria*, with a crew that wanted to get back to Spain in the easiest, best-known, and quickest way, set sail to the west for home over the Cape of Good Hope route. When the *Trinidad* had been repaired, she sailed eastbound, heading across the Pacific for Panama, but she was "baffled for months" by adverse winds. She finally turned back and put into the Moluccas, having lost 35 men from starvation and scurvy and with only 19 survivors, all of whom were thrown into prison by the Portuguese, and ultimately only Espinosa and three men reached Spain.

The *Vittoria* had a bad time of it in the South Atlantic, and because her crew was decimated by famine and scurvy, she sought relief at the Cape Verde Islands, claiming that she was a transatlantic voyager in distress. But a Portuguese port was no place for a Spanish ship engaging in illegitimate trade (and poaching on Portugal's exclusive commerce) to put into for help. Suspicion was awakened on the part of the authorities by the remarks of a sailor made in a tavern while "in his cups," and thirteen of the vessel's crew were seized and gaoled. However, the *Vittoria* escaped from the harbor and at long last reached Seville on September 6, 1522, where 18 starving men, most of them incapacitated by disease, landed. Of the five ships that left Spain and comprised the expedition, only one returned to the home port safely; that was not the flagship *Trinidad* but the *Vittoria*. It was said that of the 240 men who had left Seville on the Magellan expedition on August 10, 1519, "a scant thirty-five of those who did not desert ever returned to Spain" and that only 18 circumnavigated the globe on one of the original five ships that composed the fleet. The arrival of the *Vittoria* at Seville, after an absence of over three years, completed one of the most eventful and memorable voyages in the annals of sail and the history of marine navigation. Leland D. Baldwin, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAS*, says: "In the pages of history there is no voyage so fraught with all the qualities that make humanity at once so glorious and so despicable as that of Magellan and his sailors, who were the first to circumnavigate the globe."

Ferdinand Magellan, to whom all credit is due for the successful outcome of the expedition, unfortunately did not circumnavigate the globe. It is said that the *Vittoria's* cargo of spices (cloves) realized in the market a sum that paid for the entire expedition. King Charles gave the reward that Magellan had earned to the one-time mutineer Juan Sebastian del Cano, with a pension of five hundred ducats and arms bearing a globe encircled with the words, "Thou hast encompassed me." But Cano and his men on the *Vittoria*, whereas the first to travel around the world from a European port, are not entitled to the honor of being pioneers in circumnavigating the globe; for a Moluccan named Henry, who had sailed via the Cape of Good Hope to Europe and had been "purchased" by Magellan, sailed with him and reached the old home of the Moluccan and the point of origination of his voyage around the world "some sixteen months" before the *Vittoria* arrived at Seville. Therefore, an East Indian slave—the property of Magellan—was the first man to circumnavigate the globe.

The first adventurers "to double Cape Horn," or to sail around the Cape (the southernmost tip of the American continent), were the Dutch navigators Willem Schouten and Jacob Lemaire, who accomplished this in 1616, or ninety-six years after Ferdinand Magellan had discovered and passed through the Strait of Magellan from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

*John Cabot — Evidently the Real Discoverer of the
Mainland of the Continent of America Following
the Exploratory Voyages of Early Vikings*

John Cabot (1450-1499), sailing in 1497 under the British flag and letters patent issued by King Henry VII of England, was most probably the first discoverer of the continent of North America. However, he was not an Englishman; his real name was Giovanni Caboto, and he was born in Genoa, Italy. In 1461 he moved to Venice and became a naturalized Venetian citizen on March 28, 1476, when twenty-six years of age. (The Venetians evidently spelled his name Zuan Calbot.) Cabot went to sea early, and during trading voyages to the eastern Mediterranean and a visit to Mecca—then the greatest market for the exchange of Far Eastern and European goods—the idea developed in his mind that possibly a water route existed by means of which, if only it could be found, merchandise could be moved by ship between the world's great production and consumption markets of the East and the West much more quickly and economically than over the land routes then in use. In 1484, Cabot (then thirty-four years of age) moved with his family from Italy to London, and in the course of time he explained his ideas and plans to British merchants. Before Columbus embarked on his first historic voyage of discovery, Cabot had succeeded in interesting merchants of Bristol (who did an extensive business between that port and Iceland) in his theory and scheme. They financed the Italian navigator in an attempt not to find a route to the faraway Spice Islands, or East Indies, which could be reached sailing west only if the world was round "like a ball," but to discover the actual whereabouts, size, and worth of the "Island of Brazil" or that of the "Seven Cities," imaginatively referred to by contemporary cosmographers and shown on medieval maps to the west of Ireland; for if the world was shaped like a globe and the Far East could be reached by sailing west, such islands would prove to be intermediate ports, way stations, or halting places of value.

For several years, vessels sailed from Bristol and made futile endeavors to find the mythical islands out in the Atlantic west of Ireland and far to the south of Iceland. John Cabot took an active part in these expeditions, but was interested in them only to the extent of possibly finding land that would prove to be a steppingstone to the Far East. In 1493 news reached England of the discovery by Christopher Columbus of the East Indies, which he had reached by sailing west—a plan that his fellow Genoese, Giovanni Caboto, had talked of since 1480. The success of Columbus increased very materially the respect of the English for the Italian navigator who had lived among them for several years. On March 5, 1496, King Henry VII, being anxious to have an English expedition push on to the Far East by a course more northerly than the routes pursued by the Spanish and with hope aroused by reports of the two voyages of Columbus, granted to his "well-beloved John Cabot, citizen of Venice, to Lewis, Sebastian and Santius, sonnes of the said John, full and free authority, leave and power upon theyr own proper costs and charges, to seeke out, discover and finde whatsoever isles, countries, regions or provinces of the heathen and infidels, which before this time have been unknown to all Christians." Merchandise from the countries visited was to enter England free of duty, but one-fifth of the net gain from the business had to be paid to the crown. The Bristol merchants decided to abandon their search for the mythical islands and push on straight for Asia. They backed Cabot in his plans and supplied the ship and money needed for the enterprise.

Cabot left Bristol (located at a latitude of about $51\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N.) on Tuesday, May 2, 1497, on the ship *Mathew*, with eighteen men aboard. Sailing north of Ireland to about 55° N., they then steered west by south and on Saturday morning, June 24, after 52 days at sea, made

land at about 47° N., which is now called Cape North, at the northern extremity of Cape Breton Island (the northeastern part of Nova Scotia). A landing was made, and the point named Cape Discovery. On June 26, Cabot hoisted the royal banner of England's king, with due ceremony, and took possession of the country in his name. One of the Cabots (probably Sebastian) drew a crude map of the region and on it wrote: "In the Year of our Lord 1497, John Cabot, a Venetian, and his son, Sebastian, discovered that country which no one before his time had ventured to approach, on the 24th of June about 5 o'clock in the morning." This was some thirteen months before Christopher Columbus, the accredited discoverer of America, had actually reached the continental mainland. Cabot sailed and explored the waters between Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and landed at several points. The islands now known as St. Paul, St. Pierre, and Miquelon were visited, described, and given names, which were later changed by the French. The present Cape Ray on the west coast of Newfoundland was named St. George's Cape, and Cape Race, which was the last land seen of the big islands comprising the newly discovered continent of North America, was named England's Cape. In the *Mathew*, Cabot visited in the summertime (June and July) a part of North America now known as Canada, but he had no idea that he had discovered a new continent. He reported that the climate was temperate, the soil fertile, and the rich Newfoundland Banks teeming with "baccalaos," or codfish. The navigator-explorer was so convinced that he had found the northeastern coast of Asia and reached the country of the Great Khan "700 leagues beyond Ireland" (whence came the rich silks and precious stones that he had seen in the great mart of Mecca) that he hurried back home in his little ship and dropped anchor in Bristol Harbor on Sunday, August 6, 1497, having been absent on his historic quest only 96 days (3 months and 4 days). This in itself was an outstanding performance for any ship engaged in a voyage of discovery. (Relatively recently, a supposedly authoritative historical work has plotted the course of Cabot's 1497 voyage as from Bristol around the south of Ireland to a landfall at about Cartwright, Labrador; thence a skirting of the coast north to Cape Chidley and the Hudson Strait and a return following the shore to Cape Race, Newfoundland, and home.)

King Henry VII was disappointed on Cabot's return not to hear of gold and wealth of a similar nature in the Indies, and he turned a rather deaf ear to the stories of fish (and possible furs). However, history tells us that the king "very promptly rewarded John Cabot," for after the death of Henry an item was found in his private expense book, which indicated that he had been appreciative of Cabot's efforts and "generous" with the navigator-explorer. This historic item reads: "10th August 1497: To hym that founde the New Isle, 10 pounds." The thrifty Dutch are thought to have driven a good bargain with the Indians on the Hudson when in 1626, according to reports, Peter Minuit, director-general of the New Netherland Colony, bought Manhattan Island (New York) for sixty guilders, or about twenty-four dollars, in merchandise, which consisted of bright cloth, beads and other trinkets. But Henry VII did better than that in his dealings with John Cabot, for the whole of the continent of North America (or at least the most available and essential part) went to him and the British Crown for a measly ten pounds. Nearly three centuries later, Edmund Burke, the British parliamentarian, declared in a speech: "We derive our rights in America from John Cabot, who first saw the northern continent in 1497."

King Henry VII, the cautious and economically minded ruler of England, was evidently skeptical at first of John Cabot's claim that Asia, China, or the lands of the Far East had been reached on this voyage to the west across the North Atlantic. However, he shortly followed his small recognition gift with the grant to Cabot of a pension of £20 and the promise to equip him with a fleet of ten ships to sail west the next spring over a course urged by Cabot. This was west to what we now know as Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, then south skirting the coast of the continent believed to be Asia "as far as Cipangu" (or Japan), which Cabot figured would be "near the equator." He visualized London as "a greater center for spices than Alexandria" because of the new trade route that he had partly opened up and would

discover and map completely during the coming year if he was properly equipped for the expedition. For a short while, John Cabot was a "passing fancy." A Venetian visiting England wrote home, "Honors are heaped upon Caboto, he is called Grand Admiral, he is dressed in silk, and the English run after him like madmen."

Henry VII issued fresh letters patent February 3, 1498, and himself "also advanced considerable sums of money" to finance the venture or what were evidently funds to be used in profitable trade. It is said that this special royal charter gave John Cabot (referred to as "Kabotte, the Venecian") the right to impress six English vessels, to enlist crews, and to follow up the discoveries that had been made during the Cabots' first voyage. Cabot left England for Spain, presumably to engage the services of competent and experienced men who knew something about the Indies and to pick up information that might be of help to him. At Lisbon he met Joao Fernandez, known as Llavrador, who told him from personal knowledge of the existence and location of "a big island in the West," which we now know as Greenland, and thereby caused Cabot to change his plans for the first part of the coming voyage and head for Greenland and, after skirting it and making the mainland, to follow and explore the entire coast of "Asia" from the Arctic region in the north down to the tropics.

Early in May 1498, John Cabot again left Bristol, not with ten ships as originally promised him by Henry VII but with two sizable vessels (for that day—probably of 50 to 75 tons) and three hundred men. Three other ships of small size that were generally used for trading between Bristol and Iceland accompanied him, but the first of the flotilla to leave on the expedition to the Spice Islands and the Indies was forced to put back by a storm off the Irish coast. Cabot sailed farther to the north than on his first transatlantic voyage. Early in June, the coast of Greenland was reached, and as this was the island or "country" that Joao Fernandez, called Llavrador, had told him about, with evident correctness, Cabot named it Llavrador's Land. (Some writers say that he reserved this name for part of the mainland that he later visited, which is the present Labrador.) Cabot sailed to the north and on June 11 was at $67\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N.; here his crew mutinied and refused to go farther to the northward because of the cold and ice, so Cabot was compelled to put his ships about. After exploring the southern part of Greenland, he went up the west coast of the island until checked by icebergs, crossed Davis Strait (87 years before John Davis, the Englishman, "discovered" it in 1585 when looking for a northwest passage), and reached Baffin Land near the present Cape Washington (118 years before William Baffin sailed in that region). Cabot thought that Baffin Land was part of the mainland of Asia and Hudson Strait a bay, so he continued south. Off the coast of Labrador and the northern part of the mainland of the continent, he encountered Indians and did a little bartering for furs. He passed the Strait of Belle Isle (also considered as a bay), skirted the Newfoundland coast, which he regarded as the main shore of Asia, and revisited Cape Breton Island. He then followed the Nova Scotia, New England, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware coasts and, when off the shore of Maryland (38° N.), felt required to discontinue his voyage of exploration.

Cabot, as he journeyed south presumably to Cipangu and the Spice Islands, had been increasingly surprised to find no sign of the civilization that he knew existed in the Far East. However, he said that his decision to return was forced upon him by the low state of his stores and supplies and the temper of his crew, including members of his own family. John Cabot reached England late in October 1498, having been absent less than six months, which is a surprisingly short time for such a momentous voyage of exploration. He returned a somewhat saddened man and died shortly thereafter while futilely planning to get capital, backing, and ships for a third voyage, which, he contemplated, would continue his survey of the coast of "Asia" from what we now know as the Delaware River south to the equator and to the "rich lands" of the tropics and Southern Hemisphere. At that time, however, the Spaniards, supported by the Church of Rome, were exploring and undertaking the conquest of lands in the Indies south of 24° N., and Henry VII, somewhat peeved at making no

money out of the Cabot expedition to the north coast of "Asia," did not care to repeat unprofitable adventures, particularly when they threatened to lead to trouble with Spain and the Pope of Rome. His first thought, however, when he gave letters patent to John Cabot to sail west and seek to discover new lands, was well expressed by the statement: "If Spain grows fat on the newly discovered Indies [America] so can Englishmen." Later English explorer-navigators and colonizers, while leaving Central and South America to the Spaniards and Portuguese, gradually developed a slogan that expressed their policy and explained their motives and actions: "Make North America an English nation, and drive the French and Spanish out."

Cabot evidently died in 1499, but his pension was paid him for that year. A map made in 1500 by the Spaniard Juan de la Cosa (a pilot who had sailed with Columbus) shows the eastern coast of North America and expressly states that the region had been discovered by the English. In 1501 the Spaniards became annoyed with the activities of the English in the northwest Atlantic, and although they were almost solely connected with the fisheries, Ferdinand and Isabella issued a decree "to stop the explorations of the English." We are told that during the period 1500-1502 the Corte-Reals, of Portugal, picked up trinkets that had been left by John Cabot in the "new founde lande."

Practical-minded West County merchants of England were never greatly impressed with the clarion call for gold and treasure that motivated the Latin countries and the aristocracy of England and other lands and produced the exploiting and plundering conquistadors of Spain. The Bristol merchants would not gamble for gold, but they sent fishing expeditions to Cabot's "new founde land" in 1501, 1502, 1503, 1504, and subsequent years, and possibly some of these early sixteenth century voyagers contacted the Indians and did a little trading in furs. There is a record that on March 14, 1501, Henry VII chartered what was apparently the first of the English-American colonial companies, and it would seem that early fishing, trading, and exploring voyages were made under this charter or an amended one dated 1502; for Henry, in his notebook, reports having paid twenty pounds to certain Bristol men "in consideracion of the true service which they have doon unto us to our singler pleasur as capitaignes into the new founde lande." The Bristol merchants are also credited with bringing to the king "three men, taken in the new founde island." However, the fisheries were the prime object of the Bristol voyages and, as the sixteenth century advanced, became the sole reason for the regular yearly expeditions to Newfoundland and the northeastern portion of the New World.

Some writers have said that John Cabot, although only forty-nine years of age when he died and known to have been hale and vigorous when the voyage commenced, was a sick man during his second expedition and that his son Sebastian was practically in command during most of the voyage. Sebastian Cabot (1476-1557) was twenty-two years old when the journey was made. He is mentioned in several British historical works as an Englishman, although he was born in Venice and eight years of age before he first saw Britain. Sebastian was not of the stature and caliber of his father John, and after the return of Sebastian to England from the American coast in 1498, nothing definite and worth-while is known of him for fifteen years. Ferdinand of Aragon, learning of his knowledge of the northeast coast of America, considered sending him on an exploratory voyage, but this expedition, scheduled to sail in March 1516, was never undertaken because of Ferdinand's death in January. The younger Cabot was in the service of Charles V of Spain until the winter of 1520-1521, when he visited England and negotiated with Cardinal Wolsey for the command of an expedition that Henry VIII was planning to send to Newfoundland. Nothing came of it, and in March 1525 Cabot obtained an appointment as commander of a voyage to sail from Seville over the route discovered by Magellan to "the Moluccas, Tarsis, Ophir, Cipango and Cathay."

With the backing of the emperor Charles (king of Spain) and some of the leading merchants of Seville, Sebastian Cabot set out in the fall of 1526 with three ships and a goodly crew (also reported as four ships and two hundred fifty men) and was at the River Plate in

February 1527. There is some doubt as to whether Cabot ever intended to journey to the Pacific by the southwest passage, but it would seem that the Italian Englishman could not get along well with the Spanish gentlemen adventurers aboard, and it is said that he put four of them ashore on a Brazilian island. Whatever the original plans of Cabot may have been, he sailed up the estuary of La Plata and abandoned all thoughts of continuing to the Pacific. One report has it that Cabot found the ships unsuitable and ill-prepared for a long and hazardous voyage through the Straits of Magellan and that this fact, coupled with the mutinous spirit of officers and crew, made such a venture impossible. For some three years, Cabot explored the waters that fall into La Plata. At a point on the Paraguay River, a little below the Asuncion of today, the Spanish fought the Payagua ("sweet-water pirates"). Cabot made friends with the Guarani, who wore silver ornaments, and learned of a "white king" and silver mines in the Andes. He conceived the idea of finding and conquering the fabled land of Peru and of opening up a water route to transport the precious metal to Spain, so the muddy waters of the Parana became the River of Silver (Rio de la Plata), and Cabot returned to Spain for ships, boats, men, horses, and equipment to carry out his ambitious project.

Some historians say that, from the first, Cabot merely carried out "secret orders received from the emperor" to explore the southwest part of the continent on the Spanish side of the line of demarcation set forth by the Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal. This theory seems to be backed up by the report that Cabot, immediately upon his return to Spain in August 1530, was loaded with honors and promises and was in high favor. But this did not last long. The Spaniards who had been marooned on an island off Brazil succeeded in getting back to Spain, and possibly they caused trouble, for Cabot soon fell into disgrace and was condemned to banishment in Oran, Africa. He never returned to the River of Silver, but he had been the means of awakening Spanish interest in the development and exploitation of Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay (west of the Portuguese Brazil and the treaty line) and such American lands lying in the admitted zone of Spanish influence—confirmed by a papal bull—as could be reached from the Atlantic Ocean.

It would seem that Sebastian Cabot occupied for some time the position of piloto-mayor of Spain and that these duties (recording voyages, making and filing charts, etc.) had at one time been assigned to Amerigo Vespucci when Spain wanted to keep him under its eye, but had no intention to use or trust him in exploratory expeditions. Evidently, Cabot tried for some time to get back to England and succeeded in the fall of 1548 "against the will of the emperor Charles V." Edward VI of England put Cabot on the king's pay roll in 1548 as one "Shabot, a pilot" and, in so doing, got into trouble with Spain, which made two official demands (the latter of "Bloody" Queen Mary) for Cabot's repatriation. In his later years Sebastian Cabot (known as the "younger Cabot") was connected with the Muscovy Company and was interested in the development of a northeast passage to the East. Of three vessels dispatched from England in May 1553, two were caught in the ice near Arzina and their crews frozen to death; the third reached the White Sea, and the Captain (Chancellor) traveled overland to Moscow, returning to England in July 1554. It would seem that this experience put a stop to reaching the Pacific by a northeast passage, but English vessels sailed to Russia in 1555 and 1556, and this trade route was thereafter used in the summertime.

*Gaspar Corte-Real and His Brother Miguel — the
Portuguese Navigator-Explorers*

There were three Corte-Real brothers, of a noble Portuguese family, whose father was at one time governor at Terceira, the third and central island and seat of administration of the Portuguese-discovered and owned Azores archipelago (the Western Islands). These

brothers were evidently all noblemen of means and navigators, and their names were Gaspar, Miguel, and Vasco. Their voyages to the Arctic seas, Greenland, Labrador, Newfoundland, and the northeastern mainland of the newly discovered American continent in the first years of the sixteenth century, it is said, "opened the way for important Portuguese fisheries on the Newfoundland coast."

In 1500, Gaspar Corte-Real set sail for the northwest to engage in an exploratory voyage at his own expense. The Cabots, sailing under the English flag, had discovered a large land in the far west, off whose shores the fishing was excellent "beyond anything seen in any other waters" of the world, and the New World explored by the Cabots was evidently that strange land in the Western Ocean (out of which flowed "a great river") to which Captain Cousin, the French navigator-fisherman of Dieppe, had been blown by heavy northeasterly winds in 1488. Gaspar Corte-Real wanted to see for himself just what this New World was and whether or not (if the theory that the world was round was correct) he could reach the real Cathay and Indies by sailing still farther to the west. After skirting part of the shores of Greenland, Labrador, and Newfoundland, Gaspar Corte-Real returned home, but the following year, with three vessels, sailed again from Lisbon and returned to the region that he had explored the year before. It would seem that, somewhere off the eastern shore of Labrador, the commander of the expedition left the other two ships with instructions to search for a northwest passage, while he in his own vessel surveyed the islands and coast to the southwest, as he was desirous of exploring the territory that lay between the northern lands of the New World and the rich islands of the Indies discovered by Columbus and being exploited by the Spaniards. Where Gaspar Corte-Real sailed, what he saw, and the fate that befell him and his ship and crew, we do not know; for nothing more was heard of the vessel after she headed for a cruise down the eastern Canadian and New England coast.

In May 1502, Miguel Corte-Real, with three vessels, sailed from Lisbon in search of his brother and to continue the work of exploration of the New World lying in the northwest across the Atlantic Ocean. After reaching Newfoundland in June, the three ships separated, each being given a certain direction and region in which to explore and search for Gaspar Corte-Real and his ship; all the vessels agreed to a certain rendezvous in Newfoundland (said to be St. John's) by late August (the 20th). Strange as it may seem, Miguel Corte-Real—as did his brother before him—disappeared with his ship when he sailed in the direction that Gaspar had taken, and the other two vessels of the expedition, after waiting until late autumn off Newfoundland, returned home to Lisbon without their leader.

There is a tradition that in 1472, João Corte-Real, the father of the Corte-Real brothers, made a voyage to the northwest Atlantic and reached the "newe founde lande." It is also said that the king of Portugal, hearing in 1499 of John Cabot's claims of having discovered "the land of the Grand Cham" by sailing from England "due west," became particularly interested to learn if, by chance, any of these "newe founde landes" lay east of the papal and treaty line of demarcation and were, therefore, in the area that Portugal had the exclusive right to dominate and develop. As the king of Portugal apparently knew of João Corte-Real's interest in the area that had been recently brought into the foreground, it would seem but natural for him to express his fears of England's possible poaching on his domain to the Corte-Reals, with the result that the sons of João Corte-Real were influenced to make exploratory voyages to the territory for their king and country.

A great deal of the Corte-Real exploration is shrouded in mystery. On the first and evidently the only voyage to the New World completed by either of the brothers, Gaspar Corte-Real cruised along the northeast coast of the continent, did some exploring, made several landings, and captured some Indians. He reported that timber was growing "in great abundance" on part of the land, that the waters off the coast were excellent fishing grounds, and that the country was one that promised well and was worthy of further exploration. A map has been published that shows the course of Gaspar Corte-Real outbound in 1500 as from Lisbon to Terceira (Azores), then north to the Greenland east coast to about 67° N. (a few miles

south of the point that John Cabot had reached in 1498); the map is thereafter indefinite, but it shows a course in the Davis Strait, a skirting of the coast of Labrador for some distance, and a return home to Lisbon direct from Cape Farewell, Greenland. Gaspar Corte-Real was appointed the Portuguese governor of Terra Nova as a reward for his "discovery." It is extremely doubtful that he saw any land or waters that John Cabot had not visited before him, although he did apparently know that Hudson Strait was a strait and not, as Cabot thought, merely an ordinary sizable bay, for we are told that Corte-Real named it Strait of Aniam.

One report says that Gaspar Corte-Real, as a result of his landings on the (Labrador) coast, "captured some sixty Nascopee Indians, whom he carried back for slaves." This number does not seem possible and is too large for Corte-Real to have handled on a single small vessel. There are records suggesting that of the fleet of three ships that he took to Newfoundland in 1501, only one got back to Lisbon and that this vessel carried "seven captured Indian savages," but brought word confirming the existence of great forests of big trees and a seacoast with an abundance of (cod) fish. There does not seem to be any record of what the two returning ships carried to Lisbon in late 1502 (or the winter of 1502-1503). The records referring to the voyages of the Corte-Real brothers are somewhat mixed up and confusing, and possibly all the returning ships (numbering either four or five) from the three exploratory expeditions brought back the "sixty Nascopee Indians." It is positive, however, that all the ships reaching Portugal and completing the Corte-Real voyages reported waters in the northwest Atlantic, off the coast of either big islands or the mainland (Terra Nova), that were well stocked with fine big fish, so that Gaspar Corte-Real, the first of the brothers to explore the region, has been called "the father of the Portuguese fisheries on the Newfoundland Banks" and in American waters. The Portuguese Fishing Company was promptly organized following the Corte-Real explorations, with fleets hailing from Vianna and Aveiro (Portugal) and Terceira (Azores). The fisheries must have been on a large scale and very profitable in the early years of the sixteenth century, for we read that in 1506 King Emanuel of Portugal decreed that "the fishermen, upon their return from Newfoundland, shall pay a tithe of their profits at the Royal Customhouse."

The mystery in regard to the Corte-Reals has been increased during comparatively recent years by the discovery of an inscription on a well-known and historic rock near Dighton, at the head of Narragansett Bay, that evidently—notwithstanding the ravages of time—reads:

"M. CORTEREAL 1511 V. DEI DUX IND"

Of great significance is the appearance, as part of the inscription, of the old royal arms of Portugal, which consisted of a shield within a shield, the inner one containing five quinas, or "five-spots" of small dots or squares (or, where exigencies of space demanded, one quina within the two shields sufficed as in the symbol of Portuguese discoveries that is used on the Cantino chart of 1502).

Dr. Edmund Burke Delabarre of Brown University has deciphered the abbreviated Latin inscription (of a type that was usual in those days), which has become in places somewhat indistinct through the ravages of weather and water and partly obliterated by later Indian pictographs, and has translated it as "Miguel Cortereal. 1511. By the Will of God, leader of the natives of India of this place"; or "Miguel Cortereal. 1511. By the Grace of God, leader of the Indians." Dr. Delabarre has done excellent work—with modern photographic equipment, a scientific, unbiased mind, and thorough, painstaking research—to bring to light and interpret the Dighton Rock inscriptions, whose existence have been known since the Anglo-Saxon occupation of the territory. His conclusions are sound and can be accepted by seekers after truth, even though—as is usual in discoveries and interpretations of inscriptions of this nature—so-called "authorities," some of whom have preconceived notions, are divided in regard to the acceptance of the Delabarre reading of a chiseled message that is well over four centuries old.

An excellent, voluminous, well-illustrated, and essentially scientific work on this subject,

entitled **DIGHTON ROCK**, was written by Dr. Delabarre and published in 1928, and among later supplementary and supporting documents is an article under the caption, "Miguel Cortereal: The First European to Enter Narragansett Bay," read by the same author-scientist before the Rhode Island Historical Society, February 17, 1936 (published in the Rhode Island Historical Society Collections, Vol. XXIX, No. 4—October 1936).

There was an old tradition among the Indians inhabiting the region of the Narragansett in regard to an early visit to that territory of white men in a bird-like wooden house that swam on the water, and the time preceded the claimed visit of Verrazano in 1524. John Danforth wrote in 1680: "It is reported from the tradition of old Indians, that there came a wooden house, and men of another country in it, swimming up the river Asonet, that fought the Indians and slew their saunchem." Another version of the same tradition, which persisted through the years, is given by Edward A. Kendall in 1807. It reads:

As to traditions, there is, though but in a few mouths, an Indian tradition, which purports, though some ages past, a number of white men arrived in the river, in a bird; that the white men took Indians into the bird, as hostages; that they took fresh water for their consumption at a neighboring spring; that the Indians fell upon and slaughtered the white men

at the spring; that during the affray, thunder and lightning issued from the bird; that the hostages escaped from the bird; and that a spring, now called White Spring, and from which there runs a brook, called White Man's Brook, has its name from this event.

Kendall also heard from the Indians of the bird's being injured (or the ship wrecked), and when the fighting was over, misunderstandings overcome, and peace restored, some white men lived with the Indians (or at least passed one or more winters with them) in the long, long ago. It is generally believed that this tradition refers to the visit of Miguel Corte-Real to the waters of the Narragansett in his Portuguese ship in 1502. The following are extracts from Dr. Delabarre's writings on the subject:

Cortereal . . . anchored near the rock which has since become famous under the name "Dighton Rock," . . . took Indians into his ship as hostages and sent men ashore for water. These men were attacked and slain by the natives, very likely because the latter were frightened and angered by the seizure of the hostages. During the conflict firearms were used by men on the ship, the hostages escaped, and the Indian sachem was killed. For some reason, Cortereal settled there among the natives. . . . After the heat of misunderstanding and conflict was over, Cortereal might readily have gained their confidence. The possession of firearms was an advantage. The other wonderful possessions and proficiencies of the strangers must have caused them to be looked upon as beings of a superior order. Why they interrupted their voyage is not sure. It may have been because of loss of men, or wreckage of the ship, or illness or injuries received or lateness of the season. . . . Very naturally, having decided to remain here for a time at least, Cortereal promptly made himself sachem of the natives in place of the one who was slain, . . . and he associated with him-

self a native assistant in government, so that thereafter this tribe, unlike any other around it, was ruled by "two kings" down to the time when the Pilgrims came. We find reason to believe that the strangers found favor with the Indian maidens and contributed to the later population of the tribe. . . . In 1511 Miguel Cortereal cut his name and the date on Dighton Rock. It is only recently that this fact has been discovered thanks to improved methods of photography. His reason for doing this, I conjecture, was the hope that he might thus attract the attention of some passing explorer and so get taken home. If we ask why he waited so long before making the record and did it so far inland, we can only conjecture that he preferred to maintain his own residence on Assonet Neck and to keep men on the outer coasts on the lookout for possible passing ships; and that only in 1511 did it occur to him to carve these lines, both because thus he would have an additional means of attracting attention, and, if no rescuer came, he would be leaving a record which would endure after his death and reveal his fate.

If it is true that Verrazano really—as claimed—visited the Narragansett in 1524, then his remarks about some of the natives encountered (twenty-two years after the arrival in the region of the Corte-Real expedition and after Corte-Real had died) tend to support the belief of the presence of Corte-Real and his men in the community for a number of years. Verrazano reported to Francis I of France of coming in contact with natives in this locality "inclining more to whiteness (*bianchezza*)" and "most civilized in customs." We also read that generally throughout Verrazano's explorations in America, the Indians showed great astonishment at the "*bianchezza*" of the Europeans' skins, so it is evident that Verrazano was

impressed with the signs of white blood in a certain small tribe of Indians encountered on the Narragansett. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that the name "Wampanoag" means "white people" (wampi and wompi are Indian words for white and nauog for people; therefore, wampi-nauog refers to white people) and that Corte-Real and his men were responsible for the lightness of complexion of many of the young natives as well as for the copper (or brass) plates that, it was found, the tribe possessed. Gradually, however, the whiteness bred out, and by the time that the Pilgrim Fathers landed at Plymouth (over 118 years after Corte-Real appeared on the Narragansett) the color of certain members of one of the lesser tribes of Rhode Island Indians was not sufficiently noticeable as to cause surprise and comment, for apparently no one in colonial times referred in writing to it.

The conclusions of Dr. Delabarre in regard to Miguel Corte-Real's visit to the waters of the Narragansett in 1502 are supported by both prime and a mass of secondary and supporting evidence and tradition. In closing his paper written in 1936 on this subject, Dr. Delabarre expresses merely the views of most qualified, impartial, scientific research authorities and unprejudiced historians when he says:

Among all these considerations there is a considerable and satisfying nucleus of solid facts. Around them we have gathered a number of other scattered facts. . . . By and of certain inferences we have sought to give them their simplest explanation and reasonable connectedness. Even though some of the inferences may be questioned, . . . still a great many of them, if not all, are certainly

permissible and in many cases unavoidable. Together, fact and justified inference fitting into a harmonious structure, they add a chapter of absorbing interest to the pre-colonial history of the Wampanoags and prove that Miguel Cortereal and his companions were the earliest known Europeans who came into Narragansett Bay and explored the coast of Rhode Island.

It is interesting to note that of the same Corte-Real family as João, the father, and his sons Gaspar, Miguel, and Vasco (all of whom were interested in the sea and in maritime expeditions and explorations), but of the following generation, was the famous Portuguese soldier, painter, and epic poet, Jeronymo Corte-Real (1533-1588).

*Exploration of America Inspired by the Desire to Find a
Water Route to the Indies — the Conquest of Central
and South America through the Lust for Gold*

The lure of expeditions to the south was gold, precious metals, jewels and loot, with the sunshine and warmth associated with the tropics, a life of relative ease in a kindly climate, a search for "the fountain of perpetual youth," and an escape from the rigors, restrictions, and cramping, prosaic life of Europe. Central and South America was a land of wealth to be exploited by the unscrupulous and fanatical, and it was only a short step from domination and confiscation by forces under the flag of a Christian monarch, whose depredations, enslavement, and butchery of infidels were blessed by the church, to the bloody looting and diabolical raids of pirates—the notorious buccaneers of the Spanish Main. The first stated aim of the Spaniards was trade with the Indies, and the Casa de Contratacion (a committee for the regulation of trade) was established at Seville in 1503. European animals and plants were brought across the Atlantic, and sugar plantations were started early in Cuba and Hispaniola (Haiti). But, from the first, the main object of the Spaniards in conquering and possessing the islands of the West Indies and later the mainland of the American continent was gold to be obtained by slave labor. The surface wealth of the islands was soon exhausted. The feeble

natives, who were savages, and the more robust and belligerent cannibal Caribs perished at the hands of the avaricious and unscrupulous invaders.

The Spanish kept going farther afield in the Americas looking for gold. Pedrarius Davila (Pedro Arias de Avila) transferred the Darien settlement to Panama in 1519 (following Vasco Nunez de Balboa's discovery of the Pacific Ocean in 1513), and during 1519 and 1520 Francisco Hernandez Cordova and Juan de Grijalva, sailing from Cuba, explored the coasts of Yucatan and the Gulf of Mexico. Hernan Cortes, also using Cuba as a base, sailed from that Spanish island possession in February 1519 for the conquest of Mexico. Here the Europeans found Indians possessing a measure of civilization and an organized government, but the Aztecs held weaker tribes in subjection. Cortes, described as "the most accomplished and statesmanlike" of the Spanish conquerors, made a conquest of the country in 1521 by urging and supporting the dominated Indian tribes in a revolt against the oppressive Aztecs and, through the promotion of civil war among the natives, obtained his objective, which was the subjugation of all. This experience developed a policy used generally by the Spaniards in their further conquests in Central and South America. They spread from the Caribbean to Peru and Chile on the west coast of the continent and then into the interior of Argentina. The first permanent settlement in this territory on the Atlantic side was at Buenos Aires, near the mouth of the River Plate, in 1580. The part of the continent of North America west of the Rio Grande and all of Central America became New Spain, which at first included Venezuela and Spanish possessions on the south as well as the west shore of the Caribbean Sea; New Castile included the isthmus and ran south to the lands west of the Andes. Later, New Granada was formed to include Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador; New Castile was supplanted by Peru; and a prime "vicerealty" for the Spanish possessions on the River Plate, Argentina, etc., was formed. The Spanish conquests from Mexico and the Caribbean to Chile and the Argentine were held to be the peculiar property of the Christian sovereign of Spain by the bull of Pope Alexander VI in 1493 and the agreement entered into by the Spanish and Portuguese at Tordesillas in 1494.

In the meanwhile, the Portuguese, in addition to their exploratory voyages and trading to the Far East around the African continent (and the Cape of Good Hope), had been giving some attention to the eastern South American bulge into the Atlantic (Brazil), which was within the scope of their specific geographical monopoly. Portuguese exploration of this part of the coast of America began with a voyage by Pedro Alvarez Cabral in 1501 (he named what is now Brazil "Santa Cruz"). The Florentine, Amerigo Vespucci, sailing under the Spanish flag, claimed the discovery of (Central) America in 1497; also that of the Bay of Rio de Janeiro for the Portuguese in 1502. Attempts at settlement by the Portuguese on the coast are said to have begun as early as 1510 (also 1516), and in 1572 there were two provinces in Brazil that had separate colonial governments under the domination of Portugal—one at Rio de Janeiro and the other at Bahia.

The right of the Spaniards and the Portuguese to divide ownership of the New World between them, with Spain getting all of North and Central America and most of the southern part of the continent (as decreed by the Pope and Holy Church of Rome in gross ignorance of the geography of the world and of the existence of a large new continent), seems to have been honored by other nations and the division recognized to a great degree by Spain and Portugal themselves as far as the tropics and South America were concerned. England was in general alliance with Spain at the time of the discovery of America and during the early sixteenth century. Henry VIII, king of England from 1509 to 1547, withdrew his country from the domination of the Catholic Church of Rome and made England a Protestant nation, but he wanted no break with Spain. His successor, Edward VI (1547-1553), was weak, and "Bloody" Mary (1553-1558) was an ardent Catholic. It was not until the reign of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603), a Protestant, that the English commenced to assert themselves on the seas. They then first claimed the right to trade with all Spanish possessions, in or out of Europe, by virtue of their treaty of trade and amity made in the reign of Charles V, but the

Spaniards maintained that there was "no peace beyond the line" set by the pope and agreed upon by Spain and Portugal at the conference of Tordesillas in 1494. As waters beyond the line were outside the scope of law and amity, the queen and government of England winked at, officially and diplomatically knew nothing about, but secretly encouraged armed trading "beyond the line," with piracy as well as smuggling. As early as 1496, in the reign of Henry VII, the English had given some attention to the discovery of a northwest passage to China and in the early sixteenth century to a northeast route around the north of Asia to the Spice Islands of the East Indies. The rivalry of France and Spain caused Francis I of France also to encourage exploration in North America and the discovery of a water trade route to Cathay.

As the Spanish colonial period advanced, there were four separate governments, each responsible to the king—New Spain, New Granada, Peru, and La Plata (or Buenos Aires); but there developed also four "captaincies-general"—Cuba, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Chile, which, while technically subdivisions of the four viceroyalties, were actually directly responsible to the king. Ecuador came into existence as the "Presidency of Quito" and Bolivia as the "Presidency of Charcas." It is significant that during the end of the domination of Spain in the Americas, the viceroyalty of New Spain ran from Guatemala up north practically to Alaska.

Statistics show that from 1534 to 1586, a period of between fifty-two and fifty-three years, 26,619 heads of families migrated from Spain to the Americas—about 500 families and, it is estimated, 1,500 to 1,600 people, all told, per year. The population of Spanish America in 1570 is said to have been 150,000 whites (including all soldiers and officials as well as farmers and artisans, their families and followers), 40,000 African Negroes, and about 4,000,000 Indians; of the whites, 36,000 were in Mexico and 59,000 in Peru. From Roland D. Hussey, in *COLONIAL HISPANIC AMERICA*, we further learn that at the close of the Spanish colonial period (about 1810), there were approximately 2,300,000 whites, 1,000,000 Negroes, and 10,000,000 Indians in Spanish America; that of the whites, about 1,100,000 were in New Spain, 275,000 in Cuba, and 150,000 in each of Guatemala and Peru.

Newfoundland and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Draw Hard-working, Practical-minded Men to
the North American Shores

The fisheries on the Newfoundland Banks and in the northwestern waters of the Atlantic Ocean publicized by John and Sebastian Cabot turned the attention of the practical, hard-working north Europeans to the Americas much more than did the exploratory voyages of Columbus and the Latin people who followed him farther to the south. Newfoundland, which is sometimes termed "the senior colony of Great Britain," antedates in discovery but not in continuous settlement any other overseas British dominion. During the years that Columbus was "discovering" America, fishing ships from several European countries were sailing west in the North Atlantic to the Banks of Newfoundland—admitted by all who had voyaged there to be the world's greatest fishing grounds. During the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the many transatlantic expeditions of the Corte-Reals, Verrazano, Cartier, Gomez, and others gave England, Portugal, France, and Spain a knowledge of the abundance of fish to be found in Newfoundland waters. It is stated that in the year 1517, besides English fishermen, there were fifty Castilian, French, and Portuguese vessels fishing on the Newfoundland Banks. It was, however, a long journey in stormy seas from a European port to the fishing banks, and a

round voyage took a great deal of time, with the return cargo of fish limited because of the small size of the vessels. We are told that in 1527, the little fishing smacks from Devon being unable to carry east their large catch, "sack ships" (large merchant vessels) were employed "to carry the salt cod to Spain and Portugal." This means that at that time, and possibly for some years prior thereto, English fishermen visiting the Banks had landed on the Newfoundland shore to salt and cure their catch, reduce its bulkage, and prepare the fish for market. In an act of 1541, the Newfoundland trade was classed by the British with the Irish, Shetland, and Iceland fisheries.

The hardy fishermen of western Europe welcomed the discovery of the Banks of Newfoundland with their teeming myriads of codfish. There was a great market for fish in the Roman Catholic countries of Europe, for in addition to requiring the abstinence from meat on all Fridays, the medieval calendar abounded with fast days during which the church permitted the eating of fish but no flesh. Lord Burghley, when pressing before a British Protestant Parliament for legislation intended to encourage and develop the fisheries and Britain's marine interests, felt it necessary to explain that the law proposed by him was an economic, political, and patriotic one, outside the domain of religion; that it was "meant only for the increase of fishermen and mariners, and not for any superstition for choice of meats." That the Newfoundland fisheries during the last half of the sixteenth century were popular and being worked extensively is indicated by Sir Humphrey Gilbert's statement that a navigator would readily know when his ship was on the Banks by the "incredible multitude of sea foule" hovering over the water to pick up the offal cast overboard by fishermen.

Sir Richard Whitbourne is authority for the statement that in 1578 (five years before Sir Humphrey Gilbert's attempt to plant an English colony at St. John's, Newfoundland) there were "100 Spanish, 50 English, 150 French, and 50 Portuguese ships" fishing on the Newfoundland Banks. Hakluyt says that in 1578 the number of vessels employed in the Newfoundland fisheries was four hundred, of which one-quarter were English, the rest being French and Spanish Basque, but Anthony Parkhurst the same year, referring also to the same fisheries, wrote: "The English are commonly lords of the harbours where they fish and use all help in fishing if need require."

The English fishermen may have been outnumbered afloat on the fishing grounds during the third quarter of the sixteenth century, but that they were numerically strong in their flaking operations on the Newfoundland shore from the spring to the fall of each year is indicated by the reception given by the fishermen to Sir Humphrey Gilbert when he landed at St. John's, Newfoundland, in August 1583 to found a colony and formally take possession "of the country" in the name of the queen of England. Gilbert cruised along the Newfoundland shores exploring the coast, but he encountered no hostility on the part of any fishermen who had their locations on the beaches for curing fish. No mention is made of any objection or resistance to his actions by the Basque, Portuguese, and French fishermen who are known to have been frequenting the fishing grounds off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador at that time—only indifference and amusement on the part of the British fishermen, who seemed to think that Sir Humphrey was somewhat demented. The Newfoundland colonization plan of Sir Humphrey Gilbert did not carry forward because of his tragic death in the Atlantic when his little "shippe" (the *Squirrel* of 10 tons) foundered in a gale.

In 1610, King James I of England granted a patent to John Guy, of Bristol, described as "an enterprising merchant," to enjoy the usual full rights and privileges from a "plantation" that he was permitted by royal favor to establish in Newfoundland, but no marked success attended Guy's efforts to found settlements. In 1615, Capt. Richard Whitbourne, of Exmouth in Devon, was dispatched by the British Admiralty to establish order and correct abuses that had grown up among the fishermen. On his return in 1622, he wrote a "Discourse and Discovery of Newfoundland Trade," which, we are told, King James, by an order in council, "caused to be distributed among the parishes of the Kingdom for the encouragement of adventure into plantation there."

In 1623 (i.e., six years before the Company of the Massachusetts Bay was chartered to colonize in New England), Sir George Calvert (1580-1632), a Yorkshire statesman, later the first Lord Baltimore, obtained an English royal patent conveying to him the proprietorship of the whole southern peninsula of Newfoundland and the exclusive right of fishing in the surrounding waters. Calvert planted a colony named Avalon at Ferryland (forty miles north of Cape Race), transported and landed settlers, and built a house that was described as "a handsome mansion," where he lived with his family for several years; but he could not protect his colony, and the French "so harassed his settlement by incessant attacks" that he was forced, at length, to abandon it. Calvert—like Raleigh before him—preferred a "kindlier climate" than that of Newfoundland, so he sailed thence to Virginia, but was forbidden to settle there unless he took "the oath of allegiance and supremacy." He declined to do this and sailed for home to obtain a new concession and charter for the territory now known as Maryland. George Calvert died on April 15, 1632, at the age of fifty-two years, and the charter for Maryland (named after Queen Mary II—joint sovereign with William III) was issued with "the great seal" on June 20, 1632, in favor of his son Cecilius Calvert, the second Lord Baltimore and the real founder of Maryland.

We are told that in 1626 a hundred and fifty vessels were being dispatched to the Newfoundland fisheries from Devon, England, alone, and naturally fleets were sent to the Banks from other English fishing villages. The fish caught was salted and dried (flaked) on the shore. As winter approached, the fishermen all re-embarked for England, carrying with them the product of their labor that had not been sent across seas in "sack ships," their supplies, and most of their property. Fishing on the Banks was a seasonal operation, and the fishermen had "no stomach for spending a winter in America." In 1650 (about one and a half centuries after this part of the country had been "discovered" by John Cabot and 650 years after Leif [Ericson], the Norse viking, had visited it), Newfoundland contained only three hundred fifty families and had a population of less than two thousand, distributed in five small settlements chiefly along the eastern shore. The number of people living on the island was naturally much greater during the fishing season of the summer and part of the spring and fall, and "a floating population of several thousand frequented the shores during the summer for the sake of the fisheries." Strange as it may seem, a condition soon developed that discouraged colonization of Newfoundland, and this grew to be an official policy of the British Government. Referring to the fishery interests that worked the Banks of Newfoundland and the waters of the northwestern Atlantic, we read:

It became the interest of these traders and ship-owners to discourage the settlement of the country, in order to retain the exclusive use of the harbours and fishing coves for their servants, and also a monopoly of the fisheries. They were able to procure the support of the English Govt. of the day for this system, and stringent laws were passed prohibiting settlement within six miles of the shore,

forbidding fishermen to remain behind at the close of the fishing season, and rendering it illegal to build or repair a house without a special license. The object of this shortsighted policy, which was persisted in for more than a century, was to preserve the island as a fishing station and the fisheries as a nursery for the English fleet.

The Basques, Portuguese, and French, from early days, had realized the immense value of the fisheries off the northeast coast of America (Newfoundland, Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Maine), and as the French grew to be a great naval power, they tried to obtain possession of Newfoundland—and this for reasons other than the fisheries. Since Jacques Cartier's exploration of the St. Lawrence (up to Montreal) in 1524-1525 and Samuel de Champlain's explorations, attempts to colonize, and focusing of attention, beginning in 1603, on a profitable fur trade of mammoth proportions for the nation that controlled the great water highway running far inland and tapping an unexplored, rich country, the French had been determined to own the St. Lawrence watershed and all the lands thereabout, particularly Acadia (including Nova Scotia), Cape Breton Island, Labrador, and Newfoundland. They strove long and desperately to possess Newfoundland, as it commanded the entrance and was at the mouth of their great trading river. Therefore, this island had a double value to the

French: (1) proximity to the world's greatest fishing grounds; (2) the gateway to the trading river down which came unsurpassedly rich furs.

During the long wars between England and France, the frequent raids and persistent pressure and encroachments by the French rendered life and property insecure to the relatively small numbers of British settlers on Newfoundland or along the "fish coasts" of Labrador, Cape Breton Island, and Nova Scotia. When at length the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 ended hostilities for some years between the nations and recognized the British possession of Newfoundland, it did not deliver "the great fish island in the Northwest Atlantic" wholly from the grasp of France, as the treaty gave that country the right of catching and drying fish on the western and northern sides of the island. "Though no territorial rights were conferred on the French and the sovereignty was secured to England, the practical effect was to exclude the inhabitants from the fairest half of the island." A number of sturdy Anglo-Saxon settlers, in spite of restrictive regulations and the persistent encroachments of the French (legal and illegal), clung to the soil and steadily combated the frequent, unscrupulous, and very shortsighted maneuvers of the English fishing merchants to uproot them. In 1728 the British Government, notwithstanding the organized opposition of the domestic fisheries interests, appointed Capt. Henry Osborne the first governor of Newfoundland and sent him out to the island with a commission to establish a form of civil government. Since Sir Humphrey Gilbert had landed at St. John's in 1583, formally taken possession of the island in the name of Queen Elizabeth of England, and announced his intention of founding a settlement there, it had required 145 years for conditions pertaining to real colonization and government of the settlers of the island to advance to this point. In 1763 the fixed population of Newfoundland, still known as "the great fishing isle," was stated as 8,000, with an additional 5,000 on shore during the fishing season. In 1785, following the close of the War of the Revolution, the number of "settled inhabitants" of Newfoundland was mentioned as "ten thousand souls—men, women and children."

*Sir Humphrey Gilbert — the Pioneer English
Colonist in America*

A forerunner of the New England, or northeastern, colonists of America was Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1539-1583), referred to in British historical records as "the English soldier and navigator who was the pioneer colonist in America." He was a stepbrother of Sir Walter Raleigh. In April 1566, Gilbert joined with Anthony Jenkinson in a petition to Queen Elizabeth for the discovery of the northeast passage, and in November following he presented an independent petition for the "discovering of a passage by the north to go to Cataia." In 1572, Sir Humphrey Gilbert (he was knighted on January 1, 1570) fought in the Netherlands against Spain. Upon his return to England, he wrote a famous DISCOURSE—dealing with a probable northwest passage to China—that is credited with promoting the 1576-1578 enterprises of Sir Martin Frobisher (1535-1594), the Yorkshire navigator and explorer who is rated as one of England's "most able seamen and greatest naval heroes."

On June 11, 1578, Sir Humphrey obtained from Queen Elizabeth his long-coveted charter for northwestern discovery and colonization, and on September 23, 1578, he left Dartmouth presumably on a voyage of discovery in the northwest Atlantic. Although Gilbert's charter authorized him to discover, occupy, and possess such remote "heathen lands not actually possessed by any Christian prince or people, as should seem good to him or them," he

returned home in May 1579 with little to show for his efforts that had not been discovered, explored, and chartered by others earlier in the field. There is much mystery attached to this 1578-1579 voyage of Gilbert, but it is evident that it was more of a privateering cruise, undertaken with the hope of obtaining wealth for furthering his plans in the northwest Atlantic, than one planned for direct exploration and development of the northeastern lands of the New World. Some historians say, however, that Gilbert was on the Banks and off Nova Scotia in the fall of 1578 and had hopes of exploring the more or less legendary big river named Norumbega (or Norumbeque).

In 1579, Sir Humphrey rendered valuable service to the government in Ireland (he had been appointed governor of Munster in October 1569), but evidently he became badly in need of funds, even though in 1578 he disposed of his patrimony and the estates in Kent that he had through his wife, and in July 1582 he had to appeal to the government for the payment of an amount then owing him. Matters were apparently adjusted, for in 1583 Gilbert succeeded in equipping a fleet for a "Western planting," and on June 11 he sailed from Plymouth with five ships and "the Queen's blessing." Forty-nine days later (July 30, 1583), he was off the north coast of Newfoundland. After some period spent in exploration, he selected the site of the present St. John's at the east of the island and landed there August 5, 1583, to establish the first English colony, or plantation, in North America. On the island, Gilbert found many fishermen engaged in drying and curing their catch, and they were not particularly interested in what he told them about his "planting" of an English colony there. Gilbert erected a monument and did divers other things, such as the customs of the day required of those taking possession of a new land for the royal ruler to whom it was subject. The fishermen of other nations (Basques, Bretons, and Portuguese) apparently made no objections of any moment, for it seems that all they cared about were the fisheries and the right, without any interference, to use any part of the shore that they might desire to handle their catch and flake their fish. It appears that, contrary to the initial intent, Gilbert did not at that time put any men ashore to stay. In 1580 he had sent a ship under the command of John Wallace to survey some indefinite part of the New England coast referred to at that time as "Norumbega" and the land of the "Grand River" of the new western world, which seems to have been in northern Virginia and possibly the Penobscot area, for evidently that is where Wallace visited and traded with the Indians for furs. Afterwards, he carried his cargo to France, where, De Costa says, the furs sold at forty shillings each.

It is said that before settling the men ashore permanently at St. John's, Gilbert planned to extend his explorations and personally learn more of the geography of the American coast in the territories that we now know as Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Maine. While proceeding to locate and explore the indefinite country and River of Norumbega, or "Great River," which Gilbert suspected might lead to the waters of Cathay and the Indies, he ran into a lot of bad luck. His fleet encountered a terrific gale during the latter days of August (probably the end of a southern hurricane), which scattered the ships and caused the wreck of his largest vessel, the *Admiral*, and severe injuries to others. With great reluctance, Gilbert decided to go back to England for needed refitting and supplies and gave orders to that effect to the remnants of his fleet with which he made contact, affirming that he would return to St. John's in May of the following year.

Most surprisingly, Gilbert sailed for home in the little "barke," or "friggot," *Squirrel* of only 10 tons instead of in the "great ship" *Golden Hind* of 40 tons, which accompanied him, although he well knew that in heavy seas the *Squirrel* was so small as to be a great hazard. However, he affirmed that he could not leave the little craft in the West and that he would not ask any man to serve on a ship in which he would not sail. Gilbert's masterly handling of the diminutive vessel kept her afloat for forty days after she headed for home, but in a "great tempest" off the Azores the ship foundered and Sir Humphrey Gilbert went down with her. Captain Haynes of the *Golden Hind* reported that on Monday, September 9, 1583, "the friggot [*Squirrel*] was near cast away . . . yet at that time recovered; and giving forth signs

of joy, the general [Gilbert], sitting abaft with a book in his hand, cried out unto us in the '*Hind*,' 'We are as near to Heaven by sea as by land.' The same Monday night, about twelve, the friggot being ahead of us in the '*Golden Hind*,' suddenly her lights were out; . . . in that moment the friggot was devoured and swallowed up in the sea."

Sir Humphrey Gilbert was forty-four years of age when he died. He was a versatile and intellectually brilliant as well as brave man. His heir, Sir John Gilbert, who died in 1608, was associated with Sir Ferdinando Gorges in his early attempts to colonize northern Virginia (New England). Sir Humphrey's other sons, Bartholomew and Raleigh, both figured conspicuously in voyages to New England and attempts to colonize it. In 1602, Bartholomew Gilbert was a co-captain with Bartholomew Gosnold in the historic voyage of the *Concord* to the Maine and Massachusetts coasts, and Raleigh Gilbert (named after Sir Walter Raleigh, his uncle) was the second in command to George Popham in the famous expedition that landed colonists at the mouth of the Kennebec River in 1607.

*Sir Walter Raleigh Carries on the Work of Establishing
English Colonies in America Initiated by His
Stepbrother Sir Humphrey Gilbert*

Sir Walter Raleigh (1552-1618), a great favorite (at times) of Queen Elizabeth, presumably carried on Sir Humphrey Gilbert's work. On June 11, 1578, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Raleigh's half-brother, who for years had been advocating the existence and need of discovery of a northwest passage to the Pacific, obtained from Queen Elizabeth a long-sought and prized charter for northwestern exploration, trade, and colonization. That same year, it would seem, Gilbert led what was virtually a piratical attack against the Spaniards, and Raleigh, then twenty-six years old, accompanied Sir Humphrey as captain of the *Falcon*. In 1583, the year before Raleigh was knighted, he furnished one of the five ships of the fleet with which his half-brother sailed from Plymouth to plant a colony on the northeastern shores of America. This expedition, with which Raleigh was not connected in person, ended disastrously. Sir Humphrey Gilbert landed at St. John's, Newfoundland, and selected that site for a colony and the center of his operations. While proceeding to explore the coast of the New World to the southwest, Gilbert's fleet suffered such heavy loss and damage during gales of hurricane force that Gilbert had to abandon all his plans for the voyage and, with the surviving units of his badly battered fleet, sail for home for necessary repairs. On the return passage to England, Gilbert heroically and dramatically lost his life when the little *Squirrel*, of which he was in command, foundered.

The mantle of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who had disposed of his estates and risked his all in an endeavor to colonize northeastern America and open up new trade routes to China and the Indies, fell upon young Raleigh. His thoughts and motives were quite different from Gilbert's, for he turned his attention entirely to the south and to such lands then not occupied by Spain or "not possessed by any Christian prince or people." Raleigh was influenced greatly by the general anti-Spanish feeling in England at the time and was thrilled by the exploits of Hawkins and Drake. After his own experience in privateering against the Spaniards, his passion became "all of North America for the English" and as much of the rest of the New World as could be wrested from Spain. The patent given in 1578 to Gilbert, his half-brother, ran out in 1584, but in March the crown renewed it, in substance, in Raleigh's favor. The new grant gave Raleigh and his heirs the proprietary right over all territory he

or they occupied on payment of one-fifth of the produce of all mines of precious metals to the crown. Queen Elizabeth, evidently, had no interest either in the fisheries or in timber, and her thoughts, as far as the colonization of America was concerned, were along the Spanish line of gold and exploitation for precious metals.

Baldwin, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAS*, says: "It is the glory of Spain always to have been first in spreading Christian truth; it is the glory of England always to have been first in spreading economic truth." He adds:

While the world was going mad over the golden will-o'-the-wisp that lured so many gallant hidalgos to their deaths, a little group of men in London was working to undermine the reign of gold and substitute the reign of commerce. The leader of this group was that pearl-encrusted mirror of fashion

Sir Walter Raleigh, whose contradictions of character make him the traditional man of the English Renaissance, . . . and associated with Raleigh were his half-brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and a clergyman named Richard Hakluyt.

Whereas it is true that England's glory was in commerce, Raleigh was not a true man of vision or even an ardent—not to mention successful—pioneer in that field. Gilbert actually antedated Raleigh in his endeavors, and Gilbert was trade-minded, with his plans concentrated on the north and "the hard way." Hakluyt was merely academical and a collector and publisher of material pertaining to ocean voyages; he was not a practical man, a navigator, or a merchant. He never went to sea and knew nothing of ships, trade, or foreign countries at first hand. Although many Englishmen at the end of the sixteenth and during the first part of the seventeenth century clearly saw that "gold was simply one of the instruments of commerce, not a legitimate end in itself," and that "true wealth was in goods," Raleigh was in fact never one of that number; he was at heart as gold-crazy as any Spanish conquistador and fully as ruthless and unscrupulous in his desire to obtain the precious metal and any form of portable treasure. Sir Humphrey Gilbert visualized a trade route to China and India in the north and sought to make his dream come true by capitalizing the commerce of the Newfoundland fisheries, pushing on through promoting the mainland fur trade, and planting settlements, or colonies, as he went farther afield until a paying trade route could be developed between England and the Far East. Richard Hakluyt had neither the strong convictions of Sir Humphrey Gilbert in regard to trading "the hard way in the north" nor of Sir Walter Raleigh, whose thoughts were along lines of Spanish procedure and the finding of gold and the mining of precious metals if he had no opportunity to obtain them by the looting, subjugation, and exploiting of foreign peoples.

For a clergyman, Hakluyt did not exhibit any great measure of the humanities or express much love or sympathy for his unfortunate fellowman in the lower classes of society. He looked to North America as a place where England might plant "the offals of our people as the Portingals do in Brasill, and so they may in our fishing, in our passage, and divers wayes yeelde commoditie to England by harbouring and victualling us." Baldwin says that the pioneers of American colonization in England desired an outlet for the vagabonds "that swarmed in every hedgerow of once merry England and a market for the goods that England's manufacturers were itching to make"; but the early American settlers were not "vagabonds" or what Hakluyt contemptuously referred to as "the offals of our people." The settlers of Jamestown in 1607 represented a social cross section of old England, with its gentry and servants; the Popham (Sagadahoc) colonists of the same year were selected men of ability—generally in mechanical lines; the Plymouth Pilgrims (1620) were fairly well-educated and industrious religious refugees; while the early Puritans, who migrated to Massachusetts Bay in 1628-1630, were men of intelligence and of an unusually high caliber, many of them possessing wealth. In writing to Queen Elizabeth, however, urging colonization in North America (Virginia), the devout Hakluyt said: "If her Majestie take these westerne discoveries in hande and plant there, yt is like that in short time wee shall vente as greate a masse of clothe yn those partes as ever wee did in the Netherlandes and in tyme moche more." Hakluyt took an interest in the fisheries because they used ships and made voyages, but

had the Raleigh complex of the south and gold; he favored settlements in the southern part of Virginia and the crowding-out of the Spaniards. In his letter to Elizabeth, referring to the king of Spain (for whom England's queen had no love), Hakluyt said: "If you touche him in the Indies, you touche the apple of his eye."

In April 1584, Sir Walter Raleigh sent two ships to America (under Capt. Philip Amadas and Capt. Arthur Barlowe) on a voyage of exploration. They sailed via the Canary Islands to Florida and worked carefully up the coast to as far as the inlet between Albemarle and Pamlico sounds in modern North Carolina, or to about Lat. 35° N. Amadas and Barlowe, upon their return to England, reported that they had found an ideal site (in North Carolina) on which to plant a colony. The land was described as "the most plentiful, sweet, fruitful and wholesome of all the world" and the natives as a people "most gentle, loving, and faithful, void of all guile and treason, and such as live after the manner of the Golden Age." It is generally believed that Raleigh named the country—a vast and undefined territory on the continent of North America—"Virginia" in honor of his sovereign, the Virgin Queen of England, but some historians affirm that Elizabeth herself, "in a moment of self-gratulation," named the land "Virginia." It is of interest to note that none of Raleigh's captains or settlers ever set foot on or even saw any part of the country now known as the State of Virginia.

The first body of settlers, consisting, we are told, of "108 men" under Ralph Lane as colonial governor, sailed from Plymouth April 9, 1585, on a fleet of seven small vessels commanded by Raleigh's cousin Sir Richard Grenville (or Greynville—1541-1591) and landed on what is now Roanoke Island, North Carolina, on August 17. The doughty Grenville returned almost immediately to England, but even at that he stayed too long, for before his departure he burned the cornfields of the Indians as punishment for the theft of a silver cup. The "most gentle, loving, and faithful" natives, "void of all guile and treason," stepped out of "the Golden Age" in which Captain Amadas and Captain Barlowe had placed them and retaliated in kind by acts of hostility. We are told that Lane was a good leader and did his best to make the settlement a success, but that the opacity and "God Almighty superiority" of Grenville had doomed the colony from the start. Lane even explored a promising North Carolina inlet with the hope that it might lead to the Pacific. The surviving settlers, threatened with famine and with destruction by the Indians, went back to England June 19, 1586, on ships commanded by Sir Francis Drake (1545-1596), the famous English admiral, who was the first Englishman to circumnavigate the globe (1577-1580) and in 1588 won glory in the defeat of the Spanish Armada.

Ralph Lane is credited with taking back to England some tobacco and potato plants, and he is said to have been the first English smoker. Lane and Sir Francis Drake interested Raleigh in the use of tobacco, who popularized it in court circles and "tooke a pipe of tobacco a little before he went to the scaffold." Tobacco, however, was first taken to Europe by the Spaniard Francisco Fernandes in 1558, or twenty-eight years before Lane introduced it in England. Thomas Harriot, a naturalist with Lane in the Virginia (North Carolina) colony, wrote of the Indians' use of the weed as follows: "By sucking it through pipes of clay, they purged all gross humours from the head and stomach, opened all the pores and passages of the body, preserving it from obstructions or breaking them, whereby they notably preserved their health, and knew not many grievous diseases, wherewith we in England are often afflicted." James I, who ascended the throne following Elizabeth's death in 1603, loved his Scotch whisky, but it would seem that he had no use for tobacco. In a "counter blaste to tobacco," he denounced the use of the plant as "loathesome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain, dangerous to the lungs," to say nothing of "the black stinking fume" and "horrible Stygian smoke."

Whereas Raleigh, through Lane, was probably responsible for introducing tobacco into England, the report that Raleigh's men brought the first potato plants to England is erroneous. The original habitat of the wild potato is Peru and Chile, and potatoes were unknown

to the Indians of Virginia until they were introduced there by the whites about a century after Raleigh's attempts at colonization. Sir John Hawkins is said to have carried some sweet potatoes into England in 1565, but the introduction of the ordinary potato into Great Britain and Ireland (where it became the staple food crop of the island) is generally attributed to Sir Francis Drake, who looted the coast towns of Chile and Peru in 1578 and then returned to England across the Pacific and Indian oceans. In Offenburg, Baden, there is a monument inscribed, "Sir Francis Drake, introducer of the potato into Europe in the year of our Lord 1580." Other records indicate, however, that Drake brought the first potato into England in 1586. If Raleigh, as is claimed, introduced potatoes into Ireland by planting them on his great estates in that country, the plants probably came directly or indirectly from Drake, as they positively were not brought to Raleigh by Lane from the North Carolina plantation.

Soon after what was left of the first group of settlers had left for England with Sir Francis Drake in June 1586, Sir Richard Grenville returned to Roanoke Island "with supplies and more colonists" and succeeded in influencing 15 emigrants to remain there when he sailed away. In the spring of 1587, Raleigh organized his third colonizing expedition and dispatched another company consisting of 121 persons under John White, with instructions to remove the plantation to the shore of Chesapeake Bay. The ships arrived at Roanoke Island July 22, 1587. It was found that not one of the 15 persons left there by Grenville the year before remained alive. The sailors refused to carry the emigrants any farther, and the new settlers went ashore. It is said that Simon Ferdinando, a Portuguese sailor in the employ of the English, was responsible for this apparently mutinous and unwarranted action on the part of the crews of the ships, and he has been accused of duplicity. (Ferdinando had made a voyage to Maine in 1579 in a "little frigate" while in the service of the Earl of Walsingham.) Incidentally, John White's granddaughter Virginia Dare, born on the island August 18, 1587, was the first English child born in America. In the early fall, White, taking the only ship left to the colonists, returned to England for supplies and necessary equipment and seemingly neglected his fellow countrymen in Virginia, for he did not get back to Roanoke Island until 1590, at which time no trace could be found of any of the emigrants and the settlement had been destroyed. All of the colonists had either died or disappeared, and the only sign of their having been there was the word "Croatan" carved on a tree. It appears that Raleigh did make attempts to send aid to the colonists in 1588 and again in 1589, but the relief expeditions did not get through; the first was mixed up with the Spanish Armada crisis, and the second was captured by Spanish corsairs. One report was prevalent that the colonists had been massacred and exterminated by the Indians the same as the earlier settlers; another legend says that "they wandered away with friendly Indians" and "went native."

In 1589, Sir Walter Raleigh, chagrined at his failure to colonize America, had withdrawn from further attempts to establish "plantations" in the New World and had resigned his rights to a company of merchants, preserving to himself a rent and a fifth of whatever gold might be discovered. It is said that Raleigh spent over forty thousand pounds in his attempts to found an English colony in America, but was compelled to discontinue his efforts because of the war with Spain and the drain upon his means. Subsequently, two more expeditions to the Carolinas failed to find any signs of the English colonists, but when the Jamestown, Va., settlement was planted by the London Company, the colonists heard from the Indians of the massacre of many English at Roanoke and the intermarriage of a few pitiful survivors with the Hatteras Indians. Capt. John Smith was friendly with the Indians in Virginia and quite successful in his contacts and relationships with them. His ability to get along with the aborigines and win their friendship and confidence saved that colony from extermination through starvation as well as from possible attack on a large organized scale, which would have resulted in the destruction of the settlement and the massacre of its inhabitants. Smith knew in 1608 of the Roanoke colonists' fate, which had occurred ten years before at a point about a hundred miles to the south—as the crow flies—but decidedly remote as far as accessibility was concerned on the part of the badly organized, discordant, and ill-

equipped Jamestown Colony; hence his refusal to follow the orders of the proprietors of the London Company and further weaken the then tottering Jamestown settlement by embarking on the futile mission of searching in hostile Indian country for any possible survivors of the Raleigh Roanoke colony.

Sir Walter Raleigh was more interested in El Dorado in the interior of Guiana on the Orinoco River in the northern part of the continent of South America than in the more prosaic settlement projects of Virginia. The legend of El Dorado, the gilded king, who was reputed to cover himself with pure gold and to wash it off in the waters of the sacred lake "Manoa" in Guiana, reached Raleigh among the papers of captured Spanish ships. This strange legend, invented by coastal Indians with habitations near the mouth of the Orinoco, impressed the gullible, imaginative, and gold-crazy Englishman, causing him to ascend the river in 1595 in search of El Dorado, send Lawrence Keymis on a similar mission a year later, and make his disastrous third and last adventure to the Orinoco in 1617 with Keymis as his lieutenant.

Raleigh did strongly believe that North America should be an English-owned colony, and he preached this doctrine more because he wanted to keep the Spanish out of it than with any idea of the value of Virginia to England. He wrote regarding Virginia, "I shall yet live to see it an English nation." However, Raleigh positively did not, as claimed by so many historians, "plant the seeds of England's greatness overseas" on the continent of North America; he neither wrote nor said many of the statements attributed to him or "his numerous mouthpieces"; he had no part, directly or indirectly, in the founding in 1606 of the London and Plymouth companies, which were responsible for the English colonization of Virginia and New England. Indeed, these ventures were made possible only when the throne revoked the charter rights held by Raleigh, which had reached him through the death of his half-brother Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who died when Raleigh was thirty-one years of age.

Too great emphasis has been placed by some historians on the contribution of Raleigh to the development and colonization of North America, and it has even been suggested by one recent writer that the title of "Father of American Colonization" should be given to "that great originator Walter Raleigh." Recorded history is a queer mix-up of writings and sayings that are the product of emotion, bias, and propaganda. Raleigh, because of his consistent and almost fanatical hatred for Spain, was a hero to most of the "common" and uninformed people of England, and his trial, imprisonment, and ultimately his death, together with certain reported and exaggerated "knightly" incidents, added to his popularity with the lower classes and made of him an appealing historical figure. From the available records of his trial in November 1603 and his condemnation to death, it would seem that the direct evidence presented was not sufficient to prove his guilt of conspiracy as charged; yet practically everybody in a position to know was well aware (1) that Raleigh knew full well of the conspiracy and, even if not guilty of any direct treacherous act, had encouraged the movement and given it his sympathetic support and (2) that much evidence that could have been presented against him by the government was purposely withheld by the council for reasons of state. King James I refused to permit the death sentence to be carried out, although he denounced Raleigh as a disloyal man and a warmonger whose liberty would endanger his "peace policy." Raleigh was confined to the Tower, but his imprisonment was made "easy" by royal decree, and from December 1603 to March 1616 he enjoyed a great measure of freedom and comfort while restricted in movement to within the walls of a great prison used to secure aristocratic political offenders.

The character of Raleigh is well illustrated by the method used to secure his release from prison and his doings thereafter, which operated to the discredit of all who were a party to them. King James was in need of money, and Raleigh, knowing this fact, worked on it to obtain his liberty, promising the king that he would find a gold mine for him in Guiana "without trenching on a Spanish possession." It was obvious that Raleigh was talking recklessly in order to obtain his freedom. Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador, warned James that

the Spaniards had settlements in the territory to which Raleigh wanted to go, and Raleigh left the Tower and embarked on his last expedition to the New World, knowing full well that he had given promises he could not keep, that his gold-mine story was a deliberate lie, and that if he obtained gold or treasure for his king, it would have to be acquired by resorting to piracy. That James I was aware of the truth is evident by his pre-departure declaration to Raleigh: that if he was guilty of piracy at any stage of the expedition, he would be executed on his return to England in harmony with the sentence of death passed upon him by the court at the trial held at Winchester in November 1603—the carrying-out of which verdict had been merely suspended by James. Raleigh, banking on intrigues that he entered into with certain foreign powers antagonistic to Spain, sailed to the Orinoco in March 1617. His men fought the Spaniards in an established Spanish settlement and killed several of them. His son Walter was wounded and died during the journey up the Orinoco, while Sir Walter Raleigh remained at Trinidad ill with fever; no gold mine was found and no other portable wealth. On the return of the expedition to Raleigh's headquarters, the leader, Lawrence Keymis, committed suicide, and after the crew mutinied, Raleigh was compelled to return home. Upon his arrival in England, he was arrested and was executed on October 29, 1618, under orders of King James. A modern writer has said that, "after another disastrous attempt to colonize in Guiana, he [Sir Walter Raleigh] was beheaded at the request of Spain, to the dishonor and shame of the civilized world"; this statement is not in harmony with the facts, for Raleigh was beheaded in accordance with the death sentence passed upon him by an English court in November 1603 after having been given fair warning by the crown that if he committed an act of piracy and made war on Spain during his expedition, the royal clemency would cease and the law take its course.

Sir Walter Raleigh never journeyed to America to take part personally in any one of his three attempts at colonization, and all three expeditions (1585, 1586, and 1587) were badly planned and managed. At this time, Raleigh, being high in the queen's favor was more interested in grabbing wealth and power in England and Ireland than he was in American colonization. (In 1585 he was made warden of the English mines; in 1586 he was given by the crown 40,000 acres of "forfeited" land in Ireland and, a year later, a further substantial acreage. Then followed grants of valuable English properties, a patent to issue licenses to tavern keepers and one to control the export of woolen cloth.) He was an ornamental court favorite, and his positions, such as captain of the guard, were more honorary than arduous or responsible. Raleigh's real interest in America was in the possibility of finding gold and precious metals in the New World. At heart, he was an English conquistador and an exploiter—not a colonizer, a builder, and a developer. In 1587, when Raleigh sent his third and last expedition to America, he was more interested in holding his power at court than in colonizing America, for the Earl of Essex was displacing him as Elizabeth's favorite, and in 1588 (the year of the defeat of the Spanish Armada), Raleigh was in eclipse. When he went to Dorsetshire, he lived on an estate that he had "extorted" from the Bishop of Salisbury "by unscrupulous use of the royal influence." In 1595, Raleigh personally journeyed to America, but he sailed to the coast of South America to explore for gold. His account of the voyage was fantastic and, it is said, "was received with incredulity," as it evidently was mostly imaginative. In 1590 he had been declared an atheist and, a little later, was referred to as "the most unpopular man in England" because of his "greed, arrogance and scepticism in religion." When Essex fell from royal favor, it is significant that Raleigh once more was in the ascendancy at court and that in February 1601, when Essex was beheaded, Raleigh presided at the execution as captain of the guard. Historian Baldwin rightly says that "Raleigh proved his courage—and his brutality—in the wars in France, the Netherlands and Ireland; his arrogance and his subtlety in the scramble at court for royal favor and for confiscated lands."

There is nothing about Sir Walter Raleigh's life to suggest that, following the death of his stepbrother Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1583, he cared anything whatsoever about the colonization of America except for the possible benefits that the monopolistic rights of settle-

ment and of trade would mean to him in gold or portable wealth. Hence he declined even to consider continuing Gilbert's exploration in the northwest and the establishment of settlements in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New England; he declared himself as opposed to exploration "north of the 36th or 37th parallel" (New England runs from about 41° to 45° N., and Newfoundland is about 48° N.). It is said that when Bartholomew Gosnold completed his 1602 voyage to New England (then known as northern Virginia), Raleigh seized Gosnold's cargo of sassafras and cedar and claimed that the navigator had been poaching on his exclusive domain. As Raleigh saw that the Gosnold cargo was a profitable one, he joined with Bristol merchants (who supplied the money through Hakluyt) and the next year (1603) sent a ship to Massachusetts under Capt. Martin Pring, with Gosnold's pilot on board, under orders to duplicate the itinerary, cargo, and profits of the Gosnold voyage.

Sir Ferdinando Gorges (1566-1647) and Capt. John Smith (1579-1631) are entitled to most of the honor for the colonization of North America, and both must share the glory of being primarily responsible for the English occupation and development of New England.

*Bartholomew Gosnold — English Navigator,
Trader, and Colonist*

Bartholomew Gosnold was an English navigator who played an important part in the exploration and colonization of North America and the first voyager to the New World to sail from Europe direct, and with intent, to the New England coast. In 1602, with Bartholomew Gilbert (son of Sir Humphrey Gilbert) accompanying him as second in authority, or co-captain, and thirty-two men, Bartholomew Gosnold commanded the small "barke" *Concord*, chartered by West County merchant-adventurers. Gosnold left Falmouth, England, in late March, touched at the Azores April 14, crossed the Atlantic to a point on the Maine coast near Portland (Casco Bay), and sailed down and explored the northeast American coast.

We read from the writing of John Brereton, a member of the crew of the *Concord*, which is confirmed by the manuscript of Gabriel Archer, "a gentleman" on board (who later became a leader of the Jamestown, Va., colonists), that when in "the latitude of 43 degrees," off the New Hampshire coast, there put out from the shore a "Baske-shallop [Biscay shallop] with mast and saile, an iron grapple, and a kettle of copper." The Indians aboard (Brereton says "sixe" and Archer "eight") approached boldly, and what little clothing the "savages" wore was evidently European in origin. These Indians, "by some words and signs they made," intimated that "some Baskes of S John de Luz have fished or traded in this place" (near the mouth of the Piscataqua and the Isles of Shoals), and Archer states that the Indians, "with a piece of chalk described the coast thereabouts and could name Placentia of the Newfoundland; they spoke divers Christian words and seemed to understand much more than we, for want of language, could comprehend." This strange but verified encounter of pioneer English explorers with Indians who had been taught by Biscayan fishermen to draw maps with a piece of chalk, who were acquainted with the fishing port of Placentia, Newfoundland, who could speak several words of the French of St. Jean de Lux (on the shore of the lower southeast corner of the Bay of Biscay, about midway between Biarritz, France, and the Spanish border at Hendaye-Irun), and the chief of whom wore a European hat, breeches, waistcoat, stockings and shoes suggests that the fishermen frequenting the Newfoundland Banks following the explorations of the Cabots and Corte-Reals in 1497-1502 must have on occasions wandered to the shores of New England. Indeed, it would have been surprising if, of the several hun-

dreds of European fishing vessels that had been visiting the fishing grounds off Newfoundland and Labrador for a century, many had not come, at some time or other, either in sight of or casually in contact with the shores of Maine, New Hampshire, or Massachusetts. The Gosnold encounter with Indians off the Piscataqua indicates without doubt that the real, practical discoverers of New England were the Newfoundland fishermen of the sixteenth century (generally English, Portuguese, French, and Spanish) and not the European navigator-explorers of the seventeenth century—Gosnold (1602), Pring (1603 and 1606), Champlain (1604-1606), Waymouth (1605), Hudson (1609), Argall (1610), Biard (1611), Harlow (1611), Plastrier (1611), Block (1614), and Smith (1614).

Gosnold paid particular attention to the Maine and Massachusetts coasts, having primarily in mind the possibility of trading and of acquiring materials for which there was a good market in England. Among the landing places that he named were the Elizabeth Islands, Cape Cod, and Martha's Vineyard. Brereton's description of fishing off what Gosnold first named "Shoal Hope" and later, because of further survey and experience, changed to "Cape Cod" is of interest:

In five or sixe hours absense we had pestered our ship so with cod fish that we threw numbers of them overboard againe, and surely I am persuaded that in the months of March, April and May, there is upon this coast better fishing, and in as great plentie, as in Newfoundland; for the sculles of Mackerell, herrings, cod and other fish that we daily

saw as we went and came from the shore were wonderfull; and besides the places where we tooke these cods (and might in a few daies have laden our ship) were but in seven faddome water and within lesse than a league of the shore; where in Newfoundland they fish in fortie or fiftie fadome water, and farre off.

Archer's report of the fishing of the *Concord* off Cape Cod substantiates the enthusiasm of Brereton, and Archer is in accord with the statement made that the fishing off the newly discovered and named cape was better than in the deeper waters of the Banks, which lay some distance from the island of Newfoundland.

The chroniclers of the Gosnold voyage speak of the New Hampshire and Massachusetts Indians as having copper utensils, implements, and ornaments ("a kettle"; "pipes steeled with copper"; "a plate of rich copper, in length a foot, in breadth half a foot, for a breast-plate"; "the ears had pendants of copper," etc.). It would be interesting to know where these Indian aborigines, or "savages," obtained so much copper in a form available for such purposes.

Gosnold was primarily interested in opportunities for profitable bartering with the natives and in finding such marketable things as sassafras rather than in locating sites for settlements. Indeed, most British reports say that the Gosnold voyage was solely a commercial and trading venture, with no thought of colonizing, but Gabriel Archer writes of the apparently serious attempt to establish a little settlement on one of the Elizabeth Islands (Cuttyhunk). It is said that Gosnold's men set to work to build "our fort and place of abode"; that a crew of ten men built a house "sufficient to harbour twenty persons at least with their necessary provisions"; that a division was made of "the ship's stores for England" and for the planters, "whereby there fell out a controversy"; that, with most of the men (under Gosnold) cutting cedar wood on a nearby island and ten men left at the fort and proposed settlement, two of these men, while exploring the little island for possible food, were assaulted by four Indians with bows and arrows. It is implied that of the thirty-two men on the *Concord*, twenty had been planning to stay on the small island off the American coast and found a colony. The number was small for the establishment of a settlement in a country inhabited by Indians, and the number of men left (twelve all told, officers and crew) to take the laden "barke" back to England was also small. In any event, the attack by the Indians and the food controversy caused a revolt. Some of the men who had "vowed to stay" refused to do so; "whereupon the planters diminishing, all was given over." On June 17, the *Concord*, with her entire company and a cargo consisting principally of sassafras and cedar wood, sailed for England and came to anchor at Exmouth, the harbor town of Exeter, Devonshire, on July 23, 1602, after an

absence of about four months. Henry F. Howe, in PROLOGUE TO NEW ENGLAND, says in regard to the Gosnold voyage:

The colonization attempt was obviously ill prepared and halfhearted. The meaning of the voyage was rather, that here for the first time was a forthright expedition to America which returned to England with a paying cargo of something besides fish or furs, and a trustworthy description of a commercially attractive coast. It is said that the sassafras cargo of the *Concord* was confiscated by Raleigh because of his royal monopoly through the queen's patent. But it is also said that the cargo influenced the market sufficiently to produce a sudden drop in the price of that product.

Whereas the claimed seizure of the cargo of the *Concord* by Sir Walter Raleigh would be "in character" with the man, it is well to bear in mind that in 1589 Raleigh had resigned his rights in Virginia to "a company of merchants," preserving to himself a rent and a fifth of whatever gold might be discovered; that at the time of Gosnold's voyage in 1602 Raleigh was not in royal favor but in positive disgrace as Queen Elizabeth neared her end; and that during that very year he was dismissed from the captaincy of the guard as well as the governorship of Jersey and deprived of his monopolies. Moreover, Bartholomew Gilbert, who sailed in the *Concord*, was a nephew of Sir Walter Raleigh, and the ship, according to trustworthy sources, had been chartered for the voyage and the expedition had been largely financed by Sir Walter's friends, one of whom was Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton. In further opposition to the theory of arbitrary confiscation of the cargo is the fact that shortly after Gosnold's return to England the "well-informed" Richard Hakluyt influenced a group of hardheaded Bristol merchants to send Martin Pring in the ships *Speedwell* and *Discoverer* to America to follow the course of Gosnold and bring back to England cargoes of sassafras.

Contrary to the writings of some historians (who, nevertheless, base their views on the account of Gabriel Archer) and in support of the contention of others and the statements of contemporaries, it would seem that the Gosnold voyage was never planned to be a colonizing expedition but was organized as a commercial venture. We know that Sir Walter Raleigh was thoroughly disgusted, at the time, with losses sustained during his attempts to colonize the country farther to the south, and he could not have been expected to risk his own money or lend encouragement to his friends to do so in another effort to plant a settlement in America. Gosnold, as chief of the expedition, was primarily a navigator and shipmaster, and he had been ordered to make the voyage a profitable one and to bring back to England a paying cargo. Gabriel Archer and Bartholomew Gilbert, who were on board the *Concord*, were undoubtedly settlement-minded, but the little bark carried neither men nor supplies to plant a colony in a country inhabited by "savages," who could be expected to welcome traders but to resist their occupation of Indian lands and the confiscation of Indian property. It would seem that, from the start, Gosnold had instructions to endeavor to find and return to England with a cargo of sassafras, then in great demand in England as a supposed remedy for many diseases, including smallpox and "the plague." Archer himself testifies to the believedly medicinal and curative powers of the aromatic product of the American lauraceous shrub, for he writes, "The powder of sassafras in twelve hours cured one of our company that had taken a great surfeit by eating the bellies of dogfish." Gosnold made no serious attempt to obtain furs. He could have loaded his ship in a week with the best of fish off Cape Cod, but he declined to dry, salt and cure fish to make it any important part of his marketable return cargo. The space in the ship that could not be filled with sassafras, he loaded with cedar wood; moreover, when the *Concord's* holds were full, of what he deemed to be a profitable cargo, he promptly returned to England.

Bartholomew Gosnold, who made the voyage to the American coast with the sole object of obtaining a money return to the investors, seemingly became convinced as a result of his observations and experience that the country was a rich one that should be settled, owned, and defended by the English. Following his return, he interviewed several influential Englishmen on the subject and did much to influence Sir Ferdinando Gorges, of Plymouth, to send out the Popham expedition to found a colony at the mouth of the Kennebec River in Maine.

Gosnold talked of northeastern America as a land of fish, timber, and furs as well as other profitable natural products, and his arguments and recommendations, supported by the testimony of Archer, Gilbert, Brereton, and others who were on the little *Concord*, contributed much toward securing the grant of the royal charters to the London and Plymouth companies in 1606. Notwithstanding the recommendations of Gosnold and the lure of the Newfoundland fisheries, the general sentiment in England was to colonize America "somewhere between 34° and 41° N.," or from the present border line between North and South Carolina to a little north of New York, and in 1607 Gosnold was in command of one of the three vessels that took the first colonists to Jamestown, Va. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, in the meantime, had become decidedly interested in northern Virginia, and Capt. George Waymouth had been sent out in 1605 by Gorges, Southampton, and Arundel with specific instructions to explore the American coast immediately north of Casco Bay. Following the enthusiastic report of Waymouth, Gorges influenced the Popham and Gilbert families to finance a colonizing expedition to the Sagadahoc (Kennebec), Maine, under George Popham and Raleigh Gilbert (a brother of Bartholomew Gilbert, who was an associate of Gosnold on the *Concord* voyage in 1602). Neither expedition was a permanent success, but the trouble with the Jamestown adventure was the bad selection of a site in "a kindly climate" as well as indolence and lack of discipline on the part of the colonists. Gosnold ardently backed up Capt. John Smith in the latter's efforts to introduce order, industry, and system in the colony, but not even Smith could defeat nature and overcome the evils of an extremely unhealthy location, deadly to white settlers. Bartholomew Gosnold died of swamp fever on August 22, 1607, a little over three months following the arrival of the colonizing expedition at Jamestown, Va.

The Colonization of the Part of America That Became the United States

The prime period of the colonization of North America was during the seventeenth century—from 1607 to the 1680's. The British led and, especially after 1660, were decidedly in the majority, other nations sending colonists being the Netherlands, Sweden, France, and Spain. Virginia and Maine were settled by the English in 1607, Plymouth (Mass.) in 1620, Massachusetts Bay in 1628, Maryland in 1632, Connecticut in 1634, Rhode Island in 1636, the Carolinas in 1663, New York in 1664, New Jersey in 1665, and Pennsylvania (and the lower counties, later Delaware) in 1681. The only English colony settled after 1681 was Georgia, which was founded in 1732 to strengthen British outposts on the Florida border, this southern part of the country being then owned by Spain.

The present states of New Hampshire and Maine are in fact offshoots of the Massachusetts colony. Both the Massachusetts Bay (Puritan) and the Plymouth (Pilgrim) colonists were essentially Protestant-Puritan, and the colony of Massachusetts Bay became the citadel of Puritanism in America. The Puritans expelled not only Roman Catholics but also Anglicans, Antinomians, Anabaptists, Quakers, and all nonconformists and made life unpleasant for the Puritans who did not fully agree with all the picayune regulations prescribed by an authoritative and bigoted group of leaders as well as their arbitrary doctrinal decrees.

A trading post was established by members of the Plymouth (Pilgrim) Colony near Windsor on the Connecticut River in 1633. About this same time, John Oldham, of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, explored the watershed and made such a good report to the Puritans that emigrants from three Massachusetts towns desiring more "freedom" left the colony to

establish their own settlement in the Connecticut Valley. A group of discontents from Watertown founded Wethersfield in late 1634; others from New Town, or Cambridge, settled at Windsor in the summer of 1635; and later in that year a third group from Dorchester moved to Hartford. (The three settlements were within a space of some ten miles, north and south, near the Connecticut River and centered about the present site of Hartford.) These early Connecticut colonists had reached Massachusetts in the Puritan migration of 1630 and were led "west," principally by Thomas Hooper, Roger Ludlow, and John Haynes, to seek their fortunes, "religious liberty," and freedom from mental and political oppression by the autocratic and dominating nature of the Puritan government in Massachusetts Bay. However, the instrument of government known as the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, adopted in 1639, shows that the emigrating Puritans, in their new location, followed closely the institutions and policies of Massachusetts Bay. The religious test for citizenship was omitted, but there was a union of church and state as well as an undemocratic property qualification for suffrage. Whereas the Plymouth Colony of Pilgrims also presumably granted citizenship without regard to conformity to a certain prescribed religious belief, it had driven out Roger Conant, a good Protestant Christian, merely because he was an Anglican.

The New Haven colony was never recognized as a true or separate colony but as the "New Haven Jurisdiction," although it covered a large area, including the towns of Guilford, Branford, Milford, and Stamford on the mainland and a part of Long Island, of which Southold was the principal town. The New Haven settlement was established in 1638 by a company of Puritans led by Theophilus Eaton and Pastor John Davenport, who had crossed the Atlantic to Massachusetts Bay in 1637. Evidently, the hidebound and autocratic Puritans in control of the Massachusetts Bay Colony were not theocratic enough to suit such extremists as Eaton and Davenport, so they sought a new land that would be governed under a "plantation covenant," with the scriptures as the supreme guide in both civil and religious affairs. The New Haven settlers, it would seem, really sought to take the Bible as their body of laws, and they thrashed out its interpretations in meetings of the church members who also served as the civil court. In June 1639, the "free planters" definitely adopted an elaborate set of principles of theocracy and affirmed the religious test for citizenship. The government of the New Haven Jurisdiction was of the strictest and most intolerant Puritan type; its notorious "Blue Laws" are indicative of its domination of human conduct and narrow, stiff-necked conception of religion. New Haven decided in 1644 that the "Judicial Laws of God as they were declared by Moses" should constitute the rule of the courts. Trial by jury was prohibited; the death penalty was imposed for "conspiracy against the jurisdiction," and any resident who was found "concealing or entertaining Quakers or other blasphemous heretics" was subject to heavy fines and persecution. Connecticut received a royal charter in 1662 as a corporation under the name of "The Governor and Company of the English Colony of Connecticut in New England in America" and absorbed the New Haven Jurisdiction (excluding its Long Island territory). This charter, which defined the boundaries of the colony of Connecticut as extending from Massachusetts south to the seas (Long Island Sound) and from the Narragansett Bay, or Rhode Island and Providence plantations, west to the "South Sea" (Pacific Ocean), was secured by the Connecticut "go-getters" in London without the knowledge or consent of the New Haven colonists. The New Haven Jurisdiction protested against the enforced union with Connecticut, but for political reasons the colonists finally assented to it in 1665.

Rhode Island was founded by refugees from Massachusetts, who went there in search of religious and political freedom denied them in the domain of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Roger Williams, who founded a settlement at Providence in June 1636, was the most liberal and consistent advocate of tolerance. After experiencing the bigotry and narrowness of the professed champions of religious freedom, he withdrew from all church connections and after 1640 remained a "seeker" after truth and an "independent" until his death in March 1684 at the ripe age of eighty years. Other prominent settlers who helped to found Rhode

Island were William Coddington (1601-1678), who had arrived at Salem in June 1630; John Clarke (1609-1676); and the historic and controversial Anne Hutchinson (1600-1643), wife of William Hutchinson, who had migrated to Boston in 1634. These, with followers, all of whom were known as "Antinomians," established a settlement at Portsmouth on the island of Aquidneck in the spring of 1638, but being dissatisfied with conditions, Coddington and Clarke moved in April 1639 about eight miles to the south and located at a site that became known as Newport. Samuel Gorton and his followers similarly seceded from the Providence settlement in January 1643 and, moving about ten miles to the south, founded the village of Warwick. It is evident that the Rhode Island seceders from the authority of the Massachusetts Bay Colony had their own ideas of religious freedom and sought to make others converts to their personal views and convictions. The four Rhode Island settlements were consolidated on May 19, 1647, under a patent of March 14, 1644, issued by the parliamentary board of commissioners for plantations. Later, the union split into two parts, the mainland settlements of Providence and Warwick being in one and the island towns of Newport and Portsmouth in the other. In March 1644, the name of the island was changed by the General Court from Aquidneck to the Isle of Rhodes or Rhode Island. A reunion of the four settlements was effected in 1654 by the liberal and tactful Roger Williams, and a charter for the Rhode Island and Providence plantations was obtained from King Charles II on July 8, 1663.

Anne Hutchinson, the religious enthusiast, who was referred to by Governor Winthrop as a woman "of a ready wit and bold courage," was banished and excommunicated by the Massachusetts Bay Puritans in 1638. She voiced a protest against the legalism of the Massachusetts Puritans that struck at the authority of the clergy in an intensely theocratic community. Anne Hutchinson and her supporters were called "Antinomians"—not because of any doctrinal theories held but rather as "a term of reproach"; later, the word was used to imply a belief that "faith alone is necessary to salvation." The derivation of the word ("*anti-nomos*") suggests anti-law, and the Puritan clerics evidently applied the designation "Antinomian" to anyone who dared to differ with their views, contradict their conclusions, defy their arbitrary edicts, or question their "divine" authority. Anne Hutchinson was the recognized leader of the Antinomians, but after she established a new settlement with her friends and followers at Portsmouth (Rhode Island), harmony did not long prevail among them. Anne's husband died in 1642, and she herself was killed by Indians near what is now known as New Rochelle, N. Y. (on Long Island Sound), in August 1643. The intolerance and religious bigotry of the Puritans are evidenced by their expressed views on hearing of the cruel death of Anne Hutchinson—one of their old "sisters in the Lord"—at the hands of the savages: "It is a manifestation of divine Providence."

Baldwin, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAS*, says:

There was no nonsense about religious freedom among the first Puritan settlers of Massachusetts Bay. They came to America to set up the kind of church government *they* wanted. Not that they disagreed with the principle of religious persecution. The historian Fiske sets forth their state of mind succinctly. "It is wicked for falsehood to persecute

truth," they asserted, "but it is the sacred duty of truth to persecute falsehood." What can you do with men like this? It was 1656 before the Quakers found one answer. They were forbidden on penalty of death to return to Massachusetts after having been expelled, but four of them persisted in returning and were accordingly hanged.

Considering the agitation in Massachusetts in the 1760's and early 1770's for "no taxation without representation," which led to the War of the Revolution, independence, and the birth of the republic, it is interesting to note that as late as 1680 (with Boston then an important port and a town with many merchants and artisans who were not Puritans and had no desire to become so), the church oligarchy still ruled; that "not one man in five seems to have had the right to vote," although it is natural to assume that the worthy people, disenfranchised for religious reasons, bitterly resented being taxed by the saints without representation in the government of the province.

The Puritans and the emigrants who joined with them in the building of a new country (but who did not become church members) were decidedly property-minded and shrewdly

mundane in their policies. At all times, trade, shipping, and profits as well as agriculture, food, housing, etc., were kept prominently in the foreground of thought, and prosperity through work and self-sacrifice was encouraged. The religious aspect connected with the founding of such colonies as Rhode Island and Connecticut should not be permitted to obscure their real significance, for as Baldwin says:

They were the first democratic commonwealths of America. Their founders believed in "liberty and equality, both in land and government," and they held strictly to the ideal. Rhode Island was particularly anathema to the Massachusetts Bay authorities, who tried to have its charter revoked and would have succeeded had it not been for the efforts of

Sir Henry Vane, who stoutly defended Rhode Island in the commonwealth parliament. Vane had spent some time in the straitjacket of Boston and had even served for a year as governor. It was to Vane's unhappy year in Boston that America owes much of the gratitude that democracy was not smothered in the cradle.

Sir Henry Vane (1613-1662), English statesman, known as "the younger" because of his illustrious father who was secretary of state in 1640, had strong Puritan views and emigrated to Massachusetts in 1635 "in order to obtain the free exercise of his religion." He was elected governor of the colony in 1636, but one year in office was all that the saints could stand of a man with liberal or tolerant views. In August 1637, Vane returned to England a disillusioned man in regard to religious freedom in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and he quickly became a leader of the English Parliamentary Party. Vane had broad views, but upheld the Constitution and, when placed on the Council of State, refused to take the oath approving King Charles I's execution. He was a commissioner in the negotiation for a union between England and Scotland and was prominent in the tactful handling of foreign affairs. As chief commissioner of the navy, he was largely responsible for the victories over the Dutch operating under Van Tromp. Vane was too tolerant for Cromwell, and when he protested that the latter's arbitrary act of dissolving the Parliament was "against morality and common honesty," Cromwell "fell a-railing at him, crying out with a loud voice, 'O Sir Henry Vane, Sir Henry Vane; the Lord deliver me from Sir Henry Vane.'" Vane fought for the sovereignty of an elected parliament of the people and was imprisoned by the Roundheads; but after the Restoration, he was again thrown into prison and, with Charles II on the throne, was executed on June 14, 1662.

During the civil war in England, the fight between the king and Parliament, the period of the commonwealth and of Oliver Cromwell as lord protector, the Puritan theocracy was evidently skillful in its management of affairs as far as the British were concerned; but Charles II was a tyrant with some very definite ideas, and he was not pleased to read in a letter from one of his officers in the colonies that the king's letters were of no more account in Boston than an old copy of the London GAZETTE. It was Charles II who annexed New Haven, against its wishes, to Connecticut and in 1684 dissolved the confederation and annulled the charter of Massachusetts, planning to set up an arbitrary regime under a royal governor. His death in 1685 prevented him from putting into effect all the "reforms" in colonial government under direct control of the crown that he had in mind. However, his successor to the British throne, James II, united New England, New York, and New Jersey under his appointee, Sir Edmund Andros (1637-1714), and when the king's men appeared at Hartford to seize the charter of Connecticut, the document was spirited away and hidden in a hollow tree—the Charter Oak. James II's reign was brief and stormy. As rebellion spread in the colonies from Maine to the Chesapeake, Britain's king fled in fear of his life, and in 1689 William and Mary ascended the throne, following which citizen-soldiers of Massachusetts marched into Boston and threw Governor Andros and his officers into prison. In New York, the deputy governor was driven out, and Jacob Leisler, a German merchant, was at the head of a "turbulent democracy" for about two years. Most of the colonies returned to their old status except that Maryland was made a royal colony and Massachusetts continued as a royal colony as decreed by Charles II and James II.

In 1692 the Massachusetts Bay Colony combined with the Plymouth Colony, the islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket, etc., and the provinces of Maine and Sagadahoc under

a royal charter known as the "Province of Massachusetts Bay." The secularization of the province was, therefore, accomplished, which sounded the death knell to the old oligarchy of Massachusetts based upon the votes of the saints (or members of the Puritan Church).

New Hampshire was formed by several grants made by the Council of New England under authority and rights vested in it by King James I in 1620. The first of these grants was to John Mason on March 9, 1622, and the name "New Hampshire" was first applied to a grant of territory between the Merrimac and Piscataqua rivers, which was given to John Mason on November 7, 1629. The first settlement in New Hampshire of which there is undisputable evidence was established in 1623. Simultaneously with the grant of New Hampshire to John Mason, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, his colleague, took title to the land between the Piscataqua and Sagadahoc (Kennebec) rivers and named this part of the province of Maine "New Somersetshire." The settlements in Maine gradually extended north and east from the Piscataqua to the Passamaquoddy, but remained part of the colony of Massachusetts. Although agitation for separation commenced to be articulate in 1785, it was not until March 3, 1820, that Maine finally severed all ties with Massachusetts and became a separate state.

The Dutch colony of New Netherland, on the Hudson River, was first settled in May 1624, the pioneer colonists consisting mostly of Protestant Walloon refugees. The Dutch were also the pioneer colonists on the Delaware, where they planted a settlement in 1631, and in 1638 the Dutch and Swedes established what became known as Christinaham, the nucleus for the colony of New Sweden, which became active and really Swedish in 1643. It fell before a Dutch attack in 1655, and the Delaware remained Dutch until seized by the English in 1664. By the Treaty of Westminster (February 1674), the Dutch—including the old Swedish—settlements on the Delaware and the Dutch provinces on the Hudson River became part of the English possessions in America.

William Penn (1644-1718), English Quaker and the son of Admiral Sir William Penn, landed at New Castle on the Delaware on October 27, 1682, to found a colony on "a tract of Delaware wilderness," which he had obtained from the crown (Charles II) in settlement of a debt of £16,000. The English king insisted upon calling the province "Penn's Woods," or "Pennsylvania," in honor of Admiral Penn, who died in 1670. William Penn had gained some experience with colonization in New Jersey and proposed to set up a commonwealth where religious liberty would be complete. He not only welcomed Quakers from any part of the British Empire but also waged a propaganda campaign in the Rhineland, which encouraged large numbers of thrifty, hard-working, and competent Germans to emigrate to the New World. Penn's "holy experiment" was eminently successful and in the main was operated most creditably. The founder pyramided his fortune, and as Benjamin Franklin said, the Quakers united "the subtlety of the serpent with the innocence of the dove." Baldwin has written that commerce under the shrewd Quaker merchants and manufacture and agriculture under the ingenious Germans comprise the colonial annals of Pennsylvania and that people other than Quakers "had never to complain of the theocratic abuses of New England or the extreme aristocracy of Virginia. . . . Pennsylvania walked down the middle of the road, avoiding the ditch on either hand, and as such it was to become a parent of the great North American tradition of liberty, moderation and progress." Delaware united with Pennsylvania in 1693, but gradually became autonomous; in 1767 it made a settlement with Maryland as to its boundaries and in 1776 had a separate entity and governor.

James Edward Oglethorpe (1696-1785), English general, was the founder of the colony of Georgia (named after George II)—the last of the English colonies to be established in America. Oglethorpe was responsible for the incorporation in 1732 of the Georgia Trustees, composed of philanthropic nobles and clergymen, to found the proprietary colony of Georgia between the Savannah and Altamaha rivers as a refuge for the persecuted Protestant sects and the unfortunate but worthy indigent classes of England. The British Parliament granted the charter and gave £10,000 to the enterprise, not so much because of its sympathy for certain oppressed Protestants on the Continent or a wish to provide an asylum for persons

who had become insolvent but because of a desire to form a buffer colony—primarily of a military nature—to protect South Carolina from invasion by the Spaniards from Florida and by the French from Louisiana. Oglethorpe, as a soldier of experience, was appointed governor of Georgia, and even though he was interested in philanthropy, it would seem that at heart he was somewhat of a buccaneer. When war broke out with Spain (the "War of Jenkin's Ear"), Oglethorpe, early in 1740, invaded Florida and evidently welcomed the opportunity to fight the Spaniards, but the Spanish fleet frustrated his attempt to take St. Augustine. In 1742, Georgia was invaded by a powerful fleet and army. The defenders were favored by the elements, and the troops who landed were defeated by Oglethorpe's forces in a series of bloody conflicts in the marshes of the Altamaha. Georgia became a royal province in 1753. It was the only colony to be founded in what is now the United States during the eighteenth century. However, there were large immigrations of Germans and Scottish-Irish who settled in Pennsylvania and New York and thence overflowed into the western parts of Virginia and the Carolinas.

The early charters of discovery given to John Cabot (and his son and partner Sebastian), Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and Sir Walter Raleigh contemplated the founding of feudal principalities in the New World, and British colonization of North America originated almost entirely in private initiative, the government legalizing and rewarding the efforts of the adventurous settlers and planters and leaving them generally to themselves. There were a variety of motives for the founding of the colonies—economic, religious, and political—and the individual settlers, even more than the incorporators or proprietors, were actuated by one or more of these three prime reasons. Because of the way that things were handled and the financial gamble involved, it was but natural that there were a number of colonies separate and independent of each other, although having full allegiance to the crown, and that many attempts to establish settlements in the early years of the era of colonization met with failure. The term "chartered colonies" describes the form under which the surviving American colonies were founded and operated for varying periods of time. Some of these colonies have been termed "corporate provinces" and others "proprietary provinces," but "proprietors" might have been individuals or "proprietary boards." The last British colony founded (Georgia in 1732) continued in existence for twenty years under a proprietary board of trustees.

In *THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH OVERSEAS ENTERPRISE*, Sir C. P. Lucas says that even the earliest charter (1406) of the merchant-adventurers who conducted the English wool trade with Holland was not a charter to give a trade monopoly. He continues:

It was a charter to grant a constitution, a charter to enable Englishmen sojourning in foreign parts to govern themselves. . . . The one and only object of the charter is better government and the way in which better government is to be attained is by granting self-government. The king knew well, and the merchants knew well, that, given law and order, English trade would prosper without government assistance. . . . The king knew well, and the merchants knew well, that among English, the golden road to law and order is to give them definite au-

thority to govern themselves, to choose their own rulers and make their own laws. Exactly two hundred years later, in 1606, the continuous history of the British Empire beyond the seas began with the granting of a royal charter to the Virginia Company; the charter which was given to the English merchants in the Low Countries for their better government in 1407 might almost have been a model for the founding of English colonies in America.

This is true only in part. English colonization was superior to that of Spain and France because it was based on a mercantile system and was not dominated by either the crown or the church. As Henry F. Howe says, the Anglo-Saxon colonies in America followed the tradition of English patents, "which sent out a group of self-governing, free men whose only responsibility was to return a profit to a self-sustaining group of English investors; all that the king insisted on was that the settlers' government should not be inconsistent with the laws of England." The crown and Parliament gave no financial support or even naval (or military) protection to the early settlers. From the first, they were entirely on their own, and the colonies were financed by companies that embarked on the venture not for patriotic

reasons but with hopes of making a good profit on their investment. Colonization was a private enterprise, and the crown granting the early patents demanded a "double tithe" of the income for itself in return for giving the patentee exclusive privilege to explore and colonize, mine and trade. That this monopolistic feature of the charter was valued highly is evident by actions taken to prevent poaching on the patentee's domain and by the confiscation of any cargo from chartered territory that had not been obtained or sanctioned by the patentee.

England paid but little attention to its American colonies until they had proved themselves of value and ready to be milked. The colonies were developed by adventurers seeking to make a profit and by settlers who demanded the right "to govern themselves, to choose their own rulers and make their own laws." When England decided to change the pattern and policy of the mother country in relation to her colonies, revolution was born. This is well illustrated by the statement of Levi Preston, who on April 19, 1775, ran sixteen miles with his gun to take part in the clash at Lexington. When asked, years later, as to the causes that led him to take up arms against the British, he did not dwell on the Sugar Act, the Mutiny Act, the Stamp Tax, the "Coercive Acts," etc., but laconically replied: "What we meant in going for those redcoats was this—we always had governed ourselves and we always meant to. They didn't mean we should."

In 1606 two joint companies were chartered by King James I with monopolistic rights confined to settlements and trade within certain boundaries as to parallels of latitude in North America. One had its residence in London, the other in Plymouth. The London patentees founded Jamestown (1607) and other settlements along the James River, which later became the province of Virginia; in 1609 and 1612, they secured new charters and a concession of territory about four hundred miles wide extending through the continent, and Virginia assumed the form of a proprietary province, with an English trading company as its owner. The charter of the (London) Virginia Company was revoked in 1624 because of political conditions in England and controversy over a contract for the sole importation of tobacco, and a royal commission was appointed to readjust the affairs of Virginia and inaugurate its government as a royal province.

The Plymouth patentees achieved no permanent results, but for many years west of England men had been making fishing voyages and expeditions of discovery to northern Virginia, which Capt. John Smith had named New England in 1614. A new charter was procured in 1620, and the reorganized company, fully incorporated, became known as the New England Council, which was a closed body with its membership limited to forty. The moving spirit in this enterprise was Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who had conceived the plan and engineered the financial backing for the establishment of the Popham Colony on the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) River in 1607. Gorges was well backed by English nobles ("names and blood"), but a lack of real cash resources and of active interest on the part of most of the patentees—and this together with the development of a Puritan interest in New England—led to failure of the New England Council to function as anticipated, and no colony was ever established by the council itself. However, parts of the territory covered by the council's charter, which lay adjacent to the New England coast, were parceled out among the patentees, who established a few weak and struggling settlements, all proprietary in character.

The Plymouth Colony, of *Mayflower* and Pilgrim fame (founded in 1620), and the colony of Massachusetts Bay (founded in 1628-1630)—both Puritan emigrations—procured the original title to the soil from the New England Council, composed primarily of British nobles and Anglicans, but evidently a group of hardheaded West County merchants invested in the ventures and compelled such actions as were necessary to found the colonies. At the outset, both the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies were technically proprietary settlements, although far different from such in spirit and destiny. In 1629 the Massachusetts Bay Colony secured a royal charter for the territory between the Charles and Merrimac rivers and thus took a long step towards independence of the New England Council. John Winthrop was

elected governor of the colony. Winthrop and members of a governing body—"Puritan in spirit and nonconformist in practise"—settled their business affairs in England and migrated to Massachusetts Bay. This decidedly Puritan colony planted in New England was from the start fanatically and aggressively religious in character. It became a sort of "biblical commonwealth" for quite a while and subordinated trade, landholding, and settlement to the interest of the Puritan faith—as interpreted by the resident leaders. In 1635 the New England Council resigned its charter, a writ of *quo warranto* was issued against the Massachusetts Bay Colony charter, and a plan came very close to being consummated that would have sent Sir Ferdinando Gorges, an ardent High Church man (an Anglican) and Royalist, as governor-general, or royal governor, of New England. However, troubles were brewing in England, which led to civil war and to the commonwealth; the suit against the Massachusetts patent failed to accomplish its purpose, and for political reasons (the government having much of real moment to absorb its attention) the scheme was shelved and later abandoned.

The royal grants of England to companies distinctly organized for colonizing and trading with the New World are somewhat confusing. In 1606 grants were made to two English companies giving them exclusive privileges and rights of a monopolistic nature to erect plantations, or settlements, for colonizing and trading purposes on the eastern shores of the New World (named "Virginia" either by Raleigh in honor of his queen and patron or by Elizabeth herself) between the parallels (latitude) of 34° and 45° N. The Virginia Company of London obtained a grant to the area between 34° N. (about Cape Fear, North Carolina) and 41° N. (about White Plains and Sag Harbor, N. Y.—a little north of New York City and Yonkers and taking in almost all of Long Island) to a depth of 100 miles inland from the coast line and including all islands adjacent to the coast or within a distance of 100 miles offshore. The Virginia Company of Plymouth, at about the same time, received a royal grant to the area between 38° N. (about the line between the present states of Maryland and Virginia) and 45° N. (about Pembroke and the Passamaquoddy, Maine), with the same limitations stated for depth inland and for islands adjacent to the mainland and offshore. These two very important grants, issued in 1606, obviously overlapped each other, and the area between 38° and 41° became known as the Neutral Zone, in which the charters provided that either company could plant a colony, but that such a settlement should not be located within a distance of a hundred miles of any colony established by the other, or rival, company.

In 1620 the situation in regard to monopolistic control by the Virginia companies of land in and trade with the New World was further confused by a royal grant to the Council for New England, which covered the area between the parallels (latitude) of 40° N. (about the Toms River and Camden, N. J.) and 48° N. (about northern New Brunswick; Cape Anguille and St. John's, Newfoundland), including all islands and seas adjoining and extending in depth "from sea to sea," i.e., from the Atlantic to the Great South Sea (or Pacific Ocean).

In practical operation, the Virginia Company of London, which founded the colony at Jamestown, Va., continued for years to operate in the South; while in the Virginia Company of Plymouth and the Council for New England territory, the Plymouth plantation of the Pilgrims embraced the Cape Cod area and went as far north as Cohasset. The "Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay" (the Puritan colony), a much more vigorous settlement, monopolized all of Boston Bay and environs, agreed with the Plymouth Company (about 1630) on the boundary line between the two colonies (running from Cohasset on the coast west by south), and then expanded to the north, embracing not only Salem, Marblehead, and Gloucester but also, by 1642, territory north of the Merrimac River at about the present boundary line between the states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The merging of the Plymouth (Pilgrim) and Massachusetts Bay (Puritan) colonies in 1692 gave substantially the geographical pattern of the present State of Massachusetts.

With the Navigation Laws and Trade Acts came a reassertion of British authority over the colonies through the supplanting of charter and proprietary governments by royal govern-

ments. In 1685 only two of the provinces were royal, but by 1763 eight of the twelve continental British colonies had such governments; Pennsylvania and Maryland retained proprietary governments, while Connecticut and Rhode Island were chartered colonies with elected governors. The royal form of government, of itself, made for friction and contention between the assembly elected by popular vote and the governor and council appointed by the crown. In all the American colonies, the settlers soon discarded the advocated early seventeenth century plans of a community sharing of property, for the industrious and frugal refused to carry the dead load of the indolent and prodigal. By degrees, the colonists threw off the cramping, humiliating, and uneconomic control of the proprietors, who had received grants from the crown and had promoted the first settlements. Although the British Government gave, more or less unwillingly, a large measure of self-government to the "plantations" and later to the colonies in America, it was, however, no less intent than the Spanish Crown in retaining the whole colonial trade in British hands; in excluding any so-called "undesirable" foreign elements of an aggressive and belligerent type; and in operating the colonies with a policy "single at all times" to the glory, wealth, prestige, and power of Britain as a maritime nation, the "Mistress of the Seas," and with domination over the world's ocean-borne foreign trade.

The French made attempts to colonize around the Bay of Fundy (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, Canada) before England sent out its two pioneer colonizing expeditions to the New World in 1607, and after the Sagadahoc venture failed, the French held a dominating position in the northeastern portion of the continent. Notwithstanding trading and fishing voyages to Maine and Massachusetts made more or less intermittently by the Plymouth Company, France, unchallenged in the exploitation of the St. Lawrence and the northeastern hinterlands, was steadily extending its scope of interest into New England—which meant occupation and domination—when in 1613 Capt. Samuel Argall from the English Jamestown, Va., colony, by naval power (privately owned), put a stop to French encroachments in the territory that England claimed as North Virginia. However, for many long years after the English had colonized in the southern reaches of the Chesapeake and around Massachusetts Bay, only relatively small areas of the continent of North America were in the hands of the British; the territory between the Chesapeake and what is now Connecticut was controlled by the Dutch and Swedes; Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas were dominated by the Spanish, with the French as their only rivals in the "upper stretches of the South." The French gradually extended their influence from Canada southward until they became strongly entrenched once more in the Penobscot and controlled the area north of the parallel of 44°. Of a country that stretched from about Lat. 25° to around 55° to 60° N. in usable territory (and continued farther north through the Arctic regions to the pole), England dominated only some two degrees (36°-38°) in the South (Virginia) and about three degrees (41°-44°) in the North (Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and parts of Maine). Moreover, the English colonies and controlled territory represented only a relatively narrow strip of land along the seacoast or on the banks of navigable rivers, and the English possessions in North America included two areas that were a long distance apart. Not only were foreigners strongly entrenched between them but also the French, with Indians as their allies, were practically in control of the land and its trade routes back from the ocean in the north and central portions. As Spanish domination around the Gulf of Mexico and the southwest weakened, the French, working south from the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, by rivers, hemmed in the English colonies and by 1681 established a French encirclement to the west extending from the Gulf of St. Lawrence in the North (about 50° Lat.) to the mouth of the Mississippi River where it enters the Gulf of Mexico (about 29° N.) in the South.

*The Colony of the London Company at Jamestown, Va.
Generally Considered as the First
English Settlement in America*

The first English settlement in America that is generally considered as being a permanent one was established on May 14, 1607, at Jamestown Island on the James River, Virginia (about forty miles above Norfolk). (The "permanency" of this initial settlement is open to argument, as evidently the colonists surviving the hostility of the Indians and the ravages of disease abandoned the location and were on a ship bound for home when they were stopped near the mouth of the Chesapeake and "planted" elsewhere.) The London Company, responsible for the Jamestown colonization, was chartered in 1606, with all rights of trade and settlement between 34° and 41° N., which, according to the popular mind in England, was the choicest location in America from the standard of a mild and healthy climate and the chance of making "an easy living, comfortably." The purpose of the company, as stated, was to find gold and build up a profitable agricultural community. It was also hoped "to hold the country against Spain," but this phase of the matter was not openly admitted. Nothing was said of furs, fish, and timber; such activities were evidently left for the Plymouth Company, whose lands were farther north.

The Spanish ambassador to England, hearing of the formation of the London and Plymouth companies with the stated intent of colonizing, developing, and exploiting Virginia, protested on behalf of his government; for all the lands of the New World west of the 1494 Tordesillas treaty demarcation line, by papal bulls, were the exclusive property of the Spaniards. Britain, however, was Protestant, and its people generally hated Spain. Although the British king, James I, was a peaceful man, ardently declared his great friendship for Spain, and had married a Roman Catholic wife, the plans of English colonization of America went forward. The objecting Spanish dignitary was informed, we are told, that the entire matter was a trivial one and not worthy of his notice, as "the whole project was nothing but a subtle scheme to relieve England's over-population by sending the thieves to sea where they would be drowned." This amazing statement, emanating from one of the leaders of the London Company of Virginia, was somewhat in line with the Reverend Richard Hakluyt's statement of sending "the offals of our people" to colonize the New World, and Hakluyt was an important member of the London Company and later obtained the "living" at Jamestown—an honorary appointment and a subtle form of clerical graft.

The London Company obtained its charter from King James I on April 10, 1606. Shares were originally sold at £12½ each to 203 investors, of whom 116 were also shareholders in the East India Company and 13 in the Muscovy Company. The establishment by the London Company of the plantation of James Towne was fundamentally and absolutely a business venture—a matter of investing money to earn a financial return; quick as well as large profits were expected by the shareholders in the Virginia enterprise. The settlers were duly commissioned by the company to grow crops, explore the neighboring country, convert the Indians to Christianity, but chiefly to find profitable mines of gold and silver as had been done in Central and South America "to the great glory [and profit] of Spain." The London Company owned James Towne—both land and equipment; moreover, it had property rights in the labor of settlers for a stated number of years. The plantation, or colony, was originally merely an industrial branch of a company, with headquarters in London, which financed all operations, provided local directing officers, fed and clothed the laborers, and owned the product resulting from this labor.

From the first, the operation of the London Company of Virginia was a disappointment to its shareholders, for the anticipated financial return on their investment was not forth-

coming. When shares were originally sold, only a part of the capital was called for, and many of the investors refused to pay the second and third installments. Whereas capital stock subscriptions totaled £52,624 from 1609 to 1619, records show that only £36,624 was actually paid in. Changes in management occurred from time to time without achieving beneficial results to an extent that brought a return to the shareholders. It is said that "during fourteen years £150,000 was sunk in this unprofitable venture." In the early 1620's, the company was virtually bankrupt, and in 1624 its charter was finally annulled and the colony became a royal province administered directly by the crown.

The London Company placed its first colonizing expedition to Virginia under the command of Capt. Christopher Newport, who had previously made voyages for Sir Walter Raleigh. Three ships were chartered for the venture—the *Susan Constant*, the *Goodspeed*, and the *Discovery*. (In 1610, Henry Hudson took the *Discovery* to search for a northwest passage, from which voyage the ship, but not her master, returned to England.) The expedition set out from England on December 19, 1606, but the ships did not reach the Virginia shore until April 26, 1607, after a very long passage of 128 days. As the settlers sailed into the Chesapeake, the broad river that debouched opposite the Capes from the west looked impressive, so they named it the James River after England's king. The colonists sailed up the river against the current until on May 13 they came to a low peninsula on the north bank, which they wrongly concluded would make a good location for a settlement. It appears that a landing was made the next day, and first a church was "built"—nailed boards between trees, with a spare sail overhead. After the usual appropriate religious service, five of the six members of the council that had been selected in London (the names of whom had been brought with the expedition as "sealed orders") were elected. The exception was "young John Smith" (twenty-eight years old), who had been "thrown into chains" because he had "dared to differ" with Edward Maria Wingfield, of whom the council, after receiving word of his appointment as a member, showed approval by electing him president. Work was commenced on the construction of Fort James, which soon became known as Jamestown. President Wingfield, upon releasing Smith from custody, sent him away with Captain Newport on a brief exploratory mission, during which Smith met and promptly made friends with Powhatan (1550-1618), the Indian sachem, or chief, whose good will was later to prove of immeasurable value to the English colonists.

From the start, there was no real government of the colony, no strong man in authority; wrangling and controversies grew worse and more serious as the weeks went by. The first Indian attack, in force, occurred on May 26, 1607, twelve days after the colonists had landed, and we are told that the savages were beaten off only by the guns of the three ships lying close inshore. This occurred during the absence of Captain Newport and Captain Smith, but we read that upon their return to the settlement, they found the place "invested by savages" who lay in the tall grass and weeds and with their bows and arrows (and fine marksmanship) "picked off the English at their leisure." Some friendly Powhatans, appearing on the scene a little later in response to an invitation extended to them by Smith, allied themselves with the colonists to drive off the hostile Indians; but first the Powhatans gave the English the sound advice to keep the wild long ground cover (grass, weeds, and shrubs) cut short, so as not to give the enemy shelter, and to locate their settlement in a clearing, so that hostile visitors would have to expose themselves before they attacked.

Captain Newport sailed back to England on June 21, with some timber and "sassafrif" (sassafras), leaving the survivors of 105 colonists ashore at Jamestown with provisions and needed supplies for only thirteen or fourteen weeks. The settlers were presumably under the command of a council, which elected its own officers, but the egotistical and intolerant Wingfield, from the start, showed his incapacity, and few of his subordinates were any better. Social position, relative means, school education, and ability to talk were considered the criteria of leadership. The colonists themselves were largely unsuited to the life, and none had had any training for it. Only John Smith, apparently, rose to the occasion and demon-

strated ability to cope with conditions, but jealousy and prejudice on the part of others prevented Smith from accomplishing what he sought to do for the good of his countrymen and the success of the colony.

The original settlers of the London Company at Jamestown were an oddly assorted group, described as "48 gentlemen, 12 laborers, 4 carpenters" and the balance (41) as "servants and soldiers." It has been said that these colonists were "gentlemen 'who embarked with virtually enslaved white servants to attend to their needs, laborers to work for them, and soldiers to protect them.'" Although the Jamestown settlers held communal property for a few years, nevertheless, they recognized classes from the first, and before long the call to the mother country was not for more "gentry" but for "laborers" and "indentured" servants and toilers, who were given not only the meanest but also the most of the physical work to do. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that in 1619 the Virginia colony of the London Company bought Negroes from a Spanish slave ship. The practice of slavery was introduced early and spread rapidly in the southern colony and its offshoots, which became interested primarily in agriculture and the building-up of landed estates. The leaders, or "gentry," of the Jamestown Colony were not only class conscious but also ambitious, politically-minded power-grabbers and wranglers. John Smith was an exception, for while he was well born and had means, he was well traveled and a worker; hence he stands out so conspicuously among most of his associates, who were inclined to argue, "twaddle and fiddle." They did not deign to do anything worth-while with their own hands, while the colony went to ruin.

The settlement was in a low marshy district, which proved to be unhealthy, and it was surrounded by lurking, hostile savages. Sickness became common and provisions scanty. If it had not been for Smith and the friendly Powhatans, the Jamestown colonists would have starved to death. Captain Newport left them with food enough to supply their usual needs only up to the end of September 1607, and the next shipment of provisions and supplies from England did not reach them until over four months after that. Smith taught the settlers to catch fish, crabs, etc., but game seems to have been too wary and eluded them. Smith bartered with the Indians for corn, and only by obtaining food from the aborigines was the colony able to survive. Smith wrote, "Our drink was water. Had we been as free from all sins as gluttony and drunkenness, we might have been canonized for saints." One of the "gentlemen adventurers" had this to say of life at Jamestown during the late summer and fall of 1607:

If it had not pleased God to have put a terror in the Savages' hearts, we had all perished by those Vild and cruell Pagans, being in that weake estate as we were; our men night and day groaning in every corner of the Fort most pitifull to heare. If there were any conscience in men, it would make their harts to bleed to heare the pitifull murmurings

and outcries of our sick men without reliefe, some departing out of the World, many times three or foure in a night; in the morning their bodies being trailed out of their Cabines like Dogges, to be buried. In this sort did I see the Mortalitie of divers of our people.

It would seem that Smith was not popular with the colony's leaders, who had been appointed or elected because of their social standing or means, and he was frequently sent away on exploring expeditions as an excuse to get him out of the settlement. However, in the fall of 1607, Wingfield was deposed. The colony was full of intrigues and contentious elements, and we read that although a new president was elected, a member of the council was shot for scheming "to set up a dictatorship." In December 1607, John Smith, while exploring on the Chickahominy River, was captured by Powhatan Indians under the leadership of Openkankano, a brother of Chief Powhatan and leader of the faction of the Indian Confederacy that favored war against and extermination of the whites in the protection of the Indians' rights and lands. It was from this episode that Pocahontas, the thirteen-year-old daughter of Powhatan, first stepped into the picture. She claimed John Smith in usual and legal Indian fashion as a relative and agreed to become his sponsor—all with the approval of Powhatan and the tribe in general. Smith was, therefore, subjected to the ceremony of adoption, following which he was a brother of the Indians and a free man. He returned to Jamestown

on January 9, 1608, which was the "very day" that the much delayed Captain Newport arrived at the settlement on his second voyage, bringing the first load of provisions and supplies from England that had reached Jamestown since the landing of the colonists seven months and twenty-six days before. At the time of Captain Newport's arrival at the James River settlement, only 38 out of the original 105 colonists were still alive. Captain Newport brought out some new emigrants (120 in number according to some historians), but starvation was a thing of the past, and in addition to receiving food from England, the settlement had frequent visits from Powhatan, who came bearing gifts of corn, venison, and game as expressions of love for his brother John Smith.

There is a record that on April 20 the ship *Phoenix* (Capt. Francis Nelson) arrived in the James River bringing more emigrants to the settlement. (Again the number of the new colonists is stated as 120, which is probably incorrect, and the 120 evidently refers to the total number of new colonists who arrived early in 1608.) In the summer of 1608, John Smith was elected president of the council of the colony, replacing Ratcliffe, who was deposed. In October of the same year, Captain Newport arrived with his second cargo of supplies and 70 new colonists, but he was also the bearer of ridiculous instructions to the president of the council from the management of the London Company in England, which can be briefly summarized as emphatic orders: (1) to find gold and give the company a substantial and quick return on the capital invested in the colonizing enterprise; (2) to discover the passage to the Great South Sea (Pacific Ocean); (3) to search for Sir Walter Raleigh's missing colonists (who had gone out to North Carolina in 1585-1587); (4) to employ certain "Poles and Dutchmen" to make pitch, tar, soap-ashes, and glass; (5) to crown Powhatan, the chief of a confederacy of Algonkian Indian tribes, as king of the territory and natives. The thoroughly absurd order of crowning Powhatan, as Fiske says, "was grotesque enough to have emanated from the teeming brain of James I after a mickle noggin of his native usquebaugh." Baldwin writes: "And so with a red cloak and a copper diadem, Newport and Smith robed and crowned the dusky Powhatan. That puissant monarch was mightily pleased with the red cloak and gave his old coonskin robe of state as a gift to his royal brother James." Powhatan, the father of Pocahontas, who married John Rolfe, "ruled" with the recognition and beneficent support of the English.

Smith objected to the instructions brought to him by Newport and wrote London fully explaining his views, which were to concentrate on making the colony self-supporting and industrious; this was necessary to obtain an adequate and reliable food supply and to make the settlement strong enough to protect itself. By developing natural resources, agriculture, forests, fisheries, and mines, the colonists could prosper and ship surplus goods—as remitted wealth and return to the investors—to England. Smith fought the diverting of the colonists' very limited energies; he condemned indolence on the part of the settlers and suspected the London Council of avarice as well as fundamental ignorance of the conditions in America and of colonizing in general. He wanted men to work growing crops, felling trees, building defendable domiciles, and constructing ships for the fisheries and coastwise trading. He predicted the end of the settlement by starvation (if the colonists escaped hostile Indians and sicknesses from the soil—swamp fever and malaria), unless the people overcame their aversion to manual labor and each did his share of productive work. Smith compelled the lazy among the settlers to do their part of the physical work and was probably the first to use the slogan, "Food for those who work and earn it." The gentry objected to manual labor, but Smith, we are told, made all who were physically able work for the good of the colony. There was much "felling of trees, strengthening the fort, riving planks and building houses." As for the gentlemen, we read, "The axes so oft blistered their tender fingers that many times every third blow had a loud othe to drowne the eccho."

Smith had shown unusual ability and versatility and was preparing for extensive agricultural and fishing operations, but he needed colonists who would work and some artisans skilled in the mechanical arts, including that of shipbuilding; moreover, he wanted a reason-

able quantity of supplies and some goods for trading with the Indians. Smith disliked the location of the settlement and deemed it very unhealthy and unsuited for a strong, self-supporting colony that could produce a surplus for export. The members of the council of the London Company did not like Smith's report and suggestions or his failure to send back to England gold or some valuable cargoes. They also censured his "harsh treatment of the Indians"; whereas it was well known in Virginia that, had it not been for Smith and his ability to get on well with the Indians and obtain food from them, the white colonists would have starved or been exterminated.

When Newport appeared in 1609 with his "third supply" ship, conditions in the settlement under Smith's leadership were much improved. There were some 193 surviving colonists (or about 65 per cent) out of a total of 295 who, it would seem, had been sent out and landed up to that time. In the same year, the London Company of Virginia underwent a reorganization and, with additional capital available, became "The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the First Colony in Virginia." Records show that the revamped and enlarged corporation had "659 nobles, gentlemen, merchants, clergymen and 56 guilds of the City of London" interested in it. The reorganized London Company had its boundaries fixed, according to which Virginia was to extend from a point 200 miles south of what is now Old Point Comfort, at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, to another point 200 miles north of the basic point, with a coast-line "breadth" of 400 miles, and the area defined was to extend from "sea to sea, west and northwest." If the northern boundary was taken literally, as defined, the colony of Virginia would have embraced a good part of the West and included all of California north of Santa Barbara; also the whole of the present States of Oregon and Washington and part of Canada.

Thomas West, Lord De La Warr (1577-1618), was appointed the new governor and captain-general of Virginia for life, and nine vessels with new officials, including Sir Thomas Gates, the lieutenant-governor, supplies, and five hundred more colonists were dispatched to Jamestown. Four of the ships sailed up the James River on August 11, 1609. The flagship *Sea Venture*, carrying the new lieutenant-governor, Sir George Somers (admiral), Sir Thomas Dale (high marshal), and Capt. Christopher Newport (vice admiral of the fleet), together with letters of instruction and outlined procedure for the organization and management of the colony, was wrecked on one of the Bermuda islands, with other ships of the fleet "dispersed and distressed" by the same storm that destroyed the flagship. The high officials of the expedition and the colony were not lost in the *Sea Venture*, but their arrival at Jamestown was much delayed. As the earlier ships to reach the colony had Ratcliffe, Martin, and Archer aboard (who were former members of the council in Virginia and bitterly antagonistic toward John Smith and his policies), they spread the news of a change in the management of the colony, and trouble developed. The fleet that was able to reach Jamestown carried about three hundred colonists, generally of an undesirable quality, for historians refer to most of them as "dissidents and lazy young gentlemen, the seventeenth-century equivalent of remittance men." About this time, Smith was dangerously burned by an explosion of gunpowder. He returned to England for medical attention and had nothing more to do with the Jamestown Colony, the London Company, or any of its plans, although he continued personally interested and active in the colonization of America—particularly New England—and the establishment of fisheries.

When Smith left Jamestown, the harvest was newly gathered, and the colony, we are told, was in "a sufficiently stable condition to ensure its steady growth" if a competent administrator had been put in charge. The industrious and serious-minded mourned his departure, and one of them wrote, "Thus we lost him that in all our proceedings made justice his first guide." With Smith not on hand to direct the colonists, maintain discipline, and keep everybody occupied and the settlement in peaceful, friendly relations with the Indians, everything went to pieces. Some of the unruly "young gentlemen" made trouble with the Indians, with the result that "thirty whites were massacred" and the food supply cut off, while the Indians

practically laid siege to the settlement and shot the venturesome, the careless, and the stragglers. Baldwin says: "The survivors moved in together and tore down the empty houses for fuel, while for food some of them resorted to cannibalism. In the fall there had been five hundred settlers; when Newport and Somers arrived from Bermuda, only sixty remained." The winter of 1609-1610 was a terrible one for the colonists in Virginia and became known in history as "the starving time." Jamestown had been accidentally burned in January 1608, but had been rebuilt, and in 1609 the population was given at 490.

As the *Sea Venture* had been wrecked on the sparsely inhabited and undeveloped Bermudas, it was many long months before the survivors of the flagship (with all the high dignitaries aboard) could salvage material from the wreck and, with the aid of local woods, manage to build two seaworthy pinnaces and continue on their journey. When the new governing body—and the high officers of the expedition—finally reached Jamestown, with a number of new settlers who had been through a distressing experience, they found the colony reduced to the direst straits.

Sir Thomas Dale, who had been high marshal of the impressive 1609 expedition to Jamestown, was a British naval commander. Notwithstanding the bad luck that attended his voyage to Virginia and the decision reached soon after his arrival, he was later (from 1611 to 1616) to be actually, though not always nominally, in chief control of the colony of Virginia either as deputy governor or high marshal. Dale was responsible for inaugurating steps that led to the abolition of the communal system and the introduction of private holdings. He also drafted Virginia's first code of laws, entitled "Articles, Lawes and Orders—Divine, Politique and Martiall," which were notable for their pitiless severity. Dale has been described as of "the bulldog type." However, he merely—with the proper needed backing—put into effect, once more, in the colony the policies inaugurated and developed by John Smith. Baldwin rightly says: "The medicine he gave the ne'er-do-wells and sturdy rogues of Jamestown was bitter, but it proved an efficacious purgative. The colony never again fell into quite the old state of disorder." Dale left Virginia in 1616. He was given command of an English fleet and sent out to the East Indies against the Dutch. He defeated the enemy near Batavia late in 1618, and he himself died in the East on August 9, 1619.

Upon the arrival of the high officials and the survivors of the *Sea Venture* at Jamestown, conditions in the colony were found to be so deplorable and the mortality so high that all agreed (June 10, 1610) to abandon efforts to establish a colony on the James River, and the survivors and newcomers boarded the pinnaces and dropped down the river bound for home. At the river's mouth, by a strange coincidence, the discouraged, departing would-be settlers met a fleet of three ships, which had sailed from England in March, with Lord De La Warr (Delaware), the governor-in-chief, aboard, a new crop of colonists, and "plentiful supplies." The old Jamestown settlers were influenced to return with Lord De La Warr to a new and healthy site, where a trading post was set up, stockades built, and steps taken to bring the hostile natives to subjection. This new location, known as Hampton (fifteen miles northwest of Norfolk on Hampton Roads at the mouth of the James River), was the site of an Indian village, Kecoughtan, and it retained that name for some time. The London Company and Lord De La Warr, while admitting that Jamestown was entirely evacuated and abandoned for a short while, always affirmed that this was merely a temporary desertion caused by stress of circumstances; that Jamestown was again occupied and that soon after entering the James River, Lord De La Warr proceeded to the old settlement and, having landed, took part in an impressive ceremony "before the dismantled fort" and on his knees made a "prayer of thanksgiving" that through God's grace he had arrived in time "to save the colony."

England at last was aroused, and it was said that nothing would be permitted to block the success of the Jamestown Colony of Virginia. If England moved out of the Chesapeake, it was felt that Spain would move in, and a very definite English policy was developing to keep the Spanish, French, and Dutch out of Virginia—which meant all the lands of the New

World north of the Spanish-held Florida. In 1611, 650 additional colonists were landed, the James and Appomattox rivers were further explored, and new plantations and settlements were established. New colonists were constantly being sent over by the London Company, including relatively large numbers of "indentured" servants, who were imported as laborers. Lord De La Warr's rule, it is said, was "strict but just," and in general he brought a good measure of order out of chaos. His chief tasks were to defend the colonists from the "furtive and unfriendly savages" and to plant settlements at healthy sites. We are told that he constructed two forts near the mouth of the James River, which must have been to defend the English from possible attack from the sea by ships belonging to other European countries, and that, most surprisingly, he rebuilt Jamestown—evidently for emotional reasons and to maintain prestige with the Indians, for the location was positively unhealthy.

Much has been said of the achievements of Lord De La Warr for Virginia, but he actually spent much less than a year in America; he arrived at the mouth of the James River on June 10, 1610, and "in March 1611 he returned to London," where he remained until April 1618, when he set sail on his second visit to the colony. He died at sea on June 7, 1618, at the age of forty-one years. Lord De La Warr was not of a rugged pioneer type, but his name, influence, and money were capitalized heavily in keeping the Virginia colony going and growing. It appears that the object of his second visit to America was to investigate charges of "the tyrannical rule" of the deputy, Samuel Argall, who evidently was "in bad" with the office managers of the Virginia Company in London. Argall, however, was a real man and not only (with Sir Thomas Dale) put Virginia on the map but also, because of his sea exploits, brought fame to England and in 1613 drove the French out of Maine and the Dutch out of New York. Historians tell us that the American colonists commenced to assert themselves on the high seas at an early date, and Maclay, in *HISTORY OF THE NAVY*, writes:

The first attempt was made in 1613 when Samuel Argal commanded an expedition of eleven vessels, mounting in all fourteen light guns, from Virginia against a French settlement in Nova Scotia. As the French were without artillery the place was reduced with little difficulty. On returning to Virginia, Argal was sent against Acadia a second time with only three vessels, but better equipped than his first command, and he laid waste all the French settlements. Entering New Amsterdam (New York) on his re-

turn, he obtained the surrender of that place, claiming it rightfully belonged to England by virtue of its having been first discovered by an Englishman, but as he had no means of making good his conquest the Dutch returned to their old allegiance immediately after his departure. Returning to Virginia, Argal lost one of his ships in a storm, another was driven to the Azores and made its way to England, and the third regained the Chesapeake.

Historian Henry F. Howe, in *PROLOGUE TO NEW ENGLAND*, writing of Argall's attack on the French in the Penobscot and of driving them out of all settlements in New England, says:

Had Jamestown [Argall] not come to the rescue, it seems quite likely that New England might easily have become New France. Nowhere in England at this time were there resources available for the colonization of New England comparable to those possessed by the French Jesuits. In this situation only military force could conceivably have turned the tide. The English were exceptionally fortunate in having a sea rover of the caliber of Argall in North American waters at this juncture [1613], for if St. Sauveur [in the Penobscot] had had time to

make itself impregnable, with the additions of supplies from such supporting voyages as the Jesuits could easily command, it is almost inevitable that the French would have made it impossible for a Pilgrim colony to establish itself in Massachusetts. Thus the remnant of the tradition of Drake and his sea dogs in the person of Sir Samuel Argall should be regarded as a brilliant and decisive force in the history of the English colonization of North America. To Virginia and her admiral [Argall] New England owes her very existence.

The English colonies in America needed men of the type of Capt. John Smith and Capt. (Sir) Samuel Argall. The London Company of Virginia treated Captain Smith shabbily, and evidently only the death of Lord De La Warr intervened to prevent in 1618 an official humiliation for Captain Argall somewhat similar to that which Captain Smith experienced in 1608-1609 and subsequent years. Some historians have likened Argall to a pirate, but, although one of the last of the Elizabethan sea dogs, he was an able and resourceful soldier who played the game according to the rules. The records of the Jamestown, Va., colony attest

that Argall obeyed instructions and at no time exceeded the commission given him. When he operated against the French in 1613, he had orders from Sir Thomas Dale, governor of Virginia, to expel the French from any settlements that they might have made within the limits of King James' patents, and to have carried out effectively instructions of this nature does not warrant a man's being branded as a pirate. Moreover, Argall's ship, the *Treasurer*, was outfitted as a privately owned ship of war (or a privateer), and what she was and what she did were justified by conditions and fully covered by the charter of the London Company of Virginia. Capt. (Sir) Samuel Argall was no "saint," but he was certainly no lawless rogue. The Jesuit priest, Pierre Biard, who was one of the prisoners taken at St. Sauveur on the Penobscot, wrote of Argall: "From what we have experienced since, he was a fine captain, very wise and shrewd, but nevertheless a gentleman full of courage; his men also were not all inhumane, nor cruel against any of us."

The management of the London Company continued to emphasize and concentrate on agriculture after it learned that its original hopes of finding lots of gold in the New World—which would not even require laborious mining—were not to be realized. Tobacco had been becoming popular during recent years in England, and the settlers found the Indians cultivating it on the James River. John Rolfe, who was evidently "the first American squaw man," began producing tobacco for the English market, and before long the colonists, finding it easy to raise and a very profitable "gentleman's crop," concentrated on its cultivation. Before the middle of the seventeenth century, tobacco had crowded out all other crops in Virginia except such as were needed for food. As a matter of fact, Virginia owes its survival and very life to tobacco—as Massachusetts does to fish and Maine to timber. Tobacco became not only "the economic basis of Virginia's existence" but also, to a great degree, the standard of value, as it was the chief article of barter. Both taxes and the salaries of public officials and preachers were paid in tobacco, and the standard of living became dependent on the tobacco market. Before long, Virginia "came to have little significance in the eyes of the English government save as a source of tobacco." There is a story told of a Virginia parson who, in the last decade of the seventeenth century, went to England to raise money for the College of William and Mary. Baldwin tells of his experience as follows:

The sovereign received him graciously and ordered the attorney general to draw up a grant of £2,000. That official, however, opposed the grant and, when he came to draw it up, grumbled that the country had better uses for money. The reverend

gentleman replied that the purpose of the college was to educate young men for the ministry and that Virginia had souls to be saved. "Souls!" exploded the attorney general. "Damn your souls! Make tobacco!"

The payment with tobacco of the salaries of Anglican clergymen in the colony of Virginia carried down to the days of the Revolution. By the law, these parsons in the middle of the eighteenth century were entitled to a salary of 17,000 pounds of tobacco a year, but as tobacco prices rose sharply and colonials thought that the clergy were being overpaid, the Virginia Assembly in 1755 and 1758 passed the Two-Penny Acts, which commuted the salaries of clergymen into cash at the rate of two pence per pound of tobacco (or some £142 per year). Inasmuch as this fixed sum was below the value of 17,000 pounds of tobacco at the market price, the Anglican clergy, most of whom were English, raised the cry of fraud against their parishioners and appealed to the crown for justice. The Privy Council responded by repudiating the Virginia Two-Penny Act of 1758; whereupon the clergy instituted suit for the "unpaid part of their salaries." It was in one of these suits that young Patrick Henry, the patriot-orator of the Revolution, appearing for the people in a suit brought by Rev. James Maury in the Hanover Court in 1763, delivered an impassioned address, denounced the Anglican clergy as unpatriotic ingrates and enemies of the community, condemned the British Government for its high-handed encroachment upon colonial liberty, and won for his poor farmer-clients a verdict from the jury. Maury was given only "one penny damages."

Tobacco culture by English colonists in America dates back to John Rolfe, but he is better known today as the husband of Pocahontas, daughter of Chief Powhatan, who as a

child saved the life of John Smith and went sponsor for him. It is said that during a war with the Indians, Capt. Samuel Argall traded a copper kettle to a Potomac chieftain for Pocahontas and that the Indian princess was taken to Jamestown as a hostage. John Rolfe, a young widower, married Pocahontas in the little church of the settlement after she had been baptized and given the name Rebekah. Following this marriage, peace was again made between the English and the Powhatan Indians, and the Rolfes crossed the Atlantic. We are told that the Lady Rebekah ("La Belle Sauvage") was a sensation in London and that "as the daughter of an emperor, she received the courtesies of the bedazzled court." King James I is credited with having censured John Rolfe "for marrying into royalty without his sovereign's permission." Pocahontas could not withstand the English climate and soon died of tuberculosis, leaving a son, Thomas, who as a young man returned to Virginia and founded a family.

The inhabitants of Virginia in the early days were "a social hodgepodge," and it became a melting pot of "gentlemen's sons" and indentured servants who were either poor but honest, ambitious, and industrious persons or petty criminals. The gentry was represented by ne'er-do-wells, penniless younger sons, adventurers, speculators, and later by fugitives from the victorious Puritans and Roundheads under Cromwell. Many of the indentured servants going to Virginia were "redemptioners" and most respectable and highly competent craftsmen or farmers, who paid for their passage over by "indenturing" their services for a term of years until they had redeemed their pledge by working out the amount of money advanced to cover the cost of their transportation to the New World. From the start, the inhabitants of Virginia were generally Anglicans and united in support of the crown and the Church of England as against the Puritan Dissenters and the anti-monarchical movement that resulted in the beheading of King Charles I in 1649 and the forming of the commonwealth, with Oliver Cromwell as lord protector (1653-1658). During the civil war in England, Virginia was for king and church. Massachusetts and New England generally supported the Puritans in their ideas covering both state (and Parliament) and church, or chapel; they stood for the separation of state and the established Anglican (Episcopalian) Church, but themselves built theocracies in Massachusetts and New Haven in which their own dissenting churches were supreme. Virginia stood for a continuance of aristocracy in the social order; New England for reform that tended toward democracy. The sentiments of Virginians toward king and church were sufficiently strong to warrant Cromwell's sending a fleet to the Chesapeake and the James, which demanded loyalty to the Roundhead Commonwealth of England, and when the Virginians saw the guns of the English fleet, we are told, they "yielded gracefully" and expressed their fidelity and allegiance to the ruling power of the mother country.

The importation of indentured servants to the American colonies dates from the founding of the Jamestown Colony in Virginia in 1607. When labor was needed for the growing of tobacco, there was a great call for servants bound for a term of years for work in the colony until it was found, after the first importation of black African slaves to Jamestown in 1619, that Negroes were better workers and cheaper to own and maintain in the long run. At first, land and improvements in the Virginia colony were held in common by the "free" whites, but in 1616 land was parceled out to those deemed qualified to own it. Settlers scattered along the banks of the James and Appomattox rivers, and the rapid expansion of tobacco culture, with indentured whites and gradually more and more with Negro slave labor, made the community self-supporting. From the beginning, however, the colonists took no interest in fishing, timber, shipbuilding, or in any form of industry. It was an agricultural settlement and was made prosperous to the dominating class by the work of imported indentured laborers and Negro slaves. Representative government was inaugurated in 1619. This was the year that Negro servitude was introduced into the colony and into the territory now known as the United States and Canada by the purchase of African slaves that were part of the "cargo" of a Dutch slave ship that visited Jamestown looking for a market.

The "New Towne" of Jamestown, built in 1619 east of the original settlement, was evidently occupied by "some brave or foolhardy souls"; for on March 22, 1622, the Indians slew

347 "whites" who had settled in or around Jamestown. We are told that "sickness and famine reduced the population by one-half"; and again that "the mortality at Jamestown was always very heavy" outside of the massacres and almost constant, furtive attacks and sniping by the Indians. In 1623, thirteen years after the colony had first been abandoned, it had a population of 183 (or 37 per cent of that of 1609). Following the death of the sachem, Powhatan, in 1618, the Powhatan group of Algonkian Indians who inhabited the tidewater section of Virginia and southern Maryland became increasingly hostile toward the whites. There was another severe Indian attack in the early 1640's, in which, it is said, "five hundred white settlers were killed." The Indians attempted in 1676 to stop definitely the inroads of the whites into their territory. Nathaniel Bacon led the forces that defeated "the savages" in the battle of Bloody Run, and having been outlawed as a reward for his work in behalf and for the protection of the colonists by Governor Sir William Berkeley, Bacon almost completely destroyed Jamestown by fire in September 1676 during a civil war that ensued. The settlement was again burned in 1698, following which the seat of government was removed (1699) to the Middle Plantation (now Williamsburg) and the unfortunate village fell rapidly into decay. In 1648 the population of the Virginia colony was stated at 15,000 and in 1700 at 70,000, "comprising about 50,000 whites and 20,000 Negro slaves."

Capt. John Smith, Navigator, Explorer, and Colonizer
The Founder of Maritime New England

Capt. John Smith (1579-1631), the best known of the early Virginia settlers and a romantic figure in history, was well born, went to sea early, and had lived an almost incredible life of adventure before he became interested in the colonization of America upon his return to England from abroad in 1605, when twenty-six years of age. No man showed more energy or ability in securing the charter of the London Company, and he spent much money in making it possible to carry forward the enterprise. Smith was one of the group of pioneer settlers and was treated shabbily by his fellow colonists. If it had not been for Smith, the Jamestown Colony would have been quickly wiped out of existence by hostile Indians, famine and disease; yet only the timely arrival of Capt. Christopher Newport, with his "first supply" ships and more emigrants from England, saved Smith from being hanged by the colonists on an absurd trumped-up charge begot by jealousy. In 1608, Smith explored the Chesapeake and its tributaries. He examined both sides of the bay to its head and into the Susquehanna, went up the Potomac River to the site of the present-day Washington, up the Rappahannock to where Fredericksburg is now located, and explored part way up the Patuxent, Choptank, Chester, Elk, Nanticoke, and York rivers. During this time, Smith and his small party traveled three thousand miles in an open boat in a hostile country and met with many adventures while conducting this survey, collecting data, and mapping the findings.

When Smith returned to the Jamestown Colony from his explorations on September 7, 1608, he took active resident administrative charge of affairs upon the vote of the council. In October, Captain Newport again arrived from England carrying instructions from the council in London. The demand called for the prompt finding and shipping to London of gold; the searching for a northwest passage to China and the East Indies; the locating of the lost Roanoke (Raleigh) colonists; and the crowning of Powhatan as king. Governor Smith sent a letter to the council in England setting forth his views and stressing the necessity of sending over "competent toilers to make the colony self-supporting." From the start, he had preached the doctrine of labor and productive work for all to prevent the threat of starvation and anni-

hilation by hostile Indians. He urged the colonists to work, grow crops, fish, cut lumber, and make improvements for health and security; he advocated the construction of defensible homes and community structures and of ships for fishing and trading. Smith's views on colonization went for naught. The London Company was reorganized, and new officials were sent out to Jamestown. Smith had been severely burned by an explosion and returned to England for medical care, only to find himself in the bad graces of the "stockholders" of the company. He had made many enemies by his honest, forthright policy in the colony. With his departure from Jamestown in late 1609, the settlement literally "went to pieces." It was abandoned by the "mere handful of survivors" of a dreadful winter and was saved from extinction only by further expeditions from England and a change of location and policy.

Capt. John Smith was never afterwards employed by the London Company, but he continued his interest in colonization and turned his attention farther to the north and east—to the fisheries and the establishment of settlements in a more vigorous and healthful climate than that experienced on the James River. He studied the available records of the Popham-Gilbert colonization of 1607-1608 at the mouth of the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) River and in 1614 made a fishing and exploring voyage with two ships, plotting a remarkably accurate map of the American coast from the Penobscot to Cape Cod. This country he named "New England," and the designation still holds; moreover, he assigned the name "Plymouth" to the mainland opposite Cape Cod at about 42° N., and that is where the colonists landed from the *Mayflower* on December 21, 1620. They accepted the name of the place, which they located on the map prepared six years before by Captain Smith. During this exploratory voyage of 1614, Smith set up fishing stations on Monhegan Island and on the mainland at Pemaquid, opposite the island. Evidently, he loaded his ships with dried and salted, or cured, fish and sent one with her cargo to Spain, and the other he took back to England.

Smith, in his description of this historic voyage (written in 1614), commences his manuscript by implying that the financial return of the venture had been marred by the time lost in bothering with whales off Monhegan, which made him late for the real spring fishing season. However, there is historic proof that the "London marchants" who financed the voyage were well pleased with the results and became very peeved with Smith—and later belligerently unfriendly—when he declined to sail for them again and duplicate the commercial phase of the voyage with four ships and on a much larger scale. Writing of his experience in regard to the fisheries and trading of his 1614 voyage, Smith said: "We found this whale-fishing a costly conclusion; we saw many and spent much time in chasing them; but could not kill any." Continuing, he writes that the late arrival of his men and the "long lingering about the whales" caused them to lose the benefit of the good deep-sea fishing season; "for by the midst of June, the fishing failed," although they were able to get a catch "of dry fish about 40,000; of cor-fish about 7,000." Smith says that while the sailors fished, he ranged the coast in a small boat with eight or nine other men and that "wee got for trifles neer 1,100 bever skinnes, 100 martins and neer as many otters." He writes:

With these fures, the traine [fish oil] and cor-fish, I returned for England in the bark; where within six months after our departure from the Downes, we safe arrived back. The best of this fish was solde for five pound the hundredth, the rest by ill usage betwixt three pound and fifty shillings.

The other ship staid to fit herself for Spaine with the dry fish; which was sould, by the sailers reporte that returned at forty ryalls [twenty shillings] the quintall, each hundred weighing two quintalls and a halfe.

Other reports are to the effect that Smith's men "caught and cured twelve hundred quintals of fish that sold in Spain at five [Spanish] dollars a quintal"; also that the voyage of the two ships "cleared fifteen hundred pounds" in English money.

Captain Smith, who was in fact the founder of maritime New England, advocated the use of the fisheries in the northwest Atlantic in relation to his colonization plans. He wrote of New England and its shores, "Nothing is here to be had which fishing doth hinder, but further us to obtain." He strove to interest in his plans for the establishment of settlements

on the New England coast men who would be free and not "indentured" workers, who would be interested in the fisheries—the backbone of the early colonies—and who would be industrious working ashore and afloat, according to the season, building their own vessels and homes, and raising crops and cattle that, with fish, would make them self-supporting as to food.

Captain Smith left the New England coast on the return passage of his historic exploratory, fishing, and trading voyage on July 18, 1614. He had arrived at the "Ile of Monahigan" (Monhegan) from London "in the month of April" and left for home after a stay of "only eleven weeks" off the American coast. He writes: "Now, returning in the Bark, in the fifth of August, I arrived at Plimouth; where imparting there my purposes to my honorable friend Sir Ferdinando Gorges, and some others, I was so encouraged, and assured to have the managing their authoritie in those parts, during my life, that I ingaged myselfe to undertake it for them." Sir Ferdinando Gorges was one of the principal members of the Virginia Company of Plymouth (and Bristol), whose interest in America was in the establishment of settlements in North Virginia—north of New Jersey; whereas the territory of the London Company was much farther to the south—Virginia, the Carolinas, and the Chesapeake. It was but natural for Smith, having become enthusiastic over the prospects of colonizing New England (northern Virginia), to ally himself with the Plymouth Company, which held the charter for that territory, for his connection with the London Company and the development of southern Virginia (around the Chesapeake) was definitely at an end.

Smith journeyed to London to settle affairs with the London merchants who had financed his 1614 voyage, and it is evident that they were so much pleased with Smith and the commercial success of the adventure just ended that they offered him the command of a fleet of four ships to go again to the north New England coast for "fishing and trading" (evidently for furs). Smith was compelled to decline this offer for two reasons. *First*, he had entered into an agreement with Gorges and the Plymouth Company; *second*, he affirmed that he was henceforth interested not in fishing and trading as such but in the colonization of New England, with the fisheries and bartering (with the Indians for furs) necessary phases of the plans and subordinated to the prime idea of planting settlements in the New World. This break with the London merchants, it would seem, caused much ill-feeling in London and operated to drive Smith "for good or ill" into the Plymouth camp, which, unfortunately, did not have the money and the resources of the London group. The relative impecuniousness of Gorges and his associates, who held the Plymouth charter to colonize and develop northern Virginia, soon showed itself. Gorges, when he made his deal with Smith, had promised him four ships to be available in the fall of 1614 for a colonizing expedition to New England, but the money to lease the ships and finance the undertaking was not forthcoming. After a lot of personal work on the part of Smith, co-operating with Gorges, Dean Sutcliffe, of Exeter, was urged to finance a conservative venture with Gorges, some West County merchants, and a few remaining London friends. Two vessels were chartered, one a ship of 200 tons and the other a "barke" of 50 tons. The plan was to have the returns from the fishing and trading carry the expenses of colonization from the start, and John Smith, with sixteen other men (including Thomas Dermer and Edward Rocroft), was to plant an English colony in New England and remain there until it was thoroughly established.

The ill-fortune of Smith in his personal colonizing efforts in northern Virginia was evident from the very first. His little expedition put to sea, but the voyage had barely started when the larger of the two vessels was dismantled, and Smith had to return to port for repairs. It would seem that the smaller of the two ships escaped serious damage by the elements, reached Monhegan, and returned to Plymouth in August "well fraught" with fish; this little vessel, which apparently made a successful commercial voyage, was evidently under the command of Capt. Thomas Dermer, a skipper who played an important role in the attempts of the Plymouth Company to colonize New England in the last half of the second decade of the seventeenth century. Money was not available for reconditioning the ships and continuing

the adventure as planned, and notwithstanding all the enthusiasm and persuasiveness of Smith and Gorges, funds could be raised to charter only one small 60-ton ship for Smith to resume his voyage. But the bad luck of Smith and Gorges—and the Plymouth Company—continued, and this vessel was captured by French pirates and Smith taken as a prisoner aboard the armed French vessel. It was on this ship that Smith found time to write his famous "Description of New England," which is by far the best work that has come down to us chronicling the voyage, doings, itinerary with map, findings, impressions, and views of any of the early American explorer-navigators. When the pirate ship anchored at a French west coast port, Smith escaped and found his way back to Plymouth. He soon discovered that West County English merchants considered him "ill-starred" and had had enough of him, so he printed his book and, being a salesman, dedicated it to Prince Charles (the Prince of Wales, then sixteen years of age; later King Charles I). Smith also gave the young prince the privilege of changing names on his map; hence we have the Charles River, Cape Ann, etc. This book, published at Smith's own expense, ran through three editions prior to 1628 and was quite extensively read by "humble folk." It has been said that it "did much toward disseminating the truth regarding a country which had been under a ban since the return of the unfortunate Popham colonists," with their tales of hostile, savage warriors and a terrific winter of killing cold, ice, and fierce gales.

In the meanwhile, the London Company and the group of London merchant-adventurers, who had offered the command of a fleet of four ships to Capt. John Smith in 1615 to fish off the New England coast and trade for furs with the Indians, had gone forward with their plans and sent these vessels across the Atlantic to fish off Monhegan. They offered command of the expedition to Capt. Michael Cooper, who had been with Smith and was under contract to him, but evidently Cooper broke his agreement and accepted the new and important command. The fleet reached Monhegan in March, and the party fished and flaked its catch at Pemaquid, following which one of the ships took a cargo of dried salt fish to the Jamestown Colony of the London Company, two returned to London with fish and some furs, and the fourth vessel of the fleet, bound for Spain and well laden with fish, was captured by the Turks.

Smith, backed by his book, which was circulated in 1616 (about twenty-five hundred copies printed), and a measure of royal favor, succeeded in early 1617 in getting sufficient financial support from some of the members of the Plymouth Company and West County merchants to attempt another colonizing venture—and this in spite of the hoodoo attached to his name at Plymouth and the six colonizing fiascoes whose ships had sailed from that port for Maine and New England during the ten-year period 1606-1615 inclusive. Three ships were chartered, but only fifteen persons were selected as settlers in the New World; so it would seem that the 1617 Smith adventure was going to concentrate on fishing and trading for immediate profits and the establishment of a colony in New England on a very small scale. But fate was against this enterprise. Astounding as it seems, we are told that a previously unheard-of condition of adverse wind prevailed for "a greate tyme" in the English Channel and that for "three months the Smith ships, together with hundreds of other vessels, lay windbound in Plymouth Harbor." The ships of the period, with their square sails and no fore-and-aft canvas, were unable to sail in any direction except with the wind astern or abeam. Rigging a ship with both square and fore-and-aft sails, so that she could sail against the wind, was unknown in 1617, although Fletcher, of Rye, is said to have discovered "the art of tacking" in 1539. The financial backers of this Smith's last attempt to colonize New England, we are told, grew increasingly restive and pessimistic as day followed day and week followed week, with the people on board consuming the stores, the seamen being under pay, and the merchants seeing under their very eyes all outgo of funds and no compensating income. At length, they grew weary of the proposition, refused to replenish stores or "send any more good money after the bad," and the entire project was abandoned, much to Smith's disgust and humiliation.

Capt. John Smith had been given the rather empty and worthless title of "Admiral of New England" by the Virginia Company of Plymouth (and Bristol) following his 1614 exploratory voyage and the publication of his map and book, but the desertion of his 1617 enterprise by the merchant-backers led to a rift that was never healed. All business relations between Gorges and Smith were terminated. Smith failed in his final plan to enlist the support of Lord Bacon and resigned from the active leadership of the Plymouth Company, as the merchant-sponsors "had exhausted their patience and their resources." It would seem that in 1615-1617 Smith lost the confidence of the Bristol merchants and the purse-tight and supercritical, penny-pinching investors in expeditions, who would not put enough money and real thought into their plans and demanded success and quick, big profits, even though the odds were overwhelmingly against their venture. Captain Smith was very evidently cast aside by the Bristol and Plymouth merchants, who, shortly before, had bestowed a vain title upon him; for when some of the West County men with Puritan leanings joined with London investors in organizing the historic expedition of the "Pilgrim Fathers" in the *Mayflower* and *Speedwell* (scheduled to sail for the New World in the spring of 1620), Captain Smith was told that he was not wanted, although he had requested in 1619 the job of piloting the ships. One of the reasons advanced was amusing. The expedition was not going to New England, which was Captain Smith's peculiar territory, but to North Virginia and a big river that runs to the north—now known as New York and the Hudson. Actually, the only one of the two ships to make the transatlantic crossing, the *Mayflower*, was blown to the north and made land at Gosnold's Cape Cod, and the Pilgrims landed, ironically, at John Smith's Plymouth.

When turned down by the Virginia Company of Plymouth (and Bristol), Captain Smith was given to understand that he was too particular, too exacting, and his demands for ships, equipment, and supplies too expensive. The backers of the Pilgrim expedition seemingly "played cheap" and took chances. The *Speedwell*, after two ventures, had to put back for good, and she was pronounced unseaworthy; the *Mayflower* finally sailed on September 6, 1620, several months later than planned, carrying 102 of the 120 passengers who had embarked on the two ships and inadequate supplies, food, and equipment for this number of colonists. Capt. John Smith would not have been a party to either such poor planning or reckless execution, and it is not surprising, in view of such a start, that about one-half of the *Mayflower* passengers failed to survive the first winter ashore. Until his death in June 1631 (when fifty-two years old), Captain Smith worked unceasingly to promote a popular interest in the colonization of New England.

At an early date, Capt. John Smith preached "the gospel of the fisheries" in the North Atlantic off the New England shores and the Banks of Newfoundland. He talked and wrote that the fisheries in the northwest Atlantic would provide a permanent prosperity, and he proved by his own ventures that there were "good fish markets in far countries." To Smith the fisheries meant "hard work, ships and good profits," but the ships (1) to catch the fish and take them ashore to be dried, salted, or cured, and (2) to take the preserved catch to a foreign market (some Catholic country where fish was always in demand) were an essential to his plan making for colonial prosperity in America. Smith said that in 1619 there went to America "a ship of 200 tuns, . . . which with eight and thirty men and boys had her freight which she sold for £2,100 . . . so that every poor sailor that had but a single share had his charges and sixteen pounds ten shillings for his seven months' work," and he added that in 1620 three different ships "made so good a voyage that every sailor that had a single share had twenty pounds for his seven months' work, which is more than in twenty months he should have gotten had he gone for wages anywhere." Smith also considered the profits of the merchants, while commenting on the fact that men low in the social scale in England would have a chance in America to rise above their station by industry, frugality, and intelligent business ventures and thus become capitalists. The statement was made that "the charge of setting forth a ship of 100 tuns with 40 persons to make a fishing voyage" was £420-11s. If the take of fish on the American coast would sell for £2,100, the return to the

merchant is figured as £700 and to the shipowner (who took one-third of the income from the voyage) a similar amount, and he need have no more capital tied up in the venture than the merchant, as Randolph said that a 100-ton ship could be built in New England for £4 per ton.

Smith's figures would seem to divide the return from an "average" fishing voyage, such as he describes, as roughly one-third to shipowner, who merely supplied the bare ship; about one-third to the merchant, who outfitted and managed her and furnished supplies; and about one-third to the officers and crew, who sailed her and did all the fishing. Possibly in the charges of the merchant are some payments to the few officers aboard a deep-sea fisherman. In Smith's time, if the same interest owned and outfitted the ship and acted as merchant, it would seem that he (or a group of capitalists) would receive two-thirds of the income from a fishing voyage and the crew the remaining one-third. Weeden, in his *ECONOMIC LIFE OF NEW ENGLAND* (quoting Bourne's *WELLS AND KENNEBUNK*), shows that in 1682-1685—if not earlier—"the capitalist fitting out the expedition with boat, provisions, seines, etc., took one-half of the value of the catch and the other part went to the crew." John R. Spears says, "In the eighteenth century, the share of the capitalist was reduced to one-fifth."

An English historian said that "England is more indebted" to Richard Hakluyt "for its American possessions than to any man of that age"—a statement that is not in harmony with the facts. Richard Hakluyt (1553-1616) was of Welsh extraction and became a man interested solely in "maps and the Bible." Although probably the greatest of British geographers, he was merely a recorder of what seafaring adventurers had accomplished and reported; he was not a navigator or explorer. He did not make a single voyage of discovery, and as far as personal initiative, adventure, and risk were concerned, he contributed nothing to the knowledge of the American continent or to its colonization. In 1584, several years after Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1539-1583) had focused British thought on a northwest passage to China and the Indies and had received his patent for the colonization of North America and a year after Gilbert had attempted to plant an English colony at St. John's, Newfoundland, and explore the Nova Scotia and Maine coasts with the idea of establishing other settlements on the mainland, Richard Hakluyt wrote his first work, which was entitled "A particular discourse concerning Westerne discoveries." At the time, he was in Paris as the chaplain attached to the English Embassy, and after receiving this appointment in 1583, he had occupied much of his time in collecting information regarding Spanish and French voyages of exploration and "making diligent inquirie of such things as might yield any light unto our Westerne discoverie in America." Hakluyt's work was written and published ninety-two years after Columbus had discovered the West Indian islands and eighty-seven years after John Cabot had discovered the mainland of the New World.

Later (in 1609), Hakluyt published a translation regarding Hernando (Ferdinando) de Soto's discoveries in Florida of 1539-1541, a work said to have been intended to encourage "the enterprise of planting the English race in the unsettled parts of North America," but before this (in 1606) the name of Richard Hakluyt appears among the list of members of the Council of the London Company of Virginia. Apparently, he was one of a large group of men who petitioned King James I for patents to engage in trade with and colonize North America, the monopolistic rights for which had been granted originally on June 11, 1578, to Sir Humphrey Gilbert and following his death in 1583 had been transferred to his step-brother Sir Walter Raleigh (1552-1618). It is but natural that Raleigh was interested in what Hakluyt wrote of the discoveries of foreign explorers, but before he commenced his research and translations, Raleigh had been financially interested, with Gilbert, in trading with and planting settlements in North America and had contributed one ship to the fleet that in 1583 made England's pioneer attempt to colonize the New World under the direction of and the patent held by Sir Humphrey Gilbert. The unfortunate experience of the Gilbert expeditionary fleet in the North Atlantic in the autumn of 1583, followed a year later by Hakluyt's translation of the records of the explorations of the more southerly part of North America, may have had a certain amount of influence in causing Sir Walter Raleigh

to abandon colonizing efforts north of the Chesapeake and to concentrate on the Carolinas. However, Raleigh was a gold hunter of military bent; he had the characteristics of the Spanish conquistadors and was more interested in finding wealth and in exploiting a country than in the development of any part of the New World by colonization, agriculture, and industry.

Hakluyt is said to have influenced, in a measure, Bristol and West County merchants to send Martin Pring on a trading voyage to the New England coast in 1603; but there was no originality in the Pring voyage, as he merely sailed over the course that Bartholomew Gosnold had covered the preceding year, and the voyage was for commercial profit with no thought of colonization. Probably the only influence that Hakluyt had with the West County merchants was his assurance that the trading expedition could be made without fear of Raleigh's confiscating the profits, for, with the death of Elizabeth on March 24, 1603, and the ascension of James I to the throne, Raleigh was in eclipse and, being charged with conspiracy, was on his way to the Tower, where he was committed on July 19, 1603. He was tried in Winchester in November 1603 and sentenced to death.

The works of Richard Hakluyt consist of translations and compilations. However, he was an excellent research student and an outstanding geographer. He became the greatest expert in England on maps of the ocean, its shores and trade routes, but as far as America was concerned, he was much more interested in Virginia than in New England. Hakluyt did not risk his resources in any exploration and colonizing project. He was a receiver of financial gain for his work rather than an adventurer with his means. He spent five years in Paris, enjoying the emolument as chaplain to the embassy, while he concentrated on his research work and translations. He was further rewarded by Elizabeth for his first "Discourse," and among the many preferments received by him were a couple of rectories, a chaplaincy at the Savoy, the archdeaconry of Westminster, and the prospective "living" of Jamestown, Va.

It would seem that Hakluyt, instead of being placed first among the Englishmen of his day responsible for the colonization of North America, should be ranked about sixth. The men who should be placed ahead of him in the relative importance of their contribution are Capt. John Smith (1580-1631) and Sir Ferdinando Gorges (1566-1647), who for earnest and consistent work and enthusiasm greatly outshine all others; the 3rd Earl of Southampton (1573-1624); Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1539-1583), the pioneer; and Sir Walter Raleigh (1552-1618). Probably Southampton's actual contribution to the English colonization of America is the least well known, and a brief synopsis of the practical interest in the New World of Henry Wriothesley, the 3rd Earl of Southampton, shows by comparison with that of Hakluyt how little the latter is entitled to the honor that certain historians have given him (and the truth of the adage that "the pen is mightier than the sword"—or the work of the chronicler more potent as far as enduring fame is concerned than that of unpublicized men who have contributed much to the world's progress). Southampton financed Gosnold in his exploratory voyage in the *Concord* in 1602, and this expedition was the first to sail west direct to the New England coast and the first attempt of the English to plant colonists north of the Carolinas. Southampton was one of a few men who backed Waymouth in his historic exploration of the Maine coast (Sagadahoc-Pemaquid-Monhegan) in 1605, which led to the establishment of an English colony in North Virginia (Popham on the Sagadahoc) in 1607. Southampton was one of the petitioners of the Plymouth Company of Virginia in 1606 and became treasurer of the London Company of Virginia in 1609; henceforth he was primarily interested in the well-being and growth of English settlements on the Chesapeake but not exclusively so, for in 1611 he financed the expedition of Harlow to explore the American coast around Cape Cod.

Sir Walter Raleigh made three futile attempts to colonize in the Carolinas during the period 1584-1587, but all were badly planned and executed, and outside of a possible source of wealth Raleigh had no great interest in North America and never personally made a voyage to its shores. When he did embark for the New World, he sailed to South America in true

Spanish fashion on the hunt for gold. Sir Humphrey Gilbert's views on America and a north-west passage to China and the Indies were widely circulated prior to 1575 and operated to promote the Sir Martin Frobisher expeditions of 1576-1578, and Gilbert's famous "Discourse" on this subject was published in 1576, or eight years before Hakluyt wrote his first work on American explorations.

Capt. John Smith and Sir Ferdinando Gorges were unfortunate in their business undertakings when they endeavored co-operatively to colonize New England; yet the reason for their separation in 1617 was that an unkind fate had exhausted the patience and resources of their West County merchant-sponsors, both of which essentials were evidently far too limited to make for success in ventures that required an abundance of courage and ample means. To the end, Gorges held to his original high opinion of Smith; for in his BRIEF RELATION OF THE DISCOVERY AND PLANTATION OF NEW ENGLAND, published in 1622, Gorges, referring to Smith's capture by French pirates, writes of the occurrence as resulting in "the ruine of that poore Gentleman Captaine Smith who was detained prisoner by them and forced to suffer many extremities, before hee got free of his troubles." Some British historians refer to Capt. John Smith as an "English adventurer who was the founder of Virginia." Smith, originally a man of means, became interested in the colonization of America at the same time as Gorges, in 1605, but Smith not only threw his entire energies into colonization schemes but also embarked heart and soul into the London Company's southern Virginia enterprise and supplied much of his personal fortune to make the Jamestown expedition possible. Although only twenty-seven years of age at the time, he was appointed a member of the council in Virginia by the council of the company in London in late 1606 and was elected president by the Virginia council in July 1608 (about fifteen months after the colonists had landed at Jamestown, during which time Smith had proven to be the only executive to perform conspicuous, worth-while work for the good of the settlement). From 1605 to his death in 1631, he devoted all his time, energies, and personal fortune to the English colonization of North America, and during this period he wrote by far the best and most practical literature on the subject from the standpoint of geographic and economic fact and of appeal to possible colonists. Smith, the outstanding geographer of the period, made voyages to both northern and southern Virginia, surveyed and made maps of the Chesapeake and the New England coast, and for the rest of his life and to the limit of his resources championed, along sound lines, the English colonization of North America.

Sir Ferdinando Gorges lived sixteen years beyond the time of Captain Smith, and Gorges continued loyally his interest in New England to the end of his days. Whereas he devoted much of his time and energies and some of his means to the colonization of New England, Gorges never gave his "all" in an unselfish devotion to the ideal as did Smith; moreover, he never made a voyage to America and never forgot for a moment that he was an aristocrat and that he was interested in New England (and later solely in Maine) for what he could get out of it. Gorges consistently advocated the English colonization of New England, but he held reservations and at no time risked a great deal of his own means in an heroic endeavor to achieve the desired ends. In this respect, only Sir Humphrey Gilbert equaled Capt. John Smith in his all-out loyalty to a cause, for in 1578 Gilbert disposed not only of his patrimony but also of the estates in Kent that he had through his wife, in order to finance his first expedition following the granting of a royal charter to him by Elizabeth for discovery and colonization in northwestern America. Smith journeyed to North America as did Gilbert, but Gorges, Southampton, Raleigh, and Hakluyt did not do so, and not one of these leading historic Englishmen in the colonization of North America other than Smith ever proved his ability to plan and operate a colony, to make friends and get along with the Indians, or to explore and map for the benefit of contemporaries and posterity, based on his own surveys, any part of the New World. As shown by an analysis of the record of actual accomplishment of the foremost candidates suggested by historians, the honor of being the leading spirit in the European colonization of North America should go to Capt. John Smith.

In the advocacy of colonization, Smith commences his writings by stressing the need of properly trained men to lead such enterprises and of selecting colonists qualified by experience to be useful in the venture. He writes:

It is not a worke for every one to manage such an affaire as makes a discoverie and plants a colony. It requires all the best part of Art, Judgement, Courage, Honesty and Constancy, Diligence and Industrie to doe but neere well. Some are proper for

one thing then another; and therein are to be employed: nothing breedes more confusion than misplacing and misemploying men in their undertakings.

Smith says that the country that he has named "New England" lies "betwixt the degrees of 41 and 45" on the coast line; i.e., between a point in the vicinity of New York and the Passamaquoddy, or present Canadian border. His detailed survey, however, "stretcheth but from Pennobscot to Cape Cod," and he evidently favored the establishment of settlements within this area, which was healthful and free from the swamp diseases that, it is said, caused in the first few years the death of a thousand Jamestown, Va., colonists. Smith wanted to see established in Maine and Massachusetts colonies that, co-operating under English rule, would keep the French out of the territory and profit by the fisheries, while utilizing forest resources, promoting agriculture for sustenance, with crops and cattle, and trading with the Indians for furs. Smith advocated prosperity based on industry rather than on piracy and gambling; he urged that England follow the example of the conservative Dutch in the realm of economics rather than that of the more spectacular and volatile Spaniards. He maintained that the wealth and marine power of the Dutch had been built upon their fisheries, and he wrote: "Never could the Spaniard with all his mynes of golde and silver pay his debts, his friends and army, halfe so truly, as the Hollanders stil have done by this contemptible trade of fish." Smith tells how the Portuguese and Biscay fishermen, with all their handicaps in equipment, sent numerous ships out yearly to the fisheries and that "Newfound Land doth yearly fraught neare 800 sayle of ships" with fish for the European markets. If the pattern of fisheries then in effect was profitable (as it undoubtedly was, for it had been in use for well over a century and was steadily increasing in volume of ships engaged therein and in the annual catch), then, with a twelve-month-in-the-year colonization plan to take the place of the practice of shipping across the Atlantic in the spring not only the fishermen but also the men and equipment needed for the curing and of returning them in the fall, thus resulting in an entire wintertime of nonproductivity, "why should wee doubt—but to doe much better than they, where there is victual to feed us, wood of all sorts to build boats, Ships, or Barks; the fish at our doores; pitch, tarre, masts yards, and most of other necessaries onely for making."

Smith did more than any one man to bring to the attention of class-dominated Englishmen, the unemployed, and those virtually enslaved by debt and suppressed by custom the glorious opportunity offered of personal and mental freedom in a new world:

Here are no hard Landlords to racke us with high rents, or extorted fines to consume us; no tedious pleas in law to consume us with their many years disputations for justice. . . . Here every man may be master and owner of his owne labour and land.

. . . If hee have nothing but his hands, hee may set up his trade; and by industrie quickly grow rich; spending but halfe that time wel, which in England we abuse in idleness.

Smith suggested that, with colonies established, ships sailing across the Atlantic for fish could carry out supplies for the settlers, thus making both the westbound and the eastbound passages profitable instead of having the expenses of the hard crossing to the westward, when the ship was light, eat into the profits made on the homeward passage, when fish laden. "This would so increase our shipping and sailors, and so employ and encourage a great part of our idlers and others that want employments . . . that could they but once taste the sweet fruites of their owne labours doubt lesse many thousands would be advised by good discipline, to take more pleasure in honest industrie, then in their humors of dissolute idelnesse."

Smith did not advocate colonization by any mass migration; he preferred the gradual settlement of colonies and even suggested tying up the founding of them, at first, with the

fishing economy. Probably Smith was influenced in his arguments by the knowledge that the great losses sustained by the financial backers of the Sir Walter Raleigh colonization ventures in the South and the more recent Gorges-Popham attempt to found a settlement on the Sagadahoc had frightened the owners of capital and that neither sound businessmen nor more adventuresome men of means (and inherited wealth) would have anything more to do with colonization plans following the general lines used in the past. Smith's scheme of gradually building a settlement by leaving in New England each year the one-third of the men of the crew who were carried out to the Banks on a fisherman to do the work of setting up and operating the flakes and of drying, salting, and curing the fish ashore would have depended for its success upon (1) the caliber of the men left on the New England shore; (2) the leaving of sufficient food supplies, equipment, etc., to carry these men through a long winter until ships contacted them in the spring; (3) the location of a settlement where the men (few in number) could be protected and safe from a surprise Indian attack; (4) the thorough equipping of the men with guns and ample powder for use in hunting and as a means of defense against the Indians, who were tricky, furtive, naturally thievish, suspicious, and hostile as well as relatively numerous. Notwithstanding the appeal made by Smith to the small businessmen who had a little money to invest, it is doubtful as to whether in his lifetime there would have been any successful attempt to colonize New England if it had not been for certain religious, social, economic, and political conditions in England that produced Dissenters, Puritans, and Roundheads and led to civil war, the establishment of the commonwealth in England, the rise to power of Cromwell, and the beheading of King Charles I, who as "the high and mighty Prince Charles of great Britaine" had changed the names of towns, rivers, and capes on Captain Smith's maps.

In 1914 a tercentenary tablet was placed on Monhegan Island, Maine, to the memory of Capt. John Smith, who, "with two vessels, in 1614 anchored in the island harbor and explored the coast from Penobscot Bay to Cape Cod, discovering a large opportunity for adding to England's glory by colonization," and who "returned home and spent his remaining years in advancing American enterprises." No man did more to colonize America than Capt. John Smith, and the only man who equaled him in enthusiasm and maintained loyalty was Sir Ferdinando Gorges, with whom Smith was associated for a few years. Gorges was at all times interested in North Virginia, or New England (and particularly the province of Maine); whereas Smith, while he concentrated his colonizing efforts and attention on New England following his voyage of 1614, before that time had saved the Jamestown Colony of the London Company from extinction. It was Smith who kept alive the James River settlement until the site of the colony and the policy of the proprietors were changed. His earnestness, vigor, courage, directness, versatility, and managing ability made bitter foes in Jamestown, Va. His criticism of the proprietors of the London Company of Virginia made enemies among the men of name and money who were financing and dictating the policy of the colony in London. His entering into a contract with Gorges and the West County merchants of the Plymouth Company in 1614 caused animosity on the part of London merchants when, because of this commitment, Smith was compelled to decline the command of a fishing fleet of four London ships sailing to the New England coast in 1615. The bad luck of Smith in the service of Gorges and Plymouth and Bristol merchants of limited means, by which three attempts to reach New England for trading and colonizing on a small scale failed (one due to pirates and the other two to the elements), caused his West County friends to turn against him, and Smith's talk and writings, critical of the South Virginia colony and its management, embittered Londoners and developed a more or less organized propaganda movement against him.

Smith, who had been made "Admiral of New England" and whose book, "Description of New England," was primarily responsible for both the Pilgrim and Puritan colonization of Massachusetts, died in obscurity in 1631, when fifty-two years of age. Much has been written denouncing Smith as a charlatan, a prevaricator, and a fraud, and this is but natural con-

sidering the times and the numerous influential enemies that he made by his many implications as well as direct criticisms. Whereas much of history is "merely fiction agreed upon" by interests that have been powerful enough to influence and largely control expressed opinions and to subsidize writers who, through the years, have become authoritative historians, Smith need not be judged by the writings of others. Ignoring the man's egoism and imaginative flights, which were unimportant and harmless, the fact remains that his explorations and maps of the Chesapeake and of the New England coast and his writings in regard to New England, the fisheries, and colonization place him in a class by himself—unequaled by any man of his generation. Capt. John Smith was an explorer, geographer, economist, and promoter *par excellence*. Nothing has been written or can be said by any employed and authoritatively directed or merely biased "character-wrecker" to detract from his greatness as the one man more responsible than any other for bringing New England—and the continent of North America—as a possible home in the New World to the attention of the many thousands of oppressed "humble folk" of England who became the colonists of the seventeenth century and the foundation upon which a great nation was built.

*Gorges Attempts to Colonize Massachusetts—and Save the
Plymouth Company—during the Few Years Preceding
the Pilgrim Migration on the MAYFLOWER*

Sir Ferdinando Gorges made an attempt in 1614 to combine the establishment of a small colony on the Massachusetts shore with a trading voyage to pay expenses when he sent Capt. Nicholas Hobson "to fish, trade and plant some men ashore" in the Cape Cod and southern Massachusetts territory. Gorges valued the use of captured Indians as "pilots" and interpreters, and on Hobson's ship he sent back to the New World an Indian who had been one of five kidnapped at Cape Cod by Capt. Edward Harlow in 1611. This Indian (Epenow), after suffering humiliation in London by being publicly exhibited as a freak, was acquired by Gorges, who, it would seem, still had one of the Pemaquid-Sagadahoc Weymouth-captured Indians employed on his English estate as a slave. Epenow was a tricky, resourceful, and vengeful Indian. He told Gorges fanciful tales of a rich gold mine somewhere near Martha's Vineyard to which he could guide the English. Gorges, badly in need of funds, "fell for the yarn" and sent Epenow (as a prisoner, or slave-pilot) to guide Hobson to the mine and wealth, which, if found, Epenow was promised, would purchase his freedom. The Indian well knew that there was no such mine, and he made monkeys out of the English. Escaping from the clutches of an armed guard of "gentlemen" who had been deputed by Gorges to watch over and hold him prisoner until the gold mine had been found, Epenow cunningly contrived, on reaching port (probably at Martha's Vineyard), to surround the vessel with twenty canoes filled with apparently peaceful Indians—their weapons out of sight. The canoes, at Epenow's suggestion (in the Indian language, which the English could not understand), would not come near Captain Hobson's ship. While the Indian captive made a pretense of pleading with his countrymen to come aboard, running from side to side of the ship, he confused his guard and escaped long enough to jump overboard and swim to one of the canoes, and then the Indians opened fire on the English with long-range bows and arrows. It is said that in the ensuing fight some of the Indians were killed by the English musketeers and that Captain Hobson and many of the crew and those aboard who had contemplated settling in America were badly wounded.

The well-organized reception of the Indians to the English expedition, their strength and

hostility, ended the voyage as soon as the ship reached the Massachusetts coast. Much to Gorges' disgust, Captain Hobson promptly returned to Plymouth without a cargo of any kind, and Gorges himself and his syndicate of backers sustained a heavy financial loss. The voyage was one of expense, with no compensating income and, of course, none of the promised gold. Following an account of Epenow's cleverly planned and executed escape (and the death of another Indian captive slave of Gorges that was aboard the ship), we read: "Hereupon the captain and the whole company were discouraged and returned to England, bringing nothing back with them, but the News of their bad Success, and that there was a war broke out between the English and the Indians."

Gorges was naturally indignant with Captain Hobson for bringing the ship back to Plymouth without fish, furs, sassafras, or any other cargo, even if he could not discover the hoped-for gold; but Hobson claimed that his wounds and those of the many members of his company, together with the crew's belligerent attitude, which savored of mutiny, precluded any other course of action. The result of the Hobson 1614 expedition to colonize (and trade with) New England was a bad blow to the impoverished Plymouth Company. Its president, Richard Hawkins, in a courageous attempt to keep the charter of the company alive, spent the winter of 1615-1616 at Pemaquid and Monhegan on the Maine coast—evidently at a fishermen's settlement that must have been established there before his arrival and had probably been in use for years (some historians say since 1608, the year of the abandonment of the Popham Colony on the Sagadahoc, some twenty-three miles away due west). Capt. Edward Brande contacted Hawkins on Monhegan in April 1616, and we are told that Hawkins went to the Chesapeake with a cargo of fish. Apparently, he could not make a satisfactory trade, for he continued on to Spain, where he disposed of his cargo profitably. Upon his return to England, Hawkins reported that a war was waging between the various tribes of Indians in Maine and that most of the Indian warriors that frequented the Sagadahoc-Pemaquid area had been killed in battle and their villages destroyed.

The last voyage conceived and managed by Gorges to Maine and New England before the *Mayflower* landed her passengers at New Plymouth, Mass., in December 1620, was a dramatic and, as usual, an unfortunate one. Gorges sent Capt. Edward Rocroft across the Atlantic in 1618 to meet Capt. Thomas Dermer at Monhegan. Both of these men had been associated with Capt. John Smith, and the plan was to proceed to a certain part of the New England coast that Dermer had heard of through a Massachusetts Indian named Squanto, who had been captured by Thomas Hunt at Plymouth in 1614, but was then living in freedom in Newfoundland. Dermer, in the meanwhile, had sailed to England and had taken Squanto with him to act as pilot and interpreter if Gorges and his friends of the Plymouth Company could be interested to back another exploratory voyage to the New England coast. Whereas Squanto was said to be a free Indian, he had evidently been bought for a house slave by John Slavy, connected with the Newfoundland company, and when Dermer came in contact with Squanto, he was living "under the protection" of Capt. John Mason, the English governor of Newfoundland. He was to become important later as a colleague and partner of Gorges in the latter's final frantic attempts to keep his hand on Maine and the country north and east of the Merrimac after Massachusetts was taken away from him because of the effective colonization of the Pilgrims and Puritans in that territory. Squanto's prime interest in Dermer and later in Gorges was a desire on the part of Squanto to get back to his own land and his own people.

After learning from Gorges of the Rocroft voyage and receiving the backing and equipment for the expedition (which came very slowly and took all winter to get), Dermer crossed the Atlantic to Monhegan, where he arrived in May 1619, only to find that Rocroft had sailed for the south in the fall of 1618. (He had put mutinous members of his crew ashore at the old Popham settlement at Sagadahoc, and these men, for protection from the Indians, had spent most of the winter of 1618-1619 on Monhegan.) Dermer, learning of the movements of Rocroft, sailed to the southwest to search for him and found that his friend had been shipwrecked and lost his life. Dermer evidently cruised along the New England coast in "an open

pinnace of five tun" while his ship and crew engaged in the fisheries off Monhegan and dried the catch at Pemaquid. On the journey to the southeast to what was apparently Cape Cod Bay, Dermer saw many signs of the desolation and virtual extermination of the Indians caused by the terrible plague of 1616, but he continued beyond Plymouth (Squanto's native country). After redeeming a Frenchman who was an Indian captive and finding other Frenchmen who had been shipwrecked, he returned in his pinnace to Monhegan. Dermer dispatched his "big ship," fish laden, to the Virginia colony on the Chesapeake and proceeded south once more in his little pinnace to explore the coast south of Cape Cod. Squanto, the Indian, with apparently no relatives alive at Plymouth, was put ashore at Saco—probably at his own request. (Eventually, he turned up at Plymouth after the Pilgrims had established their colony there.) Dermer was nearly wrecked before he reached Cape Cod and had much trouble with the Indians on the southern portion of the cape (around Chatham), where, it would seem, the force of the plague had not been felt. He came in contact with the Indian Epenow on Martha's Vineyard and later made the first passage of Long Island Sound, through Hell Gate and East River, to New York Harbor. In the "streights," the Indians fired showers of arrows at the English boat, but Dermer says that "it pleased God to make us victours." He got through safely and proceeded all the way to Virginia, where he showed a map of the coast and of his "discoveries." While returning to the north in 1620, he is said to have explored the Delaware and Hudson rivers.

After reaching Monhegan, Dermer surprisingly decided to sail south once more in his little pinnace to the Virginia colony on the Chesapeake. Possibly Dermer, feeling himself handicapped and cramped (as had many others before him) because of the impecuniosity of the Plymouth Company, was on his way to throw in his lot with the London Company of Virginia. He had made two calls at Martha's Vineyard within a year, but when he appeared the third time, notwithstanding that his pinnace was very small and his crew but few and relatively weak, Epenow—the Indian once enslaved by the English—felt that Dermer's interest in the land of his people was becoming a menace to their security, so the Indians attacked the Englishmen, killed all but one, and mortally wounded Dermer himself. He lived long enough to reach Virginia, where he died of his wounds. However, while he was fighting the Indians at Martha's Vineyard, the *Mayflower* was struggling across the Atlantic to find some place about "Hudson's River" on which to plant a settlement, permission for which had been obtained from the London Company of Virginia. Instead of reaching the entrance to the Hudson River (about $40\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N.), the *Mayflower* made a landfall at Cape Cod (about 42° N.). The turbulent Martha's Vineyard, the abode of the hostile Epenow, was between the two points at about $41\frac{1}{3}^{\circ}$ N. It was good fortune that the *Mayflower*, having been blown to the north of her course, was swept far enough in that direction to avoid a landing on the south coast of Massachusetts (and Rhode Island) or the islands offshore, where the country had not been depopulated of its aborigines by the great plague and was inhabited by Indians who were aggressively and treacherously hostile (with cause) to the white race—and particularly to Englishmen. Henry F. Howe, in PROLOGUE TO NEW ENGLAND, says that Dermer was "the first martyr to the cause of New Plymouth," and he adds:

In Dermer Gorges lost one of his most resourceful leaders. His death was the final blow in a long series of disasters to the Plymouth Company. The accidental landing of the Pilgrims within the grant of the Plymouth adventurers was a happy but totally unforeseen circumstance to Gorges and his company. The Leyden emigrants were able to take advantage of all the preliminary work prepared for them by the Plymouth Company, together with the golden opportunity provided by the depopulation of Massachusetts by pestilence.

During this time the company was having trouble with its charter in Parliament, and Dermer's was the last serious effort of the adventurers in New England before their re-organization. Nevertheless, their heartbreaking series of catastrophes, all unknown to them, had laid the groundwork for the permanent settlement of Massachusetts. In utter rout and hopelessness they had already won the battle. And even while Dermer was fighting his last battle with the savages of Martha's Vineyard, the *Mayflower* was on her way across the Atlantic.

It does not seem that all the bungling of the Plymouth Company following the unfortunate attempt to plant a colony at the mouth of the Sagadahoc "had laid the groundwork

for the permanent settlement of Massachusetts." The credit should be given to Capt. John Smith and not to the Plymouth Company "botchers," who were either too impoverished or too purse-tight to do any real adventuring; too cowardly and too rapacious for immediate profits to back Captain Smith, give him a fair chance, and—"blow high or low"—follow his very competent and experienced leadership. Smith could get along splendidly with the Indians, and he appreciated the importance of agriculture (crops and cattle), the fisheries, and the fur trade as well as the value of forest products. He had a commercial sense and was an advocate of industry and economy. He was by far the best authority of his day on the fundamentals of colonization and the practical application of basic economic and social principles and on the planning, locating, planting, managing, and governing of colonies. It is most unfortunate that Capt. John Smith, having been handicapped in southern Virginia by senseless jealousy and antagonism, hidebound prejudices, aristocratic whimseys, and traditional propensities that turned to personal enmity toward him when he dared to oppose the decrees of the divine-right London proprietors, was unlucky when he tied up for "good or ill" with the more democratic Plymouth Company and with Gorges, an aristocrat but the enthusiastic advocate of the colonization of northern Virginia (or New England). Evidently, the stars were against the union of Smith and Gorges or Smith and the Plymouth Company. However, Smith was not to blame for his vessel's being dismantled when he was sent to sea in a ship in poor physical condition, on which no money had been spent for needed refitting. Neither was he to blame for being captured, when unarmed, by a powerful and fast French privateer nor for his fleet's being detained in port (with another hundred ships) for some three months because of the elements and a lack of favorable wind. Smith was unlucky, and if in 1614 he had not been a man of honor but—as in the case of Capt. Michael Cooper—had repudiated his contract with Gorges and the Plymouth merchants and joined forces with the London group of adventurers, he would probably, with ample money behind him, have risen to undying fame and become the "Admiral of New England" in fact as well as in name and the real and undisputed father of English colonization not only in New England but also on the continent of North America.

*The London and Plymouth Companies and the First
Permanent English Settlements in America*

From the time in 1578 that Sir Humphrey Gilbert obtained from Queen Elizabeth of England a "patent" for discovery and settlement in North America, there were many charters, patents and rights to certain very broadly specified parts of the New World, north of Mexico and the Spanish conquests, granted by the English Crown to individuals and companies organized to colonize and obtain wealth from the newly discovered land across the Atlantic. After Sir Walter Raleigh's failure to establish a permanent colony at Roanoke, N. C. (1586-1603), Sir Ferdinando Gorges, commencing in 1604 or 1605, became particularly interested in colonizing the territory to the north, which Captain Smith named New England in 1614. Gorges continued to be an ardent champion of the English settlement and control of that part of the North American continent until his death in 1647, in which year, although eighty-one years of age, he wrote his "Briefe Narration of the Originall Undertakings of the Advancement of Plantations into the Parts of America."

A new London Company had taken over the rights of Raleigh and his associates in Virginia (to the south) when the patent reverted to the crown and went forward with a plan to establish a settlement on the James River, Virginia, just as Sir Ferdinando Gorges concurrently engineered and organized a Plymouth Company to settle and develop what was then

known as northern Virginia. He got financial backing for an expedition to colonize at the mouth of the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) River in Maine. Both ventures were undertaken in 1607, and neither was successful. However, the Jamestown settlement, being located in a milder though less healthy climate, continued in a fashion until June 1610. As it was quickly re-established in the same region after having been abandoned, it is generally considered as the beginning of a permanent colony under the control of the London Company and the first such colony to be planted by the English on the continent of North America or in the New World. The Sagadahoc expedition, although badly planned as to location on the river, was superior to that which went to the James River, especially with respect to the caliber of the settlers and their industry. A terrible Maine winter on an exposed shore, with persistent ice and snow, intense cold, and ocean gales from which there was inadequate protection, and the loss by fire of the warehouse containing supplies brought from England undermined to a great degree—with cause—the morale and health of the men. Upon the death of their resident leader, Capt. George Popham, and of the colony's chief sponsors, Sir John Popham (lord chief justice and a brother of George Popham) and Sir John Gilbert (a brother of the second leader and a son of Sir Humphrey Gilbert), the colonists decided to abandon the site and disband rather than attempt to withstand the rigors and hardships of another winter in the unprotected setting near the beach at the mouth of the Kennebec River, with insufficient or, at least, "very uncertain" financial support, and a large majority of them returned to England.

During the first few months of settlement life in Maine, the colonists, in addition to building structures and a stockade to house and protect them, had constructed a sizable vessel—the *Virginia*, America's first ship. When those colonists who declined to go back to England scattered, it is believed that they settled on the Maine coast as fishermen and traders and that they continued to build boats according to their needs.

The first permanent settlement of colonists in New England, or North Virginia, was established in late December 1620 by "a small body of religious dissentients," who had made arrangements with "The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the First Colony in Virginia" to plant themselves within the company's bounds. The settlers had sailed for the Hudson River in the *Mayflower*, but had been blown from their course; hence they arrived at the shores of the New World around Cape Cod and landed at Plymouth instead of reaching "the mouth of the big river that runs north." Arrangements were later made by the *Mayflower* adventurers (who, contrary to their original intent, had founded a settlement at Plymouth in the Cape Cod region of Massachusetts, New England) with the revamped Plymouth Company of Virginia for the rights of occupancy and for needed financial and kindred support. Primarily through the energetic efforts of Sir Ferdinando Gorges, that company had succeeded in 1620 in obtaining a new charter, and the New England Council had come into being. Evidently, the error made by the *Mayflower* Pilgrims in reaching their destination operated to give Britain a great measure of concern around the Hudson for a period of about half a century (for it permitted the Dutch to establish in 1624 the first colony in that region), but it was a windfall for the struggling, unfortunate, and impecunious Plymouth Company. During the more than fourteen years of its existence, that company had no colony to show within the geographical area covered by its charter, and even its trading voyages had been few and had brought but little profit or glory to England—and this during a time that the French had been particularly active in trade and the establishment of posts and settlements in the northern part of the American continent.

Since 1606, Sir Ferdinando Gorges had remained a dominant factor, in management at least, in all matters pertaining to the development through colonization and trade of northern Virginia and in the operation of the original Plymouth Company and its successor corporations. Gorges seems to have had the faculty of planning colonization ventures and securing an authoritative voice in management without risking much of his personal fortune; nevertheless, he was an outstanding figure in schemes to found settlements in New England and was a prominent personality in the affairs of the Plymouth Company. In 1635 he sought to

be appointed governor-general for all New England, but we are told that the English civil war, in which he espoused the royal cause as an ardent Anglican, prevented him from ever officially gaining that office. Historians tell us, however, that Gorges was largely instrumental in procuring the original and subsequent charters for the Plymouth Company and the New England Council and was also, "at all times, perhaps the most influential individual member of the Plymouth Company" and of colonization, trading, and development schemes outside of the specific jurisdiction granted the Puritan enterprises. Records show that Gorges was the recipient, either solely or jointly, of several grants of territory from the company, for one of which he received in 1639 the royal charter of Maine. As he advanced in years, he became increasingly ardent in his advocacy of the "feudal type of colony."

The passengers of the *Mayflower*, who founded the colony at Plymouth (like the colonists who had attempted to plant a permanent settlement at the mouth of the Kennebec River), were "humble folk"—industrious and serious-minded, with a sense of individual responsibility and a desire to work hard for the common good. They were religious, of Puritan persuasion, and quite narrow in their views as far as worshipping God was concerned; hence they became known as the Pilgrims and their leaders as the Pilgrim Fathers, but they were a well-disciplined group and in material matters had sound ideas in regard to economics and the creation of wealth and prosperity through production, self-sacrifice, and arduous work.

For a long term of years, white men and women of the poorer and more unfortunate classes were imported into the American colonies (particularly into Virginia) as bound servants, and they landed on American shores to enter a life of serfdom, or to live void of freedom and rights as if in a penitentiary, until they had worked out their liberty. The colonial proprietors, in an effort to get land settled and productive and make money for themselves, issued so-called concessions, or "conditions of plantation," stating terms on which they would grant land to free settlers. Under a system known as "head rights," which originated in Virginia, tracts of land were granted to colonists "proportional to the number of servants imported," and in this way a traffic in indentured servants, or bound labor, because of their "head rights" value to their employers (or virtual owners) in the acquisition of land, was encouraged among both planters and masters (and owners) of merchant vessels who made money in transporting them.

The North Virginia (New England) colonies were from the first interested primarily in fish, ships, timber, and trading in furs, even though the management of the Massachusetts Bay Colony (and, to a lesser extent, of the Plymouth Colony) emphasized the importance of the growing of crops and the raising of livestock. The pioneer Sagadahoc colony had been strongly ship-minded, and the Puritan colonies of Massachusetts quickly became so—of necessity. However, the South Virginia (Chesapeake or James River) colony of the London Company at no time gave much thought to either shipbuilding or timber, and it accomplished little or nothing in this field for a century or more.

Sir Ferdinando Gorges and the Popham (Kennebec) colonists of 1607 were attracted to the Sagadahoc because of North Atlantic fishing on the Banks and off the coast and because of the wonderful forest lands with great trees down to the ocean shores—trees from which ships could be built for fishing and trading. This is proven by the fact that their first stop was at "the fishing Ile of Monhegan"; that they brought trained shipbuilders with them and located their settlement at the mouth of a river that tapped a wonderful timber country, down which felled trees—white pine and oak—could be driven or rafted by means of a strong current to a beach at its mouth, which, when first seen in August, was an ideal site for building ships.

The *Mayflower* passengers and the founders of the Pilgrim colony at Plymouth were neither fishermen nor shipbuilders. At first, they turned their thoughts to survival by means of agriculture, and in order to obtain money to pay their bills and the high interest on the sums of money borrowed from the Plymouth Company, they embarked in trading and the bartering of certain surplus crops for furs. For this necessary line of activity, they needed

ships; hence they petitioned the Plymouth Company to send them some men trained and competent to build vessels. Ships built for trading were available for fishing, and the fisheries meant an increased food supply and later, when the fish were dried and salted, or cured, a highly desirable medium of trade.

The Massachusetts Bay Colony of the Puritans developed in 1628 and 1629 from the urge in England to found settlements in New England because of its promise of religious freedom, but the English businessmen behind the Boston Bay venture were evidently much more interested in agriculture and in planting "a bit of England" in America than they were in either the fisheries or timber. Later, however, the fisheries saved all the Massachusetts colonies (Boston, Salem, Plymouth, etc.), and New England became primarily a maritime province.

John R. Spears, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, says: "The demand for Virginia tobacco increased until the English merchants sent their agents to the colony to buy and pay for the crop long before the harvest in order to have first chance to secure it. Why should the Virginians build or buy ships under such circumstances?" The Virginia colonists of the London Company never showed much interest in shipbuilding, save in small vessels for use in local transportation on their sheltered inland waters. What "shipbuilding" they actually did was mere boat-building. Claims have been made in comparatively recent years that "in or around 1610, two vessels were built in Virginia for Bermudian owners." This is evidently untrue. The colonists had not been sufficiently ship-minded when leaving England to bring with them any metal, equipment, or supplies for building vessels, and there is no record that they were ever sufficiently interested in the subject to send for such materials. John Smith made his wonderful exploratory voyage in the Chesapeake and adjoining waters in a ship's longboat made in England, and English ship small boats and Indian canoes were apparently used by the Virginia colonists for years. However, there is a record written by a Spaniard who visited Jamestown in 1611 that refers to the building by the colonists of "their first boat," and we are told that the iron being used in this small craft had been obtained "from a ship wrecked at Bermuda." This was probably a repair and salvage job performed under the supervision of seamen (who also may have been deputized to do the actual work); for of a fleet of nine vessels that sailed from England in 1609 with a new administrative force, the flagship of the flotilla, the *Sea Venture*, was wrecked on the Bermuda coast, and four other vessels suffered considerable damage. The ships that had been in company with the *Sea Venture* when she was lost, though scattered and "greatly distressed," survived the gale and probably, later, brought their battered hulls and small boats to the Virginia colony for such repairs as could be made together with all of value that could be salvaged from the wrecked flagship.

*Indian Hostility to Europeans—the Great Plague of 1616
Makes Possible a Relatively Peaceful Colonization
of Massachusetts in the 1620's*

The Massachusetts Indians gave the Europeans more trouble through their belligerency, wariness, and trickery than did the Maine aborigines, who were generally admitted to be composed of wilder tribes of savages. Waymouth reported the threatening attitude and treacherous plotting of the Maine Indians at Pemaquid in 1605, but he added fuel to the flames when he kidnapped "five salvages" on the Sagadahoc and took them and their "two canoas with all their bowes and arrowes" to London. In August 1607, Popham and Gilbert naturally found

the Indians at Pemaquid unfriendly, and the English were not permitted to land; somewhat over a month later, Gilbert had a close shave and was fortunate in avoiding a fight with the Indians on the Sagadahoc. The French Jesuit priest, Pierre Biard, is authority for the unverified statement that these same Indians massacred eleven of the Popham colonists through cunning treachery in the fall of 1607. Biard says that the policy of the Indians toward the English settlers was "to kill the wolf's cub before he has stronger teeth and claws."

The only other historical record of a fight between the whites and the Indians of Maine seems to be that of Henry Hudson's 1609 expedition under the Dutch flag in the *Half Moon*. Robert Juet, the mate, tells us that in July, on the Maine coast (somewhere in the Sagadahoc-Monhegan-lower Penobscot area), while fitting a new foremast that had been cut ashore, "we kept good watch for fear of being betrayed by the people and perceived where they layed their shallops. The five and twentieth, very faire weather and hot. In the morning we manned our scute with foure muskets and sixe men, and tooke one of their shallops and brought it aboard." Juet continues: "Then we manned our boat and scute with twelve men and muskets, and two stone pieces or murderers and drove the savages from their houses and tooke the spoyle of them, as they would have done of us. Then we set sayle." This was evidently an act of aggression on the part of an English-officered and partly English-manned Dutch ship, and the party was suspicious of the evil intent of the "savages." The Indians were using two shallops, which they apparently had stolen from the French, and Juet filched one of them by the use of his scute (dinghy, or skiff) and then continued the act of piracy by despoiling the natives, but nothing is said of the fight or possible shedding of blood or loss of life.

Champlain was threatened by the Indians at Gloucester in September 1606; Capt. John Smith was attacked at Cohasset in 1614; a French ship was raided and burned at Peddock's Island in Boston Harbor in 1615 (most of the officers and crew were massacred, and at least five of the men were taken captive, humiliated, and enslaved); and Capt. Thomas Dermer was attacked by flights of arrows from the shore when he made a passage of Hell Gate from Long Island Sound to New York Harbor in 1619.

It was, however, in the general territory that was colonized by the Pilgrims in late 1620 that the Indians had shown the most consistently treacherous and belligerent attitude of any of the tribes inhabiting New England. In the Buzzard's Bay and Martha's Vineyard region off the south arm of Cape Cod, the Indians attacked Bartholomew Gosnold's men in 1602 when they were building a house on one of the Elizabeth Islands; evidently the English were considered usurpers and thieves, for they had stolen an Indian canoe. Capt. Nicholas Hobson had a battle off Martha's Vineyard with the "savages" in 1614, and several of the company, including Captain Hobson, were badly injured. The damage wrought by the Indians was so great that all thought of trading was forgotten and the ship returned to England with empty holds (much to Sir Ferdinando Gorges' disgust) and spread the report that war in America had broken out between the English and the Indians. In 1619, Capt. Thomas Dermer had trouble with the Indians at the southern part of Cape Cod, for he wrote: "Almost everywhere where they were of any strength they sought to betray us. At Manamock I was unawares taken prisoner, when they sought to kill my men, which I left to man the pinnace; but missing their purpose, they demanded a ransome, which had, I was a farre from libertie as before: Yet it pleased God at last, after a strange manner to deliver me, with three of them into my hands." One of the Indians who fell into Dermer's hands was the chief, and after he was secured on board the pinnace and Dermer was about to sail, a bargain was made by means of which the three Indians were set free in exchange for the return of the ransom in goods (hatchets) that the English had paid to the Indians and a canoe-load of corn. The following year (1620), while the *Mayflower* was battling her way across the Atlantic with the Pilgrim colonists aboard, Captain Dermer, on his way from Monhegan to the Chesapeake, was attacked by the Indians at Martha's Vineyard; all his men except one were killed, and he himself was mortally wounded in the fight, but succeeded in reaching Virginia, where he died of his wounds.

The Cape Cod Indians who inhabited the Eastham and Chatham district of the outlying cape and the southern neck of land were very hostile to the white men (and were but little affected by the plague, or scourge, of 1616). During the exploration of the cape by Champlain and De Monts (when at Eastham on July 23, 1605), the Indians, in order to steal a kettle, deliberately murdered a Frenchman; this was evidently the first known massacre of a white man by the Indians in New England. On October 15, 1606, when Champlain and De Poutrincourt were at Chatham (at the southeast corner of Cape Cod), the Indians in great numbers attacked a small party of French ashore, killed four and wounded a fifth; later, they maltreated the dead and desecrated their graves. This seems to have been the first real battle waged in New England between the Indians and the whites, and it occurred on Cape Cod only a few miles south of the place where the first European was murdered by the savages. The pattern of this attack was characteristic of all Indian warfare that was to follow—superior numbers, treachery, and a swift surprise attack, with atrocities to living victims and brutal savagery in the maltreatment of the dead. Champlain and De Poutrincourt continued their exploration of the southern Cape Cod shore, journeying to Wood's Hole (at the southwest corner of the cape), where, because of the late season, they turned back and, upon reaching Chatham, again wreaked their vengeance upon the Indians by a reprisal, the strategy, treachery, and diabolism of which were worthy of the cruel, perfidious savage mind. An undesignated number of Indians were betrayed and butchered by the French. In Canada, Champlain was surprisingly outstanding in his ability to get along with the Indians, but the Cape Cod aborigines were too much for him. However, he was so sure of the rightness of his revengeful act that he wrote when leaving the scene of atrocious retribution, made possible by artifice and his protestations of friendship to the Indians, "God has not left unpunished the misdeeds of these barbarians." It is interesting to note that it was in this same general region that Capt. Edward Harlow, in 1611, kidnapped five Indians by strategy, deceit, and force, thus keeping alive the enmity of the Cape Cod Indians toward the white man.

Plymouth Bay, where the Pilgrims landed from the *Mayflower* on December 21, 1620, had a record for the hostility of the native aborigines toward the whites. If this area had not been within the 1615-1616 plague belt, which extended from Cape Elizabeth, Maine, to Buzzard's Bay on the Massachusetts coast (and some thirty miles inland), it seems positive that the relatively weak pioneer colonists would not have been permitted to make a peaceful landing or, if once ashore, would not have been able to withstand the hostility of the Indians during the first hard winter. Capt. Martin Pring in the *Speedwell*, in July-August 1603, was the first European of record to have experience with the belligerency of the Plymouth Indians, who were guilty of many threatening acts just short of open war, including the burning of the woods where the English temporarily located themselves ashore. The firing of the ship's cannon, the constant alertness of well-armed men, and the appearance of the large mastiffs (which always terrified the Indians) seemingly prevented a conflict between Pring's men and some two hundred armed and warlike Indians. Capt. John Smith, always a tactful but courageous pacifist in his relations with the Indians, had this to say of Plymouth and its Indian inhabitants after his exploration of the Massachusetts coast in 1614: "An excellent good harbor, good land; and no want of anything but industrious people. After much kindness, upon a small occasion, wee fought also with fortie or fiftie of those; though some were hurt, and some slaine; yet within an hour after, they became friends."

A few weeks after Capt. John Smith had left Plymouth, Capt. Thomas Hunt arrived in the harbor and committed the most outrageous piratical act ever perpetrated upon the Indians whose lands were explored and occupied by the English and French on the continent of North America during the seventeenth century. On several occasions before Hunt's visit to Plymouth, a few American Indians at a time had been kidnapped by explorers, with more curiosity than sense, and taken to Europe as exhibits. Hunt, however, through diabolical trickery, enticed the Indians aboard his ship with protestations of friendship and a desire to trade and then had his men "set upon them," capture twenty-seven of them, stow them between decks, and set sail for Spain to sell them as slaves. This act of an English captain, bitterly denounced

by Smith, Gorges, and all interested in the British colonization of North America, was one of war and provoked a retaliatory and hostile attitude on the part of the Indians of Plymouth toward the English.

A few of the captured Indians taken to Europe later returned to America as "pilots" (guides) and interpreters, escaped from their servitude, and rejoined their native tribes. They encouraged their fellows to fight the white man—not by foolhardy bravery but by deceit, strategy, and treachery. The Indian bows and arrows, it was said, could not wage successful war against the firearms of the English, so the Indians should withhold their furs and not trade them for trinkets; in exchange for the desired peltry, they should demand knives, hatchets, guns and ammunition (or real weapons of war); they should steal the boats of the white man, and they must not let him build houses and forts upon their land, for if the white men took a little, it was sure that they would want more and, in the end, take all. The only way for the Indians to fight the white man, they asserted, was with real weapons of war, and then attacks should be made always by surprise and in overwhelming numbers. It was the French, however, and not the English who took the initiative in making alliances and war pacts with the Indians. Champlain took sides in the wars between Indian tribes, and he armed "friendly" Indians to fight their foes and later to fight the English. French Jesuit priests, from the time of the pioneer Pierre Biard (in 1611), captured the imagination of the American Indians through mysticism and mummery, and these priests led the ignorant, dominated, and fanatical Indians into battles with the infidel English Protestants through the many years of French and Indian warfare. Later, avaricious traders from the Dutch and English colonies bartered with Indians for furs and gave in exchange "fire water" to make them wild and firearms, which in Indian hands were used to kill many more Englishmen than Frenchmen.

American Indians encountered by traders and settlers south of the Casco were interested in land because of their cultivation of crops and, unlike the northern aborigines, were not nomadic hunters and trappers but agriculturists, fishers, and builders of permanent houses as well as tillers of the ground. Having their roots in the soil, Massachusetts Indians were naturally more antagonistic than the aborigines of the north toward the invasion of the white race, whose presence operated to rob them of their land, their homes, their food, and everything that contributed to their continued existence, well-being, and freedom. The kidnapping and enslavement and the murdering and punishing of Indians, even in reprisal for treachery, by earlier explorer-traders tended to increase the underlying enmity of the Massachusetts Indians toward Europeans, and it is doubtful if the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies could have been established in 1620 and 1628, respectively (except on a much larger and more elaborate and costly scale, with soldiers to defend the settlements), if the dreadful Indian plague of 1615-1616—caused by contact of the aborigines with white men—had not operated to exterminate almost all of the Indians in the country from Saco, in the north, east to the Narragansett.

Authoritative historians tell us that the Indian tribes among which the Pilgrims (1620) and Puritans (1628) planted their first settlements in Massachusetts were reduced "from a population of some hundred thousand to only about five thousand" at the time of the invasion of the English and the commencement of their permanent colonization. This plague and devastating pestilence—fatal to the Indians but from which the white man was immune—caused the greatest "mortality" of history or tradition among the Massachusetts Indians. Thomas Morton, an early settler in the Boston Bay (Quincy) area, writes that one of the "salvages" boasted of Indian power to a captive Frenchman around 1615 "and say'd that they [the Massachusetts Bay Indians] were so many" that the God of the white man "could not kill them." Morton continues:

But contrary wise in short time after, the hand of God fell heavily upon them, with such a mortall stroake, that they died on heapes, as they lay in their houses; and the living that were able to shift

for themselves would runne away & let them dy and let their Carkases ly above the ground without buriall. For in a place where many inhabited, there hath been but one left alive, to tell what became of

the rest, the living beinge (as it were) not able to bury the dead, they were left for Crowes, Kites & vermin to pray upon. And the bones & skulls upon the severall places of their habitations made

such a spectacle after my coming into those parts that as I travailed in that Forrest, nere the Massachusetts, it seemed to mee a new-found Golgotha.

This devastating plague was some European disease, unknowingly transmitted to the Indians by white men from ships engaged in exploration and trading. It would seem that the first record of the existence of this scourge is found in the report of Sir Ferdinando Gorges' agent, Richard Vines, who was sent to Maine in the fall of 1615 on a fishing and trading vessel with orders "to leave the ship and ship's company" with his own men and engage in trade and discovery. These men spent the winter in Maine, and Vines first encountered the plague at Saco village (Chouacoet). He and his fellow Englishmen occupied the same houses as the sick and dying Indians and "lay in the cabbins" with them, but not one of the white men was affected by the disease (not so much as a headache) while they stayed there; yet we read that the plague was so dreadful that Saco village and the country around it were "in a manner left void of inhabitants."

Capt. Thomas Dermer, when sailing down the Massachusetts coast in 1619, came across signs of the devastation of the Great Indian Plague of 1616, for he wrote: "I passed alongst the coast where I found some ancient Plantations, not long since populous now utterly void, in other places a remnant remains but not free of sicknesse. Their disease the Plague for wee might perceive the sores of some that had escaped, who describe the spots of such as usually die." Dermer says that when he arrived at "my savage's" (Squanto's) native country (Plymouth), he found all the Indians dead.

Gov. William Bradford, of the Plymouth Colony and *Mayflower* fame, wrote in 1621, soon after the Pilgrims had established their settlement, that the Indians in the Plymouth Bay and surrounding Massachusetts section were "not many, being dead and abundantly wasted in the great mortalitie which fell on all these parts about three years before the coming of the English wherein thousands of them dyed, they not being able to bury one another. Their Sculls and bones were found in many Places lying still above the Ground, where their Houses and Dwellings had been. A very sad Spectacle to behold." The time mentioned for the visitation of the plague to the Plymouth area of "about three years before the coming of the English," which in this case refers to the landing of the Pilgrims, would place it as around the late summer of 1617; whereas it would seem that the scourge probably reached Plymouth a year or so earlier. Bradford also wrote that the Indians "brought Word that the Narighansets lived but on the other side of the great Bay, and were a strong People, and many in Number, living compacte together, and had not been at all touched with this wasting Plague." A white man, French or English, was the carrier of the disease that in pestilential fury almost exterminated the Indians on the New England coast line (and some twenty to thirty miles inland) between the parallels of 41° 45' and 43° 30' N. All records show that no white man had any visible sign of the disease or was affected by it and that the plague did not "seize upon any other than the natives, the English in the heate of the Sickness commercing with them without hurt or danger."

Daniel Denton, with what Baldwin describes as "the callous smugness of an Old Testament prophet praising Yahweh for smiting the children of Canaan hip and thigh," wrote in 1670: "It hath generally been observed that when the English come to settle, a divine hand makes way for them by removing or cutting off the Indians either by wars one with the other or by some raging mortal disease." History suggests that such a conclusion on the part of the "Faithful," or the self-proclaimed "God's Anointed," would seem to be justified by a consideration of fact; yet the English Pilgrims and Puritans did not have the missionary zeal for saving the souls of the heathen such as actuated the French and, to a lesser degree, the Spaniards. The French settlers, it has been said, were animated in their conquest of the chilly north by "the search for furs, fish and souls"; the Spanish, while primarily seeking for gold and portable treasure in the south lands, had the padre go virtually hand in hand with the conquistador as they subjugated and looted the natives of the West Indies, Central and South

America and sought to save their souls. The Dutch and English, being Protestant, were less "pious" than the Catholics of the Latin races and admittedly—in spiritual matters—more selfish; they were content to work hard, trade with the heathen, and "omit a zeal for souls—other than their own." When it came to tolerance in religious matters, however, the Puritan Protestants exhibited a fanaticism in relation to other expressed beliefs of their fellow countrymen that equaled or exceeded in bias and essential ignorance anything the world has ever seen. The French Catholics got along much better with the Indians than did the English Protestants, but the ardor of the Jesuit priests for saving the souls of the heathen did not prevent the French from arming friendly Indian tribes to fight their enemies or, later, the Dutch and English—all for the economic and political benefit of the French. Christian firearms and fire water bartered to the Indians for furs by the peoples of all European nations (Protestant and Catholic), coupled with the transmitting of "the diseases of white men," operated toward the gradual extermination of the American Indian along lines that it is difficult to profess—as did so many clerics—were for "the glory of God" or the result of the divine leadership of His "chosen people."

The Pilgrim Colony at Plymouth, New England

The coast of New England from Narragansett to Passamaquoddy as well as that of Newfoundland, Labrador, Nova Scotia, and what is now New Brunswick was familiar to fishermen a long time before the Plymouth (Pilgrim) and Massachusetts (Puritan) colonies were established. The waters were pretty well known as a result of the explorations of the many navigators who had futilely sought, following the discoveries of Columbus in 1492, to find a northwest passage to India and Cathay (China and the Far East). Basque, Norman, Portuguese, and British fishermen, blown by easterly gales from the world's finest fishing grounds off the Grand Banks, had found shelter under the lee of capes jutting out from the mainland of an unknown continent. Giovanni Caboto (John Cabot) and his sons had explored the coast from the parallel of $67\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N. (around Baffin Land and Greenland and well north of Labrador) to 38° N., which is south of the latitude of Washington and about the boundary line on the coast between the present states of Maryland and Virginia. Bartholomew Gosnold visited Cape Cod and the Elizabeth Islands in 1602 and charted and named them. De Champlain was at Gloucester, Marblehead, and Boston in 1604-1605 and made some charts calling Gloucester "le Beau Port." The interest that developed in England in northern and northeastern Virginia was due primarily to the explorations and good reports of Capt. George Waymouth in 1605 and of Capt. John Smith in 1614.

Whereas Captain Waymouth's glowing account of the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) and the surrounding country inspired the Popham expedition and the first attempt to establish a colony in New England, it is evident that Capt. John Smith was the Englishman most responsible for the planting of the Plymouth and Boston-Salem (Massachusetts Bay) colonies. In 1614, Smith explored the Massachusetts coast and gave it that name, which was what the Indians called the region where the later Puritan colonists settled in 1628—now known as Greater Boston. Apparently, Smith caught fish at the then well-known northwest Atlantic fishing grounds and set up his "fish-flakes" (wooden frames) for drying his catch on the nearby coast (in this case at Pemaquid and the island of Monhegan, Maine) as had hosts of fishermen of many nationalities before him. But Captain Smith was more than a trader; he was an explorer and publicist. After surveying and mapping the coast from the Penobscot to Cape Cod (and all of Cape Cod Bay), he penned upon his return to England his "Description of New England," which was widely read and has more recently been referred to as "a

sane, conservative exposition of the natural advantages of Massachusetts." Morison, in his *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS* (1921), has said: "For his pioneer work, sound advice, and hearty support of the Pilgrim colony, John Smith should rightly be regarded as the founder of maritime Massachusetts. Yet in all our glut of tercentenaries, this honest, valiant captain has been wellnigh forgotten in the region that he served so well." Smith had urged Englishmen to fish on a better business basis; to save time and money by the establishment of settlements in New England, where fish could be dried or cured and prepared for long-distance shipments, with the fishing smacks remaining in the western waters for years, thus saving the waste of time and the associated expense of so many transatlantic crossings with the ships empty, as they spent months bucking westerly gales when riding light and empty. Smith went still further and advocated the erection of colonies with permanent fishery plants, posts well outfitted for fur trading with the Indians, and skilled mechanics properly equipped to build ships for the fisheries and for shipping dried fish to the markets overseas. Such colonies as he proposed would make it unnecessary to send out from England fresh crews and equipment every summer.

The *Mayflower* passengers, who landed at Plymouth on December 21, 1620, by means of a shallop and became known as the "Pilgrims," were not a particularly "sea-minded folk" as most historians affirm; but they had been greatly impressed and influenced by Capt. John Smith's admirable book, which advocated the colonization of North America and portrayed "a glorious future" to the unemployed, debt-ridden, and oppressed masses of England in a new land with its atmosphere of liberty. The Pilgrims had set out to found a colony, presumably a trading and agricultural settlement, somewhere near the Hudson River but south of the 41st parallel and not so far north as the Sagadahoc (about $43\frac{3}{4}^{\circ}$ N.), "where it is known the winters are long and severe"—but the fishing good. A patent had been obtained by the Pilgrims for a settlement in the territory of the London Company of Virginia, which held rights for colonization only as far north as the 41st parallel (a little to the north of New York Harbor, Manhattan Island, and the mouth of the Hudson River); but after making a landfall at Cape Cod, getting into dangerous shoals, and working around the cape into Provincetown Harbor, they finally—following some six weeks of exploration of the cape, mostly afoot and under extreme difficulties—disembarked and founded a plantation at Plymouth. This was outside the domain of the London Company (being about three miles south of 42° N.) and within the area whose rights of settlement were held by the Plymouth Company of Virginia—a queer coincidence of names—which company had just been replaced by the Council for New England.

Most of the Pilgrims had worked and lived (practically in exile) in Holland, a great fisheries nation, and had probably heard much of the big river and fine country that the English navigator, Henry Hudson, had "discovered" and explored in 1609, when in the employ of the Dutch and in command of the Dutch ship *Halve Maen*. Possibly this fact influenced the Pilgrims in their original plan to settle in the Hudson River territory of the New World. The *Mayflower* was blown north of her intended course and finally "made land well south of the Sagadahoc" but far to the north of the latitude of $40^{\circ} 30'$, for which she had been heading. We are told that when the land was identified as Cape Cod and the ship's position became known to the Pilgrims, they were dismayed and "grievously concerned." William Bradford wrote:

After some deliberation had amongst themselves, and with the master of the ship, they tacked about and resolved to stand for the Southward (the wind and weather being fair) to find some place about Hudson's river for their habitation. But after they had sailed that course about half the day, they fell amongst dangerous shoals and roaring breakers, and they were so far entangled therewith as they con-

ceived themselves in great danger; and the wind shrinking upon them withal, they resolved to bear up again for the Cape, and thought themselves happy to get out of those dangers before night overtook them as by God's providence they did. And the next day they got into the Cape-harbor where they rid in safety.

It has been suggested that the *Mayflower's* landfall off Cape Cod instead of the entrance to the Hudson River was far more an act of man than an act of God; that it

savored very much of "a Dutch bribe of the navigator." However, in one respect, Plymouth Bay proved to be a providential landing place, as the hostile Indians who inhabited that part of the country had only lately been ravaged by a plague. Baldwin says: "With half their number dead the Indians believed that white men had brought the disease upon them as punishment for the murder of some white fishermen a few years before. When, therefore, they saw the Pilgrim Fathers, late of Scrooby and Leyden, they contented themselves with bestowing upon them an elaborate and ceremonious cursing, meanwhile keeping carefully out of sight."

Capt. Thomas Jones of the *Mayflower* was an experienced Banks fisherman, and Mate Robert Coppin had served on North Atlantic fishing craft, had visited the Massachusetts coast (and, it is believed, Boston Harbor), and thought highly of the waters off the northeast coast of America as a means of livelihood. We read from the journal of the Pilgrims:

And every day we saw whales playing hard by us, of which in that place, if we had instruments and means to take them, we might have made a very rich return; which to our great grief, we wanted. Our master and his mate, and others experienced in fishing, professed we might have made three or four thousand pounds worth of oil. They preferred it before Greenland whale-fishing, and purpose the next winter to fish for whale here.

The shallop sent out in the *Mayflower*, Bradford tells us, had been "cut down in bestowing her betwixt the decks and she was much opened with the people's lying in her," and it was "16 or 17 days before the carpenter had finished her." We read that while still on the cape the Pilgrims busied themselves "in seeking out wood, and helving of tools, and sawing of wood to build a new shallop." Some enthusiastic historians have referred to this boat as the second to be built in New England, but it is evident that numerous small boats—most of them larger and much more substantial and seaworthy than this one—had been built on the Maine coast for the fisheries and for transport between the mainland and the islands (particularly in the Monhegan-Pemaquid region) during the twelve years that preceded the first attempt at boat-building by the Pilgrim colonists. Later, the weary and somewhat dispirited emigrants discovered Plymouth across the bay from Truro (where, for a time, they had seriously considered settling), and when they decided to found a colony "where God and His winds had blown them," the captain, mate, and others affirmed that the location "afforded a good harbor for boats" and was "a place of profitable fishing"; that the situation was "healthy, secure and defensible." Weeden, in his *ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND*, says that while freedom to worship God was foremost in the talk and writings of the Pilgrims, nevertheless, they were "intensely practical in applying their theories of Providence and Divine control to the immediate business in hand."

Henry F. Howe, in *PROLOGUE TO NEW ENGLAND*, truly says:

The Pilgrims rediscovered Plymouth. Not one among them, not even their pilot, knew of its existence except for their possible examination of Smith's map, and they came upon it [in late December 1620] in the last extremity of freezing cold, near shipwreck, Indian hostility, hunger and disease. Despite the fact that during the previous eighteen years at least six expeditions had entered this harbor, and that it had been mapped for fifteen years and named for six years, not one among the Pilgrims had ever heard of it. Members of the ship's crew seem to have been at Newfoundland and Greenland but, so far as we know, Robert Coppin [the mate] was their only link with the previous New England voyages, and he of doubtful value. Is it any wonder that Captain John Smith wrote in 1622 that it was "for want of experience" that they ranged to and fro for six weeks before they found a place they liked to dwell on"? In the same period of time Smith himself [in 1614] had explored and mapped five hundred miles of coast. The Pilgrims had made a courageous acquaintance with perhaps fifty miles, much of it on foot. Had they made even a circuit of Massachusetts Bay, they would probably have settled in Boston Harbor, as they admitted during their voyage there in 1621. That they did not was no reflection on their courage, but it was a commentary on their lack of experience.

The hostile Indians (although few in number) did the Pilgrims a good turn in driving them from Wellfleet and Eastham on the projecting, narrow cape, and it is strange that the Pilgrims, as far as exploration was concerned, accomplished so little in six or seven weeks' time. Howe comments on "how futile had been the use the Pilgrims had made of their first

month in America," and he adds that "no previous expedition had ever required [over] two weeks to assemble a shallop or accomplished so little with the shallop in the first two weeks after it was made ready." In that time, they had not ranged a distance of more than twenty miles; whereas we are told that fifteen years before Champlain had skirted and explored the coast of the entire bay in five days.

It is to be regretted that Capt. John Smith was not in command of the Pilgrim expedition as was his desire, but if he had been, he would undoubtedly have taken the settlers to their port of destination—the Hudson River; on the other hand, if his proverbial bad luck on colonizing voyages to America had held, he would have been on the old, worn-out *Speedwell* (one of the two vessels chartered for the expedition), which, after making two attempts to sail and get clear of the channel, put back to port and was pronounced "unseaworthy." (The *Speedwell* is of historic interest, for this ship, with the *Discoverer*, sailed in the Martin Pring expedition to the New England coast in 1603, at which time New Plymouth was explored.) It is interesting to note that Capt. John Smith, writing of the distribution of his book "Description of New England," said: "One thousand with a great many maps both of Virginia and New England, I presented to thirty of the chiefe companies in London at their halls." Almost immediately afterwards, he penned: "Upon these inducements some few well disposed Gentlemen, and Merchants of London and other places, provided two ships"—which were the *Mayflower* and the *Speedwell*—to transport the Pilgrims to America. Captain Smith, therefore, was responsible for the voyage of the *Mayflower* and the founding of the colony at Plymouth, a place that he himself had named. It is unfortunate that he was not on board in November 1620 following the arrival of the Pilgrims off Cape Cod to guide them and give them the benefit of his great experience and outstanding ability; for they were "a group of religious exiles who had made no preliminary investigation in America, who knew practically nothing of the previous work of the Plymouth adventurers, and whose physical stamina and technical background for such a project were decidedly below standard." However, these colonists, the first to come with women and children to New England, who landed in Massachusetts not by intent but by accident, succeeded through courage, perseverance, self-sacrificing industry, frugality, and faith in planting a colony when all who had tried to do so before them had failed—and this notwithstanding that they arrived in late December unprepared for their ordeal and lost about one-half of their number during the first winter.

Never had a group of colonists landed in America under more precarious conditions. It was originally figured that the immigrants would take two ships to transport them with their needed stores, equipment and supplies, but after a month's delay in the English Channel, they were jammed into the one ship, the *Mayflower*, with such supplies as the vessel had room for, and it was nearly twenty weeks after the ship left Southampton that she disembarked her passengers at Plymouth. Instead of arriving in the Hudson in early September as had been planned, the Pilgrims landed farther north at Plymouth, a more exposed part of the coast, during the end of December, with winter upon them. They had practically no real mechanics aboard, as is proven by the "16 or 17 days" required to condition their shallop. Evidently, they had only one carpenter, and he was not any too good, for Bradford wrote, "Our carpenter made slow work of it." The question of housing and protection from wintry gales, extreme cold, heavy snows, and hostile Indians was aggravated by an overshadowing food problem, and we read that while the Pilgrims were considering Truro as a site for a settlement and were apparently under pressure from Captain Jones to disembark somewhere, "it was also conceived, whilst we had competent victuals, that the ship would stay with us; but when that grew low, they would be gone and let us shift as we could." It was a gloomy future that lay before the Pilgrims as they landed at Plymouth December 21, 1620, with over three months of severe winter ahead of them, for which they were ill prepared.

The *Mayflower* was an English-built vessel, and it is known from William Bradford's diary that she was of about 180 tons burden. Authorities are generally agreed that she was between 90 and 100 ft. long, 24 to 25 ft. beam, and of the usual great depth, with the high ends that were common in her day. Her three masts carried two square sails on the fore and

main and a triangular lateen sail on the mizzen; she carried a spritsail from a yard on the bowsprit. The high-sided *Mayflower*, with lofty poop and forecastle of evidently flimsy construction, had a hard time of it beating against the prevalent westerly winds on her passage out, and she was 65 days (over nine weeks) from England (September 6, 1620) to sighting Cape Cod. On the return passage, however, in ballast, favored by the "brave west winds," she is reported to have crossed "from Plymouth to London in 31 days." Of the outward passage, Bradford wrote that the *Mayflower* met "with many contrary winds and fierce storms with which the ship was shrewdly shaken and her upper works made very leaky." It was the "high upper works" and the "lofty range of cabins" that permitted so small a vessel to carry a hundred passengers and that caused her to sail so poorly against the wind and to leak so badly in the upper works in a seaway. Later colonial-built ships were stripped of unnecessary top hamper, and it was found that such vessels not only sailed faster, particularly against the wind, and were relatively "amazingly handy" under all conditions but also "carried sail more stiffly and kept cargo and passengers drier than the tall-pooped vessels of Europe."

The history of the Pilgrim colony at Plymouth really dates back to December 1617, when the greater part of an exiled English Puritan congregation at Leyden, Holland, made inquiry of the London Company of Virginia looking to the planting of a Puritan colony within its domains. Permission was finally obtained through the influence of Sir Edwin Sandys, a statesman, who became managing director of the London Company in 1619. It took some time to interest capital in the venture, but Thomas Weston, a merchant of London, investigated the matter and visited Leyden. Being convinced that the applicants were sober, industrious "God-fearing characters," he and a few associates decided to finance the Pilgrims on their contemplated voyage across the Atlantic. The agreement entered into by them with the London businessmen who supplied the capital required that all the emigrants would constitute a partnership responsible to the merchant-bankers for the money advanced. Roy A. Foulke concisely states the principal features of the contract as follows:

As guaranty, the emigrants bound themselves to work for a period of seven years, to place their produce into a common warehouse, and to receive their subsistence out of the common store. After seven years, there would be a settlement. Services of each emigrant would be rated as a capital of ten pounds. For every ten pounds of property he brought along, he would receive an additional share. All profits would be reserved for the seven years when

the entire amount, and all houses and land, gardens and fields, would be divided among the shareholders according to their respective interests. A London merchant advancing 100 pounds would receive tenfold more than the penniless emigrant for his entire service of the seven years. That equation certainly gives an early relationship between the value of capital and labor.

In 1626, when less than six of the seven stated years had elapsed, the Pilgrims were indebted to their London merchant-bankers to the amount of £1,800. A new agreement was entered into by which the Pilgrims were to obtain title to all possessions in the colony on the payment of this sum in nine annual installments of £200 each; but, in addition, a current account of £600, which was an obligation carrying interest, had to be liquidated as soon as possible. Hoping to retire the indebtedness, eight of the Pilgrim leaders entered into a general partnership on behalf of the entire colony to trade colonial and English merchandise with three of the London backers. The arrangement did not work out well because of the character of the three English partners, at least one of whom seems to have been positively unscrupulous. Disputes were carried on year after year, and it was not until 1645 that the Pilgrim Fathers got clear of their indebtedness to the London merchants.

Plymouth—a spot so named on Capt. John Smith's map—was deeply embayed and proved to be "ill provided with back country." The Pilgrims had a hard time to eke out an existence and "learned the secrets of fur trading and fishing only after costly failures"; moreover, it is apparent that they were mercilessly exploited by the English financiers. There were only forty-one adults among the "hundred souls" (said to be 101 men, women, and children originally) on board the *Mayflower* to sign the famous "Mayflower Compact" in Provincetown Harbor a month before the day of their landing at Plymouth. The first winter spent in New

England was so terrible, it is said, that the Pilgrims buried about half their number, "leveling the graves and sowing them with grain in the spring to conceal their losses from the Indians." Other available records say that the Pilgrims lost fifty-one of their number during the first winter, and historian Baldwin writes that in the spring "the Indians came into the villages and, finding themselves well treated, set in with childish eagerness to impart to them their age-old knowledge of fishing, hunting and growing corn. The abandoned fields of the Indians were planted in corn, trade was opened in furs and buckskin, axmen cut panel wood for shipment to England, and doubtless the women and children dug sassafras."

There was a demand on the British managers by the early settlers for shipwrights to be sent over to build ships needed for communication between coastal points, for trading, and for the fisheries. Gov. William Bradford records that a ship carpenter was sent to the Plymouth Colony from England in the spring of 1624 and that "he quickly builte them 2 very good & strong shalops (which after did them greate service), and a greate and strong lighter, and had hewne timber for 2 catches; but that was lost, for he fell into a feaver in ye hote season of that yeare . . . and dyed." It was one of these shallops, decked over amidships, that was sent under Winslow to the Kennebec River in 1625 to barter some of the Pilgrims' surplus corn for beaver skins, and it is said that this fur trade eventually relieved the Plymouth Colony settlers "from their financial difficulties and extricated them from the clutches of the merchant-adventurers in London." This Plymouth-Kennebec trading shallop, we are told, was cut in two, after her first voyage, by a house carpenter, who lengthened her and laid a complete weather deck, and this rebuilt "small pinnace did good service for seven years." The need of the deck in trading along the northeast coast as well as a longer or larger vessel than the original shallop was expressed by the governor, who wrote, "Bigger vessel had they none. They had laid a little deck over her amidships to keep ye come drie, but ye men were faine to stand it out all weathers without shelter; and yt time of ye year begins to growe tempestious."

The Plymouth coasting shallop had to be decked over to preserve her cargo of corn, which was all the "Mayflower colonists" had to offer in trade, but John R. Spears says that the lengthening of the craft occurred after a subsequent voyage, which is probably incorrect; nevertheless, what he writes of the craft and the trading characteristics of the Pilgrims in 1626 is of interest:

Some English merchant who had maintained a trading post on Monhegan Island sent word down the beach that they were going to abandon it and would sell the remainder of their goods at a bargain. Although in the years that had passed the Pilgrims had, at times, come so near to starvation that men had been seen to stagger in the street because they were faint with hunger, they had persisted. They had caught and sold fish. They had produced forest products and corn for sale. They had traded with the Indians for furs. They had traded with the fishermen who came over from England and they had made a profit on every deal—they had not lived

in Holland for nothing. When a bargain in trade goods on Monhegan Island was offered, they had capital to make a purchase, and going there with a shallop they secured stuff worth £400. Then, on finding at the mouth of the Kennebec some other goods that had been taken from a French ship wrecked on that coast, they bought an additional £100 worth, which was all their boat would hold, as one may suppose. For as soon as they reached Plymouth Bay they cut their shallop in two and lengthened her, so that when another opportunity was offered to buy goods at a bargain she would have a larger capacity.

The Pilgrims, from the first, devoted their surplus crops to the fur trade and sent their shallops "eastward" to barter with the Indians—grain for beaver—as the aborigines east of the Saco were hunters and nomads and not agriculturists. From 1631 to 1636 inclusive, records show that the Pilgrims bought and shipped 12,150 pounds of beaver and 1,156 of otter skins. Governor Bradford wrote, "Ye parcells of beaver came to little less than 10,000 pounds, and ye otter skins would pay all ye charges." Otter skins, it is said, sold for fourteen to fifteen shillings per pound, and it is impossible to estimate what the charges were and the net profits to the colonists. The Pilgrims were required to buy many of their needed supplies and some of their trade goods on credit, and their usurious backers, who were devout English merchants, made them pay the outrageous interest rate of 40 per cent per annum on the

money that they advanced to their dearly beloved brethren in the Plymouth Colony of New England. Morison, in the *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS*, referring to the Plymouth Pilgrims, says:

For two generations they owned no great shipping. Reënforced by the Puritan emigration of a later decade, they eventually spread out along Cape Cod, the south shore and Buzzard's Bay. Their faith and courage are beyond disparagement; but had

Massachusetts been peopled alone by the Pilgrim seed, it would long have remained a mere slender line of cornfields, trucking posts and fishing stations. In 1630, ten years after its settlement, the Plymouth colony contained but three hundred white people.

From early days, Plymouth was, of necessity, interested in the fisheries, but it was not advantageously located either in proximity to large and valuable forest lands or at the mouth of a river down which could be brought expeditiously the peltry obtained by the Indians in their "back country" hunting and trapping lands. As early as 1628, the Pilgrims of Plymouth established a fur trading post on the Kennebec River and there bartered with the Indians for beaver skins.

On maps of the Piscataqua-Pemaquid region covering a period prior to 1642 (generally 1625-1642), the "Plymouth Colony Trading Grant" is shown occupying an area of about four hundred fifty square miles (some thirty miles east and west and fifteen miles north and south), centered at a post named Cushnoc on the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) about thirty-seven miles from the site of the old Popham Colony at its mouth. The coast points shown on the map northeast of Piscataqua are Agamenticus (Bristol, Gorgeana, York), Winter Harbor (with Saco up the river), Richmond's Island (Trelawney's Plantation), Sagadahoc, Damariscove Island, Pemaquid, and Monhegan Island. Most of these settlements were noted for their fisheries, but some of them became important trading points for forest products.

It is significant that Plymouth was never incorporated as a town or city, but in 1633 the General Court of the none-too-prosperous colony did order that "the chiefe government be tyed to the towne of Plymouth." In 1692 the Plymouth Colony was united to the much more vigorous Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay.

The Early Puritans—Massachusetts Bay Colony

A colony development plan destined to make history originated with the Rev. John White, of Dorchester, England, who, having become interested in fishermen, persuaded some English merchants to finance a colony in northern Virginia. The original settlement and fishing station planted in 1623 at Cape Ann failed through bad management, the backers withdrew from the venture in 1626, and most of the colonists returned to England. Roger Conant, once of the Plymouth (Pilgrim) Colony, and "a few of the most honest and industrious" decided to remain in America, but they moved to another point on the coast and settled on the shore of the sheltered harbor of the Naumkeag Peninsula. This first and evidently unsuccessful attempt of the so-called Puritans to establish themselves in Massachusetts (or New England) as colonists is referred to by Morison as follows:

In 1623 the "Dorchester adventurers," a group of West-County capitalists, endeavored to put his [Capt. John Smith's] suggestions into practice. A crew of men landed at the site of Stage Fort Park on Gloucester Harbor, built huts, flakes and a fish-

ing stage, commenced tillage, and drew plans for a fishing-trading colony with church, school and shipyards. The immediate experiment failed, though not before a full fare had been sent to Spain.

Roger Conant left his fellow Pilgrims at Plymouth and became the first prominent seceder for "conscience' sake" because he would not agree to sever his adherence to the Protestant

established Church of England and become a Puritan separatist. He traveled up the coast to Nantasket, where Capt. Miles Standish had built a Pilgrim outpost, and pushed on to join the Dorchester Company's fishing settlement at Gloucester, Cape Ann, in 1623. After that venture failed, Conant founded the settlement in 1626 in the Naumkeag location, which later became known as Salem (and Beverly). In 1628, John Endecott (1588-1665), with other "joint adventurers," purchased from the Plymouth Company a strip of land about sixty miles wide along the Massachusetts coast and extending westward to the sea (Pacific Ocean). Endecott was given the responsibility of establishing a colony in this section of New England. He brought some sixty or sixty-five emigrants to Conant's new settlement site at Naumkeag, which he renamed Salem, and ousted Roger Conant. Ralph D. Paine, writing of old Salem, says:

The first settlers who had fought famine, pestilence and red men were not consulted in the transaction, but were transferred along with the land. They had established a refuge for those oppressed for conscience' sake, and Roger Conant, brave, resolute and patient, had fought the good fight with them. But although they held meetings and protested against being treated as "slaves," they could make no opposition to the iron-handed zealot and

aristocrat, John Endicott, who came to rule over them. Eighty settlers perished of hunger and disease during Governor Endicott's first winter among them, and when Winthrop, Saltonstall, Dudley and Johnson brought over a thousand people in seventeen ships, . . . they passed by afflicted Salem and made their settlements at Boston, Charlestown and Watertown.

John Endecott was the local governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony from April 30, 1629, until he was replaced in command by John Winthrop on June 12, 1630. Endecott continued to take a prominent part in the affairs of the colony and for many years lived at Salem, where he was a member of the congregation of Roger Williams (1604-1684), a pioneer of religious liberty, who was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony in October 1635. In June 1636, Williams founded the colony of Rhode Island, naming the first settlement "Providence" in remembrance of "God's merciful providence to me in my distress." It is interesting to note that in January 1636 the bigoted Puritans of Boston Bay made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Williams and transport him to England on a trumped-up charge involving church and state and the right of the king to grant patents to land over which he had no just title. Rhode Island became "a shelter for persons distressed for conscience," and in 1644 Williams obtained in England a charter for the colony under the title "The Providence Plantation in the Narragansett Bay." However, he was true to his principles, as he bought the land occupied from the Indian sachems, Canonicus and Miantonomi, and his great friendship with the Indians was of much benefit to all the New England colonies.

John Endecott commanded an expedition against the Pequot Indians in 1636 and later served as commander-in-chief of the militia. He was deputy-governor in 1641-1644, governor in 1644-1645, and upon the death of John Winthrop in 1649, Endecott was annually elected governor every year except two (when he was deputy-governor) until his death. He was governor of the colony when he died on March 15, 1665, at the age of seventy-seven years. John Endecott was an able man, and under his authority the colony of Massachusetts Bay made rapid progress. Unfortunately, he was very intolerant in the realm of religion, and although he was one of the commissioners of the United Colonies of New England, he was elected president of that body only once (in 1658). Endecott's great bigotry and hardness, particularly toward the Quakers, were generally more than many of the colonists could "stomach"; whereas in civic matters Endecott was credited with being just and faithful to his trust. Edward Eggleston expresses the general opinion of historians when he says of him: "A strange mixture of rashness, pious zeal, genial manners, hot temper, and harsh bigotry, his extravagances supply the condiment of humor to a very serious history—it is perhaps the principal debt posterity owes him."

It would seem that, notwithstanding the admitted failure of the Dorchester Company's first attempt to found a colony in Massachusetts, the "emigrants" who returned to England reported favorably on the possibilities of a properly planned, equipped, financed, and managed venture along the lines that had been suggested by Capt. John Smith. The Rev. John White continued his interest in a Puritan colony in New England, with the result that pro-

moters of means reorganized the earlier setup and, obtaining a charter as the "Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay," received title to all land surrounding the bay and running north to the Merrimac "from sea to sea." We are told that some of Endecott's earlier emigrants who landed at Salem and many of the followers of the ousted Roger Conant explored "the head of the bay" and that some of them located where Charlestown is now situated. John R. Spears calls these early Charlestown Puritan settlers "the original boomers," or boosters, of America, and he writes: "With its dancing waters, its green islands, and its views of the distant blue hills from which the Indians had already called it Massachusetts, the region was enchanting and the Puritan explorers described it in such glowing colors that 200 more settlers were brought over the next year." Among the emigrants who crossed the Atlantic to "a land of great promise" in the New World in 1629-1630 were "shipwrights, carpenters and shipbuilders" and men who were practical and industrious artisans as well as some farmers and fishermen. Practically all, however, were Dissenters or willing to be "separatists," and most of them were quite stiff-necked and somewhat fanatical in their religious beliefs. The settlers who crossed the ocean to live in the "New Colony" of northern Virginia, or New England (i.e., the Massachusetts Bay Colony), were from the first known as the "Puritans," and they are distinctive from the emigrants who settled in the "Old Colony" of Plymouth (New England), known as the "Pilgrims."

Contrary to the general opinion and the writings of many historians, it would seem that the intention of the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony was not to establish a predominantly maritime and trading community (principally fish and some furs) but to plant a bit of a "purified" old England across the seas in a "New England" of a New World. They wanted "religious freedom," which was really no freedom at all in spiritual matters but merely the chance to worship in their own way without interference, and they had no tolerance for others having contrary beliefs. The Puritans sought to establish a community in which they would be free to worship as they themselves wished in harmony with their own prescribed and exceedingly narrow authoritative code; however, they were positively opposed to mental liberty and to affording a refuge for anyone who might wish to worship in any way different from their own. In 1636, Roger Williams was banished from the colony for his "unorthodox" views (he settled in Rhode Island), and at about the same time Anne Hutchinson and Harry Vane (the younger), evidently leaders in the Antinomian controversy, were compelled to leave the colony. This state of affairs caused much criticism—and rightly so—in the mother country, but no reaction seemed to affect in the least the arbitrary acts and rulings of the religious leaders in power. Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New Haven as well as Rhode Island were settled early, to a great extent, by Puritans who could not see "eye to eye" with the church leaders and could not "swallow" their narrow rulings; the opinions of these Puritans may have been equally bigoted and picayune, but their views were dissimilar—and they were stubborn about them. There was no place or chance for a difference of a religious nature or in the interpretation of the Bible to live within the confines of the colony of Massachusetts Bay—at least if it was expressed or even suspected. As a matter of fact, through most of the colonial period, the leaders of this colony fought religious freedom with every weapon in their power.

It appears that the first and foremost object of such men as Winthrop, Dudley, Endecott, Saltonstall, and other leaders was "to found a church and commonwealth in which Calvinist Puritans might live and worship according to the word of God as they conceived it." As Morison says: "They aimed to found a New England, purged of old England's corruptions, but preserving all her goodly heritage. They intended the economic foundation of New England, as of old England and Virginia, to be large landed estates, tilled by tenants and hired labor. In this they failed. The New England town, based on freehold and free labor, sprang up instead of the old English manor."

The Puritans of Massachusetts Bay at first devoted the major part of their energies to agriculture, and as new immigrants were constantly arriving, the earlier settlers were enabled to profit from their crops and cattle. The colony is said to have had about two thousand inhabitants by the end of 1630. Very early in the thirties, Capt. Thomas Wiggin, an observ-

ing shipmaster hailing from Bristol, England, wrote a letter about the Massachusetts Bay colonists in which he said: "The English, numbering about two thousand, and generally most industrious, have done more in three years than others in seven times that space, and at a tenth of the expense." In 1643 it was reported that the Puritan colony "harboured about thirteen thousand soules," said to be more than all the rest of the English colonies combined, but the nature of the activities and life of the settlement had greatly changed. Capt. John Smith, who inspired—at least in an economic sense—the emigrants to cross the stormy Atlantic and make their homes in a strange New World, had urged fishing, trading, and shipping (with shipbuilding) as the three prime activities of any New England settlement; but while the Pilgrims in the "Old Colony" did not awaken to realities and possibilities and export their first cargo of fish until 1624 (they landed December 21, 1620, "to erect" their settlement), the Boston colonists did not send away their first fish cargo until 1633, or five years after the first group of emigrants sent out by the holders of the Massachusetts Bay charter had reached their destination. By 1637 the colonists were getting very pessimistic in regard to agriculture and the future, and one of the pioneers wrote: "For the present, we make a shift to live, but hereafter, when our numbers increase, and the fertility of the soil doth decrease, if God discover not means to enrich the land, what shall become of us I will not determine."

The first experience of the Puritans in shipping fish abroad was not a great success, for they did not own the vessel that carried the fish to England for them, and to dispose of the cargo abroad they had to employ an agent, who evidently charged them a high commission. The New Englanders gradually learned that the profit in export trade came to the shipper that owned his own vessel and did not have to pay three or four pounds per ton freight money, which a British shipowner charged them for carrying their product to the English market; still later they found that no agent in a foreign country would have as much interest in selling their goods to advantage as they themselves. It took several years to learn the lesson, but ultimately Massachusetts Bay merchants became convinced that the only way to make money on a cargo of fish or any other item, such as forest products, was to carry the commodity in their own ship and sell it themselves direct to the consumer. Morison well says that "God performed no miracle on the New England soil," but "He gave them [the colonists] the sea," and "stark necessity made seamen of would-be planters."

Ralph D. Paine says that the earliest settlers in the Salem and Boston Bay region were yeomanry for the most part interested in religion, government, and a desire to better their economic status in a new world that would be more or less of their own making. He continues:

Dwelling along the harbor front, or on the banks of small rivers near at hand, they at once busied themselves cutting down trees and hewing planks to fashion pinnaces and shallows for traversing these waterways. Fish was a staple diet and the chief commodity of trade and often averted famine while the scanty crops were being wrested from the first clearings. . . . These early men of Salem were more at home upon the water than upon the less

friendly land, and it was inevitable that they should build larger craft for coastwise voyaging as fast as other settlements sprang into being to the north and south of them. No more than ten years after the arrival of John Endicott, shipbuilding was a thriving industry of Salem, and her seamen had begun to talk of sending their ventures as far away as the West Indies.

Shipbuilding was begun in America under the pressure of necessity, and it was fostered by the conditions of life in the New World. The importance of the sailing ship in the story of the development of the United States cannot be overlooked. Without the sailing ship, the early colonists could not have existed, and their successors could not have achieved independence and national distinction. Blood and inherent characteristics ultimately will tell in any fight for survival, and the early American settlers, almost without exception, sprang from seafaring stock. Winthrop L. Marvin, in *THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, wrote in 1902:

Fortunate is that race whose veins hold the salt of the sea, for in its soul there is sure to be genius for adventure. The founders of the American colonies were shipbuilders and sailors, both by inheritance and environment. . . . Without exception

the early settlements clung close to the ocean. It was the one sure source of their food until the gathering of the first uncertain harvest. It was their road toward home and their safe refuge, if need be, from an overwhelming onset of the red savages. So

it is not strange that the sea and its affairs dominated the thoughts of the first Americans, and that they scarcely waited to raise rude shelters above their heads before the dark forbidding wilderness which stretched all along the coast began to be notched here and there by busy shipyards.

John R. Spears says that the French to the northeast, "having a water-road to the far away region of the Great Lakes," became absorbed in the fur trade. The Dutch on the Hudson, though less favorably situated, had water communication through the Iroquois country and "did a large business in furs," and the English on the Chesapeake were absorbed in tobacco raising and were astonishing the world with their product. New England, however, had no extensive accessible back country from which it could draw furs. The settlers were, in the early days, unable to produce from the soil any crop for which a good and profitable market could be found in Europe, but they had the forest with its trees and the ocean abounding in fish; moreover, they had the urge to work and to develop a trade for such products as the natural resources of the country afforded.

In response to a request by the colonists for shipwrights, a letter of instructions dated April 17, 1629, was written to John Endecott by "The Governor and Deputy of the New England Co. for a plantation in Massachusetts Bay" and addressed to "The Governor and Council for the London Plantation in the Massachusetts Bay in New England." Mention is made of men and various articles of trade and for use having been sent to the colonist-settlers from London. The letter includes the following:

We have sent six shipwrights of whom Robert Moulton is chief. These men's entertainment is very chargeable to us; and by agreement is to be bourne two-thirds at the charge of the general company, and the other one-third is to be bourne by Mr. Cradock, our Governor, and his associates interested in a private stock. We hope you will be care-

ful to see them so employed as may countervail the charge, desiring you to agree with Mr. Sharp that their labor may be employed two-thirds for the general company and one-third for Mr. Cradock and his associates; praying you to accommodate said Mr. Cradock's people in all fitting manner as he doth well deserve.

In a second letter written to Mr. Endecott under date of May 28 and continued to June 3, 1629, appears the following: "The provisions for building ships, as pitch tar, rosin, oakum, old ropes for oakum, cordage and sailcloth, in all these ships, with nine firkins and five barrels of nails in the *Two Sisters* are two-thirds for the company in general and one-third for Mr. Cradock and his partners; as is also the charge of one George Farr, now sent over to the six shipwrights formerly sent." This letter also requests that a storehouse be erected for the shipwrights, of whom Robert Moulton was principal; that they be assisted by other colonists; that as soon as three shallops are finished, they be owned by the preceding bodies, be equipped, and perform voyages on their account in the proportions previously set forth. The wording provides "two of them to bee lett out for the companie, by lott, or as you shall agree there to make an equall devision, and one for our govvnor & his partners." Continuing, the letter reads:

As our Governor [Matthew Cradock] has engaged himselfe beyond all expectation in this business, not only in his particular but by great summes disbursed for the generall, to supply the wants thereof; soe our desire is that you endeavor to give all furtherance and friendly accommodation to his

agents and servants. . . . If you send the shippes to fish at the Bancks and expect them not to returne again to the plantacon, that then you send our barke that is already built in the country to bring back our fishermen and such provisions as they have for fishing.

We are told that the first substantial, permanent shipbuilding activity in the country "probably resulted from the establishment at Salem, in 1629, of six competent master builders of the Massachusetts Bay Company, to whom were given land grants and other favors." Other historians say that most of the shipwrights sent out from England to the Puritan colony went not to Salem but to "the Mistick River," that they were joined by other skilled artisans in 1630, and that "the first real American shipyard properly so called was located on the Mystick River somewhere around where Medford was to be"—after, however, the ship carpenters had first been employed in taking care of the immigrants' great need for housing.

John Winthrop (1588-1649), Puritan leader and the first real governor of Massachusetts, was a lawyer of note in England. He was a Puritan with wide acquaintances, and on August

26, 1629, having lost a valued political appointment, he joined in the "Cambridge Agreement," by which he and his associates pledged themselves to remove to New England provided the government and patent of the Massachusetts colony should be removed thither. Winthrop was chosen governor of the colony twelve times by annual election, and he was occupying that high office when he died. History reveals that Winthrop gave all his strength, fortune, and devotion to the colonies. He was a conservative aristocrat, just and magnanimous in his political acts under circumstances of great difficulty, and far more tolerant in his religious views than most of his associates. He opposed the majority of his fellow Puritans in the Antinomian controversy of 1636-1637. He was the first president of the commissioners of the United Colonies of New England, organized in 1643, and in 1634-1635 he was the leader of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in resisting coercion by the English Government. In 1645-1646, Winthrop defended the colony against threatened parliamentary interference. It is evident that much of the early success of Massachusetts was due to Winthrop's foresight, wisdom, and skill. He died at the age of sixty-one years.

Gov. John Winthrop sailed in the *Arbella* (reported as of 400 tons) from Cowes, England, on Thursday, April 8, 1630, accompanied by a large party of Puritan immigrants. On Saturday, June 12, after a passage of 65 days, they reached Boston Bay, and on the 17th of that month Winthrop made the following record, "Went up Mistick River about six miles." Not far from the Governor's House at "Ten Hills" and "on the north shore of the river" (within the limits of Medford) was constructed the first vessel of size that, historians affirm, was built in Plymouth County and "the third ship to be built in America." This vessel, a "bark of 30 tons," constructed by Governor Winthrop by subscription at a cost of "one hundred and forty-five pounds," was named *Blessing of the Bay* and was launched into "the Mistick River" on July 4, 1631. On May 16, 1636, Winthrop, writing of the craft, said, "I will sell her for one hundred and sixty pounds." It would seem, therefore, that the owners of the *Blessing of the Bay* felt that the "bark" had suffered no deterioration from five years' wear and tear in service. Governor Winthrop recorded his reason for building this vessel in the following words: "The general fear of want of foreign commodities, now that our money was gone, . . . set us on work to provide shipping of our own." It was also said that the "bark" was built with the thought of trading with the Dutch and other white settlers on the Atlantic seaboard and of giving the Massachusetts, or New England, colonists "a means of communication with their neighbors at New Amsterdam less difficult than that through the wilderness." This first colonial-built trading vessel is said to have been constructed "mainly of locust." Winthrop records that the "bark" went to sea August 31, 1631 (on her maiden voyage), and the following October "went on a voyage to the eastward" and soon engaged in trade with the Dutch at New Amsterdam.

It would seem from earlier correspondence between the British owners of the Massachusetts Bay plantation and their local New England managing representatives (before referred to and quoted in part) that a seagoing "barke" had been built in the colony about two or three years prior to the *Blessing of the Bay*, which has been generally credited through the years with being Massachusetts' pioneer ship. It seems probable that the early British settlers on the Massachusetts coast built several sizable vessels prior to the historic *Blessing of the Bay* and that, from the first, New England colonists on the coast, inlets, and rivers constructed ships for fishing, transport, and trading soon after they had built their houses. A ship meant contact with the world, food, and the means of a livelihood. The Puritans of Salem built some vessels at an early date, for there is a record of an 18-ton Salem-built pinnace bringing tobacco and corn to Salem in 1631. About this time, the fishing and trading station established by the "fishmongers in London" near the mouth of the Piscataqua River was clamoring for food-stuffs other than fish, for the settlers there were fishermen and had done no planting whatsoever. It was also in 1631 that John Winters built a sizable "barke" at Richmond Island, off Cape Elizabeth, "way down East."

The president of the Massachusetts Bay Colony company, Matthew Cradock, an eminent merchant and shipowner of London, England, began an organized effort at shipbuilding in the

United States. It is stated that he was "more forward in advancing out of his substance than any other, being generally the highest in all subscriptions." There is much doubt as to whether Cradock ever personally visited the colony, but, if not, then he sent over competent men to represent him, acquire property, make improvements, and build vessels in his name. As each member of the company who had subscribed fifty pounds was to have two hundred acres of land allotted to him, Cradock or his agent selected his claim on the Mystic River, several miles upstream from the settlement at Charlestown, at a place that later became known as Medford. William Wood, writing in 1633 of the "Mistick River" in his "New England Prospects," said:

On the east side is Maister Craddock's plantation where he hath impaled a Parke where he keeps his Cattle till he can store it with Deere: Here likewise he is at charges of building ships. The last year one was upon the Stockes of a hundred Tunne; that being finished, they are to build one of twice her burden. Ships without either Ballast or loading may floate down this River; otherwise the Oyster-banke would hinder them which Crosseth the Channell.

There is a record of the ship *Rebecca* (tonnage not stated) being built by Cradock at his "Mistick River" yard in 1633, and contemporary writings tell us that several vessels of good size were launched from Cradock's "yard on the Mistick" and that they "all went to England to go into the general service of their builder and owner." It was said in the middle of the nineteenth century that "Cradock's old shipyard" was at the site of the one then occupied by J. T. Foster. It would seem that the ships built by Cradock were ketches—vessels with two masts, the principal one being placed nearly amidships and the second mast, a short one, being stepped far aft. These masts carried lateen sails. Later, these Massachusetts craft were changed in rig; the two masts were retained, but moved somewhat forward. The forward mast, still the principal one, carried yards and square sails, and the after mast carried upper and lower fore-and-aft sails (the prototype of the later brigantine).

The records show that in 1634 a Massachusetts-built pinnace of 50 tons brought corn to Boston from Maryland in exchange for fish. Sizable fishing vessels were built in the colonies as early as 1620. There are records of this type of construction at fishing centers, such as Gloucester in 1623, Marblehead in 1634, and Portsmouth in 1635. We are told that one merchant in Marblehead owned eight fishing craft as early as 1634 and that Portsmouth, N. H. (the Piscataqua and Isles of Shoals region), had "six great shallops, five fishing boats with sails and anchors, and thirteen skiffs" engaged in trade as early as 1635. A fishing station was established at Scituate in 1633. The fishermen needed boats, and deep-sea fisheries required "shippes" or "barkes." Many of the early settlers came from Kent, and among them were shipwrights who had been trained in the British naval dockyard at Chatham. As the locations of fishing grounds were extended and moved farther offshore, larger and more seaworthy boats were needed. The North River territory of Massachusetts, with its several little towns and settlements, became a shipbuilding section of importance in early colonial days, branching out (as did many other communities, such as Boston, Salem, Portsmouth, etc.) from the fisheries to general coastwise, West Indian, and global foreign trade. William Barstow, who emigrated from England in 1635, is said to have been operating a shipyard in that part of Scituate now known as Hanover in 1649; but for fourteen years before settling at Hanover, he evidently had been building shallops, pinnaces, and "barkes" in the general territory for fishermen and coastwise transport.

Overseas trade between the mother country and the American colonies was early reported as profitable to the British shipowners. Around 1630, it is said, passengers were carried across the Atlantic for five pounds each, horses for ten pounds a head, and goods, or merchandise, at the rate of three pounds per ton. Many ships were put into the service and the freight rates increased as the decade advanced, for in 1635 Capt. John Mason wrote to the secretary of the English Admiralty that over forty ships were regularly employed in the trade with New England, of which, he affirmed, "six sail of ships, at least, if not more" belonged to the Americans. In 1636, we are told, Thomas Mayhew and John Winthrop (Jr.) sent a vessel from Massachusetts Bay to Bermuda (then called the Summer Islands), where she sold

"corn and pork" for the owners' account and brought back to the colony potatoes and some fruits. This was probably the first importation of Bermuda potatoes into New England, and the profit on the venture was reported as "twenty od pounds."

When the ship *Desire* of 120 tons was built at Marblehead in 1636 for the fishing business on the Banks, it was said that she "followed a barke that is already built in the country." The *Desire* became famous. She was not, as has been stated by some historians, "the first vessel built in the settlement"; neither was she, as claimed, "the first New England ship built for the West Indies trade," but after engaging in deep-sea fishing for about two years, she acquired enduring notoriety. She has been designated by historians as "the pioneer Puritan slaver" or at least "one of the first, if not the first, New England vessel to be engaged in the slave trade." The records show that in 1638 the ship *Desire* (120 tons) of Marblehead (Capt. William Pierce) returned from a seven-month voyage to the West Indies, "bringing cotton, tobacco, and Negroes from Providence and salt from Tortugas." Evidently, the Negroes were slaves, so the slave trade started early.

*British Emigration to the West Indies in Relation to the
Colonization of the American Mainland during the
First Half of the Seventeenth Century*

The general impression prevails that, during a great migration from England in the first part of the seventeenth century, most of the immigrants, described as "the discontented and the Puritans," journeyed across the Atlantic to colonies in North America. It is also popularly believed that the movement was primarily one to attain religious freedom. Whereas the religious phase was a factor of moment, the economic seems to have been even greater, and many of the Puritans were "country gentlemen and middle-class businessmen, most of whom were feeling the stress of the times severely." The settlement of the important and highly publicized "Massachusetts Bay Colony" was not a unique and specific geographic change of residence but merely an episode in a much broader movement. (The company to control the colony was organized in 1628, and its first great band of settlers was sent out to the Boston region in 1629.) Between 1620 and 1642, records show that 14,000 persons migrated from England (or Britain) to Massachusetts and another 4,000 "to the rest of New England"—a total of 18,000. But during the same years, 36,600 persons, or over twice as many, migrated to the West Indies, and 18,600 of them went to the Barbados. Apparently, the more kindly climate and a possible life of ease appealed to the Puritans and the politically, religiously, and economically "discontented" of Britain. A hard life of self-denial in an atmosphere of religious "freedom" was not the prime motive causing the migration across the vast ocean to the New World in the West.

The Bahamas, consisting of twenty-nine islands and numerous rocks (located about 24° N. and 76° W.), are famous as being the first landing place of Columbus in October 1492 on his initial transatlantic voyage of discovery. They were never settled by the Spanish, and King Charles I of England gave a grant of the islands to Sir Robert Heath in 1627. The Bermudas are very small (only about twenty square miles) and are located about 32° N. and 64° W.—about 580 miles east by south of Cape Hatteras. The main island was discovered early in the sixteenth century by Juan Bermudez, a Spaniard, who was shipwrecked there while on a voyage from Spain to Cuba. A British colony was established on the island in 1609 by Sir George Somers, but the "possession" was granted in 1612 to the Virginia Company. The largest British island in the West Indies is Jamaica of over 4,200 square miles

(averaging about 18° N. and 77° W.). It was discovered by Columbus May 3, 1494, and when Cromwell, actuated by anti-Catholic zeal, captured it in 1655, the population, both whites and slaves, was only 3,000. (However, when the law abolishing slavery was passed in 1833, 125,590 slaves were freed.) Trinidad, the next largest British island in the West Indies (located about 10½° N. and 61° W.), was not taken by the British until 1797, and it was ceded to them by the Treaty of Amiens in 1802.

The relatively small island of Barbados in the West Indies, containing only 166 square miles and located about 13° N. and 59½° W., occupies a prominent position in British colonial history. This island, first visited by the Portuguese, was taken possession of in 1605 in the name of King James I by the crew of the English ship *Olive Blossom*. The first English settlement was directed by Sir William Courteen under patent granted to Lord Leigh (Earl of Marlborough), and on February 17, 1625, an English ship "landed forty English and seven or eight Negroes" on the island, thus beginning the building of a colony that in later years was of great value to Britain and of the utmost importance to New England traders. The early settlers planted tobacco and cut logwood—the familiar brazilwood of the time. Evidently, the island became exceedingly popular in a short time, for one record claims that there were "36,000 white men in the Barbadoes" in 1645. West Indian island tobacco, however, and particularly that grown in Barbados, had a bad flavor, and the islands were compelled to discontinue raising it and turn to sugar. This fact materially helped Virginia and made that mainland English colony the chief tobacco-growing center of the New World. We are told that in 1676 the export of sugar from the island "was capable of employing 400 sail of vessels averaging 150 tons." Whereas the number of "settlers" was stated as 64 in 1628, the population of the small island was recorded as "20,000 whites and 46,000 slaves" in 1684.

In 1623 the Englishman Thomas Warner, who had been a member of an unsuccessful Guinea colony, settled with a group of followers on the island of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) of the Lesser Antilles. (These islands were shunned by the Spaniards, as they had no gold and the natives were particularly savage Caribs.) A few years later, some Frenchmen fleeing from the Spanish sought refuge on the island. An alliance was formed between the English and French, and the collective white manpower was strong enough "to blot out the native Caribs," after which, we are told, the English and French colonists divided the 68-square-mile island between them, but later the English took it all.

In the great migration from Britain to the New World during the period 1625-1640, it has been claimed that as many as 100,000 men came to the Lesser Antilles. This exodus was caused by economic, religious, and political conditions in the mother country and also by the publicity given in England, through the publication of Capt. John Smith's book, to the opportunities for gaining freedom and becoming prosperous in the New World. Many of these settlers, we are told, must have "died of yellow fever, drink and the violence incident to frontier settlements," but large numbers worked "the small plantations into which the islands were divided." Evidently, they produced too much tobacco for the European market to absorb, and this of such a poor quality as regards flavor that in 1639 the bottom fell out of the market and the plantation boom was over as far as tobacco was concerned. Dutch merchants proposed the planting of Brazilian sugar cane and the supplanting of white labor by Negro slave labor. By the adoption of these suggestions for economic reasons, the whole social life as well as the commerce of the Lesser Antilles was changed, and the unemployed white men, stranded as human derelicts on the islands of the "Caribbean cockpit," gave impetus to piracy.

The early British colonists who located on the mainland of North America south of the Dutch on the Hudson (New Netherland and later New York) were not marine-minded and did not build ships; neither did the British settlers on the islands in the Caribbean Sea (erroneously called from the first the West Indies), which lie still farther to the south. The islands that the British occupied did not grow timber suitable for shipbuilding, but this cannot be said of the mainland settled by the Jamestown, Va., colonists and by those who followed them and located in what are now known as Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia; for here grew the finest timber in the Americas for the building of the hulls of ships (oak for fram-

ing, keels, etc.; hard pine for planking, ceiling, and decking). The South did not have the lofty, straight, big-diameter and "tough yet soft" white pine trees that grew in the North, unequalled in the world for the masts and spars of sailing ships; but it did have better and more abundant oak and hard pine, upon which the shipyards of New England, New York, and the Delaware later became dependent as their source of needed raw material for the building of wood hulls. What we now call Canada (the territory lying northeast of the Passamaquoddy) did grow splendid white pine, oak, and other timber as suitable for shipbuilding as that found in the states of Maine and Massachusetts, but such timber resources never inspired the French settlers to build ships, and after the forests contiguous to the shipbuilding yards of New England were pretty well cut out, Canada was used in conjunction with the South as a source of timber supply for New England shipbuilders. For long years, they continued in the highly competitive business of building ships when they had only the men (skilled artisans) and the "know how," coupled with resourcefulness and outstanding ability in the realm of design and economic construction, but no nearby or handy raw materials with which to work. Massachusetts, New York, and Maine wood shipbuilders rose to their greatest heights in the production of fine wood ships after the local timber supply and that contiguous to their operations had been exhausted.

French Explorations, Activities, and Settlements in North America

Following the discoveries and exploratory voyages of Columbus and his contemporaries in the tropical zone to the westward, navigators sailed up or down the coast of the New World seeking a northwest or a southwest passage to the Pacific, which Balboa had discovered in September 1513. In the fall of 1520, Magellan found a passage to the Great South Sea (Pacific Ocean) through a strait in the American continent at about 53° S. When the world learned of this discovery in 1522, the various European maritime nations diverted their attention to explorations for a northwest water route, north of Mexico and the islands and countries that the Spaniards were exploiting, or a northeast passage to Asia (China, Cathay, or the Indies). The claims of France to the possession of a great part of the continent of North America were based on the voyages of the Florentine navigator Giovanni da Verrazano (1480-1527) and Jacques Cartier (1491-1557) in the first part of the sixteenth century. However, in 1502, closely following John Cabot's historic 1497 and 1498 voyages of "discovery" and exploration of the northeast coast line of the New World, the Bay of St. Lawrence was explored by Captain Denis, of Honfleur, France, and as early as 1504 Norman, Breton, and Basque fishermen were reported at Cape Breton. The French skipper Thomas Aubert is credited with being in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1504 and reaching Dieppe in 1508 with some captured "Red Indians" and a map of the coast. The following year (1509), some Norman fishing vessels returned to Rouen with a number of captive Indians and their canoe aboard. In 1517, historians tell us, there were "fifty Castilian, French and Portuguese vessels fishing on the Newfoundland Banks," and in 1518 Baron de Lery made what was evidently the first attempt to plant a French colony in the New World. The site was probably on Sable Island, off the south coast of Nova Scotia. Although the settlement was soon abandoned by the French, some of the cattle remained on the island and not only survived but also multiplied; for they are said to have been found there by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, England's pioneer colonist in America, when he was exploring the northeastern coast of the New World three-quarters of a century later.

Little is known of what Verrazano (also spelled Verrazzano and Verrazani) attempted or accomplished on his expedition of 1524, when under the patronage of King Francis I and the flag of France he sailed, presumably, to find a water passage through the New World, north of the equator, that would lead to Cathay and India. This voyage has been described as "ill-recorded and disputed" as to statements of findings and claims. The rivalry between Francis I of France (1494-1547; crowned in 1515) and Charles V (1500-1558), the Roman emperor, as Charles I of Spain, gave France a strong motive in the 1520's and for many years thereafter for assailing the Spaniards in the New World. Verrazano, as a navigator deemed competent for purposes of exploration, was evidently employed by Francis I in 1523 to sail west across the Atlantic and make a survey of the coast line of the New World north of Florida and of the area that the Spaniards were exploiting and plundering. Still farther west in the Indies, Francis and his advisers thought that gold was to be found. While Spain was concentrating its efforts in the "Isles of America," Francis I outlined to Verrazano the scheme by which he was to search for a route to the north of Florida that would permit the French to sail still farther to the west in the Northern Hemisphere and come to rich islands or lands en route and, finally, to the Orient and the Indies.

It would seem that the instructions of Francis I to Verrazano were specific and, following the explorations of John Cabot, are of historic significance. Cabot sailed in 1497 and 1498 for the English on a northerly course to explore the lands in the western Atlantic, and skirting the coast of the New World from the icebound Arctic waters off Greenland, he surveyed the shores of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New England, New York, New Jersey, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake territory, going as far south as the Carolinas. Verrazano, twenty-six years later (in 1524), sailed for the French across the Atlantic to about the point off the Carolina coast where Cabot had terminated his second and last voyage, and from there Verrazano sailed north and east for an indeterminable distance, supposedly looking for a water passage to Cathay but primarily searching for gold and wealth that could be plundered. He did not sail far enough up the American coast to encounter ice or severely cold weather. This voyage was the first deliberate attempt to discover a northwest passage by exploring the American coast sailing from the south to the north. Cabot had been the pioneer in all such voyages, but he first sailed to the far north and thence proceeded to the south.

The Verrazano voyage is controversial, as the records are unscientific, unconvincing, and unauthoritative. The Florentine navigator, it has been said, first left France in 1523 under distinct orders from King Francis I to sail to Madeira, then proceed due west at about this parallel of latitude to the Americas, and search the coast from there north for wealth and a water route to Cathay. The Verrazano expedition must have been well armed and manned if certain reports are true, for some historians tell us that Verrazano, about two months after sailing on his mission, was back in a French port bringing as prizes the first Spanish treasure ships, loaded with gold and tangible, portable wealth, which Cortes was sending home to his sovereign as the "first fruits of his conquest of Mexico" and the plundering of the temples of the Aztecs. Evidently, Francis I was pleased to get this gold—even by piratical, hijacking methods; but he promptly sent Verrazano once more to sea to continue his voyage as per the original instructions.

However, there is good reason to doubt the authenticity of the statement that Verrazano was the pioneer French corsair to prey on the treasure ships of Spain or that he ever took part in any such adventure—this is not in character with the man. It would seem that a fleet belonging to Jean d'Ango, a merchant and corsair of Dieppe, and commanded by Jean Fleury (or Florin) sailed in 1523 and sighted several Spanish ships near the Azores, bound from Mexico to Spain, laden with looted treasure. The French ships captured two of the Spanish galleons after a long chase, and the astonished mariners and merchants beheld for the first time "tangible proof of the rumored riches of Montezuma." When Jean d'Ango presented Francis I (1494-1547), king of France, with the choicest of the hijacked treasure, Charles, king of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, we are told, "boiled with indignation" and instructed his ambassador to the Court of France to lodge a protest and express the outraged feelings of

the emperor of the Christian world. In response to the statement so frequently used about that time that the Pope of Rome "had divided the non-Christian world between Spain and Portugal," King Francis retorted with a demand to be shown in Holy Writ "Father Adam's testament by which he divided the world between my brothers of Spain and Portugal."

The records show that Verrazano actually sailed from Madeira on his westbound transatlantic passage on January 17, 1524, and was off the Carolina coast in March, making a landfall probably at about Cape Fear, North Carolina. Presumably searching for a water passage to the west, Verrazano sailed north. We know nothing that is definite or authoritative of where he went or what he found. Apparently, he was not a thorough explorer, and his records resemble those of an emotional dilettante. He reports finding on his journey north from the Carolinas "a pleasant place below steep little hills," from which "a mighty well-guarded river runs into the sea." Was this the Hudson River? If so, why did he not explore it (as did Hudson when he "discovered" it eighty-five years later [in 1609] and sailed to Albany, while searching also for a northwest passage to China), and why had Verrazano failed to notice or be impressed with the possibilities of the Chesapeake and Delaware? Evidently, Verrazano next visited and paid particular attention to a part of the coast that most writers "guess" was Narragansett Bay (and the site of Newport, R. I.) and to a certain island, to which he gave the name "Louisa" after the "illustrious mother" of Francis I. This island, however, was later (in 1614) "discovered" by Adriaen Block and named after him (Block Island). Apparently, the only reason for the identification of Narragansett Bay and Newport, R. I., with the pseudo-explorations of Verrazano is the following statement attributed to him, which is outstanding and rare inasmuch as a definite position is given by him or his chronicler as to latitude: "This region is situated in the parallel of Rome, being 41° 40' of North Latitude, but much colder." The latitude stated is well inside the bay (about at Bristol), and the geographical layout of Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island (on which is Newport), and the Sakonnet, being a three-pronged ocean inlet, does not harmonize with Verrazano's description of a harbor with an entrance "half a league broad," which then enlarges itself to form "a very large bay 20 leagues in circumference, in which are five small islands." The Narragansett Bay region is very different from this description, as it has two main inlets landward and three necks, or entrances, from the ocean—not one; moreover, it has one very large, two quite sizable, and some nine small islands.

The Verrazano records say that after leaving the port situated at Lat. 41° 40' N. on May 5, 1524, the expedition followed "close to the coast" to the east and then to the north, but the higher mountains and "more elevated country full of very thick woods" referred to after the party left port do not describe a coastal exploratory voyage past the Elizabeth Islands, Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket, and around Cape Cod. Moreover, there is another record that says that Verrazano, after his second stop on this voyage, usually placed by modern historians at (1) the Hudson and (2) Newport, R. I., "abandoned his quest and returned to France."

Henry F. Howe, in his admirable work PROLOGUE TO NEW ENGLAND, credits Verrazano with being "the first significant modern explorer of the Rhode Island region and the discoverer of New England." There is much uncertainty, however, as to whether or not Verrazano ever entered Narragansett Bay, and the evidence of the Dighton Rock is much more trustworthy than the claimed "splendid reports" of a Florentine-French voyager whose actual accomplishment is discredited by most historians. The Dighton Rock, bearing the name of M Cortereal (Miguel Corte-Real) and the date 1511, which is nine years after the time that he is known to have sailed from Newfoundland to the southwest to search the American coast for his brother, was discovered at the northerly end of the Mount Hope Bay, or east fork of Narragansett Bay, where the Taunton River runs into it, and about twenty-seven miles inland from the ocean (Sakonnet Point). According to the Dighton Rock inscription, Miguel Corte-Real, a Spanish nobleman who was also a navigator-explorer and adventurer, not only visited the Rhode Island territory in the first years of the sixteenth century (presumably in 1502) but also actually lived in that general locality as "Leader of the Indians" some thirteen

or more years before the time of Verrazano's highly controversial voyage. Moreover, John Cabot's voyage down the New England coast in 1498 should not be ignored or undervalued in historic importance; for Cabot was a painstaking explorer, even if he did not have a chronicler to write a lot of detailed impressions of the Indians, etc., while ignoring the fundamentals of a voyage intended to be for the purpose of finding a water passage in the northwest leading from the Atlantic to Cathay (or the Pacific). John Cabot was unquestionably the discoverer of New England following the viking explorations and visitations, the voyage of Leif (Ericson, the son of Eric the Red) from Norway in 1000 to Vinland, which was New England, and the attempted colonization of the country by Thorfinn Karlsefni in 1003-1006.

Verrazano, whose report of his American coast exploratory voyage pictures him as a human person, very kindly disposed toward the Indians and interested in them, was a man sent out by King Francis I to find gold and a sea route that the vessels of France could use to obtain wealth and bring it to him—just as the Spanish exploring exploiters of Central and South America were plundering in the southern and tropical lands and sending treasure to his royal rival, Charles V, the Roman emperor who was also the king of Spain. When Verrazano returned to France with neither gold nor the promise of any treasure for the coffers of the king and without having discovered a northwest water route to Cathay, Francis I branded the voyage as not only a disappointment but also a failure—a waste of time and money. It would seem that Francis would not have felt so bitter if Verrazano (as stated by most historians) had been the buccaneer that had first shown French corsairs how to hijack the Spanish treasure fleet for the glory and wealth of France and its king. The reaction of King Henry VII of England to the historic 1498 exploratory voyage of John Cabot was very similar to that of Francis I to the far less worthy performance of Verrazano. Both the monarchs—English and French—were primarily interested in gold and treasure; secondarily in a short ocean route to Cathay, the Spice Islands, and the Indies. They had no interest in a new world inhabited by savages that owned no gold and portable wealth which could be wrested from them by force of arms. Neither of these kings, in his lust for treasure, was in the mental attitude to pay any attention to a new land far beyond the seas that offered merely fish, timber, and furs, and these to be obtained only by toil and through the channels of regular industry and trade.

Verrazano brought back from his exploratory voyage of the Atlantic coast of North America one bit of false information that persisted for a century of time. He asserted that there was a vast western body of water coming in close to the mainland coast of the New World, which he had explored from the Atlantic. A great sea had been discovered by Balboa in September 1513 and, being sighted from the "peak in Darien," had been named the South Sea. In the fall of 1520, Magellan had reached the Great South Sea and, finding it to be an ocean, named it El Mar Pacifico. Verrazano maintained that this sea of Balboa and ocean of Magellan ran close to the shore of the New World around the Carolinas. The vast body of water, believed to be part of "the Seas of the Pacific," was named the "Sea of Verrazano." This part of Verrazano's generally unacceptable and nonauthoritative report of the voyage was for some unknown reason taken seriously by geographers, who held the notion tenaciously for an unwarrantedly long period of time notwithstanding a steadily increasing knowledge of the Pacific. The English colonial charters of the seventeenth century giving grants of land bordering the Atlantic between certain parallels of latitude and running "from sea to sea" reflect the influence of the believed existence of the "Sea of Verrazano." The early Spanish explorers of the continent going beyond the Mississippi to the Rockies and the French exploring the inland water routes from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico knew full well that Verrazano's claim of a big sea was false, but only the inland explorations of settlers farther and farther to the west knocked the idea out of the heads of the English. Probably, the incompetent Verrazano, looking across a bar off the North Carolina coast, had mistaken the waters of a sound (such as Pamlico, Albemarle, or Currituck) for a vast western sea, or he may have landed on the eastern shore of Maryland or Virginia and heard of the big waters of Chesapeake Bay. In any event, the conclusion reached by Verrazano reflects the caliber, or

capacity, of the man, and the serious attention given by certain English geographers to the Florentine dilettante's opinion reveals their gullibility.

Few historians have ever accepted the statement that Verrazano explored the New England coast or sailed to any point much, if any, distance north of Cape Cod or Massachusetts Bay. However, maps of his voyage have been published that plot a course from somewhere near Brest, France, to the Madeiras; thence west to the North Carolina shore, south to about Savannah, Ga., and then a turn-about and a skirting of the seacoast north and east to about Cape Sable (the southern tip of Nova Scotia); thence a turn east and back to France, with Verrazano convinced that there was no water passage through the New World to the Indies between the parallels of about 32° and 44° N.

Jacques Cartier, on the other hand, was a forthright and responsible French navigator and an explorer of the first flight, and he goes down in history as the discoverer of the St. Lawrence River (if we overlook the fact that the viking Karlsefni explored the estuary and evidently went up as far as Cap Chat or even the Saguenay some 530 years before him). Cartier sailed from St. Malo, France, on April 20, 1534, with "two ships and 61 men," to search for a northwest passage to China and the Indies—or reach the Sea of Verrazano. He sighted Newfoundland May 10 after an amazing transatlantic voyage of only 20 days, and skirting the northeast coast he reached Labrador. After exploring that part of the mainland of the American continent, he called it "The Land of Cain," his opinion of the territory visited evidently checking with that of Leif (Ericson), the Norse sea rover, who had explored and named part of it Helluland, or Flagstoneland, in the year 1000. Cartier passed through the Strait of Belle Isle between Labrador and Newfoundland into the big Gulf of St. Lawrence and explored the estuary and Anticosti Island, but not having the proper ships and equipment for traveling up the river, he decided to return home, where he arrived on September 5 after an absence of four months and sixteen days.

Cartier again left St. Malo on May 16, 1536, with two ships and a "barke"; he passed through the Strait of Belle Isle, was at the mouth of the Saguenay September 1 (which Indians informed him was the name of a kingdom "rich and wealthy in precious stones"), and started to travel upriver in his small light-draft "barke" and the longboats from the "big ships." The "barke" ran ashore or stranded, and Cartier continued up the river as far as the Indian village of Hochelaga (located on the site of the present Montreal), but could make no further progress because of the Lachine Rapids. These rapids were named "Lachine" (China) in 1669 in mockery of Robert Cavelier de la Salle (1643-1687), who dreamed of a westward passage to Cathay and was barred at this point of the St. Lawrence as had been Cartier and others from 1536 on. When Cartier was at the island of Orleans, where the river narrows from the estuary in the vicinity of Quebec, the Indians told him that he was then in the Kingdom of Canada; hence the name of the country, which has survived to this day notwithstanding the fact that Canada, in reality, was the Huron-Iroquois word for village. In this respect, it is significant that Cartier in his reports to France called the country that he was exploring Northern Mexico. He lost twenty-five men from scurvy on this voyage and very foolishly seized Donnacona, an Indian chieftain, with eleven of the headmen of an Indian village, and carried them to France, returning by Cabot Strait and reaching St. Malo July 16, 1537. The voyage, while of interest, was not deemed successful, as Cartier had not discovered a northwestern sea passage to Cathay and the Indies.

Cartier's attempts to get backing for another voyage to "Norumbega" and to find a northwestern water route to China seemed doomed to failure, as the French were strong for cash in hand and weak in faith, but Jean Francois de la Roque de Roberval, a lord of Picardy, was ambitious for fame and riches and became interested in Cartier's reports of the New World. The king granted Roberval a charter to explore and colonize the lands in the West, provided certain returns were made to the crown. To encourage Roberval to lay out his own money to an extent that would give promise of a successful undertaking, Francis I gave the man who yearned for honors the resounding title (in addition to his already voluminous name) of "Lord of Norumbega, Viceroy and Lieutenant-General in Canada, Hochelaga,

Saguenay, Newfoundland, Belle Isle, Carpunt, Labrador, the Great Bay and Bacalaos"—which, in these days, seems ludicrous. Jacques Cartier was given the title of captain-general and a fleet of five ships, with, it is said, "a plentiful supply of released criminals among the crews." With part of the fleet, he sailed ahead of the new "Lord of Norumbega," departing from St. Malo in May 1541, on his third voyage to eastern Canada and the St. Lawrence. Cartier sailed to a point above Quebec, where many of the men landed and built a fort and living quarters—the nucleus of a settlement—while he and other men proceeded farther upriver and continued explorations. It had been planned that the sieur de Roberval would follow Cartier with some two hundred male and female settlers in three ships, but as Roberval failed to arrive at the point of rendezvous during a period of over a month beyond the fixed time, Cartier returned to France.

Some historians say that Cartier did not meet Roberval either at the appointed place or during Cartier's passage down the St. Lawrence, but other authorities say that the men did meet and that Cartier, soon becoming disgusted with Roberval's egoism, cruelty, and incapacity, left for home after seeing that the colonists were settled in the buildings protected by a fort and stockade that Cartier's men had built for them. It is the consensus of opinion that Roberval proved to be a shortsighted, capriciously brutal ruler and a most incompetent manager. The winter was too much for the colonists. They were decimated by disease, famine, and executions, and in the spring the disillusioned survivors sailed for France. Some historians say that Cartier (still in the employ of Roberval) sailed to Canada early in 1542 and brought back home what was left of the first French attempt to colonize in the New World, but records show that Cartier made his fourth and last voyage to Canada and the St. Lawrence in 1543. As he had been displaced as supreme commander on both his 1541 and 1543 expeditions, these two voyages proved of little historic value.

In 1542, Jehan Alphonse (or Jean Allefonse), of Saintongue (a province of western France at the mouth of the Gironde), who had been a navigator-pilot in the 1541 Cartier-Roberval expedition from France to the St. Lawrence, is credited with taking his ship on an exploratory cruise down the North American coast from Cape Breton Island to "a great bay in the Latitude of 42°," which was probably Cape Cod Bay. The French navigator claims that on this voyage he sailed up the River Norumbegue and found the river salty for a distance of some ninety miles from the sea. This—if a statement of fact—would suggest that Alphonse went farther south than stated, for he could not have sailed ninety miles up the Penobscot in salt water; only the Hudson River would meet this description. De Costa says, "In 1541 the prospect of the settlement of Canada under the French gave such a stimulus to merchants that in the months of January and February 1541 and 1542 no less than 60 ships went to fish for cod in the new lands." Gosselin, after an examination of available old records, says that "in 1543, 1544, and 1545 this ardor was sustained" and that "during the months of January and February from Havre and Rouen and from Dieppe and Honfleur about 2 ships left every day." We are also told by John Fiske that in 1542 French traders (possibly Alphonse?), looking for Indians with furs to barter, entered the Hudson and went up the river to the vicinity of the present Albany, where they established a temporary trading post. This was sixty-seven years before Henry Hudson "discovered" the river that now bears his name and went upstream about one hundred fifty miles, looking for a water route to China or the South Seas.

The death of King Francis and the beginning of wars of religion suspended French colonial enterprises under royal direction, but the Huguenots, under the inspiration of Admiral Gaspard de Chatillon Coligny (1519-1572), the great Protestant protagonist of French expansion, made attempts to found colonies in both North and South America, commencing at Rio de Janeiro in 1555. Andre Thevet, a French traveler and cosmographer, was with Admiral Coligny on the expedition from France in 1555, when Durand de Villegagnon planted a settlement in Brazil for French Protestant refugees (later destroyed by the Portuguese after being weakened by internal dissensions). It is said by some authorities (and disputed by others) that Thevet sailed home from Brazil in 1556 by way of the West Indies, Florida, and the North American coast. There is unquestionably doubt as to the authenticity of Thevet's ac-

count of the voyage, and it has even been asserted by some historians that Thevet never made the voyage at all; nevertheless, whether he was dealing with facts or hearsay based on the explorations of others, an extract of his report is of interest:

Having left La Florida on the left hand with all its islands, gulfs and capes, a river presents itself, which is one of the finest rivers in the whole world, which we call "Norumbeque" and the aborigines "Agoncy" and which is marked on some marine charts as the Grand River. . . . Some pilots would make me believe that this country is the proper country of Canada, but I told them that this was far from the truth, since this country lies in 43° N. and that of Canada is 50 or 52.

This River Norumbeque is of legendary interest. It was the great river of North America through the sixteenth and the early part of the seventeenth century, and at various times it has been "recognized" by historical writers as the Chesapeake (37° N.), the Delaware (39° N.), the Hudson (40½° N.), the Kennebec (43¾° N.), and the Penobscot (44¼° N.). The statement of Thevet that he found the river at 43° N. would place it as the Piscataqua, which could hardly be described as the traditional "Grand River of North America." Thevet also says that the country of Canada is in 50° or 52° N.; whereas the ocean approaches to the St. Lawrence River are in about the latitude of 46°-51° N.

It is generally said by historians that the oldest European settlement within the borders of the original United States was that founded by the Spaniards at St. Augustine, Fla., in 1565, which is forty-two years before the English landed to colonize at Jamestown, Va., and at the Kennebec River, Maine. However, in 1562, three years before the Spaniards settled at St. Augustine, a band of French Huguenots, under Jean Ribaut, landed at that same place, and Ribaut described the country as "the fairest, fruitfulest and pleasantest of all the world." Notwithstanding this eulogy, he decided not to settle there with his followers but to sail a little farther up the coast. On May 27, 1562, the Huguenot band sailed up a sound or harbor in South Carolina, which Ribaut named Port Royal, landed at Beaufort, and established a settlement on Parris Island, which was evidently named Charlesport and was most probably on the Beaufort River. This colony did not long survive, and Ribaut returned to France. The region was occupied by the Spaniards, who built Fort San Felipe on the oceanward tip of Parris Island in 1566, and this fort was in existence until 1576, when Fort San Marcos (1577-1586) replaced it. This part of the country was first permanently settled by the English in 1710.

In 1564 another party of French Huguenots, under the leadership of Rene de Laudonniere, established Fort Caroline at the mouth of the St. Johns, Florida. This colony did not prosper, and Laudonniere was about to return to France when the Spanish, under Pedro Menendez de Aviles (1523-1574), arrived in the Bay of St. Augustine to destroy the Huguenot settlement and build a Spanish colony in its place. Philip II of Spain (1527-1598), who ascended the throne in 1556, was determined to put a stop to the intrusion of all foreigners into his "half of the world" and gave orders that the French must be expelled from all of Florida. Menendez, described as a "generous, friendly, light-hearted and merry" Austurian, was selected by the king to clean out the French colony at Fort Caroline and was told not "to leave a man alive, but to inflict an exemplary punishment, that they [the French] may remember it forever." Menendez attacked Fort Caroline in force, captured it, and put to death almost the entire garrison on September 20, 1565. He announced to his victims that he was murdering them "not as Frenchmen but as Lutherans."

About this time, Jean Ribaut arrived off the coast with four ships, six hundred men, and supplies to strengthen the colony, but he had bad luck with storms, which scattered his vessels and wrecked them. A hundred and forty men who got ashore from two of the ships were hunted down by Menendez and called upon to surrender. Being unable to wage war against the vastly superior and better-equipped Spanish force, they ceased resistance after receiving the promise that their lives would be spared. When the French had been disarmed, they were massacred on September 29, 1565, and "died like sheep in the slaughter pen." Two weeks later, Jean Ribaut and two hundred shipwrecked companions had the same ghastly and treacherous trick played on them, and they were murdered as had been their compatriots.

The lagoon where these mass crimes occurred is called to this day "Las Matanzas" (The Massacres). When Philip II was informed of the news, he declared that his adelantado of Florida had "done well in the sight of God and of all good Catholics."

But there is an interesting sequel to this story. Two French Catholic noblemen, Dominique and Ogier de Gourgues, were friends of Jean Ribaut. These brothers had tasted "Spanish mercy as galley slaves," it is said, and they organized an expedition of vengeance. They outfitted a little fleet of three vessels, crossed the Atlantic to the scene of the Spanish massacre of French Huguenots, and captured the Spanish Fort San Mateo in the spring of 1568. At about the spot where the garrison of Fort Caroline and some of Ribaut's men had been executed, they hanged their Spanish prisoners. Dominique de Gourgues inscribed on a tablet made of pine wood (by burning with a hot iron) the words, "I do this not as unto Spaniards but as to traitors, robbers and murderers." Knowing that the French force was not strong enough to attack St. Augustine and feeling that the mission of retribution had been vigorously accomplished, the De Gourgues brothers and their followers returned to France.

The territory between Virginia and Florida was originally named by Admiral Coligny, the French Huguenot, in honor of Charles IX of France. In 1663, when it was granted to an English group of "lords proprietors," the name was continued, but this time in honor of Charles II of England, the grantor. Nevertheless, the name is indicative of the French Protestant attempts to colonize the territory a century before the English Carolina grant was issued. The lords proprietors founded a settlement on Albemarle Point on the west bank of the Ashley River in 1670 and in 1672 built a new town, which became Charles Town and soon grew to be "the only English seaport worthy of the name on the entire southern seaboard."

The discovery of America by Columbus and his cruises around the Caribbean and West Indian waters turned the thoughts of most of the explorers, adventurers, and exploiters of the Spanish and Latin races to those kindly, exotic regions in or near the tropics that afforded a field for plunder rather than development. However, persistent attempts were made by navigators of other countries to find a northwest passage to China and India without annoying and infringing upon the domain of the Spaniards, which they had set apart to themselves for exploitation. As a result, northeastern America was "discovered" and the coast charted in a fashion long after the north European fishermen had become generally acquainted with the territory and had been not only using the Banks of Newfoundland as their main fishing grounds but also making it a practice to land somewhere on the coast to dry and cure their catch preparatory to taking a full cargo home. Before the middle of the sixteenth century, it appears that from one hundred to two hundred European vessels, manned principally by French, Basque, English, and Portuguese fishermen, visited the Banks every year. We are told that 350 vessels sailed in 1577 for the northwestern Atlantic fishing grounds and that after the fishermen gathered their harvest, they "went ashore in the bay where St. John's, Newfoundland, now stands and cured the fish on flakes built on the beach before sailing for home." We read that the hardy mariners enjoyed their visits ashore, for while they cured the fish a diet of "venison and wild fowl" replaced their salted and none-too-good ship food and caused a measure of jollification; moreover, even though they worked hard ashore, the life was one of relative ease compared with that afloat in what would now be considered ridiculously small, fragile, badly conditioned, and unseaworthy boats.

The French (Bretons) and Spanish (Basques) were among the pioneers in fishing on the Newfoundland Banks, and possibly they established small settlements in eastern Canada and what is now northeastern Maine. Fishermen getting their catch in the North Atlantic off the Banks were positively not inclined to be colonists as the history of Newfoundland particularly and also of Labrador and Acadia (Nova Scotia) emphatically shows. There were many navigators who explored the waters of Maine and eastern Canada from Giovanni Caboto (John Cabot) in 1498 to the end of the sixteenth century, but Samuel de Champlain (1567-1635), the French colonial pioneer and the first governor of French Canada, was the first French (or Latin) navigator and explorer who appeared in the country with the intention—practically applied—of colonization. Champlain, who in 1603 made his first voyage to what is now

Canada, was described as "young, ardent, yet ripe in experience, a skilled seaman and a practical soldier." We are told that before he became interested in northeastern America, he had been living a strenuous life in the West Indies.

Champlain made his first voyage to Canada in 1603, being sent out with Pont Grave (a fur trader who had previously made voyages to the New World) by Aymar de Chastes, or de Clermont (governor of Dieppe), on whom King Henry IV of France had bestowed a patent giving exclusive rights in trading, with the commission to establish a French colony in North America. Champlain explored the St. Lawrence River to the rapids above what is now Montreal and, from the first, succeeded in establishing friendly relations with the Indians. (In this connection, it is of interest to note that another Frenchman, Jacques Cartier, went up the St. Lawrence in 1536 until checked by the Lachine Rapids, above Montreal; that Karlsefni, the Norse explorer, during 1003-1006, went up the river until it narrowed from a wide estuary.) Upon the return of Champlain to France, he learned of the death of De Chastes, his patron, and of the conveyance of De Chastes' privileges and fur trade monopolies to Pierre du Guast, sieur de Monts (1560-1611). King Henry IV of France had given to De Monts "full powers to explore and take possession of all lands in North America lying between the 40th and 46th parallels" (or from a point just south of New York to around Louisburg on Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia).

Champlain again crossed the Atlantic, this time as royal geographer, with De Monts and Pont Grave each in charge of a ship. On this expedition, it is said, were 120 men, about 80 of whom (some were artisans and others laborers) it was planned to settle in New France. Pont Grave and his ship went up the St. Lawrence and bartered with the Indians for furs, while De Monts, with Champlain, explored the coast of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the Bay of Fundy looking for a site for a permanent colony and trading post on the ocean. The location determined upon was Dochet Island at the mouth of the St. Croix River in Passamaquoddy Bay, and it proved to be a most unsuitable and impractical site for the purpose. Champlain explored the North American coast from the Passamaquoddy to the Penobscot in the autumn of 1604 and, with De Monts, left the St. Croix camp on June 18, 1605, to search for a suitable place for a settlement in a kinder climate farther to the south. They explored the New England coast to Cape Cod quite thoroughly, and as their supplies were becoming exhausted, De Monts determined to return to the island of St. Croix. Champlain wrote, "We had not been able to do on any of the coasts which we had explored on this voyage." After skirting the shore of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, Champlain and De Monts had discovered no place in which to plant a colony more favorable than the admittedly unfortunate choice of St. Croix, where during a miserable winter of hardships about half of the men of the settlement had died either of the intense cold or of starvation.

The French abandoned the St. Croix camp during the fall of 1605 and transferred their supplies and equipment across the Bay of Fundy to Port Royal (Annapolis), Nova Scotia. They established a new settlement there in a setting but little, if any, better than their original one as far as winter temperature was concerned. Pont Grave, arriving from France in a ship loaded with supplies, stayed in charge of the colony (with Champlain), and De Monts returned to France. The winter of 1605-1606 was a mild one, and the Micmac Indians proved friendly, useful, and most helpful; nevertheless, more than a quarter of the Frenchmen died, and the spring of 1606 saw only thirty-two European survivors, forty-seven out of the original seventy-nine having died in the two winters. Early in 1606 (March and April), Champlain and Pont Grave made two unsuccessful attempts to go down the coast and explore the shore from Cape Cod to the Chesapeake. It is said that on the second of these ventures Champdore, the sailing master, was held responsible for the disaster that wrecked the French "bark" and that he was "put in irons." However, it would seem that neither Champlain nor Grave knew anything about ship- or boat-building and that no man of the surviving company other than Champdore could direct the production of another craft, so the ironed sailing master was set free "to build a ship," which, it is said, he did in somewhat less than three months' time.

When this new vessel was completed, there was mutiny in the colony, and the men demanded that the settlement be abandoned and that they be taken in the ship to Newfoundland for passage home. While in the Bay of Fundy, however, the discouraged returning French colonists met a supply ship under sieur de Poutrincourt, which had been sent out to fortify their needs and bolster their morale. Poutrincourt, who, it is said, was with Champlain and De Monts when they first established a settlement on the St. Croix, carried instructions from De Monts to abandon the Acadia (Nova Scotia-New Brunswick) sites and plant a colony farther south beyond Cape Cod. At that time, however, the summer was too far advanced to explore a coast so far away and plant a new colony in a strange country. After much persuasion, the men agreed to go back to Port Royal and rebuild the old settlement, so that they could withstand another winter there in safety, with more comfort, and after Pont Grave was sent on an expedition to stop the activities of certain unauthorized fur traders on Cape Breton Island, Champlain and Poutrincourt left on an exploratory voyage south. For some unaccountable reason, Champlain, on his third voyage down the coast, spent much time duplicating the surveys made on previous voyages. (This was done, it was said, at the insistence of Poutrincourt, and he was technically in command of the expedition.) They spent some time at Chatham on the southeast "corner" of Cape Cod, where four or five of their men were assassinated by the Indians; they got as far as Wood's Hole and the entrance to Buzzard's Bay and then, because of unfavorable winds and the rapidly approaching fall of the year, had to turn back. They stopped again at Chatham, where by strategy they captured some Indians and butchered them in reprisal for the treacherous attack of the savages. The French party arrived at Port Royal on November 14, 1606, after narrowly escaping shipwreck and having spent ten weeks on this third and last Champlain exploration of the New England coast.

De Monts had been paying his expenses of exploration and of establishing settlements through income received in fur trading, in which Pont Grave and his voyages and expeditions figured conspicuously; but when Grave went after poachers in order to protect De Monts' monopolistic rights, trouble developed with the Bretons and Basques, and rival traders not only got the ear of the king of France but also had influence to persuade Henry IV to revoke the De Monts patent. The French stayed their second winter at Port Royal and the third in the attempt to establish a colony in Acadia and the Bay of Fundy region, and then in the spring of 1607 they abandoned their settlement and, taking their supplies and such equipment as was worth moving, sailed back to France. It is said, however, that of the "eighty men" who settled on the island of St. Croix in 1604, "only a quarter survived the terrific ordeals to which they had been subjected and reached home safely."

The French settlement buildings at Port Royal, evacuated in 1607, were not destroyed by the Indians, and title passed to sieur de Poutrincourt, Henry IV confirming the grant. In 1610 the boy king, Louis XIII (then only nine years of age), ascended the throne, and Marie de Medici, "tool of the Jesuits," became regent. Poutrincourt sailed from Dieppe in February 1611 with a small group of would-be colonists to settle on his Port Royal property. He was ordered by the crown to take a Catholic priest with him as a missionary to save the souls of the Indian infidels, and Pierre Biard, a Jesuit, was apparently authoritatively selected for this job. However, Poutrincourt—foolishly it would seem—took with him a priest of his own choosing and, in doing so, aroused the enmity of the Jesuits. When his son Biencourt went back to France with news intended to strengthen his father's position and obtain further supplies, he found that the Jesuits and their supporters had gained control of the French trading and settlement venture in the New World and that henceforth Canada was to be a Jesuit mission ground. Biencourt's ship, after being reconditioned and equipped by the Jesuits, was sent out to Port Royal with Pierre Biard and Enemonde Masse (also a Jesuit priest) aboard, and a fight between Poutrincourt and the Jesuits was under way that resulted in the breaking of Poutrincourt and his being thrown into prison in France "for debt" in early 1613. The Jesuits took ownership to his property, including his vessel, the *Jonas*, and on March 12, 1613, dispatched her to Port Royal with forty-eight settlers, with orders to found a colony on the Penobscot.

Sir Samuel Argall, in command of the ship *Treasurer* of 130 tons, carrying 14 cannon and sixty men, left Jamestown in May 1613, with orders from the governor of Virginia, Sir Thomas Dale, to expel the French from any settlement that they had founded between the 34th and 45th parallels of north latitude. Argall, with the assistance of some Indians, came across the recently arrived French expedition at Mount Desert and destroyed it, with a small loss of life. He captured the French ships (the *Jonas* and a "small barke" that carried only nine men) and took the crews and settlers prisoners. Argall followed up this raid by the destruction of the old French buildings on the island of St. Croix (which Captain Plastrier, expelled from the fishing grounds off Monhegan, had used in 1611) and the burning of the buildings at Port Royal, with the uprooting of crops and the removal of livestock. It is said that Biencourt and the few men who were with him escaped and hid in the woods, living for some time with friendly Micmac Indians. The Frenchmen soon returned to France, but records indicate that later Biencourt was once more resident as a trader at Port Royal.

Pierre Biard, the Jesuit priest, is of importance historically because of his exploration of the coast of Maine in the fall of 1611. In company with Biencourt, Biard made two journeys—"one of perhaps a dozen days, the other of a month and a half." His record continues: "We skirted all the coast from Port Royal to Kinibequi, west-southwest." All we know of Biard's explorations has come down to us in a letter dated January 31, 1612, written at Port Royal by the Jesuit priest to his superiors in France. Biard was taken aboard the *Jonas* at Port Royal in late May or early June 1613 and was one of the French party attacked and captured by Argall at Mount Desert. It would seem that Biard showed a good deal of ability both as a missionary and an explorer. Historical records depict him as a scheming, unscrupulous Jesuit, "a conspirator against the traders," hated alike by both the French and English. The year 1613 is a memorable one, for because of Sir Samuel Argall's aggressiveness New England was saved from becoming a French- and Jesuit-dominated colony and the way was kept open for the establishment of English colonies at Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay in the 1620's. Around 1610-1611, Maine had supplied the Jamestown colonists with fish when greatly needed, and the Virginia settlers had been obtaining fish regularly each year from the Maine coast. In 1613, Jamestown and the London Company of Virginia repaid the debt by vigorous naval and military actions that preserved New England to the British. It is significant, however, that when Argall sailed from the Chesapeake on a secret mission to oust the French from northern Virginia, he wrote before leaving, in order to camouflage his expedition, that he was sailing in the *Treasurer* to fish for cod off the islands on the coast of Maine.

Baldwin, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAS*, says:

The significant thing about the attack on Mount Desert is that Argall had managed to pick up on the coast an auxiliary fleet of ten English ships. Evidently the mariners soon discovered that spring and fall winds would waft them to Newfoundland without the roundabout voyage to the Cape Verde

Islands on the trades. Newfoundland was frequented by English fishermen in such numbers that there was never much doubt that it was an English possession. There were trading posts ashore also, though of course the men who used them said little for publication by the Reverend Richard Hakluyt.

Champlain was no navigator and knew nothing of either the building or the operation of ships. He was an excellent explorer, observer, geographer, and chronicler, and he became an effective propagandist. We are told that De Monts, following the revocation of his exclusive trading and colonization rights, was granted a patent in a modified form and that Champlain induced his patron to abandon Acadia (Nova Scotia) and the coast and establish a settlement and trading post on the St. Lawrence. Evidently, De Monts was ordered by his sovereign to keep clear of fishery entanglements and concentrate on trading with the Indians and on furs. Two ships were sent to the St. Lawrence, on one of which Champlain was placed in command to explore and colonize; the other vessel was to be used for trading and, by this means, to obtain sufficient profits to pay for the entire expedition, with a pleasing margin. Champlain fixed on the site of Quebec, built a small trading post, and, in fact, founded there in July 1608 the first white settlement on the St. Lawrence watershed, giving it its present name. In the spring of 1609, Champlain joined a war party of Algonkian and Huron Indians,

discovered the lake that bears his name, and took part in a fight with the Iroquois, whose defeat caused the tribe to turn to the Dutch as allies (against the French) and later to the English. After a visit to France, Champlain returned to Canada in 1611 and established a trading post at Mont Royal.

Claims have been made that the French built a ship in eastern Canada about this time; also that Champlain built several vessels during the second decade of the century, but no authoritative records are on hand in regard to such construction. If any ship was built by the French in the first half of the seventeenth century, she was probably a pinnace for coastal trading or a small combined fisherman and trader and was presumably built at Acadia. What boats Champlain built were for river use and were at first constructed along the lines of the Indian canoes, being light and suitable for portage. Possibly, as the years advanced, he built some heavier and more seaworthy boats along European lines but no seagoing ships. Aside from the fisheries on the Banks, which were seasonal in operation, the interest of the French in the New World was primarily in the fur trade and in the big river, which was a water highway through a rich trapping and trading country to the great inland lakes. Champlain traveled far and explored much country, but after 1606 he concentrated on discovering trade routes inland, using rivers and lakes and water travel wherever possible. He capitalized heavily on the friendship of the Indians and was probably acquainted with the eastern end of Lake Huron and Lake Ontario, for in 1615, with a war party, he crossed Lake Nipissing in the north, and on another occasion he was with and assisted the Indians when they attacked and took an Onondaga fortified town a few miles south of Lake Oneida.

For several years, Champlain traveled so much—learning about the country and the possibilities of trade, routes, and transport—that he evidently neglected colonizing as well as shipbuilding, but following his wanderings he devoted himself to the growth and strengthening of Quebec and each year crossed the Atlantic to France with this end in view. Records inform us that in 1616 Champlain and a farmer named Louis Hebert were living at "the Quebec trading post." The population of "the settlement" in 1626 is stated as "105 persons all told." Champlain was not a shipbuilder; neither was he interested in deep-sea sailing vessels except in so far as they were instruments of trade and transport. His passion was trade routes (and merchandise) and not the carrying of goods acquired for market. When he was in the West Indies, he advanced the amazingly farsighted idea of building a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, "by which the voyage to the South Sea would be shortened by 1,500 leagues." When he explored the New England and Canadian coasts, he had ever in his mind the possibility of finding a northwest passage to India and China, and even when traveling and charting the upper St. Lawrence, he took time in 1613, while going up the Ottawa River, to check up on Nicholas de Vignau's theory and alleged discovery of a short route to the Pacific by that river, "a great lake at its source and another river flowing north therefrom." Champlain was one of the 120 members of the "Company of New France" created by Richelieu (1585-1642) to reform abuses and take over, in 1629, all his country's interests in the New World. This company was given a monopoly of trade, and all products of the territory were to enter France duty free; in return, the company was to take to New France 300 colonists a year—only French Catholics. That year Quebec fell to the English fleet, and Champlain, as governor of the French province, was taken to England as a prisoner of war. (This was also the memorable year that a rather strong group of English "Puritans," including John Winthrop, obtained and put into practical effect a charter as "The Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England.")

The French settlers in Acadia quarreled with the Jesuits, and English colonists of Virginia under Capt. Samuel Argall invaded the settlement of Port Royal (Acadia) in 1613 (in time of peace) and expelled the greater part of the inhabitants, who were few in number and far from the protection of the exploring Champlain. In 1621, Sir William Alexander obtained from King James I of England a grant of the peninsula, which was named in the patent "Nova Scotia" instead of Acadie (or Acadia—the name given it by the French after the Micmac Indian word "Acadie," which meant "fertile land"). The colonization of any part of the

continent of North America by the French was a bone of contention in the wars between France and England. The Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye in 1632, however, confirmed France in possession of Acadia, Cape Breton, and New France; Champlain was released by the British, and he returned in 1633 to his former post, but died two years later at the age of sixty-eight years.

The French were active in trading on the coast of Maine in 1609, for Robert Juet, an officer of Henry Hudson's ship *Half Moon*, writes of encountering Indians there who said "that the French-men doe trade with them; which is likely, for one of them spoke some words of French." A little later, Juet writes: "Wee espied two French shallops full of the country people come into the harbour. . . . They brought many beaver skinnes and other fine fures which they would have changed for redde gowns. For the French trade with them for red cassocks, knives, hatchets, copper kettles, trivets, beades and other trifles." It would be interesting to know where the Indians obtained the "French shallops" that they were using. Had they been left behind by Champlain and his colleagues when they abandoned the Port Royal colony in 1607? Hudson took one of these shallops from the Indians and then manned it with twelve armed men to retain possession of the stolen property. The Indians were natural thieves, but evidently Europeans gave them many lessons in treachery and piracy.

Capt. John Smith speaks of ranging the Maine coast on his voyage of exploration and trading to New England in 1614 and says that "eastwards our commodities were not esteemed [by the Indians in trade], they were so neare the French who afford them better." Smith also writes of two French ships farther west "that had there a great voyage by trade." He records that when he visited Boston Bay (and gave the name of Massachusetts to the region), he came across French traders, who, "having remained here neere six weeks, left nothing for us."

Capt. Thomas Dermer, who had been associated with Capt. John Smith in his efforts to found a colony in New England (and had afterwards made one or more trading voyages for the somewhat impoverished Gorges and the Plymouth Company), when searching for the missing Capt. Edward Rocroft (another of the Gorges-Smith Plymouth group of would-be New England colonizers), came upon a castaway of a French vessel, which had been wrecked in 1616 "at the north-east of Cape Cod." On the same voyage, Captain Dermer "redeemed" another French sailor from his Indian captors, and this unfortunate seaman was evidently a survivor of a French vessel destroyed in Massachusetts Bay. We are told by Thomas Morton, the founder of a Puritan settlement at Quincy, Mass., that this French ship was trading with the Indians "for beaver" in Massachusetts Bay "some few years before the English came to inhabit at New Plimouth in New England," when the savages "set upon the men, at such advantage, that they killed manie of them" and "burned their ship, then riding at Anchor." Some of the French seamen were captured by the Indians and enslaved. Morton says that the savages "did keep them so longe as they lived, onely to sport themselves at them, and made these five Frenchmen fetch them wood and water, which is the generall worke that they require of a servant." This was before the Great Plague of 1615-1616, which almost exterminated the Massachusetts Indians. From the number of French traders who, during the first part of the seventeenth century, were visiting not only the Maine coast (in the proximity of New France) for the fishing and trading in furs but also the more southerly Massachusetts coast, it would seem that the 1605-1606 surveys, maps, and reports made by Champlain of the entire New England coast had received much attention in France from merchants and navigators and had encouraged further commercial explorations and trading voyages.

The French in the northern part of the American continent were at first fishermen, catching and curing fish and shipping them to the homeland in French vessels. Those who were not fish-minded and wedded to the sea became fur traders and used the St. Lawrence as a highway to tap a rich fur country in the west. The settlers built small fishing boats for river and smooth-water work in the second quarter of the seventeenth century, but France constructed all the deep-sea and sizable craft. It is said that a ship was built at Quebec in 1663,

but it was not until the nineteenth century that the St. Lawrence River and the Canadian provinces really began to build ships. New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Quebec established important yards whose product sailed on every ocean of the world and stood forth, in regard to both the ships themselves and the men who sailed them, as the only merchant sail comparable with the "wooden ships and iron men" of New England. The Richelieu "Company of New France" showed no vigor and leadership following Champlain's death. In 1660, after more than thirty years had elapsed since the company's formation, "there were not more than two thousand French in the whole country." The charter of the company was revoked in 1663, and New France became a royal province. Outside of the right to fish on the Newfoundland Banks, France evidently cared little for the coast provinces of the North American continent, but it did value the St. Lawrence as a water highway and the control of the trade from the interior of the continent. This feeling and policy account for the fact that Acadia and New France were inactive in shipbuilding.

A map of New France in 1673 shows Fort Pentagoet (St. Castin's) at the mouth of the Penobscot (or Norumbega) River and Mount Desert on the island to the east; St. Croix settlement on an island at the mouth of the St. Croix River, which is now the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, Canada; Port Royal (now Annapolis), Nova Scotia—then part of Acadia; and a settlement on Cape Breton Island. The activities of the French inland, following Champlain's explorations, are apparent, for the settlement Tadoussac was established at the mouth of the Saguenay River where it enters the St. Lawrence, and others are shown at Quebec (Stadacone), Three Rivers, and Montreal (Hochelaga) on the St. Lawrence, with Fort Frontenac at the entrance to Lac Frontenac (Ontario) and trading posts in the Iroquois country at Ossernenon and Ste. Marie (a mission). At the western end of Lake Ontario was the settlement, or trading post, of Otinawatawa (where Hamilton now stands), and farther west the peregrinations among the Indians of the fanatical French Jesuit priests are seen in the location of the Mission du St. Esprit on the southwest shore of Lake Superior; St. Francois Xavier and St. Marc, with the trading station Nicolet (established in 1634) around the south end of Green Bay (Baye des Puans, part of Lac des Illinois—now Lake Michigan); and the trading-mission posts Sault Ste. Marie and St. Ignace around the junction of Lac Huron, Lac des Illinois, and Lac Superieur. It is evident that by 1673 the French had used for their trading advantage the waters of the Great Lakes, but they traveled generally along the shores in canoes guided by Indians, and there is no record that the French built any sizable boats—not to mention vessels that even in those days would rate as "shippes" or "barkes"—on the Great Lakes during the seventeenth or the early years of the eighteenth centuries.

The early French emigrants to Canada who went inland were pre-eminently traders and not agriculturists, and they did not have the attributes of real colonists. Gradually, they explored the country and particularly the streams, which were the water highways for trade. From the Great Lakes, or Inland Seas, they worked north and south in their quest for furs. With Indian help, they learned the geography of a vast new world and gained knowledge of all its rivers and streams, lakes and portages. The French of Newfoundland, Labrador, Cape Breton Island, and along the coast of Acadia (Nova Scotia) confined their interests to fishing; but some settlers located back from the sea in Acadia and found the shore fertile and the country a veritable New France. As a general proposition, however, it was the Anglo-Saxons who colonized the coast line of North America and gradually extended their interest in land first by settling on the banks of the river highways and later by penetrating more deeply into the country and farther and farther west. Up to the time of the Revolution, the British colonies were essentially coast-line and river settlements and primarily maritime. The ocean was the cause of their existence and of their maintenance. The French, working deep into the country by means of the St. Lawrence, had their prime interests in America to the west.

In 1682, Rene Robert Cavelier, sieur de la Salle (1643-1687), who had already explored the Ohio River, sailed down the Mississippi and took possession for France of the region at the mouth of the river—Louisiana. During 1679-1682, the French developed a route almost

entirely by water, with an extremely small amount of portage, from Fort Frontenac (about where Kingston now is on the northeast shore of Lake Ontario) through four of the Great Lakes to Fort Miamis (about Michigan City, Ind., at the south of Lac des Illinois, or Lake Michigan) and down the Miamis (St. Joseph), Kankakee, Illinois, and Mississippi rivers to the Gulf of Mexico, where La Salle claimed territory for the French and planted a sign with the royal coat of arms and an announcement of ownership to the world bearing the words: "Louis le Grand, Roy de France et de Navarre, Regne; le Neuvieme Avril 1682."

Upon going to France, La Salle influenced the ministry to believe that a French colony at the mouth of the Mississippi would be a strategic move of major importance in the war then being waged against Spain. La Salle was, therefore, appointed "Governor of all Louisiana" and of the forts and stations on the Mississippi and in the "Illinois country," etc., and in 1684 he sailed from France with four ships and 400 men to plant a colony near the mouth of the Mississippi River. From a naval standpoint, this voyage was a failure. Beaujen, the commander and navigator, refused to obey La Salle's orders, the main supply ship was captured by the Spaniards, La Salle was stricken with a fever, and the expedition became thoroughly disorganized. A wrong course was set, and the shore was first sighted west of Galveston. La Salle, with only 180 men left, disembarked at Matagorda Bay, Texas, which was erroneously imagined to be the western outlet of the delta of the Mississippi. Evidently, La Salle was no navigator and had but little, if any, "ship sense" or knowledge of vessels and of their operation at sea; hence the failure of an ambitious enterprise. Land explorations in an effort to reach the "big river" were unsuccessful; two of the three ships that reached Matagorda Bay were wrecked, and the third, further defying La Salle's orders, returned to France. La Salle, in January 1687, with only 45 men left, took about half of the survivors and made a final attempt to get to "the Mississippi and Canada." They had not proceeded far when a mutiny occurred, and La Salle was assassinated by one of his own men. It is said that a very few ultimately reached Fort St. Louis on the Illinois River. Many starved in their attempt to reach a "civilized" post, but most of the men who landed in Texas were murdered by the Tejas Indians.

La Salle was a gentleman of Rouen, who journeyed to New France when twenty-three years old (in 1666) and settled on a seigniorship near Montreal. He was restless and ambitious and an indefatigable, self-sacrificing worker, but unfortunately he had a peculiar nature that prevented him from getting along with other people. Although an ardent Catholic and a "son of the True Church," La Salle antagonized the Jesuits. He failed to win the support of French traders or the friendship of the Indians, but he was a just and honorable man. Apparently, his only loyal and dependable associate was Henri de Tonty, an Italian (with only one hand), whom he engaged in France as a lieutenant in 1677. When La Salle made his historic journey down the Mississippi, he took with him Tonty, about twenty Frenchmen, and twenty-five Indians, principally from New England, who had been driven west by the "saints." La Salle's personality was his greatest weakness. Cold, austere, and aristocratic, he made no friends. Although he was admired for his mental powers, vision, and planning, he was feared and heartily disliked, so that many attempts were made to poison him. When La Salle was finally murdered by one of his own men (Tonty was not there), the assassin, after laying him low, cried, "There thou liest, great bashaw!" The men of his party, all of whom had conspired against their leader, did not give him a decent burial—Christian or otherwise—but contemptuously stripped him of his clothes and left his naked body as carrion for vultures or beasts of the wilds.

It is amazing that one of France's greatest and bravest explorers died from becoming lost in a strange country—a predicament that he never would have experienced had he known anything about navigation and ships. Although La Salle was murdered by his men in Texas in 1687 (after making a mess of a naval and colonizing expedition to the Mississippi through a lack of knowledge of navigation), French Louisiana—named by La Salle in honor of King Louis XIV of France—was born.

While La Salle knew nothing of ships, he greatly appreciated their value in the hands of competent men and their importance as a means of transportation. He presented to Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac et Palluau (1620-1698), governor and lieutenant-general for the French king in La Nouvelle France (Canada), a grandiose scheme for a commercial empire and suggested building a fleet of sailing vessels on Lakes Ontario and Erie for use in the fur trade and more vessels on the Mississippi, which he proposed to use as a channel of transportation (with an ice-free delta) for getting "the beaver of the upper river" domain, with its numerous tributaries, and "the buffalo robes of [the western and inland] forests and prairies" to France. Protection for the entire French commercial system "against Indian and European interlopers" was to be secured by "a chain of forts from the St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico." Frontenac approved the plan and sent La Salle to France to get royal support and funds. Several small sailing vessels were built on the shores of Lake Ontario. However, the fur traders, then the Jesuits, and later the Iroquois Indians turned against him—all for selfish reasons. La Salle made another visit to France in 1677 and obtained further assurances of support for his plans and financial means, but the forces against him in America were too strong. He built a small ship, the *Griffin*, on Lake Erie and sailed in her to Green Bay, and when he sent her back loaded with valuable furs and orders to return with a cargo of cordage, ironwork, and materials and equipment for building boats on the western rivers, the ship was lost. Frontenac was recalled to France in 1682, and he did not return until 1689; in the meanwhile, matters were in a deplorable, chaotic condition. If Frontenac had remained in office in Canada and the church and traders had not been so ignorantly jealous of La Salle and had been kept in their proper places and if the required sympathetic and loyal co-operation and practical assistance had been given to La Salle, the end would have been very different; by means of ships, boats, and water transportation, the French would have developed a formidable commercial empire stretching from the far north and west to the Gulf of Mexico, with ocean transport to France.

For a century, the French tried to unite "the beggarly settlements" in Canada and Louisiana by setting up posts all along the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, their prime motive being to keep the English out of their trading Indian country and confine them "between the Alleghanies and the sea." After La Salle's time, the French held the lakes and rivers extending from Nova Scotia to the Gulf of Mexico, which formed an arc "locking in" the English colonies. However, the basic policy of the French—expressed by a mania for the fur trade and indifference to agriculture, forest products, and shipbuilding, coupled with an ignorant, debasing, and stifling religious fanaticism—proved their undoing and ultimately resulted (following two centuries of warfare with and against Indian tribes) in the Anglo-Saxon domination and acquisition of the whole of the continent of North America, i.e., north of the Mexican border.

In 1697, after the Treaty of Ryswick (which ended the war begun in 1689 between France and the Grand Alliance of England, Spain, Holland, and "the Empire"), Pierre le Moyne d'Iberville (1661-1706) was chosen by the French to found a colony in Louisiana on the Mississippi. He reached the Gulf coast in 1699 and promptly built Fort Maurepas (near Biloxi of today), following which he built a fort on the Mississippi about forty miles from its mouth to command all movement on the big river. Evidently, Iberville was more military-minded than a founder of colonies should be, and the "settlement" he planted on the river proved "unhealthy and unprosperous." Antoine Crozat (1655-1738) held Louisiana from 1712 to 1717 as a private grant from the king, but he affirmed that it was "too great a drain" upon his purse and asked to be relieved of it. The Western Company then acquired it, and it was absorbed by John Law's *Campagnie de la Louisiane ou d'Occident* (founded in August 1717), which also took over the *Campagnie du Canada*.

John Law (1671-1729) was a Scotch economist and evidently ahead of his time. He encountered a lot of hostility and aggressive jealousy on the part of French leaders of finance

and business, who banded together "to break the foreign upstart and his dupes"—shares in the Law company having been sold to the public. In 1718 the company was granted a tobacco monopoly by the French Government, and in 1719 it took over the *Campagnies des Indes Orientales et de la Chine* and became known as the *Campagnie des Indes*. The French Government, Law's enemies, and the investing French public were entirely to blame for the conditions that followed. Hysterical gambling on the part of "investors," with the steady pressure and acts of a group of rival French financiers (whose only policy was to destroy Law and all his works), precipitated a panic in 1721, following a period during which speculation reached an unparalleled height. Law was obliged to leave France, and his "Mississippi scheme" and the whole system of his operations were denounced and demolished by his enemies. Notwithstanding what happened, John Law was undoubtedly a brilliant man and a financial genius; but "the French were the French," and with the government in power urging him on and on, beyond points that he wanted to go, and with the French public first becoming "hysterical as bulls" and later alarmed and panicky in its unloading of securities and the wrecking of credit, there could be only one end to the story.

However, the Law company accomplished much for the French colony of Louisiana. In 1718, it sent out Jean Baptiste le Moyne, sieur de Benville (1680-1768), a brother of Iberville, as governor, and he proved to be a good man, who carried out faithfully the company's Anglo-Saxon ideals of colonization. Seven ships loaded with emigrants, stores, and supplies were sent from France to the Mississippi in 1718 and eleven in 1719. Le Moyne founded the city of New Orleans upon his arrival in the colony in 1718. We read that the following year "five hundred Negroes from the Guinea coast arrived," so slavery commenced in the French colony at an early date and was on a big scale, based on the number of Negroes that continued to be imported year after year. The misfortunes of the *Campagnie des Indes* did not seemingly affect the growth and prosperity of Louisiana, and the company retained its grant of the colony until 1731, when it reverted to the crown. Cotton began to be grown in 1740 and sugar cane in 1751.

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the French were active in exploring west of the Mississippi, the only expeditions of note during this period (all French) being those of St. Denis (1714-1716); Bourgmont (1714-1724); Du Tisne (1719); La Harpe (1719); Villasur (1720); Mallet (1739-1740); and the Verendryes (north in Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota) in 1738-1743. The French captured in 1719 and occupied for four years the Spanish fort (and settlement) at Pensacola (San Carlos de Austria). French Louisiana grew from 1699 to 1763 to be a very active settlement, with New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Natchez (Fort Rosalie) on the Mississippi; Balize on the delta jutting out into the Gulf of Mexico; Biloxi (with the nearby Fort Maurepas) on the Gulf east of the Mississippi; and Mobile (with Fort Conde, built in 1711) and Dauphine Island at Mobile Bay to stop the Spanish from extending their influence west.

By the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, France yielded to Britain its claims to Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson Bay, but held the shores of the St. Lawrence and the island of Cape Breton to command its mouth. In 1745, New England colonists planned an expedition and captured Louisburg, the stronghold of France on Cape Breton Island, as it menaced their fishing and trading; but to the "everlasting disgust" of all Americans the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 handed back to France this brilliant conquest by New England sailor-militia soldiers. In 1755 the British took the stern step of deporting about three thousand Acadian French from Nova Scotia, as they were suspected of disloyalty. During the Seven Years' War, which commenced in 1756, the British, because of their ability to command the sea, defeated the French in battle; they took Quebec in 1759 and Montreal the following year, and the Peace of Paris in 1763 finally ceded Canada to Great Britain—about the time that the ferment of revolt began to work seriously in New England and the colonies farther south.

New France and British Canada were not shipbuilding provinces at any time prior to

the Revolution, but after the United States came into existence as an independent republic and to some degree during the years of the War of the Rebellion, Britain encouraged and did much to develop wood shipbuilding in the Dominion of Canada. After nearly two centuries of virtual somnolence in the art and practical application of shipbuilding (and this while New England, Canada's neighbor to the south, built more and more ships and finally led the world as a shipbuilding province in both quantity and quality of output), Canada gradually came to life as a maritime province and built a tremendous fleet of wood ships (almost entirely for British owners), continuing until the time that the demand of the mother country was for iron and steam rather than wood sail.

Spanish Expeditions of Discovery and Exploration in North America and Mexico

Shipbuilding in the West Indies and on the islands and shores of the Caribbean Sea (and on the Pacific side of the isthmus) naturally antedated the building of ships on the continental mainland of North America and the territory now known as the United States and the Dominion of Canada. The Spanish, however, failed to develop an active shipbuilding industry in any of their western world possessions, and 115 years elapsed, following the discovery of certain West Indian islands by Columbus, before the arrival of colonists at the Kennebec River in Maine and at Jamestown, Va., and 128 years passed before the *Mayflower* landed the Pilgrim settlers at Plymouth on the Massachusetts coast. Historians tell us that vessels were occasionally built by the Spaniards at Havana, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Panama, and Mexico, but that Spanish colonial-built ships were relatively costly "despite the excellent hardwood of the Spanish Main." Hutchins says, "Although the resources of ship timber of the Spanish colonies were abundant, regulation, royal monopolies, the lack of skilled labor and the existence of other more favorable roads to fortune prevented the rise of a large industry." Clarence H. Haring is authority for the statement that some vessels were built for the Pacific Spanish Plate Fleet in the early sixteenth century and that yards at Havana constructed West Indian merchantmen and frigates, as many as six being reported as having been built there in 1590, a statement that is evidently incorrect with respect to both quantity and type of construction.

The loot that the "good Christian" Spaniards carried away from the "infidel civilizations" of the New World (Mexico, Peru, etc.), all by ships sailing from a Caribbean seaport to Spain, was tremendous both in value and bulk—specie, jewels, handworked precious metals, treasure, and works of art. Spain sacked and despoiled the lands it discovered, exploited and subjugated in the New World to a degree unprecedented in history. It is no wonder, therefore, that Spain betrayed little interest in the lands north of Mexico, whose wealth could be obtained only by industry and whose inhabitants were "savages" void of culture as measured by European standards; moreover, the combative resistance and fighting ability and methods of the red American Indian, from Florida to the mountains and deserts of the Far West on the North American continent, were too much, at all times, for the Spaniards to overcome. It is said that between 1587 and 1600 Spanish galleons carried into one Spanish port \$145,000,000 worth of property looted from the New World. The ships in this service sailed in waters largely uncharted, and as a result some—and, it would seem, many—were lost on reefs and shoals. Although they traveled in navy-protected convoys as "treasure armadas," stragglers

were captured by French, English, Dutch, and Portuguese vessels that in times of peace were pirates and in war "privateers," or full-fledged royal ships of war. A favorite place for hunting Spanish treasure-laden galleons was evidently the sea around the Azores Islands. It has been said of this marine movement of wealth from old American civilizations to Spain: "The wealth of the New World, largely secured by force and brutality, flowed into Spain, making her richer, more powerful and more arrogant. The wealth served to corrupt the country and its morals; basically the unearned riches left no lasting mark on a nation that seemed destined to lose prestige with each passing century."

Available records show that between the years 1503 and 1660 treasure from the Americas was imported into Spain to the value of about seven hundred and fifty million pesos. These pesos were Spanish dollars of eight reals; hence they became known as "pieces of eight." It is interesting to note that the "pieces of eight" of pirate romance became the standard value of United States currency—the dollar of eight bits being a carry-over of the division of the Spanish dollar into eight reals. Of additional interest is the fact that the carrying of Mexican silver in Spanish galleons from Acapulco across the Pacific to the Philippines and thence to China led to the introduction of the Shanghai, or Mexico, silver dollar as the standard currency in the East.

After Columbus on his first voyage to the west discovered the Bahamas (and later Cuba and Hispaniola—Haiti), he wrote to "Their Majesties of Spain" that he had opened up to them vast new realms, the very land where "gold is born." But the gold mines of the West Indian islands, including the "fabled mines" of Hispaniola discovered in 1496, proved disappointing, were soon worked out, and evidently never produced more than some fifty thousand dollars a year; the real gold of the islands lay in their fertility, and money was later made out of crops, particularly sugar cane, fruits, rice, maize, tobacco, cotton, and also livestock—but not out of mining.

The precious metals that did so much to make and maintain Spain as a great power for so many years came chiefly from Guanajuato and Zacatecas in central Mexico and Potosi in what is now Bolivia. The Portuguese for a time laid claim to the mine of Potosi, the greatest silver-producing mine of the world, and even their seventeenth century maps show Potosi in Brazil, although it is well over a thousand miles west of the line of demarcation as set forth in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. Mexico produced a variety of metals, with silver in abundance and some gold, and from 1521 to 1922 the Mexican mines yielded three billion dollars worth of silver—about two-thirds of the world's production during that time. The enormously rich Potosi mine, discovered in 1545, had an output of £163,000,000 to the beginning of the nineteenth century and £400,000,000 to 1864. In 1611, Potosi was a flourishing mining community with a prosperous city of 160,000 people. The altitude is too high for either white men or Indians to work steadily, and although laborers were supposedly sent to the mines for a period of only six months, it is said that "four out of five laborers died in their first term of service." Historians tell us that "eight million Indios" have "perished in the mines of Potosi" and that "an Indio drawn for service in the mines . . . departed as one bound for the tomb." The precious metals of the Indies, on which the maintained prosperity of Spain depended up to the nineteenth century, consisted primarily of silver, and a good part of the silver was "mined in blood" just as the Spaniards' earlier loot of the treasure of the Mexican and South American civilizations was obtained by blood—murder, treachery, and subjugation.

The early navigators prominent for their voyages to America under the French flag became favorably known in France as corsairs before they obtained any recognition as explorers. Piracy was rampant on the high seas following the discovery of America by Columbus and grew to tremendous proportions when Spain commenced to send home its treasure ships laden with loot from the Central and South American countries. The habit of buccaneering spread north even to the fisheries, and Hakluyt frequently refers to marooned crews, confiscated car-

goes, and freebooting. What wealth and treasure France could not obtain by exploitation of conquered countries and plundering of subject peoples, it endeavored to wrest from Spain by piracy. During Queen Elizabeth's reign, Protestant England joined the Huguenots of France in preying upon the Spanish, and Sir Francis Drake (1540-1596), Sir John Hawkins (1532-1595), and most of the famous English sea dogs of the era when Spain was not at war with England were pirates and terrorized the Spaniards at sea long before the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588. It is said that, during the summer of 1563 (only five years after Elizabeth ascended the English throne following the death of Henry VIII, who turned Protestant and defied the authority of the Church of Rome), "four hundred English and Huguenot privateers captured seven hundred Spanish prizes." The prime purpose of England during Elizabeth's reign was to wrest supremacy on the seas from Spain and to displace Spain as the dominant power in the New World. This explains why Sir Walter Raleigh, a man of many faults, was so extremely popular with the masses in England; it was his steadily expressed enmity toward Spain that made him a heroic figure in their eyes.

Usher, in *SPANISH SHIPS AND SHIPPING*, says that in the annual Seville Plate Fleet, or treasure armada, of 1610 forty ships of 18,780 tons (averaging 470 tons each) were Spanish built and twenty smaller ships of 5,975 tons (averaging 300 tons each) were colonial built. These figures seem very high for both the total tonnage and the average size of vessels in the Spanish fleet claimed to have been built in the Spanish domains of the western world. Of the several places where it is reported that the Spaniards built ships, only Havana seems to have been used—and that spasmodically—as a real shipbuilding center, and it is said that the industry there was not very successful with respect to either the cost, quality, and durability of the ships or the time required for construction. The vessels said to have been built "occasionally" in Mexico and around the Isthmus of Panama were more in the class of boats than that of ships, and it is extremely doubtful as to whether the Spaniards at any time built a sizable ship capable of deep-sea navigation on the mainland of the continent of America. Central and South America, including the West Indies, have never developed an active shipbuilding industry, and none of the countries, notwithstanding the opportunities of the late nineteenth and particularly the twentieth century, has grown to be a maritime power of even the second or third class.

The main object of Spanish explorations was always "gold"—to be gained by subjugation and exploitation or won by slave labor. The Casa de Contratacion was established at Seville in 1503, following which sugar plantations were set up in Cuba and Hispaniola in an effort to make these possessions "pay their way." The surface gold and wealth of the West Indian islands were soon exhausted, and as the feeble, conquered islanders perished, the need of importing cheap labor became apparent. The slave trade from the African coast to the Indies was born as the acquisitive Spanish explorers, on sea and land, commenced to go farther afield in the search for either natural gold or loot. The Spaniards, notwithstanding their prime lust for gold and portable wealth, were not only conquistadors but also the introducers of both sugar cane and slavery into the West Indies—"an economic combination of the greatest importance to the commerce of the world." The practice of raising an agricultural crop to be harvested and handled by slave labor was followed in the islands of the West Indies and was soon adopted in principle by the English colonists of Virginia, starting as early as 1619, in the growing of tobacco and later cotton, with Negro slavery surviving the Revolutionary War of the thirteen British-American colonies for freedom and independence and continuing in the South until it was stamped out for good through a long and bloody Civil War (1861-1865).

A map of 1588 shows Spanish settlements on the peninsula of Florida at Tegesta (Miami) and at San Antonio (Charlotte Harbor—Punta Gorda) and Tocobago, or Ucita, on Espiritu Santo (Tampa Bay) on the west coast. North of St. Augustine and south of Port Royal, in addition to San Mateo (at the mouth of the St. John's River), were Spanish settlements on

what is now known as Cumberland Island (San Pedro) and St. Catherine's Island (Santa Catalina), Georgia. During the first century following the discovery by Columbus of the West Indies, Spanish explorers and exploiters did not move up the North American coast above Port Royal in the southern part of South Carolina (about $32^{\circ} 18' N.$), probably shown on old maps as the port of Ayllon.

Following Juan Ponce de Leon's discovery of Florida in 1513, Panfilo de Narvaez, who sailed from Hispaniola and Cuba in 1527 with about six hundred men (soon reduced to less than four hundred), landed at what is now Tampa Bay early in 1528 and journeyed by land to Apalachee Bay. It is said that this exploratory and expeditionary force "suffered terribly from exposure, hunger and fierce Indian attacks." In September, Narvaez, "his ships being lost" and his forces still further greatly reduced in number, "hastily constructed a fleet of five boats"—referred to as horsehide boats—and embarked in these small, frail craft to explore the north coast of the Gulf of Mexico from the mouth of the Ochlockonee River and Apalachee Bay westward. The delta of the Mississippi was skirted (and not recognized as the mouth of a great river), and the fleet of boats was wrecked somewhere near the site of the present Galveston. Narvaez perished in the disaster. One report says that the boats were either wrecked on or lost off the coast of what is now Texas and that Narvaez lost his life when his boat was "blown out to sea" and swamped. It appears that Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, the second in command, and a very few of the men succeeded in getting ashore somewhere near the mouth of the Daycao (Trinity) River. De Vaca spent the next eight years (1528-1536) in leading one of the most amazing and dramatic overland expeditions in history. After traveling north of the Rio Grande for some time, the party crossed the river at about El Paso and Juarez ($31\frac{3}{4}^{\circ} N.$) and then worked west, swinging south until finally the Spanish settlement at Culiacan on the west coast of Mexico (about $24\frac{1}{2}^{\circ} N.$) was reached. Only four men—Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, two seamen, and a Negro—out of the original "proud host of six hundred men that left the Spanish Isle of Cuba" survived the ordeals of Indian fighting, starvation, shipwreck, and the long, hard and weary wanderings afoot. During a good part of the time that De Vaca was in command, he and his men were held in captivity by the Indians.

Inland, the Savannah and Alabama rivers and part of the Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Colorado basins were explored and the country searched for possible portable wealth during the period from the time of De Soto in 1538 to the end of the Beltran-Espejo expedition in 1582-1583. Before the end of the sixteenth century, Spaniards, in their search for wealth, had penetrated as far north as Quivira (around Great Bend on the Arkansas River, Kansas), reaching about $38\frac{1}{2}^{\circ} N.$, had explored the Grand Canyon, and had posts above where the Arkansas empties into the Mississippi River (Quizquiz, Quiguate, Casqui, Pacaha—the latter being in the northern part of the State of Mississippi). On the Pacific, Hernando de Alarcom in 1540 explored the Gulf of California from San Blas to its northernmost reach, where the Colorado River enters. Compostela, Mexico (about $21^{\circ} N.$), a little to the south of San Blas, is shown on maps of the period as the beginning or end of a principal land route that went all the way north to the Colorado River.

Hernando de Soto, one of the conquerors of Peru, chafing at finding no civilization with its gold and removable treasure among the Indians who inhabited the southeastern portion of North America, left his fleet of ships under the command of Diego Maldonado, set out northward overland, and died while hunting for portable wealth on the Mississippi in what is now southern Kentucky. Some of his men, after further explorations in southern Missouri (described as "the country of the wild cows"), eventually reached Mexico by "sailing down" the Mississippi River. It is said that the Spaniards, although inexperienced in shipbuilding, built and equipped "seven brigantines," which is apparently a false designation as far as the accepted term of Anglo-Saxon colonial days is concerned, and we read that they "twisted rope from bark," made sails from skins, forged nails and made anchors "from stirrups and the fet-

ters of the slaves." With horse meat for their principal food, they embarked downriver on July 3, 1543. They had to fight their way through "swarms of Indian canoes filled with archers," and the exhausted survivors reached "a little Spanish town near Tampico" about two months later.

In 1541, as a result of the concern of De Soto's wife (who was the daughter of Don Pedro Arias de Avila [Pedrarias Davila] and evidently in charge of the government of Cuba during her husband's absence), Captain Maldonado, after looking in vain for De Soto in the Gulf of Mexico, was dispatched to search the shore of the East Coast of North America, with orders to proceed as far north as the region of the "baccalaos," or codfish, which John Cabot had reported in great numbers off the shores of Newfoundland. Maldonado, it would seem, did a very thorough job of exploring the coast line from Florida to Maine (and possibly farther to the northeast) and searching all ocean inlets and river mouths looking for De Soto and his party, for Maldonado did not return to Cuba until 1543. However, there is no record of his voyage, which is of historic interest, as it was apparently the most thorough and also the last exploration made by the Spaniards of the coast of North America north of the Carolinas.

The only other Spanish exploration of the eastern shore of the North American continent seems to have been that made by Estevan Gomez, who was evidently sent out from Spain in late 1524 with orders to explore and map the American coast from the Arctic region down to the then well-known Florida. Gomez was one of the captains of the Ferdinand Magellan expedition, which had left Spain in September 1519 to find a southerly salt water route to the Spice Islands of the East Indies by sailing west. In command of the *San Antonio*, he was one of the three captains who mutinied at Puerto San Julian, and later, when in the Magellan Straits, he was the captain who basely deserted his commander, quietly stole away, and returned to Spain rather than continue to face with Magellan the rigors and hardships of the voyage. After reaching Seville, Gomez was rightly cast into prison for his perfidy and cowardice, but after spending nearly three years in confinement, he was ultimately released. It was said that Charles V listened to the petitions and pleading of Gomez and "gave him a caravel in which to test his obsession that there was a northern strait" to the Pacific Ocean. It is evident that the prime reason behind the Gomez voyage of 1525 was to see if a northwest water passage existed from the Atlantic to the Pacific that could be used without traveling as far from the equator as "the remote, bitterly cold and tempestuous latitude of the Southern Straits" (54°). It is strange that, on an exploration of this kind, Gomez should arrive at Newfoundland in mid-winter. Obviously he was not looking for any Arctic northwestern passage but for a water route "through the islands of America" in some moderate northern latitude where the climate was relatively temperate, and his instructions probably read between the point we now designate as Cabot Strait (the southerly entrance to the St. Lawrence) and Cape Hatteras in North Carolina.

On Diego Ribero's map of 1529, which was said to show the results of Gomez' explorations, the Gulf of Mexico, West Indies, and northern coast of South America are well plotted as to both latitude and longitude, but north of the well-known Florida the map is very inaccurate and shows that, whereas Gomez may have done his job sufficiently well to report to the Spaniards that there was no water passage to the Pacific through the Americas between Florida and the Arctic lands (described as Tierra del Labrador), as a geographer, plotter of maps, and recorder of positions he was most incompetent. Most of the country north of about 40° is marked on the Ribero map as Tierra del Estevan Gomez, so apparently the explorations of Gomez were highly esteemed by the Spaniards, even though there is no point—cape, river, or island—on the map plotted from his findings that can be identified today. The Spanish maps of North America made following the Gomez voyage bear a significant addendum, "They [the Spaniards] found no gold"; also, of course, they found no northwest passage. Historians tell us that in "a frugal attempt" to cover the expenses of the voyage, Gomez loaded up with

Indian slaves before he sailed back to Spain. Baldwin, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAS*, repeats a story told by early historians: "When he [Gomez] came to shore, he was asked what he had brought and replied esclavos (slaves). A by-stander understood him to say clavos (cloves) and rushed off to court the tidings that Gomez had returned from the Spice Islands. Gomez never lived it down."

The Spanish did no colonizing in North America north of Florida in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and did not explore the North American Atlantic Coast after the voyage of Diego Maldonado, who searched the eastern shore of the New World between Florida and Newfoundland in 1541-1543; nevertheless, they were always interested in what the English, French, and Dutch were doing in the northern part of the continent and at times seemed particularly concerned at the activities of the English. The Spanish apparently had a camouflaged secret service staff stationed in England in their employ, which either stole documents from loyal Englishmen or bought them from unscrupulous and less patriotic ones. Relatively recently, the only known plan of St. George's Fort and the Popham Colony on the Kennebec River was found in the official archives of Spain, and the only copy of a map of North America made in Virginia by a royal cartographer about 1610 was discovered with it. It has been said that these maps were acquired by the Spanish ambassador resident in London and sent by him, as secret documents, to the pious Catholic King Philip III of Spain. These maps were probably "stolen" or unscrupulously bought from the English, but the times were strange and Britain was far from being a united people. James I was king, and whereas the nation was supposed to be Protestant, James "carried water on both shoulders." It has been said that his "subservience to Catholic Spain was almost besotted" and that, while he married his daughter Elizabeth to a German Protestant, he sought to marry his son to a Spanish Catholic princess. Historians tell us that James was "befooled" by the Spanish ministers in England, so there is a possibility that the plans and maps prepared by and for Englishmen may have been given to the Spanish by James himself, who put peace above patriotism and honor, operated under his belief of the "divine right of kings," and by his craftiness and gross unfitness to occupy the English throne prepared the way for the English civil war, the rise to power of the Puritans and Roundheads, and the English commonwealth with the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, 1649-1660. During James's reign, England and Scotland were never truly united, although James was king of the Scots before he became king of the English. Roman Catholicism battled Protestantism; the Puritans, Dissenters, and nonconformists fought the Anglican, or established, church, which originally was a branch of the Catholic Church of Rome with the English king as pope; and a class and economic revolution was under way.

The Spaniards were unusually hardy hunters for gold, and as conquistadors they occupy a unique place in history, being the forerunners and prototypes, to no small degree, of the bloody and rapacious freebooters who ran wild in later years as the "pirates of the Spanish Main." The Spaniards, however, did not take well to colonizing; evidently they craved excitement and adventure too much and were too great gamblers to be satisfied with a return from agriculture and the development of a settlement through legitimate trade, not to mention arduous work. Several attempts were made by the Spaniards to colonize the southern part of the continent of North America, but the efforts lacked the enthusiasm, self-denial, and industry to make a self-supporting and prosperous settlement in a new world. Juan Ponce de Leon, in 1514, received a grant from the king of Spain to colonize "the island" of Florida, and he was appointed civil and military governor of what was intended to become "a beautiful, healthy and prosperous Spanish colony in the Indies." In 1521, when De Leon made an expedition to plant settlers on the peninsula, many of the men, both agriculturists and soldiers, "succumbed to disease," and many more were killed by the Indians, whom the Spaniards, from the first, treated as a low order of savages—to be enslaved or exterminated; De Leon himself was wounded in a fight with the Indians and was taken to Cuba to die. It is evident that, from the beginning, the Spaniards did not find Florida to be the imagined land of

perpetual youth and health. In 1559, Tristan de Luna sailed from Vera Cruz, landed somewhere in Santa Rosa (Pensacola Bay), and attempted to found a permanent Spanish colony; gradually the intended settlers abandoned their leader, refused to be subjected to discipline and orders to labor, and in 1561 De Luna gave up the venture in disgust. The Spanish centers of occupation that survived the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were primarily army posts, with many of them reinforced in scope and numbers of inhabitants through the zeal of the Roman Catholic Church and its battle against the Protestant movement then spreading over the world. (A large percentage of the population was made up of slaves—African Negroes and subjugated Indians.)

The Spanish exploration of the New World was conducted with amazing energy because of the frenzy and avaricious mania associated with the lure of gold and treasure. Referring to the relatively short time required by the Spaniards to explore and exploit most of the continent of America (from North Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and Upper California in the north to the Straits of Magellan in the far south), Baldwin, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAS*, says:

In less than the span of a single lifetime, the men of Spain had laid a continent at the feet of their sovereigns and placed on it a stamp that will never be erased. Beside the rapidity of the Spanish advance, the two and a half centuries that the Anglo-Americans took to go from Jamestown to the Golden

Gate were snail-paced. It was, as a thoughtful observer has commented, as though the English in the half century after John Cabot's voyage had explored the entire North American continent, founded all of its great cities, and discovered all its gold mines.

The big difference between the progress of the Anglo-Saxons and that of the Spaniards was, of course, due to the dissimilarity of climate, temperament, and zeal—religious and economic. Sir Walter Raleigh, who was an English version of the Spanish conquistador, quickly sensed the hopelessness of getting wealth out of the north with any measure of dispatch and turned his attention to the tropics and as close to the Spanish center of operations as he dared venture; hence his prime interest in El Dorado (the northern part of South America) and southern Virginia (the Carolinas). The severe climate of the north made even fishing and fur trading a seasonal affair; whereas in the territory of, say, thirty degrees of latitude on each side of the equator, the climate was kindly and permitted activities at maximum pressure without regard to the seasons of the year. Fish, furs, and timber were the bait pulling traders to the northern part of the New World, but in the central zone, discovered by Columbus, the lure was gold and treasure, and there is no doubt as to which magnet had the greater drawing power. Where the Spanish operated, the expeditions were supported and encouraged in every possible way by state, church, and the people; in England the cost and risk of exploration had to be borne by private individuals, and capital was greatly needed and sadly missed by enthusiasts of colonization such as Sir Ferdinando Gorges, Capt. John Smith, and others. The exploration, exploitation, and subjugation of the rich lands in and around the tropics proved to be a veritable gold rush by the Spanish analogous to the Gold Rush of the Anglo-Saxons (and others) to California and Australia in mid-nineteenth century, when "speed was king." The Anglo-Saxons proved that they could move fast and both settle and develop a tremendous territory on the Pacific side of North America and a whole new continent in the Southern Hemisphere when gold was the lure. Following the discovery of the rich isles of the Indies (West Indies) and the lands of the Spanish Main (Caribbean), Central and South America, Mexico, etc., the Spanish flocked to the Americas in force—conquistadors, hidalgos, and padres—with well-armed and armored soldiers, war horses and dogs, and all the implements of might backed by a great nation and a powerful church. Baldwin rightly says that the great age of the conquistadors passed with "the permanent settlement of the pampas," and he adds:

The methods the Spanish used were perhaps logical. Civilization seems always to march across rivers running red with blood and through valleys fetid

with the odor of decaying corpses of less advanced races. With the passing of the conquistadors, however, something went out of the men of Spain in

the New World—the spirit of adventure. For two centuries and a half, the Spanish colonies, except on certain frontiers, lay dormant. Waves of disaster broke over Spain in Europe and beat upon the shores of her American possessions. That the colonies were not overwhelmed was due to the occasional energy of the priests and soldiers who guarded their frontiers, to the old prestige which dazzled the eyes of

jealous powers and hid Spain's true weakness, and perhaps most of all to the rivalries among the nations that sought the Spanish colonial heritage. By the time the rivalry was settled and England had emerged triumphant, the Spanish colonies were in revolt, and it had become apparent that economic exploitation was possible without the assumption of political responsibilities.

It was not until the closing years of the seventeenth century that the Spanish attempted to extend their "settlements" in Florida beyond certain points on the east coast, but the activities of another Catholic nation, France, in the Mississippi territory (following La Salle's discoveries in 1679-1687) and jealousy of its Gulf of Mexico explorations caused the Spaniards to build a settlement (army post) at Pensacola in 1696. The French had dominated the country in the north back from the Anglo-Saxon colonies on the Atlantic coast. The Spaniards, for a century, monopolized explorations in the southwest of the North American continent, but at the close of the seventeenth century the French, following the Mississippi, had strong fort-protected settlements in what became French Louisiana.

In 1598, Juan de Onate, a Spaniard, working north from Mexico and Chihuahua, explored to Albuquerque and passed through El Paso; in 1601 he traveled east to the Arkansas River to a point somewhere around the present Hutchinson and Wichita, Kan., and after spending some time later at Santa Fe, San Gabriel, and environs (in what is now northern New Mexico), he journeyed west in 1604-1605 (in what is now Arizona) through Phoenix to Yuma, continuing to the head of the Gulf of Mexico. Spain issued a grant of territory named "New Mexico" to Onate as early as 1598, and it appears that the explorer, with hopes of finding gold, established Santa Fe as his capital in 1609. We are told that Onate was saddened and disgusted to find his province "poor in gold and valuable metals," but the New Mexican Indians quickly became converts of the Spanish padres, and it is said that by 1630 there were "fifty friars, twenty-five missions, and sixty thousand neophytes" in the territory. The Indians, while "accepting" Christianity, continued surreptitiously to worship their old gods. In 1680, after a medicine man had been whipped by a Spaniard for witchcraft, the Indians en masse rebelled at forced labor, exploitation, and the inhumanities received at the hands of the Christian white men, with the result that over four hundred Spaniards were massacred and those fortunate enough to escape the lightning attack of the Indians took refuge at El Paso.

Following Onate's journeys of 1598-1605, there were no other exploratory expeditions of note in what is now the middle and southwest United States for over a century, but the French developed trade routes by water throughout the Midwest to an amazing extent in the late seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century.

In 1775-1776, Anza Entrada, starting from San Miguel and the Sonora River in Pimeria Baja, Mexico, traveled north through Tucson, skirted the Gila River west to La Purisima Concepcion and Bicuner, near Yuma, then went north, reached the Pacific Coast near Ventura (San Buenaventura), and continued a trek following the coast line to Yerba Buena (San Francisco). The Escalante-Dominguez expedition covered a circuitous exploratory course west and north of Santa Fe and Albuquerque (July 1776-January 1777) and reached Great Salt Lake to the north, and what became known as the old Spanish Trail to Los Angeles, Calif., followed the Escalante-Dominguez route as far as the crossing of the Green River, then branched off west and to the southward through the Mojave Desert to the coast.

The British colonies on the North American continent followed the coast and did not penetrate inland beyond points reached by navigable rivers. The southern boundary was placed by the English at the parallel of 31° N. under the Carolina charter of 1663. (This strikes the coast at the present St. Andrews Sound—a little south of Brunswick and Jekyll Island—Georgia.) Two years later, by the charter of 1665, the southern border of Carolina

was set at the line of Lat. 29° N., which runs from the present New Smyrna (below Daytona Beach) to a point on the west coast of the Florida peninsula well south of Cedar Keys. However, this arbitrary setting of boundary lines by the English meant nothing, as the important Spanish settlements of St. Augustine on the east coast and Santa Cruz de Savacola and San Luis on the Ochlockonee and Apalachicola rivers, which flow into the northeast corner of the Gulf of Mexico, were located between the parallels of 29° and 31° and farther north on the Chattahoochee River (about $32\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$ N.) was the Spanish settlement at Savacola. The only British colony in America founded in the eighteenth century (or at any time following 1681) was Georgia in 1732, and the prime object was the strengthening of the British outposts on the Spanish Florida border. The Spanish ignored Britain's claims to what is now a good part of Georgia and Alabama and all of Florida, but placed a northern boundary line of the province named (Spanish) Florida running from Port Royal (Santa Elena) on the coast west and to the north of their settlement at Savacola and built a fort at the line on the Chattahoochee River in proximity to Coweta Town. This line and the claims of the Spanish to the territory so bounded were evidently maintained by the Spaniards for about a century.

By the Treaty of Paris in February 1763, Florida was ceded to England by the Spaniards in exchange for Havana. This gives an idea of how little the Spaniards really valued their foothold on the North American continent, for it was said that it had always paid them poor dividends and was more of an expense than a source of revenue. Concurrently, the occupation by France of territory east of the Mississippi terminated, and England formed the provinces of East Florida and West Florida. Under British rule (1763-1783), Florida prospered, a civil government replaced the Spanish (and French) military rule, and immigration began. During the War of the Revolution, Britain spent a lot of money improving conditions in Florida, and most of the new immigrants were influenced to be loyal to England in the fight of the thirteen American colonies for independence. In 1779 (during the war), Spain, having declared war on Britain, invaded Florida, and at the Treaty of Paris in 1783, which conceded the independence of the American colonies, Florida reverted to Spain. No religious liberty was promised the Anglo-Saxons, so most of them left Florida. A dispute between Spain and the United States over the northern boundary of Florida was settled by the Treaty of 1795, the line being established at Lat. 31° N.

What was known as "Louisiana" was transferred from France to Spain by a secret treaty of November 3, 1762, but formal transfer was not made until August 18, 1769. In 1794, Spain, hard pressed by Britain and France, recognized the Mississippi River as the western boundary of the United States, and free navigation of the river was granted to the citizens of the young republic. Spanish rule in Louisiana, which had not been virile and effective, terminated by the retrocession of the territory to France in 1800; but Napoleon, fearing an attack upon it by Britain, offered the entire territory of "Louisiana" (including a large area of the west central section of North America, to which France held explorers' title) to the United States in 1803. On December 20, 1803, at New Orleans, the United States took possession of the lower part of the province and on March 9, 1804, at St. Louis, of the upper. This business deal is known as the "Louisiana Purchase," and it covered a territory of about a million square miles (about five times the size of France itself) and doubled the area of the United States, while giving it not only ownership of the Mississippi but also control of all the great river system of central North America. The price paid of \$11,250,000 outright plus \$3,750,000 for the claims of American citizens against France—a total of \$15,000,000—represented only about three cents per acre. Even with interest payments incidental to the final settlement, the young republic being unable to pay promptly in cash, the total cost eventually (\$27,267,622) was only around four and a quarter cents per acre. At the time of purchase, the entire area was estimated to have a population of about 80,000 people.

In 1812, Congress annexed to the Mississippi territory the Mobile district of West Florida, claiming that it was included in the Louisiana Purchase; in 1813 the area was occupied by

United States forces, and the Spanish commandant did not offer any resistance. (The eastern portion of this acquisition, including Mobile, became part of Alabama.) By the Treaty of 1819, Spain formally ceded East and West Florida to the United States. The treaty was ratified in 1821, following which the United States took formal possession. At this time, the territory of the United States embraced the present coast line from Passamaquoddy Bay (separating Maine from Canada) to the State of Texas on the Gulf of Mexico, and the western border ran from northern Texas to the northern boundary of today—about the present Glacier National Park in Montana. It was 1853 before the United States reached its present territorial area (excepting Alaska, which was annexed in 1867). The northwestern boundary was settled by treaties with Britain in 1842 and 1846, and the Rio Grande was made the southern boundary in 1848. In that year, following a war with Mexico, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceded California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and parts of other Mountain States to the United States by the payment of \$15,000,000 to Mexico and the assumption of some \$3,000,000 of debts due by Mexico to American citizens. The acquisition of territory was completed in 1853 by the Gadsden Purchase from Mexico of certain lands (now part of New Mexico and Arizona) south of the Gila River; the area acquired was 45,535 square miles, and in a deal with many provisions the consideration paid Mexico by the United States was \$10,000,000.

The acquisition of California by the United States in 1848 was most fortuitous and had a pronounced effect on the history of merchant sail, the trade on the Seven Seas, and the development of civilization. In 1542-1543, Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo and his successor, Barthome Ferrelo, are said to have explored the coast as far north as Cape Sebastian, Oregon. In 1579, Sir Francis Drake sailed up the coast, repaired his ships in Drake's Bay, and named the land New Albion. In 1602-1603, Sebastian Vizcaino explored the coast and discovered Monterey Bay. California was difficult to reach by either land or water, and the Spaniards were interested in trade between Acapulco, Mexico, and the Philippines. Although a little was known about Baja California, or the long peninsula stretching south from the present United States border, the land that is the west coast of North America was generally supposed, for some two centuries after its discovery, to be an island or a group of islands. Spain became interested in the California coast following the Russian explorations in Alaska during 1745-1765 and the trend of the Russians southward. San Diego was occupied by the Spanish in 1769 and Monterey in 1770, these moves, it was said, being "because of the foreign [Russian] danger" and also "the long-felt need of a refitting station [on the California coast] for the galleons from Manila." Until 1841, the Russians occupied Fort Ross and a trading post on Bodega Bay only a short distance north of San Francisco.

The entire California coast (upper and lower) is unique in the fact that for a long term of years it was exploited primarily by missionaries. The Jesuits, who were identified with the French occupation of Canada and the Middle West, reached the peninsula of California in 1697, and they remained until 1768, when they were expelled by order of Charles III of Spain. Their property was turned over to the Franciscans, who also had gone north with the expeditions of the Spaniards to establish fortified bases in Upper California. In 1772 the Franciscans abandoned Lower California to the Dominicans and trekked north to join their brethren at the new army posts and settlements at San Diego and Monterey. The mission period of California history was under way. Between 1769 and 1823, twenty-one "missions," in all, were established. In an economic sense, the missions were "the blood and life of the provinces." The native Indian neophytes did all the work, were virtual slaves, received no education, and, it has been said, "were trained into a fatal dependence, so that once coercion was removed, they relapsed at once into barbarism." Religion was used to dominate the lives of the natives and compel them to work, and the Spanish priests were successful in making slave labor out of Indians where Spanish militarism had failed. The missions did a vast amount of trade and much toward paying the expenses of the government as well as

enriching the church. The government of the province of Upper California was in the hands of an army officer stationed at Monterey.

Outside of exploring the coast line of the Gulf of Mexico (Narvaez, 1528; Moscoso, 1542-1543) and the Gulf of California (De Alarcon, 1540) in small boats and sailing around most of the coast of Florida, Spanish explorations of the North American continent (including Mexico) had been land expeditions searching for gold and portable wealth. Commencing with the St. Lawrence, French expeditions—also in small boats—had been by water, and the object was trading in furs. The Spanish explored and developed, more or less, great overland trails; the French discovered rivers and used them as water highways and went tremendous distances with a minimum amount of portage. In settling the California coast, the Spanish followed their practice of traveling by land. Missions were built—about a day's journey apart—on the trail from San Diego to Yerba Buena, where the Mission of San Francisco de Asis was built, from which the city of San Francisco later received its name. Most of the present cities in this part of the state are named after missions, which, in turn, bore the names of saints of the Roman Catholic Church. Water transportation up and down the coast was not used in the colonizing of California as it was on the eastern seaboard, where it had been employed exclusively for a long term of years in the early days and was continued for economic reasons after good land roads were built. The result is that the Pacific Coast of North and Central America (although it was discovered by Balboa in 1513 and the Gulf of California explored by De Alarcon in 1540) has no shipbuilding history prior to well on into the nineteenth century. So long as the Spaniards and Mexicans owned and dominated the country, there was practically no coastwise shipping of any kind.

In 1822, Upper California gave its allegiance to Mexico. Overland immigration from the United States began about 1840. In 1846, Commodore John Drake Sloat, U.S.N., sailed from Mazatlan, Mexico, and on July 7, while the United States was at war with Mexico, raised the Stars and Stripes over Monterey and proclaimed California a part of the United States. Fear that either Russia or England might obtain California and thus threaten Mexico caused Spain to occupy California in 1769. After the revolution against Spain broke out in Mexico in 1811, California, having affirmed its loyalty to Spain for eleven years, was somewhat forced against its will in 1822 to give allegiance to Mexico. Distrust of the British, Mexicans, and Russians as well as the natural demands of expansion and an appreciation of the possibilities in national development from the ownership of the Pacific coast, with its ports and shipping facilities, caused the United States to act and take possession of the territory in 1846.

It is fortunate that gold was not discovered in California until after the American occupation and the Oregon and Mexican cessions of 1846 and 1848, but "gold made California." It was responsible for an unprecedented rush of settlers, who quickly put the stamp of certainty on its connection with the United States, and was the greatest single factor in history contributing not only to the development of the American mercantile marine but also to improvements in the type, size, and quality of merchant sail the world over. The Gold Rush to California and the era when "speed was king" gave birth to the real clipper ship—an American production that revolutionized merchant sail and made the United States the acknowledged world leader in the building and operation of merchant ships from the period of the discovery of gold in California to the destructive years of the Civil War (1861-1865).

*New England during the First Half Century of
Colonization—Fish, Ships, and Trading*

In the 1620's, the Pilgrims and Puritans of Massachusetts, in both the "Old" and "New" colonies, were primarily interested as far as shipbuilding was concerned in constructing vessels for the fisheries (which meant food for themselves), for local trading and transport, and for communication and trading with other settlements of Europeans and with the Indians, who at certain points could be bartered with to advantage. By 1640 the need of bigger ships became evident. The colonists had fish and some products of the forest to sell, which the merchants of Barbados, Jamaica, Antigua, and other islands of the West Indies wanted to buy and pay for with items very acceptable to the colonists. The English were monopolizing the transatlantic trade, but the colonists saw a chance for broader and more profitable markets for their products and the obtaining of a greater variety of desirable food in exchange. A crisis came to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641-1642 because of political conditions in the British Isles: the revolt of Scotland and Ireland; the "Long Parliament" in England, which met on November 3, 1640; the conflict between King Charles I (1600-1649), the second of the Stuart kings (who had ascended the throne in 1625 when in his twenty-fifth year), and the House of Commons, which resulted in the king's raising his standard at Nottingham on August 22, 1642, civil war, the execution of the king at Whitehall January 30, 1649, the rise to power of Oliver Cromwell, the abolition of the monarchy (and the House of Lords), and the proclamation in 1649 of a commonwealth that lasted with vigor until the death of Cromwell—the lord protector of England—on September 3, 1658, and soon afterwards fell, with an invitation being given to King Charles II to take the crown and his entering London on May 29, 1660. From early in the forties, the civil war and turmoil in England—political, religious, and economic—cut down to practically nothing the westward flow of emigration and goods and caused a pronounced shortage of floating tonnage to handle the exports from the American colonies. Governor Winthrop had been aware for some time of the weak economic position of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and in writing to an English associate in 1641 of the conditions being experienced and what seemed to him to be a solution of the problem, or at least a practical way out of the difficulties, he said: "All foreign commodities grow scarce . . . and our own crop of no price. Corn would buy nothing and a cow which last year cost 20 pounds might now be bought for 4 or 5 pounds. . . . These straits set our people on work to provide fish, clapboards, plank &c. . . . and to look to the West Indies for a trade."

It would seem that the civil war in England, so distressing to the colonists, was "a blessing in disguise" as far as the future economic life of New England was concerned, for it forced them in Massachusetts to turn from agriculture to the sea and the forests and to build, own, and operate their own ships. Indeed, the English civil war and the resulting depression of 1641 in the colonies really made Massachusetts a maritime province. The Puritans took to the sea in the early forties—not from choice but from necessity. Morison, writing of this period of "how maritime Massachusetts came to be" through the development of foreign trade, with its own ships, captains, and markets, says:

The gravelly, boulder-strewn soil was back-breaking to clear, and afforded small increase to unscientific farmers. No staple of ready sale in England, like Virginia tobacco or Canadian beaver, could be produced or readily obtained. Forest, farms and sea yielded lumber, beef and fish. But England was supplied with these from the Baltic and by her own farmers and fishermen. Unless a new market be found for them, Massachusetts must stew in her own

juice. It was found in the West Indies—tropical islands which applied slave labor to exotic staples like sugar cane, but imported every necessity of life. More and more they became dependent on New England for lumber, provisions and dried fish. More and more the New England ships and merchants who brought these necessities controlled the distribution of West India products.

Fishing had continued from early days in some of the villages of the colony, and many settlements were populated by fishermen emigrating from England. Gloucester survived an early setback. As Samuel Eliot Morison writes: "Dorchester, the first community 'that set upon the trade of fishing in the bay,' was little more than a transference to New England soil of Dorset fishing interests. Scituate was settled by a similar company. The rocky peninsula of Marblehead . . . attracted fisher-folk from Cornwall and the Channel Islands. . . . Marblehead obeyed or not the laws of the Great and General Court, as suited her good pleasure; but as long as she 'made fish,' the Puritan magistrates did not interfere. Literally true was the Marblehead fisherman's reproof to an exhorting preacher: 'Our ancestors came not here for religion. Their main end was to catch fish!'" Marblehead was consistent in its attitude and single in its interests and activities, for in 1669, when protesting an export tax, it affirmed, "Fish is the only great stapple which the Country produceth for forraine parts and is so benefitall for making returns for what wee need." Undoubtedly, it was fishing and shipping that brought prosperity to Massachusetts Bay just as it was forest products and shipping that developed the State of Maine (once part of Massachusetts). Fishing or logging (and lumbering) alone brought but little wealth, and it was control and ownership of the means of distribution, in conjunction with production and the shipping to market of one's own product, that brought prosperity. We have been told that "Puritan Massachusetts derived her ideals from a sacred book; her wealth and power from the sacred cod." Morison quotes this saying and in regard to the fishing industry writes:

The firm-fleshed codfish of northern waters is unsurpassed for salting and drying. Colonial Massachusetts packed three grades. Dun fish, the best, was "made" by alternately burying and drying the larger-sized cod until it mellowed sufficiently for the taste of Catholic Europe. Portugal and Spain, where Captain John Smith sold his first fare, Southern France and the "Western" and "Wine" Islands, were the markets for dun fish; and for barrel- and pipe-staves as well. In exchange, Cadiz salt, Madeira and Canary wine; Bilbao iron and pieces of eight; Malaga

grapes and Valencia oranges were carried to English and colonial markets. When Charles II began tightening up colonial trade, Sir George Downing, of Harvard's first graduating class, saw to it that this Mediterranean traffic was allowed to continue. The middling grade of dried codfish, easy to transport, to keep, and to prepare, was a favorite winter food of colonial farmers. The lowest-grade dried fish, together with pickled mackerel, bass, and alewives, was the principal medium in West-India trade.

Gov. John Winthrop had an able lieutenant in the building of a colonial merchant marine in the Rev. Hugh Peters, a famous Puritan divine. Born in England in 1598, Peters was graduated at Cambridge in 1622. Trouble with the ecclesiastical authorities in England forced him to flee the country. He sought refuge in Holland and served an English congregation in Rotterdam until 1634, when he emigrated to New England and was made pastor of the Puritans at Salem. Peters made the Salem colonists fish- and trade-minded and preached fish, ships, and trading for prosperity, with the building and operating of their own ships. Such progress was made in fishing, trading, and shipbuilding that Peters saw Richard Hollingsworth launch at Salem, in June 1641, "a large ship of 300 tons"—a veritable monster of a vessel for the times and place. Hume says that, toward the close of the sixteenth century, only 217 of the 1,232 vessels owned in Britain were of over eighty tons burden and that there were not five which exceeded two hundred tons. Peters undoubtedly did much fundamentally to give Salem its characteristic impress as a famous source of maritime adventure and more than this, for Governor Winthrop wrote:

The general fear of want of foreign commodities, now our money was gone and that things were like to go well in England, set us on work to provide shipping of our own for which end Mr. Peters, being a man of very public spirit and singular activity for

all occasions, procured some to join for building a ship at Salem of 300 tons, and the inhabitants of Boston, stirred up by his example, set upon the building of another at Boston of 150 tons.

This Boston-built ship, we are told, was the *Trial*. Her tonnage is stated as 160 and also as 200 tons, and she was built for and steadily employed in the foreign trade. We are told that in 1641 two other vessels were building at Salem besides the "large ship" men-

tioned by Governor Winthrop and that in 1642 five more ships were launched—"three at Boston, one at Dorchester, and one at Salem." These vessels were primarily general traders rather than fishermen, and they were used successfully in barter trade with "Virginia on the southern coast" of the continent and with the islands of the West Indies. History tells us that William Stevens and other shipwrights built "a good ship at Gloucester in 1643," and the same builder was constructing vessels there eighteen years later, for the records show that in 1661 he built "one new ship 68 foot long by ye keele and 23 foot broad from outside to outside and 9½ foot in hold under ye beam." In 1644 a 200-ton ship was constructed at Boston and one of 250 tons at Charlestown. Andrews says that in 1645 the *Seaforth* of 400 gross tons was built at Massachusetts Bay, and we are also told that on October 17, 1646, a ship of 300 tons was launched at Boston.

Hugh Peters, in the meanwhile, had proved himself to be "a master of diplomacy." He had successfully negotiated a settlement with the Dutch of New Amsterdam over border disputes with Connecticut, and when the civil war began in England, he was sent by the colonists to Britain as their ambassador. Being an ardent Puritan, he joined the hosts of Cromwell and became Cromwell's private secretary. He was appointed chaplain to the Council of State in 1650, preached at Whitehall continually during the protectorate, and gained much influence. For his zeal, Peters was arrested soon after the Restoration and was specially exempted from the Act of Indemnity; he was accused of abetting the execution of Charles I. Peters' trial "was a scene of flagrant injustice," and he was condemned and executed (hanged and quartered) at Charing Cross, London, on October 16, 1660.

For several years, with the view of taking advantage of the great forest resources of New England (which permitted the building of ships so much more cheaply than was possible in the mother country), the emigration of shipwrights to America was encouraged by the Massachusetts colonies. Special privileges were granted them, such as exemption from the duty of military training, the gift of shipbuilding and home sites, the right to cut timber almost anywhere without molestation, and no assessment for taxes on property, real and personal, that was actually used in the building of ships. Such inducements resulted in bringing many good shipwrights to the New England colonies, and capable carpenters located in the early days not only at Boston, Salem, and Plymouth but also at Scituate and other coast towns and constructed such vessels as were demanded by the times.

The Massachusetts Great and General Court on October 7, 1641, passed a law to regulate shipyards "on the Mistick River" and at "Meadford" and "prevent shams in shipbuilding," and in the enforcement of the enactment the court insisted that nothing should be "defective or amiss in any materials or workmanship." The law read:

Whereas the country is now in hand with the building of ships, which is a business of great importance for the common good, & therefore sutable care is to bee taken that it bee well performed, according to the commendable course of England & other places; it is therefore ordered that, when any ship is to bee built within this jurisdiction, it shalbee lawfull for the owners to appoint & put in some able man to survey the worke & workmen from time to time, as is usual in England; & the same shall have liberty & power as belongs to his office, & if the ship-carpenter shall not, upon his advice, reforme & amende any thing which hee shall find to bee amisse, then, upon complaint to the Governor, or Deputy, or any other 2 magistrates, they

shall appoint 2 of the most sufficient ship carpenters of this jurisdiction, & shall give them authority from time to time (as neede shall require) to take view of every such ship, & all worke thereto belonging, & to see it bee performed & carried on according to the rules of their arte; & for this end an oath shalbee administered to them, to bee faithfull & indifferent between the owners & workmen; & their charges to bee borne by such as shalbee found in default; & these viewers shall have power to cause any bad timbers, or other insufficient worke or materialls, to bee taken out & amended, & all that they shall judge to bee amisse to bee reformed at the charge of them through whose fault it growes.

Regulatory decrees affecting industry were evidently promulgated early in Massachusetts, but there is no record as to who was delegated for this singular supervisory duty in the shipyards of "Meadford" or how the carpenters liked it.

The same court, two years previously (1639), had exempted ship carpenters and fisher-

men from compulsory military training during the fishing season. On May 29, 1644, the General Court proposed the formation of a company of shipbuilders "with powers to regulate the building of ships and to make such orders and laws amongst themselves as may conduce to the public good." The practice of government supervision of shipbuilders was evidently made effective and continued in the colony, for we read among the legislative acts of forty-seven years later (1686): "Whereas in the several counties & seaport towns there have been appointed meet persons for the surveying of ships (either which are building or defective) & damnified goods; it is hereby declared that the said persons are continued in that service, & for their satisfaction shall receive, each of them, from the employers, four shillings for every survey made & returned under their hands."

The author of *NEW ENGLAND'S FIRST FRUITS*, writing from Boston September 26, 1642, said: "Besides many boats, shallops, hoys, lighters, pinnaces, we are in the way of building ships of an 100, 200, 300, 400 tons. Five of them are already at sea, many more in hand at this present, we being much encouraged herein by reason of the plenty and excellence of our timber for that purpose and seeing all the materials will be had there in a short time." It would seem that most of the big ships were sold abroad. The communication between settlements on the coast, the movement of colonists, and the barter exchange of products led to the building of shallops and various small craft; the need of firewood and forest products in the Boston Bay area brought about the building of beamy sloops for that trade. Both fishing craft and "wood sloops" were soon being built all along what is now known as the New England coast.

In Lechford's *NEWS FROM NEW ENGLAND*, published in London in 1642, it is said that the people of the provinces were building ships and had "a good store of barkes, catches, lighters, shallops and other vessels." During the last half of the seventeenth century, tradition tells us, New England "built many ships for merchants in the West Indies," and in 1665 the number of vessels owned in Massachusetts Bay—and built in the colony—was mentioned by a committee of the General Court as "about eighty from 20 to 40 tons, about forty from 40 to 100 tons, and about a dozen ships above 100 tons."

A map of Massachusetts Bay as of 1642 shows Haverhill as a settlement on the Merrimac River, Salisbury slightly to the north, and Newbury (shown as Wessacucon) to the south but both near the mouth and definitely in the Merrimac River area. Ipswich (then named Agawam), on the small Ipswich River, is also located as a settlement a little farther to the south but north of Cape Ann peninsula, and Rowley is shown between Agawam and Wessacucon. Hampton (then known as Winicowett) is plotted about eight miles north of the Merrimac River and is the farthest north of the Massachusetts Bay settlements, being over the boundary line of the present State of Massachusetts and in New Hampshire. It is significant that in 1642 the Massachusetts Bay Colony had spread and settlements had been planted so far from Boston (Shawmut) and Massachusetts Bay. The map also shows Gloucester on the south side of Cape Ann; Naumkeag (Salem), Marblehead, Saugus (Lynn), Medford, and Winnisimmet across the Mystic River from Charlestown; Newtown (Cambridge), Watertown, and Dedham on the Charles River; Concord and Sudbury about seventeen miles inland from Boston to the west; Roxbury and Dorchester close at hand near the Shawmut Neck; Braintree on the Fore River; Wessagusset (Weymouth) and Barecove (Hingham) between Natascot (Nantasket) and the Fore River; and the boundary line running from Cohasset on the coast inland west by south as agreed upon by the Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonies in 1640.

Many of the settlements in the Greater Boston area encouraged shipbuilding. Willoughby had a yard in Charlestown on the site of the later Fitchburg railroad depot, and in 1641 the town, to encourage the enterprise of shipbuilding in the community, gave Willoughby permission and full liberty "to take timber from the common . . . without being bound to cut the tops of the trees." In 1659, Edward Gaskill and William Jeggles, in 1664, Eleazer Gedney, and in 1669, Jonathan Pickering were granted privileges in the Boston area with respect to the location of shipyards and the use of the water front, the only restrictions evidently being that they should not "incommode the highway, nor hinder cattle from coming to the salt

water." On March 23, 1677, the above-mentioned Jonathan Pickering had granted to him "a convenient parcell of land about Hardie's cove for himself and heirs forever to build vessels upon and ye selectmen are appointed and empowered to lay out ye same and this to be full satisfaction for ye prejudice done him." Johnson, in his *WONDER-WORKING PROVIDENCE*, refers to the "good timber for shipping" to be found in Gloucester and to several vessels that had been built in that town. He also mentions "a very sufficient builder," evidently William Stevens, who constructed ships at Gloucester during the period 1640-1665. A town regulation of Gloucester introduced the element of taxation and declared: "All ship carpenters that build vessels of greater or less burthen shall pay into the town, before the launching of any vessel, one shilling a ton unto such as the townsmen shall appoint; or pay as a delinquent of town order, ten pence a tree. Neither shall they be permitted to import or transport board, planks, clapboards, boates, hoop-staves, firewood or any timber, more than other men, but only in building vessels in the town." There is a record of a contract dated June 1661 in which William Stevens, the shipwright of Gloucester, agreed "with John Brown, for himself, and Nicholas and John Balbach, of Jarsay, to build 1 new ship . . . the said Stevens to be paid the sum of £3, 5s. for every tunn of the said ship's burthen." For a part of his pay, Stevens agreed to accept "£150 in Muscovadoes sugar at 2d. by the pound at Barbados."

Early Shipbuilding and Shipping at the Piscataqua

What is now the State of New Hampshire, with only a scant eighteen miles of ocean frontage, achieved some fame for shipbuilding because of the Piscataqua River (which divides the state from Maine) and the deep-water port of Portsmouth at the river mouth, which is never icebound in the winter. While Portsmouth is the only harbor on the New Hampshire coast for large vessels, other waters in the vicinity, such as Little Harbor and Sagamore Creek, saw considerable marine activity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when ships were small, and the Piscataqua River system has about a hundred miles of inland shore washed by salt water with a great rise and fall of ocean tides—some seven to ten feet and, at times, even more. The Piscataqua towns of South Berwick, Dover, Durham, Newmarket, and Exeter, fifteen to twenty-five miles up from the sea, were not only shipbuilding centers but also, in a sense, ports in colonial days, during the early years of the young republic, and throughout most of the first half of the nineteenth century.

William Hubbard wrote in 1680: "The Piscataqua is a river of noat which has been frequented ever since the country was first planted by such as came this way for trafficke with the inhabitants . . . that have seated themselves in several plantations upon the uppermost branches thereof. The channel is very swift and spacious, fit for vessels of great burden for the space of nearly twenty miles, where it divides itself into many considerable bays and small branches." We read from Jeremy Belknap, "Between the upper end of Great-Island and the town of Portsmouth is a broad, deep, still water called 'the Pool,' where the largest ships may lie very conveniently and securely." This, he says, was the usual station of the ships engaged in the masting trade with England during colonial days, "of which seven have been loading at one time." The tidal current floods up the river for about five hours while, because of the fresh water run-off of the Piscataqua and its many tributaries, the duration of the ebb is about seven hours. As there is practically no slack water between tides and the average current runs at about four knots (spring ebb as high as six knots), the river is prevented from freezing over even in the most severe winters; this fact greatly adds to the value of the lower Piscataqua as a port and location for the building of ships.

In 1603, Martin Pring in the *Speedwell* (a ship of 50 tons) and William Brown in the *Discoverer* (a bark of 20 tons) were fitted out for an eight-month voyage and dispatched by some of the "chiefest merchants and other gentlemen in the west of England for the farther discoverie of the north part of Virginia." After making a landfall somewhere to the eastward, Pring worked westward along the coast until he found the Piscataqua, "which we rowed up ten or twelve miles," and "beheld very many goodly groves and woods replenished with tall oakes, beeches, pine-trees, firre-trees, hasels, and maples." In 1605, Samuel de Champlain "discovered" the Isles of Shoals (about seven miles off the coast and the mouth of the Piscataqua) and sailed along the New Hampshire shore. In 1614, Capt. John Smith, who in his "Description of New England" referred to the convenient harbor at the mouth of the Piscataqua, praised the country back from the rocky shore and was impressed with the plentiful supply of timber and the prevalence of every variety of fish.

Under the leadership of Sir Ferdinando Gorges, the Council for New England was formed in 1620. It procured from King James I a grant of much territory, which included the present states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, etc. In 1623, three years after the landing of the Pilgrims and the founding of a settlement at Plymouth, Mass., David Thomson and others landed on the New Hampshire coast at Pannaway (south of Little Harbor and now in the town of Rye), erected salt works, and established a fishing station. Thomson was the head of a company that was organized for fishing and trading, and one proviso of the incorporators was that the entire stock of the company was to be held jointly by the original investors for a term of five years. Thomson promptly built a sizable house on Odiorne's Point overlooking Little Harbor, but it appears that he personally moved to "an island in Boston Harbor in 1626," although he evidently still continued to supervise the work and business of the settlement until 1628 or later.

A grant for the colony designated as New Hampshire, which embraced all the country between the Merrimac and Piscataqua rivers, was given to John Mason (a colleague of Sir Ferdinando Gorges) on November 7, 1629. On November 17, or ten days later, the Laconia Company received its first grant of land, and early in 1630 it sent colonists over to settle. We are told that these Laconia Company emigrants occupied the Thomson house on the shore and later built "Mason Hall," or the "Great House," on the west bank of the Piscataqua beside the protected waters of the bay in what is now Portsmouth. One fact with respect to the plans and activities of the Laconia Company is worthy of note, for it was stated that its prime interest was in establishing an extensive fur trade with the Indians. The proprietors of the company believed that the Piscataqua River had its source in or near Lake Champlain and, therefore, was ideally suited for tapping a great fur country inland, with a much shorter water route to and from the ocean than by "the Great River" (St. Lawrence) that the French were exploiting.

There were settlers between the time of Thomson in 1623 and the Laconia Company in 1630, for in a grant to Edward Hilton in 1630 it is stated that Hilton had already "built houses and planted." The settlement of Hilton and his colleagues was then known as Dover and was up the river and on the north point of the big harbor at the bay. Some historians say that Edward and William Hilton, members of the Aristocratic Fishmongers Guild of London, with their friends or followers, arrived at the Piscataqua in the ship *Providence and Plymouth* about the same time or very shortly after David Thomson landed at Little Harbor. It is said that they settled at Pomeroy's Cove, near the tip of Dover Point, and "engaged in the fisheries." Fishermen settled around the Piscataqua as early as 1623, and they evidently had a competent shipwright associated with them, who schooled them in the building of "great shallops" in addition to smaller craft. The shallops were at first open boats fitted with several pairs of oars as well as a mast and lug sail; later, they were decked over. Adams says that in 1631 Edward Godfrie was in charge of the fisheries at Pannaway and "had under his direction six great shallops, five fishing boats with sails, anchors and cables, and thirteen skiffs."

In 1638, John Wheelwright, an Antinomian leader who had been banished from the

Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay, founded a settlement at Exeter on land which, it is said, was bought from the Indians. Puritans crossed the Merrimac and settled at Hampton notwithstanding the geographical limit to the north clearly specified in their charter, and as Anglicans had located at Strawberry Banke (Portsmouth), there was a conflict of three religions in three settlements forming points of a triangle in the area that was New Hampshire and clearly beyond the boundary of the colony of Massachusetts Bay. Nevertheless, the militant, "religious" Puritans sought to control the territory by stretching their northern boundary line. It was not until 1679 that the controversy supposedly ended with the crown's constituting, or reaffirming, New Hampshire as a separate province and outside the jurisdiction of Massachusetts and its aggressive Puritans. However, bitter boundary disputes between the colonies continued until the English king in 1741 settled by decree the southern border of New Hampshire.

At Dover Point, where the Hiltons had established a settlement primarily interested in the fisheries, vessels were built during the thirties and forties of the seventeenth century, and just prior to mid-century a small "friggot" was launched to protect the Piscataqua fishermen and traders from pirates who, following the example of Dixy Bull, of London, were active off the coast. Records show that in the 1650's Robert Cutts was building deep-sea fishing boats in what is now known as Kittery, Maine, and that his son succeeded him and kept the yard busy. Samuel Winkley was building at Kittery about the same time; also John Diamond, William Tytherly, and Peter Dixon. The Winkley yard was operated by the family for three generations.

It is said that several English shipwrights settled early at Dover, as they were attracted by the timber. Among them were John Hall, John Heard, Hatevil Nutter, and Richard Waldern. William Henderson and his son Howard built ships not only for the coastal trade but also for transatlantic service; some of them traded regularly with Barbados, and others went to Africa for slaves. In 1678, Isaac Waldron, of Boston, sued William Henderson for his failure to complete work on the *Primrose*, a ship of 127 tons; the courts upheld the Dover shipwright.

John Wheelwright, whose doctrinal ideas were obnoxious to the stiff-necked Puritans, was expelled from the colony of Massachusetts Bay. He founded Exeter in 1638, and although he was referred to as a preacher and a reverend, he must have encouraged industry as well as agriculture in his settlement, as the use of good timber, growing in the vicinity, for the building of ships was advocated at an early date. In spite of the fact that Exeter was six miles up the little (Exeter) river from the great bay of the Piscataqua and on shallow and cramped inland waters about twelve miles south of Dover Point, there is a record that Edward Gilman, Jr., had a 50-ton vessel on the stocks at his Exeter shipyard in 1651.

Around the middle of the seventeenth century, the Hunking, Seaward, and Jackson families were building ships at established yards in Portsmouth. John Bray, an American pioneer in shipbuilding, was constructing sizable vessels—for the period—at Kittery as early as 1660, and it is said that he built "in front of the Pepperrell mansion." He continued for many years turning out good deep-sea ships and steadily growing in importance and wealth. His daughter Margery married Col. William Pepperrell, who, following years engaged in Isles of Shoals fisheries, moved in 1680 to Kittery and became the Piscataqua's leading merchant and influential citizen. (He was master of "the good briggenteen" *William and Andrew* and the father of Col. Sir William Pepperrell, famous as the commander of the Louisburg expedition in 1745.) William Pepperrell (later spelled Pepperell) amassed a sizable fortune constructing and operating ships, financed largely with money brought to him by his marriage to Margery Bray. John Bray was esteemed so highly as a solid, wealthy citizen that when Pepperrell finally succeeded, after a period of probation, in getting the father's consent to the marriage, it was generally thought that "the Isles of Shoals fisherman" had done "well by himself."

One of the earliest recorded contracts for the building of an American vessel is the following taken from York (Maine) Deeds (Book III, Folio 23):

Articles of agreement between Capt. John Davess, & John Penwill, with Mr. John Bray:

Know all whom It may Concerne, that ye sayd John Davess & John Penwill haue fully bargained & agreed with Mr John Braye shipe wright, for ye erecting & building of a vessell burthen Eighty Tunns upwards, not under, & the Dementions as followeth, to say fuety foote by keyle, & by beame seaventeen foote, & in howle nine foote. And for the Tunns that the sayd vessell amonts unto, the

sayd Davess & Penwill to pay ye sayd Bray Three pounds fiae shillings per Tunns..... The sd Bray is to allow unto Davess & Penwill foure pounds for Tarr & Ocum/ The sayd vessell to haue Two Decks & to bee in proportion to Mr Robert Elliotts vessell (Joyners worke excepted). But ye sayd Bray to fitt the sayd vessell with Masts, yards, Boate, all to a Cleate.

Signed January 29, 1673

We are told that in 1665 there were "above twenty sawmills" on the Piscataqua; that the business of the settlement was in "timber and its products, fisheries, and ships." Including the Isles of Shoals, "fifteen hundred men were employed in the cod and mackerel fisheries alone." In 1671, Robert T. Mason reported the Piscataqua yearly export trade as "20,000 tonns of deales and pipe staves, 10,000 quintalls of fish, 10 shiploads of masts [for the Royal Navy], and severall thousand of beaver and other skins." The stated annual imports were primarily "2,000 tonns of salt" and "300 tonns of wine and brandy." At about this time, Edward Randolph, collector of customs, reported to the government that the district was "well stored with able masters, marriners, fishermen, and good carpenters; they build yearly severall ships of good burthen besides ketches and barks." Mention is also made of orders received by Piscataqua master shipwrights to build ships for English merchants and of the large export of masts and ship timbers to England and of pipe staves and timber (and its products) of all sorts "from hence to Barbados and other parts of the Carib. Islands."

The Earl of Bellomont wrote, "If ever England should think it a good point of husbandry to build ships of war cheap, Piscataway will be the properest place for it." It was said that the Piscataqua section of New England would grow rich and strong if, in addition to the exporting of mastings, "she were put upon the building of great ships for H.M. Navy." The suggestion bore fruit to a limited degree, for the British Government ordered two vessels to be built at Portsmouth for the Royal Navy. The first, constructed in 1690, was the *Falkland* of 54 guns, and she was followed in 1696 by the smaller *Bedford* of 32 guns and 135 men, which was a low-built galley about 130 ft. long and 18 ft. beam, fitted with oars as well as two masts and sails that were removable at will. The *Falkland* was evidently a large, well-built, successful, and long-lived vessel. The British Navy List at the time of William III's death in 1702 rated her as of "776 tons, 48 guns, 226 men"; she was a regular line-of-battle ship and continued in service until 1768, when she was seventy-eight years old—a ripe age for any ship. The galley *Bedford*, after taking part in several actions, was evidently made into a fire (suicide) ship, and she disappeared from official lists in 1723 following twenty-seven years of active service.

Adams says of William Partridge, a shipbuilder actively engaged in Portsmouth at the close of the seventeenth century, "He was bred a shipwright and was distinguished for his skill in naval architecture and other mechanic arts. He had been a contractor for purchasing masts and timber for the Navy."

In a report made by the council to the Lords of Trade, the entries at Portsmouth between June 1680 and April 1681 numbered forty-seven and consisted of twenty-two ships, eighteen ketches, two barks, three pinks, one shallop, and one fly-boat. Lord Bellomont's report of 1697 gives a list of sizable deep-sea vessels owned in the Piscataqua—and all apparently built there—consisting of eleven ships, five brigantines, four ketches, and four sloops. It has been said that the Piscataqua would have exceeded Boston in fisheries tonnage if it had not been so preoccupied with timber and lumber. At the end of the century, Boston and environs were concentrating their business energies on fisheries, but the Piscataqua was interested in timber and fish and "built ships to carry the products of the forests and cured fish to markets, both coastal and overseas." At the time, some forty vessels were plying regularly between the Piscataqua and Boston. William G. Saltonstall says that the (William) Pepperrell family, of

Portsmouth, interested in shipbuilding, fisheries, timber, and trading, had at this time "one hundred or more vessels of their own, most of them Banks fishermen," and that, "loading a new vessel with fish and lumber for the West Indies or some European port, Pepperrell would sell the cargo and perhaps the vessel itself at large profit."

The following is a copy of a contract to build a sloop in the Piscataqua, New Hampshire, territory entered into on June 12, 1694, by "Jno Chevalier alias Knight," of Portsmouth, N. H., and Capt. Benjamen Bullard, acting in behalf of Christopher Terry, a merchant of Barbados. It is interesting to note that the shipbuilder agreed to complete the vessel and launch her in 81 days from the signing of the contract.

ARTICLES of agreement had made and concluded by & between Capt Benjamen Bullard of Barbados Merchant & Mr Jno Chevalier alias Knight of Portsmouth in the Province of New Hampshire in New England Merchant Wittneseth Viz That he the said Jno Chevalier alias Knight doth by these presents covenant promise & ingage to erect set up & build or cause to be erected set up & build a good substantiall sloop according to the demensions following for the sd Capt Benja Bullard for accott of Mr Christopher Terry of Barbados Mercht to say fortie one foot by the keele from the after part of ye sternpost to ye breach of ye sweep of the stem & to have thirteen foot Rake forwd and sixteen foot nine inches by the beam in bredth & seven feete & half deep in the hold & to have two wales of a side each wale to be eight inches deep the floor to be eight foot & half & ten inches dead rissing and to have a twelve foott transom & a rise abaft from the main deck to the quarter deck of two foott and a rise forward of one foott and two foott and half deep in the weste with a good Gunnill wale. moreover to have four Ports of a side in the wale on each side and to build a good Longboat sutable for such a Vessel All which sd Sloop & boats to be built of good sound seasoned white oake timber and plank except where Pine may be more convenient with a handsome head to sd Sloop all to be finished to a cleat and Launched into channell at or before the last day of September next: And Capt Benja Bullard for his part in behalfe of Mr

Christopher Terry aforesaid to pay the sd Chevalier alias Knight or cause to be payd fiftie five shillings pr tonn for each tonn and so for every such tonn sd sloop shall measure according to the Custom of shipwrites to say half the ships breadth to measure for depth and devide by the number ninety-five and find all iron worke Pitch Tarr & Ockum or to pay the sd Chevalier for the same and for ye true performance the sd Jno Chevalier alias Knight for himselfe his heires Executors and Administrators and Capt Benja Bullard in the behalf of Mr Christopher Terry his heires Executors and Administrators doe by these presents bind themselves & everie of them each to the other in the Penalty & forfeiture of three hundred Pounds currt money of New England to be payd by the failing party to the observing parties: In testimony whereof they have to these Agreements Enterchangeably Putt their hands & seales this twelfth day of June 1694 & in the sixth year of the Reign of our Sovereign Ld & Lady Wm & Mary King and Queen over England Scotland France and Ireland, Defenders of the Faith & it is alsoe intended and agreed altho the words left out that Capston Rudder and windlass is to be put to the sd Sloop by the builders at their or Mr Knights Cost and charge.

Dated June 13, 1694

Ack before Thos Packer J of P

Wit

Wm. Pittman

Henry Crowne

Soon after Queen Anne ascended the English throne in 1702, war broke out with the French, who used and encouraged the Indians to raid and destroy on land while they harassed the British and the American colonists at sea and in the coast ports. But in spite of these difficulties, New England and Piscataqua shipbuilding and shipping went on apace. Most of the vessels built on the Piscataqua were sloops, ketches, or narrow-sterned pinks of less than one hundred tons burden, but some were larger and a few of two or even three hundred tons. About this time, according to Hall, a ship of 130 tons was built at Exeter; Kittery launched five vessels totaling 920 tons (an average of 184 tons per bottom); and Portsmouth built a mast ship, described as "a fly-boat, or hag-boat, of 250 tons," for transatlantic service. William G. Saltonstall, in PORTS OF PISCATAQUA, says:

Shortage of good timber in England, Holland, France and Spain during the seventeenth century led English merchants to build ever more vessels in the colonies. They cost only three or four pounds per ton, or its equivalent in country pay, and they were soundly built. Not only did the rocky coves and inlets of Kittery and Portsmouth watch this

growth but far up from the sea, at Exeter, and Dover, and Berwick, and Eliot, small vessels were built in marshy creeks, salt meadows, and, not infrequently, deep in the forest. As a rule, the building was done as near as possible to the lumber supply. This was cheaper than bringing the material down to the sea. Thus many a small sloop was built

upriver at the fall line, or back from the water entirely, miles into the woods. During the winter, when the snow was deep, long teams of oxen (sometimes 100 yoke or more) dragged these small vessels slowly down to the river, to rest on the ice until a spring thaw generally floated them. Bluff-bowed, broad-beamed, and shallow draft, these vessels of the Piscataqua district were among the best and cheapest to be had during the latter half of the

seventeenth century. The fact that their builders were often their captains or owners insured sound workmanship. These yard master carpenters knew the whole process: getting out the timber, doing what designing there was to be done, building the molds, framing, planking and launching. The shipwrights in their yards worked with a will, from sunrise to sunset, as long as they received their daily grog and rum at "the launch."

In November 1696, William Pepperrell wrote to an agent concerning a vessel he had just built: "If you and the carpenter think it convenient, and the ground has not too much descent, I think it may be safer and better to bend her sails before you launch her so as to leave immediately . . . for, Sir, it will be dangerous tarrying there on account of hostile savages in the vicinity, and it will be very expensive to keep the men on pay. I send you a barrel of rum and there is a cask of wine to launch with."

Weeden, in *ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND*, tells us that the Yankee skipper was generally a part owner of both vessel and cargo, always a trader and adventurer, and went from port to port beyond control of owners, who would not have directed him if they could. The master mariner was often also a master shipbuilder prior to the dawn of the era of the specialist, and in the early colonial days both fishermen and lumbermen had on occasions been shipbuilders. To the art of obtaining and preparing a product and of building a vessel to transport it to a profitable market had to be added skill in trading by barter or outright sale. It was said that the early settlers of Massachusetts and New Hampshire expended their energies in fishing to load ships and shipbuilding to catch fish and to carry cured fish overseas. Some colonists combined forestry and farm operations with shipbuilding and used their vessels for transporting lumber and forest products to market. That the role of the New Hampshire mariner was a broad one as late as the end of the third decade of the eighteenth century is evidenced by the following indenture of apprenticeship (dated at Portsmouth, N. H., August 13, 1729) of a boy who was desirous of acquiring practical knowledge of the "arts and mysteries" of the building—and apparently the operation—of ships:

I Mathias Hains of Portsmouth in the Province of New Hampshire, by the consent of father, Hath put himself . . . apprentice to John Cate marriner . . . to learn his art trade or mystery and with him . . . after the manner of an apprentice to serve . . . for and during the term of seven years. . . . And the said master shall teach the said Apprentice to read,

writ & Cypher. . . . Instruct him in the Art, Trade or Calling of a marriner . . . (if the said apprentice be capable to learn) and to find . . . good and sufficient Meat, Drink, washin & Lodging during the said term: and at the expiration thereof to give unto the said apprentice two suits of apparrell ye one for Sunday and the other for working Dayes.

Saltonstall says that "such apprenticeships supplied the training necessary for the mastery of the trade" of shipbuilding and that on the Piscataqua (as in other parts of the country) apprentices, on becoming journeymen, usually worked in several yards to broaden their experience and knowledge of the methods used by various successful shipwrights before settling down or branching out for themselves.

Winter Harbor and the Saco in Early Colonial Days—Fish, Lumber, and Ships

The Saco River, with what became known later as Winter Harbor, was evidently first explored by Samuel de Champlain and Pierre du Guast, sieur de Monts during July 10-12, 1605. They were impressed with the Indians, whom Champlain refers to as Almouchiquois, and the

palisaded Indian village on the south bank of the river near its mouth he named Chouacoet. Writing of the surprising agricultural pursuits of the Indians, he says:

They till and cultivate the soil, something which we have not hitherto observed. In the place of ploughs, they use an instrument of very hard wood, shaped like a spade. . . . We saw their Indian corn, which they raise in gardens. . . . With this corn they put . . . Brazilian beans. . . . When they grow up, they interlace with the corn, which reaches to the height of from five to six feet; and they keep the ground very free from weeds. We saw there many squashes and pumpkins, and tobacco, which they likewise cultivate. . . . We saw

also a great many nuts; . . . also many grapevines . . . from which we made some very good verjuice. The savages dwell permanently in this place, and have a large cabin surrounded by palisades made of rather large trees placed by the side of each other, in which they take refuge when their enemies make war upon them. They cover their cabins with oak bark. This place is very pleasant and agreeable as any to be seen. The river is very abundant in fish and is bordered by meadows.

The Saco Indians fished, used fish for fertilizer, and made points for their arrows from the claws of lobsters and crabs. They used animal furs for clothing in the winter, but apparently had no peltry for trading purposes. It would seem that these Indians were a peaceful, friendly, and hospitable people; yet they were described as "savages."

Capt. John Smith, during his historic exploration of the New England coast in 1614, visited the Saco, and he featured Sawocatuck (Champlain's Chouacoet and later the English Winter Harbour) as an important point on the coast, which he divided into sections in his description as "from Pennobscot to Sagadahock"; "betwixt Sagadahock and Sawocatuck" (Saco); and "betwixt Sawocatuck and Cape Cod." When Richard Vines, sent over to New England with others by Sir Ferdinando Gorges "for trade and discovery" in the autumn of 1615, got through his business in the Monhegan-Damariscove-Sagadahoc area, he and members of his party apparently went to the Saco Indian village to spend the worst of the winter. Here they found "the Great Plague" at its height among the Indians. This seems to have been one of those contagious diseases carried by white men to which European adults were evidently immune, but which brought death to the primitive peoples of other lands. The hospitable and peaceful Saco Indians suffered terribly from the scourge brought to them unwittingly by the white man. Following the early days of European visitations and occupation, there were, from the first, influences at work to destroy the aborigines of the New World other than firearms and "firewater."

Although the Saco River (about thirty miles to the northeast of the Piscataqua) is located in the region that became part of the State of Maine, in the early colonial days this area was more in contact and associated with the settlements at the mouth of the Piscataqua than with those of the Sagadahoc (much farther to the east), the nearer Casco, Falmouth (Portland), or any other Maine community. Winter Harbor (now Biddeford Pool), at the mouth of the Saco River, was from the first an important fishing center, bearing the same relation to the upriver settlement of Saco that the Isles of Shoals, with their fisheries, bore to the general trading, timber, and shipbuilding towns of Portsmouth and Kittery on the Piscataqua River. Because of the good deep-sea fishing and nearby forest lands with an abundance of timber, shipbuilding was initiated on the Saco by the earliest settlers, for communication and trade by water with other regions on the coast were both natural and economical. Later, as Saco, like most other Maine coast and river settlements, became a community with lumber and forest products to sell or barter, ships were built on the river to carry materials to markets such as Boston and, later, to points farther south and, finally, to the West Indies, Central and South America, and Europe. While the part of the country that we now know as the State of Massachusetts was interested primarily in fisheries and in building ships for fishing, Saco, after the first few years of existence, largely concentrated on its forests, built ships of its timber, and used the product of trees for its principal item of trade and barter.

The Saco River, although not large, has been an important stream as far as the lumber industry is concerned. The quest for timber and lumber was a prime motive in the colonization of all of the State of Maine. In the southern maritime portion and on the coast line of New

Hampshire, the fisheries were the real original urge, but timber and fisheries went hand in hand in the Saco as well as the Piscataqua River regions (and both activities necessitated the building of ships). It has been truly said that, still farther east and in some inland sections, "the original settlers went to hew out a living or a fortune in the pine forests."

Clapboards, pine boards, and pipe staves were the first commodities produced in quantity. A trade in clapboards was established early in the seventeenth century, for R. Williams, a "clapboard cleaver," upon his death in 1635, left a stock of clapboards valued at £164-8-4, which, it is said, was "a large amount in those days." The trade in pipe staves on the Saco was so important that a point on the lower river in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was known as Pipe Stave Point. Folsom says that the first sawmill privilege was granted in the Saco region in 1653, followed by a second in the same year "upon the great falls of the River of Saco." It is recorded that in 1668 the first mill sold one hundred fifty-one English pounds' (sterling) worth of "good pine boards" to a merchant in London. Four years later, we are told by contemporaries, "pipe staves and clapboards" were being shipped in quantity from the Saco River "to the Canaries."

The falls of the Saco, marking the end of the river for floating logs downstream and being an economic source of power, determined the location of towns (Saco and Biddeford) primarily interested not in fisheries but in timber products, general trade, shipping and, therefore, shipbuilding. John Jocelyn, writing in 1672 of his two visits to the Saco (made in 1638, with a protracted stay during the period 1663-1671), says of the fisheries of the settlement: "Winter Harbor [Biddeford Pool] is a noted place for fishers; here they have many stages." He also notes that the first-grade fish, after drying, were sent to "Lisbon, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Toulon, and other cities of France," and it is recorded that "claw-board [clapboard?] and pipe staves" were shipped from the Saco to the Canaries along with the fish. The second-grade, termed "refuse fish" (certainly not a good trading designation), was shipped to the West Indies for consumption by the Negroes.

The first sawmill in America is authoritatively said to have been built in 1623 at Agamenticus, which was the ancient name of York, Maine (some twenty-three miles down the coast from the Saco in the direction of the Piscataqua); it was erected under instructions of Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who wrote: "I sent over my son and my nephew, Captain William Gorges, who had been my lieutenant in the Fort of Plymouth, with some other craftsmen for the building of houses and the erecting of sawmills." This was about a century and a half before conservative old England, held back by the prejudice and antagonism of British labor, installed mills for sawing timber. It has been said that sawmills in Maine "followed closely the frontiers of settlements" and that scarcely was a hamlet settled before a sawmill was established, consisting of a single vertical saw operated by river, tide, or wind. The availability of water power to run sawmills determined the location of many early settlements which, like those on the Saco River, grew into towns.

James Elliott Defebaugh, in *HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY OF AMERICA*, after summing up all the claims for the location of the first sawmill and the beginning of the lumber industry in America, writes:

It seems reasonably certain that the first sawmill in New England was built at York, Maine, soon after 1623, and the second on Salmon Falls River, in what is now South Berwick Township, Maine, in 1631 or the year following. These mills were doubtless of the type which prevailed for the succeeding two hundred years. They were driven by water power, and the sawing machinery consisted of an upright saw in a frame driven by a connecting rod from a crank attached to one end of the water wheel shaft. The log was moved against the saw by a pawl and ratchet gear driven by the same power as the saw in time with it, although probably it

was moved by hand in some of the older mills. This form was known as a sash or gate saw. The next advance was simply the introduction of several parallel saws into the sash. This was the gang saw, which, in various improved forms, is still in use.

Notwithstanding that Plymouth was the first permanent English colony in New England, it did not have a sawmill until about 1640, the exact date being unknown. The first sawmill in Plymouth colony of which satisfactory record exists was probably built on Third Herring Brook, in the town of Scituate, in 1657; this mill was destroyed in 1677 by the Indians.

Bolles says that a sawmill was erected in New England on the Salmon Falls River near the present city of Portsmouth, N. H., soon after the land was granted, in 1631, to Mason and Gorges, the great proprietaries of that region. John E. Hobbs tells us that a sawmill was built in 1631 in the old town of Berwick, Maine, that a second mill was put in operation in this locality in 1634, and that "here also in 1650 was built the first gang sawmill in this continent, if not in the world."

From the earliest days of settlement on the Saco, ships were built for the Winter Harbor fisheries and for the transport of sawn lumber, pipe staves, and miscellaneous forest products, and these ships were built from trees growing in the vicinity, which were highly considered for the construction of the hulls and spars of sailing vessels. For many long years, shipbuilding on several of the rivers of Maine was connected with timber and sawmill operations. Shipyards were located near the sawmills (on the ocean side of the mill when power for the mill was obtained from waterfalls in the river), and the seasonal operation of the mills in conjunction with woods logging and shipbuilding gave the men employed continuous work. When ships were built for the fisheries, it was usual to have the fishermen during the winter-time, when operations on the Banks and offshore were suspended for months, keep occupied ashore in the felling and handling of timber in the woods and the building of ships. It has been said that the commerce of the Puritans in the Boston Bay region "smelled as strongly of fish as their theology smelled of brimstone." In Maine, the backbone of the economic order and the principal reason for establishing settlements was timber, and Maine commerce, while it included fish (for fish was easily obtainable and both a necessary food and a good commodity of commerce for a people that did not go strongly into agriculture), rested solidly upon a foundation of white pine and oak. Ships were built of timbers and plank, the product of the forest, and ships were needed for transporting the fruits of Maine industry to markets as well as to engage in fisheries.

Whereas timber products predominated in all New Hampshire and Maine trading, the settlements on the Piscataqua and the Saco continued to be great fishing centers until well into the nineteenth century. Seacoast Maine communities, and those at the mouth of relatively small rivers, were required to use and develop fisheries for the obtaining of a trading commodity supplementary to timber products. Settlements located on the big rivers that tapped a great inland territory—such as the Kennebec, Penobscot, and St. Lawrence—soon built up a big business bartering with the Indians for furs. France was first attracted to eastern Canada through fisheries on the Banks of Newfoundland and the finding of land where the French cured their catch, but after they explored the St. Lawrence, the North American colony known as New France was considered valuable to the French primarily because of its fur trading posts.

Timber shipments to England commenced soon after the American colonies were founded. In 1634 the first cargo of masts from New England was received at a British royal dockyard; presumably it was shipped from the Piscataqua and the timber collected there picked up from points up the coast as well as upriver. We are told that, within a few years' time, white pine trees suitable for mastings were cut at York, Wells, Keinbank (Kennebunk), Saco, Scarborough, Falmouth, and Keinbeck (Kennebec). The Piscataqua is a sort of dividing line between the Maine white pine and the Massachusetts oak regions, and for long years Portsmouth, which was well established early as a port, obtained from the territory now known as southwestern Maine—of which the Saco was an important producing and shipping center—a considerable part of the masts and timber products that it shipped to England. Gradually, however, economic considerations overcame political prejudices, and Falmouth, in Casco Bay, superseded Portsmouth as the British Navy's most important shipping port handling timbers for large masts and spars.

The Spur of Necessity Makes a Thriving Maritime Colony

From the earliest colonial times, New England seafarers showed a rare courage, with tenacity of purpose and a determined, persevering spirit, in the face of tremendous handicaps and every manner of adversity. New Englanders had "to capitalize" the ocean, which was at their doors, and use it not only to their interest but also as a prime means of human existence. They had "to sink or swim," and they were required to develop unusual physical, moral, and mental characteristics in order to win and survive in an unkindly environment. Early colonial seamen fought a continuous hard battle in small craft that were unsuited for deep-sea voyages. These hardy, adventurous souls put to sea in light, open, diminutive "ships" propelled by wind and oars; they sailed on uncharted seas, off unlighted shores, with practically no mechanical devices to assist in navigation; they faced an incessant plague of freebooters, who sailed on their lawless, plundering quests under any national flag (sometimes even that of Britain), a "Jolly Roger," or none at all. What Daniel Webster said of New England seamen at a later time was equally true from the beginning of their activities, which date back to the early seventeenth century: "It is not by protection and bounties but by unwearyed exertion, by extreme economy, by that manly and resolute spirit which relies on itself to protect itself. These causes alone enable American ships still to keep the elements and show the flag of their country in distant seas."

Geographic and economic conditions forced the early American colonists to be builders and operators of ships, and as the years advanced these settlers gradually became conscious of their natural advantages and the fact that they were the possessors of the world's richest storehouse of materials necessary for the building of ships—hardwood, white-pine masting, and what are termed "naval stores." Maloney has said:

In the beginning the habitat of the people of the United States was of necessity confined to a narrow strip along the Atlantic seaboard. With limited agricultural interests they naturally turned to the sea, first as an important source of food supply and then gradually as an outlet for their energy and

spirit of enterprise. Wood was the world's common and only known shipbuilding material. The vast and then apparently inexhaustible forests of hard and soft woods of the new land provided a wealth of it. The colonists could build vessels cheaply and quickly.

In the very early days of colonizing on the North American continent, the British-born New Englanders were generally fishermen, lumbermen, sailors, traders, and farmers. They, and their immediate progeny, quickly developed into shrewd merchandisers and, under the spur of necessity and the stimulus of individual freedom, displayed that remarkable strain of originality and inventive genius which, it has been said, "characterized all New Englanders until the trait became synonymous with the name 'Yankee.'" William H. Clark, writing of conditions in the colonies during the last half of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth century, says:

Salt water washed every town of any size in America because large towns could not exist without at least direct connection by a navigable river with the sea. . . . The east wind blew over most farms, for only a very few of them were more than twenty miles from the beach. . . . In New England, the farmer depended upon the sea for the extra income which, in addition to the meagre yield of his acres, meant all the difference between prosperity and mere existence. Only sea-borne commerce could take

from the farmer his surplus—his extra grains, salted beef and pork, and only foreign trade could take his by-products, his shingles and pipe-staves, lumber and furs, and the thousand and one small wooden articles, such as axe-handles, ox-bows, buckets, wooden bowls, brooms and the rest—those many things which Yankee fingers turned out during the long winters when everyone sought shelter from the cold and snow beside the roaring fireplaces in the farm kitchens.

While the settlers in the southern colony of North America, which retained the name of Virginia, had discovered an easy opulence in the tobacco crop, were obtaining slave labor to toil for them, and were thus not compelled to turn to the hardships and the hazards of the

sea, the settlers in the northeastern colonies of the country—the New Englanders—were hampered by an unfriendly climate, with land immensely difficult to clear for cultivation and but little soil suitable for crops. Ralph D. Paine says that such colonists were “between the devil and the deep sea” and “sagaciously chose the latter.” In the colonies generally, the forest was regarded as an enemy to agriculture and homesteading that “had to be destroyed with infinite pains,” but many New England pioneers regarded it with favor as the material from which to build stout ships, obtain long, straight masts and spars for them, and later fabricate timbers, lumber, and forest products with which they could trade and find an even broader market than with fish—the original cargo for most of the colonial-built vessels. Geographical factors and racial characteristics were prime elements in the development of the settlements in the New World and the nature of their trade with each other and overseas. Spears says:

Under the conditions of life in New England, the people became perforce farmers, growing their own food; loggers, cutting timber in the near-by forest for use in building houses, fishing smacks, and ships; fishermen, going afloat in the smacks and then curing the catch on the beach; seamen, who blow high or blow low, carried the catch in

their own ships direct to the consumer; traders, meeting the competition of the keenest merchants in the world; inventors, who, when unable to do their work by methods already in use, promptly improvised something new that would serve the purpose.

In the early years—which include most of colonial days—the sea continued to be the best and surest highway between the colonies, and the principal towns were still on the ocean shore or on the banks of navigable rivers. Marvin says that for passenger - freight transportation, from colony to colony or from settlement to settlement, the main reliance was the handy ketch or pinnace. “And this habit of the colonies was also the habit of the small neighborhoods. So far as was possible, the farmhouses were set near the water, and a boat rode at anchor by the door. . . . Roads through the wilderness were few and bad and menaced perhaps by prowling Indians. But on stream or sea the colonists felt themselves secure. . . . Thus a great part of the population was inured to the sea, and very many even of the farmers were half farmers and half fishermen.” Many of the settlers were half farmers and half marine traders and seamen, and quite a number were farmers and shipbuilders. Some tilled the soil, cut timber, built ships, and operated them in trade.

Philip English became prominent in 1676 as a shipmaster and merchant-owner in Salem, and he is generally described by historians as the first of a long line of shipping merchants who made Salem a pre-eminent trading center and for a time “the most illustrious port in the New World.” The ship *Desire* has interested historians because in 1640, with her cargo of cotton and tobacco, she brought some Negro slaves home to Salem from the West Indies. Later, she made a transatlantic passage to England in only 23 days, which performance speaks well for the quality of both the early colonial-built ships and their commands and crews. As early as 1664, or some twelve years before Philip English became a conspicuous figure as a Salem shipowner and captain, a local writer said, “In this town are some very rich merchants.” Several of these merchants, it would seem, were also shipmasters, and their descendants were destined ultimately to give the port “a peculiar fame by reason of their genius for discovering new markets for their trading ventures and staking their lives and fortunes on the chance of finding rich cargoes where no other American ships had dreamed of venturing.”

The vessels that crossed the Atlantic and made the West Indies “to pile up wealth” for Philip English and his fellow Massachusetts shipowners of the period were small craft and “mere cockleshells for deep-sea voyaging”; but they risked storm and capture and, moreover, the hazards of sailing at times in unknown and uncharted seas and of making port on strange coasts. The masters of these vessels had to make their way without navigating instruments or helpful book advice. An old writer describes the procedure in vogue in a somewhat exaggerated vein as follows: “Their skippers kept their reckoning with chalk on a shingle, which they stowed away in the binnacle; and by way of observation they held up a hand to the sun. When they got him over four fingers, they knew they were straight for Hole-in-the-Wall; three fingers gave them their course to the Double-Headed Shop Key and two carried them

down to Barbados." Notwithstanding the risks and hazards, the "rule-of-thumb" methods of navigation, the lack of lighthouses and charts of practical value, the colonial shipmasters made their desired foreign destination and returned home and did a wonderful job in handling their vessels at sea and trading in port.

An Englishman, Edward Randolph, writing in 1676 of the New England colonies under the British Crown and giving his views and impressions as a critical reporter following a personal visit, said in substance:

Massachusetts is a most thriving maritime colony. Thirty of her merchant shipowners are worth ten to twenty thousand pounds, having won fortunes out of their adventures in trading and shipbuilding. The province produces enough food (grains, fish and meat) to feed itself, as well as all things necessary for shipping and naval furniture, etc., and have a large surplus annually for export. The farmers in the wintertime, when not following agricultural activities, busy themselves with cutting timber, which they make into barrel staves, lumber, clapboards, shingles and the like; cutting masts and spars out of the great pines, which are abundant; and burning the forest to leach pearl ash [potash] out of the ashes, some for their own use but mostly for export. Massachusetts Bay Colony owns 430 ships of from 30 to 250 tons that have been built in and

belong to the jurisdiction. Most of these ships "traffick" with the West Indies and with most parts of Europe, freighting their own products and those of other colonies and distributing return cargoes among all the colonies and the West Indies, so that there is little left for the merchants residing in England to import into any of the plantations. They pay no attention to the English laws regulating trade. Massachusetts has sent ships to Egypt, to the slave markets of West Africa, and even to the pirate headquarters of Madagascar. The merchants have constant care to keep all their ships in continual employment, trying all ports to force a trade, whereby they abound with all sorts of commodities and Boston may be esteemed the market town of the West Indies.

In 1631, Massachusetts had launched her first sizable vessel—a ship of 30 tons. Forty-five years later, Randolph reported that its people owned 30 ships of from 100 to 250 tons burden, 200 of from 50 to 100 tons, 200 of from 30 to 50 tons, and 300 of from 6 to 10 tons; the latter were chiefly fishing craft, although some were engaged in the coastwise trade. The colony then owned 430 vessels as large as or larger than the historic *Blessing of the Bay*, and other American colonies also owned many ships. Official British Admiralty reports for the same year (1676) state that 330 colonial-owned ships of from 50 to 250 tons were sailing out of Boston alone, with at least five hundred more smaller craft of all types under 50 tons in size, most of which were operating in coastwise trade, for the sea and rivers were at that time practically the only highways in America between settlements and trading points. By the end of the seventeenth century, more than a thousand vessels are said to have been registered as built in the New England colonies.

England was becoming more and more jealous of the flourishing maritime commerce of New England and was devising restrictive acts of Parliament, one after the other, to hamper and curb what was considered as a colony that was growing to be a dangerous rival of the mother country in the ocean-carrying trade. British shipping interests, shipbuilders, and narrow-minded politicians sought to stifle American enterprise, discourage American ingenuity and initiative, and kill American deep-sea commerce; but the "hardy merchants of New England violated or evaded these unjust edicts" of the British Parliament and continued to send their ships to sea.

*Philip English—Eminent Pioneer Shipping Merchant of Salem
A Victim of the Diabolical "Religious" Witchcraft
Hysteria of the Late Seventeenth Century*

The first of a long line of prominent and history-making shipping merchants of Salem, Mass., was Philip English. A native of the island of Jersey, he apparently arrived at Salem in the latter part of the 1660's. In 1676 he sailed his own ketch, the *Speedwell*. Ten years later, he had become so prosperous "a sea-faring merchant" that he built a "mansion house on Essex Street," which stood for a century and a half and was long known as "English's Great House." In 1692, Philip English, of Salem, was reputed to be "the richest man in the New England colonies." We are told that he owned at that time "twenty-one vessels," which traded coastwise with Virginia and offshore with "Bilboa, Barbados, St. Christopher's, the Isle of Jersey, and the ports of France"; it is said that, in addition to his fleet of ships, English owned "a wharf, warehouses and fourteen buildings in Salem town."

Very devout are the records of Philip English's business transactions, and one of the bills of lading, dated 1707, reads in part:

Shipped by the Grace of God, in good order and well conditioned, by Sam'll Browne, Phillip English, Capt. Wm. Bowditch, Wm. Pickering and Sam'll Wakefield, in and upon the Good sloop called the *Mayflower* whereof is master under God for this present voyage Jno. Swasey, and now riding

at anchor in the harbor of Salem, and by God's Grace bound for Virginia or Merriland. To say, twenty hogshats of salt. . . . In witness whereof the Master or Purser of the said Sloop has affirmed to Two Bills of Lading . . . and so God send the Good Sloop to her desired port in Safety. Amen.

A Salem merchant wrote in 1700 of the foreign commerce of Salem as follows:

Dry merchantable codfish for the markets of Spain and Portugal and the Straits. Refuse fish [a perfectly edible second grade, or variety, of fish, which sold at a cheaper price and was in great demand as food for slaves], lumber, horses and provisions for the West Indies. Returns made directly hence

to England are sugar, molasses, cotton, wool and logwood for which we depend on the West Indies. Our own produce, a considerable quantity of whale and fish oil, whalebone, furs, deer, elk and bear skins are annually sent to England. We have much shipping here and freights are low.

According to the records that have been preserved, the little sloops and ketches of Philip English at times carried to Virginia codfish, mackerel, salt, wooden bowls, platters, pails, kegs, rum, cider, and also some molasses and muscavado sugar, and the vessels brought back to Salem such articles as wheat, pork, tobacco, Indian corn, furs, hides, and English goods, including old pewter, iron, copper, and brass.

It is of interest to report—but outrageous—that the witchcraft frenzy of Salem penetrated even into the home of Philip English, the greatest shipowner of the town. English had married the only child of W. Hollingsworth, a respected Salem citizen, and the lady "had the best education of her times." She was a baptized Christian, but the "proud and aristocratic lady" was "cried against," examined, and committed to prison. The evident and real reasons behind the charges made against Mary English by "religious" fanatics were: (1) she was haughty and overbearing in her manner toward the poor, and (2) her husband was a staunch adherent of the established English Church. Salem, so named by the early religious settlers after Psalm LXXVI, Verse 2 ("In Salem also is his tabernacle"), organized the first Congregational Church in America in 1629. Salem was the center of the witchcraft delusion, or madness, that swept over part of the Puritan colony in 1692-1693. While the frenzy—supposed to be of a soul-saving, religious nature and protective to Christ's church—was carried to several parts of Massachusetts, it was Salem Town that led in the manifested fervor of inhumanity and gross ignorance and henceforth had its name indelibly connected in the pages of history with witch persecution. Salem "witch burners" became in later years the odious designation given by historians and colonists in general to people who had

this fanatical spirit of Puritanical religious intolerance. However, as a matter of fact, Salem did not actually burn its victims, although it ducked in water, devilishly persecuted, and tortured many of the hundreds who were arrested and imprisoned. Of those "tried," nineteen persons were hanged as children of the devil, and one was cruelly pressed to death for refusing to plead. The witch inquisition of Salem, capitalized by bigoted Puritans for the believed benefit of their church and religion, was medieval witchcraft, which, in fact, meant knowledge of and contact with the devil. (The word "devil" is a derivative from the root "div," from which we get the word "divine," and really means "little god.") It is a well-known fact, spread over the pages of history, that "when a new religion is established in any country, the god or gods of the old religion become the devil of the new."

Philip English was a Protestant, but being an Anglican and a member of the established Church of England (Episcopalian), he was deemed to be outside the pale in a religious sense by the fervent Puritans. English was, however, a great man in the business and economic life of the town and too important, with too many friends, to be attacked by the Puritan fanatics until their movement of revolution gained power and "converted" or intimidated an overwhelming majority in the community. The successful captain, shipowner, and merchant, whose operations had meant so much to the prosperity and economic well-being of Salem Town, was attacked, therefore, by the intolerant Puritans through his wife. The officers of the inquisition, with the high sheriff and deputy, forced an entrance into the English home on a Saturday night, read "the Mittimus" to Mary English while she was in bed, and ordered her to get up and accompany them to jail. This the good lady refused to do, so guards were placed in and around the house, and the next morning she was taken to the Cat and Wheel, a public house that served as an overflow prison. Philip English, visiting his wife several times daily during the six weeks she was confined in the temporary prison, was then also accused by the leaders of the witchcraft persecution, who by that time felt powerful enough to attack Salem's leading merchant. As all available space that could be used in Salem for jails was crowded, English's friends arranged that he and his wife should be sent to Boston and confined there "in the Gaol" until the overcrowded court calendar would permit of their being tried in Salem. A later clerical historian, writing in 1793, says that the "Ministers" and "Gentlemen of the town [of Boston], encouraged by the Governor, Gaoler, etc.," arranged for the escape of "Mr. & Mrs. English with their eldest child and daughter" at midnight preceding the day the authorities were to take them back to Salem to stand trial; that "the Governor gave letters to Governor Fletcher, of New York, who came out and received them, accompanied by twenty private gentlemen, and carried them to his house."

Ralph D. Paine, in *THE SHIPS AND SAILORS OF OLD SALEM*, writing of the removal of the Englishes from overcrowded prisons in Salem to "Arnold's jail in Boston" until the time set for trial, says: "It brings to mind certain episodes of the French Reign of Terror to learn that they were taken to Boston on the same day with Giles Corey, George Jacobs, Alice Parker, Ann Pudeator and Bridget Bishop, all of whom perished except Philip and Mary English. Both would have been executed had they not escaped death by flight from the Boston jail and seeking refuge in New York." Nothing can ever eradicate the blot on the "fair name of Salem" caused by the witchcraft hysteria, persecution, and inquisition of 1692. The destructive revolution of crass ignorance in which hatred was wedded to religion burned fierce; but a reaction quickly set in, and even ardent Puritans felt it necessary to put out the fire, as the delusion was getting too embracing and out of hand. In May 1693, Governor Phelps stepped in, demanded that the persecution cease, and ordered all prisoners held on the charge of witchcraft to be released. Historian Paine writes:

That a man of such solid station [as English] should have so narrowly escaped death in the witchcraft fury indicates that no class was spared. While his sturdy seamen were fiddling or drinking in the taverns of the Salem water-front, or making sail to

the roaring chorus of old-time chanties, their employer, a prince of commerce for his time, was dreading a miserable death for himself and that high-spirited dame, his wife, on Gallows Hill.

Philip English apparently remained about a year in New York, but strange as it may

seem, notwithstanding the diabolical treatment of the Englishes at the hands of the fanatical religionists of Salem, their hearts were still in that old town. Contemporary records show that while "under the ban," English, hearing of the condition of the poor at Salem, "sent a vessel of corn for their relief." New Yorkers urged the Salem refugees to make their permanent home in New York, but after sanity reasserted itself in 1693, English and his family went back to Salem. An eighteenth century historian tells us: "They were received with joy upon their return and the Town had a thanksgiving on the occasion. Noyes, the prosecutor, dined with him on that day in his own house."

Philip English, who, we know, was in Salem some time prior to 1670 and was a ship-owner and skipper-merchant in 1676, continued an active shipping career until his death in 1736. English was a man of character and ability, a good sea captain and trader, and known for his vision, initiative, and courage. He is of historic interest, as it is generally admitted that he was the pioneer of eminent Salem and New England shipping merchants who did much to write the seafaring history of the colonies and the nation. The following letter written by Philip English in 1722 to "Mr. John Tausel," one of his sea captains, gives an insight into American commerce of that period:

Sir, you being appointed Master of my sloop *Sarah* now Riding in ye Harbor of Salem, and Ready to Saile, my Order is to you that you take ye first opportunity of wind and Weather to Saile and make ye best of yr way for Barbadoes or Leew'd Island, and there Enter and Clear yr vessel and Deliver yr Cargo according to Orders and Bill of Lading and Make Saile of my twelve Hogsh'd of fish to my best

advantage, and make Returne in yr Vessel or any other for Salem in such Goods as you shall see best, and if you see Cause to take a freight to any port or hire her I lieve it with your Best Conduct, Managem't or Care for my best advantage. So please God to give you a prosperous voyage, I remain yr Friend and Owner.

British Navigation and Trade Laws — Colonial Noncompliance and Growth of American Shipping

From early days, the ruling elements in Britain were fearful of the American colonists on the sea and strove to discourage shipbuilding and ship ownership in the New World. Sir Josiah Child, British economist and director of the East India Company, London, England, wrote in 1668:

Of all the American plantations, His Majesty has none so apt for building of shipping as New England nor any comparably so qualified for the breeding of seamen not only by reason of the natural industry of that people but principally by reason

of their cod and mackerel fisheries, and in my poor opinion there is nothing more prejudicial and in prospect more dangerous to any mother kingdom than the increase in shipping in her colonies, plantations, or provinces.

The first act of the English Parliament affecting by regulation the commerce of the American colonies was that passed in 1646 (during the reign of Charles I), which provided that no colonial produce should be carried from America to foreign ports except in vessels sailing under the British flag. In 1650 (the year following the beheading of King Charles I and the rise to power of the Roundheads), although England was in the throes of civil war, Parliament had sufficient unanimity of national desire and motive to prohibit all foreign ships from trading with the colonies unless they received an English license to do so. What has been called by British historians "the famous Act of Navigation" was passed by Oliver Cromwell's Parliament in 1651. It provided that no goods produced in Asia, Africa, or America should be imported into any part of the English domain (including all colonies and possessions) except in ships belonging to English subjects, whereof the command and

more than half of the crew were Englishmen; it prohibited the importation of goods produced or manufactured in Europe except in English ships or ships belonging to the country where the goods originated or vessels of the country from which they could only be or were most usually exported.

Since the days of Elizabeth, the English had been jealous of the enterprising Dutch, who had grown to be the leading maritime commercial power. The early English Navigation Acts were said to be measures designed "to restrain the freedom of the Dutch carrying trade" and give it to English ships, or "to wrest the control of the ocean-carrying trade from the Dutch." The First Dutch War was the result of the Cromwell Navigation Act, but this English legislation, presumably aimed at a foreign people, materially affected the American colonies; for prior to Cromwell's rise to power, all English legislation and decrees relating to them, from their establishment on the James (Virginia) and Kennebec (Maine) rivers in 1607, had been designed to favor and encourage both colonial commerce and shipping. (The terms are not synonymous as sometimes imagined, for marine commerce is trade, or traffic, and deals with commodities; whereas shipping refers to the vehicles of transport, i.e., to ships and the tonnage of floating bottoms generally.)

After the Restoration and the ascending to the British throne of Charles II in 1660, the Parliament created a council for trade and a council for foreign plantations (colonies); also, it passed the first of a series of acts of trade. It was said that under Charles II the English Parliament "quickly set about closing the breaches in the mercantilist walls" which remained after the Act of 1651 and that the Navigation Act of 1660 went far towards making "the English Empire truly mercantilistic." This act was even called the "Great Palladium" or "Magna Carta of English commerce." Through it, England declared its intention of concentrating control of the resources of the colonies in its own hands, it completely dominated all American exports, and it excluded all foreign merchants from the colonies. The Navigation Act of 1660, dealing with the exports from the colonies, was followed in 1663 by the so-called Staple Act, which controlled along generally similar lines—"to the power and glory of England"—the importation of goods into the American colonies, and through this act of 1663, we are told, "the structure of English mercantilism was completed."

The English, by legislative fiat and supplementary decrees (the principal Navigation Laws, or Acts of Trade, of the seventeenth century being those of 1660, 1663, 1673, and 1696), required that the chief products of the colonies should be those that could not be raised in England. Exports as "enumerated" should be sent only to England and import duty paid thereon, and what England did not want could then be shipped from a British port to a foreign country or possible market abroad. All colonial imports, it was decreed, should be handled the same way, and all goods, both export and import, had to be carried on English- or colonial-built ships manned and commanded by Englishmen. The British historian McCulloch says that by these early Navigation Acts it was required "that certain specified articles, the produce of the colonies, and since well known in commerce by the name of enumerated articles, should not be exported directly from the colonies to any foreign countries, but that they should first be sent to Britain, and there unladen (the words of the act are, 'laid upon the shore') before they could be forwarded to their final destination." McCulloch continues, "Sugar, molasses, ginger, fustic, tobacco, cotton and indigo were originally enumerated; and the list was subsequently enlarged by the addition of coffee, hides and skins, iron, corn (grains), lumber, etc."

As soon as the American colonists had any product for which there was a market abroad (other than salt or cured fish), England promptly placed the article on the list of "specified," or "enumerated," goods that could not be shipped to any foreign country except via an English port, where the American ship's cargo had to be unloaded and "laid upon the shore" for the assessment of duty. If there was a crying need or even a sizable demand in Britain for the colonial product en route to a foreign port, such goods never reached their intended destination. Whereas it was distinctly stipulated that the colonists were not compelled to sell

their goods in England, they could, after inspection and the payment of duty, be re-exported from an English port only with official permission and under certain regulations. Moreover, if such re-export was denied, the colonials, after paying the English import tax, would be required either to sell their goods at an English-offered price or to stand the further loss of the cost of transport both ways—in addition to the duty. Americans desiring to purchase from foreign countries commodities that could or could not be produced in Britain (with a few exceptions, such as wine from Madeira and the Azores) were required to carry them first to England, where, after they were "laid upon the shore," examined and checked, with duty assessed and paid, they might be reshipped to a colonial port provided, of course, Americans were still willing to pay the original cost plus the great increase resulting from duties, handling charges, and the expense attributed to delay—which of itself was quite large. It is no wonder, therefore, that American merchants and shipowners raised the cry that they were being "cruelly exploited by the system erected by the Laws of Trade."

The policy of England in regard to "enumerated" articles was to monopolize all colonial commodities that might be deemed highly desirable, if not essential, to its wealth and power. Through these means, Britain not only sought to be independent of rival commercial powers—France, Holland, Spain, etc.—but also hoped, ultimately, to oblige these nations to buy from England. The list of American products not "enumerated" was steadily reduced as the years advanced; for Britain attempted to utilize the Navigation and Trade Acts to strengthen its trading position in world markets, benefit its manufacturers and merchants, and increase the national revenue through customs duties. It is significant that in the year preceding the Lexington incident and armed rebellion, George Grenville (1712-1770), the British chancellor of the exchequer, in his efforts "to raise a colonial revenue and strengthen the British mercantile system," added to the list of enumerated articles practically all colonial commodities that had heretofore—because of their nature and relative unimportance to Britain—escaped the penalty of restricted commerce and taxation.

The Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663 were admittedly aimed at smothering the colonial export and import trade and were the result of a British policy dominated by the mercantilist principle that "all plantations endamage their Mother Kingdom, where the trades of such plantations are not confined to the Mother Kingdom by good laws and severe execution of them." In further efforts "for maintaining the greater correspondence and kindness between subjects at home and those in the plantations [colonies]," the British Parliament decreed: "No commodity of the growth, production, or manufacture of Europe shall be imported into the British plantations, but such as are laden and put on board in England, Wales, or Berwick-on-Tweed, and in English-built shipping whereof the master and three-fourths of the crew are English." The self-evident purpose of such a restriction was to prevent American colonial shipowners from conducting their own trade with the countries of Europe, and both the import and export trade of the colonies was to be limited for the benefit of the merchants of England. The Navigation and Trade Acts operated to lower the prices of American goods in England, as the market became glutted and the prices of European products in the colonies advanced greatly. As Spears says, "The colonial producer was robbed by the artificial reduction of the selling price of his product and the artificial increase of the price he paid for his European goods—robbed twice by arbitrary laws." The English policy as expressed by the Navigation and Trade Acts of the 1660's remained unchanged in principle throughout the colonial era, becoming worse instead of better as Britain attempted to enforce them and raise revenue. Even William Pitt (1708-1778), "the Great Commoner" and defender of colonial liberty in England, insisted upon "keeping the colonies in economic leading strings." The monopolization of colonial trade by England was generally felt by Englishmen to be the foundation stone of the empire, and it was freely declared that, if the colonies were allowed to trade as they pleased, "we may just as well have no colonies at all." James Macpherson, in *THE RIGHTS OF BRITAIN ASSERTED* (1776), tells us that during the period immediately preceding the American Declaration of Independence, nothing succeeded in incensing Eng-

lishmen against the colonists so much as the charge that Americans sought to throw off the restraints of the Navigation Acts and establish free ocean trade with the countries of the world.

Notwithstanding the hampering of colonial trade and the injurious, vexatious, and humiliating treatment of colonial producers, merchants, and shipping interests that resulted from the British Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663, the American merchant marine showed such a vigorous growth that it alarmed the English shipowners, shipbuilders, and, it would seem, the admiralty. After Sir Josiah Child, the English economist, writing in his "Discourse and Trade" in 1668, had given warning to the British Government of the "American Peril" and the danger of colonial ships and seamen to the "Mother Kingdom," the English Parliament in 1672 deliberated on the situation and finally passed another act to restrict and regulate American trade by levying a heavy tax upon the commerce between the different colonies. It discouraged every form of American manufacture or industry and even domestic trade in agricultural fields—except through England and in English ships. This act, presumably another expression of the hypocritical furtherance of "greater correspondence and kindness" between the mother country and her subject colonials overseas, operated so to suppress enterprise and restrict profitable business that English legislation and decrees threatened to impoverish Americans. Robertson truly says, "By these successive regulations, the plan of securing to England a monopoly of its colonies . . . was perfected." Not content with regulating, restricting, and suppressing colonial transatlantic trade, England jealously struck also at the prosperous American carrying trade to and from the West Indies. Lindsay, the British historian, writes in *MERCHANT SHIPPING* that certain later legislation, "combined with various conditions taken from the Navigation Laws, requiring heavy duties on numerous articles imported into the colonies from the countries that produced them or from anywhere else except Great Britain, and prohibiting the importation of sugar from the colonies except in British bottoms, necessarily aroused the indignation of the American colonists and sowed the seeds of future rebellion."

The Massachusetts General Court, as early as the seventeenth century, declared that it would not obey the Navigation and Trade Acts because the people of the colony were not represented in the English Parliament and because "the laws of England are bounded within the fower seas, and do not reach America." As historian John C. Miller says, this was "a more sweeping assertion of colonial rights than was made by Americans until 1776."

The colonial West Indian trade was conducted principally in small craft, and the English Navigation Laws and Trade Acts, if strictly enforced, were "particularly exasperating" because they operated to ruin "poor men who ran great hazards in their arduous calling." Marvin, in *THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, refers to whole communities in the colonies as being interested in these little vessels—in both the building and the freighting of them. The woodsmen would contribute the timber, the shipwrights their labor, and the farmers the cargo. Such a vessel, in which a great many were interested as part-owners, would represent, when fully laden, very little actual money paid out but, rather, its equivalent in hard toil and self-denial. Marvin also says:

The failure of the enterprise meant penury, if not actual ruin, for a whole community. There were the risks of the sea, the uncharted southern reefs, the fog, the hurricanes, and, worst of all, the ferocious pirates who were the plague of the Spanish Main in the earlier half of the eighteenth century. The lucky vessel that escaped all these perils had

still another deadly enemy in the cruiser or customs officer of the king, and many a weather-beaten craft returning well laden was seized right in her home harbor and carried off before the eyes of her poor co-operative owners, who could only stand by in helpless grief and fury at this wasting of their hard labor of the year.

In the fight for world power against France, Spain, and Holland, Britain felt that a "self-sufficient mercantilist empire" was essential to national greatness and to the international domination (with mastery of the seas) to which it aspired through victory over all rival states. In a larger sense, the purpose of the Navigation Acts was to enable England to increase its national ocean commerce and strengthen its position among nations as a marine

mercantile power. John C. Miller, in *ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION*, says, however:

The Laws of Trade and Navigation, or Navigation Acts, enacted by the English Parliament during the seventeenth century were mercantilism translated into statute law. Although these acts were only a part of English mercantilism, they were its most important expression and formed the basis of British colonial policy long after the American Revolution had demonstrated their inadequacy. By mercantilist theory, the function of colonies was to produce raw materials for the use of the mother

country, to consume its manufactures and to foster its shipping; and the purpose of the Laws of Trade and Navigation was to ensure that the English colonies fulfilled these ends. This implied, as mercantilists readily admitted, that the colonies were to remain dependent agricultural regions, closely tied to the economy of an industrialized mother country. No mercantilist saw any impropriety in consigning the Western Hemisphere to a position of perpetual economic inferiority.

Even British historians have denounced the narrow-minded politicians who, with the extinction of the French and Spanish shipping trade as their prime objective, not only deliberately "threw the colonials to the lions" but also sacrificed themselves. Their policy resulted in a serious diminution of the direct carrying trade between England and the North American colonies, and this again, as the Britisher Lindsay says, "depriving them of their accustomed market, prevented their being any longer able to consume British manufactures to the same extent as formerly, or even to discharge debts due to creditors in England. Hence an effect not anticipated; in that the Americans, forming associations to dispense with English manufactures, were led to resort to native industry and thus to lay the foundation of a permanent rivalry, the end of which cannot now be conjectured. In short, a national American spirit was evoked, highly antagonistic to British interests."

In the eighteenth century, severe restrictive measures were passed by the British Parliament to prevent the growth of manufactures in the American colonies, but all such laws, like the Acts of Trade of 1673 and the notorious Molasses Act of 1733, while annoying and restraining and detrimental to American enterprise and prosperity, were "more honour'd in the breach than the observance." The operation of the Navigation and Trade Acts enriched British merchants and manufacturers at the expense of Americans. It has been well said that the British Crown, through its series of Navigation Acts, had stated in effect to its colonial merchants: "You must buy all your manufactures through us [the British] or from us; you may not establish your own plants; because we must protect our own farmers, we will buy only a fraction of the produce raised by yours; and since we must defend the profits of our own merchants at all costs, you may export only certain 'enumerated' commodities, only in British ships, and only to British ports." The effect of this policy was to encourage smuggling and build up the entry of contraband into the colonies, unrecorded and duty free, on a vast scale. Britain held one real economic advantage in trade relations with the colonies. Its manufactures were better, cheaper, and more available than those of other countries; hence it was to the interest of the colonies to buy from England, even though this resulted in a trade balance unfavorable to the colonies. Americans were generally in debt to the English, and to square accounts the colonials established and fostered West Indian trade as a market for surplus colonial commodities—timber, fish, flour, etc. For return cargoes, they imported sugar and molasses, and from such traffic the triangular trade gradually developed along several lines, the most important being that of molasses, rum, and slaves. Rum made from molasses in New England was shipped to the African coast of Guinea, where it was exchanged for Negro slaves, who were carried to the West Indies and sold; the proceeds were put into molasses for import into the colonies to make more rum and into cash to be remitted to England to pay for goods purchased by Americans from the mother country.

Lord Bellomont, commissioned by King William III as governor of New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, following his arrival at New York April 2, 1698, to begin his administrative duties, promptly attempted to obey the orders of the crown by trying to put down piracy and by making vigorous efforts to enforce the Navigation Laws and Trade Acts. In 1700, after running up against the stubbornness, persistency, and independence of New England merchants, Bellomont wrote with feeling, "How much I despise them." It is said

that the contempt for the colonials as expressed by Bellomont was "well-nigh universal" among the English nobility. Fortunately, however, the crown's ministers were generally more tolerant of the demands of Americans for freedom on the seas, and Sir Robert Walpole, prime minister of England from 1721 to 1742, said in 1739: "It has been a maxim with me to encourage the trade of the American colonies in the utmost latitude. Nay, it has been necessary to pass over some irregularities." This "encouragement" of ocean trade referred to by Walpole and the overlooking of the American colonies' noncompliance with the English Navigation and Trade Acts had been in practical effect for about a century prior to the reign of George III, and when Walpole made his statement in 1739, it was with full knowledge of the fact that as far as the American colonists were concerned the Molasses Act of 1733 had from the first been as futile and was then as dead as the Navigation and Trade Laws of Cromwell and Charles II.

Incidentally, it is of interest to note that violation of excise duties and the avoidance of unpopular taxes were not peculiar to the American colonial part of the British Empire. Walpole not only weakened his position but also drove himself from political power in Britain when he exposed "the enormous frauds on the excise duties" in the mother country and proposed "to check smuggling and avoid fraud" by levying the full tax on imported tobacco, wines, etc., when they were removed from the warehouses for sale. We are told that Walpole's attempts at such reforms in duties and taxes in Britain met with violent opposition. Although many officials holding important positions were dismissed, antagonism toward Walpole's proposals became so great that they had to be dropped. Again, we read that the imprisonment of two notorious smugglers in the Tolbooth at Edinburgh (and the hanging of one of them) resulted in the Porteous Riots of September 7, 1736, and the lynching of the captain of the City Guard (who had fired on the crowd) by "an armed body of men in disguise"—all of which operated "to weaken Walpole's influence in the country." Evidently, the enforcement of import duties and taxes was no more popular in Britain at this time than in America.

Henry Belcher, writing of conditions in the American colonies, said: "Smuggling in the eighteenth century was a respectable and profitable occupation." The colonists practically ignored all British-made laws that they thought were arbitrary and despotic and cheerfully evaded the payment of all taxes that they deemed unjust or unconstitutional. Prior to the Grenville revenue and enforcement acts of 1764, the customs system in America had been very lax and inefficient. The collectors had no power to enforce the payment of duties, and many of the officials were very unscrupulous. Some British collectors even held their offices and drew their pay without being resident in the port of entry or in any part of the colonies; they stayed in England and let low-paid clerks (generally subject to bribes) run their offices—sometimes even taking for themselves a rake-off from the graft received by their assistants.

Upon the ascension of George III to the throne on October 25, 1760, the man—who was determined to be a real king and rule his people—commenced to demand that the American colonies be made, by force, to conform to all the English-made laws with respect to trade and taxes. After the Treaty of Paris (February 10, 1763), which ended the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the armed forces of Britain, the Mistress of the Seas, were available for compelling the obedience of America to all the laws on the statute books and the arbitrary dictates of the English Crown, and it was soon seen that the king was determined to make even the Parliament of England an organ submissive to the royal will.

English privateers, which had been preying upon the commerce of neutral as well as belligerent countries, were glad to see the Navigation Laws suddenly revived in the era of peace following the Treaty of Paris, and in the constant evasion of the old English laws by colonial ships, the piratical privateers sailing under the British flag reaped a golden harvest. The capture of a law-breaking colonial ship by an armed British merchantman, privateer, or pirate carried with it the reward of confiscation of the property. Because of England's growing jealousy of American shipping, a great eagerness was displayed by English owners and

captains of armed ships to capture unarmed or inadequately protected colonial-owned merchantmen. Spears writes, "The rôle of these [English] piratical privateers as guardians of the law was supported by Courts of Admiralty which were composed of judges who received fees that were increased by every condemnation." He further says that after about a century of time, during which American shipping had in fact been encouraged, "a horde of pirates and corrupt judges" revived an archaic and repudiated law, "and when a valuable prize was in question, they even disregarded the law they pleaded, as well as justice, to condemn her, and there was no redress."

Admiralty courts had been established by the British in the colonies in 1696 as an instrument for enforcing the Acts of Trade. These hated courts, with a British judge, tried suspected colonial violators of Britain's commercial laws without benefit of jury. This undemocratic procedure was made worse by the fact that the judge was directly interested more in conviction than in justice, as he received a commission of five per cent upon the amount of the fine and condemnation. However, the unity in purpose of colonials and their patriotic and economically worth-while allegiance to the dictates of the "Higher Law" saw to it that there were very few seizures and confiscations of American ships and cargoes. Technically, real teeth were put into the British Navigation Laws and Trade Acts by George III following the end of the Seven Years' War, for American merchants had been protected in some degree prior to his reign and Grenville's measures through a provision in the law that the informer was liable to suit under the common law if seizures were made upon false information or contrary to law. In 1764 the British Government not only continued to deprive a suspected violator of the right to trial by jury but also took from the merchant even the small guarantee of justice that he had heretofore enjoyed. Under the new procedure, a customhouse officer could make a seizure in any part of the colonies and carry the trial to the Canadian port of Halifax, to which the owner would be required to travel to defend his property; if the admiralty judge decided (as he could be expected to do under the circumstances) that there was cause for seizure, the owner had no redress. We are told, however, that colonials became so cautious, well organized, and resourceful in their illicit trade that only six seizures of contraband were made in New England during 1765-1767 and only one of the cases prosecuted was won by the crown.

The high-tariff Sugar Act of 1764 was a British trade and revenue act combined and carried with it the demand for the strict and unwavering enforcement of the Molasses Act of 1733, with modified—and as the British believed—enforceable duties. The English never seemed to understand that, dating back to the Act of Trade of 1673, the American colonists had not conceded the right of a British Parliament to tax them without their consent or arbitrarily to restrict their freedom and enact laws unfair to them and opposed to their survival and well-being. Most of the colonists had emigrated from England to escape religious, economic, and social tyranny. They had come to America in search of freedom and to create a new land of liberty. The conditions of early colonial life, with its hardships and dangers, had encouraged independence of all external authority, and the colonists, from the first, made their own laws according to their own standards of right. As Spears says, the American colonists, through the years, had been steadily "developing the American habit of doing what they happened to believe to be right, regardless of the [English] law in the case, and they called . . . this habit an appeal to the 'higher law.'" This "Higher Law" of the colonists, to be invoked more and more as the eighteenth century advanced, was based on reason, equity, and democratic principles. The colonists demanded as their "right" the continuation of the freedom of trade and the encouragement of initiative that they had enjoyed prior to the enactment of English Navigation Laws and Trade Acts, particularly as they had received no help from England in establishing themselves in the New World and had been left to themselves to carve out their own future by industry, frugality, and self-reliance. To such a people, "taxation without representation" and arbitrary legislation by a parliament overseas without the "consent of the governed" were not to be tolerated, and all English acts that ran contrary to the well-being, liberty, and dignity of the colonists were deemed invalid by them.

The spirit of liberty and a refusal to be interfered with by the mother country were promptly evidenced in the colonies following the passing of the Navigation Laws and Trade Acts in the days of Cromwell's commonwealth. For more than a century preceding the outbreak of resistance to British might that led to armed Revolution, Americans ignored unjust British laws affecting their lives and commerce when it was necessary to do so to live and when it was to their well-being to consider them as nonexistent. In the early days of colonization and dire need, England had left the daring pioneer settlers to themselves; no help, protection, or encouragement had been rendered, but the colonists had been told in no uncertain terms by words and deeds that they would have to shift for themselves. In New England particularly, this policy of the mother country developed a unique and amazing degree of self-reliance, resourcefulness, and ingenuity, the concomitant attribute of self-sufficiency, and a logical taking for granted of the fundamental and underlying spirit of responsibility with intertwined liberty. It is recorded in the annals of Salem Town that "when it was reported to the Lords of Plantations that the Salem and Boston merchant vessels arrived daily from Spain, France, Holland, and the Canaries [in 1763] which brought wines, linens, silks and fruits, and these were exchanged with the other colonies for produce which was carried to the aforesaid kingdoms without coming to England, complaint was made to the magistrates that these were singular proceedings." The reply of the colonists was that "they were His Majesty's vice-admirals in those seas and they would do that which seemed good to them." The maritime colonies had no idea of throwing off allegiance to the British Crown until some time after the Boston Massacre of 1770 and even the Lexington and Concord armed clashes of April 19, 1775; but they proposed to do, in matters of ocean trade, "that which seemed good to them," and they did not intend to have unjust laws made by a parliament three thousand miles away mar their prosperity or affect their well-being. After British troops were unnecessarily planted on American soil as an army of occupation, colonials objected to their presence, arbitrary acts, and sense of superiority; then, with naval ships blockading their coast, they voiced opposition to America's being taxed to pay for military power that the colonies did not want, bills for wars that Britain had undertaken, and expenses of a government concerning which the colonies were not consulted and had no voice in Parliament. Unjust, biased, and crudely selfish Navigation and Trade Laws, with the British attempt to enforce a system of taxation without representation, drove a loyal people into rebellion and, ultimately, independence.

The insistence of the British to tax as well as to restrict the commerce of the American colonists, with inquisitorial and vexatious attempts at enforcement and the insolence of English officials, led to organized violation of the tyrannical British laws. It has been said that, whereas "Divine Right" monarchs once ruled "without hypocrisy through naked force," the British Crown, with a shortsighted Parliament and a prejudiced, arbitrary ministry, sought to dominate the American colonies through customs duties and taxation. The Navigation Laws, Acts of Trade, Molasses and Sugar Acts all failed in their purposes as did the Stamp Act, and the colonials refused to bow the neck to the yoke and answered tyranny—backed by Britain's naval and military might—by boycott, organized evasion and repudiation, and, later, open revolt and war. The shortsighted English, through "ingenious restrictive" measures, thoroughly exasperated the colonists, but even the British acts designed to suppress American initiative and activities in the realm of shipbuilding and ocean trade failed in their objective (these acts totaled thirty during a period of 120 years); for the American merchant marine, in the number of its ships and men, steadily increased until at the outbreak of the Revolution there were more people in Maine and New Hampshire engaged in shipbuilding and navigation than there were in agriculture. David A. Wells, in *OUR MERCHANT MARINE*, says that Massachusetts owned one seagoing vessel for every hundred of its inhabitants. Moreover, these ships generally went to sea well armed and manned for their own protection—to avoid capture by pirates, foreign foes, and revenue cutters; therefore, colonial merchant vessels schooled their seamen in marine warfare, and American merchant ships hastily fitted out as privateers were an important and active factor in the struggle of the colonies for independence.

*The Fisheries — a Nursery for the
American Mercantile Marine*

Fishing is one of the earliest forms of hunting for food, and as men were surely hunters before they were cultivators, it has been said that the "fisheries is the oldest industry in the world." Although about three-quarters of the earth's surface is covered by water, the great fishing grounds of the world are almost entirely within waters limited to a depth of about two hundred fathoms (1,200 feet) and principally in waters not deeper than one hundred fathoms (600 feet), and it is improbable that any great abundance of fish is to be found in waters beyond these limits. Therefore, the world's great commercial fisheries, known as "deep-sea fisheries," are, in fact, hunting grounds for fish on what are termed the "banks of the oceans" and "the shelves of the continents" in deep water that in relation to the depths in mid-ocean is not deep at all. When man first ventured out to sea, it was probably in some sort of dugout to hunt fish, and when America was first discovered by white men, they found that the red aborigines were fishermen not only experienced in hunting for seafood in the ocean off the coast but also actually adept at putting out to sea in fragile canoes and capturing whales.

Fisheries have played a vital part in the destiny of many nations, and the countries that have led and developed in the realm of deep-sea fisheries have grown to be maritime powers. Fishing not only provided food for a people (and fertilizer for growing crops) but also prepared the way for sea trade, and the search for better fishing grounds led to exploration and discovery. The effect of fisheries on the modern world and civilization is inconceivably great. We are told that the growth of the all-powerful Hanseatic League came "from the small beginnings of the herring fisheries of Scania," and it is well known that the rise of the Dutch to the status of a great sea power in the seventeenth century followed "their predominance in the fisheries of the North Sea." Sir William Monson, British admiral in King James I's reign (1603-1625), who was in command of the fleet on the "Narrow Seas" and was sent on an expedition to find the lairs of pirates on the British coast and surrounding islands and utterly destroy them and their nefarious operations, wrote: "It is the fish taken upon his Majesty's coasts that is the only cause of the increase of shipping in Europe; and he that hath the trade of fishing becomes mightier than all the world besides in the number of ships." The countries of western Europe learned during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that by fostering the fisheries in a nationalistic sense, they would also encourage the training of seamen and the building of ships. The fisheries were the foundation on which practically all the leading maritime powers were built—naval and commercial.

Throughout the Middle Ages, salt fish played an important part in the economy, trade, and food of European nations. It was the Lenten fare of Catholic peoples and was generally used on certain days; it was, moreover, part of the rations of armies in the field and, with salt meat, was the winter food of the northern countries. When Britain turned Protestant and its fishing operations declined, with a pronounced weakening in the size and strength of the fishing fleet, the nation encountered what was perhaps its greatest humiliation at sea. We are told that the Tudors "feared a loss of sea power from the decline of the fisheries which followed the reformation; and by various measures, including the so-called 'Political Lent,' sought to give a new impetus to the fisheries." The English, from the days that they learned of the connection between a fisheries fleet and a naval force, particularly as to (1) the number of trained and hardy seamen available and (2) a knowledge of the waters, sought "to assert a British dominion over the North Sea." A British historian writes, "Throughout the history of Great Britain, the fisheries have not merely been a 'nursery' for the mercantile marine and the royal navy but have directly contributed to the fighting forces at sea in times of war—and this from the days of the Cinque Ports when the fishermen acquired their privileges in return for naval service." (Around 1930, the annual value of fishery products for the entire

world was "conservatively" estimated by authorities at about \$800,000,000; but it is significant that Japan was the foremost fishing nation of the world, followed by North America—United States, Canada, Newfoundland, and Labrador—with Great Britain a good third.)

The world's first great fishing ground was in the waters of the North Sea in proximity to Britain, Scandinavia, Denmark, and Holland. Adventurous fishermen looking for bigger hauls in less crowded waters fished off the Norwegian coast "up North," they worked off Iceland, and in the early sixteenth century Basque fishermen frequented the northeast American coast and, being so far from home, salted their catch ashore, so that they could return with it in an edible condition. Portuguese and French fishermen—from Roman Catholic countries—quickly followed as did Englishmen. Soon the coast of Newfoundland, Labrador, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, and Maine had its landing and curing stations, which were in use during the fishing season and then abandoned as the vessels sailed for home in the fall with their salted fish. The Newfoundland Banks gradually became acknowledged as the best fishing grounds in the northwestern Atlantic, and as the sixteenth century advanced English fishermen worked on the Banks in increasing numbers and thus probably inspired Sir Humphrey Gilbert to make his attempt to plant an English colony at St. John's, Newfoundland, in 1583. In the seventeenth century, English firms sent fishing expeditions from prominent ports to the Western Ocean, but occasionally financed fishermen to settle on the American continent at points from the Cape Cod, Plymouth, and Massachusetts Bay regions as far northeast as well up the coast of Labrador. We are told, "Great fishing firms from the Channel Islands made settlements on the south coast of Labrador, and [at the close of the century] Major George Cartwright, from England, opened stations as far north as Sandwich Bay." Cartwright, Labrador, is presumably named after him.

Capt. John Smith, following his memorable exploratory voyage of 1614, preached fish, ships, and settlements in New England; moreover, he proved by his personal experience in fishing off the American coast (and in curing his fish ashore at Pemaquid, Maine) that the fishery was a profitable business. (Smith also found whales "so thick and so easy of approach" that he "turned aside" from his exploring and deep-sea fishing operations "to take them," but was unsuccessful because of a lack of equipment.) The Banks fishermen who had seasonal drying and salting stations along the coast of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Labrador did not establish settlements on the land, with their families (who had a year-round residence), and did not build up an industry solely American, with the ports, shipyards, shore plants, homes, and development associated with permanent occupancy; nevertheless, they did operate to turn the minds of many Europeans to the northern "American Islands," in whose adjacent waters, it was proven, was wealth that could be gained by courageous and hard-working men. The products of the sea—not to mention those of the forests and the trading in furs—were probably, in the ultimate, apt to be much surer, more lasting, and more profitable to settlers than the finding of gold, in which the Spaniards were interested solely, in the more southerly part of the New World. In the North was a living to be made by honest work; in the South lay all the uncertainty of the gambler's life. Again, in the northern part of the New World, which after 1614 was named New England, was freedom to be gained by real settlers and colonists; freedom from the cramping domination of Europe, which affected every phase of man's life—economic, social, mental, religious, and political.

The terrifically cold winter experienced by the Popham colonists at the exposed mouth of the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) in 1607-1608, following a similar experience of the French on the St. Lawrence at St. Croix and Port Royal in Canada, discouraged emigrants from settling on the New England or Canadian coast as far north as 44°. The Pilgrims who landed at Plymouth near the end of 1620 were actually heading for the Hudson River, which they had heard from Henry Hudson and Dutch fur traders had a much more "moderate climate" than Maine in the winter. Notwithstanding the agricultural predilections of the Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth Colony proprietors, the New England emigrants were both thrifty and fish-minded to a degree from the first. Later, through necessity, they took cod, halibut, and mackerel very seriously into their calculations. Being Protestants and Dissenters, the Puritans

and Pilgrims were opposed to all Roman Catholic dietary practices, especially those emanating from papal or established church authority; but many of the Pilgrims had lived in Holland, where fish was a staple and economic article of food, and the rank and file of the Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonists were hardheaded businessmen and traders. The fisheries and the forests, with furs obtained from the Indians by barter, proved to be their prime assets in commerce, and aside from the furs shipped to the mother country, dried fish and rough lumber formed the basis of their earliest overseas trade with England, other European countries, and the West Indies. They bartered with the Indians for furs as did all the earlier settlers on the North American continent, but whereas the Dutch and French colonists on the Hudson and St. Lawrence traded almost exclusively in pelts and built no ships, the English settlers, from the earliest days of the Popham Colony in 1607, were fish- and ship-minded, and the bulk of their trade during the entire colonial era was the product of deep-sea fisheries and of their forests.

The names given by the early settlers in New England to the towns they founded reflect their interest in the sea and in fisheries. Boston, the prime center of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, was named after Boston, a seaport on the River Witham in Lincolnshire, four miles from the North Sea (England's greatest fishing waters) and famous for its deep-sea and coastal fisheries; also agricultural produce. Plymouth was a prominent port and fisheries center on the Devonshire (south of England) coast. Both Weymouth and Dorchester were important fishing ports in Dorsetshire on England's south shore. Gloucester was named after a port on the River Severn in western England, whose fisheries were valuable, and Ipswich was a town in Suffolk, on the east coast of England, that engaged in fishing and trading with the Continent. English fishing companies or groups of either fishermen or men with a yen for fishing founded many New England towns and villages, and outside of the Massachusetts Bay group of early settlements, the New Hampshire coast and Dover on the Piscataqua were colonized by fishermen. Up the coast, Winter Harbor at the mouth of the Saco River and Pemaquid in Maine, among others, were—like the Isles of Shoals, or Smyth's Isles—entirely fishing settlements. On Cape Cod, Yarmouth (named after Norfolk's greatest herring-fishing port), Barnstable (after Barnstable, Devon, England), and many other villages were named after English communities where the fisheries were of importance.

It appears that Dorchester, in the Inner Bay, was the Massachusetts Bay Colony's first community "that set upon a trade of fishing," and it is said that this settlement was "little more than a transference to New England soil of Dorset, England, fishing interests." Scituate, in the Plymouth Company domain, was settled by a similar company, while "the rocky peninsula of Marblehead," with its ample harbor (between Boston and Cape Ann—with its Gloucester), originally "settled" in 1629, later "attracted fisher-folk from Cornwall and the Channel Islands, who cared neither for Lord Bishop nor for Lord Brethren." Roger Conant (1593-1679), who, with a few of the early emigrants to a Cape Ann (Puritan), Colony, had "resolved to stay" in New England when most of the colonists returned home, was from Dorchester, England, and in 1626 he planted settlements at Beverly and Salem. These communities were for the expressed purpose of accommodating Banks fishermen in the wintertime and for raising crops and cattle for food. In 1628 a patent for the Salem settlement was granted to the Dorchester Company, which was owned by English fishing merchants. The New England colonists found by experience that many of the ideas of the original British proprietors did not operate to give them the self-supporting dignity and prosperity that they desired, and only when conditions that led to the civil war developed in England around 1640-1641—and the colonies were pretty much thrown on their own—did they take to the sea in full seriousness for a means of livelihood and the promotion of colonial prosperity through the fisheries and forest products transported to overseas markets in their own ships, built, commanded, and manned by their own men. It was the harvest of the sea—and not agricultural crops or returns from stock-raising—that, coupled with the marketable products from forest lands, gained for the New Englanders the means of obtaining tools, clothing, and desired commodities from abroad and

the few extra comforts, or semi-luxuries, of life over and above the necessities for a healthful and productive existence.

The Massachusetts Bay Colony passed laws in 1652 in regard to the quality of materials and labor put into its ships and required surveys and certification, and how important the colony deemed its fisheries is proven by the decrees of the Puritan lawgivers. It has been said that "the prosperity and perhaps the very life of the American settlements hung upon the fisheries"; that the "jealous care for the quality of the product [fish] was due to a knowledge that the foundations of the colonies really rested on the decks of fishing smacks." The fisheries were subjected to attention in the public interest along lines of quality of product and the market, and the development of the industry was encouraged in many ways by the General Court. Beginning in 1639, fishing vessels were exempted from "all charges for a period of seven years"; fishermen and ship carpenters were excused from serving the public on "training days." When alewives were taken at the weirs, the fishermen were to be served at a price fixed by law before any were offered to the public, and the interests of the commonwealth (in fishing enterprises) were placed ahead of those of individuals or of small communities when the fishermen had need of "bait." Land was set aside for fish-curing stages, and pasture was provided for the cattle that fishermen owned but could not attend to while at sea. Prior to 1648, fishermen, on coming ashore "to make"—salt, dry, or cure—their catch, were allowed to land anywhere and do all things required, including the cutting of timber and the location and construction of stages, regardless of who owned the land. They were privileged beings engaged in a preferential industry, and after 1648 they still held the same right of freedom of action, but they were then required to pay the owner of the land for its use and for the timber cut.

In the early colonial days, the vessels used for deep-sea fishing were very small. Building facilities, iron, rope, canvas, and many essential materials were decidedly limited—as were funds. Yet boats were built of an ever-increasing size to fish farther offshore, and the Indians called them "the winged canoes of the pale-faces." Being limited to small and relatively unseaworthy craft for long years and determined "to fish the Banks," colonial fishermen, through necessity, exhibited a vast amount of courage as they developed—the hard way—knowledge and knack in the handling of their craft at sea. These early American fishermen fought not only "Old Man Ocean" and all the perils of the deep but also pirates on the high seas, lurking and vengeful red Indians (in King Philip's War and afterwards) as they approached the land, and at times the naval ships or privateers of powers, such as France and Spain, with which England at the time might be at war. Shipbuilders, fishermen, and sailors were compelled to develop initiative not only in methods of production and use but also in the requirements of obtaining and using substitute materials. They showed resourcefulness with their industry, and the life at sea demanded a rare form of intelligent courage and quick thinking that boldly expressed themselves in daring acts and maneuvers but not in recklessness or foolhardiness—if the men were to survive. The mainstay of the shipbuilding industry in America was the fishing business; also, the fisheries proved to be the nursery for the gradually growing American mercantile marine, and it was the fishermen who largely supplied the captains, officers, and crews of the trading ships.

The early offshore New England fishermen were generally shipbuilders also. They cut the framing and planking needed for their boats in the common woods and built their craft in a favorable and often protected setting during the winter, or off season for fishing. Their cost was for paint, sailcloth, cordage, ironwork, etc. The hulls were built in the woods and dragged (later by oxen) on sledges to tidewater for launching. In 1645, Massachusetts sent her first fishing craft to "the Banks," and this pioneer fleet was described as "a ship and other vessels." The shallop used for coastal fishing, transport, and trading was not suitable for this well-offshore, deep-sea service in waters that could be very rough, so a "ketch" was developed resembling the Dutch "pinkie" (having a hull rounded at both ends in distinction from square-stern craft). These ketches, decked over with a cabin aft, were beamy and had a good deep

hold and a good draft; they proved to be excellent and reliable sea boats, with good speed as well as capacity, and were well adapted for general trading and for fishing on the Banks.

Although the New England colonies, as the years advanced, turned out some sizable vessels for use as general traders and built many ships for English owners during the seventeenth century, the number of such craft launched was probably not large. An early prejudice—prompted by jealousy and fears for the home industry—developed in England against ships that were built at low cost in the American colonies, and for many long years the general trading of the settlements was small outside of that in conjunction with the fisheries. By the middle of the seventeenth century, ships were being built not only in the Massachusetts Bay towns and Plymouth but also on the Merrimac and Piscataqua rivers and at all fisheries centers. Newbury, near the mouth of the Merrimac, was important as a shipbuilding point in 1650, and there are records showing that as early as 1652 a sawmill “producing oak plank for shipbuilding” was in operation at Salisbury “up the river and among the timber.” The vessels were used “for the fisheries and deep-sea trading” as well as some for the coastal service. From the days of the earliest settlers, the area around the mouth of the Piscataqua and the Isles of Shoals was a great fisheries center. Fishing vessels were built at Dover in the mid-1620’s, and the section that later became Portsmouth, N. H., and Kittery, Maine, has an old and interesting historic record in the production of ships and the development of men to build, navigate, and handle them—first for the fisheries and later for general ocean trade.

The northern part of the continent of North America was first used and settled by men interested in the fisheries, and for many long years the colonies were supported by fish, furs, and timber. Capt. John Smith and others favored the fisheries off the New England coast in preference to those on the Newfoundland Banks farther to the east. Bartholomew Gosnold (1602) is responsible for naming the important Massachusetts cape after the codfish. Puritan Massachusetts, it has been said, was founded upon and owes its prosperity to “the sacred cod.” Baldwin refers to “the reign of Cod and God.” Historians tell us that Massachusetts took up codfishing seriously in 1670, but that “its growth was so rapid that within five years 4,000 men and 665 ships were engaged in the business.” That the fisheries have meant much to the development of New England is indicated by the motion made by John Rowe, the Boston merchant, on March 17, 1784, in the Representatives Hall of the old State House of Boston “that leave might be given to hang up the representation of a cod fish in the room where the House sit, as a memorial of the importance of the cod fishery to the welfare of this commonwealth, as had been usual formerly.” Leave was accordingly granted, and the same wooden emblem presented by Rowe still faces the speaker’s desk on Beacon Hill. That the Massachusetts ports still give recognition to the importance of the fisheries in the development of the colony and state and honor the men who have engaged in the industry and commerce is evidenced by the fact that on August 1, 1943, two thousand persons attended the annual commemoration ceremony at Gloucester, Mass., where a hundred wreaths were cast into the sea on the ebb tide, honoring the Gloucester fishermen who had died at sea during the past year and the eight thousand men sailing on fishing vessels hailing from that port who had lost their lives in line of duty since Gloucester became interested in the fisheries.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the fisheries was a nursery for the American mercantile marine just as the fisheries had proved to be a training field and source of supply to man the ships of the Dutch, British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese fleets and to furnish the best men for the British merchant service. Operations of foreign fishermen to the Banks were seasonal, and the men did little but fish and then prepare their catch and deliver it to market, living on the fruits of their season’s hard work in the fisheries during the winter months and until it was time to embark once more in the spring. For the New England fisherman, life was fuller, harder, more complex, and his work far more varied. In the wintertime, he worked outdoors as long as the light would permit—logging, shipbuilding, and with his stock; in the evenings, he was kept busy indoors—making and conditioning his tools, equipment, supplies, and rig for both fishing and shipbuilding. The early New England fisherman was as versatile as he was industrious, and he grew to be as ingenious

as he was self-reliant; he was "on his own." What was done, he had to do himself, and to accomplish much in a limited time taxed his mental and physical resources, but produced a man unequalled in the history of nations in building and navigating vessels; in fishing, curing, and marketing his catch; and in trading ability at home or abroad, whether his cargo was entirely fish or part fish and part barrel staves, lumber, or other forest products. In a little vessel of his own construction the early New England colonist would brave any tempest while fishing on the North Atlantic; navigate his ship and sail her with a minimum crew and expense, safely and relatively quickly, to any port where there was a market for his cargo; drive a good bargain, usually by barter; and sail home at the end of a profitable voyage or call at some intermediate port en route, either outbound or homebound, if such procedure would prove to be the most profitable—considering the time involved and his own plans for a succeeding voyage. The fisheries did more than make sailors; it was a school that turned out courageous, resourceful, and quick-thinking men, excellently trained commanders, and keen businessmen. From such a school graduated seamen who took American colonial and early built United States ships for general trading on the Seven Seas and revolutionized the construction and handling of merchant sail the world over. It was American shipmasters and officers from "the fisheries" stock and from the nursery of the American merchant marine who taught the world, including the proud, conceited, and self-satisfied Britishers, how ships could and should be sailed to save time and make money.

The profitable sale of the products of whaling caused a rapid growth of that branch of the fisheries in the colonies and early in the eighteenth century opened up a type of marine adventure that produced unusually rugged, courageous, daring, and resourceful seamen. The colonial whalers went far afield. In 1751 they went as far north as Disco Island in Baffin Bay; in defiance of the corsairs haunting the waters and ignoring the profitable lure of the slave trade, Americans in 1763 were taking whales off the Guinea coast of Africa. It was said, significantly, that in 1767 no less than fifty whalers crossed the equator "by way of experience." The whalers were the real explorers of the Seven Seas in the eighteenth and throughout a good part of the nineteenth century. The colonials of this period were people who either had crossed or were the descendants of those who had crossed the Atlantic looking for new lands and opportunities, and it was the spirit of America to widen the horizon and to adventure afield. Spears writes:

When Captain Shields led the way around Cape Horn, he not only aroused a spirit of emulation in all other whalers, but he inspired a whole people. As they listened to the story, the people of the interior were reminded that the streams be-

fore their doors were dimpling highways to the sea and the wonder world beyond its borders; and there were no other highways worth mention in the country in those days.

Whaling was generally looked upon as a profitable business for "he-men," and life on a whaler was no job for a weakling or for any man who was fearful of hazard or who was unwilling to sacrifice much in the quest of oil. Whaling voyages were generally of long duration, but a good "greasy" voyage often made the members of the crew, through the operation of the "lay" system of compensation (by means of which all became partners in the venture), rich enough to buy a share in a whaler. It was said of Nantucket, America's leading whaling port: "There is no poverty there, but every man is a capitalist." The fundamental requirements for whaling and privateering were somewhat similar. Both necessitated adventurous and hazardous cruises for gain. The whaler hunted for the giant mammals of the ocean, some of which put up a terrific fight before they were captured and killed, and the risk of the battle was often as great as that from the cannon of an enemy ship that an armed merchantman sought to take as a prize.

The whaler offered not only a unique chance for a youth to gain knowledge of ships and the sea and experience the thrills of adventure, with the gamble of "big money," but also an opportunity to win rapid promotion and substantial recognition. Whalers carried more petty officers than any other ships, and we are told that many a young man of inherent

ability who joined up with a whaler as a "greenhorn" returned from the voyage "proudly wearing the badge of a boatsteerer." In a country in which there were many bond servants looking for a chance to work, buy their freedom quickly, regain their self-respect with a measure of recognition), and obtain an opportunity through earned capital to rise in the world, such an occupation as whaling—even more than privateering—was highly esteemed. However, whaling required fearless daring, prowess, and fortitude as well as quickness in thought and action; so it is no wonder that the seamen with whaling experience were considered the most desirable catch for the British press gangs and that whalemens, credited with being the best sailors afloat, were said to make the best fighters on naval vessels.

Colonial deep-sea fishermen manned to a great degree the American privateers during the War of the Revolution, and their bravery against tremendous odds, their unique audacity, and their outstanding ability to handle vessels under sail brought forth the plaudits as well as the grudging but sportsmanlike admiration of even the enemy. American whalemens, who from the first took the initiative and led all nations in strange seas on every part of the globe, were merely American fishermen specializing in a particular field that involved very long voyages. Edmund Burke's famous apostrophe to the Yankee whalemens in a speech delivered March 22, 1775, in the House of Commons is well known. He said that no sea was too remote and no climate too severe—hot or cold—for their field of actions and history-making accomplishments and that no sea or climate had not witnessed their toil. Neither the perseverance of the Dutch, the nervous activities of the Latins, "nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise" had ever carried industry based upon the perilous mode of deep-sea fishing and whaling to the admirable achievements obtained by the New Englanders—then in revolt against the mother country. In the War of 1812, once more deep-sea fishermen and whalemens manned the American privateers and wrought havoc on the merchant marine of the Mistress of the Seas. This war was, in fact, a seaman's war, and one of its prime causes lay in the admitted superiority of the American sailor and in England's persistent attempts to obtain, by force, seamen from the American deep-sea fisheries, whalers, and general traders for the British Navy. Britannia proved by its acts during the War of the Revolution, the years following the birth of the young republic, and the War of 1812 that it considered Yankee sailors from the nursery of New England fisheries the best-schooled, most resourceful, and "by long odds the most capable seamen in the world."

In the latter clipper ship days, the demand for big ships in large numbers, each carrying a veritable army of men, followed a period when a great change had occurred in the building and operating of ships for the fisheries. In the old days, a boy would take to the sea as naturally as a duck takes to water, and ships and the sea would constitute his life work. He would receive training on how to navigate and take his position at sea. He would learn the hard and only way—by experience and an increasing measure of responsibility—how to handle and operate a vessel under all conditions of wind, sea (temperature, weather, fog, and ice), and lading. From the first he was determined to advance from the forecabin to the quarterdeck, and he knew not only that he had a chance but also that the speed and extent of promotion depended solely upon himself and his demonstrated fitness. Moreover, from the start of his career, he was more or less a partner in every marine venture; there was no tradition to cramp, stifle, or swamp him—no class distinction and limitation as in Europe; he was the master of his own fate and free to carve out a future for himself that could be anything that hard work, self-sacrifice, developed talents, and proven ability could produce. The colonial and early American fisheries gave to the United States its greatest sailors and the forebears of its outstanding shipmasters.

When, following the conclusion of the War of 1812, conditions gradually changed in regard to (1) foreign trading, (2) the forecabin, and (3) the opportunities for and encouragement to American boys to follow the sea, a different class of men gradually took over the forecabins of American ships and the transatlantic packets, and the low moral caliber of their British crews had much to do with the change. By the time of the California Gold Rush

and the real clipper ship decade (1850-1860), practically no American boys were going to sea to mix with the "scum" and "guttersnipes" of the forecastle, a large number of whom were picked up in dives and carted aboard drunk. These were the days of bucko mates, belying-pin soup, and ship discipline by terrorism. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the era of the clippers certain authorities asserted that the fisheries did not supply sailors for the American fleet of big, fast merchantmen. American boys would not have anything to do with the Atlantic packets during the thirty years that preceded the real clipper ship era, but in the days of the young republic ambitious youths from fishing towns entered the merchant service and rose to officer and command American traders on the Seven Seas. Bentley, in 1816, writing of Marblehead fishermen, thought that they were too independent and apt to be troublesome on a deep-sea merchantman, but he adds, "No men are equal to them in the things they know how to do." Some marine writers around the middle of the nineteenth century maintained that fishermen did not make good merchant seamen, as they "were not used to discipline"; they should have added that New England seamen would not stand for one moment the physical abuse that was meted out to the forecastle hands when big crews meant mostly foreigners and "gutter and dive sweepings," many with a criminal record. Some of the clipper ship captains said that it was generally easier "to make a good sailor out of a landsman than a fisherman," but one of these articulate masters was Capt. Josiah Cressy of the famed *Flying Cloud*, and he himself was a Marblehead boy with a fisheries background. The colonial and early American fisherman lived a hard life at sea; he could rough it with anyone, but he would not stand abuse or unwarranted disciplinary measures. Moreover, he craved freedom and independence; he had no use for the wage system; he wanted his "lay," or his share of the profits, whether it be large or small; he desired to feel the dignity of a partner in any venture and to profit by his own work. In plain, old-fashioned words, the Yankee liked "fishing on his own hook." Notwithstanding his refusal to knuckle under and conform to the disciplinary demands made of the big crews of the clippers, the American-schooled fisherman was the best sailor that ever stepped upon the deck of a sailing ship, and the colonial fisheries was, in truth, the nursery for the American mercantile marine and the earliest school for both its resourceful shipbuilders and its unequaled shipmasters.

The Dutch Settlement on the Hudson

Hendrick Hudson, after vain efforts to reach China via the Arctic in 1606-1608, rounded Sandy Hook on September 3, 1609, in the little *Halve Maen* (*Half Moon*) and discovered the river that now bears his name on this his third attempt to find the "northwest passage." He was impressed with what is now New York Harbor and the country in general and wrote of finding "a fruitful, pleasant region of islands and great rivers." Also, "This territory is the finest for cultivation that I ever in my life set foot upon, and the situation well adapted for shipping." Hudson sailed up the "Great River," but after traveling about one hundred forty miles inland, due north, ran into "sand bars and shallows," which convinced the navigator that "despite the tides of this strait-like inlet," it was indeed a river and that he had again lost the long-sought northwest passage. Reluctantly, he returned to the ocean and shortly thereafter set sail for home. Robert Juet, first mate of the *Halve Maen*, wrote of trading with the Indians up the river: "Many brought us Beaver Skinnes and Otters Skinnes which we bought for Beads, Knives and Hatchetts." Historians tell us that Hendrick Hudson's official report that "a vast trade with the Indians for furs could be established" so interested the Hollanders that the United Netherlands (whose independence had just been acknowledged) claimed the "newly discovered country."

It is alleged, however, that in 1524 (thirty-two years after Columbus' discovery of America) the first European dropped anchor in New York Harbor. He was an Italian navigator of Florence, Giovanni da Verrazano, in the service of Francis I, king of France. Verrazano, in the *Dauphine*, also in quest of a route to Cathay, reported "a mighty well-guarded river" running into the sea. Indians interfered with the French surveying party upstream, and the *Dauphine* set sail from the "Grand River" of "New Gallia" and, after visiting what was supposedly the site of Newport, abandoned the voyage of exploration and returned home. Estevan (or Esteban) Gomez, a Portuguese, sailing under the flag of Spain and under orders of Charles V, was apparently in New York Bay in 1525 and charted the mouth of the river, which he named Rio de San Antonio of "Tierra de Esteban Gomez." French vessels traded with the Indians in this vicinity intermittently during the balance of the sixteenth century, and an Englishman, Thomas Hood, signed a map in 1592 on which Sandy Hook is designated as Cape de las Arenas.

Hendrick Hudson was not Dutch at all but an English navigator and explorer, whose name was Henry Hudson. He spent some time trying to reach China by a short trade route via the Arctic (or, as was said by contemporaries, by way of the North Pole). He became known as "the father of the English whale fisheries" at Spitsbergen and made voyages to find a northeast passage for the Muscovy, going as far north as $75^{\circ} 30'$. In the fall of 1608, Hudson was invited to Amsterdam and was employed by the Dutch to sail for them and find a passage to China by either the northeast or northwest route, which had been suggested as possible by the explorations of the English navigators Sir Martin Frobisher in 1576 and John Davis in 1585. Hudson sailed from Texel in the *Half Moon* April 6, 1609, with a crew of eighteen or twenty men, and in early May was in the Barents Sea among the ice. As the crew became mutinous, Hudson put about and sailed for North Virginia "to seek a passage in about 40° N. Lat.," which, it was written, "he thought existed because of a letter and map sent to him by his friend Capt. John Smith" (then at Jamestown, Va.). Hudson "set face toward the Chesapeake and China." He put into the Kennebec River in July, apparently for water, and sailing again continued down the coast to $37^{\circ} 36'$, returning to the big river, the mouth of which he had passed. On September 3, 1609, in $40^{\circ} 30'$, he entered the bay of what is now New York and went up the river to about the point where Albany now stands, surveying the country and proceeding until he became satisfied that this course did not, as hoped, "lead to the South Seas or China." On October 4, the *Half Moon* set sail for Holland and on November 7 arrived at Dartmouth, where she was seized by the English Government; Hudson and the other British members of the crew were commanded not to leave England again unless they were in the service of their own country. This 1609 voyage of Henry (Hendrick) Hudson, financed by the Dutch, was important in many respects, not the least of which was the exploding of the authoritative Hakluyt's theory, or myth, that "near 40° N. latitude" there was "a narrow isthmus, formed by the Sea of Verrazano"—like that of Tehuantepec (in the southern part of the Gulf of Mexico) or Panama.

An English company was formed to support Hudson in what is referred to as his "fourth attempt to reach China by a northern sea passage." He sailed from London April 17, 1610, on the *Discovery* of 55 tons; in June he was in the strait that now bears his name and entered Hudson Bay on August 3. After three months spent in exploring the bay, the *Discovery* went into winter quarters, but following the thaw in the spring of 1611 Hudson had trouble with a mutinous crew, with the result that on June 22 he and eight men (some of them sick) were forcibly put ashore. It is evident that all of these men later died. On the voyage home, the members of the crew, sailing under Robert Bylot as elected master, fought among themselves; some were killed in a fight with the Eskimos or starved to death, and "the weary remnant of a once strong English crew" was promptly jailed upon arrival in Britain.

Hudson evidently referred to the river that now bears his name as "The Great River of the Mountains." Subsequently, Dutch traders called it variously the Mauritius, the River of the Manhattees (after Manna-hata, which was the Indian name for the island now known as Manhattan), the Rio de Montaigne, and the North River. (The latter name still

holds to this day for the lowermost part between New York and the Jersey shore as the water between New York and Long Island is designated the East River.) Why the Dutch named the Hudson the "North River" is difficult to comprehend. The Delaware they called the South River, but the Hudson was never the northern limit of their claimed province as was the Delaware the south, for the Connecticut River seems to have been what they considered a geographical border for their colony. However, the Hudson was "to the north" of the great South River and, moreover, flowed to their prime settlement from the north.

In 1610 or 1611, the first vessel was dispatched from Holland to Hudson's River with merchandise for trading with the Indians, and a lucrative trade with peltries sprang up. Hendrik Christiaensen and Adriaen Block, two Dutch mariners, are credited with being the first of the Dutch traders, and it is said that they reached Hudson's River on their second voyage in the fall of 1613 in two high-pooped sailing vessels named the *Fortyn* and *Tigre*. Captain Christiaensen proceeded up the river in the *Fortyn*, traded with the Indians for furs, and founded Fort Nassau, the first Dutch trading post in America. Captain Block, with the *Tigre*, evidently remained at Manhattan, and during the winter the ship caught fire. As a result, Block and his crew built log cabins ashore for shelter and a new little vessel, the *Orrust*, of great historic interest, as she is credited with being "the second sailing ship constructed in North America." The merchants of Amsterdam and Hoorn formed the United New Netherland Company and on October 14, 1614, received from the states-general a three-year monopoly of the Dutch fur trade in the "newly discovered countries in America between New France and Virginia, the seacoast whereof lies in the latitude of from forty to forty-five degrees, now named New Netherland, as is seen by a Figurative Map, hereunto annexed." In this connection, it is interesting to note that King James I of England, in 1606, had openhandedly made a grant to the Plymouth Company of Virginia of all land in North America between the 38th and 45th parallels of latitude north and to the London Company of land between the 34th and 41st parallels.

Adriaen Block (also spelled Blok and Bloex), known as a Dutch explorer-trader, is said to have built his famous little "long yacht" during the winter of 1614-1615 upon the "upper reaches of the river" for his personal use. She was a sloop-rigged, light-draft, "protected-waters" craft capable of navigating on the river and sound, fitted with leeboards and of "sixteen tons burthen." Some writers say that tradition gave her a length of 44 ft. on the deck and 38 ft. on the keel and a beam of 11½ ft., which probably overstates her real size, particularly as to length. Little is definitely known of the vessel. Historians say that the boat was named the *Orrust* (*Restless*); several mention that she was built to replace the Dutch-built *Tigre* (or *Tiger*), "which had been damaged beyond repair." References to the craft seem to place her definitely as a small river and sound boat of little carrying capacity, but one historian says that "after exploring the coasts of New England and Delaware Bay, she sailed for Holland with a cargo of furs." John H. Morrison, in his HISTORY OF NEW YORK SHIPYARDS, says that "Capt. Adrian Block was sent out in 1613 in command of the ship *Tiger* by some merchants of Holland, in company with two other vessels, to New Amsterdam to trade with the Indians, but through an accident his ship took fire while lying in the bay and preparing to return home." Morrison says that Captain Block built a "small yacht" named the *Orrust*, which he used for exploring the coast and Long Island Sound. This little vessel is said to have "sailed around Cape Cod to Nahant" and returned to Manhattan, making landings at Visschel's Hoek (now Montauk Point) and on Block Island, which still bears the navigator's name. The dimensions Morrison gives for the vessel are seemingly erroneous, viz., length 44½ ft. and beam 16½ ft. He also says that the "yacht" was built at the lower end of Manhattan Island, and other writers have said that "Block's shipyard"—if it could be called such—was probably on the bank of a creek (De Heere Gracht), which is said still to flow "beneath the pavement of Broad Street," New York City. The *Orrust* is generally credited with being the first vessel to brave the dangerous rip tides of Hell Gate, which Block named Hellegat, and explore the Connecticut and Thames

rivers and Narragansett Bay. Captain Block's chart, prepared after an exploratory voyage as far to the northeast as Cape Cod Bay, shows a fairly accurate knowledge of both shores of Long Island Sound.

It is interesting to note that Sir Samuel Argall, returning to Jamestown, Va., in the well-armed and manned English merchant ship *Treasurer* (130 tons) in November 1613 after destroying the French settlements on the Penobscot, St. Croix Island, and Port Royal, Nova Scotia, put into the Hudson to reconnoiter and here found the Dutch ship *Fortune* anchored off Manhattan Island, where a few men were busily engaged on the construction of a small vessel or sizable boat. Argall, the so-called buccaneer, reported that he found the leaders of the party to be two Dutch fur-trading captains named Adriaen Block and Hendrik Christiaensen, who with their ships, the *Fortune* and the *Tiger*, had been about to sail back to Holland with good loads of furs when the *Tiger* was destroyed by fire. With winter coming on, they had built hurried shelters for the crew of the burned ship and had set to work to build "a small 16-ton yacht for the journey home." Argall, under the circumstances, certainly did not act like a pirate; he did not seize the *Fortune* and her valuable cargo of furs and did not stop work on the yacht. We are told that he was content to censure the traders for trespassing on the territory of King James of England and that he made the men haul down their Dutch flag and run up that of England. In any event, it is positive that he did not molest the Dutchmen, take any furs from them, or interfere in any way with their work. However, he impressed upon them that they were poachers and must not continue to trespass on the Virginia domain of the king of England when the then emergency had been overcome.

The map of Adriaen Block presented to the states-general of The Netherlands in October 1614 (when an application was made by the newly organized Amsterdam Trading Company for trading monopolies) shows Niev Nederlandt extending from an indefinite big river, probably intended to be the Delaware (to the north of "Virginia"), to some other indeterminate region—a sort of "No Man's Land"—between big rivers, which lies to the west of Novae Franciae and is possibly intended to cover the Piscataqua, Kennebec, and Penobscot territory of Maine. This land was described by the Dutch as the "unoccupied" region lying between Virginia and Canada, and we are told that the first monopoly granted the Dutch company covered a region that extended from the Delaware to the Passamaquoddy. Some historians maintain that Block, during his explorations, went as far east as the Isles of Shoals and possibly saw the mouth of the Piscataqua, but this is extremely doubtful, and a point somewhere between Nahant and Cape Ann on the Massachusetts coast was evidently the extent of his explorations to the northeast. Although Block's map is ambitiously all-embracing as far as the territory designated as Niev Nederlandt is concerned, this does not mean that Block had explored the area, but rather that, in setting forth limits and boundaries, the hopes, requests, claims, and demands of individuals, of companies, and of nations were always made amply large to cope with any possibility of future development and to permit of reducing later by compromise between rival claimants. It is amusing to note that Block, who was made by Argall to haul down the Dutch flag at Manhattan (New York) in November 1613 and to acknowledge the rights of the English to all of Virginia (i.e., from Florida north to the St. Lawrence), should be responsible eleven months later for a map based on his own explorations and acquired hearsay or legendary knowledge, which claimed for the Dutch all of the continent of North America lying between the Delaware and what was probably intended to be the Penobscot. Block, it is said, upon his return from exploring Massachusetts Bay and other points on the coast to the east, met Christiaensen in the *Fortune* somewhere off Cape Cod, turned the *Orrust* over to Cornelius Jacobsen Mey, who had been second in command of the *Fortune*, and then Block and Christiaensen returned to Holland in the *Fortune*, while Mey took the *Orrust* back to Nieuw Amsterdam.

The *Fortyn* (*Fortune*) continued in trade between Holland and Hudson's River during the period 1615-1618, and among other little Dutch ships making voyages in this fur trade were the *Vosken* (*Little Fox*) and *Naehtegael* (*Nightingale*). The United New Netherland

Company apparently made no attempt to establish a permanent colony and, therefore, lost its monopoly.

In 1621 the Dutch West India Company was first chartered and was given a monopoly of the Dutch trade with the whole American coast; it was authorized to plant colonies and to govern them under a limited supervision of the states-general. This company, which from its organization had abundant capital, was destined to figure for many years as the dominant factor in the development—or rather exploitation—of the Dutch settlements on Hudson's River. In June 1623, New Netherland was formally made a province and the management of its affairs assigned to the Chamber of Amsterdam. In May of the following year (1624), the big Dutch ship *Nieuw Nederlandt* (Capt. Cornelius Jacobsen Mey) arrived in Hudson's River (then called the Mauritius) with the first permanent colonists aboard, consisting of 30 families—110 men, women, and children; also "farming implements, livestock, seeds, household effects, and trading goods." These colonists were mostly Protestant Walloon refugees who had fled from the Spanish Netherlands to escape the Inquisition, and they were required to be "loyal Reformed Calvinists, to obey orders, to convert the heathen, to live where they were told for six years, and to lend a hand in all communal enterprises." The *Nieuw Nederlandt* returned to Holland with "700 otter and 4,000 beaver skins valued at 27,000 guilders" aboard, and the Dutch fur trade was firmly established. In the summer of 1625, a second fleet, consisting of three ships protected by "an armed yacht" (deputized for this purpose by the Dutch Government), reached New Netherland; but the important fact about this convoy was that it transported "a great heard of cattle" and out of 103 head shipped, 100 arrived and were unloaded safely. We are told that this cattle, sent out by Pieter Evertsen Hulft, one of the directors of the Dutch West India Company, "was of the greatest service to the colonists and gave them considerable advantage over the Plymouth colonists of the same period." It was said a little later that "the Massachusetts colonists have to live on fish and water, but the Dutch of the New Netherlands have their beef, grain and milk."

On May 4, 1626, the *Meewtje* (*Little Sea Mew*) reached New Netherland with Pieter Minuit aboard, the newly appointed director-general of the colony, and he it was who, before the winter came, had not only built the stockade Fort Amsterdam, with its guns commanding the entrance to what are now known as the North (Hudson) and East rivers but also consummated the famous real estate deal with the Indians that was reported in the words: "Have bought the Island Manhattes from the wild men for the value of sixty guilders, it is 11,000 morgens in extent." The *Wapen van Amsterdam* (*Arms of Amsterdam*), which sailed from New Netherland on September 23, 1626, for Holland, was the first vessel clearing the new Dutch colonial port of which a copy of the manifest has been preserved. There is listed "7,246 beaver skins, 853 otter, 48 mink, 36 wildcat, 34 muskrat pelts" and "many logs of oak and nut wood."

In 1627, Director-General Minuit of the Dutch colony of New Netherland endeavored to trade with Governor Bradford of the British Plymouth Colony, offering to barter Dutch goods "either for beaver or any other wares or merchandise you should be pleased to deal for." Bradford replied that the New England colonists, whereas they would not "go about to molest or trouble you in anything," would not hesitate "to make prize" of anyone who should attempt "either to trade or plant" within their limits, and he specifically added: "We desire that you forbear to trade with the natives in this bay and rivers of Narragansett and Sowames, which is at our doors." Minuit's answer to this communication was friendly, but affirmed the right of the Dutch "to trade in those parts." Minuit asserted that, although the English colonists had certain authority derived from their king, the Dutch had similar rights and privileges given to them by the states-general of The Netherlands and that these they would use and defend. Later, Minuit made further overtures looking to friendly trading for the advantage of both the English and Dutch colonies, and he sent Bradford, as a good-will present, "a rundlet of sugar and two Holland cheeses." Bradford declined to accept an invitation to send a special representative to New Amsterdam to confer on the trade problem, saying, "One of our boats is abroad and we have much business at home." However, Minuit

was persistent and sent a delegate named De Rasiere to talk with Bradford. The English governor, who described the man in his letters as "of fair and genteel behavior," evidently agreed to the plan to open coastwise traffic between New England and New Amsterdam, and many ships voyaging between New England and Virginia stopped en route at the Dutch settlement at the mouth of the Hudson River.

The Dutch West India Company, which was primarily and almost solely interested in furs and skins, maintained a strict monopoly on all trade and fixed prices on all exports and imports. The annual exports of the colony more than doubled between 1624 and 1635, but it was said that "the total trade of 705,000 guilders barely paid a profit on the company's investment." The number of furs exported during the peak volume year was stated as "85,000 skins." However, the company made "big money" in other channels, and whereas the New Netherland Colony was branded as "a poor enterprise," the company made highly lucrative ventures in Brazil and elsewhere, and in 1628 the capture of seventeen Spanish galleons brought loot valued at twelve million guilders.

Some writers have said that around 1630 a vessel named the *Nieuw Nederlandt* was constructed on what is now the Manhattan bank of the East River with timber brought down from the upper Hudson. It is declared that prior to this time only a very few vessels—all small sloops, shallops, or what the Dutch termed "yachts"—had been built in New Netherland, and it is admitted that "compared with the ships of other nations, all Dutch vessels were small, owing to the shallow canals and coastal waters of the mother country." Yet we are told that the *Nieuw Nederlandt* was a very big ship; ridiculous statements have been made of her size, and one "historian" says 800 tons. We also read that, when the ship reached Holland, "she was greatly admired for her soundness and beauty of construction, but the company directors complained that her great size led to excessive operating costs," and that "the builders did not repeat the venture." John H. Morrison, in his HISTORY OF NEW YORK SHIPYARDS (1909), says:

The West India Company, who had the territorial right of trade with the colony, had built [about 1631] at Manhattan the ship *New Netherlands* "of about 600 tons," and it was in all probability the largest merchant vessel in the world at

the time, and was sent to Holland. She was fitted for carrying thirty guns. We find that the record shows that the building of this vessel was severely criticized at a later date as bad management on the part of the West India Company.

It is apparent that no such ship as described was ever built at New Netherland during the year, decade, or even the century stated and surely not at any time while the province was under Dutch rule. Incidentally, the date of construction, stated as 1631, was the year that the very marine-minded Massachusetts colonists launched their first vessel, the *Blessing of the Bay*. She was a "barke of 30 tons" and conspicuously different in size from the purely imaginary ship of from 600 to 800 tons (or from twenty to twenty-seven times bigger) written about so glibly by historians who fail to differentiate between legends of a Paul Bunyan variety and facts substantiated by records. The publicity in regard to this ship is based on legends and fanciful tales. The time and place of construction, the builders, and the size of the ship are all unknown. Tradition gives the credit for building this mammoth, mythical, and fantastic ship not only to the Dutch but also to the Belgians and the Swedes located somewhere in the New World—and there were positively no shipwrights of these nationalities in the Dutch colony of New Netherland around 1630. One historian says, "At New Amsterdam, the Dutch built many small boats for gathering furs on the Hudson, and they repaired ships coming to the port when there was need." As late as October 10, 1658, J. Aldrichs, writing from New Amsterdam to people in Holland regarding a "galliot" that was needed for river, sound, and coastal use, said, "We are not yet in condition to build such a craft here." At that time, however, it appears that there were several yards on the East River that occasionally built small craft for sound, harbor, and river work, but they were not large enough for transatlantic service, and few were of a size deemed necessary for any kind of deep-sea trading.

The Dutch were a great marine power at the time of the colonization of America and were certainly sea-minded. They described themselves upon their coinage as a nation whose "way is on the sea," and it is said that early in the seventeenth century "a thousand ships a year" were built in Holland. The Plymouth Pilgrims had lived in the seafaring atmosphere of Holland for many years "and had absorbed, to add to their inherent British interest in the sea, something of the Dutch aptitude for trade and ocean life." Records strongly suggest that the early Dutch colonists in America were discouraged in shipbuilding by the government of Holland, the mother country. Any vessels needed by the settlers were to be built in Holland, where, it was said, they could be constructed cheaply by competent shipwrights and riggers. Even though the Dutch West India Company established a small shipyard at New Amsterdam, where it apparently built a few ships and handled the repairing of Dutch vessels, it is evident that shipbuilding in America was never encouraged or developed by the Dutch during their occupancy of what became New York. This was seemingly due to pressure from the mother country, the efficiency of the shipbuilding industry in Holland, the low cost of transporting timber from the Baltic to Holland, and the lack of a supply of skilled shipyard labor at New Amsterdam and along the Hudson as a result of official discouragement of the emigration of any shipwrights.

Director-General Minuit was recalled to Holland in 1632 to answer the charge that he had been unduly partial to the patroons in his dealings and judgments. Wouter van Twiller, who replaced him in 1633, operated, it was said, "to promote only the selfish commercial policy of the company" and, it should be added, his personal fortune. As an indication of the marine activity of the New Netherland colony and the nature of the work performed in the shipyard of the Dutch West India Company in New Amsterdam (the only yard on Manhattan Island or the Hudson River) in the years 1633-1638, the following document is of interest and historic value. It is the "Return of the Ships Built and Repaired in New Netherland during the Administration of Wouter van Twiller."


Before me, *Cornelius van Tienhoven*, Secretary of New Netherland, appeared in presence of the undersigned witnesses, *Tymen Jansen*, ship-carpenter, about 36 years old, and with true christian words in stead and under promise of a solemn oath, if necessary, at the request of his Honor, Director General *Kieft*, declared, testified and deposed, that it is perfectly true that he, deponent, during the administration (of *Mr. van Twiller*) has worked as ship's carpenter and has been engaged on all old and new work which *Mr. Twiller* ordered to be made, to wit;

- Ao. 1633, the ship "*Southerck*" repaired and provided with new knees.
- Other carpenters have long worked on the ship "*Hope of Groeningen and Omlanden*."
- The yacht "*Hope*" captured Ao. 1632 by said *van Twiller* was entirely rebuilt and planked up higher.
- The yacht "*Prins Willem*" has been built.
- The yacht "*Amsterdam*" almost finished.
- A large open boat.
- In the yacht "*Wesel*" an orlop and caboose were made.

In the yacht "*Vreede*" the same.
 The boat "*Omwal*" at Fort Orange.
 The yacht with a mizzen sold to *Barent Dircksen*.
 The wood cutter's boat.
 Divers farm boats and skiffs were sold to various parties.
 Also many boats and yawls made for the sloops.
 Moreover the carpenters constantly repaired and caulked the old craft.

All of which he, deponent, declares to be true and to have testified and deposed at the aforesaid request to the best of his knowledge without regard of persons but only in the interest of truth. Done at Fort Amsterdam this 22nd of March, Ao. 1639.

Wybrant Pietersen } as witnesses
 Maurits Jansen }

This is the m  of
 Tymen Jansen

Apparently, the Dutch were a hardheaded, purse-tight, or penny-pinching, and suspicious folk. The head officials in Holland were keen and extreme in their efforts to prevent graft and their agents abroad from becoming either rich or powerful. They wanted to see the money they spent go out and actually what it bought or produced. Some historians have said that the Dutch sought ways and means to encourage shipbuilding on the Hudson, but

this is not so. It has also been written that the directors of the Dutch West India Company "were anxious to encourage the starting of shipyards and granted many privileges for the purpose." In 1650 they decreed that "all who were willing to emigrate to the Hudson River were to have the right, gratuitously to cut and draw from the public forests as much timber as they should need for the construction of vessels." On March 10, 1649, however, the authorities had ordered that only the owners of real estate in New Amsterdam below the Harlem River should have the right "to build yachts, sloops, and vessels." All shipbuilding of importance was to be carried on under the eye of officials and tax collectors. The Dutch encouraged men to go out in the woods and at their own risk and expense cut and produce ship timbers, knees, planking, masts, and spars to be used for the repairing of Dutch ships and for the occasional building of a small new ship at New Amsterdam. The Dutch were positively opposed to the investment of Dutch guilders in shipbuilding on the American continent or anywhere outside of Holland, but they did want capable ship carpenters at their Hudson River colony to repair all Dutch ships efficiently, economically, and with dispatch, and they encouraged skilled artisans occasionally to emigrate with this object in view. Henry Hall says that a ship carpenter arrived at New Amsterdam in 1652 "to build a ship-house and stocks and go into business" for himself. Private enterprise in the realm of shipbuilding was not fostered on Manhattan Island during the time that it was under Dutch control, and shipbuilding and repairing in New Netherland were done at the shipyard of the Dutch West India Company. After occupation by the English, shipbuilding became a free enterprise in the New York colony, but it took many years before Manhattan and the Hudson turned out ships comparable in quantity and size with those of the other English colonial settlements.

Wouter van Twiller, during the five years of his governorship of the Dutch colony, had become the richest landowner in the settlement. He bought valuable lands from the Indians, such as what became known as Governor's, Ward's, and Blackwell's islands, and raised cattle and grew crops thereon, including tobacco. He was accused of "using his office to promote his own personal interests, while neglecting those of the colonists," and feeling ran high against him, particularly among the patroons in New Netherland and their relatives and friends in Holland.

William Kieft, the newly appointed director-general, reached New Amsterdam aboard the ship *Harnick* (*Herring*) early in 1638 and promptly reported to the Dutch West India Company in Holland that conditions in the colony were deplorable. The fort was unfit for defense; the mills were idle; the warehouse was falling down due to lack of repairs; the cattle had wandered away into the woods; every vessel at New Netherland was unserviceable except the small "yacht" *Prince Willem*; and only one new vessel was on the stocks or in process of construction.

Smuggling was a well-established institution in the Dutch colony in 1638. The company directors complained that several persons in New Netherland were in the habit of taking the best furs for themselves and reserving those of inferior quality for the company. These guilty persons, it was further charged, then exchanged these acquired good furs for merchandise, which they were further accused of actually sending out "in the company's own ships, clandestinely, secretly and without knowledge of the company." A law was passed stipulating that no person was to export any merchandise of any kind whatsoever, "on pain of confiscation," unless it was properly declared and described in detail, but smuggling and dishonesty in trading persisted. We are told that "trading sloops continued to ply stealthily between New Amsterdam, Plymouth, and Virginia" and that even Negro slaves got tobacco money by bootlegging furs. The company officials were evidently grafters and persisted in shutting one eye at all irregularities when it was made worth their while to do so. It has been said:

Because of the unreasonably strict maritime regulations imposed by the various governors, most of the colonists were engaged in smuggling. British vessels, Dutch sloops trading in Virginia, and even

the company's own ships [those of the Dutch West India Company], without knowledge of their owners, carried on an illicit trade. Drastic but ineffectual regulations were also drawn up against

"Scotch traders" and others who sought profit at the expense of the monopoly in fur trading, always remained. Smuggling, a direct result of the company's expense.

Kieft did not hesitate to put a new code of laws into effect, but he failed to lessen materially the amount and effect of smuggling. He also introduced sumptuary laws; however, he was unable to change much, if at all, the habits of the people. A nine-o'clock curfew law, he persisted in enforcing. His decree prohibiting "the harboring of sailors on shore overnight" was treated not only with the scorn meted out to anti-smuggling regulations but also rather more roughly, for we are told that outraged sailors tore down the proclamations. Before Kieft had been director-general of the colony a year, the Dutch West India Company abandoned its attempts to maintain a monopoly of trade in New Netherland and gave notice that the colonists and the inhabitants of all friendly nations might trade there subject to an import duty of 10 per cent and an export duty of 15 per cent. It required, however, that all goods, both imports and exports, should be carried in the company's ships. The statement generally made by historians that "in 1639 the fur trade of New Netherland was thrown free and open to everybody" needs qualification.

Whereas the Raritan Indians had caused the colonists a little trouble during Van Twiller's selfishly weak administration, the arbitrary and contemptuous handling of them by Kieft resulted in almost continuous strife and led to his recall at the earnest solicitation of most of the leaders in the Dutch colony. As early as 1641, several "white rowdies" stole some pigs from a farm on Staten Island, and the Dutch farmer blamed the theft on a band of Indians who were in the vicinity. Kieft, without any attempt to get at the facts, arbitrarily ordered the massacre of several Indians as a warning to the others that they would have to be honest as far as the property of the white man was concerned if they wanted to live. The Indians retaliated crescendo, and the worthy burghers of New Amsterdam had a lot of trouble on their hands before peace was restored. Kieft then adopted a queer innovation of taxing the Indians for protection, and he decreed: "If there be any tribe that will not willingly contribute, we shall induce them to do so by most suitable means." This implied by "force of arms," but even the New Amsterdam Dutch were horrified when on one occasion (in 1643) the "suitable means" proved to be an "inhuman massacre" of 80 upriver Indians at Pavonia (now Jersey City). One record says that 120 Indians were ruthlessly slaughtered in an unexpected night attack and that the soldiers returned to New Amsterdam "with eighty gory heads on their pikes." Director Kieft shook "the bloody hands of his men and gave them the thanks of the city." The Indians retaliated by virtually wiping out all the outlying Dutch settlements, and there were times when the entire population of New Amsterdam was driven into and compelled to remain within the stockade that surrounded the fort. Some historians affirm that the Dutch would have been driven out of New Netherland if Capt. John Underhill, of New England, had not led an assault on the main Indian stronghold near Stamford (Conn.) and "killed seven hundred warriors," following which battle the Indian wave of retribution (and taking vengeance on the Dutch) subsided. The Dutch citizenry objected to Kieft's Indian tax for "protection," but far more when the people became subject to war taxes to protect them from the Indians who refused to pay taxes and rebelled at Kieft's methods to enforce collection.

It is said that when Kieft was deposed as director of the Dutch West India Company for "misrule of both whites and Indians," he sailed for home a rich man. One of the greatest marine disasters connected with the history of the Hudson River colonies was the loss of the Dutch ship *Princess*, which left New Amsterdam for Holland on August 16, 1647, and evidently foundered at sea during a hurricane from the south. Among the sixty passengers and crew who lost their lives in this catastrophe were William Kieft, the retiring director-general of the province, and Dominic Everardus Bogardus, the militant Dutch parson, who was the first clergyman established in the town and whose political tirades from the pulpit had led to Gov. Wouter van Twiller's recall to Holland in 1637. If Kieft was an unscrupulous grafter as claimed, his ill-gotten wealth did him no good, for he went to his death and his guilders to the bottom of the ocean.

Peter Stuyvesant, a former governor of Curacao, arrived at New Amsterdam in May 1647 to succeed Kieft as director-general, and this harsh and severe, autocratic disciplinarian, upon entry to the port with a fleet of four ships, publicly declared: "I shall govern you as a father governs his children"—evidently in "good old Dutch" fashion. Stuyvesant aggressively attacked the smuggling problem, regulated and handicapped all trade, subjected the officers and crews of ships to all sorts of indignities, and issued edict after edict. He got nowhere apparently, for smuggling continued on a large scale as is proven by his increasingly harassed and seemingly hopeless attempts to stop it. We are told, however, that the Dutch colony generally prospered during Stuyvesant's term of office; that the population of the province had increased from about two thousand in 1653 to about ten thousand in 1664—or fivefold in eleven years. (The accuracy of these figures, cited by many historians, is questioned, as they do not check with more authoritative figures of later periods.) It would seem that during "Peg-leg" Stuyvesant's administration, New Amsterdam became a Babel and melting pot of peoples that foreshadowed the modern New York. In addition to the Dutch, Indians, and Negroes (slaves), there were a large number of Englishmen—both Anglicans and Puritans—in the city; also Presbyterians from Scotland, Roman Catholics from Ireland, Huguenots from France, Moravians from Germany, Waldenses from Italy, Jews from Portugal, etc.

It appears that the Dutch originated the vicious and shortsighted practice of bartering firearms in exchange for furs with the Iroquois Indians and that soon the beaver skin traffic of "the back country" was flowing to the Dutch trading post near Albany on the Hudson. When the West India Company forbade the sale of firearms to Indians, Dutch traders still continued the nefarious business. They were not alone in their harmful boomeranging bartering, for the English on the Connecticut followed suit, and the French had been arming their Indian allies with European "firesticks" as well as hatchets. Before long, practically all colonial traders of all nationalities and creeds were engaging in the traffic, or arming the red men to fight not only other Indians but also the white men. Van Rensselaer, a powerful Dutch patroon of the upper Hudson, consistently defied the authorities and bartered with the Indians on the basis of "white man's firesticks for select beaver."

The members of the newly organized Dutch West India Company, in the spring of 1624, sent the first Dutch colonists from Amsterdam to Hudson's "Great River of the Mountains" for the sole purpose of "protecting their investment" in what was deemed to be an important Indian fur trading post in the western world. The Dutch were admittedly alarmed over "the increasingly possessive attitude adopted by the English" toward the river and its environs. Bearing upon this matter, it is of special interest to note that, "with high hopes and burning faith," the British Pilgrim Fathers, who founded the Plymouth (New England) Colony, sailed for Virginia from Plymouth, England, on September 6, 1620, on the *Mayflower*, a vessel of about 180 tons, with 102 passengers aboard—Pilgrim emigrants and their families. They were admittedly intending to "finde some place aboute Hudson's River for their habitation," but the "deangerous shoulds and roring breakers" about Monomoy and the direction of the wind forced the *Mayflower* "to bear up againe for the Cape." Their landing at Plymouth (December 11, 1620—December 21 N. S., now remembered as Forefather's Day on December 22) was not one of intent; it was caused by weariness from the Atlantic passage and the need of saving human lives. Had the *Mayflower* kept on her intended course, British settlers would have colonized Manna-hata and the Hudson three years and five months ahead of the Dutch, and the arrival of the *Nieuw Nederlandt* with its thirty families from Amsterdam in May 1624 might have led to hostilities between the British and the Dutch notwithstanding the declared religious ardor of both groups of settlers. Since the granting of the patent to the London and Plymouth companies (1606) and the patent to the Council for New England (1620), the English had contended that the Dutch were intruders and had halfheartedly laid claim to New Netherland

—and this in spite of the occupancy of the territory by the Dutch and their good position in regard to “discovery” and prompt colonization.

During Kieft's tenure of office, British settlers, presumably from the Massachusetts colony, had gradually drifted into the province of the Dutch and occupied land not only in what is now Connecticut but also in Westchester, Long Island, and the upper part of Manhattan Island. Colonists of British origin moved up from Virginia into what is now Pennsylvania and New Jersey, i.e., north of the South (Delaware) River and in territory claimed by the Dutch. In 1635 the Dutch West India Company sent an armed vessel into the Delaware to dislodge several Englishmen who had settled at Fort Nassau on the river, and we are told that “the English settlers were taken prisoners.” It is said that in 1636 Charles I of England issued a patent to the Earl of Stirling, granting him the whole of Long Island. By the Treaty of Hartford in 1650, the commissioners of the United Colonies of New England forced Stuyvesant to agree to a boundary between the British and Dutch settlements, which roughly determined the present line between the states of New York and Connecticut, but the line of 1650 cut across Long Island from Oyster Bay to the Atlantic Ocean, giving the British about two-thirds of the area of Long Island. In 1653 the Dutch, “fearing an attack by the British colonists” of New England, built a strong protective fence, palisade, or wall, which they could defend, and the line of defensive wall across Manhattan at what was then the northern limits of New Amsterdam is marked by the Wall Street of the present day. In March 1664, Charles II of England formally created a province from the Connecticut to the Delaware rivers, including the whole of Long Island and evidently all the territory then claimed by the Dutch, and granted it to his brother James, the Duke of York and Albany, “as its Lord Proprietor.”

An armed force in four British men-of-war, under Col. Richard Nicholls, arrived in New Amsterdam Harbor early in September 1664, and as the Dutch were “chafing under Stuyvesant's harsh rule” and unwilling to fight and defend the town, the Dutch director-general was forced to surrender on September 8. Stuyvesant tore up the British summons to surrender and tempestuously threatened war to the death. He thundered defiance to the British and orders of resistance to the Dutch, but they were all ignored. Dutch and foreigners, patroons and commoners, rich and poor alike had had enough of both Stuyvesant and the Dutch West India Company and were seemingly glad of the chance to try out English rule if, as proclaimed in the British demand for capitulation, all men would be treated justly—no matter what their race, religion, social standing, or wealth might be. Nicholls promptly changed the name of the fort to Fort James and the name of the town, or settlement, to New York; furthermore, he renamed Fort Orange “Fort Albany.” The British governor, Nicholls, kept his original promise not to interfere with the trade of the Dutch colonists with Holland, although from the time of the British occupation commerce between New York, England, and British colonial ports and possessions was encouraged. A treaty was made with the Indians by the English, and the “Duke's Laws” were put into effect in the colony, with the private rights of the Dutch carefully preserved. The government was progressive in the matter of religious freedom. In August 1673, when England and Holland were at war, a Dutch fleet surprised New York and captured the city, but by the Treaty of Westminster (February 1674) the Dutch title to the province was finally extinguished. It was not until the arrival in the harbor in October 1674 of the *Muyll Tromp* (*Jew's Harp*) that the British and Dutch colonists heard the news, and the new English governor, Major Edmund Andros, did not arrive to take up his duties until a month later.

*England Substitutes the Flour Barrel for the
Beaver Skin — and New York Prospers*

So long as the Dutch held Manhattan Island (New Amsterdam), the Hudson, and surrounding territory, the port was relatively inactive. The settlement had been founded by them purely for trading purposes, and to the Dutch mind the fur trade (or the beaver skin) was the sole *raison d'être* of New Amsterdam. The Dutch West India Company, we are told, sneered at "the trifling trade with the Indians in the tardy cultivation of uninhabited regions." When the four frigates under Nicholls sent out by England (successfully engaged in wresting from Holland leadership in ocean trade and supremacy on the seas) captured New Amsterdam in the summer of 1664, Holland and its hard-headed merchants thought that they had not lost much. Prior to the British capture of New York, the Dutch had shown no disposition to avail themselves of their opportunities to build good ships in quantity cheaply on the American continent. The Dutch West India Company established a yard in the late twenties or the thirties (primarily to keep ship carpenters on hand to repair Dutch-built ships) and built a few ships intermittently from the thirties to the early sixties, but it was impossible for the Dutch to obtain a sufficient amount of skilled labor to undertake much new construction; moreover, both the Dutch government and investors frowned upon any expenditure of good money for building ships anywhere outside of Holland. It would seem that no ship of size was built in New Amsterdam or in any part of the colony during the Dutch occupation. While the Dutch attempted to build an occasional ship in New Amsterdam, they constructed no important vessels, they established no shipyard of note, and their ship carpenters—few in number—were occupied generally in making repairs on Dutch-built ships. Holland, which for many years constructed and operated only relatively small vessels of light draft for all its deep-sea trade, was firmly opposed to having its ships built on the American continent, and the colonists were not encouraged to build vessels even for their own river, sound, and coastwise trade.

After the British occupation of New Amsterdam and the Dutch colony on the Hudson in 1664, the settlement now known as New York became more trade- and ship-minded. Two ships were built in the New York colony in 1669, one of 120 tons on Manhattan Island and a smaller one of about 65 tons at Gravesend, Long Island. Following Governor Andros' arrival in New York at the close of 1674, the complexion of the colony and of its trade changed. England was determined "to weld her overseas possessions into a co-ordinated commercial system." We are told that Andros took the best "visions" of his predecessors and the most promising of the various single attempts that had been made to develop deep-sea trade in and out of the port of New York and used excellent judgment in making his decisions and lots of initiative and courage in putting his plans into effect. Andros certainly did institute a drive for prosperity through exports, but his great achievement was in finding the proper article that could be produced in or around New York and shipped and sold profitably abroad and in developing it for the market, so that the colony had for sale a "volume product" of quality for which there was a steady demand. From the point of view of Britain, which henceforth became "the mother country," New York, as Robert G. Albion says in *THE RISE OF NEW YORK PORT*, "was not one of those ideal colonies like the West Indies with their sugar, Virginia with its tobacco, or South Carolina with its rice and indigo"; on the other hand, "it was not considered as 'prejudicial' as the New England colonies whose ships and fish competed with home activities." At the time that the British finally took over New York (1674), the colony was already realizing some income from the growing and milling of wheat and its export either as flour or hardtack. We are told in *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK*:

Farmers, especially those in the Hudson Valley, wheat they could adapt to the moist eastern climate were presaging Yankee ingenuity in the kinds of and the blends of flour, not to say the varieties of

packing, they could evolve and profitably export. Andros quickly realized that even the most honest and farsighted miller could not possess the skill, the variety of wheats, or the machinery to grind, sift, and blend the proper kinds of wheat at the proper seasons and in the proper and requisite states of ripeness and dryness. The alternative, he also realized, was that the term "New York flour" would soon become either meaningless or worse. Quality was necessary then as now, but uniformity was almost more important. He resolved to achieve uniformity at the bottleneck, where the wheat comes

to the mill and where, being ground, it passes through screens of fine sifting cloth. This, the final process, is bolting and in the bolting laws Andros identified pure-food legislation as a necessary adjunct of profitable world trade. Such legislation involved monopoly of one manufacturing process. There were complaints from individuals whose business the acts harmed, but in the long run the colony benefited. Though various laws in the series of bolting acts were repealed, amended or ignored, the long-range effect was regularity of process and uniformity of product.

The English, quite promptly following their occupation and control, substituted the flour barrel for the beaver skin as New York's prime article of trade, and in 1678 the colony passed an act requiring the bolting of export flour at the port of shipment to facilitate inspection and permit of the guarantee of quality. At this time, records show, New York possessed only "three ships, seven sloops, and eight small boats"; but in that year (1678) Gov. Edmund Andros wrote, "There may have lately traded to ye collony, in a yeare, from tenn to fifteen shippes or vessells of about together 100 tunns each, English, New England, and our own built, of which 5 smale shippes and a ketch now belonging to New Yorke, foure of them built there." Other statistics indicate that about 1680 there were 23 ships of all types hailing from New York, most, if not all, of which had presumably been built in the province. The entries of vessels made at the New York collector's office from June to November 1681 numbered 154. By 1694 the port of New York had so grown, because of the "flour barrel boom" in exports, that there was owned by the local merchants a fleet of "sixty ships, sixty-two sloops, and forty boats." The number of sizable deep-sea vessels, therefore, had increased twelve times and the number of all craft, including those designated as "boats," nine times during a period of sixteen years. At this time, criticism of the monopolistic features of the Andros flour bolting acts was at its height (and Benjamin Fletcher had received in 1692 the appointment as royal governor of New York), but the colony at long last was prospering and New York had become a port of prime importance. It is said, however, that Andros so concentrated the activities of the colony in the production and export of flour that he had eventually "brought about six hundred families out of a total of nine hundred and eighty-three into the flour industry." New York's flour barrel had to be marketed for export in triangular trade the same as the products of New England and the Delaware, for Virginia alone enjoyed a mutually satisfactory transatlantic "shuttle," or two-way, direct trade with the mother country. New York sold most of its flour, as did New England its fish, lumber, and forest products, in the West Indies and southern Europe; only a small fraction of its exports was sent direct to England.

Edmund Andros made some serious mistakes as governor of New York; nevertheless, his achievements were great. He virtually put New York "on the map" as a port, for in addition to developing the profitable flour trade he created a "harbour before ye city of New York." He prohibited the practice of casting anchors or grapnel at the Battery sea wall and built a city dock of stone, which extended from Whitehall slip to Coenties slip and the City Hall. At his orders, "the pestilential canal," De Heere Gracht, was filled in and drained, and the highway built over it became known as Broad Street because of its unusual width compared with the other streets of the town. Andros also prohibited the throwing of refuse into the harbor waters and put into effect other important sanitary innovations that contributed to the health and cleanliness of the community. After his recall to England, Andros, writing in justification of his administration, said that upon his arrival at New Amsterdam (New York) he found the place "poore, unsettled and without trade, except a few small coasters; hardly any went or came from beyond seas"; but that he left the colony "greatly increased in people, trade, buildings and other improvements; new townes and settlements lately built . . . a market house (the only one in all those parts) . . . and the navigation increased at least

ten times to what it was; and plenty of money (hardly seen there before) . . . and noe disaster happened in any part of the government during my comand there."

In 1689, France and England commenced another hundred years' war and "intermittent duel for empire," which, as Albion says, "did not reach its final phase until the peace settlement of 1815" following the conclusion of the young American republic's War of 1812 with Britain. New York capitalized the condition of hostilities between two great marine powers to its own advantage and became interested in the lucrative occupation of sending out letter-of-marque ships and privateers to prey upon enemy shipping. It became difficult, at times, to differentiate—in New York more than in any other colonial port—between privateering and outright piracy. The contempt of American colonials for the British Navigation Laws and the refusal to honor them added materially to the complication, and smuggling led to all sorts of highjacking and crude piracy. Records show that in 1700 Boston possessed 194 sizable seagoing ships, among them "big ships of 300 tons." New York at the same time, after benefiting for about a quarter of a century from the flour barrel export stimulus, had "124 ships of 100 tons and under, ketches, brigantines and sloops." Although not wrestling for leadership as a shipbuilding community, New York under the British flag had become quite active in ocean trade at the turn of the century and, with a harbor of great consequence, had grown to be a maritime center of some importance. Around 1700, New York was a notorious rendezvous for pirates, who used the port to dispose of their loot and, as Albion says, "swaggered about the streets, abetted by many leading merchants who were glad to buy their booty at bargain prices, while officials winked at their shady activities." The lawlessness on the part of New York merchants and colonial officials became so great and officers were openly so lax in enforcement of the law that irregular cargoes were unloaded and vanished before they appeared to seize such cargoes; when the king's officers were sent to take possession of such goods, "the whole body of merchants" interposed with violence. Piracy and the disposition of pirates' booty among the merchants of New York, in violation of all law, became so bad that the colonial governor urged the British Admiralty to send over a swift and well-armed, handy deep-sea war vessel "which would discourage and destroy these vermin who have hitherto made New York their nest of safety."

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, "New York appears to have had about half as much trade as Boston," and "about one-third of it was in direct violation of the navigation laws." The West Indies trade alone, we are told, "during the remainder of the colonial period, rivaled the fur trade in its profits." During the first part of the century, New York "lived almostly wholly on trade with Indians, Great Britain, and the West Indies." To England the New York merchants sent "mostly beaver, whale oil, and some tobacco" and to the West Indies "flour, bread, peas and pork, and sometimes horses." When the trade was direct both ways with the West Indies, the ships brought back "rum which pays duty and molasses which does not." The West Indian trade, however, was generally triangular.

Provisions were shipped from New York and exchanged for West Indies products, which were taken to England and then again exchanged for manufactured goods. These were brought back to New York and sold, and thus there were [presumably] three profits on each [completed] transaction. The bulk of this traffic was with the British [West Indian] Islands; there was more trade with

Barbados than with any of the other islands, as provisions were taken there not only for the local supply but also for transportation to the Spanish coast and the French Islands. Most of the trade was merely an exchange of products, but a considerable cash balance resulted, which was remitted at once to England to pay for manufactured goods.

Lord Cornbury, governor of New York from 1701 to 1709, found that the war then being waged between England and France had a pernicious effect upon the shipping interests of New York, as many of its vessels had been lost and the continuance of the war did not encourage the owners of shipyards or capitalists to invest money in such property. In a report to the Lords of Trade and Plantations in England, forwarded in 1708, he wrote: "There have formerly belonged to this port 32 topsail schooners, *besides* sloops, now we can't reckon above 28 topsail schooners *and* sloops." Cornbury is also authority for the statement that

the vessels owned by merchants in Jamaica, Barbados, and others of the Leeward Islands, which were nearly all built in America, came from New York and that not more than six vessels belonging to the islands were built in the West Indies. In 1721 the English Lords of Trade, in a report submitted to the king on the state of the American colonies, said that "the vessels belonging to the province of New York are small and not considerable in number, being employed only in the carrying trade to the southern islands and neighboring colonies." We are told that the transatlantic trade was handled in British bottoms, of which 64, with a tonnage of 4,330 tons, arrived in New York from 1714 to 1717. During the same period, 63 English ships were cleared from New York for British ports; 464 ships, sloops, and other vessels for the West Indies and American colonial ports; and 118 for foreign—other than English overseas—ports. Whereas New York was becoming increasingly active as a trading port, it lagged behind New England in the building of ships, and most of the vessels built in New York were sloops and small craft.

During the years 1717-1720, New York exports averaged £52,000 and imports £21,000 annually—a favorable trade balance of £31,000, or $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. About 225 ships cleared the port annually (from 215 to 235), and the figures were about the same as those for Philadelphia and the Delaware. In 1772 exports were £150,000 and imports £100,000—a favorable trade balance of about £50,000, or $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. But all these figures give no consideration to the value of goods handled by smugglers. It has been said that official figures on both imports and exports represent "only a fraction of the trade which was actually entering and leaving the port." Some historians say that smuggling and shipping irregularities and violations of the laws were so extensive that the records show only "a small fraction" of the actual volume of business handled, and it was estimated that "for every cargo seized by the custom authorities a dozen were discharged surreptitiously."

Governor Hardy took "drastic measures" to put a stop to illegitimate commerce and trading with the enemy by New York merchants during the first years of the French and Indian War (1754-1763), but it is said that he "failed signally" in his objective because of the resourcefulness and craftiness of New Yorkers who found means of circumventing his embargoes and decrees and of continuing profitable trade with the foreign islands. Hardy asserted in a letter to the Lords of Trade written July 10, 1757, that vessels from Holland were bringing goods, including contraband, into the colonies "that render to His Majesty no Duty in Europe, and almost totally discourage the Importation of these commodities from Brittain," and he adds:

When I first arrived at New York I found this iniquitous trade in a very flourishing state, and upon inquiry was informed that it had been a common practice for Vessels to come from Holland, stop at Sandy Hook, and smuggle their Cargoes to New York and carry their Vessels up empty; this I was determined to put an end to, when this trade took another course by sending their Vessels to the ports of Connecticut, from whence it is not very difficult to introduce their goods thro the

sound to New York, and even to Philadelphia. . . . Another method the Importers take is to stop at some of the Out ports of Britain (in their outward bound passage from Holland) and make a report and enter only half of their cargo, by which the King is defrauded of his Duty on the other half. In short, My Lords, if some effectual means are not used, the greatest part of the commerce of the American colonies will be withdrawn from the Mother Country, and be carryed to Holland.

Notwithstanding the activity of the British Navy in the West Indies and off the American coast, with many seizures, arrests, and confiscations, smuggling and colonial defiance of British Navigation Laws and Trade Acts continued unabated, and American skippers who knew their coast were very adept at navigating at night. They knew all the bars and channels, secluded inlets, and landing places; moreover, it would seem that revenue officers could quite generally be induced to wink at violations of the English laws when it was made worth their while to do so. A further obstacle to the enforcement of arbitrary English laws was the attitude of the courts and the small number of convictions—and this in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Cadwallader Colden (1688-1776), the acting governor, who was burned in effigy in his own coach at Bowling Green by a mob during the Stamp Act riot in

1765, declared that the colonial merchants had their "connections" with the courts, and he demanded the removal of Judge Robert Livingston, "since no cause of any consequences can come before him in which . . . he or the Livingston family is not interested." Britain found by experience that it was impossible to deal effectively with a lawlessness that enlisted the sympathy and support of a large proportion of the people. We are told that "by the middle of the eighteenth century, smuggling in our young and struggling country had advanced from an expedient to a virtue, and compliance with the tariffs had become a quixotic eccentricity." When the British tried to enforce the high-tariff Sugar Act of 1764, what might be termed the turning point of colonial history was reached; for it marked the final phase of a revolt that had been brewing for about a century, and smuggling—which had always been profitable—"now assumed the color and fervor of patriotism."

The number of ships owned by the residents of New York is stated as 99 in 1747, 447 in 1762, and 709 in 1772, and the number of employed seamen for whom New York was the home port is given as 755 in 1747 and 3,552 in 1762.

During the three-year period 1715-1718, available records show that New York was sending 112 vessels annually to the West Indies, 21 to Great Britain, 11 to other European ports, and 71 to American colonial coastal ports—a total of 215 sailings. The vessels are said to have averaged only 35 tons. At the same time, Boston had nearly twice as many sailings, and its vessels averaged about 50 tons. In 1770, with a more vigilant customhouse in operation than was the case prior to 1764, New York stood fourth among American ports in the total tonnage arriving and clearing, being led by Philadelphia, Boston, and Charleston in the order named. The New York figures for arrivals (about equal to the clearances) were approximately as follows: West Indies, 8,700 tons; coastwise, 7,800 tons; British Isles, 5,725 tons; southern Europe, 3,125 tons; and Africa, 230 tons—a total of some 25,530 tons, or about 55 per cent of the Philadelphia, 67 per cent of the Boston, and 93 per cent of the Charleston, S. C., totals.

But very little is known regarding New York shipbuilders until the latter part of the eighteenth century. An increase in shipbuilding naturally followed the growth of the port's exporting trade. Mynheer Rip van Dam is mentioned as a Dutch builder of early days. We are told that towards the close of the seventeenth century "three busy shipyards had sprung up between Beekman Street, northern limit of the town, and the Catherine Street docks," and it is said that "John Dally, John Rivers and the brothers Joseph and Daniel Latham were, until William Walton eclipsed them all, New York's notable [colonial] shipwrights."

The figures for the population of New York in early colonial days are unreliable, possibly due to confusion between New Amsterdam and New Netherland—the town and the province. The same situation exists with respect to the records of New York (town or city) and the colony of which New York was the prime center and port. There are records stating that the population of the town of New York was only 4,476 in 1700 (that is, the settled inhabitants definitely located and resident within the town limits). We are told that in 1763 the city had somewhat over 13,000 population; in 1790, 33,000; and at the turn of the century, 60,000, being exceeded in both 1790 and 1800 only by Philadelphia. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, New York passed Philadelphia in population and has continued since that time as America's largest and wealthiest city.

Henry Hall, in a report prepared by him as special agent of the U. S. Government, says that New England was so very active in shipbuilding in the first part of the eighteenth century that, in comparison, the industry on the Hudson seemed to languish. He wrote:

New England enjoyed the great advantage of a steady demand for the fisheries and the coasting trade, and its shipyards had something to do nearly all the time. If the men were not hewing out the timbers and putting together the materials for a new sloop, ketch or bark, they were apt to be busy repairing an old vessel; and as wages are lower

and labor more skillful where work is steady, the New England yards could build better and cheaper ships than those in the other provinces. South of New York there was little or no building in colonial times, and there was not much even at New York. Tonnage was chiefly built in New England.

The General Assembly in 1718 made presentation to the governor of the province of New York and New Jersey that it was "of advantage to change the law so that vessels built in the province of British owners should be free from certain taxes on shipping," as it was at this time seen that "the shipbuilding business was in a very depressed condition in the province for the amount of trade transacted." Again, we read from official records of the New York colony of 1736 that "shipbuilding, which in some of the neighboring provinces is carried on to a large extent and has become a considerable part of their returns to Great Britain for many years, has been much neglected and little used in this province." It was not only the building of new vessels in New England for London merchants that caused concern and jealousy in New York but also the constant sending across the Atlantic of large shipments of masts and shipbuilding timber. The governor of the province of New York a few years later, in an address to the legislative body, said:

I have reflected on the decay of shipbuilding which for many years has been much regretted, but little attempted to be retrieved. I am ignorant that many causes may be assigned for its decay, some of which, and particularly one, it is not in the power of the merchant or the builder at present to remove; nor do I see any other way whereby a remedy may be applied than by your aid. If the demands of the builder be higher than in the neighboring provinces the merchant will not and cannot build here without injuring himself. If the builder undertake the work at the same rate that is given in the neighboring provinces, he complains, and I fear with too much truth, he only labors to be undone for the excessive wages of carpenters which he must be obliged to hire, for

want of apprentices, runs away with his profit, he cannot take apprentices, being unable in his present poverty to maintain them. It is you alone who can supply a remedy to this evil, and you may do it at a very small annual expense, for I am persuaded that £200 a year given to shipbuilding, with apprentices at the rate of £8 a year, with each apprentice for six or seven years, will soon revive that necessary and useful work. It will make shipbuilders willing to take apprentices, enable them in their present necessities to maintain them, and to build for the merchant at as low a rate as in the neighboring provinces. You will then keep among you many thousand pounds which are now yearly exported out of the province by your neighbors, who are at present your carriers.

This plan of subsidy for the protection of the New York shipbuilder from the more cheaply built vessels of New England does not appear to have been sufficiently inviting to the lawmaking body to place it upon the statute books.

"Rule Britannia" and the American Colonists' "Higher Law"

The bulk of the early American settlers was of English stock—a race in which the spirit of liberty permeates both individual and national thought, belief, and action. It is true that the original settlers of the Jamestown, Va., colony consisted of designated "gentlemen," indentured servants, laborers, and soldiers and that many of the indentured servants were virtually slaves; that the English ruling classes, while demanding individual liberty for themselves, were quite willing to enslave others—even their own weaker or more unfortunate countrymen; that the colonists—northern as well as southern—encouraged, participated in, and did much to extend the evil of the slave trade in African Negroes; that much of the religious liberty demanded by the Pilgrims and Puritans, such as freedom to worship God according to one's own individual light, conscience, and desire was enveloped and impregnated with bigotry, narrowness, bias, and an assumption of infallibility that decreed the individuals, groups, or sects to be right and to be the inspired instruments and interpreters of God and His will and all contrary-minded wrong, outside the pale, and "Children of the Devil." Nevertheless, with all these self-evident failings and shortcomings, the fundamental characteristic of an

overwhelming proportion of the early American colonists was an appreciation of and an aspiration leading toward complete liberty of mind and economic opportunity for the individual together with political freedom from arbitrary outside domination for each of the colonies.

The great national song of the English is "Rule Britannia," and in it the world is told:

Rule Britannia. Britannia rules the waves
And Britons never, *never*, *NEVER* can be slaves.

For some time prior to the American War of Revolution, the following boastful and intolerant lines adorned the columns of the NAVAL CHRONICLE of London: "The sea and waves are Britain's broad domain and not a sail but by permission spreads." The British boasted not only that England was the undisputed and unchallenged Mistress of the Seas, dominating by its numerous and powerful navy every trade route on the oceans of the world, and that the British flag "waved over every sea and triumphed over every rival" but also that this domination over the ocean with its ships and commerce was a "Divine Right" and the exclusive prerogative of the English Nation. The preface of THE SEAMAN'S VADE-MECUM (a manual and constant companion of the English marine officer and apprentice, published in London in 1744), contained the following, which expresses a doctrine generally believed by the British, both afloat and ashore:

That the Monarchs of Great Britain have a peculiar and Sovereign Authority upon the Ocean, is a Right so Ancient and Undeniable that it never was publicly disputed, but by Hugo Grotius in his MARE LIBERUM, published in the Year 1636, in Favour of the Dutch Fishery upon our Coasts;

which Book was fully Controverted by Mr. Selden's MARE CLAUSUM wherein he proves this Sovereignty from the Laws of God and of Nature, besides an uninterrupted Fruition of it for so many Ages past as that its Beginning cannot be traced out.

The British Government, in its attitude toward the colonies, forgot that the colonists were English and had the same underlying determination not to be enslaved—and this not only in the realm of liberty of conscience to worship God according to the dictates of one's own heart but also in the domain of economics. Failure of the British to deal justly with their American colonies led to the Revolution, which commenced with no underlying thought of American secession from the empire but which developed, because of the British attitude, into a demand for absolute independence in order that the colonists might be assured of unquestioned political and economic liberty for all time. They at no time meekly submitted to the tyranny of British legislation. They made their local laws, and these—not the English statutes—expressed their own standards of right. They violated unjust British legislation and regulatory measures and in essentials "cultivated a feeling of manly independence of all [outside] authority." As early as March 11, 1660, an Englishman visiting the colonies wrote home in horror after sensing the American love of individual liberty: "It is not unknown to you that they look upon themselves as a free state . . . there being many against owning the king, or having any dependence on Engld."

By this time, the colonists had developed what became known as "the American habit" of doing what they happened to believe to be right and individually, socially, and collectively "just," regardless of the British law in the case. As the years rolled by, they called this habit an appeal of free men to the "Higher Law." The colonists were notorious violators of all selfish, arbitrary British law; they persistently violated the mast law and disregarded the king's "Broad Arrow" cut in the bark of white pine trees; they embarked in "irregular trade" when British restrictions deprived them of freedom of the seas and of foreign markets; they resorted to smuggling and at times even tolerated pirates benevolently. It was hard to distinguish, in those days, between worthy mariners extending the glory of the British Empire on the Seven Seas and pirates or even privateers. We are told that Governor Bellomont, when he made energetic attempts to enforce the British Navigation Laws, found all the colonists either vigorously or subtly opposing him. Colonial violations of Britain's tyrannical laws, which could not possibly be enforced by the mother country without practically the full use of her army

and navy and an augmented police force, were winked at by England's best governors and resident officials. Had this not been the case, the colonies would have been in armed revolt a full century earlier. Dating from the enactment of unjust and discriminatory laws, irregularities were not so much passed over as they were not noticed, for it was much easier for an official "to save his face" in the colonies and retain the confidence of his people abroad if he was not apparently cognizant of law violations.

The "Higher Law" of the colonials gradually merged into "Natural Laws" and "Natural Rights" as the eighteenth century advanced and the spirit of democracy and rebellion to arbitrary, despotic rule from the outside spread in the colonies. For a while, much was made in Massachusetts of "Charter Rights," and political leaders resisting the acts of the British Parliament declared, "Our ancestors came away by compact between the King and them and the Parliament has nothing to do with us." Whereas this argument had a good deal of weight as far as the people of Massachusetts were concerned, it could not be presented as one of the broad, "inherent and inalienable" rights in whose defense all Americans could unite to oppose British tyranny, for most of the colonies had no such charters. However, the "Higher Law" and "Natural Laws" (and rights) were much more potent, all-embracing, and universally defensible than "Charter Rights." The colonials had to look only to the writings of John Locke (1632-1704), England's great philosopher, to justify their stand and, furthermore, receive inspiration to strengthen their faith and courage. Locke was the chief "scientific" and unemotional defender of civil and religious liberty and an ardent advocate of toleration. He affirmed that the people had the right to govern themselves in the way they judged to be for the common good; that the state is the outcome of free contract. In a state of nature, men enjoyed complete liberty; when they created a government, they willingly endowed it with specific powers for their own common good, and tyranny began when government invaded the natural rights of man.

John Locke actually served as a commissioner on the British Board of Trade in 1696-1700 and resigned only to devote his time to writing and to avoid "making so many trips to London." When writing his *TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT* in 1685, he little dreamed that this classic on English constitutional law and polity would be the textbook for American revolutionists and frame the principles afterwards embodied in the American War of Independence and the rational part of the French Revolution. In Locke, American patriots found justification for their stand that their own elected colonial assembly was their government and that as taxes could not be levied without the people's consent, these elected bodies, representative of the people, alone held the power to govern and to tax.

John Locke's emphasis upon "Natural Law" was particularly pleasing to American colonials, as it justified not only their views but also their acts since the passing by British Parliaments of the earliest Navigation and Trade Laws. Man had created government merely to make his natural liberties and rights more secure; moreover, government at all times must respect the "Natural" and "Higher Law" or forfeit its right to exist. No government could rightly take the property of its subjects without their consent, for Locke declared: "If any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority and without such consent of the people he hereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government." Locke's philosophy of government not only connected taxation perpetually with the expressed voice of the people, i.e., representation, but also sanctioned rebellion against tyranny in the form of an oppressive government; the right of revolution was one of the natural rights of man, which should be used if necessary to preserve his liberties and pass them on to succeeding generations. Therefore, Samuel Adams, of Boston, was merely following the arguments of Locke, Britain's great philosophical leader of thought in the closing years of the seventeenth century, when in 1773 he declared that Americans had no need for constitutional arguments, for "they are on better ground; all men have a natural right to change a bad government for a better whenever they have it in their power."

American preachers contributed to the rebellion because they saw the religious as well

as the political liberties of Americans threatened by the mother country, and the Congregational and Presbyterian clergy drew a parallel between the Puritans' resistance to English kings and archbishops in the seventeenth century and the struggle against the tyranny of the Parliament and ministers of George III. Jonathan Mayhew wrote in August 1765 that it was a religious duty to oppose a tyrannical king and that "no people are under a religious obligation to be slaves if they are able to set themselves at liberty." The pastors in colonial pulpits taught that the "Higher Law" (i.e., "the eternal laws of truth, wisdom and equity and the everlasting tables of right reason") was the only criterion to govern and judge human conduct. "All commands running counter to the declared will of the Supreme Legislator of heaven and earth are null and void and therefore disobedience to them is a duty, not a crime." The purpose of civil government was the common good of society, and Mayhew declared: "The people know for what end they set up and maintain their governors and they are the proper judges when they execute their trust as they ought to do it."

The fundamental Higher, or Natural, Laws were believed to be moral laws that every normal person knew instinctively, for, as Locke said, the knowledge of what was right or wrong was "interwoven in the constitution of the human mind." The early Greek philosophers had advised recourse to the laws of nature when doubt existed as to proper procedure. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) said that the Universe is dynamic—not static; that the world is "becoming" and by evolution and growth seeks to attain perfect Nature; that the state exists for the good life; that governments are servants of law and of the people who made them and that an inherent right rests in the people themselves to elect their rulers and call them to account.

The colonial "Higher Law" was deemed by Americans to be "Natural Law," which in New England supplanted "Charter Rights," and colonial patriots became united in the thought that "the British constitution was founded upon natural laws and that God and nature had ordained that there were certain things—clear to every man—which King and Parliament could not do." As John C. Miller, the historian, says, "Natural Law thus became the chief bulwark of American liberty because it strictly limited the authority of the mother country over the colonies." Patrick Henry, the brilliant patriot-orator of Virginia, who did much to unify the thought of the colonies and bring the leaders of the agricultural South in essential harmony with the restless and contentious marine provinces of the North, had "no faith in charters," but, as Thomas Jefferson said, "drew all natural rights from a purer source—the feelings of his own heart." Tom Paine (1737-1809), the later effective propagandist of the Revolution, remarked that a man who shaped his course in harmony with the laws of nature was on solid ground and that his words and acts would stand the test of time. Even the conservative British jurist Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), the greatest Anglo-Saxon authority on constitutional and civil law, contended that the laws of Parliament were (or should be) an exposition of "Natural Law."

Civil War in England and the Beginning of the Colonial Triangular Trading

The New England colonies, founded by the Pilgrims and Puritans, experienced a crisis in 1641, when civil war in England cut off immigration to and trade with America. The new settlements in the western world suffered, as they had been dependent on England as a market for their products as well as a source of supply for newcomers—to develop the country and

increase local demand for domestic commodities—and for needed or desirable manufactured goods. It would seem that the English civil war proved of benefit to the New England colonies, for it caused the American settlers to take definite steps to develop a market other than the mother country for the products of their forests, land (crops and cattle), and fisheries. William H. Clark goes so far as to say that the civil war in England, together with Governor Winthrop's determination to look to the West Indies for a trading market, was "the genesis of America's salvation, the beginning of her greatness." The trade of the Massachusetts Puritans with the islands to the south did not spring abruptly into existence in 1641, for in 1636 Governor Winthrop's son John and Thomas Mayhew, of Boston, dispatched a small sloop on an exploratory voyage to the Isle of Bermuda. She was loaded with corn, smoked pork, and cured fish, which she traded for citrus fruit and potatoes, and "came home to earn a net profit of 20 pounds." Gradually, such experimental voyages had been extended to the Bahamas, Cuba, and other islands of the West Indies, so that, when the English market for New England exports was suddenly cut off in 1641, quite a little was known in Boston and Salem of the possibilities of the West Indian trade.

The situation in the northern American colonies (New England) was very different from that in the South (Virginia). New England embraced only settlements where hard work was required—in a climate that was not too kindly in the winter—to produce commodities, such as timber products, fish, dried or smoked meat, and "pearl ash" (i.e., potash from the ashes of burned trees), that had to compete with similar products in the world's markets. Moreover, New England was generally good forest but rather inferior agricultural land. Virginia, on the other hand, had a "Heaven-sent crop" in its tobacco, which was in great demand throughout the civilized world, and for this commodity Virginia had virtually no competition as far as quality and flavor were concerned, so could name its own price. The West Indian markets, where fish, lumber, corned and dried beef were in great demand, were about fifteen hundred miles nearer New England than the principal trading ports of Europe. This fact, coupled with the low cost of production in America and the superiority of its fish, gave New England a great advantage in trading with the West Indies. Gradually, a barter volume of business was built up by exchanging dried fish (the staple food for slaves), lumber and forest products, corned and dried meat for sugar, molasses, and fruits; but New England itself could not handle and consume as much sugar and molasses as it could acquire in exchange for the domestic products it was desirous of selling by export. Consequently, triangular trading was developed, the first stage of which consisted in the sailing of New England ships to European ports with sugar and molasses acquired in the West Indies (in exchange for the products of American fisheries and forests, etc.) and the selling of such commodities in the markets of Europe at a cheaper price than that of its merchants. William H. Clark says:

Because New England could sell fish and lumber cheaper in the West Indies than Europe could, New England soon cornered the West Indian trade, and the astonished merchants of London and Copenhagen and Amsterdam soon found themselves buying their molasses and sugar from interlopers from Boston and Salem who sailed first from their villages in New England to Havana, swapped fish

for sugar, then brought the sugar to Europe, where they either swapped it for manufactured goods or sold it for good bright gold with which they bought the manufactured goods, and sailed home, having multiplied the value of the original cargo enough to actually profit more in a single voyage than the entire cost of their vessel.

Another form of triangular trading that developed because of the English civil war was that between New England, the Azores (Madeira or other eastern Atlantic ports), the West Indies, and back home. In 1642, Capt. Thomas Cotyemore took the *Trial* from Boston to Fayal (Azores Islands) loaded with "dun fish and pipe-staves." ("Dun fish" was salt cod alternately dried and buried in the ground "until ripe and dark and odorous"; wine barrels were known as "pipes," and wine-cask staves were called "pipe-staves.") We are told that Fayal was chosen by the Puritan Protestant colonists of New England because the people there were Romanists (Catholics) and "had religious views leading them to eat fish instead

of flesh on a great many days of the year"; moreover, they were "wine-makers who used many casks every year." Captain Cotyemore found an "extraordinary good" market for his cargo at Fayal and exchanged his fish and staves for wine, sugar, and a few other commodities. As the demand for wine in New England was very small, Captain Cotyemore decided "to drop down to the Indies before returning home to see if he could increase his profit." Making St. Kitts (St. Christopher) of the Leeward Islands of the West Indies, the captain was offered cotton and tobacco by the planters for the wine, and as both these articles would sell well in Boston, Cotyemore made an advantageous exchange. While he was at St. Kitts, some metal was salvaged from a wrecked vessel and acquired by him, so the *Trial* completed a most successful voyage (considering the time she had been away from port) and, as a pioneer, showed the way for another type of profitable triangular trading.

As the years advanced, American ships engaged in the triangular (New England-West Indies-Britain) trade, carrying fish, lumber, corn, etc., to the West Indies; sugar and molasses thence to England; and manufactured goods, metals, etc., to America. Gradually, the famous—or infamous—triangular business known as the molasses-rum-slave trade came into existence and was pre-eminent for many years. New England ships acquired molasses in the West Indies, took it to Rhode Island or Massachusetts, and used it in distilling rum, which was then shipped to the coast of Africa and exchanged for slaves. The Negroes were carried to the islands of the West Indies and sold, part of the price paid for the slaves being accepted in molasses or sugar, and the three-way trade was thereby continued indefinitely.

While Boston and much of Massachusetts devoted their prime energies to fishing (the territory was favorably situated in geographic relation to the Banks of Newfoundland) and New Hampshire and particularly eastern Massachusetts (or the province of Maine) developed a most important lumber business, Rhode Island, being nearer to the Barbados and West Indies, concentrated to a great degree on the molasses and rum trade. Newport, R. I., gained the lead in the manufacture of rum and led also in the slave trade (a leg of the famous molasses, rum, and slave triangular trade), and Newport merchants, making a good rum and selling it at a relatively cheap price, virtually captured the American slave trade. It would seem that enormous profits were made in this colonial division of foreign trade in spite of aggressive European, particularly British, competition.

From the middle of the seventeenth century up to the Revolution, many colonial ships trading to the Madeiras and Canaries made a regular practice of slaving—and they were northern-owned and operated vessels. To obtain a full cargo for return passages, wine and salt were stowed in the holds, and the vacant spaces 'tween decks were used to carry Negro slaves bought on the African coast and transported to the one-crop colonies, such as the Barbados, Virginia, etc. In later days, with New England having practically no commodities for export that Britain or other north European countries would accept in trade, American merchants developed another—and this time a most worthy and legitimate—triangular trade. Yankee ships carried New England products to southern cotton ports in the Carolinas, Georgia, and the Gulf of Mexico, loaded cotton for Europe, and completed the third, or homeward, transatlantic leg of the voyage by carrying to the United States foreign manufactured goods and commodities for which a definite domestic demand existed.

*Slave Trade during Colonial Times and the
Days of the Young Republic*

It was a Dutch ship, a privateer, that was responsible for the beginning of slavery on the continent of North America, for in 1619 such a vessel visited Jamestown in Virginia and, according to the records, sold part of her "cargo of Negroes" from the African coast of Guinea to the tobacco planters. It is said that on this initial business transaction in the English colonial slave trade "twenty Africans were disembarked." Notwithstanding the fact that the London Company was constantly sending across the Atlantic "indentured servants to labour" and that many English-born people sold themselves into virtual slavery because of economic conditions or to escape incarceration in jails, the Virginia colonists, as they increased their agricultural activities, imported more and more Negro slaves. Many of them were killed in the Indian massacres of 1622 and 1644 and in the Indian War of 1676, and a large number, being required to live in unhealthy locations, died from illness and epidemics; nevertheless, in 1700, of the entire population of the colony, stated as "seventy thousand souls all told," 30 per cent, or "over twenty thousand," were Negro slaves.

The Dutch West India Company, to stimulate the growth of its New Netherland Colony at the mouth of the Hudson River, devised what was known as the patroon system. A charter of liberties and exemptions granted the patroons freedom in trade (except for furs) and eternal possession of "fruits, rights, minerals, rivers and fountains"; but to qualify as a patroon a Dutchman had to subscribe a million guilders, agree "to plant there a colony of fifty souls upwards of fifteen years old," and purchase from the Indians land extending "sixteen miles along the coast on one side of a navigable river or eight miles along both sides of a river and as far inland as the situation of the occupants will permit." As a final inducement to the patroons in efforts to increase colonization, the Dutch West India Company undertook to supply them with servants and "allot to each patroon twelve black men and women out of the prizes in which Negroes should be found." The first Negro slaves were introduced into the colony in 1626. Apparently, the "money-loving Dutch" did not at first buy their slaves on the African coast or "the Islands" to perform the manual work in their overseas settlements; that, for a very short period at least, seems to have been in opposition to the "religious" principles of the company's directors, so the Dutch captured (i.e., stole) slaves as valuable property from ships flying the flag of a country with which they were at war or not strong enough to defend itself from piratical attacks at sea. At about this time, the profits made by the West India Company were not from trade but from the capture and looting of enemy ships.

The Portuguese, while exploring the west coast of Africa in 1442, captured some Moors and, bringing them home, were ordered by Prince Henry, the navigator, to return them. We are told that the Moorish settlement, in gratitude, sent as a present to the prince some gold dust and ten Negroes. By this act, the African slave trade was born, as immediately thereafter the Portuguese sent ships to the African coast to get "the black slaves" to be used for hard manual work.

Columbus, after his discovery of the West Indian islands of the New World, advocated the use of the natives as slaves, and he proposed to exchange "Carib prisoners, as slaves" for livestock wanted on the islands. In 1494, Columbus sent home "500 Indians" to be sold as slaves in Seville, but it is said that for certain religious reasons Queen Isabella intervened and forbade the sale. Bishop Bartolome de las Casas suggested in 1517 to King Charles I of Spain (afterwards Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor) that each Spaniard in Hispaniola should be granted a license to import "a dozen Negro slaves"—and this for economic reasons, as the Negroes were far better and more profitable workers than the Indians or subjugated natives (who were weaker, less willing and industrious, and gradually "dying

out"). Charles acquiesced and granted the exclusive right to a court favorite to supply four thousand slaves annually to the islands of Hispaniola (Haiti), Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. The Spanish "aristocrat" sold the patent that he held to some Genoese merchants for twenty-five thousand ducats. The West Indian Spaniards obtained from the Portuguese the slaves sanctioned by the protector of Christendom to be imported into the Spanish islands, and thus was first systematized the iniquitous slave trade between Africa and the American continent.

Sir John Hawkins (1532-1595), of Plymouth, England, one of England's great admirals in the Elizabethan era, was active in 1562-1567 in robbing Portuguese slavers and then in smuggling the Negroes that he had captured into the Spanish possessions in the New World, where they sold at a good price. It is said that Hawkins was "the first Englishman to engage in the slave traffic." This may be true, but he was a pirate and a highjacker and not a trader, for although he sold slaves, he never bought them. On his 1564 piratical voyage, Hawkins had in his fleet a ship owned by Queen Elizabeth herself, which she "hired to him." Hawkins traded with the Creoles, with his guns ready for action, and his piratical slaving voyages—considered of great benefit to England—won him royal favor and a coat of arms with a Negro in fetters as his crest. Another great British admiral of Elizabeth's reign, Sir Francis Drake (1545-1596), obtained his early experience at sea in the slave trade off the Guinea coast. In 1567, when twenty-two years of age, he was in command of the *Judith*, attached to Sir John Hawkins' fleet and engaged in slavery, highjacking, and piracy.

When Capt. John Smith made his famous exploratory, fishing, and trading voyage to New England in 1614, he left the Monhegan and Sagadahoc area in the smaller of his two vessels to survey the coast of southern Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. The larger ship, under the command of Capt. Thomas Hunt, was ordered to complete the work of catching, drying, and curing the fish in the Monhegan-Pemaquid district and then sail with the cargo to Spain. Smith tells us that shortly after he himself had departed from Plymouth on the Massachusetts mainland, opposite Cape Cod, Hunt sailed into the harbor and "betrayed twenty-seaven of these poore innocent soules, which he sould in Spaine for slaves; to moove their hate against our nation, as well as to cause my proceedings to be so much the more difficult." Increase Mather (1639-1723), colonial minister (son of Richard Mather, who as a Puritan divine settled at Boston in 1635, when thirty-nine years of age), wrote: "Hunt's forementioned scandal, had caused the Indians to contract such a mortal Hatred against all Men of the English Nation that it was no small Difficulty to settle within their Territories." Captain Smith further said that "this wilde act kept him [Hunt] ever after from any more employment in these parts" (Plymouth and the New England coast). The following is also taken from the writings of Increase Mather:

An unworthy ship-master whose name was Hunt, being sent forth into these coasts on the Account of the fishing Trade, after he had made his Dispatch and was ready to sail (under pretense of trucking with them) enticed Indians into his vessel, they in confidence with his Honesty went aboard, to the number of twenty from Patuxet, since called Plimouth, and seven from Nosset (now

known by the name of Eastam) these did this Hunt seize upon, stowed them under Hatches, and carried them to the Straights of Gibraltar, and there did sell as many as he could of them for 20£ to a man until it was known whence they came; for then the friars in those parts took away the rest of them, that so they might nurture them in the Popish religion.

The Spaniards, upon their entry into the Caribbean, inaugurated a policy, which they maintained to the end, of subjugating and enslaving the native West Indians. This attitude toward the aborigines tended toward their extermination but not the creation of a docile vassal people, content to toil laboriously in servitude under the domination of a superior race. The French Jesuits, early in the seventeenth century, made all of North America a mission to save the souls of the red American infidels, and the Catholic Church of Rome inaugurated the policy of "saving" Indians to the glory of God—and of itself. During this era, the Indian was subjugated mentally and spiritually, but he was proclaimed "free"; not so with the African Negro, whom all dominant European peoples of the white race, following the

lead of the Catholic countries of Spain and Portugal, cruelly hunted down like animals and sold as chattels into perpetual slavery.

From the earliest days of the exploration of the continent of North America, the Europeans carried back with them as captives natives of the New World. We are told that Gaspar Corte-Real, the Portuguese nobleman, cruising the east coast and fiords of Labrador in 1500, captured some Indians, whom he carried back for slaves. One of the vessels of Gaspar Corte-Real's second expedition of three ships in 1501 returned with "seven kidnapped Indians for slaves." A Bristol merchant's expedition to New Founde Island in 1502, we are told, carried back enslaved men. Thomas Aubert returned in 1508 to Dieppe, France, with a cargo of fish and furs and "several Indians, who were sold as slaves." The following year, a Norman fisherman reached Rouen from the Banks with "seven Indians and their canoe," they having been enticed aboard to be sold in France as slaves. We are told that Estevan Gomez endeavored to cover the expenses of his 1525 voyage of exploration of the North American coast by taking a "cargo of Indians" back to Spain to be sold into servitude. Jacques Cartier, exploring the St. Lawrence in 1534, kidnapped two Indians, lured aboard his ship by treachery, and took them to France. Capt. George Waymouth, returning to England in 1605 from his exploration of the Sagadahoc, carried back with him five kidnapped Indians, three of whom were taken home by Sir Ferdinando Gorges and used as "house-slaves." Capt. Edward Harlow, in 1611, kidnapped five Cape Cod aborigines.

The Jamestown, Va., settlers could not live at peace with their Indian neighbors and could not enslave them, so as early as 1619 they traded with a Spanish slaver for Negroes to do manual work that the Indians could be neither bribed nor made to do. The American Indian constitutionally made a poor slave and the Negro an ideal one; hence the race problem of today in the United States and the economic and political conditions that led to the Civil War of 1861-1865.

The colonists of New Amsterdam in the 1640's, having commenced to take up agriculture, expressed their desire for much larger numbers of slaves and more than the Dutch West India Company could supply through the regular channels. Therefore, Negroes were purchased "for the equivalent of sixty dollars in Curacao and sold delivered at New Amsterdam for one hundred and fifty dollars apiece." The first slaves were reported exchanged in the colony for "pork and peas." Van Twiller is said to have paid forty guilders each for three Negroes in 1636, but by mid-century, evidently, the price of slaves in the settlement had risen to as high as two hundred seventy dollars. In 1641, Dutch men-of-war took Loango Sao Paulo in West Africa from the Portuguese, and the Dutch became increasingly active in the slave trade. In 1646 the first cargo of Negro slaves reached New Amsterdam from Brazil, but it is said that the first shipload imported direct from the African coast did not arrive until 1655. This was apparently due to the trading policy of the Dutch West India Company. A committee appointed by the states-general in 1648 to report on the affairs of the company referred to the slave trade as having "long lain dormant to the great damage of the company" and with respect to the New Amsterdam (Netherland) colony declared:

With a view of encouraging agriculture and population, we should consider it highly advantageous to allow them [the colonists] to export their produce even to Brazil in their own vessels, under certain duties and conditions, to trade it off there and to carry slaves back in return; which privilege of sailing with their own ships from New Netherland to Brazil should be exclusively allowed to patroons and colonists, who promote the population in New Netherland, and not to interlopers who only carry goods to and fro, without attending to agriculture.

The Dutch authorities in Europe, however, did not want ships built on the Hudson; neither were the company officials particularly interested in agriculture, forest products, or any trading other than in furs. It is said that seven years went by before another slave ship, the *Witte Paert* (*White Horse*), brought a new cargo of Negroes to the settlement and that the disposition of this cargo resulted in somewhat of a scandal. The slaves, instead of being acquired when put up for sale at public auction and placed to work on the land, where labor was needed, were bought and shipped out of the colony, with an immediate sizable profit

to the individual purchasers. Outraged as a result of the incident, which definitely did not contribute to the expressed desire and the official plans to increase the colony's population, Peter Stuyvesant, a former governor of Curacao and director-general of the Dutch colony of New Netherland since May 1647, declared that, whereas "the negroes lately arrived here from the bight of Guinea in the ship *Witte Paert* have been transferred hence without the Honorable Company or the Inhabitants of the Province having derived any revenue or benefit therefrom, there shall be paid at the General Treasury ten per cent of the value or purchase money of the negroes who shall be carried away or exported from here elsewhere beyond the jurisdiction of the New Netherlands." That slaves shipped into the colony should be exported without the connivance of the Dutch officials is improbable, as Stuyvesant, "the peg-legged stern old martinet," presumably in an effort to stop smuggling and increase the colony's revenue, had placed restrictions on and absolute control over shipping. Every vessel in port was under the domination of the Dutch officials and had to be placed where ordered and both unloaded and loaded, under supervision, between sunrise and sunset. No vessel could clear the port "without first being visited," and it was declared a crime "to conceal, carry away or transport" out of New Netherland any of the colony's slaves or servants, free visiting traders, or inhabitants without a pass signed by the director.

It is said that in the years that followed, while the settlement was under Dutch rule, four more slavers discharged their cargoes at New Amsterdam, but that "Dutch farmers were unwilling to pay the price a good plantation hand would command in the southern market." Therefore, ships taking slaves from the African coast across the Atlantic naturally carried their cargoes where they would realize the most profit. Slaves that did reach New Netherland continued to be acquired by the Dutch more with the thought of handling for profit than for local use as labor, for we read that "slaves were always considered good currency in trading for Virginia tobacco or West India rum."

A record has come down to us of one slave ship, the *St. Jan (St. John)*, that sailed from the African coast with 219 slaves aboard destined for New Amsterdam. Before the vessel was practically "wrecked" and captured by an English privateer, foul water and lack of food had "brought on the bloody flux" and 110 slaves had died. An historian, referring to this period in the slave trade, has said, "Even when no epidemic of cholera, plague, or blackwater fever broke out, a captain expected to lose twenty-five to fifty per cent of his cargo by death." However, in the case of the *St. Jan* when captured by the English, we are told of the fearful mortality among the cargo aboard (fifty per cent), and nothing but shortsighted avarice caused this appalling loss, "the greater part of the slaves having died from want and sickness" associated with their stowage and lack of food and fresh water.

The first American colonial-built and owned ship of which we have a record of trading in slaves was the *Desire*, built at Marblehead, which, returning to her home port in 1640 from the West Indies, "brought some cotton and tobacco and negroes, etc., from thence." The traffic in slaves is mentioned in 1645 in Governor Winthrop's JOURNAL: "One of our ships that went to the Canaries with pipe-staves in the beginning of November last [1644] returned now and brought wine and sugar and salt and some tobacco which she had at Barbadoes in exchange for Africans which she carried from the Isle of Maio." Long before the end of the seventeenth century, the colonial ships trading to the Madeiras and Canaries made a regular practice of slaving, for the "legitimate" merchandise, such as wine and salt, obtainable at these island ports was not of sufficient bulk to fill the holds of the American ships. Enterprising and profit-minded New England captains, who wanted to make revenue-producing use of the vacant space in their ships between cargo and weather deck, maintained that they could find nothing for that purpose that would pay nearly as well as Negro slaves ("black ivory") bought on the coast of Africa and carried to American "one-crop colonies" in the Caribbean Sea (West Indian islands) or Virginia on the mainland.

Slavery is an unpleasant business, and the record of the United States in the slave trade

is not one of which to be proud; hence most historians either ignore the pernicious traffic or overemphasize and misinterpret certain incidents that can be made into agreeable reading. One historian says, "In 1645 an American ship which had engaged in the slave trade sailed from Boston for Guinea, the people of Boston having ordered that the slaves be returned to their native land at the public expense." Whereas it is a fact that the General Court ordered the captain of a Massachusetts ship to return to the African coast two slaves that he had brought into Boston and offered for sale (and much has been made of the incident), it should be borne in mind that these two Negroes had not been bought or obtained by barter, but were captured by assault during a raid upon an African village, in which the colonial sea captain rendered help. In deciding the question, the court did not dwell upon the human or spiritual phase of the matter at all, but affirmed the doctrine that slaves were property: "For the negroes (they being none of his *but* stolen) we think meete to alowe nothing." If the Massachusetts captain had obtained the Negro slaves by purchase, the court would have allowed him full value. Baldwin, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAS*, writes: "The most amazing instance of conscience in law is the case of the Boston slaver *Rainbow*, whose master was hailed before the court and ordered to take his cargo of slaves back to Africa, not because slave trading was a sin but because he had purchased them on the Sabbath!"

Paine writes, "The slave trade flourished from the very birth of commerce in Puritan New England and its golden gains and exotic voyages allured high-hearted lads from farm and counter." During the early days of shipping and trading, the colonial settlers were positively not generally averse to either owning or handling slaves. Merchants ordered their skippers to cross to the African coast and load their ships with Negroes to be sold in the West Indies for sugar and molasses, which were brought to Massachusetts or Rhode Island and later used for the distillation of rum, thus inaugurating the historic and notorious triangular trade, in which Negro slaves were one of the necessary paying cargoes. The Utopian province planned by the Quaker William Penn, which as Pennsylvania came into existence in 1682, was never anti-slavery in its laws and policy during Penn's lifetime or in colonial days. In 1696 the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting passed a resolution declaring slavery contrary to the first principles of the gospel (a statement with which, it would seem, all devout Christians would be in agreement), but trade and economic conditions were such that declarations of this kind were practically meaningless and accomplished nothing. Penn himself did not take a stand for emancipation of slaves, and when he finally proposed measures for the education of Negroes, permission for them to marry, repression of polygamy, etc., the assembly refused to enact the suggested legislation, although it did adopt regulations advocated by him dealing with the trial and punishment of slaves.

A succession of monopolistic companies—six in number—was organized in England between 1585 and 1672 to control the African slave trade. These companies carried captured Negro slaves out of Africa to West Indian islands needing slave labor, payment for the slaves being made in British-manufactured goods. The operations of the last of these British slaving companies, it was declared at Barbados, tended to kill "the provision trade from New England," which was necessary to the well-being of the island and the feeding of its numerous slaves. For a while, colonial ships were driven from the trade, but smugglers soon circumvented the British monopoly; attempts to intercept the cargoes of "interlopers" were unsuccessful, and the slaves were landed on beaches between ports while "armed multitudes on foot and on horseback" beat off the officials and their men who tried to prevent such entries by force. In 1698 the British Parliament threw open the slave trade to all merchantmen. The traffic was considered "so Highly Beneficial and Advantageous to this Kingdom" that England made efforts to secure the slave trade of the Spanish islands and met with some success, for we are told that "the most valued feature" of the Peace of Utrecht (March 13, 1713) was the *asiento* by which Spain agreed to permit England to send not less than 4,800 slaves every year thereafter to the Spanish colonies. Spain had obtained its needed slave supply from France prior to giving the monopoly to England, and

it had passed into the hands of the French from the Dutch. John R. Spears, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, says:

With Spanish as well as all English West Indian Islands open to the trade of the New England slavers, it is interesting to note that one port soon forged ahead of all others in the number of ships engaged in the traffic. Rhode Island merchants secured a much greater share of it than those of other parts of the coast. Their success appears to have been due in part to geographical conditions. Thus the people of Massachusetts led those of Rhode Island in the fisheries because they lived nearer the Banks, but they had no advantage in carrying forest and farm products to the West Indies. In fact, Newport was measurably nearer to Barbados than Boston was; her ships did not have to risk the dangers of Cape Cod. This was a small advantage, but all the more interesting on that account. Boston gave her attention chiefly to fish; Newport perforce made a specialty of something else, and of all the products of the soil

used in trade, within her reach, there was nothing that gave so large a profit as molasses, when it was the raw material for the manufacture of rum. Newport thought of fish at one time; a bounty was paid on whale oil taken by ships of the colony. But the production of rum needed no artificial stimulation. Molasses cost thirteen or fourteen pennies a gallon and Rhode Island distillers became so expert that some of them made a gallon of rum from one of molasses, though the ordinary product was 96 gallons in 100. Rum was not only cheap, it was satisfying. Even the French Canadians bought rum, instead of brandy from their native land. Gaining the lead in the manufacture of rum gave the Newport merchants the lead in the slave trade, for of all goods carried by enlightened and civilized white men to the degraded heathen of Africa nothing proved so tempting as this deadly stupefier.

As slaving ports, Boston and Salem were poor rivals of Newport, R. I., but most Boston merchants owned slaves as house servants and bought and sold them as they did other merchandise. By 1720 the importation of West Indian molasses into Massachusetts had increased to the point that, it was reported, "63 distilleries were running full time in the colony." We are told that New England rum had displaced beer and cider as the favorite American beverage and, furthermore, had supplanted French brandy as a prime medium of exchange in the Guinea African slave trade.

Capt. David Lindsay, in command of the 40-ton brigantine *Sanderson* (owned by William Johnson & Company, of Newport, R. I.), sailed "at 11:32 o'clock" on August 22, 1752, for "the black coast" in the slave trade. Before departure, the vessel was declared "tite as yet." The principal part of her cargo consisted of "80 hhds. six bbs. and 3 tierces of rum, containing 8220 gals."; also some lumber and staves for sale at Barbados and a small quantity of lumber "for use in making the slave deck." Captain Lindsay reported to the owners on February 28, 1753, from Anamaboe: "I have got 13 or 14 hhds. of Rum yet left a board & God noes when I shall get clear of it. Ye traid is so dull it is actually a noof to make a man Creasy." Continuing, he writes that the officers and men had been sick and that one was likely to die, and he adds: "And wors than yt have wore out my small cable & have been obliged to buy one heare. . . . I beg you not blaime me in so doeing. I should be glad I could come rite home with my slaves for my vesiel will not last to proceed farr. We can see day Lite al around her bow under deck." From Barbados, on June 17, 1753, Captain Lindsay reported:

These are to acqt you of my arivel here ye day before yesterday from anamaboe. I met on my passage 22 days of very squaly winds & continued Rains so that it beat my sails alto piceses. . . .

My slaves is not landed as yet: they are 56 in number for owners all in helth & fatt. . . . I've got 40 ounces gould dust & eight or nine hundred weight Maligabar pepper for owners.

Captain Lindsay, who had the courage to cross the Atlantic westbound in a leaky and unseaworthy little craft of only 40 tons that required ten weeks for the passage, said that the trading conditions on the African coast were bad; yet the report of the consignee shows that forty-seven of the slaves sold, in Barbados, for £1,432-12s-6d, or an average of about £30½ each, and after deducting expenses, the consignee credited the owners of the *Sanderson* with £1,324. Of the price received for the remaining Negroes, nothing is said in the record. However, to the revenue already mentioned as reported by the Barbados consignee should be added that from the sale of the lumber and staves, and upon arrival home substantial profits were realized from the gold dust and pepper brought from Africa and the molasses

from Barbados. As the usual price of a slave on the African coast was stated at 110 gallons of rum and the cost of the *Sanderson* at £450, the dividend payable to the owners for one voyage of that little vessel in the triangular slave trade was evidently very large. It has also been said that the *Sanderson*, on the first leg of her voyage from Newport, R. I., to the African Gold Coast, carried—in addition to 8,220 gallons of rum—some "African iron" (small bars used as currency among the natives of Africa around the Guinea coast) and that on the last leg of the voyage, the passage from Barbados home, the brigantine slaver carried 55 hogsheads of molasses, 27 barrels of sugar, and bills of exchange on Liverpool amounting to £412-3s.

In reporting to William Johnson & Company, of Newport, from Barbados, Captain Lindsay referred to the number of slaves aboard "for owners." In addition to monthly wages of a moderate amount, it was the practice of the shipping firms and the managers of the capital invested in individual ships to allow trading privileges and commissions of a specified amount to the captain and certain other officers. This "privilege," or special commission, was a "private venture of the trade" highly valued by a shipmaster and his officers. Foremast hands in deep-sea mercantile trade enjoyed no "privilege," and at this time their pay was about three pounds per month. When Captain Lindsay took the schooner *Sierra Leone* out from Newport in 1754 on a slaving voyage for the same owners, the agreement covering conditions of employment written by William Johnson & Company to its shipmaster read: "You are to have four out of 104 for your coast commission & five per cent for the sale of your cargo in the West Indies & five per cent for the goods you purchase for return cargo. You are to have five slaves Privilege, your cheafe mate Two, if he can purchase them, & your second mate two." It is also of interest to read of the bill of lading and letter of instructions from the owners to the captain about to sail from Newport to the coast of Africa and engage in the slave trade:

Shipped by the Grace of God in good order and well conditioned, by William Johnson & Co., owners of the *Sierra Leone*, in & upon the said Schooner *Sierra Leone*, where of is Master under God for this present voyage David Lindsay, & now riding at Anchor in Harbour of Newport, and by God's Grace bound for the coast of Africa: to say, Thirty-four hogsheads, Tenn Tierces, Eight barrels & six half barrels Rum, one barrel Sugar, sixty Musketts, six half barrels Powder, one box beads, Three boxes Snuff, Two barrels Tallow, Twenty-one barrels Beef, Pork and Mutton, 14 cwt. 1 qr. 22 lbs. bread, one barrel mackerel, six shirts, five Jacketts, one piece blue Calico, one piece Chex, one mill, shackles, handcuffs &c.

Being marked and numbered as in the Margent; & are to be delivered in like good Order & well conditioned, at the aforesaid port of the coast of Africa (the Dangers of the Seas only excepted) unto the said David Lindsay or to his assigns, he or they paying Freight for the said Goods, nothing, with Primage and Average accustomed. In Witnes whereof, the master or purser of the said Schooner hath affirmed unto three Bills of Lading: all of this Tenor and date: one of which Three Bills of Lading being accomplished the other two stand void. And so God send the good Schooner to her desired Port in Safety: Amen.

It is evident that, as far as New England was concerned, the slave trade gradually developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries more or less in conjunction with the business in sugar and molasses. Newport and Bristol, we are told, "drove a roaring traffic in rum and niggers, with one hundred sail to be found in the infamous Middle Passage." Virginia and the Carolinas, however, became the most lucrative markets for slaves on the continent of North America, for it was in the South that this kind of labor was most needed. The master of a Rhode Island slaver, writing home from Guinea in 1736, said:

For never was there so much Rum on the coast at one time before. Not ye like of ye French ships was never seen before, for ye whole coast is full of them. For my part I can give no guess when I shall get away, for I purchast but 27 slaves since I have been here, for slaves is very scarce. We have

had nineteen Sail of us at one time in ye Road, so that ships that used to carry pryme slaves off is now forced to take any that comes. Here is seven sail of us Rum men that are ready to devour one another, for our case is desprit.

The contract for the slave business entered into between the British (the English South Sea Company) and the Spaniards in 1713, as per the Treaty of Utrecht, was evidently

deemed highly important to British merchants and shipowners; for when Philip V of Spain in 1739 declared his determination to revoke the *asiento*, acquire a stretch of the African coast, and go into the slavery business rather than have the Spanish depend upon heretics for their slaves, Sir Robert Walpole, of England, "was forced by popular feeling into war with Spain"—the so-called "War of Jenkins' Ear." We are told by British historians that during the last two decades of the seventeenth century the organized African Company exported 140,000 Negroes and that private adventurers handled 160,000, making a total of 300,000, or some 15,000 per year. Bryan Edwards is authority for the statement that the import of slaves into the British colonies of America, including the West Indies, from 1680 to 1786 was 2,130,000—an average of about 20,100 per annum for a period of 106 years, which ended at a time closely following the American War of Revolution. The British slave trade reached its maximum shortly before the colonial fight for independence, the fleet of English slave ships sailing from the four slave ports (Liverpool, London, Bristol, and Lancaster) consisting of 192 vessels provided with space to transport 47,146 Negroes. Prior to the American Revolution, the planters of Virginia attempted to prohibit the importation of African slaves into the colony because the colonists feared that, unless something was done to keep out the Negroes, Virginia would cease to be "a white man's country." It is interesting to note that the British Government, because of England's mercantile and shipping interests, disallowed "such laws affecting the slave traffic," and American colonists asserted that, by so doing, it showed preference to "the immediate advantage of a few African corsairs" rather than to "the lasting interests of the American States" and "the rights of human nature." In contrast to the Virginians' ill-success in combating "the excessive British slave trade with the colonies," the merchants of Charleston, S. C., in 1769 effectively boycotted slaves and stopped the traffic on the ground that the African Negroes were "British merchandise of a particularly objectionable character."

During the War of the Revolution, the slave business declined, but upon its termination, it is said, "the trade immediately revived." Edwards wrote that in 1791 there were forty European factories handling slaves on the coast of Africa, of which fifteen were Dutch, fourteen English, four Portuguese, four Danish, and three French. It was estimated that in 1790 the British shipped more than half of all the slaves handled on the African coast and that of the total of 74,000 traded in that year, the British exported 38,000, the French 20,000, the Portuguese 10,000, the Dutch 4,000, and the Danes 2,000. It is said that, exclusive of the slaves who were killed in capture or who died before they sailed from Africa, one out of every eight was lost during the passage to the West Indies. The figures in regard to slaves transported from the Guinea coast to the British island of Jamaica are of interest. Between 1700 and 1786, the slaves shipped totaled 610,000, but we are told that in addition to the mortality at sea $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent died "whilst in the harbours" before the sale and one-third more in the "seasoning." An historian says, "Out of every lot of 100 shipped from Africa, 17 died in about 9 weeks and not more than 50 lived to be effective labourers in the islands." The circumstances of their subsequent life on the plantations were evidently not favorable to the increase of their numbers; one reason was the overwhelming predominance of males. In 1820, after something like a total of a million importations during the period of the English occupation, which dated from 1655, there were only 340,000 Negroes in the islands.

The records indicate that enormous profits were made in the buying, shipping, and sale of African slaves—and this in spite of active and most keen and unscrupulous competition. Statistics show that in England during 1750 Bristol (a famous old slaving port) had 157 shipping merchants engaged in the trade, London had 135, and Liverpool (later the leading British slaving port) had 101. The English slaving vessels, it is said, carried on an average about three hundred Negroes. During this period of particular British aggressiveness, the American colony of Rhode Island continued not only to hold its own in the marine transportation of slaves but also actually to gain in the volume of the traffic handled. THE AMERICAN SLAVE TRADE is authority for the statement that, whereas New Rhode Island had

120 slavers in 1740, the number of ships in the traffic had increased to 150 in 1770; moreover, the ships were bigger and carried more slaves per voyage.

A most vulnerable point in the ocean commerce of the colonies during the British wars with France and Spain was the slave trade. The New England-African coast-West Indies triangular trade was well understood by the enemy, and to the French a cargo of slaves "was the most coveted prize afforded." The following record describes an incident that shows the embarrassments attending this colonial trade when the French privateers were particularly active:

I, Joseph Wanton, being one of the people called Quakers, and conscientiously scrupulous about taking an oath, upon solemn affirmation say that on the 1st day of the month commonly called April A.D. 1758 I sailed from Newport in the snow *King of Prussia* with a cargo of 124 hogshead of rum, 20 barrels of rum and other cargo; that on the 20th day of the month called May, I made Cape Mount on the west coast of Africa;

that I ran down the coast and traded at Annamibo, where, while at anchor, on the 23rd day of the month called July, when I had on board 54 slaves, 20 ounces of gold-dust and 65 hogsheads of rum, I was taken by a French privateer of 60 guns fitted out in Bordeaux, called *Le Compte de St. Florentine* having on board between 500 and 600 men, while my vessel had but 3 small pieces and 11 men.

It appears that Wanton's ship was one of three Newport "rum-slavers" captured at about this same time on the same part of the African coast, while plying their slave trade, and that the officers and crews finally got back home through the friendliness and long-headed good business sense of a native African prince. He acquired one of the three captured American vessels from the French and turned her over to the colonials in order that they could return home, for this prince had benefited greatly by the trade with America and wanted more Rhode Island rum. The size of the French "privateer" as stated by "the honest Quaker Joseph Wanton" is tremendous and seems incredible; such a heavily armed and manned ship suggests a very large frigate or ship-of-the-line, and no armed, privately owned merchant ship would carry five or six hundred men (or 60 guns). At this time, France was incensed at the great decline shown in its grape brandy business on the Guinea coast and the increasing popularity with the slave traders and African barterers of rum distilled from West Indian sugar cane. Evidently, the French had taken decisive means to wipe out rum competition, for France, with its cognac, had held a preferential position in the African slave trade; it was determined to protect that highly profitable international trade and to maintain the volume of grape brandy exports and the exchange of such alcoholic spirits for Negro slaves to be sold in the world's markets.

In A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK, we read:

It is most astonishing and impressive to look over the list of those engaged in one way and another in the slave traffic. Some of New York's foremost families diverted their capital or ships to this commerce. Between 1715 and the Revolution,

the port's merchant-shipowners went in for the highly profitable traffic quite extensively, transporting thousands of Negroes to the West Indies, to southern colonial markets and additional hundreds to Manhattan.

It has been said that traffic with pirates and the slave trade were big factors contributing to the importance and growth of New York as a port under British rule before the Revolution. To these should be added aggressive and yet subtle smuggling, which was participated in with vigor and enthusiasm because of Britain's arbitrary, unreasonable, and essentially shortsighted laws. All sorts of contraband, including slaves, were regularly and cleverly shipped into New York and the surrounding territory duty free. The following letter written by John Watts, of New York, on March 30, 1762, to a shipowner of Salem, Mass., sheds some interesting light on the operations of the slave trade and smuggling, or illegal entries, in vogue at that time:

For this market they [the slaves] must be young the younger the better if not quite Children, those advanced in years will never do. I should imagine a cargo of them exceeding thirty might turn out at fifty pounds a head gross Sales. Males are best.

. . . Our duty is four pounds a head from the West Indies forty shillings [two pounds] from Africa. New Jersey pays none at all for which reason the Master might lay a mile or two below the Town and send up word.

It has been said that this "sending up word" was in the best tradition of the port of New York and that behind the scenes the "below the Town" contraband of every type, including slaves, was constantly slipped into the province, unrecorded and with the payment of no duties to the British authorities. This condition was not peculiar to New York. We are told that it was a "common thing to unload ships at Cape Ann and bring their goods to Boston in wood boats" or "run the goods to Charlestown and other ports of Greater Boston," where there were seventy-seven "unguarded wharves." New England had timber products and fish and New York had flour to export, all of which were needed in the West Indies, where food and slaves were paid for with sugar and molasses. There is an old colonial saying, "Molasses means rum, rum means slaves, and slaves mean cash"; so the slaves that figured in the New England-African coast-West Indies trade were disposed of in the places and under the conditions that brought the shipping merchants the greatest profit. That the West Indian islands were really dependent upon the American colonies for food is proven by the fact that when Britain, as a result of the War of the Revolution, prohibited its island possessions from trading with the "rebels" and the young republic, "fifteen thousand slaves died of starvation" during seasons in which the islands' crops were destroyed by hurricanes, as the West Indians were not permitted to receive the "dried fish and corn" that had heretofore been obtained regularly from New England and had become requisite for their sustenance and well-being.

The slave trade, sometimes referred to as "The Guinea Trade," continued as long as the New England colonies were part of the British Empire, but in 1788 it was forbidden, under heavy penalties, by an act of the General Court of Massachusetts. Aside from the rum and the triangular trade interests, slaving had at no time been an important line of commerce in Massachusetts and, notwithstanding popular tradition (and Faneuil Hall), never became a leading business in that New England state. Rhode Island, however, continued actively engaged in slaving for many long years. Although the slave trade was prohibited by an act of the General Court of Massachusetts in 1788, with heavy penalties imposed for violation of the law, it is evident that the traffic was not entirely stopped by this legislation. Dr. Bentley gives in his diary the names of eight Salem shipmasters who engaged in the nefarious trade, at one time or another, during the period 1788-1802. Of these captains, one was "disposed of" during a mutiny on his ship in the Middle Passage; another was murdered by a Negro; a third committed suicide by cutting his own throat; another, who was said to be a member of "a most worthy family," died at Havana. Of the eight skippers referred to as known slavers, it would seem that only one of them was arrested, and he was released because of lack of evidence, although "an extant log of one of his voyages from Salem to the Guinea coast and the West Indies bears witness of his guilt." Salem was jealous of Boston as a port, and as Salem had a regular trade with the West African coast, sending over rum and fish and returning with gold dust, palm oil, and ivory, it would seem that the local law enforcement officers not only winked at an occasional shipmaster but also rather expected him, in his desire for gain, to yield to the temptation to load "black ivory" with the rest of the cargo when he left the Guinea coast and the conditions seemed particularly propitious. In the *ANNALS OF SALEM* by Felt are printed the instructions of an owner to a slaver that left Salem in 1785. Prior to 1788, Massachusetts merchants and shipmasters engaged in the slave trade openly, but after that date they did so occasionally and furtively, although some investigators maintained that there was "a recognized underground traffic." There has been controversy between historians through the years as to whether or not Massachusetts was, as claimed, "the nursing mother of the horrors of the Middle Passage."

New England ships carried from Africa across the Atlantic many slaves that were not brought to the United States, but Senator Smith, of South Carolina, said that the statistics of slave imports at Charleston during the years 1804-1808 showed that seventy vessels entering with such cargo were British, sixty-nine were owned at Charleston, fifty-nine were Rhode Island ships, and only one hailed from Massachusetts—and that from the port of Boston. Early in the nineteenth century, Rhode Island rum was, therefore, a potent factor in the

African slave trade. All such statistics, however, fail to consider the all-important West Indian slave trade, and evidently it was decreed that American ships could engage in this traffic without breaking the laws either of Massachusetts or of the United States. An interesting insurance policy dated June 13, 1803, covered for \$33,000 at 10 per cent the ship *Hope* and cargo from the coast of Africa to Havana, Cuba, and read in part: "The assurers are liable for loss by insurrection, but not by natural mortality. Each slave is valued at two hundred dollars." The ship sailed under Danish colors, and the principal of record was Robert Cuming, of St. Croix (of the Danish West Indies), but the policy was underwritten "by seven of the most respectable Boston merchants and negotiated by an eighth."

During the Napoleonic wars, England became increasingly vigilant and sought to capitalize on its sea power by preventing the trade of its enemies with their sugar islands in neutral bottoms. The experience of Capt. Mathias Nicoll in the ship *Cotton Planter* in 1806 shows how American ships engaged in the slave trade during the period of the Revolution and the War of 1812. Nicoll sailed from New York with a mixed cargo. He stopped at Madeira and Tenerife to dispose of the flour and oak staves he had aboard and then moved on to the slave stations of the African coast. At Senegal and Goree, he bought thirty-four Negroes, "paying for them by the sale of his rum, brandy and tobacco, together with the sterling bills of exchange received in the Wine Islands." The *Cotton Planter* then stopped at the Cape Verde Islands, took some salt aboard to fill her holds, and headed for South America. At Buenos Aires, Nicoll sold his slaves and salt (and actually netted twice as much profit from the salt as he got for the slaves), loaded with jerked beef, and cleared for Charleston, S. C. Off Antigua, the *Cotton Planter* was brought to by the British frigate *Latona*. Captain Nicoll confidently pointed out that he was proceeding to a neutral United States port, but the commander of the *Latona* knew better. He had previously intercepted another ship, and among the letters aboard that had been opened and read was one written by Nicoll to the ship's owners reporting on the voyage, in which he had said: "I feel fully persuaded that the sooner my beef arrives in Havana, the greater price it will bring." Albion and Pope write in *SEA LANES IN WARTIME*: "These damning words transferred the profits of the voyage to the *Latona's* captain and his subordinates. Nicoll comforted himself with the thought of his insurance coverage: 'Premiums dig deep in profit, but are frequently repaid with heavy interest.'"

It is refreshing to know that there were a few New England shipping merchants who, in the early days of the republic, refused to participate to any degree whatsoever in the profitable slave trade. William Gray (1750-1825), of Salem and later of Boston, America's greatest shipowner and merchant of his time, not only had no liking for the slave trade but also, throughout his lifetime, emphatically denounced it. It is said that he "never permitted any vessel of his large fleet to participate in the traffic, which was a most unusual point of view for a New England shipping merchant of the late eighteenth century." (William Gray personally initiated and started, with a donation of \$10,000, the plan by which the patriotic Salem citizens of the young republic privately built the splendid frigate *Essex* and presented her to the United States Government.)

Elias Hasket Derby (1739-1799), of Salem, who was a member of a notable seafaring family and has been described as "the first American millionaire," consistently held similar strong views on the subject of slavery. Derby was a shipping merchant with vision and a combination of courage and hardheaded sagacity that was used in the realization of dreams and hopes. His father, Richard Derby (1712-1783), ship captain, owner, and merchant of Salem, had engaged in trade with Virginia and the West Indies and sent assorted cargoes to Spain and Madeira, returning home with the desired products of European countries. We are told that Elias Hasket Derby, whose shipping business was crippled during the War of the Revolution, "diverted his ability and abundant resources into privateering" and that he held a financial interest in a very large number of such Salem-owned armed merchantmen and because of his wealth and patriotism could be expected to subscribe for such shares "as

might not be taken up by his fellow townsmen." He was a pioneer in building bigger, better, and faster ships in the western world in order that they could triumph in speed, seaworthiness, handiness, and at times in fighting power over British ships. After the war, these vessels were too large for the coastwise trade, so he sent them abroad and even beyond the Atlantic and into waters where the British and the Dutch East Indies companies claimed trade monopolies. Derby's *Grand Turk* of 300 tons, known in Salem as "the great ship" because of her size, was dispatched under Capt. Jonathan Ingersoll on a pioneering voyage to the Cape of Good Hope. After trading in South Africa, Captain Ingersoll, in 1784, took the *Grand Turk* to the coast of Guinea, the world's trading center for slaves. Whereas the ship disposed of her remaining cargo of rum at the Guinea ports, she loaded in exchange not the usual Negro slaves but ivory and gold dust, as Captain Ingersoll had explicit instructions that "not a single slave should be acquired" by barter, exchange, or purchase or be "shipped aboard my [Derby's] vessel." Elias H. Derby declared, "I would rather sink the whole capital employed than directly or indirectly be concerned in so infamous a trade."

In this connection, it is well to note that Elias H. Derby did on one occasion, without his knowledge and consent, benefit financially by the slave trade. The British sloop *Polly* of Barbados was captured in January 1783 in West Indian waters by the *Grand Turk* (Capt. Joseph Pratt) and sent with a prize crew into Martinique, where she and her cargo were sold, as was usual, at auction. Included in the cargo of the British sloop were nine African slaves that sold at the French port for 8,695 livres, and of this amount, in accordance with the "half-lay" system of compensation in effect, one-half was paid to the captain and crew and the other half remitted to Derby as owner. However, this is apparently the only instance of record where Derby dealt in any way in slaves or benefited by the nefarious traffic.

Elias H. Derby's father, the famous Capt. Richard Derby of colonial and early Revolutionary fame, was not as scrupulous as his son in the matter of the slave trade, for on the margin of the letter of instructions given to Captain Derby as master and part-owner of the square topsail schooner *Volante* in 1741, when she was engaged in the West Indian trade, is penned this memorandum:

"Capt. Derby: If you trade at Barbadoes, buy me a negroe boy about siventeen years old, which if you do, advise Mr. Clarke of yt so he may not send one
Benj. Gerrish Jr."

Apparently, as the middle of the eighteenth century and the Revolution approached, the "godly Puritans" bought and used African slaves to perform certain kinds of labor for them in New England, where the winters were apt to be severe and "hard on the blacks."

The slave trade, i.e., the transporting of slaves on the high seas, was abolished by England in 1807 and by the United States a year later. England was instrumental in securing the grudging acquiescence of the other nations and so-called first-class powers and maritime countries to this policy at Vienna in 1814. However, in order to make the abolition effective, it became necessary for British and American war vessels to be used in steady patrol and police work off the fever-ridden African coast. The government of Buenos Aires declared that all children born of slaves after January 31, 1813, would be free. Colombia decreed that such children born after January 16, 1821, should be liberated when eighteen years of age. Mexico freed its slaves September 15, 1829, and the British abolition of slavery by parliamentary decree received royal assent August 28, 1833, and became operative January 1, 1834. France followed in 1848. Ten years later, it was enacted in Portugal that every slave should be free in twenty years, the emancipation becoming effective April 29, 1878. The Dutch liberated their slaves in 1863. In the United States, slavery was abolished by proclamation and certain legislative action in 1862, but it was not until December 1865 that a constitutional amendment was ratified abolishing and forever prohibiting slavery throughout the land. The Spanish legislature passed an act in 1870 providing for the freedom of all slaves over sixty and that all yet unborn children of slaves should be free but maintained at the expense of the proprietors up to their eighteenth year. Brazil, on September

28, 1871, decreed that slavery should be abolished throughout the empire, but there were certain exemptions and qualifications, and total abolition was not realized until 1888, when emancipation was voted by the legislative chamber and some 700,000 persons still enslaved were set free.

Slaving by New England ships persisted, even if only occasionally, until the Civil War. As late as 1861, the owners of two New Bedford whalers were condemned to hard labor in jail for slave trading, and we are told that "a by no means uncommon practice at New Bedford and the Sound ports was to fit out a whaler for a slaving voyage unbeknown to the crew." Up to the days almost immediately preceding the Civil War, some of the cream of the American clipper ship fleet at times degenerated into slavers or into what were designated as "coolie ships," and the trade of these vessels was almost as bad—if not quite—as that of the out-and-out slavers. The greatest markets for receiving the cargo of coolie ships were at the Peruvian guano deposits and the island of Cuba, which needed the labor for the sugar plantations. These coolie ships were loaded at Chinese ports by trickery, deceit, and dishonest methods, and the ignorant men who contracted for work abroad soon found themselves enslaved. Even their accommodation and the handling they received on the coolie ships were very little different from those of the regular slaver whose operations in the 1850's were branded illegitimate by the so-called "civilized" nations. Ralph D. Paine, writing of conditions that originated and sanctioned the slave trade and that later fostered, developed, and protected it (in each of the economic, social, and religious phases), said:

Two hundred years of wickedness, unspeakable and human torture beyond computation, justified by Christian men and sanctioned by governments, at length rending the nation asunder in civil war and bequeathing a problem still unsolved—all this followed in the wake of those first voyages in search of labor which could be bought and sold as merchandise. It belonged to the Dark Ages, with piracy and witchcraft, better forgotten than recalled, save for its potent influence in schooling brave seamen and building faster ships for peace and war.

Piracy on the High Seas prior to the War of the Revolution

Piracy on the high seas was common and divided into two categories: (1) thievery by force and trickery, (2) pillage and confiscation of floating property and its load by armed might and "cutlasses and slaughter," i.e., plundering with cruel bloodshed. As early as 1632, there are records that the New England coast "was plagued by pirates," and "the doughty seamen" of Salem, Boston, and Plymouth had to put to sea and "fight them off." The pirates here referred to were probably David (Dixy) Bull and his crew of fifteen Englishmen, who had worked north from Tortugas or the West Indies possibly in quest of salted fish, for we are told that this band "committed acts of piracy on New England fishermen and even attacked settlements." The first product of Boston shipyards, Governor Winthrop's *Blessing of the Bay*, a seagoing vessel of 30 tons launched into Mystic River (at Medford) in 1631, is said to have been used as "an armed-ship against pirates." However, there is a record that before this vessel was afloat, the fishermen of the bay and from the Piscataqua armed themselves and manned several pinnaces and shallops, in which they made three expeditions "in search of the marauders"—evidently without success. One went as far east as Pemaquid, where she was windbound for three weeks. These voyages have been referred to as "the first naval demonstrations made in the colonies." Probably Dixy Bull was the pirate whom the Puritans sought to capture or drive away, but it would seem that the charges made against

Bull by the stern Puritan fathers dealt with irreligious and horrifying levity rather than crime; one of the most serious was to the effect that when the New England fishermen assembled on their fishing boats at the hour of prayer, Bull caused his men to sing boisterous songs and utter disconcerting shouts—probably of derision. In 1633, the devout colonists of Massachusetts Bay apprehended a "pirate" named Stone and sent him to England, where he appeared before the Admiralty Court, which evidently discharged him when the testimony developed that the real cause of his arrest by the Puritans had been not piracy as charged but adultery.

The early colonists were very much "a law unto themselves," and in ocean trade they were primarily actuated by the demands of self-preservation. British laws, at first, meant but little to them; they resorted to smuggling if economic needs so suggested, and at times both Pilgrims and Puritans and the colonies' most "God-fearing men" winked at piracy on the high seas—but not at thievery on shore. The early New England settlers, at times, not only tolerated pirates but also were friendly and hospitable to them. In 1646 the Pilgrims of Plymouth entertained Captain Cromwell, a pirate, who called at the port with three ships, manned by eighty men. They were so well treated that they stayed with the Pilgrims nearly six weeks. Governor Bradley, referring to this friendly visit of the pirates, writes, "They spent and scattered a great deal of money among ye people, and yet more sine than money."

Pirates evidently harassed the fisheries off the New England coast from early colonial days, for Piscataqua fishermen were so molested by freebooters on the sea that "just prior to 1650" they built an armed "friggot" at Dover Point to protect their vessels, men, and catches on the high seas.

About this time, settlements in what is now the State of Connecticut co-operated with each other in the expense of fitting out and operating a merchant vessel with 10 guns and forty men to cruise Long Island Sound to protect their ships and commerce against depredations of the Dutch and "against all evil doers"—evidently meaning the pirates (or privateers) of any nation and the Indians. There is a record of a Dutch privateer (or New Amsterdam cruiser), under the command of Capt. Cornelius Ewoutsen, capturing four New England ketches off Block Island, and the declaration of Capt. Richard Hollingsworth, who had command of one of the vessels seized by the Dutch, is of interest. He asserted that, in addition to eight hides, he had 66 tubs of tobacco aboard, of which 47 tubs were freighted for account of Wharton and Company, merchants of Boston, 6 tubs for Matthew Cartwright, and 13 tubs for himself and crew. In these early days, therefore, the crews of colonial merchant ships were engaged in "private venture," and of the cargo aboard Captain Hollingsworth's ketch, the master and crew owned about one-fifth.

In 1645 a colonial ship that was trading with the Canaries was attacked near the Strait of Gibraltar by a Barbary corsair carrying 20 guns and seventy men. Strange as it may seem, the American vessel, according to the records, was armed with 14 guns and carried a crew of thirty men, being "a big and powerful merchant ship for her day" (probably owned and armed in England, but built at Cambridge, Mass.). The two vessels had fought for most of a day when the buccaneer had her rudder shot away, and the ships separated in the night after an indecisive battle, during which both sustained losses.

The Barbary pirates, whose operations at a later date played a major part affecting the maritime commerce of nations, including the young republic of the United States, gave "great concern" to and "sorely vexed" early colonial seamen, who in troublesome times boldly crossed the Atlantic in trading vessels that one historian described as "very much smaller than a modern canal boat or brick barge." The North African anti-Christian freebooters ("Sallee Rovers"), with a lust for gold, "hovered from the Mediterranean to the chops of the English Channel," and as early as the seventeenth century many a luckless New England seaman was held prisoner in North Africa or enslaved and put on the galley oars until funds were forthcoming for his ransom. A record of 1661 states: "For a long time previous the commerce of Massachusetts was much annoyed by Barbary corsairs, and many of its seamen were held in bondage. One Captain Cakebread (or Breadcake) had two guns to cruise in search of Turk-

ish pirates." In 1670 the General Court published in Boston "by beat of drum" a proclamation against a pirate ship at the Isles of Shoals (off the New Hampshire coast) and the much used and valued fishing grounds, and in 1673 another official broadside was hurled against "piracy and mutiny."

The red American Indians, not content with harassing the colonist-settlers by lurking in ambush on shore, went afloat and resorted to piracy on the seas as is evidenced by the testimony of many Down East settlers (in New England and New France—now Canada). There are many early records of the stealing of colonial shallops by the Indians just as they had previously stolen the small boats of the French explorers and of the Breton and Basque fishermen. In May 1636, a Puritan colonist named Oldham, while sailing his trading vessel near Plum Island, Long Island Sound, was surprised by Narragansett Indians, who murdered him (and any of his crew who may have been aboard) and seized his sloop. Shortly after this crime was committed, John Gallop, a friend and neighbor of Oldham, was cruising in that vicinity in his 20-ton sloop, manned by two men (Indians) and two boys, and sighted the Oldham sloop, which was acting queerly. Gallop sailed in that direction and saw fourteen Indians lying on the deck (with spears, knives, and tomahawks) and evidently endeavoring to escape detection. Gallop opened fire and by good seamanship kept out of range of Indian weapons, while he cleared the deck with his firearms and good marksmanship. Some of the Indians jumped overboard and were drowned, some were killed, one surrendered and was bound, and the balance of the survivors were driven into a space below deck and confined there. During the melee, Gallop could bank on the loyal support of only his two boys, as the Indians comprising his crew were also Narragansetts and were quite capable of treachery. When the deck of Oldham's sloop was cleared of belligerents and at least ten of the Indians had been killed (mostly by drowning), Gallop and his crew moved all they could that was of value from the Oldham sloop to his own, ran a line to her, and hauled up for the Connecticut shore with the recaptured sloop in tow. It is said that a gale sprung up and to save his own vessel in the storm, Gallop cut the prize adrift, which finally went ashore somewhere in Narragansett Bay. Gallop succeeded in making port, following which an expedition was sent out under John Endecott, and we are told that "the Narragansett Indians were severely punished."

There are some records suggesting that while piratical Indians in early colonial days proved themselves capable of stealing the white man's big "winged canoe," or "wood bird," they found it difficult to sail such a craft, although they moved the fishermen's shallops and small sloops with paddles. Probably the Indians shipped by the Puritans as crew were observant enough to learn to sail the white man's boats, for as the years advanced some Indians became proficient in the use of canvas. Records show that in 1665-1666 the province of Connecticut maintained an armed vessel at Watch Hill to prevent the Narragansett Indians from crossing the Sound and attacking the Montauk Indians and to protect the commerce of the colonies.

The following quaint entry dated July 25, 1677, appears in the records of the First Church of Salem:

The Lord having given a Commission to the Indians to take no less than 13 of the Fishing Ketches of Salem and Captivate the men (though divers of them cleared themselves and came home), it struck a great consternation into all the people here. The Pastor moved on the Lord's Day, and the whole people readily consented, to keep the Lecture Day following as a Fast Day, which was accordingly done, and the work carried on by the Pastor, Mr.

Hale, Mr. Chevers and Mr. Gerrish, the higher ministers helping in prayer. The Lord was pleased to send in some of the Ketches on the Fast Day which was looked on as a gracious smile of Providence. Also there had been 19 wounded men sent into Salem a little while before; also a Ketch with 40 men sent out from Salem as a man-of-war to recover the rest of the Ketches. The Lord give them Good Success.

We are told that all during the Tudor Reigns (a period from 1485 to 1603) piracy was rampant around the British Isles, particularly in the south of Ireland and around the Scilly Isles, where safe retreats existed for the pirates and where receivers of plunder were to be found willing to buy the goods that the pirates had to offer. As life became more difficult

and hazardous for the lawless in British "home waters," piracy spread to the "far-off West Indies and coast of New England" and eventually to the Red Sea and Madagascar. Sir William Monson, in his book on naval records, tells how he was sent in 1605 during the reign of James I to search for pirates in the Shetlands and Hebrides, but it was in Ireland that he "really struck pay-dirt" in the person of an Irish gentleman by the name of Cormat (or Cormac), who lived at Broad Haven "in great style" and "trafficked with the pirate captains." The Irishman was a receiver and distributor of the loot of freebooters, and his house Monson describes as being "the well-head of all pirates."

In the days of "Good Queen Bess" (1558-1603), the English Navy grew to power by "private enterprise"—by privateering and the subtle and camouflaged royal encouragement of piracy on the high seas. Queen Elizabeth herself, we are told, actually took shares in privateering projects of a wildcat speculative type. The profits on the capital invested in piracy frequently made the more moderate returns from fishing and trading seem small as well as less glamorous to the hardy, adventurous English sea dogs. It was for privateering and freebooting—with the risking of personal capital by gambling, rapacious Englishmen—that armed fighting ships were sent to sea, and it was this sort of fleet (not government-built and manned royal naval vessels) that harassed the large, pompous Spanish fleet of ships of war and broke the back of Spanish supremacy on the high seas by the destruction of the Spanish Armada in the English Channel in 1588. The French, by their early attacks on Spanish treasure ships when en route from a looted New World to Spain, were possibly the earliest government-sanctioned, tolerated, or encouraged corsairs of the sixteenth century; but England capitalized this ruthless policy to better national advantage, for privateering (and piracy) changed Britain from an insular second-rate naval power into the proud "Britannia, the Mistress of the Seas."

The sixteenth century (the century following the discovery of America by Columbus and Cabot) was that of buccaneering and freebooting, which spread from the Spanish Main to the trade routes of the world and influenced the policy and actions of all maritime powers. Most of Britain's most heroic national characters during this period were pirates on the high seas. Sir John Hawkins (1532-1595) was not only an English admiral but also a pirate and notorious slave highjacker. Sir Francis Drake (1540-1596) was not only a great admiral, navigator, and explorer but also a piratical "scorpion of the seas" dreaded, as was Hawkins, by the fleets—both merchant and naval—of other nations. The "knightly" Sir Walter Raleigh (1552-1618) gained his experience at sea engaged in piracy, and the "saintly" Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1539-1583) tried to obtain wealth to finance his North American colonization and his northwestern passage (to the Pacific) ambitions by piracy on the high seas. As Spain, through disastrous experiences with pirates and privateers, learned to protect its convoys of merchant ships loaded with valuable cargoes, the depredations of the armed ships of other covetous nations became less successful to the private investor and drove private capital more and more into searching for possible profits from legitimate ocean trade, which included the deep-sea fisheries and whaling. Sir Francis Drake's death at Panama in 1596, it has been said, "marked the end of the great period of the freebooters" and, it would seem, caused the attention of English (and French) "merchant-adventurers" to focus more and more on the possibilities of the development of trade with the unfamiliar but vast domain known as North America, or Virginia and New France.

The era of the buccaneers did not end, however, with the dawn of the seventeenth century, for the Caribbean cockpit saw the "Brethren of the Coast" actively engaged in piracy and aiming primarily at the capture or destruction of anything Spanish or Roman Catholic. Spain was regarded as "the archetype of popery, the antichrist of the Apocalypse." Tortuga (or Turtle Island, off the coast of Hispaniola), which was settled by Anthony Hilton in 1630 to combine tobacco-growing with piracy, grew to be a popular rendezvous for Caribbean pirates. Bertrand d'Ogeron, a buccaneer, was made governor of the island by Louis XIV of France, and the French colony of Saint Domingue was established by Ogeron on the western end of

the island of Hispaniola. About 1630 a group of Englishmen selected a couple of small islands off the Nicaragua coast and proposed to set up a Puritan commonwealth that, it was hoped, could be made to prosper by planting and piracy—or what they preferred to call “privateering against the Spaniards.” One of the islands, named Providence, became a notorious buccaneers’ rendezvous. We read that planting (except that performed by Negro slaves for food) was soon forgotten and that “the beaches of Providence (I. de Providencia) were piled high with goods reaped from the idolatrous Spaniards.” It was also said that “godly supercargoes came from Salem and Boston for bargains in tropical products and brought cannon, muskets, gunpowder, etc., in exchange.” In 1641 nine armed Spanish vessels attacked Providence and captured it with a tremendous amount of booty. In 1666, Edward Mansfield planned an independent republic of corsairs on the island, with its own government and flag.

The *Constant-Warwick*, said by authorities to have been the first real frigate built in England, was constructed as a privately owned ship of war by Peter Pett for the Earl of Warwick and was launched in 1649 (the year King Charles I was beheaded). This ship was a powerful vessel for her day, measuring about 400 tons and carrying 26 guns, and she was a formidable craft in every way for any individual (even if he was a member of the British peerage) to own and operate for personal profit.

Baldwin says, “The great day of the buccaneers under English patronage came in the 1670’s and under French patronage in the 1680’s.” The outstanding English freebooter of this period was Henry Morgan (1635-1688), a Welshman of great force unhampered by morals, who was encouraged and backed in his piracy by officials of the English Government—provided he would proceed against Spain or any of England’s selected enemies. In 1670, Morgan, the buccaneer, was commissioned by the English as commander of all the ships of war in Jamaica, with instructions to levy war on the Spaniards in any way that seemed good to him. Morgan’s most noteworthy exploit was the capture, despoiling, and destruction of Panama in 1671. Upon returning to Jamaica, Morgan was thanked for his services by the council of that English West Indian island. However, as a treaty had been signed between England and Spain on July 8, 1670, Morgan was placed under arrest and sent to England to answer for his conduct. He said that he was uninformed regarding the treaty when he recaptured the island of Santa Catalina (Providence) in December 1670 and followed this with the taking of the castle at the mouth of the Chagres River and his historic march across the isthmus with a force reported as “1,200 men” to sack Panama and return with “175 mules laden with treasure” and “600 prisoners” (most of whom were held for ransom). Instead of being hanged as a pirate, Henry Morgan gained the favor of King Charles II and in 1674 was knighted and appointed lieutenant-governor of Jamaica. From the time of his return to the West Indies, Sir Henry Morgan encouraged and was interested in piracy or privateering, and his support of ruthless buccaneering became so bad and so “smelt to heaven” that on October 12, 1683, Morgan was “suspended from all his employments.” The man was not apprehended for his lawlessness, and he evidently continued to be interested in freebooting (politely termed “privateering”) until his death in August 1688, when fifty-three years of age.

It is said that while Morgan was in authority at Jamaica and was willing to hang pirates on the English island, he encouraged the French-owned Tortuga to become the headquarters of the buccaneers in the West Indies and that he sent his pirate ships to Tortuga for French papers. In 1677, under the active leadership of Marquis de Maintenon and the sieur de Grammont (with Sir Henry Morgan as a sort of silent partner), about a thousand buccaneers made Tortuga their home port. It has been said that the early buccaneers’ trilogy of incentives was “gold, king, and religion”; but the latter two were evidently used merely as an excuse to obtain gold or treasure of some kind or other. A war of religion was used only when the branch, sect, or creed of the Christian universal church that the buccaneers made war upon possessed gold, and kings were avaricious for gold and glory and would generally support or overlook acts of piracy when it was shown to be to their selfish interest to do so.

While piracy seems to have been practiced on the ocean from the earliest days (and as

an evil is analogous to the deeds of highwaymen and the exploits of baron knights ashore, where "might meant right" without regard to either law or justice), yet some of the piracy that affected the early commerce of the colonies grew out of (1) the sanctions of European governments to have private owners arm and equip ships to perform national navy work and save outlays of money from the "royal purse," which practice led to privateering and promoted its blood relation "piracy"; and (2) the curious system of private reprisals that was not only countenanced by European governments but also even encouraged—sometimes openly but generally more or less covertly. Piracy on the high seas was definitely fostered when the various European governments first winked at, later tolerated, and finally encouraged the practice of private reprisals.

Letters of marque and reprisal were originally issued by a king or his government upon the petition of a subject who complained of injustice done to him by some foreign prince or person, and these powers entitled the recipient to obtain satisfaction by seizing the goods of any subject of the offending state. Historians tell us that as early as 1295, under the reign of Edward I of England, instances of granted reprisals for wrongs inflicted by a foreigner are recorded. The right of making reprisals, it is said, "belonged to every magistrate and even to private subjects until the reign of Charles VII of France" (about the middle of the fifteenth century). About this time, commissions were first issued to individuals in time of war, generally similar to those that had been formally granted for making reprisals in time of peace; but the old name was still retained, they being known as "letters of marque and reprisal." During the latter part of the sixteenth century, ships with such commissions came to be considered by certain European powers as important in the waging of naval warfare. Later, a privateer became a privately owned warship; a letter of marque was an armed merchantman that was engaged in trade and was commissioned not only to resist aggression but also to seize any enemy vessels. To take prizes was the sole reason for a privateer's putting to sea, but with a letter of marque, the seizing of enemy vessels was merely incidental to a commercial voyage.

The system whereby the government of a first-class power gave its sanction to such procedure was evidently in effect in 1576, when the property of an Englishman, Andrew Barker, in the Canary Islands was seized by the Inquisition and the Spanish authorities declined to make any redress. Thereupon, the Englishman, at his own expense but with the cognizance of the British Government, "fitted out two barks to revenge himself" and "captured enough Spanish merchantmen" through sheer piracy "to recoup his loss with interest."

Piratical cruisers not only harassed colonial commerce and plundered innocent and unarmed traders but also, at times, actually made raids ashore and seized by force "whatever they took a fancy to." In July 1689, a French pirate named Picor landed on Block Island and "remained in possession of the island, plundering the houses, and despoiling it of every moveable thing." The pirates evidently remained on the island for a week, and we read: "Two of the islanders were tortured to make them reveal the hiding place of valuables, and two negroes were killed." (Incidentally, this suggests that African slaves were owned in New England generally, even if in relatively small numbers, at that time.) Leaving Block Island, Captain Picor sailed to New London, but met armed resistance there that prevented his planned depredations. Sailing from the Thames River, Picor was intercepted by two armed sloops that had been dispatched from Newport, R. I., to capture or drive off the French pirates. We get an interesting side light on piracy and privateering during the latter part of the seventeenth century when we read that the Newport expedition was under the command of a Captain Paine, a privateersman who "in former years had served as a lieutenant upon Captain Picor." The Frenchman, being made aware of the identity of the man who was there to capture or sink him, fled, declaring that he "would as soon fight the devil as Paine."

There are records in existence showing that in 1689 an expedition was sent out from Boston in the square topsail sloop *Mary*, under the command of Capt. Samuel Pease, "to kill or capture the notorious pirates named Thomas Pound and Thomas Hawkins," who were

known to be operating off the Cape Cod and lower Massachusetts coast. The pirate sloop was contacted, in Vineyard Sound, and after exchanging cannon shots the two vessels drew alongside of each other. We are told by the narrator of the incident (one of the crew of the *Mary*) that the pirate sloop flew "a red flag" at the masthead and after being called upon "to strike to the King of England," the pirates answered with a volley. "Pound, standing on the quarter-deck with his naked sword flourishing in his hand, said, 'Come on Board, you Doggs, I will strike you presently.'" A bloody fight resulted, and the *Mary* took the pirate craft, following which "wee made Sayle toward Roade Island and on Saturday the fifth of sd. October gut our wounded men on shore and procured Surgeons to dress them." Captain Pease died at Newport from his wounds on October 12, and the *Mary* proceeded to Boston with her prize and captives, where the pirates "received short shift" and were hanged.

According to English law, piracy is "taking a ship on the High Seas or within the jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral from the possession or control of those who are lawfully entitled to it and carrying away the ship itself, or any of its goods, tackle, apparel or furniture under circumstances which would have amounted to robbery if the act had been done within the body of an English county." Gosse says that piracy, "being a crime not against any particular State" but against all mankind, "may be punished under international law in any competent court of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried." As pirates hold no commission or delegated authority from any sovereign or state, the practice of nations gives to every one the right to pursue and exterminate them without any previous declaration of war, but "they may not be killed without trial except in battle." A captured or surrendered pirate has the right of trial before a properly constituted tribunal and of being dealt with strictly according to law.

The word "pirate" has been used in the past and continues to be used quite indiscriminately. It has been applied to all kinds of raiders upon a nation's commerce or shore properties, in time of war or peace, whether legitimate and justifiable under the conditions existing or otherwise. Much privateering has undoubtedly been on the border line of piracy as have the operations of belligerents against the shipping of neutrals. Technically, piracy is not supposed to cover depredations by legally commissioned vessels of warring nations that operate within the scope granted or instructions given them by their government in power; however, it must be admitted that many governments of peoples at war have sanctioned and encouraged acts that in their essence are irregular and a form of piracy.

Lawless rovers of the sea have harassed shipping and raided coast settlements from the earliest days, and the history of piracy seems to be as old and as extended as that of commerce and of warfare. As long as there have been highwaymen and armed raids for personal gain on land, there have been their counterparts on the water, and transportation by boats or ships at sea has operated not only to extend the scope of depredations but also to permit of the looting of foreigners, which from early times has generally been considered preferable to and safer than plundering one's neighbors, or fellow countrymen. Before states and nations were formed that committed acts of wanton aggression (i.e., piracy) and called it "war," small communities, estates, families, and individuals operated along similar lines. Piracy is nothing more or less than the utilization or capitalization of power to achieve selfish ends without regard to right, law, and the interest and well-being of others. Piracy involves plundering and pillaging by force in order to gain loot, booty, or spoil that has a material value; it is acquisition of property by compulsion and violence. At times, it has been expressed by the capture of individuals who have been held for ransom, but the actuating principle is the same—a lawless utilization of power in order to gain wealth.

The Norse rovers generally operated as pirates in their depredations abroad and plundered the coasts of the British Isles and France in 789 A.D. and onwards, but the Mediterranean was the scene of pirate activities long before we have any record of viking voyages for despoliation. Piracy was rampant in these waters in the days of the Roman Empire, and history tells us that Julius Caesar, when a young man, "fell into the clutches of a gang of

sea-robbers who held him prisoner until ransomed." Among the early pirates of whom records exist were the Phoenicians, and there are numerous references to sea rovers in the ODYSSEY (attributed to Homer, about ninth century B.C.). In ancient warfare, prisoners were enslaved; therefore, piracy dealt with slavery for long years before it became a practice for certain pirates to raid coasts and seize persons to be held for ransom. The Barbary pirates learned at an early date that whereas captives of a certain sex and age had a somewhat uniform, or standard, value in the slave mart (excluding the bonus for extreme beauty in young girls), the prisoners, as individuals, had a great range of values to their own people, and most of them—and often all—could be sold back to the nation from which they were captured for a higher price than the prisoners would bring as galley or agricultural slaves (or as human beasts of burden). Barbary corsairs are known to have seized merchantmen in British waters and raided the coast to carry off captives during the reign of Charles I. In 1646 the English Parliament sent an agent to Algiers to redeem hundreds of enslaved victims of pirate raids, and the government paid £139 to free a woman named Mary Bruster; £20 for another woman named Elizabeth Mancor. A shipwright, Thomas Thomson, had a price of £130 put on him, while able-bodied seamen were deemed worth about £50 each. In 1785 the Barbary pirates captured the officers and crew of two small American trading vessels, and on July 9, 1790, the regency at Algiers, in response to an inquiry for the amount of ransom demanded, placed the following prices on the heads of the various individuals: for each of the captains, 2,000 sequins; for each mate, 1,500 Zs; for each of the ordinary seamen, 725 Zs. However, for two seamen who, the regency had heard, were more important "back home" and presumably in better circumstances, as each, it was said, "keeps a tavern," the price was raised and the ransom set at 1,500 Zs for one and 900 Zs for the other. The ransom for a passenger on one of the ships was set at 2,000 sequins. (To all these stated ransom prices had to be added 10 per cent for "duty" and an amount to cover "sundry gratifications to officers of the dey's household and regency"—arbitrarily set at a certain sum per head.)

When attempts were made by the British to enforce their Navigation Acts, colonial merchants and shipowners, with much unanimity, appealed to the "Higher Law"; they did what they believed to be right and just and, ignoring the statutes passed by a British Parliament three thousand miles away, resorted "with good conscience," ardor, and resourcefulness to smuggling on an organized basis and a vast scale. When King Charles II took notice of "colonial dereliction" and issued instructions for a strict enforcement of the British laws, the General Court of Massachusetts waxed rather indignant at the censure and naively replied that it was not conscious of having "greatly violated" them. The British Navigation and Trade Acts led to smuggling, and smuggling operated to encourage piracy; but these British laws also led to the rebellion of the colonists against arbitrary British legislation affecting the commerce, life, and well-being of Americans and to the War for Liberty and Independence. By an order in council of July 4, 1660, the British created the Lord Commissioners of the Council of Trade and Plantations to see that the Navigation and Trade Acts were enforced and "to receive, hear, examine and deliberate" upon all matters concerning the colonies and to report the facts and their findings with recommendations to the crown. This date of July 4 has been referred to by an historian as "a beautiful coincidence," but it took 116 years for the colonies to grow in strength and for the British to increase in arrogance, intolerance, and stupidity to the point that the American rebellion against despotic British rule and taxation without representation led to the Declaration of Independence.

There is no question that the British Navigation and Trade Acts encouraged smuggling, lawlessness, and piracy. American officials winked at the unpopular and unaccepted laws. The British governor (Andros) made futile attempts, under orders from the crown, to enforce the laws and complained that there were "noe custom houses" and that the governor of Massachusetts gave "clearings, certificates and passes" to anything without regard to its "lawful" importation. The king's instructions to Governor Dougan specifically required that he stop the acceptance by customs officers of forged certificates (crockets) that falsely as-

serted that the goods in question had been entered "according to law." Randolph, sent over from England to prevent "irregular trade," landed in jail in 1698 after he had seized a smuggler in Virginia and, by so doing, "stepped on the toes" of New York merchants. Earlier in the same year, Randolph had run up against Pennsylvania's contempt for the British Navigation Acts, for in April he reported that he had requested the governor of that province "to appoint an Attorney Generall to prosecute" certain men who had aided in an evasion of the laws, but Randolph wrote that "he did nothing in it." Lord Bellomont, the royal governor of New York and New England (and the king's "hand-picked" brave and honest man), we are told, had extreme difficulty in getting Randolph, the British law enforcement officer, out of a New York jail. The New York Dutch-British colonial merchants were incensed at his sleuthing and interference with their "rights" when his acts affected their pocketbooks, and Americans had no sympathy with a revenue official. It was not only the merchants and ship-owners that opposed the British in their occasional attempts to enforce the British Navigation and Trade Acts but also the populace in general. From Bellomont's letters, we read that when the ship *Fortune*, commanded by Capt. Thomas Moston, reached New York from Madagascar bringing to that port twenty thousand pounds worth of merchandise which was loot purchased from pirates, Bellomont ordered Chidley Brooks, the collector of customs, to seize her. Brooks procrastinated and said that "it was none of his business, but belonged to a Man of Warr; that he had no boat." Bellomont fumed and fretted, issued "positive commands" which, we are told, Brooks "could not avoid"; yet Brooks delayed action for "four days," during which time the merchants removed all but one-twentieth (or 5 per cent) of the goods from the ship, which by concerted action were concealed and smuggled into the country.

New York merchants, by their trading for loot with the pirates at Madagascar, became the accepted and highly valued "fence" of the pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Orient (much to the annoyance of British, French, Spanish, and Dutch merchants and ship-owners), and their actions in buying plundered goods and the booty of buccaneers, or freebooters, and smuggling such valuable merchandise and treasure into America, duty free, not only greatly encouraged piracy on the high seas but also affected trade relations with the mother country to the advantage of the colonials. Trading with the pirates, moreover, took but little money out of America, for most of the transactions were by means of barter, and the pirates highly valued American rum, tobacco, and certain foodstuffs. Bellomont wrote that "Nassaw, alias Long Island," was notorious for smugglers and pirates. "There are four towns that make it their daily practice to receive ships and sloops with all sorts of merchandise [trade goods and pirates' loot] tho' they be not allowed ports." The people, he asserted, were "so lawless and desperate" that he could find "no honest man" who was brave enough to go among them and endeavor to collect British-imposed import duties. We are told that most of the goods smuggled into Long Island, New Jersey, and Connecticut from traders and "pirate ships" were taken to New York by "wagons and small boats"; but Bellomont mentions "a town called Stamford in Connecticut colony," where "one Major Selleck lives who has a warehouse close to the Sound" and "does us great mischief," for he "receives" an "abundance of goods [of illegal entry] and the merchants afterwards take this opportunity of running them into town." Bellomont complains that the colonists are highly organized and prompt in their evasion of the import duties, for he hears of the smuggling of trade goods and pirates' loot into the country only when the deed has been done and it is too late to interfere or intercept them.

Bellomont had almost as much trouble in Boston as in New York in his efforts to enforce the British Navigation and Trade Acts. The royal British governor learned that there were various ways and degrees of smuggling and that the Puritan Bostonians often compromised in their "illegal practices" to save time, trouble, and ultimate expenses. "When ships come in, the masters swear to their manifests; that is, they swear to the number of parcels they bring, but the contents unknown; then the merchant comes and produces an invoice, and whether true or false is left to his ingenuity." Bellomont also wrote: "If the merchants of

Boston be minded to run their goods, there's nothing to hinder them. Mr. Brenton, the collector [a British official], is absent and has been these two years; his deputy is a merchant [a colonial]; the two writers [colonials] keep public houses and the coast is naturall shap'd and cut out to favor unlawful trade." We are further told that it was a common thing to unload the ships at Cape Ann and bring the goods to Boston in wood boats. It was evidently also a simple and not too hazardous matter to bring vessels into the town of Boston, for there were "almost innumerable" wharves (including those at Charlestown), and all were unguarded. It is also said that in addition to a very lively trade carried on by Massachusetts ports direct with the French and Spanish West Indies and French Canada, New England ships were in the habit of meeting French and Spanish ships at Newfoundland and French Canadian ports and "swapping" cargoes, all of which business evaded British customs duties and was evidently "unlawful." Government officials, sent out by England, denounced as pirates the privateers who smuggled in goods instead of bringing them into port openly and paying assessed fees and duties—a practice generally dodged by "legitimate colonial traders."

When William Penn (1644-1718), the Quaker, returned from England to the colony of Pennsylvania in 1699, he carried from the crown "particular instructions to put down piracy which the objections of the Quakers to the use of force had rendered audacious." We are told that the specific orders of the English Government were obeyed; that the "illegal traffic was vigorously and successfully attacked."

At times, the religious- and economy-minded mounted their ships with imposing-looking dummy cannons made of wood, which were conspicuously placed to intimidate pirates. It is said that some colonial ships left the Delaware to trade abroad armed with nothing but dummy guns and that the ruse was "most often effective." The bluff seemed to work better when impecunious but combative New Englanders fitted their ships with a number of real and some "Quaker" guns. The real cannons were fired with energy, and the enemy, seeing so much artillery power in reserve, was often influenced by the hoax either to strike his colors or run away. There is a record of Captain Jones of the Massachusetts brig *Adventure*, which foundered at sea when homeward bound from Trinidad. All hands were lost except the skipper, "who got astride a wooden Quaker gun which had broken adrift from the harmless battery with which he had hoped to intimidate pirates." Captain Jones on "his buoyant ordnance," we are told, was picked up and carried into Havana. This use of "Quaker" guns and fictitious ordnance saw its counterpart in later years—even up to the time that merchant sail reached its greatest glory—in the painting of the upper outside hull of vessels of the mercantile marine, so that they resembled sloops of war and armed naval vessels, with a row of gun ports showing on both sides, and the trading packets and early clippers gave the appearance of ships carrying formidable armaments. The ruse was somewhat effective for a while in such pirate-infested waters as the China Seas, but the conservative British, having got into the habit of painting their merchant sail in this fashion, were reluctant to change; hence British sailing ships carried wide painted white streaks on their sides, with large black squares therein (to resemble gun ports), until nearly the end of the era of sail.

Smuggling and piracy, to a certain extent, have gone hand in hand through the pages of history (as was evidenced by bootlegging and highjacking in the prohibition era during recent times in the United States). Unjust laws lacking popular support and failing to appeal to the minds of the governed as fair and sound breed resentment and lawlessness. England and other imperial European countries endeavored to enforce colonial trading exclusively with themselves, at their own prices, and under conditions that they arbitrarily decreed; the result was the wholesale buying by disgruntled and belligerent colonists (and subject peoples) of smuggled merchandise, often procured by irregular methods. Therefore, Britain's exclusive Navigation Acts, with restrictions as to trade, encouraged to an extensive degree not only smuggling but also even piracy, and merchants purchasing goods at a cheaper price because of illegal entry seldom attempted to differentiate between smuggled merchandise and that which reached them through the combined channels of piracy and smuggling.

Ralph D. Paine, writing of trading in the waters of the western Atlantic in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, says: "To encounter a pirate craft was an episode almost commonplace and often more sordid than picturesque." Pirates at about this time were a menace to commerce wherever American vessels sailed in peaceful trade. Not only were they common in West Indian waters but also were apt to be encountered on any trading voyage. The following brief record of the end of a Salem-owned and manned vessel, written in 1697, is succinct: "May 21—The ketch *Margaret* of Salem, Captain Peter Henderson, was chased ashore near Funshal, Madeira, by pirates and lost." There is no mention of what became of the officers and crew.

The closing decades of the seventeenth century, when the "infant commerce" of the colonies was fighting for its life, were referred to as "the dark time when ye merchants looked for ye vessells with fear and trembling." Besides the usual hazards of the deep, colonial seafarers had to contend with piracy of every type, with savage Indians who attacked the smaller vessels and particularly those of the fishing fleet, with the restrictions and seizures imposed by the royal Acts of Trade, with French privateers and freebooters who might sail under a national flag but in reality operated as sea rogues under a red flag. Considering what a vessel might have to contend with before reaching her destination, it is easy to comprehend why bills of lading included this petition: "And so God send the good ship to her desired port in safety. Amen." The old sea chronicles of colonial ports are thickly strewn with brief references made to encounters and battles with and escapes from foes of some kind or other who ravaged the ventures of legitimate traders. Shipping annals of Salem, for instance, record in 1690: "The ketch *Fellowship*, Capt. Robert Glanville, via the Vineyard for Berwick on the Tweed, was taken by two French privateers and carried to Dunkirk." In 1695: "The ship *Essex* of Salem, Capt. John Beal, from Bilboa in Spain, had a battle at sea and loses John Samson, boatswain. This man and Thomas Roads, the gunner, had previously contracted that whoever of the two survived the other he should have all the property of the deceased." Shortly thereafter, the *Salem Packet* is reported as capturing a French ship off the Banks of Newfoundland (so the aggression was not always with the foreign craft), and there is a record in the same year of the seizure of the Salem ketch *Exchange* by a French pirate off Block Island. This craft was ransomed for £250, and "the son of the owner was carried to Placentia [Newfoundland] as a hostage for the payment of the ransom." At this time, Barbary corsairs were also active in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, for in 1700 Benjamin Alford, of Boston, and William Bowditch, of Salem, affirmed that "their friend Robert Carver," of Salem, "was taken nine years before, a captive into Sally; that contributions had been made for his redemption; that the money was in the hands of a person here; that if they had the disposal of it, they could release Carver."

Unfortunately, religious fanaticism in the Puritan colonies affected seafarers. We are told that Salem sailors, in addition to the dangers of the elements and seafaring in uncharted waters in small (30- to 60-ton) and poorly equipped vessels and of privateers and pirates, "had to contend with the witchcraft delusion which turned every man's hand against his neighbor." Sailors ashore evidently shocked the "godly Puritans" of the older regime, for history records the fate of "one Henry Bull and companions in a vessel in our harbor who derided the Church of Christ and were afterward cast away among savage Indians by whom they were slain."

In 1703, John Quelch, "a man of resource," led a mutiny on the brigantine *Charles*, which had been armed and equipped as a privateer. She sailed under Captain Plowman to protect New England ships from the depredations of pirates and cruise against the French and Spanish, with whom Great Britain was at war. Quelch had the captain of the *Charles*, who had been taken ill, locked in his cabin, deprived of all food, water, and care, and when the luckless skipper died of starvation and neglect, his body was tossed overboard. Quelch assumed command and as an out-and-out pirate sailed for Brazil. He captured several merchantmen (mostly Portuguese) on the way and looted them of all the valuables he could transfer

and handle, his "take" including gold dust, silk, sugar, munitions, and rum. Quelch had hoisted a flag, which he called "Old Roger," over the *Charles*; it depicted "a skeleton with an hourglass in one hand and a dart in the heart with three drops of blood proceeding from it in the other." Later, as the crew had become homesick and wanted to get ashore and have the pleasure of spending some of their booty, Quelch was reckless enough to sail into Marblehead "primed with a plausible yarn," but apparently his men talked a good deal when drunk. Suspicion was turned against them, the brigantine was searched, plunder discovered, and evidence brought to light that unquestionably proved the vessel to be a pirate. The men, when they heard of the survey about to be made, endeavored to escape, but those who were not apprehended at Marblehead were captured at Gloucester and the Isles of Shoals and hanged. The following Salem record of 1704 gives information regarding the fate of some of these rascals:

<p>Major Stephen Sewall, Captain John Turner and 40 volunteers embark in a shallop and Fort Pinnacle after Sun Set to go in Search of some Pirates who sailed from Gloucester in the morning. Major Sewall brought into Salem a Galley, Captain Thomas Lowmore, on board of which he had captured some</p>	<p>pirates and some of their Gold at the Isle of Shoals. Major Sewall carries the Pirates to Boston under a strong guard. Captain Quelch and five of his crew are hung, about 13 of the ship's company remain under sentence of death and several more are cleared.</p>
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A contemporary Salem "poet," it is said, wrote the following verse, or ditty, bearing upon Quelch's piratical venture:

Ye pirates who against God's laws did fight,
Have all been taken which is very right.
Some of them were old and others young
And on the flats of Boston they were hung.

We are told, "Upon the gallows Quelch behaved exceedingly well, pulling off his hat and bowing to the spectators, while the somber Puritan merchants in the crowd were, many of them, quietly dealing in the merchandise fetched home by pirates who were lucky enough to steer clear of the law."

The most flamboyant of all colonial pirates in this rudely adventurous era was Edward Teach, alias "Blackbeard," who "filled the stage with swaggering success, chewing wine-glasses in his cabin, burning sulphur to make his ship seem more like hell, and industriously scourging the whole North Atlantic coast of the New World." Several communities, and particularly Charleston, lived in terror of this swaggering, cruel pirate until Lieut. Robert Maynard, in a small but well-armed and manned sloop (*H.M.S. Pearl*), "laid him alongside on November 22, 1718, and at the end of a hammer-and-tongs engagement, Maynard, in a hand-to-hand combat with Blackbeard, killed him and cut off the pirate's head to dangle from the bowsprit as a trophy."

Philip Gosse, a British historian and authority on pirate lore, has said that Bartholomew Roberts, born in Wales in 1682, "was perhaps the greatest of all pirates." This buccaneer was credited with having taken "over 400 ships during his career," and we read that he was "remarkable for his enforcement of discipline, for being a teetotaler, and for allowing no women or gambling aboard his ships." Roberts was killed when fighting in 1722 at the age of forty. Captain Misson, a Frenchman of good family, was unique in combining active piracy with socialistic ideas, and "he reigned for many years over a Utopian republic in Madagascar." There were two woman pirates who achieved a measure of fame, and they were both British—Anne Bonny and Mary Read. Gosse says that they "rose high in their ancient dual professions."

Owing to the difficulty of policing the seas and exterminating piracy by legitimate naval force, the custom of granting free pardons to all pirates who would surrender themselves by a certain date developed in Britain during the reign of Charles I and continued into the eighteenth century. In practical operation, the result of this policy was that when things became too warm for a pirate, he would make his submission to the authorities and receive

the royal pardon; as soon as his booty was spent and an opportunity presented itself, he would resume his old lawless practices. "One of the greatest wholesale pardonings of pirates was carried out by Captain Woodes Rogers at New Providence in the Bahamas in 1718. At that time there were more than 2,000 freebooters entrenched in this pirate stronghold, but Rogers dealt so successfully with them that almost all surrendered."

The colony of Massachusetts was very vociferous in denouncing piracy at the end of the seventeenth and early in the eighteenth centuries, but apparently some New England Puritans and Pilgrims were not far behind the New York merchants in handling goods in "a black market" and resorting to shady business dealings that "smelt to heaven" and caused William III of Britain to send Lord Bellomont to New York to replace Governor (Colonel) Benjamin Fletcher (who had dirtied his hands by protecting the illegal commerce of pirates) and to write the new appointee: "I send you, my Lord, to New York, because an honest and intrepid man is wanted to put these abuses down, and because I believe you to be such a man." Lord Bellomont, as royal governor of New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, was the "honest and intrepid man" who later, to protect his own name and cover up his own shady dealings and those of his aristocratic British friends, made a scapegoat of Captain Kidd after appointing him to the command of the *Adventure Galley* for the purpose of high-jacking pirates.

New York merchants were relatively quick to discover the handsome profits associated with the handling of looted valuables of an unusual nature, such as "fabrics, spices, jewels and Arabian gold." "Red Sea trade," we are told, flooded the city, and the port of New York became a pirate center. In *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK*, we read: "Murderous pirates, some of them notorious figures, walked the streets of the city with impunity. The goods they brought ashore filled the counters of merchants. Fashionable women bought the silks and brocades, the jewels and the porcelains; gentlemen about town strolled the Bowery in embroidered waistcoats and silver shoe buckles, carrying jeweled swords." New York wealth, influence, and "respectability" often lay behind pirate ventures. This is illustrated by a brief resumé of the life and acts of Frederick Philipse of the Philipse estate, which ranged from Spuyten Duyvil to Croton River, with the manor house at Yonkers and the Philipse-built Dutch church at Tarrytown (both of which still stand), and of Capt. Samuel South Burgess. Philipse, who married the rich widow of a fur trader in 1662 and later took Catherine van Cortlandt for his second wife, landed at New Amsterdam in 1658 as Vrederyck Felypsen—a poor would-be fur trader. With his "aristocratic" change of name and the help of his rich wives, Philipse operated in real estate and made money. He was in many enterprises and, surrounded by the evidence of his respectability and influential friends, "Philipse bought and sold pirate vessels, outfitted smugglers, and arranged for the exchange of goods and money in such far-off pirate strongholds as Madagascar."

Among the pirates that were associated with and at times financed by Philipse was the historic figure of Capt. Samuel South Burgess—a well-educated man, born in New York, of a good family, who had taken to the sea and had had some privateering experience in the West Indies. Philipse was attracted to Burgess and decided to use him to trade with the pirates in Madagascar, where Philipse and other owners sent ships to trade "liquor, guns, ammunition and money" for the valuable products of the East and the loot of the pirates. Captain Burgess, while sailing on his first voyage for Philipse, committed "several acts of piracy"; at Madagascar, he proved to be a resourceful man and a good trader, and he set sail for home with the ship's holds full of valuable merchandise, which consisted of the booty of plundering freebooters. But Burgess (having probably prearranged the program of operations with Philipse) did not sail boldly into New York Harbor and defy or plan to bribe the authorities. He unloaded the cargo of his ship into smaller, light-draft coasting vessels and then sank her, reaching New York later as a distressed but "honest shipwrecked mariner." Meanwhile, the cargo had been smuggled into the city, with no import duty, or tax, paid thereon. Following this successful and extremely profitable voyage, Bur-

gess was evidently in high favor with Philipse, and he married into his employer's family. Playing the game with rare wisdom, Burgess then made two legitimate voyages. However, when he attempted another voyage to the pirates' rendezvous and trading station, he must have been guilty of the usual privateer's "mistake" or followed too closely the pattern set on his first voyage; in any event, he was captured by the British off the South African coast, taken to London, and charged with piracy on the high seas. Burgess was tried and condemned to death, but received a pardon at the hands of Queen Anne. He then sailed as mate on the British warship *Neptune*, which sank two pirate ships, but meeting buccaneer forces too strong for her, she herself was captured by pirates. Burgess, ever an opportunist, joined the freebooters, and he later died a violent death.

We read in letters written in the last decade of the seventeenth century of the encouraging of piracy by the various colonies. In this respect, New York, Rhode Island, and the Carolinas seem to have been the most active or, as the British said, "the worst and most frequent offenders." The colonies did not hesitate to barter rum, tobacco, provisions, and even weapons with the pirates for booty, which at times included gold, jewels, silks, and works of art as well as of value. Puritan New England even sent at least one cargo of white pine masts and spars (yards, booms, and bowsprits) to the pirate lair, or rendezvous, upon the island of Madagascar, lying to the southeast of the African continent. The profits made by colonial merchants by trading with the pirates at Madagascar were almost unbelievably high. We are told that Capt. Giles Shelly of the ship *Nassau* took spirits and wine to Madagascar and sold the pirates New England rum that cost two shillings a gallon for from fifty shillings to three pounds (sixty shillings) a gallon. Madeira wine that cost captain Shelly nineteen pounds a pipe, he sold for three hundred pounds.

Benjamin Fletcher, who was appointed royal governor of New York in 1692, promptly became "friendly with the pirates of the city" and was later accused of selling them "permission to land at the port for the price of one hundred dollars a man." Fletcher, it would seem according to reports, did "a thriving business in supplying the captains of pirate ships with commissions" when they sailed and "protections" when they returned. Capt. Edward Coates of the ship *Jacob* said that he paid £1,300 for "his share" of the price paid to the authorities (or to Fletcher) for the commission with which the ship sailed. At the end of the pirate voyage, we are told, the crew received as its share of the booty "1,800 pieces of eight, a man." But Fletcher was apparently an avaricious grafter, for when the *Jacob* returned to port with her loot, Coates was permitted to land the cargo with the understanding that Fletcher would take title to the ship (valued at £800), and the governor made each of the sailors pay to him from 75 to 100 "pieces of eight" for "protections." In *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK*, we read:

In 1697, the Lords of Trade wrote from London, warning him [Fletcher] not to protect "marauders" who, they had been informed, used New York as a place of refuge. Fletcher defended himself by declaring that he never gave protection without his council's approval and that the pirates had given

bonds for good behavior. He claimed further, in apparent seriousness, that he could not be blamed if the privateers he commissioned later became pirates and that he only associated with pirates for the purpose of reforming them.

John Avery, familiarly known as "Long Ben" or the "arch pirate," although often described as an American, was born about 1665 at Plymouth, England. He took to the sea and was mate of a merchant ship, on which he headed a mutiny. Avery became captain and a daring pirate leader. His specialty, it was said, was preying on the Mocha fleets in the West Indies and Red Sea, his biggest capture being the *Gunsway*, owned by the Great Mogul himself. Avery is reported to have seized "one thousand pieces of eight" (about \$100,000) and "a treasure in diamonds" in this prize as well as "the Mogul's young and lovely daughter" and to have taken both the treasure and the girl to Madagascar, "where he settled down as a reigning monarch." He returned to the United States in 1696 and, we are told, "bribed the governor to allow him and his crew to land at Boston and dispose of their plunder"; but finding no market for diamonds in America, he went to England, where

he traded with British merchants, and settled in Devon. The pirate squandered his money, became ill, was cheated by the diamond merchants, and died practically a pauper. England, in some respects at least, was a better market than America for pirated, stolen, and smuggled goods—and a far more unscrupulous one.

Lord Bellomont, who succeeded Benjamin Fletcher as governor in 1698, was placed in office with positive instructions from the crown to stamp out piracy. Frederick Philipse had his Captain Burgess to plague him during his years of wealth and social leadership, and Lord Bellomont had his Captain Kidd. However, there was a vast difference in the captains who served their masters, for Captain Burgess was an unquestioned pirate and the more famous and notorious Captain Kidd was, in fact, no pirate at all but the victim, or scapegoat, of political intrigue. Capt. William Kidd, of New York (who lived in a house at Pearl and Hanover Streets), although hanged as a pirate in England on May 12, 1701, was no lawless mariner in the light of those days but merely a dupe of Lord Bellomont. Kidd was a bold, resourceful, and capable navigator of high standing among seafaring men, the shipping and mercantile communities of both Boston and New York, and the colonial government authorities. He had been commissioned in 1691 by Governor Bradstreet of Massachusetts and council to protect the New England coast against the forays of privateers or pirates, the New York Legislature voted him £150 in recognition of his good work, and later the inhabitants of Antigua gave him a ship named after their island home as a reward for the good service rendered in suppressing piracy in the West Indies. Don C. Seitz, who has written the only authoritative work on "The Tryal of Capt. William Kidd for Murther & Piracy upon Six Several Indictments . . . at the Admiralty Sessions held at the Old Bailey, London, on the 8th & 9th of May 1701," refers to Kidd as "the eminent New Yorker, born a Scotsman, in Greenock, whose career terminated at a rope's end." Continuing, Seitz says that Kidd "was hardly used by Fate, but what he suffered at her hands has been well atoned for by that sister Goddess—FAME—who oft in the course of history has righted many wrongs, posthumously, of course, but none the less creditably."

During Fletcher's regime as governor of New York, pirate rogues such as Edward Coates, John Evans, Richard Glover, John Ireland, Thomas Wake, and numerous others had used New York as a port. It was for the purpose of rounding up such pirates that Bellomont and the British Admiralty made an agreement with Captain Kidd in 1695, whereby he as a privateer was to protect British merchant shipping and operate to clear the seas of pirates. The British Government (King William III), however, which wanted the job done, declined to furnish a ship for Kidd to command; so Lord Bellomont, then of London, Philip Livingston, of New York, and others joined in the venture and purchased a private, armed British-built ship, the *Adventure Galley* of 287 tons (34 guns), launched at Castle's shipyard, Deptford, December 4, 1695. Captain Kidd, who held the king's commission to suppress piracy and "proceed against the French," was placed in command and received orders from Bellomont as to his voyage and actions, which Kidd followed faithfully and explicitly. Bellomont described the plan by which he himself and some other "noble lords of England" fitted out a private, armed ship to go to Madagascar and rob the pirates as a "very honest" venture. In this enterprise, not only did "the High Lord Chancellor and several other distinguished noblemen hold shares" but also, it was stipulated, one-tenth of the profit was to revert to the crown. Bellomont personally conceived and engineered the plan, but he made one great mistake in that he did not give his "most worthy" captain a ship powerful enough in cannon (and "weight of iron") or in complement (fighting manpower) successfully to wage war upon the Madagascar pirates, who, it appears, had big and fast ships, "formidable in cannon and cutlasses" (guns and manpower) and capable of outfighting any privateer.

Captain Kidd and his crew, all signed under a "no plunder, no pay" agreement, sailed from Plymouth, England, in 1696. They cruised for a year in the waters outlined by Bellomont and came across no pirates that Kidd was strong enough to attack with any hope of success. Wanting prize money and booty, the crew grew mutinous. When the *Adventure*

Galley overhauled a Dutch ship and Kidd, finding the vessel's papers in order, permitted her to go free, a gunner (William Moore) became abusive and in open revolt. In the argument that followed, Kidd, defending himself, felled the mutineer by hitting him on the head with the first thing that he could lay his hands on, which proved to be a water bucket. Moore died from the blow, and this episode became, later, the basis of murder charges against Kidd in the British courts. Soon after this incident, Kidd seized the *Quedagh Merchant*, a superior Armenian ship, also said to belong to "the Moors," sailing under French registry and the French flag, and the sort of craft Kidd had received orders to capture or destroy. As the *Adventure Galley* was a slow sailer and an inferior vessel and had been giving a good deal of trouble, Kidd changed ships, took command of his capture (said to be valued at £30,000), and put into Ste. Marie, Madagascar, for provisions. Here all but thirteen of the crew deserted Kidd, claiming that they would never make any money sailing under such a law-abiding commander, and Kidd sailed homeward.

Meanwhile, it was reported that Kidd, "instead of taking pirate ships and French merchantmen, had himself become a pirate." William III (1650-1702; king since 1689), deciding to change the government of the American colonies, selected Lord Bellomont as "an honest man" to be governor of New York and Massachusetts, and when he arrived in New York on April 2, 1698, to begin his administration, Bellomont carried orders from the crown to arrest Kidd if he returned to North America. After Lord Bellomont had taken up his administrative duties in America, King William III, on his own initiative in 1699, sent English warships to patrol the coast of Sandy Hook and exterminate piracy by vigorous action. In 1700 he went a step further and instructed Bellomont to give no clearance to deep-sea vessels sailing from New York unless they posted a bond not to call "at Madagascar or other outlaw gathering places." When accused by political enemies in Parliament of fitting out a piratical cruiser, Bellomont was unwilling to face the charges and frankly tell the facts; so he "made a scapegoat out of a Kidd" and contemptibly deserted the unfortunate man, who had trusted his British employer, been loyal and faithful to that trust, and obeyed orders. (It was this same Lord Bellomont who, when some New England merchants objected in 1700 to his seizure of a ship's cargo of their timber, railed against the contemptible character of colonials in general and the low morals of Massachusetts Bay merchants in particular and wrote that he despised them.)

When Captain Kidd was in the West Indies, he learned that he had been branded a pirate and was wanted by the British authorities, so he decided to sail for New York and straighten things out with his employer and friend. Sending emissaries ashore, Kidd found Bellomont "nervous, wary, frightened, and ambiguous" and evidently in no position or mood to give him the protection to which he was entitled. He, thereupon, sailed from a point outside New York Harbor for Boston and on the way stopped at Gardiner's Island (off the eastern end of Long Island) and put his cargo ashore. He buried what treasure he had, all of which was soon obtained by men sent out by Bellomont. (In this connection, it is well to note that Major Selleck, who lived at Stamford, Conn., and had a place on Long Island Sound, credited as being "a favorite resort of the merchants doing business with the Madagascar pirates," held for a while "£10,000 worth of the goods which Captain Kidd brought from the East.") Upon the arrival of Kidd at Boston in July 1699, he was seized on a warrant by Bellomont, and since there was no possible chance of condemning—not to mention hanging—the man in Boston or for that matter in any of the American colonies, he was transported to England.

Indicative of the propaganda broadcast by the authorities in England in conjunction with Bellomont in regard to Kidd, we read that "instead of directing his energies against the lawless privateers and pirates on the American coast, Kidd spent three years in the Indian Ocean plundering the commerce of all nations." This is absolutely false. Kidd's orders as given him by Bellomont were to highjack the Madagascar pirates and capture French vessels; he was not directed to operate in American waters to suppress piracy. The same in-

spired and deceptive publicity emanating from Bellomont and the "noble lords" who were his associates says: "Kidd buried some of his treasures on Gardiner's Island, entrusted Mr. Gardiner with his secret and then sailed away, burying other treasures at different points along the shore. Kidd then paid and discharged his crew, and, appearing in Boston in 1699, was arrested. Among his papers was found a list of his buried treasures, and when the officials presented themselves to Mr. Gardiner, the rover's box of booty was recovered." We are told that "the plunder in all was valued at about twenty thousand dollars."

It is an undoubted fact that Kidd buried some treasure on Gardiner's Island while proceeding from New York to Boston, after he had been in communication with Bellomont in New York, and that Bellomont rather quickly obtained possession of the treasure and was cognizant of the pirate goods held for sale by Major Selleck, of Stamford. However, there is no evidence to show that Kidd buried any treasure at any other point on the coast, and no great secrecy could be expected from his actions when, promptly upon his arrival at Boston, he discharged and paid off the crew who would have done the digging and have been well aware of the location of the "secret" places. Even the historians who have blindly narrated the "authoritative" British version of the Captain Kidd pirate case cannot make any sense out of it, and Edgar S. Maclay, after relating the story as told originally by Bellomont and his "noble" friends, writes: "Kidd was sent to England and tried, and it is a curious commentary on the times to note that on May 9, 1701 [May 12, 1701], he was executed, not for piracy, but on the charge of killing one of his own crew."

Kidd's trial at the Old Bailey in London on May 8 and 9, 1701, was a travesty on justice. Evidently, the "packed court" had instructions to protect Bellomont and his "English noble associates," keep them out of the matter, and "get Kidd out of the way" in the interest of the ruling (aristocratic) class. Kidd quickly sensed that "the cards were stacked against him" and that he was doomed before he opened his mouth; yet he acted with dignity and poise and was no "squeelor." He was found guilty of murder and was ignominiously, with no delay, hanged at Execution Dock on May 12, 1701—a martyr to the British ruling class, Bellomont, and the aristocrats in power. If the trial had been held a year or two later, maybe the crown would have intervened, for the rule of William III, Prince of Orange and King of England, ended in 1702, following which Queen Anne ascended to the throne, Anne not only gave leniency to Captain Burgess, of New York, a real pirate, but also pardoned him; whereas Captain Kidd, no pirate at all and more honest than his accusers and the court that tried him, with William III on the throne (who was determined "to put him away"), was murdered by the law. This was strange English justice.

Captain Kidd's name has been reddened with crimes which he never committed and in which he took no part. As Ralph D. Paine says: "His grisly phantom has stalked through the legends and literature of piracy, and the Kidd tradition still has magic to set treasure-seekers exploring almost every beach, cove, and headland from Halifax to the Gulf of Mexico. Yet if truth were told, he never cut a throat or made a victim walk the plank. He was tried and hanged for the trivial offense of breaking the head of a mutinous gunner of his own crew with a wooden bucket"—which was an act performed (1) in self-defense and (2) in an attempt to maintain discipline at sea. It is a matter of grave legal doubt as to whether "the notorious Captain Kidd" ever committed a single act of real piracy; for in the case of ships captured, such vessels were sailing under French passes and his privateering commission justified his acts. It appears that his contentions in this respect were not disproven. Captain Kidd's trial in London was a farce. All the evidence of the case points to the fact that the man was condemned to shield Bellomont and his friends, and it has been said that among the commons and opposition to the government in power in England, the opinion was freely expressed that the captain was betrayed and condemned "because certain noblemen in England had subscribed the capital to outfit his cruise, expecting to win rich dividends in gold captured from the pirates he was sent to attack." We are told: "Against these men a political outcry was raised, and as a result Capt. Kidd was sacrificed. He was

a seaman who had earned honorable distinction in earlier years, and fate has played his memory a shabby trick."

With reference to the fiction of much that is considered as history, John R. Spears, referring to Captain Kidd, writes: "That this man, who at worst had killed one man in a sea brawl and had taken one ship [a vessel belonging to 'the Moors'—the enemy of all seafaring nations], should have had ballads written about him in which he was described as 'bloody' is one of the most remarkable facts in the history of the sea. But that he should have been referred to ever since in all literature as a typical pirate is still more remarkable." The truth of the matter is that Kidd's fate and the extreme blackening of his character were the results of propaganda that originated with Bellomont in an effort to save his own skin. The British ruling class, colleagues of Bellomont, did a good job of besmirching the character of a man who had merely obeyed the orders given him, and history in this case, as in many others, is merely "fiction agreed upon"—authoritatively inspired and forced down the throats of an ignorant and gullible public.

The men who manned the privateers of New York, of about the time of Captain Kidd, were often more pirates than privateersmen and apt to be as lawless ashore as when they were "pursuing their trade" at sea. On the night of September 19, 1705, a large number of men were ashore in New York from privateers in the harbor, one of which was the privately armed brigantine *Dragon*, commanded by Captain Ginks. After heavy drinking, the men became turbulent, defied the sheriff and the civic law enforcement officers, attacked two English army officers who had just arrived in town from Jamaica, and killed one of them. Before peace and order were restored by the citizens, reinforced by disciplined man-of-war-men, many men were dead or wounded. This lawlessness was not peculiar to New York or to the American colonies, for we read that during the War of the Revolution, English privateersmen gave the authorities at British ports a "great deal of trouble and concern." The city of Liverpool admittedly experienced great difficulty in maintaining order when any considerable number of privateers were in port, and an English publication says: "The privateersmen, when they came into port, were the terror of the town and committed many excesses. So outrageous did their conduct become that in 1778 the mayor of Liverpool issued a proclamation cautioning these lawless persons that he would in future call in the aid of the military for the protection of the lives and property of the peaceable inhabitants."

It is said that piracy increased rather than diminished after the treaty of peace was signed at Utrecht on April 11, 1713, which concluded the War of the Spanish Succession and also declared the end of hostilities between England and France, with France ceding Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, the Hudson Bay territory, and its part of the island of St. Kitts, or St. Christopher (in the West Indies), to Britain. The English privateer *Whidah* of 23 guns and 130 men, under the command of Capt. Samuel Bellamy, blossomed into a real pirate and was making depredations against shipping of any nation or colony off the New England coast as late as 1717. Ultimately, the *Whidah* was wrecked off Cape Cod, and almost all on board were drowned; it was said that over a hundred dead bodies were washed ashore, but six that had life in them were resuscitated and kept alive long enough to send to Boston for trial and the gallows. After the peace of Utrecht, most of the American colonies maintained small armed vessels built as merchantmen for the protection of their coasts and commerce, but piracy still continued, for it is recorded that a British sloop of war arrived at Newport in 1723 with twenty-five pirates "to be sentenced and publicly hanged" as a warning to other freebooters who were then known to be frequenting the New England, New York, and Long Island coasts.

That it was difficult to draw the line between piracy and what was considered privateering is evident from the following item published in a New York newspaper in 1747: "Captain Troup, in the privateer brig *Royal Hester*, of this port, lately met with a Danish vessel that had a Spanish merchantman with eight thousand pieces of money on board.

Captain Troup thought proper to accept of the money, and, paying the Dane his freight, very civilly dismissed him."

Maclay says that for more than a century after the establishment of colonies in the New World, "the distinction between privateers, slavers, pirates and even government cruisers was vague, and at times obliterated altogether"; that "it was a period in which, on the high seas, might was right." Charleston, S. C., because of its geographical setting, has a history in which pirates walk across its pages not only unmolested but also honored, even though piracy was acknowledged as illegal. Selfishness of individuals, of classes, and of the community itself predominated. Many retired pirates purchased land and built homes around Charleston. We read: "In those times of almost incessant war, when one government commissioned individuals to rove the seas and rob its enemies' ships of commerce, the step from the privateer to the pirate was natural and the moral difference not very marked. Men of very good family became pirates because they loved adventure." When the Spanish attacked Charleston in 1706, the authorities did not hesitate to urge the resident pirates to enlist and fight in defense of the town. The pirates evidently responded and, under Lieutenant Colonel Rhett (commissioned as vice-admiral), manned and armed all the available vessels in port and drove off the Spanish force of "four war ships and a galley," operating under the command of a French admiral. Shortly afterwards, Rhett, with two armed merchant vessels (and with pirates among his crews), captured a large enemy ship. When Charleston prosperity was threatened by the activities of buccaneers, the law was quickly invoked against piracy. In 1699 the rice business of South Carolina was seriously affected by the depredations of a West Indian pirate, which captured several vessels off the coast when bound for Charleston to obtain rice cargoes. A shortage of bottoms to handle the rice crop developed, and when nine of the crew of the pirate ship appeared in Charleston, they were promptly seized after identification. Seven were hanged, while the other two were cast into prison.

Some twenty years later, Governor Johnson of Carolina fitted out two armed merchant vessels to proceed against two pirate ships that were operating outside Charleston to the great loss of the citizens of Carolina. One of these pirate vessels carried six guns and was under the command of Capt. Richard Worley; the other was "a powerful sloop mounting ten guns" and commanded by Capt. Steed Bonnett (reputed to be a handsome Englishman of good family). Governor Johnson was in command of one of the armed Carolina merchantmen, and Colonel Rhett was in charge of the other. Johnson's vessel went in search of Worley and fought a bloody engagement with him about seventy-five miles north of Charleston. The few pirates who were not killed in the fight, including Worley himself, were taken into Charleston and promptly hanged. Rhett sailed in pursuit of Bonnett's sloop, and after overtaking her, he induced the pirate to haul down his flag and surrender, with the understanding that the pirates would be permitted to go off scot-free (on parole). Bonnett apparently exacted some sort of promise of this nature from Rhett, as Bonnett stood with fire in his hand in the vicinity of a large quantity of gunpowder and threatened to blow up his vessel and the Carolina cruiser fastened alongside of her unless his terms were accepted. Probably Rhett, under the compulsion of the threat of a reckless man, agreed to the conditions of surrender imposed, but if so, he reneged when he got ashore and swore that he had promised Bonnett only to use his influence in behalf of the pirate and his crew of forty men. The Charleston authorities, who for weeks had seen the pirate ships cruising off the mouth of the harbor and blockading the port so that its commerce had been suspended, made short work of the members of the pirate crew. A few days after reaching Charleston and being convicted according to law, they were hanged and their bodies buried "below high water in the Ashley River." Steed Bonnett talked of honor so convincingly—and employed legal talent of such caliber to defend him and "connections"—that his case dragged on for about a year, but he too was finally hanged.

Among the notarial records of Essex County, Massachusetts, is the following official account of the misfortunes that befell the ship *Hopewell* (Captain Ellis) and her crew. Dated Salem, May 1, 1718, the statement reads in part:

Depositions of Richard Manning, John Crowell, and Aaron Crowell, all of Salem, and belonging to the crew of Captain Thomas Ellis, commander of the ship *Hopewell*, bound from the Island of Barbadoes to Saltatuda. Missing of that island and falling to Leeward we shaped our course for some of the Bahama Islands in hopes to get salt there, but nigh ye Island of Hispaniola we unhappily met with a pirate, being a sloop of between thirty and forty men, one Capt. Charles, commander. . . . They took us, boarded us and abused several of us shamefully, and took what small matters we had, even our very cloathes and particularly beat and abused our

Mate whose name was James Logun of Charlestowne, and him they forcibly carried away with them and threatened his life if he would not go, which they were ye more in earnest for insomuch as they had no artist on board, as we understood, having a little before that time had an Engagem't with a ship of force which had killed several of them as we were Informed by some of them. Ye said James Logun was very unwilling to go with them and informed some of us that he knew not whether he had best to dye or go with them, these Deponents knowing of him to be an Ingenious sober man.

The *Hopewell* was captured by the pirates on March 5, 1718, and evidently the "artist" that the buccaneers wanted was a competent navigator. Indeed, in those days, a particularly skillful navigator was often called a "sea-artist," and pirates capturing a ship with such a man aboard frequently compelled him to join forces with them. However, the official Salem chronicles of the event made these vivacious remarks in regard to the matter:

May 1, 1718, several of the *Hopewell's* crew can testify that near Hispaniola they met with pirates who robbed and abused their crew and compelled their mate, James Logun of Charlestown, to go with them, as they had no artist; having lost several of

their company in an engagement. As to what sort of an artist these gentlemen rovers were deficient in, whether dancing, swimming or writing master, or a master of the mechanical arts, we have no authority for stating.

Shortly after the *Hopewell* affair, Capt. John Shattuck reached Salem and entered his protest against capture by pirates north of the eastern end of Cuba. Sailing from Jamaica, Shattuck was in sight of Long Island (Bahamas) when he was captured by a "sea rogue" known as the "intrepid and lawless" Capt. Charles Vain in a "Pyrat" of 12 guns and 120 men. Shattuck's vessel was taken to a pirate lair at the nearby Crooked Island of the Bahamas, where the Yankee brig was stripped of everything of value, the captain and all the men despoiled, and all who objected in any way to the plundering were "shamefully abused." Shattuck, when set free with a denuded vessel and crew, was at the mercy of the elements and had great difficulty in making port, not having "a strip of good canvas aboard."

We are told that in 1724 Nutt and Phillip, two "notorious, godless freebooters," cruised off the Massachusetts coast, disguised their identity and mission when in the proximity of more powerful, armed vessels, but pounced on small and unarmed, helpless craft and left no incriminating evidence of their cruel lawlessness. Fortunately for the colonial coasting traders, these pirates captured a Salem sloop commanded by Andrew Harradine, who proved to be a resourceful and scheming, courageous man in charge of a group of brave men. When Harradine and his crew were ordered aboard the pirate, they apparently went submissively and dejectedly but with concealed arms. At a signal, they pounced upon the pirates, killed both Nutt and Phillip, and drove below decks those who escaped death in the first savage onslaught; they then battened down the hatches and sailed the lawless craft into Boston, where the surviving pirates were turned over to the authorities and "fitted with hempen kerchiefs."

Records show that on May 1, 1725, a brigantine arrived at Salem under the command of Captain Dove, having on board Philip Ashton, a youth from Marblehead, who had been on a small fishing schooner with four other men and a boy when she was captured by pirates on June 15, 1722, while lying at anchor in a bay near Cape Sable, Nova Scotia. (Thirteen or fourteen other fishing craft were seized at the same time in the same manner, and every-

thing of possible value that was portable was taken.) The pirate craft is described as a brigantine with "two great guns, four swivels, and about forty-two men." Ashton wrote that he reached home "two years, ten months and fifteen days after I was first taken by pirates; and two years and two months after making my escape from them on Roatin Island." This island is one of the Islas de la Bahia in the Bay of Honduras (about $16\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N. and $86\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ W.). The pirates roamed far afield, for they cruised for plunder from the Newfoundland Banks in the north to the coast of South America and were at Tobago, Grenada, covering in their depredations an area represented by about thirty-three degrees of latitude and twenty-seven degrees of longitude. Apparently, they went from the tropics, where they obtained most of their loot, to the Banks to get fish and impress some young, unmarried men. The captain of the pirates, described as "a gentleman rover of considerable notoriety," was a man named Ned Low with a "young child at Boston," for whom he professed great "tenderness."

It would seem that a surprising number of privateers, which began in what was officially a legitimate occupation, drifted into out-and-out piracy. In most cases, the captain and crew of a privateer shipped for a voyage on the basis of "no plunder, no pay"; they took on the adventure at the risk of their lives for what they could get out of it through attacking enemy ships, and if enemy ships were scarce on the seas, they were likely to make "mistakes" when large profits were in sight. Cotton Mather (1663-1728), Puritan divine and author, preaching one of his "hanging sermons" in 1704 at Boston on the occasion of the capital punishment being inflicted on "miserable pirates," said: "The Privateering Stroke so easily degenerates into the Piratical and the Privateering Trade is usually carried on with Unchristian Temper and proves an Inlet into so much Debauchery and Iniquity." Lord Horatio Nelson (1758-1805), the British naval hero, declared later in the eighteenth century that "all privateers" were "no better than pirates," and many an authority affirmed that there were "shady privateers" that were little better than "blackguarding pirates" and that the letters of marque under which they sailed were often but "a mere pretense."

Forced trading, when not open warfare, savored of piracy. Sir John Hawkins sold slaves to the Spanish "at the muzzles of his guns," and when Francis Drake was ruined by a destructive but reasonable defensive act of the Spanish, he branded it as "perfidy" and promptly set out to recoup his personal losses by piracy, which ultimately won for him fame, a title, and a fortune. Reprisals, it has been well said, "led to wanton aggressions, like those of the buccaneers, and wanton aggressions produced reprisals again." All governments with marine aspirations evidently encouraged their merchantmen to rob the ships of rival powers in the interest of national commerce. In war-times, the armed merchantman was openly commissioned as a privateer and sent to sea to prey not only upon the ships of the enemy but also—sometimes covertly and sometimes openly—upon the vessels flying the flags of neutral powers. John R. Spears, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, says: "It was the theory of all statesmen that the best way to encourage the shipping of one nation was to injure, as much as possible, and by all means, the shipping of all rivals. As late as the end of the eighteenth century, the Barbary pirates were subsidized by some governments to encourage them to prey upon the shipping of rivals." In the early days, the captain of an armed merchantman or privateer was the judge in regard to what was done to a captured vessel of a neutral power; later, privateers were obliged to bring their prizes before an admiralty court, but it has been well said, "The difference between the robbery as committed by the privateer and the confiscation ordered by the court was found only in the course of procedure."

There is a record of the warlike hazards of a routine trading voyage and the activity of Barbary corsairs in the personal log, or diary, written in 1759 by young Samuel Gardner, of Salem, who, after his graduation from Harvard College, made a voyage to Gibraltar in a ship of Capt. Richard Derby. The vessel sailed from Salem October 19, 1759. The following quotations from daily entries in Gardner's logbook are of interest:

Nov. 12. Saw a sail standing to S.W. I am quartered at the aftermost gun and its opposite with Captain Clifford. We fired a shot at her and she hoisted Dutch colors.

* * * *

Nov. 15. Between 2 and 3 this morning we saw two sail which chased us, the ship fired 3 shots at us which we returned. They came up with us by reason of a breeze which she took before we did. She proved to be the ship *Cornwall* from Bristol.

* * * *

Nov. 23. We now begin to approach land. . . . At eight o'clock two Teriffa [Barbary] boats came out after us, they fired at us which we returned as merrily. They were glad to get away as well as they

could. We stood after one, but it is almost impossible to come up with the piratical dogs.

* * * *

Dec. 10 [at Gibraltar]. In the morning we heard a firing and looked out in the Gut and there was a snow attacked by 3 of the piratical Teriffa boats. Two cutters in the government service soon got under sail. 3 men-of-war that lay in the Roads manned their barges and sent them out as did a privateer. We could now perceive her [the snow] to have struck, but they soon retook her. She had only four swivels and 6 or 8 men. . . . They got some prisoners [of the pirates] but how many I cannot learn, which it is to be hoped will meet with their just reward which I think would be nothing short of hanging.

Notwithstanding the efforts made and precautions taken to suppress piracy and free the trade routes of the world from "sea marauders," buccaneers were in evidence until well into the nineteenth century (and in China Seas until quite recently). Not all of the later-day pirates were Moslem corsairs or Orientals. Joseph Thwaites, an Englishman, did not begin his career as a pirate until 1763. His field of operation for many years was primarily in the Mediterranean, and he accumulated much wealth, which he stored in England as well as New York. Thwaites perfected the practice of destroying evidence against him by drowning all his captives, affirming that "dead men tell no tales"; he sent to the bottom most of the vessels taken, but was known to change completely the complexion of valuable prizes and sell them in foreign (and the less frequented) ports. Later, when suspicions began to be articulate, Thwaites abandoned the sea, moved all his wealth to New York, "built a mansion near the city," and settled down to life as a country gentleman. Shortly after he had firmly established himself as a "respected citizen," Thwaites died—not at the hands of the law as a homicidal madman and multiple murderer but from snake-bite.

With nations at war, piracy on the high seas was legalized, even with respect to neutral shipping and the application of subtle legal rulings and subterfuges. It is no wonder, therefore, that the practice of freebooting continued in times of peace and that piracy on the high seas was hard to eradicate, even when the governments of marine powers were convinced of its evil and desirous of putting a stop to the vicious practice. Writing of the influence of the pirates upon commerce and particularly upon the American merchant marine, Spears says:

Pirates captured a few ships, American as well as English, and for brief periods interrupted the trade of various ports. On the other hand, some of them supplied the colonists with low-priced goods, and at times the only coin in circulation was that brought in by the freebooters. On the whole, in a financial point of view, the pirates benefitted the young merchant marine more than they damaged it. In anticipation of attacks by pirates, all ships in deep-water trade carried cannon, and some coasters did so, especially in the longer voyages. In the trade with Spain and Portugal and the Canary Islands, the American vessels were chased and sometimes captured by Barbary pirates who had learned their trade from European renegades. New England ships in

the West Indies were always obliged to keep a sharp lookout for piratical cruisers under French and Spanish flags. But these aggressions were not an unmingled evil. For such conditions increased freight rates and the profits on cargoes carried on owners' account. Thus the freight rate from Boston to Barbados in 1762 was four times former rates and all because of pirates. Sure fortune came to the ship captain who was equal to the emergencies of the trade. Dangers cultivated the courage and enterprise of the crews. In a still broader view the habits of a people soon to become an independent nation were forming, and it was worth while for some of them to learn how to swim in rough water.

William Phips, of Woolwich (Bath), Maine

An important character and redoubtable seaman of his period and one who stood behind and championed Capt. William Kidd in the early nineties of the seventeenth century was William Phips (or Phipps). He was knighted by King James II and became in 1692 the first royal governor of the Massachusetts colony under its new charter. Phips was born on February 2, 1651, "on a frontier farm of the Maine coast," at Woolwich (opposite Bath), near the mouth of the Kennebec River. Cotton Mather wrote of Phips: "His faithful mother had no less than twenty-six children, whereof twenty-one were sons; but equivalent of them all was William, one of the youngest, whom, his father dying, was left young with his mother, and with her he lived, keeping ye sheep in ye wilderness until he was eighteen years old." Young Phips then became a ship carpenter's apprentice at Bath for four years, following which he worked at his trade in Boston, and during this period he learned to read and write. We are told that he spent a good part of his wages in the taverns of the Boston waterside "and there picked up wondrous yarns of the silver-laden galleons of Spain which had shivered their timbers on the reefs of the Bahama Passage or gone down in the hurricanes that beset those southerly seas."

Phips married a wealthy widow, whose means enabled him to go treasure-hunting on the Spanish Main, but on his first voyage, in a small vessel, he narrowly escaped losing his life and discovered and obtained barely enough treasure to pay for the cost of the expedition. His first venture convinced him that, if properly equipped and outfitted, he could recover the treasure sunk in a large, richly laden Spanish ship said to have been wrecked about fifty years before off the coast of Hispaniola. Being without sufficient funds for the contemplated enterprise and not being able to raise the money in the colonies, Phips, described as "a rough and ready New England shipmaster," went to England and "with bulldog persistence besieged the Court of James II for a whole year until he was given a royal frigate for his purpose." It is said that this expedition was not successful, but—nothing daunted—Phips persuaded other patrons to outfit him with a small merchantman, the *James and Mary*, in which he sailed in supreme command for the coast of Hispaniola. Having affairs in his own hands, he found the sunken galleon for which he had been searching for years and recovered from it £300,000 of treasure, which, besides thirty-two tons of silver and "that incredible treasure of plate thus fetched up from seven or eight fathoms under water," included "vast riches of gold and pearls and jewels" and "all that a Spanish frigate was to be enriched withal." Captain Phips sailed up the Thames to London in 1687 with his ship's "freightage of incredible treasure" and made an honest division with his backers, cleaned up all liabilities and charges made against him, and, it is said, retained for himself only £16,000 out of the total treasure of £300,000 (a little more than five per cent of the gross). We are told that because men of his integrity were not over-plentiful in England after the Restoration, King James knighted him and appointed him sheriff of New England. Hawthorne says that Sir William Phips sailed home to Boston—"a man of strong and sturdy frame whose face had been roughened by northern tempests and blackened by the burning sun of the West Indies."

Sir William Phips was appointed commander of an expedition against the French in 1690. On April 28, "seven or eight hundred men in eight small vessels" were sent by Massachusetts against Port Royal, Nova Scotia, and the place was easily captured, with "hardly a blow being struck in its defense." The squadron then destroyed a French fort at the mouth of the St. John River and on May 30 "returned to Boston in triumph." An expedition sent against Quebec did not turn out so well. Phips sailed from Nantucket on August 9 with a fleet of "32 vessels, the largest numbering 44 guns" (according to Palfrey's HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND); he carried 2,000 men and provisions for four months. A land force under the command of Captain Church was also dispatched by way of Lake Champlain. Phips reached Quebec Oc-

tober 6, but the necessary land force did not appear, as Church had found the route impracticable and had turned back. The Massachusetts ships tried to bombard the fort, but owing to the height of the land batteries, they could not reach them. After making a halfhearted attempt to land men about two miles below the town, Phips decided that as he was not properly equipped to storm the place and as Frontenac was too strongly entrenched, aggressively resourceful, and greatly favored by nature, it was better to make no foolhardy attempt to capture the fortified city, so he set sail for home. Returning, the fleet ran into heavy weather. One ship was wrecked in the St. Lawrence, two foundered at sea, and some were carried to the West Indies. Casualties and disease caused a loss of 200 men, but only 30 of these fell at the hands of the enemy.

Port Royal (in French Acadia), which Phips captured with ease early in 1690, was later known as Annapolis Royal, named after Anne (1665-1714), the daughter of James II. She was queen of England during the period 1702-1714, when what is now Nova Scotia was finally ceded by the French to the English by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Port Royal is one of the oldest settlements in America, dating back to Champlain's days, and was founded by the French in 1605, two years before the Jamestown Colony was established in Virginia.

In the winter of 1690, Phips returned to England and urged a restoration of the Massachusetts colony charter, which had been annulled during the reign of Charles II. When James II acted favorably in the matter at the suggestion of Mather, the colonial agent, the crown appointed its valued servant Sir William Phips the first royal governor under the new charter. We are told that Phips was "a man superbly brave, vigorous but unlettered." He found the colony in a very disordered and deplorable condition, but his methods of correcting evils were too blunt and direct for his British associates. It is said that on one occasion "he used his fists on the Collector of the Port after cursing him with tremendous gusto." Phips is also credited with thrashing the captain of the frigate *Nonesuch* of the Royal Navy. Whereas such conduct was probably justified, his behavior as governor was too strenuous for British officials to stomach, and they petitioned the government for his removal. We are told that Phips defended the frontier with great energy and success, but his policy of building forts was unpopular in England, as they were too expensive. Phips was a practical man, a patriotic American loyal to the crown, but no politician. He was as direct in his methods as he was honest, had no use for the pretentious and supercilious; moreover, he fought graft mercilessly in both high and low places, demanded a dollar's worth of goods or service for every dollar spent, and was a realist in the realm of economy. Because he was such a "straight-shooter," who would not deviate from his ideas of rightness to please certain selfish members of the aristocracy and cater to influential monied interests, Phips was summoned to London to explain his acts and answer certain charges. While waiting for a reaffirmation of royal favor, he died suddenly on February 18, 1695, when forty-four years of age.

Shipbuilding in New England, 1674-1714

At the Massachusetts State House, there is a register of "Ships and Vessels" built in New England from 1674 to 1714, the record for the years prior to 1693 being far from complete. This register lists 1,332 vessels for the period, of which 239 (18 per cent) were built for foreign owners. Hall's tabulation compiled from this register indicates that 230 full-rigged ships totaling 24,449 tons were built between 1695 and 1714 in the Greater Boston area (which includes Dorchester, Milton, Quincy, Hingham, and Charlestown), that about 130 of the total number built in the recorded period were launched into the Merrimac River, and that of these, 16 (about 12 per cent) were ships, most of which were built at Newbury for London owners.

Of the 239 listed vessels built for foreign account, 169 (71 per cent) were for British owners, 21 for Barbados, 11 for Montserrat, 9 for Antigua, 9 for Saint Christopher, 7 for Nevis, 6 for Jamaica, and the rest for Oporto Royal (3), Fayal (2), Madeira, and Tenerife.

George F. Dow says that, from the registry of merchant vessels in the Massachusetts state archives covering the years 1698-1714 and from additional lists running back to 1674, data are available covering 1,402 vessels built in the New England territory. The registry classifies these vessels as to types as follows:

Type of Vessel	Number of Vessels	Percentage of Total	Type of Vessel	Number of Vessels	Percentage of Total
Sloops	560	40.0	Ketches	82	5.8
Ships	439	31.3	Barks	29	2.1
Brigantines	278	19.8	Pinks	14	1.0

It is said that "seven-eighths of these vessels were owned in Boston," that the tonnage of the barks varied "from 30 to 140," and that the rule for measuring tonnage was variously applied. Whereas the tonnage computation was based on dimensions and was supposed to be "a rough estimate of the cargo capacity, the tonnage being the burden of the vessel," we are told: "The government officials would have one plan, the builders another, and the owners sometimes planned it so that the same ship paid duties on fifty tons when importing foreign goods and would be rated at one hundred tons when hired as a government transport."

The record of clearances from Boston during the British wars with France and Spain shows how well armed and manned the American colonial vessel had to be. Pinks of 40 tons carried as many as 4 guns and 9 men. The ship *Frances and Dorothy* of 200 tons carried 20 guns and 20 men; the *Two Brothers* of 140 tons had 14 guns and 19 men; the *Swallow* of 150 tons, 12 guns and 18 men; the *Trident* of 140 tons, 14 guns and 15 men; the *Prudent Sarah* of 100 tons, 10 guns and 14 men. It would seem that most of these armed merchantmen carried one gun for about each ten tons register. But few of the guns, if any, were "mounted carriage guns" or of a caliber sufficient to command respect.

The following table, prepared from Hall's figures, shows the number and size of full-rigged ships built during each of the years 1710-1714 inclusive (with totals for the five-year period) and where such vessels were built. It will be interesting to note the item, "Captured from enemy," which appears in the tabulation for four of the five years set forth. Boston, which includes Charlestown, built 67 per cent of the ships (in number) and 69 per cent of the tonnage during the period covered. The average tonnage of the 131 full-rigged ships built was 105 tons; of the 14 ships captured from the enemy, 117 tons.

	1710		1711		1712		1713		1714		Total for Five Years 1710-1714 Inclusive	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
Boston, Mass.	20	2,460	10	1,000	15	1,555	24	2,505	19	1,905	88	9,425
Piscataqua, N. H., and Maine	4	520	5	670	1	120	1	50	—	—	11	1,360
Newbury-Merrimac, Mass.	1	200	1	70	3	300	3	135	4	340	12	1,045
Taunton, Mass.	1	120	3	480	2	150	—	—	1	80	7	830
Salem, Mass.	—	—	2	170	1	150	—	—	1	90	4	410
Scituate, Marshfield, etc.	—	—	4	270	—	—	1	70	—	—	5	340
Rhode Island	—	—	1	55	—	—	2	150	—	—	3	205
New London, Conn.	—	—	1	120	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	120
Total built	26	3,300	27	2,835	22	2,275	31	2,910	25	2,415	131	13,735
Captured from enemy	6	900	4	350	3	310	1	80	—	—	14	1,640
Total	32	4,200	31	3,185	25	2,585	32	2,990	25	2,415	145	15,375

During the years 1696-1713 inclusive, the following vessels were recorded as "Captured from enemy"—French or Spanish:

Type of Vessel	Number	Tonnage	Average Tonnage per Vessel	Type of Vessel	Number	Tonnage	Average Tonnage per Vessel
Ships	43	5,086	118	Ketches	2	85	42
Barks	4	240	60	Pinks	1	80	80
Brigantines	1	40	40	Sloops	11	220	22
Total—62 vessels of 5,751 tons, an average of 93 tons per vessel.							

Among the earliest vessels constructed by the Puritans in the Massachusetts Bay Colony were ships built around 1634 for "an enterprising London merchant, Matthew Craddock" (Cradock). Maclay says that "by 1676 Massachusetts alone had constructed over seven hundred vessels, varying in tonnage from six to two hundred and fifty tons," and he adds that because of the large amount of shipping and commerce and the prevalence of privateering and piracy, "we find the colonial governments fitting out war craft at their own expense and that merchants armed their vessels with cannon." V. S. Clark says that in 1676 it was affirmed that as many as thirty "large ships" were built annually for the British account in New England, and Clark is also authority for the statement that in 1721 officials admitted that the larger part of the output of the colonial shipyards was for English account. The virtual absence of British-built vessels on the colonial registers signifies that colonial shipbuilders had forced the builders of the mother country out of their home market. Of 76,250 tons of shipping documented in New England from 1695 to 1714, colonial-built vessels represented 75,475 tons (99 per cent of the total). In the Provincial Papers, New Hampshire, 1628-1722, among the Bellmont Historical Documents, is the following interesting statement made by Lord Belmont in 1698:

Last year I examined the registers of all the vessels in the three provinces of my government; and found there then belonged to the town of Boston 25 ships from 100 tons to 300; ships about 100 tons and under, 38; brigantines, 50; ketches, 13; and sloops, 67; in all, 194 [193] vessels. To New Hampshire

at that time 11 ships of good burthen, 5 brigantines, 4 ketches, and 4 sloops. . . . I believe I may venture to say there are more good vessels belonging to the town of Boston than to all Scotland and Ireland, unless one should reckon the small craft, such as herring boats.

Records show that between 1692 and 1714 there were entered at the Boston customhouse seventy-three deep-sea vessels, excluding a host of river and harbor craft, gundelows, mosos boats, etc. These ocean craft consisted of forty ships, two barks, ten brigantines, eighteen sloops, and three pinks.

From the late 1630's the Merrimac River has been identified with the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and a map of 1642 shows Puritan settlements at Haverhill, Salisbury, and Wessacucon (Newbury) in the Merrimac region. The Merrimac is not a navigable river for more than twenty miles from its mouth, but it is one of New England's most important streams. It empties into the Atlantic Ocean some thirty-five miles north-northeast of Boston and only about three and a half miles south of the New Hampshire state line. New Hampshire has an ocean frontage of only fifteen miles (as the crow flies), and the Piscataqua River, entering the Atlantic eighteen miles to the northeast of the mouth of the Merrimac, separates New Hampshire from Maine. On the Merrimac River have been built such cities as Haverhill, Lawrence, and Lowell, Mass., and Nashua and Manchester, N. H., and from very early times important colonial shipbuilding centers were located at Haverhill, Bradford, Amesbury, Salisbury, Newbury, and Newburyport. As early as 1652, a sawmill was in operation at Salisbury, producing "oak planking for ships building on the Merrimac."

Newbury and the Merrimac have a very old shipbuilding history dating back to the 1660's. One record says that shipyards were in operation at Newbury before 1670 and that "nearby Ipswich built ships as early as 1668." Rowley, on the Parker River (a branch of the Merri-

mac), was building vessels in 1680, Carr's Island in midstream had a shipyard operating in 1683, and ships were being built upstream at Amesbury, Bradford, and Haverhill by 1700. There are records of 132 vessels being built "on the banks of the waters of the Merrimac" during the thirty-five-year period 1680-1714 inclusive. The list, in addition to 69 sloops, 30 brigantines, and 9 ketches, includes "one snow or barke, the *Sea Flower* of 20 tons, built in 1709," 6 "barques," one "barque or ship of 50 tons," and 16 ships "mostly for London owners." It is of interest to note that at the turn of the century—and certainly in the early years of the eighteenth century—the shipowners of the mother country were having ocean-going square-rigged trading ships built for them "in the far-away wilds of Massachusetts, on the shores of a deep and wide river, named Merrimac by the Indians, which flows through a land on which grows in abundance fine trees for the framing, planking, and sparring of ships."

Prior to 1700, sloops and brigantines of 30 or more tons were being built at Haverhill and Bradford. In 1733 the town of Haverhill, the farthest inland shipbuilding location on the Merrimac River (about twenty miles as the crow flies from the ocean and some twenty-seven miles by the river), granted Henry Springer the right to establish a shipyard opposite the old burying grounds on what later became known as Water Street, and below the Springer yard were two other shipyards, one of them located at the Rocks Village opposite what is now West Newbury. Thomas Cottle was a prominent builder in Haverhill around the middle of the eighteenth century and, it is said, "in 1752 launched his largest vessel." Records show that in 1790 there were two shipyards operating in the town of Haverhill and one at the Rocks Village.

Shipbuilding in Boston in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century

In the report of the governor, the Earl of Bellomont, written in 1700 to the Council on Trade and Plantations, we find this rather skeptical remark: "At Boston they pretend to build marchand ships 40 per cent cheaper than they could be built in England." In Price's *PLAN OF BOSTON*, 1723, sixteen sizable shipyards are shown, with "the lesser yards not set forth." This map states that in the one year (1723) there "were built in New England about 700 sail of ships and other vessels, most of which were fitted at Boston." Also, "There are in one year cleared out of this port at the customhouse about 1,200 sail of vessels." Edmund Burke, in his *ACCOUNT OF THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENTS IN AMERICA* (London, 1757), says:

The business of shipbuilding is one of the most considerable which Boston or the other seaport towns in New England carry on. Ships are sometimes built here upon commission, but frequently the merchants of New England have them constructed on their own account, and loading them with the produce of the colony—naval stores, fish and fish-oil principally—they send them out upon a trading voyage to Spain, Portugal or the Mediterranean; where, having disposed of their cargo, they make what advantage they can by freight, until such time as they can sell the vessel herself to advantage, which they seldom fail to do in a reasonable time. They receive the value of the vessel, as well as of

the freight of the goods which from time to time they carried, and of the cargo with which they sailed originally, in bills of exchange upon London; for, as the people of New England have no commodity to return for the value of above a hundred thousand pounds, which they take in various sorts of goods from England, but some naval stores—and those in no great quantities—they are obliged to keep the balance somewhat even by this circuitous commerce, which, though not carried on with Great Britain, nor with British vessels, yet centers in its profits, where all the money which the colonies can make in any manner must center at last.

The building of vessels by the American colonists in this way, with the necessity of selling them in foreign ports (due to the lack of demand for them in colonial and the English-dis-

couraged foreign trade), was at best a hazardous occupation; for to the uncertainties of business were added "the perils of the sea, the danger from pirates, and the operation of navigation laws." Among the records of Boston Town is the following under date of March 16, 1742:

The greatest advantage this town reaped from the trade to London was by shipbuilding, which employed most of our tradesmen. But that is now reduced so that whereas in 1735 orders might arrive for building forty sail of ships, there has been as yet but orders for two, by which means the most advantageous branch of trade to our mother country, being lessened to so great a degree, must neces-

sarily oblige a great many of our useful tradesmen to leave the town, as many have already done; so that this town will suffer exceedingly for want of that branch of trade being properly supported, and thereby rendered much less able to support a large tax, than from a decline of all other branches of trade together, by reason that that branch employed more men than all the rest.

Apparently, Boston received more orders for ships in 1742 than the spring report of March 16 forecast with pronounced pessimism. Burke states that forty-one topsail vessels were built in Boston in the year 1738, but he reports a declining business, as he says that thirty were built in 1743, only twenty in 1746, and that in 1749 the number had fallen "to only fifteen, with a total burden of 2,450 tons."

Boston was never an ideally located shipbuilding center and, from early days, was at a disadvantage in being required to have its ship timbers, planking, and mastings brought to it from a distance and at some expense. It had, however, a splendid harbor and was a good deep-sea port; because of this, it early became an important shipping center. Boston, whose merchants owned a large part of the tonnage and marketed much of the fish caught by the boats operated out of other New England ports, grew as a commercial center and was truly the capital of the Codfish State. At the time of the Revolution and thereafter, Boston bought most of its ships where they could be built more cheaply because of proximity to suitable timber; not until about 1840, when ships of larger size (requiring deep water for launching) were in demand and most of the shipyards located on shallow water had cut out their local timber, were large shipyards established in the Boston area and was the shipbuilding industry again—for a brief period—of great importance.

Rigs of Sailing Ships

The rig of American sailing vessels was changed with the years and modified by experience. Originally, the spars and sails followed British custom, which in turn was influenced by French, Spanish, or Dutch construction and use. The terms used are very confusing, for in the old colonial records "barkes" and "shippes" were not vessels carrying the rigs that would be so designated today; both ketches and sloops in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and schooners in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were very different in rig from the fore-and-afters carrying such names today and in the period preceding the end of the era of merchant sail.

The early shallops (or chaloupes) and pinnaces were light, open boats carrying canvas, and the pinnace always and the shallop frequently were fitted with oars. The average-sized shallop had one mast, with a sail hoisted from its deck; the larger ones had two masts and two sails. The ancient shallop carried lugsails, and this rig was commonly used by fishing boats; in fact, most of the small, early deep-sea colonial fishermen were "fishing luggers." The "yacht" of the Dutch, referred to in the shipping records of New Netherland (Hudson River and New York region), was not a pleasure craft or a fine-lined speedy vessel but a beamy, light-draft, bluff-bow boat used for trading in the shallow waters of the rivers, ca-

nals, and harbors of Holland. Essex, Mass. (formerly known as Chebacco), is said to have improved the early rig of the shallop and first to have used sails with the part forward of the mast cut off and a "yard" (gaff), which carried the head of the sail, "attached to the mast by wooden hoops which would slide up and down with ease." Later, the sail also was attached at intervals to wood hoops, and the foot of the sail was secured to a wood spar that became known as a boom. This rig, known as the chebacco, supplanted the lateen, sprit, and lugsail and became the fundamental characteristic of the American fore-and-aft rig (sloop, one mast; schooner, multiple masts). Pinks (so named because of their narrow stern and the shape of the hull) that carried the chebacco rig became the popular fishing boats along the entire New England coast. In 1792, Gloucester owned 133 boats of this class, totaling 1,549 tons, and in 1804 some two hundred boats of about three thousand tons total register. Originally ranging from three to five tons for ocean fishing, these boats were increased to around thirty tons for deep-sea work and were completely decked over and fitted with a cabin. About 1820 fishermen commenced putting bowsprits on their chebaccos. They then carried the planking of the bulwark a few feet beyond the sharp stern and called the boats "jiggers."

The pink, or pinkie, which later became the name of certain diminutive craft in America, was originally larger than the shallop. The English called this type the catch, or ketch, but the Dutch designated it as "pinkie," which was a name used in the Mediterranean for a small vessel with a hull round at both ends (the outside planking ending on both the stem and sternposts) to distinguish it from craft with the usual square stern above the water, planked straight across. The pinkie was and is distinctly a vessel with a narrow stern, and the name refers to shape of hull and not to rig. The original pinkies in America were ketch-rigged and had one mast stepped about amidships carrying a large square sail; later, a small mizzenmast was placed far aft, with the mainmast stepped about a tenth of the length forward of midships. The mizzen carried a lateen or lugsail. As the vessels were made larger, the mainmast was fitted with two or even three square sails.

The ketch was a European rig used in American waters for many long years because of British prejudice or stubbornness, but it has been referred to as "doubtless the worst rig ever seen in American waters." With the years, the ketch became a square-rigged vessel, pure and simple, having one tall mast—with two or more crossed yards—set well back from the bow and near amidships and a smaller mast also carrying square sails near the stern. This rig was not only complex but also extremely difficult to handle, especially on the narrow-sterned vessels that were quite generally in use during the days of the square-rigged ketch. The ketch of the eighteenth century as used in the colonies for deep-sea and coastwise trading was a two-masted vessel with square sails on the foremast and a fore-and-aft sail on the mainmast, which was shorter than the foremast and stepped well aft. Later, the ketch became a fore-and-aft-rigged vessel—used principally for pleasure. She is generally similar to a yawl, but has a larger mizzen, or second, mast and has it stepped farther forward than the yawl.

The original sloop was a one-masted vessel with one or more square sails. This was changed by evolution to a topsail sloop, which carried a big fore-and-aft mainsail fitted with gaff and boom, and a bowsprit was added forward with a sizable foresail, or jib. The colonial sloops of the eighteenth century were large vessels for their rig. Not only coastwise and West Indian trade but also the whaling and transatlantic trade developed them, and it appears that before the Revolution a British restricting regulation allowed lumber to be imported from the colonies to the mother country only in sloops. This reference is not to the vessels known as mast ships, which carried white pine timber to Britain primarily for use in the British Navy, but to vessels carrying commercial lumber, dimensioned sawn timber, hewn ship timbers, planking, etc. In 1772 a sloop of 140 tons was built at Bath on the Kennebec to carry lumber to England. She had three yards on the single mast, a large fore-and-aft sail with boom and sliding gaff, a foresail, and a jib. In the cod fisheries, Massachusetts alone before the War of the Revolution had 28,000 tons of shipping manned by four thousand sailors, and this fleet was composed largely of sloops. At that time, it was said that the great advantages

of the sloop were its cheapness to build and operate, its handiness and speed, and its safety. The modern sloop is an outgrowth of the old chebacco, "chaloupe," or shallop. The developed sloop had a square stern, and it became very popular in trading before it was taken up as the rig for small pleasure craft and for racing. Spears says, "No other rig will give a hull as great speed, in proportion to the canvas, as the sloop, and yet the rig can be managed by a few men, provided they know their work and are vigilant."

Marvin says that "the greatest gift of American shipyards to the merchant fleet of the era before the Revolution was that incomparable craft, the schooner," and that up to the early years of the eighteenth century "the square rig was the unvarying characteristic of all vessels having more than one mast." (Many one-masted vessels had one or more square sails.) The first American schooner-rigged merchant vessel was built in Bath, Maine, but the "story books" tell of Capt. Andrew Robinson's building, at Gloucester, Mass., a vessel somewhat larger than the ordinary sloop of the day and deciding to rig the craft as a two-masted sloop, as the one mainsail of a sloop in the vessel he was building "would need to be so large that it would be difficult to handle." Tradition and emotional yarns emanating therefrom place the construction date of the Gloucester-built pioneer schooner all the way from 1713 to mid-century. Henry Hall, historian for the United States Government, places the date as 1745. (Spears says 1713 and Marvin 1713 or 1714.) All of the historical marine writers seem to delight in telling a similar story in regard to how the Gloucester two-masted fore-and-aft-rigged sloop came to be called a schooner. Hall, who says that the vessel was built with square stern and fitted with two masts, bearing a sloop sail on each and a bowsprit with jib, or foresail, writes:

She was sharp on the bottom and fast and, on being launched, sped over the water so fast from the impetus gained by descending from the ways, as to elicit from a bystander the remark, "See how she scoons." "Scoon" was a word used by plain people to express the skipping of a flat stone over the surface of the water when skillfully thrown, and the builder of the vessel, having been somewhat at a loss for a name for the new rig, seized upon the

trifling incident referred to and said, "A scooner let her be," and two-masted vessels with jibs and fore-and-aft sails have since been called by that name. The advantage possessed by the "schooner" (as the name became spelled) is that the canvas of the vessel is divided into a larger number of sails, which are more easily handled than the large sails of a sloop could be, each containing the same amount of canvas.

The schooner rig proved to be peculiarly well adapted to the requirements of coastwise navigation in North American waters and was a great boon to merchants at sea; it required fewer "hands" doing less laborious and hazardous work aloft, was more efficient as well as more economical, and was much faster beating to windward in relatively short tacks up or down bays, estuaries, channels, or rivers. Later, as vessels grew larger, schooners of three, four, five, six, and one of even seven masts were built for the American coastwise trade. Since early in the nineteenth century, the fore-and-aft schooners with no yards (or square topsails) have been the only sailing vessels employed by Americans in the Banks fisheries, and they gradually superseded square-rigged brigs and brigantines in every class of coastal work. The American fisheries were annihilated during the Revolution, but their business promptly revived after the peace of 1783; by 1788, New England had 540 vessels totaling 19,200 tons register, with crews aggregating 3,290 men, engaged in the deep-sea fisheries. The schooners mentioned in early American records were the usual British type of topsail schooner—topsail referring not to a fore-and-aft sail carried above the gaff of the lower sail as on the later-built American sloop-schooners but to one or more square sails carried on yards. The British and colonial schooners were really two-masted topsail sloops. British schooners have persisted to be of the square topsail type. Some had yards on the topmasts of both the fore and main, others had yards and one or two square sails on the upper fore only; but the British clung to one or more square sails, which the Americans abandoned. In late years, some American pleasure yachts have been built with a yard (or two) on the foremast, but no square topsail schooners were built and used by Americans for coastal commercial work during the last century or more of the era of merchant sail. Topsail schooners

were, however, the favorite rig of American deep-sea privateers during the Revolution and the War of 1812. They closely resembled brigs, carried an abundance of square sails on both fore and main and, in addition, a substantial amount of fore-and-aft canvas. This rig was effective for ocean work where speed and handiness were required, and the ship's complement was made very large so that there would be plenty of men not only to work the ship expeditiously but also to handle all of the guns, board vessels to make captures, and resist enemy boarders.

Prior to, between, and for a few years after the wars with Britain, American topsail schooners similar in rig to the historical American privateers sailed to every quarter of the world and engaged in "peaceful" commerce, although they were often armed for defense in pirate-infested waters. The graceful and convenient topsail schooner rig passed from use in American shipping early in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, but it survived in the maritime provinces of Canada dominated by British tradition. In the United States, the fore-and-aft schooner supplanted the topsail schooner, brig, brigantine, and ship for coast-wise work, and for deep-sea work all sizable ships were, for many years, full-rigged ships—the smaller square-riggers being brigs; later, economy of operation substituted barks for many three-masted ships and brigantines for many two-masted square-riggers. Still later, as ships became larger, four-masted square-riggers were built for ocean trade, and all such vessels constructed in America were shipentines (i.e., with yards and square sails on three masts and fore-and-aft rig on the fourth, or jigger, mast) except one, which was a four-masted bark, the *Olympia* (i.e., with yards and square sails on the fore and main and fore-and-aft rig on the mizzen and jigger masts). (The British have persisted in calling a shipentine a "four-masted barque," and evidently they have no name for a real four-masted bark.) Marvin says that the great advantage of the topsail schooner rig for ordinary, or average, ocean work and for relatively small vessels was that "in a head wind the square topsail and topgallant sail could be snugly furled, the yards sharply 'braced up,' and the vessel steered closely to windward under fore-and-aft canvas; while the moment the breeze became free and fair the gaskets could be cast off and the square canvas sheeted home, with perhaps a great balloon-like square foresail added."

Another rig referred to in early American records was the snow—a peculiar name, said to have been suggested by "a big spread of white canvas." The snow was to all intent and purpose a brig and, at any distance, was not distinguishable from a brig, even to experienced seamen. The difference was in a mere technical detail, but British marine "authorities" have for centuries been great sticklers for believed "correctness" in their professional vocabulary; hence we have the snow, which is a brig with its spanker spread by boom and gaff, having its luff, or fore edge, attached by hoops to a pole placed very close to the mainmast and in contact with it, heeling on the deck, and having its head attached to the after part of the main-top. Snows were built throughout the eighteenth century, and the detail of rig was used after the name—scrupulously maintained by the British—had been abandoned by the more practical and less hidebound and word-worshipping Americans. In the records of the Pepperell New England expedition of 1745 from the Piscataqua to capture the great French fort at Louisburg in Canada, we read that the American fleet was composed of "three ships, three snows, one brig, and three sloops, with a number of whale boats." The sizable deep-sea three-masted square-rigged sailing vessel was for centuries designated as a "ship," but every vessel classified and registered as a "ship" in the old days was not a real square-rigged ship any more than a "barke" was what later became known as a bark (a three-masted vessel square rigged on fore and main and fore-and-aft rigged on the mizzen). The *Mayflower* that transported the original Pilgrim settlers across the Atlantic and landed them at Plymouth in 1620 was not a ship of 180 tons burthen as stated but was bark rigged. She carried two square sails, or yards, on the fore and main, and on the mizzen she had a triangular lateen fore-and-aft sail instead of the later gaff and boom spanker. On a steep bowsprit, the *Mayflower* carried a spritsail from a horizontal yard.

Another name for a rig for which we are indebted to the English is hermaphrodite brig—a monstrosity in nomenclature, which, strange as it may seem, many Americans, aping the British, have accepted and persisted in using to this day. A brig is generally similar to a full-rigged square-rigged ship with yards on each mast; but, whereas a ship may have three or more masts all square rigged, a brig has only two masts, each of which is sparred like that of a ship. When the British decided to rig a brig with no square sail below the main lower yard and get more use out of and enlarge the spanker, they made a mistake in calling such a vessel a brigantine—which she was not. When real brigantines (two-masted vessels square rigged on the fore and schooner, or fore-and-aft, rigged on the main) were built, some "bright boy" concocted the ridiculous name of hermaphrodite brig for what is obviously—at least to Americans—a brigantine. When the more punchy-speaking Americans are at a loss to name a somewhat mixed-up rig, they are prone to call it "jackass" something or other. This is at least less wordy and cumbersome, if less erudite, than a thirteen-letter word that merely signifies "neither male nor female"; a ship continues to be feminine no matter what the rig may be. American descriptive parlance of the slang variety would be more acceptable if the word "mule" were used instead of "jackass," but as far as a brigantine is concerned no other designation and no apologies for its use are needed, although it is admitted that the possible combinations making various and slightly different rigs in brigs and top-sail schooners are many. However, a brigantine is the same as a bark with the foremast omitted, a bark has three masts (the first two square rigged and the third fore-and-aft rigged), and a barkentine has one mast square rigged and the others fore-and-aft rigged. In the later days of merchant sail, there were not only three-masted but also four- and five- and six-masted barkentines, all having one mast square rigged and the remainder schooner, or fore-and-aft, rigged.

A bark has three masts (two square rigged and one fore-and-aft rigged), but a four-masted bark, the *Olympia* (before mentioned), was built at Bath, Maine, in 1892. This vessel retained the two square-rigged masts of a bark and added a fourth mast, which was fore-and-aft rigged. The rig was really like a two-masted schooner chasing a brig. A five-masted bark would be a vessel with two square-rigged and three fore-and-aft-rigged masts. This explains why the British designation of a "four-masted barque" for a vessel square rigged on three masts and fore-and-aft rigged on the fourth (the jigger, or spanker, mast) is wrong and why knowable Americans have refused to follow the British in another of their many stubborn rulings and errors in nomenclature. Again, Americans prefer and have adopted the word "bark" in lieu of the old-fashioned "barque." As far as real substance goes, both words are meaningless, so obviously the simpler one to describe a type or rig is the better. Full-rigged ships have been built with three, four, and even five masts, and they are "ships" if every mast is square rigged. (No full-rigged ships with over three masts were built in America.) Most four-masted "square-rigged" vessels, however, have been built with the fourth mast, i.e., the jigger, spanker, or aftermast, fore-and-aft rigged. These positively were not ships; neither were they four-masted barques as the British describe them. When, in the eighties, Casco Bay and the Penobscot in Maine each launched a four-masted vessel which, like the *Great Republic* built by Donald McKay in East Boston in 1853, had three masts square rigged and the fourth, or spanker, mast schooner rigged, the builders accepted the British designation and called these vessels four-masted barques or barks; but, when the *Shenandoah*—the first vessel of this rig built on the Kennebec River—was launched by the Sewalls in 1891, she was described in Bath as a shipentine, and the designation was promptly accepted by an overwhelming percentage of Americans connected with and interested in the mercantile marine. A brigantine is a two-masted vessel with the foremast and its yards like those of a brig, but with the aftermast rigged schooner fashion. A barkentine is a three-masted vessel, square rigged on the foremast and schooner rigged on the main- and mizzen-masts. A shipentine is a ship of four or more masts, with the aftermast fore-and-aft, or schooner, rigged and the other masts all square rigged.

Ship Timbers and Masts for the Royal Navy

New England was active and aggressive in shipbuilding and was a source of supply for British ship timbers, masts, and spars for many decades before the building of ships became of much importance in the more southerly parts of the colonies—the Chesapeake, Delaware, and even the Hudson and Long Island Sound. When the Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts coast, inlets, and rivers were first explored by the British, this region was emphasized as one of great value to supply the Royal Navy with ship masting, spars, and timber; therefore, by mid-seventeenth century relatively heavy demands were being made on New England for material needed in the construction of British warships. In 1605, Capt. George Weymouth (Weymouth), in the *Archangel*, sailed about fifteen miles up the Sagadahoc (Kennebec) River in Maine, with his thoughts not on fisheries, as were those of most explorers considering sites for settlements on the northeast coast of the American continent (New England and Canada), but on timber for the British Royal Navy—"fine timber trees for shipbuilding from oak for the frames to tall pines for masts"—all growing on or near good navigable waters and harbors where ships could ride with safety and have plenty of room while loading for export. Capt. John Smith, following his voyage down the Maine and Massachusetts coast in 1614, had reported "the abundance of all things belonging to the building and rigging of ships," and this territory, with its great forest tracts and white pine stumpage running down to navigable waters, was for nearly two centuries to furnish the British Royal Navy with big timbers and masts. At that time, English shipbuilders had practically exhausted the supply of suitable forest growths in Britain for shipbuilding and had turned to the Baltic for naval timber and masts.

We are told that as early as 1609 "a ship of three-hundred tonne burthen called the *Starre*, sent thither . . . upon purpose fitted and prepared with scupper holes to take in masts," set sail from Virginia with a cargo of "fower score" masts for an English royal dockyard; this was the first cargo of masts—and most probably of timber—shipped from the new to the old world. The New England mast trade, which became of such great importance to the British Empire, was evidently inaugurated on a business basis in 1634; for Emanuel Downing then wrote Secretary Coke that the first mast cargo had arrived from "the Piscataway." Foreseeing the importance of this trade and being fearful of the Dutch, Downing advocated that steps be taken to persuade the colonies "to accept a new patent and thereby be bound to transport no masts, etc., for cordage and shipping but into Old England." When the Dutch wars all but cut off timber supplies from the Baltic, England turned to its American colonies in desperate need of those forest products which New England possessed and which were of vital importance to Britain in the maintenance of its "stout walls of oak."

It was as an important center of the colonial-British mast trade that the Piscataqua rose to prominence, and its principal settlement became Portsmouth just as the most important mast port on Casco Bay (Maine) to the east became Falmouth; each of these collecting and shipping ports of mast and ship timber was named after a British Navy dockyard located on the English Channel. The timber of the Piscataqua, like that of Casco Bay, the Kennebec, and the Penobscot farther east, gradually supplanted fish as the prime export, and the Piscataqua (and New Hampshire), in this respect, followed the lead of Maine, the forestry or Pine Tree State, rather than Massachusetts, the fisheries or Codfish State. The Piscataqua timber trade, in colonial days, was built upon white pine and New Hampshire white oak. New Hampshire forests grew pines 150 ft. to 200 ft. high, 30 in. and even to 42 in. in diameter at the stump, which weighed 15 or 20 tons and were felled and shipped whole for masts. Shorter, straight pines were used for spars, and other trees were cut into dimension timber, plank, board, clapboard, etc. Oak was available for ship timbers and also for pipe and hogshead staves, for which there was an increasing demand from the West Indies, Spain, Portugal, etc.

American colonial white pine masting permitted Britain to build and maintain her war fleet, so that she became Mistress of the Seas and continued as such during the era of sail. The Piscataqua (Piscataway or "Strawberry Bank") played an important role in this trade and development and for several decades was the greatest center in the American colonies for collecting and shipping mastings for the British Navy. Samuel Pepys, a diarist of historic interest and most highly considered by authorities, was clerk of the English Admiralty and, therefore, directly and most intimately associated with the administration department of the Royal Navy at London. He gives eloquent testimony in his writings in the 1660's of the importance of New England white pine mastings to the British war fleet and wrote in his famous diary with reference to "masts, bowsprits, yards and spars" required for the Royal Navy: "God knows where materials can be had for so many first and second raters." Later, on December 3, 1666, he penned with relief and jubilation: "There is also the very good news come of five New England ships come home safe to Falmouth with masts for the King, which is a blessing mighty unexpected, and without which, if nothing else, we must have fallen next year."

New England white pine was considered "the finest timber for ships, masts and spars in the world, having a much greater toughness with resilience, and a much longer life, than Scandinavian pine." Saltonstall's research developed the fact that Maine and New Hampshire white pine timbers, or "sticks," cut for masting, "although admittedly less strong when first cut than the Norway pines, retained their natural juices while the Norway pines decayed early when exposed to constant heat and dryness, and the average New England pine mast lived four times as long as its Norwegian cousin—about twenty years." The white pine of New England was deemed so important to the well-being of the British Navy—and, therefore, of the British Empire—that the crown arbitrarily seized for its own use and disposal (with but few exceptions) all sizable white pine trees in the American colonies. For the "protection of the great New England trees," a new Charter of Massachusetts (which included Maine and New Hampshire) dated 1691 contained a restriction reserving to the British Crown all white pines which had a diameter of twenty-four inches standing on any land not previously granted to a private individual. All accessible forest lands were surveyed, and agents of the king, generally operating under armed guards, went into the forests timber-cruising for mast and big spar trees and cut the king's "Broad Arrow" into the bark of all trees suitable for the making of masts, bowsprits, and spars. This brand consisted of three cuts like the barbed head of an arrow or the track of a crow, made deep through the bark with a marking hatchet, and announced to all that the tree was the property of His Majesty the King and reserved for him. There was a penalty set of a hundred pounds for every tree bearing the mark of the king's arrow that was cut "or destroyed" without license from the crown. New England spar timbers made a great and favorable impression on the shipwrights of Britain. Referring to them, an authoritative English naval dockyard official said: "They are so large that one piece will make a lower mast for a first-rate ship of the line and are far better than even the largest sticks of Baltic fir, which have to be pieced and fitted together to form a made mast."

After the white pine mast trees were felled, they had to be taken to landings and aboard ship for delivery to English dockyards. Oxen were used to haul them to the river for floating to the collecting station. Samuel Sewall recorded in his journal on September 14, 1687, that he had seen mast operations at Salmon Falls and a tree of 28 in. diameter being handled with "about two and thirty yoke of oxen before and about four yoke by the side of the mast between the fore and hinder wheels." He added, "'Twas a notable sight." Andrew Barnaby, an Englishman arriving at Portsmouth, N. H., aboard H.M.S. *Winchester* in October 1760, described the Piscataqua mast trees as the finest in the world and wrote of the hauling of the felled timbers by "seventy or eighty pair of oxen" to water by "snaking" them along the snow. Having "balked" the masts down to the river and placed them with needed precaution on the ice to wait for the thaw or having "twitched" them into the river, the mastmen had "to drive," or rather guide, the masts and spars downstream to the mastsheds at Portsmouth. Defebaugh

says that the Piscataqua and its tributaries, such as Salmon Falls River, probably saw "the first driving operation in America."

We are told that "the government paid a bounty for masts of one pound per ton" (i.e., of 50 cu. ft. rough or 40 cu. ft. hewn timber) for the felling, handling, and rough manufacture of such masting for the Royal Navy. This work, at certain times, was said to provide such good pay that "many of the new settlers spent so much of their time 'masting' that they neglected their farms and brought famine upon themselves." It appears that masts were hewn so that they measured as many yards in length as they were inches in diameter at the butt, and at a later period records show that the price paid for a mast 108 ft. long and 36 in. diameter was £110, although as high as £153 was paid for a mast of this size (in 1768). Bowsprits 75 ft. long and 38 in. diameter brought £48, and yards 105 ft. long and 25 in. diameter fetched £25. The premium was high on long, straight trees of large diameter.

From the Langdon Papers, New Hampshire Historical Society, we obtain the following list of prices for white pine masts, yards, and bowsprits "given under the old contract for the British Navy." The great increase in value for the larger spars is conspicuous, and evidently sticks over about 30 in. in diameter had no Baltic competition with which to contend. A 74-gun British warship is said to have been equipped with a lower mainmast of 36 in. diameter, while the largest naval vessel, or so-called "first rate ship-of-the-line," was fitted with a mainmast 40 in. diameter at the base. If a spar of this size had not been available from the American colonies, a built-up mast would have had to be used. However, there are records of New England masts that ran up to 42 in. diameter, and Belknap reported one unusually mammoth tree that measured 7 ft. 8 in. at the base (92 in.); a big tree was one of over 30 in. diameter, and a very big tree was one that exceeded 36 in.

Diameter Inches	Type	Price £- s -d	Diameter Inches	Type	Price £- s -d	Diameter Inches	Type	Price £- s -d
32	Mast	74-13-4	34	Bowsprit	53- 6-8	24	Yard	42-13-4
31	"	59-14-8	33	"	42-13-4	23	"	34- 0-0
30	"	46-13-4	32	"	34-13-4	22	"	28- 0-0
29	"	37- 6-8	31	"	28- 0-0	21	"	24-13-4
28	"	30-13-4	30	"	20- 0-0	20	"	19- 6-8
27	"	24- 0-0	29	"	10-16-0	19	"	16- 0-0
26	"	21- 6-8	28	"	8-18-8	18	"	12- 0-0
25	"	18- 8-0	27	"	8-13-4	17	"	9-12-0
24	"	14- 8-0	26	"	7- 6-8	16	"	9- 0-0

A 22-in. diameter mast was valued at £10 and a 20-in. at only £6; whereas a 32-in. mast was worth £2-1/3 per inch diameter, and a 20-in. mast fetched only six shillings, or £0-3 per inch. The bowsprits were much shorter than the masts and were much easier to handle.

It is said that before the Revolution "about fifty shiploads of American white pine trees were annually sent out of Portland, Maine, Portsmouth, N. H., or the neighboring ports to hold aloft the swelling canvas of the royal line-of-battle ships and frigates." American masts were furnished to the British Government by a corrupt contract system in vogue in England. The big contractors during the colonial period (Warren Taylor, Gulston, and Henniker) resided in England, but the importance of the trade is evidenced by the fact that the contractors' resident mast agents in New England became great men and powerful political personalities in the colonies. Among them can be cited the historic Samuel Waldo, Thomas Westbrook, and Mark Hunking Wentworth. During the seventeenth century, Portsmouth, N. H., on "the Piscataway," was the mast trade center in New England and the Wentworths the influential officials in charge. Gradually, the center of operations moved eastward, and in 1727 Falmouth on Casco Bay (the present Portland) was established as a prime supply and shipping port for the king's masts. To get this large timber over to England expeditiously and economically, the

British encouraged the American colonists in the building of sizable mast ships. These vessels, bought, owned, sailed, and managed by the English, were generally of 400 to 600 tons and could carry "fifty to a hundred great masts as well as smaller pieces for yards and spars." An authority has said that the mast ships which carried New England pine "sticks" to English or British West Indian dockyards were "usually heavy vessels of 400 or 500 tons, manned by crews of about twenty-five men; . . . they were especially built for the mast trade and were equipped with large stern ports to facilitate the difficult process of loading." Saltonstall says that as early as 1670 "ten mast ships a year dropped down the Piscataqua to sail for English yards, and besides exporting a large number of colonial masts, Portsmouth shipbuilders, sometimes under the direction of English shipwrights sent out by the mast contractor, constructed a good number of these mast ships, the ocean liners of their day." Mast ships under the convoy of a fast frigate were the safest and fastest means of communication between England and the American colony. These British mast ships were operated much like regular liners of the period and on the westward run to the colonies, we are told, carried passengers, troops, mail, and slaves as well as freight. A ship of this type was constructed in Falmouth in 1734, and others followed; it is reported that one Maine-built mast ship was "a very big ship of a thousand tons burden." Parson Smith, of Falmouth, Maine, in his journal, often makes mention of the arrival and departure of the mast ships.

It would seem that mast ships were occasionally called "fly-boats" or "hag-boats"; but these vessels—which were real, well-built ships constructed for deep-sea work and hard service—should not be confused with mast and timber rafts, rudely shaped into hulls, that were sometimes sailed in the eighteenth century under their own canvas across the Atlantic. These clumsy and hazardous improvised craft (known as "Jew's rafts" or "Levy rafts"), built in a patched-up way to make one transatlantic crossing and sail before the usually prevalent favorable west wind, were used primarily for the transport of oak ship framing, shaped knees, futtocks, etc., keel, deck beam and other timbers, and some planking (only a few masts were shipped as cargo with lumber). These rafts were essentially of oak timbers, not for the use of the Royal Navy but for dealers to sell to private shipyards for the building of British merchant ships; for the admiralty dockyard officials pigheadedly took the stand, from the first, that they had no use for either American oak or American ships but only for New England "big white pine sticks." Portsmouth (and the Piscataqua) was primarily interested in shipping New England white pine; therefore, its important and profitable export timber business (outside of barrel staves, sawn lumber, clapboards, and miscellaneous forest products—generally to the West Indies) was in "great mastings" for the king's navy. Such products, of necessity, had to be shipped to royal dockyards on "sound ships," constructed with bow or stern quarter ports to facilitate loading, which were usually sent across the ocean in convoy or at least under the watchful eyes of the patrolling English fleet.

In 1721 more stringent terms were worked into the British king's "Broad Arrow" restrictive and confiscatory timber act, which declared: "No person or persons . . . shall presume to cut, fell or destroy *any* white pine trees . . . in any of the said colonies or plantations, without His Majesty's Royal License for so doing has first been obtained." This decree, supplemented by drastic enforcement regulations in 1729, was in effect until the Revolution. These arbitrary acts, for which the British Government was selfishly responsible, drew persistent and violent protests from the colonists, who ardently petitioned against their passage and repeatedly "prayed and fought" for their abrogation. Maine and New Hampshire refused to take kindly to the British domination—and virtual ownership—of their white pine forests. The law greatly affected the colonial trade with the West Indies and elsewhere and, because of its despotic and tyrannical unreasonableness, soon commenced to be violated and even ignored. Distrust of the mother country germinated, the British Government was denounced, and revolution—not then known as such—was in the air. Sewall, in *ANCIENT DOMINIONS OF MAINE*, referring to the causes that led to the Declaration of Independence, goes so far as to say: "The great issue began in the forests of Maine in the contests of her lumbermen with the king's surveyor as to the right

to cut and the property in white pine trees." Undoubtedly, the king's "Broad Arrow" was a continuous irritation to the colonists; it affected their liberty, their fundamental rights, and their pocketbooks and offered one of the earliest outlets of colonial hostility toward British autocratic dominion.

White pine trees suitable for mastings for ships of the Royal Navy as well as the merchant marine were also floated down the Hudson and Delaware rivers. Lord Bellomont, the royal governor, writing from New York in 1699 to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations of England tells of "vast pines . . . big enough for masts for the biggest ship in the world . . . to the northward of New York, up the Hudson River, the Mohacks river, and along the side of Corlears Lake. . . . There are pines of eleven and twelve feet about, for either one of those sizes is big enough for a first rate ship." Bellomont is satisfied that he can float these large trees down the Hudson and alongside ships and that "they will be the cheapest [masts] in the world." Later, the governor advises the Home Office that he has made a contract for a supply of timber for masts for the king's naval vessels, which will prove "the best bargain for the king that ever was yet made." He deplores the fact that some unfriendly persons have persuaded the Indians that the "great pines for masts" are each worth "fifty beaver skins," but states: "There are pines enough in those woods on the Mohack river to furnish the navy these thousand years to come." We also read:

The twenty-four masts I have articted for will serve a first and second rate man of war. The biggest . . . was 37 inches diameter. . . . I have agreed for two masts of 40 inches diameter, which will be a rarity when sent home. . . . I cannot but flatter

myself that this bargain for masts is a very valuable service to the king and all his dominions; for here is a sufficient store for all. I believe I shall save the king £15,000 a year in the article of masts, bolt-sprits and yards: and more.

Bellomont also writes of large available supplies of trees "for making pitch, tar and rosin" and "all other timber fit for building ships of war, as beams, planks, wale pieces and knees."

White oak timber was shipped from New Amsterdam to Holland as early as 1626, and there is an extended reference to the shipbuilding timber of New Netherland and the Hudson River watershed in a Dutch document of 1649, which reads in part: "It produces several kinds of timber suitable for the construction of houses and ships, be they large or small, consisting of various kinds of oak. . . . This timber is very abundant here." Colonists, on arriving in the province in 1650, were granted, after a certain formality, privileges "to cut and draw . . . as much timber as they shall require for the construction of houses and vessels." Under the English occupation in the latter decades of the seventeenth century, New York timber was exported to Britain for use in shipbuilding, "there being a great deal of timber in the country, chiefly oak; the white oak is the best, and they build many ships with it."

The attitude of the British Admiralty in condemning American white oak for the construction of war vessels for the Royal Navy had a bad effect when the War of the Revolution was over and the young republic attempted to build the nucleus of a navy. Six frigates were ordered by Congress to be constructed under the act of March 27, 1794, but the United States naval architect in charge of the designs and specifications (Joshua Humphreys, of Philadelphia) was so impressed with the reported views and claimed experience of British naval constructors with American oak that he specified that the frames of the new frigates must be made of southern live oak, which was a wood different from the white oak that the British had condemned and quite closely resembled English oak. Josiah Fox, a clerk in the War Department (appointed July 16, 1794, at a salary of \$500 per year), soon became the assistant constructor of the U. S. Navy and, under the influence of Humphreys, was another rabid Anglophile in the denunciation of northern or middle states white oak for use in the framing of American ships.

Humphreys asserted that the live oak and red cedar which he specified to be used in the construction of the six frigates must be obtained principally from the islands on the coast of Georgia; some parts might be obtained in North Carolina, but it was alleged that the live oak was better farther south. On December 29, 1794, the secretary of war, in a report to Congress, expressed Humphrey's views regarding the great superiority of live over white oak when in

stating the progress on the construction of the six frigates he said: "The frigates will be built of live oak and red cedar, in all parts where they can be used to advantage. These valuable woods afford the United States the highest advantages in building ships, the durability being estimated at five times that of the common white oak." In an estimate accompanying an official letter of April 21, 1794, Humphreys said: "I think it will take 55 men two months to cut the timber of live oak and red cedar, calculating 24 working days in a month, for one ship." The secretary of war on June 29, 1795, wrote:

The report of Col.^o Copperthwait returned from his mission to Georgia, relative to the live oak to be procured for the frigates. That it will now take one year to complete the quantity wanted, induces me to change the plan of sending partial supplies to all six navy yards. By continuing that plan, the business in every yard will be kept in a lingering condition, at a heavy expense, without completing anything. Had the difficulties of getting the live oak

been foreseen—had it been known that full and regular supplies for two frigates only could be kept up—certainly, the carrying forward of six frigates at the same time, would not have been attempted. What should not have been begun, ought now the facts are known, to be laid aside. Consequently, I shall direct four of the constructors to suspend their labours.

The secretary of war, on December 12, 1795, refers to the executive's deciding (on Humphrey's advice) to build the frigates "with live oak and cedar" to render them "permanently useful" and to the extraordinary delays and difficulties in construction resulting from this procedure and definitely states: "If the frigates had been constructed with the timber at hand in the several places where they were destined to be built, they might by this time have been completed."

The record of the United States in building its early frigates for the new navy is a disgraceful one, but the influence of British prejudice is largely to blame. The stated views of English naval constructors expressed in support of the desires of the admiralty, which, in turn, were made to conform with the policy of the British Government, handicapped the United States tremendously at a time when it greatly needed some vessels of war and needed them quickly. Before the Revolution, Britain was strongly opposed to the building of naval vessels in the American colonies, and after independence had been won, its arguments against the use of American timber such as white oak, accepted fully and without question by Joshua Humphreys, came close to preventing the construction of ships of war in the world's most naturally favored shipbuilding country.

When Naval Constructor Joshua Humphreys, U.S.N., was given the task of designing a 36-gun frigate (*Crescent*) for the dey of Algiers, which was built at Portsmouth, N. H., to be used as a corsair to prey upon the shipping of Christian nations, Humphreys stipulated (June 8, 1796) that live oak and cedar be used in her construction. He declared, "The white oak, if the ship be well built, may be rotten in 3 years." It is surprising that the British statements in regard to the timber used in the building of the *America* (50 guns) for the Royal Navy at Portsmouth, N. H., in 1749 were accepted at face value; whereas it should have been clearly evident to all that the ship, immediately following her arrival at the British dockyard, was condemned (when brand new and before she was subjected to any service) not for construction defects but for political and military reasons. The British Government had sanctioned the building of one warship in New England in response to public demands inspired by economy, but from the first the British were determined to kill the suggested plan and use the ship built in the colonies as proof of the undesirability of the idea. The ministry did not want British warships, on which the future of the empire depended, built in an overseas colony, and it did not want New Englanders, of all people, to gain experience and develop navy yards for the building of ships of war—knowledge and facilities that at sometime might be used against the mother country. In the middle of the eighteenth century, merchant ships were building in American shipyards in quantity for British merchants and were giving great satisfaction in service, and white oak was being shipped to English shipyards from the colonies to be used in the construction of British vessels of all types; but the Portsmouth-built *America*, constructed for the Royal Navy, was condemned by the British Admiralty, working in close co-operation

with the political- as well as military-minded ministry, before her keel was laid. The *America* was built by Col. Nathaniel Meserve, an eminent shipwright and a mechanical genius. Moreover, Col. Sir William Pepperell (both men were of Louisburg fame) supervised the job and personally examined the timber and its treatment twice a week to be sure that all the material used was sound and well worked; yet, immediately following the ship's arrival in England, the *America* was condemned because of her "defective timbers," and the report was undoubtedly generally drafted and approved by the First Lord of the Admiralty before the ship reached England or was even at sea.

The ridiculousness of the claim of the British, seemingly accepted blindly by Humphreys, that American white oak was unsuited for the building of war vessels is not only conspicuously emphasized but also proven beyond doubt by the record of that timber used in other vessels of war. Before the British fear for the future of the American colonies within the empire developed, the same New Hampshire town of Portsmouth that built (in 1749) the condemned *America* of 50 guns constructed in 1690 the *Falkland* of 54 guns and, six years later, the *Bedford* of 32 guns for the British Royal Navy. The *Falkland* was in service for seventy-eight years, and the smaller *Bedford*, when in good physical condition, was used as a suicide ship in action after she had seen twenty-seven years of service. The white oak of Maine and New Hampshire used in these ships was evidently equal in strength and longevity to the finest of all generally similar hardwood growths.

When war with Britain was developing but before independence had been declared, Portsmouth built the Continental frigate *Raleigh* of 32 guns, and the record of her construction is in sharp contrast to that of the administration-dominated building of the six frigates about twenty years later. On December 11, 1775, the Continental Congress decided to build a number of frigates, and one of the largest class was assigned to Portsmouth, N. H. John Langdon, as agent for the Congress, arrived at Portsmouth during the latter part of January 1776 and awarded a contract for the building of the frigate to Messrs. Hackett, Hill, and Paul. James Hackett, the leading shipwright of the community, was placed in charge of the work, and Capt. Thomas Thompson, the Portsmouth shipbuilder and shipmaster, was appointed to supervise the work and later command her. The Portsmouth men responsible for the building of a good ship of war in a hurry did not wait for plans and specifications, but instantly commenced work utilizing the best available materials. Langdon, enthusiastic because of the patriotic energy of the Piscataqua shipbuilders, wrote the Continental committee that the design had been developed from the dimensions and requirements stated, and he added: "Don't cramp my genius and the ship shall be launched soon." At the end of February, the committee's plans and specifications had not arrived, but the keel had been laid during the latter part of January, and on March 21, 1776, just two months later, the vessel was successfully launched. This vessel of 696 tons was built and put overboard in sixty days and then had to wait an inexcusably long time for her armaments. The *Raleigh* performed well at sea, but was run ashore in September 1778 to escape capture by two British warships that together mounted 78 guns; the crew was saved. The British refloated the ship, and as a vessel of the Royal Navy the Portsmouth frigate (built with white oak in sixty days from keel to launching) made a good record and was officially considered at the end of the war "one of the best ships of her class."

Another Portsmouth-built warship constructed of white oak and local materials was the 308-ton sloop-of-war *Ranger*, launched in May 1777 and built by James Hackett in 114 days. This vessel, commanded by John Paul Jones, carried the war to England's shores. She was captured at Charleston, S. C., when that port was taken by the British on May 12, 1780, and among the powerful British fleet that forced the surrender was the Portsmouth-built *Raleigh*. The *Ranger* also ended her days as a vessel of the Royal Navy and was not only a ship with a colorful career but also one for which the British had a great deal of respect. In time of war, vessels built in America of white oak and local timber proved to be very strong and satisfactory ships for the Royal Navy when it succeeded in capturing such craft from the United States

forces. America's first ship of the line, which was launched at Portsmouth, N. H., in 1782 as the *America* (74 guns) and given as a present by the U. S. Government to France, joined the French Navy in early 1783 and, after eleven years of excellent service at sea, fell into British hands in 1794. The British renamed the ship *Impetueux*, and she was on the active list of the Royal Navy in 1846 after being afloat sixty-four years. It is evident that the white oak and New England timbers, used entirely in the construction of this big and powerful battleship, proved not only entirely satisfactory but also ideal for the purpose used; all of which goes to show the unfairness in the reported reason for the British Admiralty's condemnation of the earlier 50-gun Portsmouth-built *America*, constructed of similar materials in 1749, or about a third of a century earlier.

The U. S. 36-gun frigate *Chesapeake* was one of the six frigates ordered to be built by Congress in 1794. Her construction was greatly delayed for political and economic reasons, so she was not completed and put in commission until June 1807. She was the first American frigate captured by the British in the War of 1812 and was taken by the frigate *Shannon* when the war had been fought about a year. (The United States had won all of the preceding six single-ship actions between vessels of relatively similar class and power.) The *Chesapeake* was sent to England, where her lines were taken off by the British Admiralty and the design of the ship copied in the building of new frigates for the Royal Navy. For some unknown reason, the *Chesapeake* was broken up in 1820, and her timbers were sold to John Prior, of Wickham, Hants. He built a mill with the materials, which, while bearing the marks of grapeshot from the *Shannon*, were all still sound and evidently made desirable structural members. The ship's deck beams measured "thirty-two feet long and eighteen inches square," and "the purlins of the deck were about twelve feet long." We are told by the British that the beams, unaltered, were placed horizontally in the mill and that the purlins "served without alterations for joists." The important thing about the breaking-up and sale of the timbers of the *Chesapeake* in a British dockyard is that "all her timbers were found to be sound and usable," thus refuting a prejudiced and unwarranted admiralty statement in regard to them. The Prior mill was in service for many years and apparently was standing as a sturdy structure at the end of the century, when the American-grown and cut timbers were about a hundred years old. Dr. Brighton, who wrote the memoirs of Sir Philip B. V. Broke (the commander of the British frigate *Shannon*), refers to a visit that Brighton made to the mill in 1864. At that time, he says, there was "nothing ship-like or of the sea discernible from without the mill," but the timbers "were pock-marked in many places with grapeshot." The structure had then given perfect satisfaction to its owners for forty-four years, and the mill was generally known for its unusual strength and low cost of upkeep.

Aside from the overwhelming evidence of good ships, with unusually long lives, being built with white oak framing in great numbers for the mercantile marine (and these ships were generally subjected to harder maintained usage than warships), it is obvious that warships built in New England and the middle colonies of local woods, including white oak, gave admirable service. Although southern live oak was in many respects superior to white oak, yet the latter species of timber, when properly cut, treated, and used, was adequate for the purpose and very satisfactory. Many white oak merchant ships were in service for half a century, and some were afloat for nearly a hundred years; however, most of these claimants for longevity honors had been at sometime or other in the whaling trade, and their timbers were probably impregnated with oil, which evidently operated as an excellent preservative.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, English white oak (*Quercus sessiliflora*) suitable for use in the building of naval vessels was becoming scarce as well as costly. In 1663 the available supply was limited, and the cost of such oak for naval construction had doubled in the preceding half century. It is said that due to the crusading of John Evelyn, there was "a general planting of oak trees all over the kingdom, particularly in the royal forests." In America there was an abundance of good quality oak at the commencement of the seventeenth century, and in 1642 a colonist, writing of shipbuilding, said: "We being much encouraged

herein by reason of the plenty and excellence of our timber for that purpose." Fine white oak trees (*Quercus alba*) with tall trunks and sizable branches, which furnished the required crooked timbers for shipbuilding, were prevalent in the colonies north of the Chesapeake in early days. This white oak, while different from the English-grown species of white oak, was described as of "first-rate quality" and, although heavy, as "tough, elastic and durable"; live oak (*Quercus virginiana*—an evergreen oak), a superior tree for ship framing, grew generally in the southern states in quantity. American oak was in great demand as long as wood ships were built, and large amounts were shipped abroad for the construction of merchant ships, although English naval officers declined to use it in the building of England's ships of the line and vessels described as the "wooden walls of old England."

That Evelyn's oak reforestation plan was effective and used on a very large scale in England and that the trees became available for use in Britain at a time when they were greatly needed is suggested by the declaration of Lord Melville in 1810 that "the vast quantities of great timber consumed by our navy during the present reign were chiefly the produce of the plantations made between the Restoration and the end of the seventeenth century." It was boasted that the British ships under Nelson that defeated the fleets of Napoleon were built from oak grown "in the tight little Isle of Britain," even though some—and possibly most—of the masting (at least of the later-built ships) was not fitted with the superior one-piece American white pine masts because of the American Revolution; instead, made-up masts of Baltic pine had to be used. However, the statement of historians that "the Evelyn-planted oak trees matured in the English forests just as the American Revolution threw English builders back on their island's own resources" is incorrect as far as the construction of English "walls of oak" (line-of-battle ships and large frigates) was concerned. The English Admiralty and naval constructors never used imported American white oak for such construction, although undoubtedly many of Britain's smaller war vessels as well as large numbers of the British-built merchant fleet had been built, prior to the Revolution, of American white oak. All British naval craft, however, had been rigged with masts, bowsprits, and spars made of American white pine, which an admiralty authority declared to be "the finest timber in the world" for that purpose and, while exceedingly strong, tough, and durable, "the only timber grown in any country big enough to make our mainmasts in one piece."

We are told that northern colonial white oak was so abundant in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the early American shipbuilders "often put nothing but the heart of oak into their ships, sawing off the outer, softer, and less enduring material." Along the coast line generally and extending many miles inland from Maine to the Carolinas, white oak was originally plentiful, but shipbuilding through the years made great inroads into this stumpage. Live oak was the product of the coast states south of North Carolina. It is doubtful if this timber was used for shipbuilding purposes much before 1750, but in that year a vessel named the *Live Oak* arrived at Charleston, S. C. We read: "By the knowledge gained of the valuable properties of this timber for shipbuilding, a new era in that industry set up in that locality." After the Revolution, men were sent to the South to supervise the felling of live oak trees and cutting them to partial shape for use in the highest type of construction in northern shipyards. The secretary of the navy in 1814 said: "When it is considered that one 74-gun ship requires 2,000 large [live] oak trees, equal to the estimated produce of 57 acres, the importance of securing for public use all that valuable species of oak which is found only on the southern seaboard is sufficiently obvious."

The lower Delaware Valley was originally covered by heavy stands of oak mixed with other hardwoods, with some pine on the Jersey side. In early colonial days, the Delaware was popularly called "Timber River," and Gabriel Thomas wrote in 1698 that the river "hath its name from the great quantities of curious timber which they send in great floats to Philadelphia . . . oak, pine, ash, chestnut and cedar." By the middle of the eighteenth century, cutting (clearing lands for agriculture and with no thought of natural reforestation or the reservation and

preservation of timberlands on a longheaded, sustained-yield basis) had made considerable inroads upon the more accessible stumpage, and attention was turning toward the hinterland of the river and its timberlands. Philadelphia, from its earliest days, had developed a thriving trade in timber products. Shipbuilding soon became an important industry because of the readily available oak and the need for bottoms in trading, and extensive timber rafting and lumber operations developed in a climate more kindly and temperate in the winter than that on the great rivers, such as the Kennebec, Penobscot, and St. Lawrence, farther east and north. Most of the timber rafted to Philadelphia came from the virgin forests of pine and hemlock on the northern Appalachian plateau and from the hardwood forest farther south. Southern yellow (or hard) pine was an admirable timber for the planking and ceiling of wood ships, and this material, strong and tough as well as hard, was generally used for this purpose in conjunction with oak framing (and hackmatack knees, etc.) by the big New England wood shipyards, with suitable transport facilities available, when northern white oak commenced to be cut out and it was no longer possible to obtain the huge supply of such trees required for the planking as well as the framing of the tremendous numbers of ships that were built in the United States in steadily increasing quantity and size during the greater part of the nineteenth century.

Even the American white pine (*Pinus strobus*), which grew in such profusion in the northeastern portion of the American continent, was gradually cut out as far as virgin growth and lofty, sizable trees were concerned, and the forests of New England (and later of eastern Canada) were somewhat devastated by the searching for and cutting of the largest and finest trees for the Royal British Navy and the getting of such trees, with the long trunk in one piece, to tidewater without regard to the damage inflicted upon the forest growth in general. American white pine was also a superior wood for deck plank, but during the latter days of wood shipbuilding in the United States, the masting for large sailing ships had to be supplied to the New England yards from the virgin forests of the Northwest, and Oregon pine (fir) supplanted eastern white pine as masts and spars of the larger vessels until it was deemed advisable to build masts and bowsprits of iron or steel.

By 1772, Maine had assumed a very definite lead over Portsmouth, N. H., and the Piscataqua in regard to mast shipments for the English Royal Navy, and the records show that in that year the Falmouth customs district shipped 382 masts, 451 spars, and 69 bowsprits. As a side line to this business, "a great lumber trade was built up," which continued after the Revolution, and "shipbuilding also was greatly encouraged." A contemporary writer of Falmouth (Parson Smith) said, "The ships and other vessels loading here are a wonderful benefit to us. They take off vast quantities of timber, masts, oar rafters, etc." It is interesting to note that as late as 1772 the Delaware was considered a source of supply by the British for oak timbers, but not particularly for masts. In the same year that Falmouth, Maine, shipped 902 large "pieces" to English dockyards, Nova Scotia sent 497 pieces and Portsmouth, N. H., 421; but Portsmouth shipped a large number of small spars in addition (1,086), or more than twice as many as Falmouth (476 pieces). The First Continental Congress adopted an agreement to import nothing from England after December 1, 1774, and to export nothing to England after September 10, 1775.

Eight days before the historic action at Concord (where five hundred colonial minutemen first spilled British blood and drove a punitive and aggressive British force of regulars back to Lexington), the Massachusetts provincial congress, in session at Concord, moved that effectual measures be taken to prevent the supplying of "our enemies with masts, spars and timber." As Albion says in *FORESTS AND SEA POWER*: "The news of Lexington had put an end to the supply [of masts] that had started in the days of Cromwell, and the colonists in Georgetown [Bath], Portsmouth, and Falmouth provided a dramatic close [in 1775] to the long struggle against England's attempt to commandeer their choicest trees." After the armed encounters at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, New England was through exporting to England all things, such as masts for ships, which it was known Britain greatly needed. There was a patriotic episode on the Kennebec River at the mast landing at Georgetown in April 1775 that

very much resembled the Boston Tea Party, and the British ships "dropped down the river without their cargoes of masts and were glad to escape rough handling." During the entire year of 1775, all of New England shipped only 239 "great masts" to Britain; Nova Scotia, 87; New York, 73; the Chesapeake, 28; the Carolinas, 2; but Pennsylvania shipped a record high of 295 pieces. During this year, which immediately preceded the Declaration of Independence, the whole of New England shipped only 18 per cent as many big mast timbers as Falmouth and Portsmouth alone had shipped three years previously. Britain had been required to obtain 698 pieces from Russia and the Baltic countries and was still "in crying need of great masts." It was said, "The particular value of New England pines lies in their ability to furnish sticks more than thirty inches in diameter." Evidently, none of the Baltic masts would do this, and but "few of the large number from the newly developed Pennsylvania supply were of that exceptional diameter requisite for ships of the line."

Apparently, the last real cargo of American masts arrived in England on July 31, 1775, shortly after the news of Bunker Hill, and this marked the definite end of a once great business and terminated a source of supply for British warship masts that had been in existence for 141 years and had monopolized the field since 1653, or 122 years. Britain, which—like France—had built composite masts (i.e., pieced or made masts) for its larger vessels prior to the importation of New England big white pines, was compelled in the late 1770's to go back to this practice and use Riga fir; but British workmen had lost the art, and attempts to revive it were rather disastrous. The lack of good masts for the British fleet helped America greatly in its fight for independence. The admiralty issued instructions to the navy "to secure any available masts in New England by force if necessary," and the legislature of Massachusetts (which included Maine) and New Hampshire forbade the export of any masts or spars of 15 inches diameter or more "to prevent the enemy, as far as may be, from obtaining a supply of masts and spars, which there is reason to suppose they are at this time in great want of."

After the alliance between the United States and France during the War of the Revolution (agreed to in December 1777 and formally signed in February 1778), France made demands on New England for white pine masts and spars, and British vessels in numbers—both sloops of war and privateers—patrolled the Maine coast to prevent France from obtaining what was deemed in the late eighteenth century "the prime essential for the building of vessels of war." The province of Maine was not an agricultural colony and was dependent on foodstuffs from the outside, and transport of both incoming and outgoing commodities had to be by water. The policy of the British during the Revolutionary War was "to starve out Maine and get its white pine mastings," and the geographical position of "remote Maine," lying next to the Canadian border and near the great British naval base of Halifax, facilitated an energetic enemy patrol of the coast that was aimed at preventing not only foreign but also all coastwise trade. Albion and Pope, in *SEA LANES IN WARTIME*, referring to conditions during the American Revolution, have written:

Probably the region that caught the brunt of the coasting troubles was Maine. It had specialized in a single commodity before the war—white pines. These had provided masts, lumber and cordwood in exchange for whatever the people required from outside. The gravest of these needs was flour and meal. Maine, too, found its coast too close for comfort to the route of the naval vessels and privateers passing to and fro between Halifax and their favorite cruising ground off Boston. Sometimes for days at a time privateers hung off Cape Porpoise or Casco Bay, harrying the coasters. More

than once, the energetic Sir George Collier sent boat expeditions up Maine rivers to capture or burn ships loading masts for France. Cut off from outside foodstuffs by these trade interruptions, little communities were sometimes in danger of starvation. In 1779, a plea came from one town for a bushel or two of seed barley at any price in silver, paper, or lumber. Over half the people, it seemed, had been without bread for a month, with only clams and small fish to stay their hunger. Some were already dead, others helpless, and all in a sort of stupor.

The Massachusetts and New Hampshire coasts fared much better, and what privateer protection the New England coast enjoyed was concentrated there, with the result that after the British evacuated Boston in the spring of 1776, trade continued with letters-of-marque vessels,

many merchants and the whole community grew prosperous, and at times, we are told, "warehouses glutted with imports." Maine was far too greatly handicapped by climate and soil to be a self-supporting province, and after four years of war conditions it had become desperate. The plight of Maine well illustrates the need of a maritime country of a navy for defense; for, whereas American privateers as "hornets of the sea" were at times splendid in attack on the enemy's merchant marine, they were useless in attack on armed shore bases—as the Penobscot expedition proved—and of little if any value in defending a coast line and the coasting trade of outlying regions. Privateers were manned to take prizes and make money and not patriotically to defend a coast line from enemy attack. Only state-, or Continental-, owned and operated armed vessels taking the seas without any thought of making captures for personal gain could perform the needed defensive naval duties, and during the eight years of the fight for independence the colonies that became the United States of America never had any such navy. The few ships that were commissioned as naval vessels gave the coast of Maine and its white pine mast trade with France no protection whatsoever; such ships were operated as government-owned privateers (most of them were only armed merchantmen), and conditions were such that crews could not be obtained to man a war vessel unless they were assured of profiting by the capture of prizes. This fact well illustrates the fundamental evil of privateering, for during the wars with England it resulted in the designing and using of America's entire naval power for attack on enemy commerce. Whereas private enterprise and a lust for gold can be well harnessed to serve a nation in a war, both can be utilized only for acts of aggression and not as a means of defense of the homeland; the province of Maine, during the fight for independence and the War of 1812, learned this bitter truth by sad experience.

Raft Ships

The American colonies shipped large quantities of timber to England for use in shipbuilding other than their white pine trees to be used for the masts, bowsprits, and spars of ships for the Royal Navy. Private yards and timber merchants desired American hardwood timber, and even though the dockyard officials and the aristocratic ruling class, evidently through prejudice and for "reasons of state," turned "thumbs down" on American oak for the framing and planking of British warships, the shipments across the ocean grew so heavy that novel means were resorted to in an endeavor to get the timber to England with a minimum of freighting expense. It appears that occasionally "large rafts of masts and lumber, rudely shaped into hulls," were sailed across the Atlantic from several points on the American coast. A big lumber merchant in London of Hebrew extraction by the name of Levy (or Levi) is generally credited with conceiving the idea of this new and strange method of transportation and of using it in his business to good advantage; hence these clumsy, makeshift, temporary, pseudo vessels became popularly known as "Levy rafts" and, later, as "Jew's rafts." Big timber rafts were sometimes built and sailed across the ocean under their own canvas. These rafts, consisting of ship timbers hewn to shape for use in vessels to be built in England, were held and fastened together by means of chains and bolts. They were sent to sea under improvised three-masted ship or two-masted brig rigs, but naturally they were clumsy, and the passage was apt to be hazardous except in favorable weather, with the raft ship benefiting from the usual prevailing west wind.

It has been said that "the poverty of the colonists drove them to some desperate expedients," and the building of some raft ships has been quoted to illustrate the "poverty" and the "desperation"; this statement is not at all consistent with the facts. The New England colonists were original and inventive. When Levy, a London timber importer, asked if some

way could not be found to transport ship and other timbers and plank across the Atlantic more cheaply than the usual and only known way of loading them on ships, often with much difficulty (and mast ships had timber ports in the ends to facilitate getting the "long sticks" in and out), a New Englander—Samuel Moggaridge, who built ships at Moggaridge's Point on the Merrimac from 1730 to 1754—said, "We can fasten timbers together, make a raft lightly caulked, and under favorable conditions of wind and sea sail them over; but it will be risky business, for you cannot bank on the weather in the North Atlantic. Some rafts would get across, and some might not. It is a gamble." Evidently, Levy was willing to take the gamble and pay for the timber and the construction of the raft as well as delivery charges before it sailed, so only the American crew and the British owner took any chances. Several of these rafts reached the other side safely before one was lost. The percentage of loss was not large until the importers demanded much bigger rafts. New England mechanics in general objected and declined the business, but some "tremendous raft ships" were built on the St. Lawrence and down to the Delaware. The disastrous experiences with these big log rafts finally put an end to the business, which at best was a hazardous one. Referring to the late eighteenth century, Marvin says, "It was not an uncommon occurrence to sail one of these rude [raft] vessels down to the West Indies, where there was always a sharp demand for good American pine lumber."

Historians tell us that "in the eighteenth century great lumber rafts shaped like ships and known as 'raft ships' were sent across the Atlantic, under their own canvas, to furnish timber for the building of British war vessels"; that "this method of transporting oak timbers for framing, keels, knees, futtocks, oak planking, and white pine spars was developed by the enterprise and ingenuity of Delaware shipwrights." This statement is evidently incorrect, for a Massachusetts builder "Down East" is generally given credit for originating the novel type of construction, which, while adopted by Merrimac and Delaware merchant-shipbuilders more than by those of other American timber ports, was for many years used by shippers on the northeast coast from the Delaware to the Passamaquoddy and continuing into the Canadian provinces, where raft ships, it is said, were occasionally built following the American Revolution and after the practice had been discontinued in the young republic to the southwest. The plan put into effect was "to build ship timber into a structure by a minimum of shaping, frames within frames, with sides many feet thick; the bow was very bluff and the stern square," the prime idea being to work all the ship timber possible into a structure without any regard to model lines or speed and to deliver this "raft ship" with an internal load of masts and spars, ship timbers, knees, planking, etc., at a British port where she could be taken apart economically and the timbers used in the construction of properly shaped, permanent, English vessels. These raft ships were sheathed "with two thicknesses of boards which broke joints and were caulked to make the hull water-tight."

In 1770 an English journal announced the arrival in the Thames River of a "raft ship" from the Merrimac River of the American colonies: "The *Newbury*, Capt. Rose, from Newbury in New England, lies at the Orchard House, Blackwell. The above is a raft of timber in the form of a ship, which came from Newbury to Soundings in twenty-six days, and is worthy of the attention of the curious." This was an incredibly swift passage—even though it was made with a favorable, following west wind and smooth seas—for a "mere mass of logs and planking." It has also been said by British historians that a big American timber raft ship went ashore on Portland Bill and promptly commenced to break up. "Among the masting recovered from the wreck was an unusually large white pine tree over ninety feet long. This 'great mast' was used for the mainmast of the ill-fated *Royal George*, a three-decker then building (1774) at the Chatham dockyards." (This ship capsized and sank at Portsmouth, England, in 1782.)

The last of the Delaware mast ships was constructed at Kensington (a part of Philadelphia) a few years before the Revolution. *Navis*, a correspondent of the *GAZETTE*, wrote that in the last one which left "there were eight hundred logs of timber—enough to build six ships of 250 tons each." Scharf and Westcott say that these raft ships were clumsy and twisted much in launching, but in the water looked much like other vessels in form; furthermore, they declare

that the craft, during the later years of their construction on the Delaware, were denounced "as a means of depriving the colony of material for building ships and of enhancing the price of timber."

In the HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY OF AMERICA by James Elliott Defebaugh, we read:

As early as the Eighteenth Century the bold plan was conceived in Maine of rafting timber from America to England. Following the initial attempt several rafts were formed. All of them were successfully launched, but all unfortunately came to grief before reaching their destination. In 1792 a raft containing about 1,000 tons of timber was built at Swan Island, in the Kennebec, by Doctor Tupper, a somewhat noted and eccentric character. It was made by treenailing square timber together in the form of a ship's hull, and was ship rigged, the intention being to send her across to England. At that time no manufactured lumber was admitted to the ports of Great Britain; hence, the timber in the raft was simply squared with the ax, to make it stow well. The ship, or raft, lay at Bath for some time, it being difficult to get men to go in her. She finally went to sea, however, carrying a small vessel on her deck. But off the Labrador Coast her crew became frightened by bad weather and abandoned her. She was afterward boarded by men from a passing vessel and found to be in good order, and it was suspected that she was deserted without sufficient cause. Two

other similar attempts were made from the Kennebec, and both vessels went safely across, but foundered on the English Coast, under the same suspicions of fraud as in the case of the Tupper ship. In 1825 the ship *Baron of Renfrew* was launched at Quebec, having made a previous unsuccessful attempt when she stopped on her way, owing to the grease being consumed by fire from friction. She was towed down to the Island of Orleans and anchored. Her dimensions are given as follows: Length, 309 feet; breadth, 60 feet; depth, 38 internally and 57 externally; tonnage, 5,888 tons; draft when launched, 24 feet; cargo on board when launched, 4,000 tons of timber. She was ship rigged, with four masts, and was perfectly flat bottom, with a keel of about twelve inches; wall sided, sharp forward and rather lean aft, and looked more like a block of buildings than a ship. She sailed in August, 1825, drawing thirty-six feet of water, in command of a Scotchman, a half-pay lieutenant in the British navy. October 27, the *Baron of Renfrew* drove on shore on the coast of France, near Calais, and went to pieces.

Apparently, the *Baron of Renfrew* was the largest of the raft ships. THE MONTHLY NAUTICAL MAGAZINE, of New York, issue of April 1855, has this to say of the world's biggest timber raft ship:

One ship of greater magnitude than the *Great Republic* has long since crossed the Atlantic. This was the timber ship *Baron of Renfrew* built at Quebec in 1825 by Charles Wood, of Port Glasgow. Dimensions: 304 ft. long, 61 ft. beam, and 34 ft. hold; registered tonnage 5,294 tons; cargo of pine

timber 8,500 tons. She was rigged with four masts and built of solid pine timber in order to evade the home duties upon the same and was known as the "raft ship." After a long and tedious passage, she arrived safely in England and was broken up.

Whereas the *Baron of Renfrew* did arrive in the English Channel, she did not reach England safely, but, being unmanageable in restricted waters, went ashore, and the stranding and pounding seas broke up the vessel. It was said by a contemporary that "the timber from the *Renfrew* was scattered all over the channel, was salvaged by all sorts of small craft, and was found over a good stretch of the English and French coasts." A contemporary writer referring to the "*Baron Renfrew*" says:

This huge, temporary and ugly unshaped vessel, with a cheap improvisation of spars and sails, safely crossed the North Atlantic, being favored by westerly winds and the Gulf Stream. Even for a raft ship, she made a long passage, but she was very unwieldy and not built and rigged for handiness,

went ashore in the Channel and promptly commenced to break up. Much of her timber, however, including some fine, big white pine masts, was picked up by English and French vessels, which cruised for weeks in search of it.

The *Baron of Renfrew* was evidently the last of the raft ships. It has been authoritatively said: "The idea did not prove to be very practical nor as economic as the promoters hoped. Several small raft ships got across all right by choosing the time and encountering favorable weather, but the last raft ships were much too large and the end was what experienced seafaring men had freely predicted." The American Revolution stopped all kinds of commerce for seven or eight years, and although some ship timber and masting were again exported to England from "the Delaware and Canada" after the peace, they evidently went as hold, 'tween deck, or weather deck cargo in regular vessels.

*Antagonism of British Authorities toward American Shipbuilding
and the Development of the Industry*

The building and use of ships were employments that the early settlers of New England, and their descendants for many long generations, adopted naturally to their advantage. From the middle of the seventeenth century to the time of the American Civil War (a period of over two centuries), England especially dreaded the competition of American colonial ships and their operation on the high seas. David A. Wells, in *OUR MERCHANT MARINE*, wrote:

Within little more than twenty-five years after the settlement of New England, or in 1650, the English Parliament, in full accord with the then spirit of the age, felt it necessary to enact a statute for the avowed purpose of protecting English shipping against the competition of the English plantations in America; which statute was followed during the next one hundred and twenty years by a series of twenty-nine separate enactments, all tending to the same end, namely, restriction of colonial trade. By the statute of 1650, the export and import trade

of the English colonies was restricted to English- or colony-built ships; and by the statute of 1663 nothing was allowed to be imported into a British plantation except in an English-built ship "whereof the master and three-fourths of the crew are English." But notwithstanding these restrictions, the business of ship-building and ship-using in the American colonies was one that would not stay restricted, but continued to grow in spite of all efforts of the mother country to the contrary.

At the time of the Revolution, Maine and New Hampshire were interested primarily in shipbuilding, the timber business, and navigation; whereas Massachusetts, essentially a maritime colony, was engaged in shipbuilding, the fisheries, and ocean commerce—owning and operating "one vessel for every hundred of its inhabitants." Sir Josiah Child (1630-1699), English merchant, economist, parliamentarian, and governor of the East India Company, who generally advocated the reservation by the mother country of the sole right of trade with her colonies, remarked that New England was the most "prejudicial plantation" to the kingdom; but he acknowledged that New England was also a large importer of British merchandise and thereby was a great benefit to English merchants and manufacturers. It is evident that during the eighteenth century Englishmen began to look with greater favor upon New Englanders than during the previous century, when they had been generally regarded as "poachers upon a preserve which rightly belonged to British merchants alone." New England shipbuilding also began to be recognized as of great importance or even vital to British marine supremacy. Joshua Gee said: "Tho we esteem New England and the northern colonies of small Advantage of us, yet if Things were truly stated, they are as profitable as most other of our Plantations. . . . If ever a Stop should be put to the Building of Ships in New England, etc., and carrying our Timber from thence we should soon sink in our Navigations and those of the Dutch flourish in its former Height and Grandeur." As historian John C. Miller points out, it began to be said about this time in England that "the small injury done English merchants by New Englanders ought not to obscure the great good they wrought; yet if the British government were compelled to choose between the northern merchants and the West Indian planters [both of whom migrated from England at about the same time—during the religious and civil unrest that preceded the civil war and the commonwealth], there could be little doubt where its sympathies would lie."

By 1700 the American colonial merchant marine consisted of a thousand ships; they enjoyed the benefits of British registry, which was an important consideration under the Navigation Acts. Not only did the colonists build for their own triangular trade (the export of lumber and fish from New England to the West Indies was the first leg) but also every year they constructed many ships to order for British merchants. Because of the plentiful supply of timber in the colonies, ships could be built there more cheaply than in Great Britain and on the Continent. So many of England's trained and competent shipwrights and building mechanics were emigrating to the American colonies in 1724 and had been traveling to the New

World during the previous several years that the Thames River master builders made public protest that their trade was being destroyed by the departure of their best workmen for America. The London shipwrights maintained that "in the eight years ending in 1720 there were seven hundred sail of ships built in New England and in the years since, as many, if not more," and that the New England trade "has drawn over so many working shipwrights that there are not enough left here [in London] to carry on the work." The master builders of the port of London, in their petition to the Lords of the Council on Trade and Plantations, prayed that colonial-built ships be excluded from all trade except with Great Britain and its colonies and that the colonists be forbidden to build ships above a certain size. It has been well said that the protests would have had more weight and the prayers fallen on more receptive ears had it not been for the fact that shipowners well knew that New England-built vessels cost only about half as much as those built in Britain and that the best-constructed ships were not only fully equal to the products of London shipyards but also superior to them.

From the earliest days, Britain was jealous of American-built ships, and official Britain, ardently supported by English master builders and shipwrights at the naval dockyards, lost no opportunity to condemn the product of colonial yards. Notwithstanding this freely expressed prejudice, shipbuilding soon became one of the chief industries in the American colonies, especially in New England, where ships were built almost immediately after the numerous settlements were established. Apparently, British merchants did not think the same as their government, for they repeatedly gave orders to colonial shipbuilders and expressed themselves as pleased with the quality of construction as well as the low cost unless, as sometimes happened, the unreasonable demand for speed in building forced the colonists—against their good judgment and often under protest—"to throw a ship together and use any kind of green timber." The British Navy, whereas it endorsed and soon showed an admitted great need as well as a pronounced preference for New England white pine trees for the masts and spars of "the king's ships," had no use for "colonial oak"—either northern white oak or southern live oak—and rejected the idea that had been advanced of having ships of the Royal Navy built in America. Notwithstanding all this political and official prejudice and the quite constant use of "patriotic" propaganda, it is evident that most of the spars and much of the timber that went into the construction of British warships, East Indiamen, and merchant traders during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century had grown in American soil. It was because of American colonial shipyards and American timber that Britain, prior to the Revolution, had become the outstanding nation of the world in maritime commerce. The building of merchant ships for Britain by American shipyards materially reduced the demands being made on the rapidly vanishing English oak suitable for ship timbers (or planking, etc.), and American forests supplied British shipbuilders with large quantities of timbers that were used in Britain in the construction of vessels for the British merchant marine. Robert G. Albion, in *FORESTS AND SEA POWER*, says: "The importance of this colonial shipbuilding in saving English timber can be judged from the fact that at the outbreak of the Revolution America was building a hundred ships a year, and the colonial ships numbering 2,343 amounted to a third of the total British registry" (as per Lloyd's Register, 1775-1776). The antagonistic feeling toward the young American republic after the Revolution resulted in the exclusion of United States vessels from British registry. "If we admit them," proclaimed Lord Sheffield, "we will finally have to send to America whenever the Royal Navy needs a frigate."

Payment for Ships

In colonial days, it was customary, at times, for shipbuilders to be reimbursed for their work by the shipowners in agricultural produce and supplies of various kinds. In 1741, Samuel Moggaridge, a noted builder on the Merrimac River, contracted to build a ship for Witter Cummings and Benjamin Harris, the owners being required to furnish all the ironwork, nails, pitch, tar, turpentine, and oakum and to pay the builder in full settlement for the work performed by him as per the signed agreement:

Three hundred pounds in cash, three hundred pounds by order on good shops in Boston, two-thirds money; four hundred pounds by orders up the river for timber and plank, ten barrels of flour, fifty pounds weight of loaf sugar; one bag of cotton

wool, one hundred bushels of corn, in the spring; one h'hd of rum; one hundred weight of cheese; the remainder part to be drawn out of said Cummings and Harris shop.

In Douglass' HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SUMMARY OF AMERICA (1748) appears the following:

The ships built in Boston exceed all other building Yards, the Many Merchants and Ship Masters, good Connoisseurs, transiently inspect them, and every bad Piece of Timber or length of Plank is censured. In Newbury, where they are not much inspected, the Builders act at Pleasure, and as the

Contracts are generally to be paid in goods, they build accordingly; thus, a noted builder, T. W., jocosely said that he had built for — "a calicoe ship." [It would seem that the ship referred to was paid wholly or in great part with "calicoes."]

The building of a ship in a colonial settlement was generally a community venture, and to some degree the custom survived in the old shipbuilding centers and ports of Maine to the end of wood merchant sail. The rigger, sparmaker, sailmaker, blacksmith, calker, and at times the painter and the joiner, etc., took their pay in "pieces of the ship," i.e., in fractional shares of ownership. They became part-owners with the shipwright, who was the builder of record, or prime contractor, as did likewise the merchants who supplied the stores and various materials and even the farmers and logging bosses who furnished the timber and planking. The captain who was placed in command was usually expected to acquire a fraction of the vessel, and the master, the mates, and at times even the sailors accepted nominal pay or none at all and were allowed a certain amount of cargo space for commodities that they were privileged to buy and sell to their own advantage; in some services, such as whaling and the fisheries, they were paid a percentage of the profits resulting from the voyage. American seamen thus learned early to be shrewd traders as well as vigorous drivers, hard workers, and good navigators. Financially, they were relatively heavily interested in the success of every voyage, and, moreover, not only the men on board but also an entire community benefited or suffered losses as a result of a ship's operations. The owner of record was often but little more than the business manager who directed the enterprise of designing and producing a ship and then of managing it in co-operation with the appointed master, supercargo, etc.

First Contract Shipbuilding in America

From the earliest days of Massachusetts Bay shipbuilding, vessels were constructed in the American colonies by British merchants and shipowners for their own account or financed in part, with the final settlement to the builders made in cash or goods (usually the latter) when the vessel was completed, delivered, and accepted in England. Later New England shipbuilders

constructed on speculation large numbers of vessels intended for British owners (generally in England or the West Indies) and had the responsibility of freighting the ships overseas and disposing of both vessels and cargoes to the best advantage wherever they could find a market. (This practice continued in Canada until well on into the nineteenth century and the end of the era of wood merchant sail.)

In 1762 a shipbuilder, William Swanton by name, in what is now Bath, Maine, "The City of Ships," constructed a vessel to the order of an owner in Dundee, Scotland. This craft, the *Earl of Bute*, it has been said, was the first ship (i.e., a three-masted full square-rigged sailing vessel) built in the United States, and this ordering of a ship instead of buying a vessel after she had been built "marked the beginning of contract shipbuilding in the United States and founded the industry that was to make Bath famous unto this generation." This fact, however, is of more than historical interest. Robert P. Tristram Coffin, in *THE KENNEBEC RIVER—CRADLE OF AMERICANS*, says:

Swanton, the Bath shipbuilder, obtained a contract from a canny Scotch shipowner and operator because he could construct a vessel as good as, if not better than, the British shipbuilders of that day. As his command of needed material exceeded theirs and with an associated lower cost to him, he was able to undercut the British price on a finished well-built ship. This demonstrates one of the two fundamental and inexorable laws which determine any nation's possession and maintenance of a merchant marine—the ability to build more cheaply than competitors, and until the dawn of the day of iron this economic advantage stood in favor of American shipyards. The second essential law, briefly stated, is the capability and necessity of operating vessels more cheaply than, or at least upon an equality with, the competition of any other nation that aspires to be a marine power.

William Swanton was apparently a successful contract shipbuilder for foreign account, for from 1762 to the War of the Revolution, he built many ships for English owners and was paid a lump sum in cash for each of them. It is said that Swanton built one or two ships every year for owners who placed contracts with him and that most of the ships were for English merchants.

It is interesting to record, however, that during the early part of the Revolution, Swanton, after laying down a big, fast merchant ship for a British customer, interested Massachusetts patriots in her and completed the vessel as the letter-of-marque, or privateer, *Black Prince* for Salem owners. She was the first ship of war built in Bath. Maclay says that this vessel, which was a full-rigged ship, was one of the most formidable privateers in the war waged for American independence and that she was one of the first craft of her type to get to sea. We are told that the *Black Prince* was "an exceptionally handsome specimen of naval architecture," carrying 18 carriage guns and a complement of 165 men. Of her it is written, "She scarcely left the Kennebec River when she had a sharp fight with an English vessel of about equal size, which she captured and sent as a prize into port." Under Capt. Nathaniel West, "she was successful in her cruises against the enemy," but unfortunately the privateer was attached in 1779 to the ill-starred Penobscot expedition and was one of the many helpless, lightly armed American merchantmen destroyed by a heavy and powerful British squadron of frigates, with a ship of the line, and the land batteries of Castine.

Early Connecticut Ships and Shipbuilding

On the map the Connecticut River looks as if it would be the greatest—as it is the longest—river in New England and the northeast New England States. It runs south over a course of about three hundred forty-five miles from the Canadian border through towns and cities we now know as Lancaster, Hanover, Brattleboro, Springfield, Hartford, Middletown, etc., to

Long Island Sound and the sea and discharges its waters between Saybrook and Lyme, Conn., at a point some thirteen miles west of New London (on the Thames River) and about eighty-five miles east of New York and the Hudson River. Unfortunately for shipbuilding and water transportation, however, the Connecticut River, in these days, is not a commercially navigable stream, and its depth of water is out of all proportion to its length and width. Today it is permanently bridged near its mouth and at frequent intervals throughout its lower stretches, and its glory as a shipbuilding stream faded for all time as ships grew larger and required more depth of water for launching and for floating in a seaworthy condition to the ocean. Shipyards in colonial times and the first decades of the republic dotted the banks of the Connecticut River from Saybrook and Old Lyme up through Essex, Chatham, Hamburg, Haddam, Middletown, and Portland; Wethersfield, Hartford, and beyond. At one time sizable ships of the period were built at East Hartford, about forty-four miles from the mouth of the river.

A party of Puritans from the Massachusetts Bay Colony sailed from Boston in 1638 and planted the New Haven colony. Dutch from New Netherland established themselves at Hartford in 1633, and members of the Plymouth Colony built a trading post on the Connecticut River near Windsor the same year (1634) that emigrants from the Massachusetts Bay Colony, following earlier explorations by John Oldham, founded Wethersfield. During the period 1635-1660, many English settlements were planted in the colony of New Haven and in the larger colony of Connecticut that enveloped it on the land and ran west to a line running north from Greenwich on the south, which had been set as a boundary between the Dutch and English colonies at the Treaty of Hartford in 1650. (This treaty also conceded to the British most of Long Island—running from Oyster Bay to the east.) All the settlements in the Connecticut and New Haven colonies in 1660 were on Long Island Sound or on the Housatonic, Connecticut, and Pequot (Thames) rivers or their tributaries. The Connecticut River was the great water highway in the Connecticut colony, and on its banks were the settlements of Saybrook (near the mouth), Middletown (Mattabesec), Wethersfield, Hartford (Dutch House of Hope), and Windsor (Plymouth Trading Post) as one proceeded upstream, with Springfield (Agawam) on the river but across the line in Massachusetts. On the Pequot (Thames) River was Nameaug (New London) and Mohegan (Norwich)—some fourteen miles upstream and where the Quinebaug River ran into the gulf-like Pequot. In western Connecticut were settlements at Fairfield, Norwalk, Stamford, and Greenwich (all on the Sound); Stratford (Cupheag) was at the mouth of the Housatonic and Paugasset (Derby) upstream. In the New Haven colony, in addition to the "towne" of New Haven (Quinnipiac), were settlements located on the Sound at Guilford, Branford (Totoket), and Milford (Wepawaug).

The defined boundaries of Connecticut—east and west—as stated by the English Crown in 1662 are of interest. Forty years after the British had learned of the passage of Magellan through the strait now bearing his name, his crossing of the Pacific Ocean to the Philippines, and the successful circumnavigation of the globe by one of the ships of his fleet, an English official royal charter granted land to the Connecticut colony running all the way from Rhode Island across the American continent through what is now part of New York and Pennsylvania and certain Central, Mountain, and Western States to the Pacific Ocean.

Shipbuilding began in Connecticut soon after the first settlements. Each family had its fishing boat, and shallows were built for coasting and river trade. Travel and traffic were by water. Ships arriving from England were unloaded into light-draft lighters, shallows, and pinnaces, and their cargoes were distributed by these smaller boats to the various settlements. A decree of the General Court of New Haven, June 11, 1640, says that in callings that required skill—and that of "ship-carpenters" is specifically mentioned—master workmen were to be paid "*not above 2 shillings 6 pence per day in summer, in wch men may worke 12 howers, butt lesse than 10 howers dilligently improved cannot be accounted nor may be admitted for a full dayes worke, nor in winter above 2 shillings a day, in wch at least 8 howers to be dilligently improved in worke.*" Those not master workmen were to receive not more than 2 shillings per day in summer and 20 pence in winter. The rates for master workmen were lowered 6 pence

a day in 1641. Either the demand for skilled artisans lessened or the available supply of mechanics greatly increased in a year's time. That boating and lightering of cargoes had become of great economic importance within the jurisdiction of the General Court of New Haven is attested by the fact that elaborate decrees were passed and made effective in 1641. The order of the court read, in part:

For going with boats of severall sorts, the man not above 2s a tyde, the whole tyde being dilligently improved, according to the nature of that employment and for boates, according to their quality and burden. A lighter of 16 tunne with a boate or cannon wth her not above 3s a tyde, and one of 12 tunne, with a boate, not above 2s 6d a tyde, a

shallop of 4 tunnes, not above 1s a tyde, and so in respective proportion. Butt in such raines or storms that goods cannot be laden without spoyling, nor the boate stirr though the tyde serve, no paymt to be made for the boate in such tydes, though the man be paid while he attends the service.

A sizable ship is generally credited with having been built at New Haven in 1648 by shipwrights who were sent from Massachusetts Bay for the purpose, and it is said that for many years the Puritans of Boston and Salem "gave to the other coasts of the country the best carpenters they had for shipbuilding." The word "best" was not intended to be interpreted literally; the meaning is that "good" men were provided in order that conditions of trade be improved and security (from Indians and foreigners such as the Dutch) increased. Hutchinson says that the chief object of the Connecticut people, located in settlements at New Haven, Guilford, Milford, etc., was trade, and, "the better to be accommodated," they built their houses on small lots of land near the water's edge. Continuing, he writes:

They built vessels for foreign voyages and set up trading houses upon lands which they purchased at Delaware Bay for the sake of beaver, but were unsuccessful and their stocks sunk very fast, and in 5 or 6 years they were much exhausted. Unwilling to give over, they exerted themselves as a last effort in building a ship for the trade to England, in which they put their whole stock of money, plate and all

the proper goods they could procure to make a more valuable adventure. In her went passenger Mr. Grigson, one of the magistrates, in order to solicit a patent and 8 or 10 more considerable persons, who, to use Mr. Cotton's expression, all went to heaven by water, the ship never being heard of after sailing. The loss of the ship entirely broke them up as traders, and they turned to husbandry for their support.

We are told by other historians that the people of New Haven in 1647, having suffered from severe reverses in trade and industry, sought to retrieve themselves by building a 150-ton ship and freighting her for England. "The vessel sailed away manned by the best and bravest of the town, but one slow month followed another and no tidings came of its arrival overseas and all New Haven was distraught." However, a contemporary chronicler tells of a vision imagined by a "favored" band of God's elect:

After a great thunderstorm about a hour before sunset, a ship of like dimensions, with her canvas and colors abroad, appeared in the air coming up the harbour against the wind for the space of an hour. Many, says the Rev. Mr. Pierpont, were drawn to behold this great work of God, yea, the very children cried out, "There is a brave ship." When so

near that a man might hurl a stone on board, her main top seemed blown off, then her mizzen top; then her masting seemed blown away by the board; she overset, and so vanished into a smoky cloud. The vision was given, in the opinion of the beholders, that they might understand the tragic end of the ship and their friends.

Evidently, the Rev. Mr. Pierpont was a very imaginative and persuasive sort of person, but the writing, while it suggests that the big New Haven vessel was a real ship, with main- and mizzenmasts and presumably a foremast, is of further interest in showing the hold of a certain sort of religion and of frenzied pastors upon the minds and lives of the people of that day. The unfortunate venture in foreign (or transatlantic) trade by the New Haven people with "a greate shippe," as mentioned by many historians, put a stop to such "ambitious undertakings," but did not affect the building in Connecticut of small and even moderate-sized vessels for ocean trading (coastwise and to "the islands"). Sloops for sound and river purposes were constructed in "considerable numbers."

There are records in existence implying that New Haven's "greate shippe" of 150 tons register was built at Rhode Island for New Haven and was to be used "for the purpose of protecting her commerce"; this was undoubtedly the vessel referred to by Hutchinson, Cotton, Pierpont, and others, for we read that she was "lost at sea on her first voyage."

Shortly after this marine disaster, which so seriously affected the lives and well-being of the New Haven colonists, the settlements of New Haven and Hartford co-operated in fitting out a vessel with 10 guns and manning her with a crew of forty men to cruise in Long Island Sound for the protection of the property and commerce of the English colonists against the Dutch and "all other evil doers." In 1665-1666, records show that Connecticut maintained an armed vessel at Watch Hill "to watch" the goings and comings of Narragansett Indians, to look out for any hostile craft, and to protect colonial shipping. We are told that in 1676 "Connecticut boasted of one thousand tons of shipping." Prior to September 1664, when the British took possession of New Amsterdam and changed it to New York, the Anglo-Saxon colonists on Long Island Sound at times had to protect their floating tonnage and commerce from Dutch adventurers. There was a mild recurrence of this condition and fear during the period from August 1673 to November 1674 that the Dutch reoccupied New York, but after November 9, 1674, when Colve surrendered to the English, the privateering or piracy of the Dutch against Connecticut ships and trade on the Sound was at an end.

In the "Review of American Commerce" for the year 1769, Lord Sheffield states that out of 389 vessels (aggregating 20,001 tons) built in the colonies during the year, 50 vessels (of 1,542 tons) were constructed in Connecticut; this means that 12.8 per cent of all American vessels built in 1769 and 7.7 per cent of the total tonnage of such craft were constructed in Connecticut. The average size of the Connecticut-built vessels was only 30 tons, but the average of all the colonial-built ships was also very small, being 51½ tons, and the 137 vessels built in Massachusetts that year averaged only 59 tons. Some fairly sizable ships, for the period, were built in Connecticut during the 1740's and 1750's and at intervals on; at mid-century the names of the ships *Swallow* and *Fellowship* appear in the public records.

Robert Greenhalgh Albion, in *THE RISE OF NEW YORK PORT*, writes:

The Connecticut towns along the Sound found a good source of income from early days onward in the cattle and dairy products which they gathered from the back country. . . . The little vessels which came and went on this business were small and operated with a minimum of formality and of per-

sonnel. Frequently the farmer and his son would load the produce into a home-made sloop and run it across the short distance to the East River slip or pier which was the center of that particular business.

Later, most of the Connecticut (and Rhode Island) towns on the Sound had a sloop or two (small and of shallow draft) that operated as "packets," with weekly sailings, carrying passengers and freight; the master, when in New York, was the merchant, selling and buying goods and supplies for "the folks back home." At one time, New London and New Haven merchants, we are told, shipped live cattle and horses, together with butter and cheese, direct to the West Indies, often bringing the return cargoes of sugar and molasses to New York or Newport—but this was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Manufacturing was notable in Connecticut from relatively early days. Iron products were made and exported from the colony throughout practically all of the eighteenth century. It was Connecticut that cast cannon for the Continental troops and made the chains that were used to block the channel of the Hudson River to British ships in the War of the Revolution.

Connecticut has been interested in the fisheries from early days, and the eastern section has an interesting history connected with whaling. In 1775 most of the whalers of the country owned outside of Massachusetts hailed from Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Long Island (N. Y.) ports, and the Thames River (New London and Groton) was on its way to becoming a whaling center of prime importance because of its excellent, deep harbor, its natural sites suitable for shipbuilding, and its good location as an economic distributing point of commercial whaling products—oil and bone.

From the middle of 1775 to the end of 1777, Connecticut shipbuilders and shipowners were sufficiently active, patriotic, and, we are told, "rapacious" to send out 22 privateers to harass the Mistress of the Seas and capture or destroy British vessels. This number of armed merchantmen commissioned to prey upon the enemy was exceeded during that period, it is

said, by only one of the other colonies (i.e., Massachusetts—the leading marine colony—with 53); the number of Connecticut-owned and sailed privateers that went to sea against the English was one more than the 21 commissioned in Maryland and Chesapeake ports and 9 more than sailed from Philadelphia and the Delaware. (New York, being in British hands from mid-1776, was blockaded and policed, but managed to get 7 privateers to sea.) In the War of 1812, waged definitely to end the fight for freedom, Connecticut commissioned only 11 out of a total of 468 privately owned armed vessels whose hailing ports are definitely known; whereas this number represented only 2.4 per cent of the total, it was more than for each of the States of Rhode Island, Virginia, Louisiana, and Georgia and was exceeded only by Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Maine.

Connecticut made an enviable reputation in late colonial days and during the early years of the young republic for building small traders and later "packets," but it was evidently unlucky in the construction and operation of large, or sizable, wood merchant sail. During the middle of the seventeenth century, its sole attempt to build and own a big ship ended in a catastrophe that "shocked the town to its depths." About two centuries later (1853), at the height of the clipper shipbuilding era, that part of Connecticut west of Mystic (near the Rhode Island border) constructed its only real clipper and its only sizable contribution to the fleet of merchant sail during the century. This ship, the *Black Hawk* of 1,579 tons (launched under the name of *Chief of Clippers*), was built and owned by Hall and Teague, of Fairfield and Bridgeport, Conn., and was constructed at Black Rock—about twenty miles west by south down the Sound from New Haven. This big Connecticut clipper ship, of which so much was expected (like the "greate shippe" of about two centuries earlier), was unlucky and her end calamitous, for she never completed her maiden voyage, but was dismasted and foundered.

Early Dutch and Swedish Settlements on the Delaware

Henry Hudson, an Englishman, is credited with sailing up Delaware Bay in 1609 on a voyage for the Dutch, during which he thoroughly explored the Hudson River in his search for a northwest passage to China and the Indies. In 1610, Lord De La Warr, associated with the London Company and its Virginia colony on the James River and in the Chesapeake area, is said to have entered Delaware Bay "in the interest of England," and, in any event, the bay, a great river, and one of the American colonies were named after him. The bay and territory in general were explored by Cornelius Hendrickson, a Hollander, in 1615-1616. It would seem that the first settlement on the Delaware was planted by the Dutch under the leadership of Pieter Heyes in 1631; the location was about the site of the present Lewes, near Cape Henlopen and just inside the bay. The expedition to found this settlement was organized by Capt. David Pieterszen de Vries and others, who wished "to plant a colony for the cultivation of grain and tobacco as well as to carry on the whale fishery in that region." The settlement, named Zwaanendaal, did not long survive, being destroyed by the Indians, although the Dutch established a trading post here in 1658 and built a fort in 1659.

Much has been written of the Swedish colonization of the Delaware, but it would seem to be the Dutch and not the Swedes who engineered the colony, and later the Dutch drove the Swedes out of what appears in the early stages to have been a joint or, at least, a friendly co-operative colonizing venture. Willem Usselinx, the chief organizer of the Dutch West India Company, established a colony on the Delaware under a charter, or manifesto, from Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632; king of Sweden, 1611-1632) granted to the South Company of Sweden, a corporation organized in 1624 as the "Australian Company." We are told that in 1633 "the

privileges of the company" were extended to Germans and that about 1640 the Dutch members were bought out by the Swedes. In 1638, on behalf of a colonizing company chartered under a Swedish grant and said to have been owned or at least controlled by Swedish capital, Pieter Minit established a settlement at what is now Wilmington, Del., naming it "Christinaham" in honor of the child queen of Sweden, Christina (1626-1689), daughter of Gustavus Adolphus. (Minit, a Hollander, had been director of the Dutch colony of New Netherland on the Hudson River from the spring of 1626 to the fall of 1632.) From the Minquas Indians, Minit bought land extending from between the mouth of the Schuylkill River and Bombay Hook on the Delaware westward indefinitely, and this territory was named "New Sweden." Later, the land area was added to, and in 1642 the company was reorganized.

The Swedish Crown then stepped into the picture and sent out Johan Printz (1600-1663) as governor. The company, which still held rights under a royal charter, was known by many names (West India, American, New Sweden, and Swedish Royal), but the old name of South Company persisted, and it still continued wholly proprietary in form. Printz arrived on the Delaware early in 1643, and the colony took on a more Swedish and less Dutch character. He established settlements on the island of Tinicum, near the present Chester (of Delaware County, Pennsylvania), another at the mouth of Salem Creek, New Jersey, and another near the mouth of the Schuylkill River, Philadelphia. The Chester settlement was planted about 1645, and it was named Upland by the Swedes. (Chester is the oldest town in Pennsylvania, and it was the seat of the Swedish courts until William Penn's arrival in 1682.)

The Swedes introduced the log cabin to America—the really substantial structure for which the cutting and fitting of logs is an art. As America was a land of forests and as saw-mills were either rare or unknown, the log house was a natural development in the New World. The Spanish built their structures of stone, adobe, or planks; the Dutch of stone or brick; the English of boards and thatch, and whereas all used piled-up logs for forts, they knew nothing of cutting and fitting logs to make permanent and comfortable structures in which to live.

Although the Swedes and the Dutch had been partners in the second attempt to colonize the Delaware, had had common interests in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648)—primarily a religious conflict—and held a very definite dislike of the English, friction developed on the Delaware between the two nationalities and between New Sweden and the Dutch New Netherland on the Hudson. In 1651, Peter Stuyvesant, governor of New Netherland, built Fort Casimir, near New Castle, Del. (about six miles south of Christinaham—and Wilmington). Johan Claudius Rising, who had replaced Printz as the Swedish colony's governor in 1654, with a large number of new colonists whom he had brought to the Delaware from Sweden, drove the Dutch out of Fort Casimir. The Swedish supremacy on the river was very brief, for in the following year Stuyvesant, with seven ships and about seven hundred men, not only recaptured Fort Casimir but also occupied Fort Christina. New Sweden went under Dutch control and became a dependency of New Netherland. The Swedes, therefore, were in the ascendancy as a colonizing power on the Delaware, theoretically, for only seventeen years and, in reality, for only twelve years (i.e., 1643-1655), from the time that Printz, the first Swedish governor, arrived on the Delaware to the fall of Fort Christina.

It is surprising that Fort Christina capitulated to the Dutch without bloodshed and that "very few of the Swedes left the colony" when it became wholly Dutch. The name Christinaham later was changed to Willingtown, following occupation by the English, due to the fact that a large part of what became a city was owned by the Englishman Thomas Willing. It is said that in 1739 a borough charter was granted and that the name with two slight changes was altered to honor Spencer Compton, Earl of Wilmington (1673-1743), for whom Wilmington, N. C., was renamed the same year.

In 1656 the Dutch West India Company sold part of the territory that had been New Sweden to the city of Amsterdam, which in 1657 established a settlement named New Amstel at New Castle and the site of the Dutch Fort Casimir. It is said that this settlement, which

evidently was more of a trading post, was "badly administered and not successful." In 1663 the entire "Delaware country" came under the jurisdiction of the city of Amsterdam, but in 1664 the English seized the Dutch colonies on both the Delaware and the Hudson. For a short time in 1673-1674, the Dutch were again in control, but by the Treaty of Westminster in 1674 the "three counties of the Delaware" again became part of the English possessions in America, and the Dutch lost all their lands and settlements on the continent for all time.

Shipbuilding on the Delaware in Colonial Days

William Penn (1644-1718), the English Quaker and founder of Pennsylvania (a son of Admiral Sir William Penn, who died in 1670), arrived in his new province at New Castle on the Delaware October 27, 1682. He sailed on September 1 in the *Welcome* from Deal, England, with "a hundred comrades," one-third of whom died from smallpox during the voyage. Penn's grant, which received the royal signature March 14, 1681, made Penn master of a province in America "north of Maryland, bounded on the east by the Delaware, on the west limited as Maryland northward as far as plantable." He explained this limit to be "three degrees northward." The area formed a tract of "extreme fertility, mineral wealth and richness of all kinds" about three hundred by one hundred sixty miles. Penn tells us that he himself suggested the name of "Sylvania" for the province, but the king—to honor Admiral Penn—insisted that "Penn" be added to the name, and to this, we are informed, William Penn strenuously objected and went so far as to try "to bribe the secretaries."

Shipbuilding was established as an industry on the Delaware River during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Three years after William Penn's arrival in the country (i.e., in 1685) it was reported to the Lords of Trade in London that "six ships capable of sea voyages and many boats" had been built at Philadelphia. Scharf and Westcott, in their *HISTORY OF PHILADELPHIA*, state that, as early as 1683, William West was operating a shipyard at Philadelphia "at the foot of Vine Street" and that William Penn in the same year wrote, "Some vessels have been built here and many boats." We are told that West, evidently the pioneer Philadelphia builder of vessels for Britishers, "acquired considerable fortune" building ships, primarily for overseas owners.

Gabriel Thomas, of London, England, in *A HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY*, published in 1698, was impressed with the quantity as well as the convenience and character of the wharves and other facilities for loading and unloading, building and repairing ships in Philadelphia. He speaks of a curious and commodious dock with a drawbridge to it "for the convenient reception of vessels, where have been built some ships at two and three hundred tons each." He continues: "They have very stately oaks to build ships with, some of which are between fifty and sixty feet long, and clear of knots, being very straight and well grained. In this famous city of Philadelphia are several ropemakers, who have large and curious ropewalks, especially Joseph Wilcox."

In 1700 there were four shipyards on the Delaware engaged in building seagoing ships besides several smaller concerns producing fishing boats and river craft. The shipyards of Philadelphia in colonial times occupied the river front from Market to Vine (or Callowhill) and were gradually driven north by the improvements in the city. Jonathan Dickinson, writing in July 1718, says: "Here is great employ for shipwork for England. It increases and will increase, and our expectations from the iron works, forty miles up the Schuylkill, are very great." J. L. Bishop is also authority for the statement that in 1718 extensive construction was reported in Philadelphia for the English market.

There are records showing that ten vessels were built at Philadelphia in 1722 with a total tonnage of 458 tons (an average of 46 tons per vessel), but construction was "on the increase." In 1723 thirteen vessels aggregating 507 tons (an average of 39 tons per vessel) were reported as built, and during the following year (1724), nineteen vessels of 959 tons total tonnage—an average of 50½ tons per vessel—were constructed. The clearances from 1719 to 1725, according to contemporary records, "averaged 119 sails annually," and a few years later as many as twenty vessels were to be seen "upon the stocks at one time, so well adapted are the docks for shipbuilding." At that early day, Philadelphia was said to contain "a great many wealthy merchants," and "the profits of its trade are large."

Records show that between 1684 and 1744 (sixty years) there were 188 square-rigged three-masted ships and some seven hundred two-masted brigs and schooners built in or around Philadelphia on the Delaware "besides river sloops and fishing yawls." The ship registers of Philadelphia show that, of all the vessels documented at that Delaware port from 1736 to 1745, 14,680 tons (99.1 per cent of the total) were colonial built and only 130 tons (9/10 of 1 per cent) British built. Furthermore, these registers indicate an annual sale to British owners of from three to twelve Delaware-built square-riggers (ships and brigs) during the later colonial period.

In 1750-1751, two ships were built in West's yard, Philadelphia, "which exceeded in size any merchant vessels previously constructed in America; one of these was of 320 and the other of 400 tons burthen." Both ships were sent to England with cargoes of colonial products and "on arrival at London were bought by the East India Company and placed in the regular East India and China fleet; they were as large as any merchant vessels built in England up to that time and of superior model and construction." The larger of these two colonial-built ships, it was reported, remained on the list of the East India Company more than thirty years and on her first run from London to India had Warren Hastings as a passenger (then a young clerk, but later the first governor-general of British India and founder of the British Empire in Asia).

Lord Sheffield's "Review of American Commerce" for the year 1769 states that twenty-two vessels aggregating 1,469 tons were built in the State of Pennsylvania. This report is indicative of two prime facts: (1) that the vessels of that period were very small, averaging only a scant 70 tons per ship for Pennsylvania and 51½ tons for all the American colonies; (2) that, whereas Pennsylvania stood sixth among the colonies in the number of vessels built during the year, it stood fourth in aggregate tonnage and was greatly outclassed as a shipbuilding state only by Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

The vessels built in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), which totaled 1,469 tons in 1769, aggregated 2,354 tons in 1770 and 1,309 tons in 1771, an average of 1,711 tons per annum for the three-year period. This is 2 2/3 times the average annual tonnage constructed during the three years 1722-1724 inclusive, or forty-seven years earlier. The tonnage entered in 1771 was 59,901 tons, and that cleared amounted to 49,654 tons. It is said that "fully three-eighths of this tonnage was owned in the province."

At the time of the Revolution, Philadelphia was a leading shipbuilding center in the colonies, and the reputation of its naval architects, also the quality of the ships built, was high. The historians Scharf and Westcott say: "The position of the city as the largest in the provinces, with an extensive commerce, numerous productive iron works in the vicinity, and the greatest facilities for procuring the best timber and naval stores from the southern colonies, gave her superior advantages. These were brought into requisition during the war for the naval defense of the port and the country generally."

The Revolution practically killed the ambitious, fast growing, and important American merchant marine and put a stop to merchant shipbuilding in all American ports. The young, belligerent republic had no real navy, and its privateers, whereas generally effective in their objective and extremely annoying to the British, were usually ultimately captured or destroyed by the superior forces of the dominant Mistress of the Seas. Philadelphia (and the Delaware),

after a brief period of paralysis, led the country in the utilization of its shipbuilding energies and resources, heretofore used in the production of merchant ships, in the conversion of available trading craft into war vessels and the building of new frigates ordered by Congress. The first American naval squadron, that of the ill-starred and grossly incompetent Commodore Esek Hopkins, was composed entirely of four merchant ships laid up in the Delaware and converted into improvised men-of-war in Philadelphia shipyards during the late summer and fall of 1775. Of the thirteen men-of-war ordered by the Continental Congress under the law of December 1775, four of the 32-gun frigates—the *Washington*, *Randolph*, *Delaware*, and *Effingham*—were ordered built in Philadelphia shipyards; but, although the first two were laid down as frigates, the *Delaware* and *Effingham*—in order to save time—were built from merchant hulls on the stocks already in frame and partly planked. (These two warships, which were in fact never more than converted merchantmen, were not as large nor as well protected as frigates, and they were armed with only 24 and 28 guns, respectively, instead of 32 guns.) One of the three "seventy-fours" (i.e., ships of the line) ordered the next year, with a brig of 18 guns and a packet boat, was also assigned to the shipyards of Philadelphia.

During the War of the Rebellion, both before and after the period when Philadelphia was in the hands of the British, the Delaware shipyards built a number of privateers and converted a few ships for the State Navy (ships provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and assigned to the Continental service). One of these, the *Hyder Ally*, a small converted French trading bark of about two hundred tons and armed with sixteen 6-pounders, was changed into a war vessel in six weeks' time in the early spring of 1782 at Humphrey's yard in Philadelphia and promptly made history, becoming famous by capturing the *General Monk*, a British sloop of war mounting fourteen 9-pounders and four 6-pounders. The *General Monk* was the American privateer *General Washington*. Captured by a strong squadron under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, she was refitted and became H. B. M. cruiser *General Monk*. After Lieut. Joshua Barney captured her, the original *General Washington* was given her old name, and following the peace of 1783, she had the distinction of being for a while the only vessel in commission of the United States Navy.

Timber and Lumber Rafting on the Delaware in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Until well into the nineteenth century, the development of the North American continent was along a relatively narrow strip on the coast line, or tidewater, and along the river banks stretching inland. The rivers were a vital means of communication and transportation between settlements and villages and were virtual water highways over which products—primarily of timber and peltry—from the inland regions passed down to ocean trading ports, from where they were carried by ships to the markets of the world. From Delaware Bay and the Atlantic, tidewater pushes upstream for about a hundred miles to the "Falls of the Delaware" at Trenton, which is the head of navigation for ships, as here the river drops about ten feet in half a mile and rock-strewn rapids offer an impassable barrier to vessels. This is the "fall line," which marks the boundary between the Coastal Plain and the Piedmont Plateau; south, the river ebbs and flows sluggishly through a broad, flat terrain, and north it flows through hills, valleys, and mountains—quiet eddies with stretches of smooth water interspersed with roaring rapids and narrow chasms.

As the river was the only highway over which the timber of the watershed north of Trenton (in the States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York) could be brought to

a market, the upriver channels, rocks, and rapids were studied and charted early and experiments made with the form and construction of rafts. In 1764 the first real "upriver big raft" built for passage through the turbulent waters was constructed at Cocheton Falls, N. Y., at a point some forty miles north of Port Jervis and the New Jersey line, and it was brought successfully downriver to Philadelphia, on the spring flood, by Daniel Skinner and another skilled raftsman. This pioneer upper Delaware raft, it is interesting to note, consisted of six white pine poles, each seventy feet long, to be used as masts for Philadelphia shipbuilders; they were held together by "hardwood spindles run through holes bored in both ends, with wooden pins outside to keep the poles from slipping off." E. B. Moore says that this venture marked the opening of an era of Delaware River timber rafting, which was to last for one and a half centuries and until the virgin stands of timber were depleted. The six masts of the pioneer raft sold in Philadelphia for "four pounds apiece," we are told, and Daniel Skinner became known as the "Lord High Admiral of the Delaware."

Logs were rafted in the early days, but later sawmills were built upriver, and after the Revolution lumber rafts became more common. By 1830, it is said, "a thousand rafts were coming down the Delaware each year, bringing an annual volume of some fifty million feet." Hancock, N. Y., at the junction of the east and west branches of the river, was the center of the upriver Delaware lumber industry, and the Delaware brought to the Philadelphia market not only the products of the forests in the river basin but also large quantities of logs and lumber that, each winter, were sledged over the narrow divide that separates the upper reaches of the Susquehanna from those of the Delaware. Delhi, N. Y., on the west branch of the Delaware and nearly three hundred miles upriver, was the upper limit of rafting. As the country developed inland, Easton, Pa., became the greatest log market on the river. The raft "runs" ended at Trenton, and from there south both log and lumber rafts drifted slowly on the ebbing tides. In later days, tugs towed "strings of thirty or forty rafts" down to the lumber market on Conrow's Dock, port Richmond, in Philadelphia. Timber rafting on the Delaware reached its peak in 1875, when over three thousand rafts came down the river, but a swift decline set in from that date. By 1900 "the flood had fallen away to a dribble," in 1907 only four rafts came down, and in 1913 there was but one. From the first, timberlands were devastated or denuded of stumpage in the absence of good forestry practices, and much natural timberland, practically unfit for agriculture, has been rendered economically useless due to the destructive cutting policy of complete exploitation.

Shipbuilding on the Chesapeake in Colonial Days

The early Virginians and the colonists on the banks of Chesapeake Bay and tributary waters were not ship-minded. This is a surprising fact in view of the early settlements established around the bay, commencing with the London Company's planting of a colony on the James River in 1607, and Capt. John Smith's exploratory voyage and charting of all the waters of the Chesapeake during the following year (1608). The waters that the settlers used for transport were placid and landlocked, so they built small boats and acquired canoes from the Indians and even purchased small ship's boats sent out to them from England or obtained from vessels that had been wrecked. The territory used small rowboats and pinnaces, also canoes, almost exclusively for years, and any sailspread on such diminutive craft did not make them into sailing vessels or worthy of recognition in a history of merchant sail. The policy of the colonists of Virginia, the Carolinas, and the offshoots of the London Company of Virginia was primarily to grow crops (principally tobacco) and look to British ships to supply

ocean transport. At no time did the Virginia or Chesapeake settlers feel the urge, and later the necessity, of building their own deep-sea ships in quantity and of operating them in ocean trade.

Records show that by 1735, however, shipbuilding was fairly well established on the Chesapeake and the rivers that flow into it. The record of vessels in the Maryland archives relates that registry was granted to William Edmondson, of Maryland, a merchant, "being of the people called Quakers, for schooner *Charming Betty* of Maryland, John Coward master, square sterned vessel, burthen ab't thirty tons, built at Choptank river, in the year 1735 by Henry Trippe, John Anderson and the said Wm. Edmondson, owners thereof." In the same year, we find "register granted in common form unto Adam Muir of Maryland, merchant, for the brigantine *Sea Nymph* . . . burthen about fifty tons, square sterned, built in Dorchester County in the year 1735, for the said Adam Muir, owner thereof." In 1739 register was granted to James Billings, merchant, for the ship *Rider* of 80 tons, built on the Nanticoke River in the preceding year. It has been said that this vessel was constructed for the tobacco trade with England. From the fifth decade of the eighteenth century onward, the building of ships was a major industry on the shores of the Chesapeake, and it has been said that shipbuilding during the latter part of this period probably ranked next to agriculture in importance. Lumber, especially white oak, was plentiful throughout Virginia and the Chesapeake region, and vessels could be built there both readily and economically. The records of most of the towns and settlements, including those far up the rivers to the head of navigation, contain references to shipyards.

The provincial legislature passed an act on August 8, 1729, calling for the laying out of a town on the north shore of the Patapsco River, which became Baltimore, named after the Lord Baltimore who established the early colony on the Chesapeake. Soon afterwards, William Jones and Edward Fell, storekeeper, procured their charter for Jones Town across the falls from Baltimore Town. Edward Fell's brother was a shipwright, and whereas he was interested in land and the development of a community with agriculture and trade, he wanted a site where he could exercise his art. Therefore, he acquired water frontage and took title to a tract, called Copus Harbor, with its hooked bluff; here he located a shipyard on the shore and a house on the higher land and called the place Fell's Prospect. However, the location soon became known as "Fell's Point," which is its name today.

Although historians have said that the first recorded vessel built at Baltimore was a sloop named *Baltimore Town* of 36 tons, launched in 1746, it is evident that small craft had been constructed in this region for many years prior to that time. Tradition tells us that William Fell, "the father of shipbuilding at Baltimore," constructed a number of sloops and ketches, and it has been said that Fell's ketches had lines "very much like those of the later Baltimore clippers." William Fell died in 1746, and his son Edward succeeded to the property and the business; he ran the shipyard and built vessels as his father had done, but developed the water front into a shipping port and laid out a regular town. For a while, Fell's Point rivaled Baltimore as a town. It was superior for shipping, shipbuilding, and marine activities, and it attracted not only town dwellers and business interests in general but also more shipbuilders. Benjamin Nelson located there and built berths for constructing ships and a marine railway for repairing all types of vessels. George Wells also established himself at the Point. Later, he contracted to build the ill-starred 28-gun frigate *Virginia*, one of the thirteen warships authorized by Congress in December 1775. The *Virginia* never got to sea; while attempting to get an offing, she ran aground in Chesapeake Bay and was there captured by a British squadron.

The southern colonies were very fortunate in possessing a great quantity and variety of fine timber as well as having a wonderful source of pitch, resin, tar, and turpentine. The live oak of the South was even superior to the white oak of the North for shipbuilding purposes—keel, keelsons, framing, posts, etc.; for planking (when oak was unavailable), no plank from any species grown in New England, New York, or Canada could compare with

southern hard pine. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the advantages of southern timber were being generally acknowledged (after being virtually ignored for a century and a half), and in the report on colonial shipbuilding for the year 1769, Lord Sheffield states that out of 389 vessels of 20,001 tons built in all the colonies, Virginia built 27 vessels of 1,269 tons and Maryland 20 vessels of 1,344 tons—a total for the Chesapeake Bay region of 47 vessels aggregating 2,613 tons. The ships constructed were very small (averaging only 55½ tons each), but the average for the entire country was only 51½ tons. In the number of vessels built in the twelve shipbuilding colonies, Virginia stood fifth and Maryland seventh; in total tonnage, Maryland stood sixth and Virginia seventh.

The Piscataqua during the Decades Preceding the Revolution

Fishery and timber products continued to be the prime articles of trade of the Piscataqua (Portsmouth, N. H.) during the first part of the eighteenth century and preceding the Revolution, and in addition to the West Indies, "the Catholic countries of Europe" were receiving fish, in quantity, shipped on Piscataqua-built vessels. Whereas the timber and forest products trade had been steadily developing for over a century, the fisheries continued as a most important means of livelihood, of food, and of foreign trade in the middle of the eighteenth century. The expedition against Louisburg in 1745 under William Pepperell (a Maine shipbuilder, a fisherman, the son of a fisherman, and a soldier, who was created a baronet by the British in 1746—the only New Englander so honored) was primarily an attack by Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire fishermen to rid the northwestern Atlantic fishing grounds of a French fortress that dominated the Banks, boasted of being "the center of the cod fisheries, and interfered with the freedom of the seas and the livelihood and trade of a substantial part of the seacoast population of New England. Incidentally, it is interesting that, when Governor du Chambon of the capitulated and once believedly "impregnable" fortress of Louisburg reached Paris, he was secretly apprehended and incarcerated in the Bastille. The charge against him was not cowardice or incompetency in defending the fisheries fortress but graft in regard to the trading for furs on the St. Lawrence, it being held that he had lined his own pockets with money that should have gone to the king of France. At the time of the historic and successful campaign against Louisburg by New Englanders, the French held strong positions on the coast from St. Castin's on the Penobscot to Louisburg on Isle Royale (Cape Breton Island). In New England, the strong points settled and held east of the Piscataqua (Kittery and Portsmouth) were York, Wells, Winter Harbor (Biddeford Pool), Saco, Casco (Fort Loyal), Sagadahoc, with Georgetown (and Bath) upriver, and Pemaquid—one of the oldest of all fisheries centers on the coast and still of importance. The fishing business was still considered not only of considerable consequence but also vital to the well-being of New England; nevertheless, products of the forest were becoming of steadily increasing volume in the territory known as Maine. Portsmouth, whereas a great timber port in the realm of masting and spars, was gradually becoming eclipsed in this field by Falmouth and Georgetown (Kennebec), and the Piscataqua—more like Massachusetts than Maine—did not long hold a prominent position as a manufacturer and exporter of sizable sawn lumber. However, for many long years, Portsmouth enjoyed a coastwise trade of considerable proportions in cordwood.

William Douglass says that in 1748, besides about two hundred coasting sloops and schooners that traded between the Piscataqua and Boston (most of them taking cordwood out), there were 121 customhouse clearances (13 ships, 20 brigs, 3 snows, 28 schooners, and

57 sloops) and 73 entrances (11 ships, 7 brigs, 1 snow, 19 schooners, and 35 sloops). These figures give an idea of the relative number of the various types of deep-sea vessels trading in and out of the Piscataqua at mid-century. It has been said, "Many of the clearances were obviously new vessels built within the district." (The "snow" referred to was a square-rigged two-masted vessel somewhat resembling a brig.)

The WEEKLY MARINE NEWS of the New Hampshire GAZETTE gives interesting statistics of Piscataqua Harbor activities: "On a single day in January 1759, sixteen sail of top-sail vessels cleared—twelve for the West Indies and four for Virginia. Between October 1760 and April 1761, there sailed from Portsmouth 20 ships, 7 snows, 27 brigs, 38 schooners, and 36 sloops (128 vessels) on foreign voyages." On December 17, 1762, the GAZETTE reported that notwithstanding the sailing of many vessels since the tenth of the month, there still remained in the harbor 76 deep-sea vessels, consisting of 20 ships, 24 brigs, 2 snows, 20 schooners, and 10 sloops. George Nelson says that between 1764 and 1772, the custom-house at Portsmouth recorded a yearly average of 103 entrances as against 155 clearances, figures which indicate "not only a vigorous trade but also a very active shipbuilding industry." Saltonstall says of this period, "All along the Piscataqua and its tributaries were thriving shipyards, the larger ones producing eight or ten ships a year, the smaller a brig or two besides a few schooners and sloops." The GAZETTE of March 1, 1765, contained a colorful item in its marine news: "Last week 80 yoke of oxen were employed on the ice to raise a vessel of 200 tons, which about two months ago overset coming in down the river, which they happily effected; it was judg'd there was at the same time about 1,000 persons on the ice." The diary of William Barrell, a Portsmouth merchant and shipowner, for the year 1766 refers to a brig launched at Newmarket in November which "stuck on the opposite side and by neglect fill'd with water at the balast ports." Later, in getting down to Portsmouth, the vessel damaged her rudder and started a leak by striking on Langstaff Rocks. Barrell gives an excellent idea of the nature and scope of Portsmouth's foreign trade in the decade preceding the Rebellion when, after comment on the sailing of two Portsmouth ships—owned by Samuel Cutts and John Moffatt, respectively—direct for London, he reports the following eight clearances on February 16, 1766:

Description of Vessel	Name of Commander	Destination
Boyd's ship	Guppy	Antigua
Hobb's brig	Hobbs	Barbados
Moulton's schooner	Simpson	Boston
Wentworth's snow	Cockrin	Martinico
Hixson's ship	Not stated	Granada
Wentworth's ship	Wingate	Jamaica
Wentworth's and Appleton's ship	Appleton	Jamaica
Warner's ship	Bunbury	Antigua

It is surprising that the ship's name seems to have been of little importance to William Barrell and that his records give (1) owner, (2) type of vessel (i.e., rig), (3) captain, and (4) trade. It is also of interest to note the ports to which the Portsmouth vessels sailed. It is evident that to Piscataqua merchants the arbitrary prohibitions and restrictions decreed by the British Government were merely trade and navigation acts to be ignored by any self-respecting, red-blooded American. They cared practically nothing about unjust, cramping laws, provided no serious attempt was made to enforce them. When England commenced to be aggressive and punitive in the matter and insisted upon literal obedience to British-enacted statutes that deprived Americans of freedom of action, then rebellion ensued, and a new nation was born as a result of a long drawn-out war of revolution.

The *Falkland* (54 guns), built in 1690, and the *Bedford* (32 guns), constructed six years later (1696)—both before described—were not the only warships built for the British Navy

on the Piscataqua River. These warships, launched in the last decade of the seventeenth century, were unusually well-built and long-lived vessels, and they gained in hard service an admirable reputation for quality, strength, and durability and as outstanding specimens of naval design and construction of their period. Gradually, however, British Admiralty officials—influenced by English shipbuilders and politicians, with persistent authoritative expressions of denunciation of American oak and American ship construction inspired by selfishness or jealousy—became more and more prejudiced against the idea of either building warships in the American colonies or using American oak in the construction of vessels built in English naval dockyards for the British Navy. English politicians, posing as statesmen, were conspicuously biased and expressive on the undesirability of building Britain's naval ships anywhere outside of "the tight little island." Naval power—the backbone of the empire—must be designed, built, and maintained in condition as a fighting force of aggression and defense by Britishers in England. Any other thought was radical and foolish, unpatriotic, permeated with possibilities of reactions harmful to the monopolistic policy of the Mistress of the Seas and, therefore, to be scathingly denounced—and this without regard to facts. Britain needed the long, big-diameter white pine trees of unequalled strength and toughness that were growing in the American colonies, but it did not need American oak for naval purposes, for it had other sources of supply. The admiralty did not object to the use of American oak by British builders of merchant ships, for such a policy made it easier for the dockyards to obtain the oak they needed for the building of warships without bidding up the price or endangering the source of supply.

After the brilliant and amazingly successful expedition of the American colonists against the French at Louisburg, a large number of the more liberally minded politicians in England preached the doctrine of a more substantial expression of appreciation on the part of the mother country toward her colonies. Unaided by British military or naval forces and "in a spirit of rare patriotism" and because of great "love of the empire," they had captured a believedly impregnable fort, which, built by the French at a highly strategic point, was a constant menace and threat to Britain. This liberal British element, by steady pressure and urging, succeeded in getting the sanction of the government to build another war vessel for the Royal Navy at Portsmouth on the Piscataqua, which, "named after a British royal dockyard," had half a century before constructed "most excellent naval vessels" and had recently taken a leading role in the conception and execution of the plan that had won Louisburg and Cape Breton Island (and control of Cabot Strait—one of two entrances to the Gulf of St. Lawrence) for the British Crown.

This third British warship to be built on the Piscataqua, authorized notwithstanding the vigorous and articulate opposition of the Lords of the Admiralty, the naval dockyard managers and artisans, and the officers of the fleet, was the *America* of 50 guns. This vessel was constructed in 1749 at Portsmouth by Colonel Meserve "by order of the British Government." However, as was to be expected under the psychological conditions existing in England in all departments of the navy and in most of the administrative branches of the government, the reaction and ultimate results of the enterprise were as bad and unfortunate as similar building of British warships, using identical materials, had been successful during the nineties of the previous century. The Meserve shipyard was located on what is now known as Nobles Island, and the *America* was built where a century later George Raynes was to lay down fine, big, and speedy clipper ships. Colonel Meserve was said to be "an eminent shipwright" and a "mechanical genius." William Pepperell was appointed by the government to supervise the construction; he visited the yard twice a week to see that only sound timbers and the best materials were used and the work well done. The *America* cost the British Government "nine pounds per ton." She made a good crossing to England, but soon after her arrival criticism and complaints were forthcoming. The ship was put out of commission and, strange as it may seem, never commissioned again; neither were any more British warships built at Portsmouth. The truth of the matter, although well known and freely talked about in Eng-

land, is hard to prove. The colonial shipwrights blamed all the trouble on the English guild of master builders, who were jealous of American shipbuilders and of their ability to construct good ships much more cheaply than any of the yards in the mother country. Politics and a subtle but unwavering and all-embracing national policy played an important part in the matter, and the official records were made to show that the royal dockyard shipwrights testified that green timbers and planking of inferior quality had been used and that the construction work had been too hurried and lacking in necessary care.

One of the most active shipbuilders on the Piscataqua during the decade preceding the Revolution was Col. George Boyd, who occupied the old Nathaniel Meserve yard on the North Millpond near the bridge, where the British 50-gun ship of war was built in 1749. Boyd's LETTER BOOK (New Hampshire Historical Society) tells us that on July 5, 1773, Boyd had "seven sail of new ships on the stocks." To English merchants he wrote, "It takes one year to have a good ship built; the fall of ye year is the time to cutt the timber & the summer following to build the ship in." The records of Boyd's activities as a shipbuilder show that he was a busy and energetic man and handled all phases of the business himself. He recorded that on March 4, 1774, with the sailing of the ship *Glasgow* for Bristol, England, this was the ninth large ship that he had fitted out and sent to sea since November 1773—a period of only four months. At the end of April 1774, Col. George Boyd sailed for England on the ship *Felicity* and left "two large ships of three hundred tons each abuilding to be fitted out by Mr. Clap, my head clerk, and Mr. John Foster." The New Hampshire GAZETTE, recording the departure of Boyd from Portsmouth, said that he had built and outfitted "in the course of the last ten years" more vessels than any other New Hampshire man in the same period of time. The paper states that "within a year past" Boyd had launched "no less than 12 ships and 2 brigs" and adds: "It may be said . . . that he is the most lucky genius of the present day in the mercantile way." Saltonstall, commenting on this press item, says: "This is a high tribute at a time when Piscataqua was probably launching fifty vessels a year, half of them square-rigged." He continues: "The GAZETTE might also have told of Boyd's humble beginning as a foreman at Myrick's ropewalk and his rapid rise to grandeur; of 'White Village,' his magnificent mansion, the show place of Portsmouth, and of his spacious gardens surrounded by a white open fence adorned with grenadiers' heads. But now the 'Portsmouth Croesus,' having named his daughter Submit, sailed to England for the duration of the revolution for which he had no enthusiasm, to return in 1787 bringing 'an elegant monument' for a grave which he occupied a week of his homecoming."

The site of the Boyd shipyard is historic ground. There a ship of war had been built for the British Government following a century of less important or, at least, less noteworthy construction of coastal and deep-sea merchant craft. In 1835—sixty-one years after the departure of Boyd from Portsmouth for England and forty-eight years after his return and death—George Raynes was to establish his yard there and make the site still more famous by the building thereon, during the fifties, of a fleet of eleven "Greyhounds of the Sea," many of which were favorably known the world over as outstanding examples of American clipper ship construction. George Raynes, who was born in York, Maine, in 1799, obtained possession of the old Boyd shipyard and acquired title to the "Boyd Mansion" (built in 1767) and its grounds, "whose landscaped lawns gently sloped to the water's edge." The old colonial "White Village" became the "Raynes Mansion," and as the beauty of the grounds and setting was preserved as far as possible by the new owner, the Raynes shipyard at Portsmouth, N. H., became known in the fifties and sixties of the nineteenth century as "the most beautiful and picturesque shipyard of modern times."

During the several years prior to the Revolution, shipbuilding was continuing at many points on the Piscataqua other than Portsmouth. Ebenezer Swasey was building ships and brigs at Exeter and taking them downriver to be rigged and fitted out. Newfields and Newmarket, down the Squamscot from Exeter, had busy yards, and it is recorded that each year the Durham shipyards at the falls of the Oyster River were "auctioned off at town meeting."

Dover continued as both a busy shipbuilding center and a port as did Berwick, where—according to Joseph Tate, the schoolmaster-historian—David Moore, of Berwick, assisted by Joseph Field, of Kittery, Maine, launched a ship on July 8, 1769, for Supply Clap, of Portsmouth, and David Moore built at least three other good-sized vessels during the twelve months ending November 1772. Unfortunately, practically nothing is known of seventeenth and eighteenth century shipbuilding in "the wilds to the east of the Piscataqua"—now the State of Maine. New Hampshire, however, had its chroniclers; Portsmouth was close to Boston in every possible way, felt the Massachusetts influence, and was much affected by its way of life. Although Maine shipbuilding was an almost unknown quantity in colonial days, it was the boast of the relatively small Piscataqua (New Hampshire) district that, prior to the Revolution, it produced one-third as many vessels as did all of Massachusetts.

Lord Sheffield, in his "Review of American Commerce," records the number and tonnage of the ships built in each of the shipbuilding colonies during the year 1769. New Hampshire is credited with constructing 45 vessels totaling 2,452 tons. This indicates that the craft were very small, as they averaged only 54½ tons each. However, this size was not out of line with the product of other states, for the average of all the 389 vessels built in the colonies was only 51½ tons. It is of interest to note from the British official figures that, as far as tonnage was concerned, New Hampshire ranked second in the list of colonies in the production of ships. Whereas Connecticut was in second place as far as number of vessels built was concerned, the average size of Connecticut-built ships was less than 31 tons, and the tonnage built on the Piscataqua was 1.6 times that of Connecticut. Massachusetts, however, built three times as many ships of 3.3 times the aggregate tonnage as New Hampshire.

The Saco during the Years prior to the Revolution

Although the Piscataqua, it is claimed, is the first river on which timber was driven in the United States and the Kennebec (with its tributary, the Androscoggin) and Penobscot rivers of Maine hold volume records for logging, it has been said that the Saco is "the oldest river of continuous lumbering in the United States." Folsom, in his HISTORY OF SACO AND BIDDEFORD, writes that in the late years of the eighteenth century there were "17 saws" at work on the falls of the Saco—the present site of the cities of Biddeford and Saco. As in most other Maine coastal and river settlements that had been located in or near "rich forest lands," the local timber satisfied manufacturing and trading operations for many decades, but in the fall of 1772 the timber operators below the falls "made the ascent of the Saco as far as Fryeburg in quest of timber" and found such great and valuable stands that thereafter upriver logging was practiced to an ever-increasing extent.

In the days when long and good-diameter white pine trees growing in Maine and New England forests—often well inland—were marked with the "Broad Arrow" by the king's agents, trees so designated, after felling by government contractors, were hauled to the Saco River, floated downstream to a collecting station above the falls, taken from the river and hauled by oxen to a landing at the narrows, from where they were transported either to the Piscataqua or directly across the Atlantic to British royal dockyards for use in the construction and repairing of warships. It is interesting to note that the colonists of Maine, from the earliest days up to the Revolution, persistently fought against the assumed right of the English Crown arbitrarily to confiscate trees growing in Maine forests. They resisted the royal decree, "poached," and ignored the king's mark in numerous crafty and subtle ways. Indeed, during certain periods in the eighteenth century (when the colonists were incensed at the

English Navigation Laws and the crown's attempt to suppress colonial trade, initiative, and individual freedom), it was said by various indignant but virtually helpless king's agents and English investigators that not more than a woefully small percentage of white pine trees in Maine marked with the "Broad Arrow" ever reached a mast landing for shipment to England.

It was the lumber industry of the Saco, with its litigations over timber titles, that caused James Sullivan, the Saco's first lawyer, to open an office in Biddeford in 1769. Sullivan, who prospered over timber-ownership controversies and legal actions, was a member of the first provincial congress and, later, governor of Massachusetts. It was due to his influence that, in 1774 (two years before the Declaration of Independence), Biddeford adopted resolutions calling for resistance to England. That Sullivan became a wealthy man through litigation regarding Saco timber is attested by the fact that, before the Revolution, John Adams, "riding circuit," stopped overnight at Sullivan's Biddeford home and marveled at the income of Sullivan, which, Adams said, was greater than what he could earn by the law in the big town of Boston.

Shipbuilding on the Saco developed in parallel fashion to lumbering. Hardwoods that could be cut economically with the softwoods were used in ship construction; tall, straight pines that were under 24 in. in diameter and thereby escaped the king's "Broad Arrow" were amply large for the masts and spars of the average general trader. As the output of the mills manufacturing lumber and other forest products increased, the need of bottoms to transport such commodities to markets became very real and was promptly met. For many decades in several parts of the State of Maine, lumber manufacturing and wood shipbuilding were closely associated one with the other, and many timber and lumber manufacturing companies or groups of operations ran their own shipyards.

From 1629 to around mid-century, the settlements on both sides of the Saco River near the falls were known as Saco, but as early as 1653 the two prime villages were described as Saco West and Saco East. In 1718, by permission of the Massachusetts Court, the villages on both sides of the river took the name Biddeford. Folsom mentions a deed of 1736 that describes the river as "commonly called Saco, alias Biddeford River." William Pepperell, Jr. (afterwards Sir William Pepperell—famous as the commander of the successful Louisburg Expedition against the French in 1745), the son of Col. William Pepperell (a most prominent citizen of Kittery and the Piscataqua—fisherman, shipbuilder, and merchant), in 1716-1717, bought a tract of some fifty-five hundred acres of land extending from the ocean several miles along the Saco River and including the falls and the sawmill and shipyard sites. (This area was known as the "Blackman purchase" and in 1716 was owned two-thirds by Samuel Walker, of New Jersey, and one-third by Thomas Goodwill, of Boston.) Soon after this acquisition, the younger Pepperell, who for years had been actively engaged in extensive business with his father, became of age and took charge of "contracting for the building of vessels on the Piscataqua and Saco rivers." Sir William Pepperell died July 6, 1759, when sixty-three years of age, and we are told that he "devised this valuable property to his grandson William P. Sparhawk" (son of the baronet's daughter—Sir William's only surviving child), with the proviso that "young Sparhawk, then a minor, was to take the name of William Pepperell when he became of age."

In 1762 the village on the east bank petitioned the general court for a separate town organization and took the name of Pepperellborough. Because of the disrepute of the Sparhawk Pepperells by reason of their Royalist sympathies, the village on the east bank of the river reverted in 1805 to the name Saco, which it had held prior to 1718 and which, evidently, had remained in common use to a substantial degree throughout the years.

Daniel Remich, who with his father conducted a newspaper at Kennebunk from 1809 to 1842, says in his HISTORY OF KENNEBUNK that "vessels were built at Saco, York, Kittery and Wells many years before a keel was laid on the Mousam" and that shipbuilding on the Mousam preceded shipbuilding on the Kennebunk River by some twenty years, with vessels being launched into the Mousam River in the 1730's. Not only did the Saco antedate the

Kennebunk and environs as a shipbuilding community but also, during the eighteenth century, Kennebunk was in the customs district of "Biddeford and Pepperellborough" (Saco).

The Saco, an intermediate point tapping a rich white pine territory, was always of importance in colonial days and had its years of prominence, but at the time of the Revolution the Kennebec and the Penobscot were being exploited, and Georgetown (Bath), on the Kennebec, had become a prime port for shipping "great naval masts" direct to England. Winter Harbor (Biddeford Pool), at the Saco's mouth, was from the first one of the leading fisheries centers on the New England coast, and the Saco River was a pioneer in the lumber and pipe (or barrel) stave business. It built fishing (coastal and deep-sea) vessels and soon afterwards trading vessels to distribute Saco River timber products to more thickly populated settlements on the coast (such as Boston) and take fish, lumber, and forest products overseas.

Wood ships (merchant sail) were built on the Saco during the China trading, packet, clipper ship, and Down Easter periods, but after the era of wood shipbuilding had passed—even for the coastwise schooner trade—the Saco River continued as a lumber manufacturing center and has operated in this field for some two and three-quarter centuries, with the stumpage running principally to white pine; other woods were spruce, hemlock, hackmatack, and miscellaneous hardwoods. Until well into the third decade of the twentieth century, logs were driven in quantity on the Saco River (and are still being so handled to a limited extent), and sizable sawmills were operating on its banks at Biddeford above the falls.

Casco Bay—Its Ships and Shipping during the Colonial Period

Casco Bay, with its numerous islands, embraces the area extending from Cape Elizabeth (at the southwest) to Small Point, or virtually the Kennebec region (at the northeast). Estevan Gomez, the Spanish explorer, seems to have either entered the bay or cruised on its outskirts in early 1525, and an early map shows the islands off the Maine coast between about $43\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ and $44\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N., which includes the Casco area, designated as "Gomez Archipelago." Bartholomew Gosnold, with Bartholomew Gilbert (a son of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, the first English would-be colonist in the New World), sailed from Falmouth, England, in March 1602, and was at the Azores the middle of April; sailing from there direct to northern Virginia, he next sighted land somewhat north of Cape Elizabeth in the Casco Bay region—probably near the place that later became well known as Falmouth, New England. This was the first voyage direct to northern Virginia, or New England, from Europe, and it is of interest to note that it was from Falmouth in the Old World to Falmouth of the New World. In June 1603, Martin Pring, of Devon, England, with the ships *Speedwell* and *Discoverer* (and with Robert Salterne, Gosnold's navigator and pilot of the previous year, accompanying him), arrived at the islands of Casco Bay, where he found "an excellent fishing for cods which are better than those of Newfoundland"; but "meeting with no sassafras," Pring, who was on a trading and not an exploring voyage, continued to the southwest.

Samuel de Champlain, in 1605, sailed past Casco Bay and noted the picturesque islands. The following year, in company with his patron, the sieur de Monts, Champlain examined the numerous islands with more care and found ripe grapes growing on Richmond's Island off Cape Elizabeth. The next explorer was apparently Raleigh Gilbert, the second in command at the Sagadahoc Popham Colony (a brother of Bartholomew Gilbert, who was with Gosnold in 1602). In a shallop, Raleigh Gilbert sailed August 28, 1607, from the Sagada-

hoc (Kennebec) River through Casco Bay to Cape Elizabeth, and he also evidently landed at Richmond's Island before making the return trip.

Capt. John Smith arrived at the "Ile of Monahigan in 43 $\frac{1}{2}$ of northerly latitude," a "parte of Ameryca," in April 1614. He was in command of "two ships from London, of a few Marchants," and Smith tells us: "Our plot was there to take whales and make tryalls of a myne of Gold and Copper. If those failed Fish and Fures was then our refuge to make ourselves savers howsoever." In his "Description of New England," Smith tells of the Maine coast "overgrown with all sorts of excellent good woodes for building houses, boats, barks or shippes; with an incredible abundance of most sorts of fish, much fowle, and sundry sorts of good fruites for man's use." Traveling from "point to point, ile to ile, harbour to harbour," Smith noted the resources of the country and wrote: "Here nature and liberty afford us freely that which in England we want or it costeth us dearly." Especially conspicuous, he affirms, was the abundance of timber of all kinds needed for shipbuilding, which was bought "at so great a price" in the European maritime countries. "I dare engage my head," he asserts, "having men skillful to worke the simples there growing, to have all things belonging to the building and rigging of shippes of any proportion and good merchandise for the freight, within a square of ten or fourteen leagues, and if for good rewards I would not fear to procure it in a less limitation." Smith visited Aucocisco—now known as Casco—on the coast, and after writing of the Sagadahoc River, he says: "Westward of this River is the countrey Aucocisco in the bottome of a large deepe Bay, full of many great Iles, which divides it into many good harbours."

There is a tradition that about 1620 "an able vessell" was built at Richmond's Island, just off Cape Elizabeth, by George Richmond, after whom the island was named, and the legend is that Richmond was the head of a trading enterprise employing "fishermen and shipbuilders." It has been suggested that men from the Popham Colony at the mouth of the Kennebec who did not return to England in the autumn of 1608 lived and worked on Richmond's Island, and there is a shadowy hint that Richmond himself or, at any rate, the leading shipwright was an old Popham colonist. It is definitely known from manuscripts that before the Sagadahoc settlement was abandoned, several of the colonists, with Raleigh Gilbert, crossed Casco Bay in a shallop and, after landing on and exploring Richmond's Island, returned to the Popham Colony August 31, 1607.

It is said that in 1631 John Winter built a ship at Richmond's Island for merchants in Plymouth, England. This Maine-built vessel is reported to have made regular voyages for some years between the settlement off Cape Elizabeth and England and probably established "the first regular packet service in the colonies." John R. Spears says, "Winter's work may be called the beginning of the American business of building ships for export." From the Trelawny Papers and the letters of John Winter to his employer, Robert Trelawny (Winter was the agent of the proprietors Trelawny and Goodyear), we glean historic facts concerning the building of certain "barkes" on Richmond's Island. Winter wrote on June 23, 1636:

<p>I do purpose to build our barke about 25 or 30 tonnes; therefore you may Please to send Cables & Canvas for sailes & ropes for Rigginge of her, accordinge for a vessel of that burden, & pitch & tarr, spukes and nailes & Chaine bolts, Rudder Workes</p>	<p>& som boulttes drawn out for knees, & other business which wilbe needfull, which I know the Carpenters at Home Can direct you best what wilbe needfull for a barke of that burden, heare is none to be gotten.</p>
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The bark *Richmond* was built in the winter of 1636-1637 and the following spring and was launched on June 10, 1637. Apparently, the vessel was rigged and practically finished when launched, for on June 20, under Capt. Narias Hawkins, she sailed on her maiden voyage to Massachusetts Bay with a cargo that seems strange going from an island off the Maine coast. Instead of the usual salt fish, furs, or forest products, it consisted of "wine, oil and earthenware," and we are told that the wine and oil found a ready sale, but the earthenware was returned unwanted. The *Richmond* was first employed in the coasting trade "for the Bay, or the Dutch plantation, or Keynetticot." In June 1638, when the ship was about ready to sail, five "discontented" Richmond islanders made an attempt to steal her and her cargo,

but the plot was frustrated because of the vigilance and courage of Captain Hawkins, who slept aboard the bark. In the summer of 1639, the *Richmond*, while on a voyage to Virginia for corn, encountered a hurricane and gave testimony to the staunchness of her construction, for Winter wrote: "They received a great storme at sea and the stripe of the sea laid the barke vppon her side, her ballast shiftinge in the hold, & before she could right her they were faine to cutt their maine mast by the bord, & they lost all their sailes & rigginge of their maine mast, yett I praise God the barke toke no hurt but proceeded in her voyage and returned me home about 51 or 52 hodgheds of Indian corne." Later in the same year, the *Richmond* was sent across the Atlantic to Plymouth, England. On this voyage, the "barke" carried 6,000 pipe staves from Casco, and we are told that this product of the Maine forests "sold at a profit of a little over twenty-five pounds per thousand," or £150 for the cargo of the "30-ton barke." Such a cargo evidently paid even better than salted or cured fish at that time.

There is a record that in 1639 or 1640 John Winter's master carpenter made a plan for a new vessel to take the place of the bark *Richmond*, which had been sent to England. In July 1640, Stephen Sargent, the master builder, reported to Trelawny that almost all the timber had been brought to the island for the ship, the frames were up, and the planking had been commenced. Winter himself wrote his employer at the same time and asked that a certain carpenter named Samson Jupe be sent out to help on the ship construction work. "Jupe," said Winter, "is a very able man for his work and able to do more in one day than the two carpenters on the island can do together." Describing the progress of the work on the new ship, Winter wrote: "The ship is formed up to the top timbers, some 10 or 12 of a side; all that groad timbers, studdell timbers and naval timbers are in and the two bends." But the builders were in need of plank, for although the trees that were to furnish it had been felled for two years, they had not as yet been sawn, and Winter said that, after sawing, they must have the most part of the summer in which to dry and season. It is evident, therefore, that in and around 1640 shipbuilding on Richmond's Island was very slow work, and it would seem that "the new ship" took about two years to build and was not launched until July 15, 1642. Winter blamed the great delay in completing the job on the workmen, who "worke very sparingly and if we speak to them for it the answer is 'if you do not like our work we will be gone,' they knowing our work must be done and no other to be gotten."

John Winter wrote that, when completed, he was much pleased with the new ship *Richmond*, which "swimbed as upright as might be when she was launched and was very stiff on her side." The dimensions he gave as "45 and 50 foot keel, 18½ foot to the beam, with two deck with a forecastle and quarter-deck, 9 foot hold and 4½ foot between decks"; this was a beamy and deep vessel for the period, and the length of the hull over-all or on deck was undoubtedly far more than a "45 and 50 foot" length of (straight) keel would suggest. This second *Richmond* was evidently built for the carrying of Maine fish to Europe, and after taking so long to build her, Winter rushed the work of completion by putting the cargo of "salt fish, traine and fish peas" aboard "as soon as the upper deck was caulked and while the carpenters were finishing the rest of the vessel." As an illustration of the versatility of the master mechanics of the old days, it is interesting to read that Stephen Sargent, the master builder, who "drew the plans" for the ship, took command of her, with a certain Douglass as first mate, and she sailed across the Atlantic for Bilbao, Spain, on her maiden voyage. There do not seem to be records available of "the big shippe *Richmond*" of Maine in service, but it is said that she was successfully and profitably employed in the transatlantic fish trade for years, carrying the product of the Casco Bay fisheries to European markets. The smaller and earlier "barke" *Richmond*, which was sent across the ocean with Casco pipe staves in the fall of 1639, figures in later historical records, and she is mentioned as being confiscated by the Roundheads "for the use of Parliament" along with the other property of the staunch old cavalier and Royalist Robert Trelawny during the early days of the civil war in England (and the rise to power of Oliver Cromwell), which led to the beheading of King Charles I in 1649.

John R. Spears, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, says: "Three facts about Winter's shipyard may be correlated. In 1638, sixty men were at work in it. During the year, a 300-ton ship brought a cargo of wines and liquors to the island. 'It was a sporadic' settlement and it 'dwindled away.'" The statement that sixty men were employed in John Winter's shipyard on Richmond's Island in 1638 positively does not check with the time taken of about eight months to build the first *Richmond*, a "barke about 25 or 30 tonnes," in 1636-1637 or the period of over two years required to build the larger ship *Richmond* in 1640-1642. (At the Popham Colony, in the fall of 1607, the 30-ton sailing pinnace was built in about three months. Some historians say that she was commenced August 19 and was in the water and rigged on October 8, 1607—which seems incredible, although it is said that she was in service before the colony became icebound that winter.) That a ship brought a cargo of "wines and liquor" to the island in 1638 is possible, for the ships carrying salt or cured fish to such markets as Madeira, the Azores, and the Spanish and Portuguese mainland would have to exchange their cargoes for products available for export. It is a matter of record that much of the cargo taken from Richmond's Island on the maiden voyage of the bark *Richmond* in 1637 consisted of wine and oil—and the oil may have been olive oil and not fish oil, which was generally described as "traine." It has been said that the "plantation" on Richmond's Island was primarily intended as a fishing station and that "boats were out almost without interruption the year round to procure cod, which was dried or cured for shipment to the ports of the Catholic countries bordering the Mediterranean." This seems to harmonize somewhat with another authoritative statement: that "a barke of some 30 tonnes burthen was built on Richmond's Island for a Dorchester fishing enterprise." The "sixty men" referred to by Spears as having been at work in Winter's shipyard in 1638 may have been the total number employed by the plantation in its fishing, shipbuilding, and shipping operations. However, Maine differed from Massachusetts from the earliest days, and it will be noted that when the bark *Richmond* sailed from Richmond's Island, Maine, near the end of 1639, her cargo consisted not of fish but of pipe (or barrel) staves. The islands of Casco Bay as well as the coast line were thickly wooded, and we are told that the settlers, from the first, neglected to pursue the field of agriculture, but "found a quicker method of increasing their gains by cutting and sawing pipe staves and clapboards for shipment." It is difficult to imagine that there was much tillable land on the "thickly wooded" Casco Bay islands in the early days of colonization, and as the "nonresident proprietors" cared only for a money return on their capital investment, the statement that the action of the settlers in fabricating pipe staves and clapboards was "much to the disgust of the proprietors" seems somewhat exaggerated and is probably contrary to the fact.

That the production of timber products for the domestic and export trade commenced early in the Casco Bay region is attested by the fact that the first lawsuit tried before a court in Maine (a meeting of Sir Ferdinando Gorges' commissioners held at Saco March 25, 1636) was between William Royall, a clapboard cleaver of Westcustogo (Yarmouth), and Winter and Cleves, of Falmouth Neck and Cape Elizabeth, over pay for the making of clapboards. The parties to the suit were residents of the Casco Bay region, and Gorges, who had conceived and managed the Popham colonization at the mouth of the Kennebec River in 1607, had evidently granted rights of settlement on Richmond's Island to Trelawny in the early 1620's. William H. Rowe, in *SHIPBUILDING DAYS ON CASCO BAY*, says in referring to the early Maine "pipe-stave and clapboard" business:

Some idea of the extent to which this business was carried on both by the tenants on the lands and by others who came in from the settlements farther west may be gathered by reading a letter from Capt. James Parker of ancient North Yarmouth concerning it. "I have this day seen," he indignantly writes, "the choicest timber cut down and sawn into staves. Transient men come down in gangs and cut from the islands; of which there are now nineteen on

Chebeague [Island] and several vessels cutting their load." So great an abuse did this become that the committee in charge of the settlements were forced to order that no timber was to be cut from lands within their control except what was needed by the inhabitants for domestic use or for building their houses. The forests thus furnish the background for the maritime history of Casco Bay and in fact for the entire State of Maine as the fisheries do that

of Massachusetts. She might well hang before her legislators as the symbol of her early struggle for existence not the cod (as did the lawmakers in Boston by resolution in March 1784) but the equally humble and important pipe stave.

Interesting as is Rowe's thought in regard to the pipe stave and correct as are his remarks as to the important position held by the pipe stave in Maine's export shipments of forest products, it was, nevertheless, the pine tree—following the fisheries—on which Maine's prosperity was built. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the fisheries off the coast of Maine were the greatest asset of the province, as the settlers traded with the Indians for furs and built ships for the fisheries and ocean trading; also shallows and boats for river transport. The Monhegan-Pemaquid-Damariscove-Seguine (mouth of Kennebec) area was the popular rendezvous for fishing vessels (and Monhegan for trading vessels) for many long years, but Christopher Leavitt recorded in 1623 that Casco Bay "is very good fishing" and added, "At this place there fished divers ships of Weymouth this year." Was this the George Weymouth (or Weymouth) whose exploratory voyage to the Sagadahoc in 1605 was responsible for the founding of the Popham Colony at the mouth of the river (at the northeastern limit of Casco Bay)? And did Weymouth and his men build ships on Richmond's Island before John Winter established his shipyard there for Trelawny and Goodyear? However, notwithstanding the early importance to Maine settlers of the fisheries and the pipe stave, the appropriate emblem of Maine's prosperity and resources is the pine tree. When early attempts at agriculture for export (to pay off indebtedness to exacting proprietors) failed, Massachusetts "farmed its waters," and the "sacred cod" was—and is—of special significance to the citizens of that colony—and state. Maine had no lands suitable for farming, but its prosperity came from the forests, which, in conjunction with shipbuilding and the fisheries, made it possible for its settlers to survive in the early colonial days in a climate less mild and kind than that of Massachusetts, and as Maine's wonderful white pine timber and lumber gained ascendancy in world trade, Maine rode on the crest of a wave to prosperity.

For about three-quarters of a century, there seems to be no authoritative historical record of ships built in or around Casco Bay or the State of Maine; however, it is known that such ships were built on or near the coast, although the establishing of permanent settlements and shipyards was certainly handicapped by the hostility of the Indians (often aided and abetted by the French, who claimed Maine as a part of New France). Rowe, of the Maine Historical Society, writes: "Among the first vessels of whose building recorded history has taken notice are the sloop *Maquoit*, built at Brunswick by the Pejepscot proprietors in 1720, the sloop built by Thomas Redding in Clay Cove in Portland Harbor in 1727, and the sloop *Packet*, launched by Payne Elwell on Royall's River in 1784."

The new charter of Massachusetts that became effective in 1691 contained a restriction reserving to the British Crown all sizable white pine trees on all lands in Massachusetts—including the province of Maine—not previously granted to a private individual. As far as Maine was concerned, the "private individual" proviso generally meant litigation, accusations of disloyalty to the crown, etc. In the early years of the eighteenth century, Maine was being surveyed for masts for the Royal Navy and the king's "Broad Arrow" cut through the bark of all sizable, straight pine trees. In 1727 the settlement of Falmouth in Casco Bay was established as a regular collecting and shipping port for masting and spars for the English Navy and gradually became of greater importance, by reason of its geographical position nearer the source of supply, than Portsmouth, N. H., the original great mast shipping port on the Piscataqua, as Portsmouth waned because of the cut-out condition of the territory that was naturally tributary to it. The location for cutting and shipping Royal Navy white pine masts and spars moved to the eastward, from Portsmouth to Falmouth; thence to the Kennebec, the Penobscot, and in later years to Canada. THE NEW ENGLAND WEEKLY JOURNAL (Boston) of May 8, 1727, said:

Captain Farles in one of the mast ships now lies at Casco Bay, who, we hear is not a little pleased with the peculiar commodiousness of that fine harbor to carry on the said business. And as this must tend very much to encourage settlements in those parts of the country, especially the flourishing bay that

will be the center of it; so there is no reason to fear upon it very much to their interest to protect and but that our government will in their wisdom, look encourage it.

New Hampshire was not part of Massachusetts as was the province of Maine, although from 1699 to 1741 both had the same governor. To Bostonians, Casco Bay, Cape Elizabeth, and Falmouth were part of the Massachusetts colony, but Portsmouth, N. H., and the Piscataqua were in another rival province, and the fight over the boundary lines of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine, which commenced in 1622, continued until a royal decree was handed down in 1741. Hence Massachusetts and the colonial government at Boston favored Falmouth over Portsmouth and for many years encouraged the development of the lower Maine coast as an eastern colonizing territory—a sort of outpost of Massachusetts in “the wild Down East country.” (The province of Maine sought independence of the colony of Massachusetts from the early days of the War of the Revolution; constant agitation resulted in Maine, until it was declared a separate state by Congress on March 3, 1820.)

Col. Thomas Westbrook, who had lived at Portsmouth, N. H., and had shipped masts for the English Navy “on his own account” from Falmouth, of the province of Maine, received the royal appointment as the “mast agent” in the Casco Bay area and first commenced operations on a large scale at Dunstan’s Landing in the town of Scarborough. Shortly thereafter, the headquarters of operations were moved by Westbrook to Stroudwater, with the masts and spars being floated down Fore River to the mast house, where they were finished and loaded on specially built mast ships and sent to the royal English naval dockyards. Many of the present highways in certain sections of Maine are old mast roads, which were laid out and built for the transportation of heavy, long mast timbers. Falmouth (Maine), organized as a town in 1719, was named after Falmouth, England, famous for its royal dockyards, and it was to Falmouth, England, that most of the ships sailed when loaded with American timber needed by the British for the building of their warships. But Portland itself—when that part of Falmouth, Maine, known as Falmouth Neck was incorporated as a town in 1786—was named after Portland, England, another important British naval center, and Fore River and the Stroudwater, to the immediate southwest of Old Portland, vied with Falmouth, Maine, and Portsmouth, N. H., in importance and activity as collecting and shipping centers of New England ship timbers to be sent under the supervision of the king’s representatives to English dockyards. As Wentworth was prominent in Portsmouth, N. H., as a powerful agent of the English king in acquiring and shipping American white pine masting, spar, and shipbuilding timbers to England so was Westbrook, the king’s mast agent, a person of great authority and prestige in and around the Casco Bay area. In 1754, Thomas Westbrook was succeeded by George Tate as agent and “Surveyor General of the woods of New England for His Majesty George II.” Colonel Westbrook wielded tremendous power in the colony for over thirty years, and the township of Westbrook, which once had great area and ran from well inland to the coast, was named after him. It has been said that “most of the mastings, with the king’s ‘Broad Arrow,’ shipped from Falmouth were cut in the forests of Windham, Westbrook and Gorham.” Both Westbrook and Tate built mast ships and other vessels at Stroudwater and elsewhere in the region, but the records have long since been lost.

James Gooding, shipwright, has been called the father of shipbuilders in the Falmouth-Portland area. He taught many men, including James Milk and Samuel Cobb, the art of building during a period from about 1720 to 1770, but all the vessels that Gooding constructed during his career of some fifty years were very small craft; in fact, he was a competent and busy boat builder. Later, Milk operated a yard in what is now the city of Portland, and Cobb built on Falmouth Neck, moving to New Casco in 1768. A Capt. Alexander Ross, a Scotchman, arrived at Falmouth in 1753 to handle the extensive trade that had developed in masting and timber for ships. It is reported that in 1756 he built a “large ship,” said to have been of 700 tons burden, for transporting American timber to England. A Robert Pagan, another Scotchman, located himself in Falmouth-Portland and was active in the

same business. It is said that Ross and Pagan, between them, constructed several good, sizable ships for those days, which, as did the vessels built of native timber by Colonel Westbrook and George Tate on the Stroudwater, carried their cargoes of New England forest products to England and never returned, the American-built ships being sold in Britain at a good profit. A large and especially constructed ship to carry masts to the royal dockyards in England was built at Falmouth in 1734, it is said, and "many others followed." These ships are reported to have been of from four hundred to six hundred tons burden, "but one at least was built of one thousand tons." It is also said that these ships had ports in the quarters for loading and unloading the masts and that "they could thus carry from fifty to a hundred great masts as well as many smaller pieces as yards and spars." The "very large mast ship *Minerva*," built by a Tory, Capt. Samuel Coulson, in the winter of 1774-1775 at or in the vicinity of Falmouth, was reported as "over 1,000 tons burden," and Captain Coulson arrived at Falmouth on May 2, 1775, bringing from Bristol, England, the standing and running rigging, sails, marine equipment, and supplies needed to complete the ship.

Records show that in 1752 Portland owned seven schooners and fifteen sloops totaling 1,367 tons; the largest vessel measured 80 tons. A brig of about a hundred tons was built in 1753, and the total tonnage of the port in 1774 was only 2,555 tons. England discouraged colonial shipbuilding for deep-sea service. It is said that at the end of the War of the Revolution, Portland did not own a single vessel that was then in serviceable condition for deep-sea work, but it is interesting to note that the community recovered quickly from the persistent harassments, destructive attacks, and the bombardment of the British, for President Timothy Dwight of Yale, on his travels through New England in 1797, said in referring to Portland: "No American town is more entirely commercial and of course none is more spritely. Lumber, fish and ships are the principal materials of their commerce." After the Revolution, the Tory, or British Loyalist, shipbuilders of Portland and the Falmouth region, generally engaged in the masting trade, had moved over the border into Canada. There are records that Robert Pagan (before mentioned) built mast ships in New Brunswick for many years and shipped Canadian white pine masts and spars to English naval dockyards.

The agreement of the First Continental Congress in 1774 to import nothing from and export nothing to Britain and its appeal to the colonists to respect the wishes of the Congress made on April 15, 1775, resulted—following the Lexington and Concord incidents of April 19, 1775—in "cutting off the building yards of the Royal Navy from the source of mast and spar supply [of New England] on which it had depended since the days of Cromwell." It has been said that during the eighteenth century Britain was dependent for the maintaining of its sea power, with its wooden naval sail, upon the forests of its American colonies and that the loss to Britain, "the proud Mistress of the Seas," of the masts from New England was "an important factor in the struggle for American independence." Boston burned the spars and naval stores collected by the British at Noddle Island in Massachusetts Bay; Portsmouth, N. H., refused to let the English take masts away from the Piscataqua, and by June 1775, the once popular governor, Sir John Wentworth, was a refugee; Georgetown (Bath) citizens drove the British shipwrights from the mast-assembly yard at the point of their muskets and forced the English mast ships and their naval escort to drop down the Kennebec River and put to sea empty.

Falmouth, in a very exposed position, exhibited the same bravery and patriotic determination to deprive the British of masting as did Boston, Portsmouth, and Bath, but fared the worst, for the town was bombarded and burned by a British fleet on October 17-18, 1775, "in punishment for showing its sympathies for the rebel cause" and for preventing the British from getting possession of and loading a large quantity of masts onto Capt. Samuel Coulson's brand new, big mast ship *Minerva*, which was on hand to take them to an English royal dockyard. A committee of Falmouth men served notice on Coulson that he would not be permitted to fit out the *Minerva* with English-made equipment, as such would be a violation of the colonial nonimportation act, and he was urged to send the material back to

Britain. Coulson and the English authorities were further informed that, whether or not the *Minerva* was fitted out and equipped for sea, no mastings or spars would be permitted to be loaded aboard her or any other vessel for shipment to England or anywhere else. Coulson, under pretense of going to Boston to apply to the provincial congress for permission to complete his new ship with imported equipment, contacted the admiral of the British fleet instead and from him obtained the aid of Captain Mowatt, R. N., and the British sloop-of-war *Canceaux*; under the guns of the warship, Capt. Samuel Coulson completed the rigging and fitting out of his mast ship *Minerva*.

Attempts of the British to obtain possession of the masts were unsuccessful, and threats were unavailing. On October 18, 1775, the British fleet bombarded from the sea and destroyed the town of Falmouth as punishment for its disloyalty to the English king, its sympathy for the patriotic cause, and its refusal to deliver the much needed white pine masts to the British Navy. As the historian Rowe says, "The business that had brought the town its greatest prosperity brought to it its greatest calamity"—and its destruction.

The Coulson masts and spars, notwithstanding the aggressive and punitive British fleet, never reached an English dockyard to be stepped as a mast, fitted as a bowsprit, or swung as a yard on an English man of war. William Gould says that for many years the historic masts remained "in a cove near Vaughan's Bridge"; that in 1835, sixty years after the destruction of Portland by the British, what could then be salvaged of the masts and spars were "built into Sawyer's Wharf at the foot of High Street, Portland," which, it appears, is now covered by Commercial Street.

Shipbuilding on the Sagadahoc, Maine, in Colonial Days

Capt. George Waymouth, the first European to explore the lower stretches of the Kennebec (Sagadahoc) River and connecting waters, sailed from Dartmouth, England, in the ship *Archangel* on March 31, 1605. He and his party sighted the Azores on April 13 and the shores of America on May 14 at a point much to the south of "their intent"; accordingly, they sailed northward and to the east and, making for the Maine coast, discovered the Isle of Monhegan, where "our men aboard, with a few hooks got above thirty great cods and haddocks which gave us a taste of the great plenty of fish which we found afterwards wheresoever we went upon the coast." From Monhegan, Waymouth could "discerne the maine land." Finding a harbor for his ship and making a landing, he "digged welles," cut needed timber, and carried ashore "the pieces of the pinnesse." The "carpenter and cooper," with needed help, "laboured to fit and furnish forth the shallop." On May 30, Captain Waymouth took the shallop with thirteen men on an exploratory trip and returned when he had found the mouth of a great river, which evidently he had received orders to locate and survey. "Tuesday the 11th of June," we read, "we passed into the river with our ship about six and twenty miles." Later, "the pinnacle" went farther upriver, and a shore party was sent reconnoitering inland. The exact itinerary of the *Archangel* is unknown, but Waymouth was apparently soon satisfied that he had found what his patrons (Sir Ferdinando Gorges, the Earl of Southampton, and Thomas Arundel) had sent him to seek and verify—evidently checking up earlier reports of the coast made by Gosnold in 1602 and Pring in 1603. He sailed for home on June 16, 1605, and anchored in Dartmouth Harbor on July 14.

As a result of Waymouth's enthusiastic report, Sir Ferdinando Gorges organized a company to plant an English colony upon the shore of the Kennebec River, which Waymouth had

named the Sagadahock (Sagadahoc). The first two migrations of colonists in 1606 were intercepted by Spanish pirates in the Atlantic. A third ship, under Thomas Hanham, with Martin Pring as navigator and sailing master, reached the Sagadahoc, but finding no trace of the settlers sent out in the first two ships, the party had to return to England. In early June 1607, an expedition managed by Sir Ferdinando Gorges and principally financed by Sir John Popham (lord chief justice of England), with two ships, the *Mary and John* and *Gift of God*, under the direction of George Popham and Raleigh Gilbert, sailed from Plymouth. Landing on August 18 at the mouth of the Sagadahoc River, the colonists built a fort and established a settlement known as the Popham Colony. Among the skilled artisans sent out by the English company was "one Digby from London, a master shipwright," and under his direction the colonists at once proceeded to build America's first ship, "the *Virginia* of 30 tons burthen."

The prime causes for the selection of the Sagadahoc by Gorges and his associates as the site for a colony in northern Virginia were (1) proximity to the world's greatest deep-sea fishing grounds; (2) the splendid trees growing near navigable waters that could be used for the frames, planking, masts and spars of big ships; (3) the deep-water river "stretching a highway for commerce with the natives far into the interior"; and (4) a capacious harbor "in which the whole royal navy might safely ride."

Samuel de Champlain attempted to reach the Quinibeque (Kennebec, or Sagadahoc) River after exploring the Penobscot in September 1604, but had to return to St. Croix when he ran short of supplies. The following year (1605), in company with Pierre du Guast, sieur de Monts (his patron), twenty men, and several Indians (employed as interpreters and guides), Champlain left St. Croix on June 18 to search for a location for a French settlement farther south in a kindlier climate. They reached Seguin (or Satquin) Island on July 1, where fog bothered them, and they apparently entered the Kennebec by way of waters to the east and the Back River, which brought them to Long Reach—the location of the present city of Bath. Champlain explored the river for several miles upstream, including Merry Meeting Bay and the mouth of the Androscoggin (the Kennebec's principal tributary). Returning to the ocean down the main river, he was impressed with the fact that this was a much superior course, with wider and deeper water, than the one he had used to get to Long Reach. After a winter spent frozen in and isolated on a small island in the Passamaquoddy to the north, Champlain was looking for fertile land to cultivate and grow crops. He was neither a shipbuilder nor a fisherman and had no interest in the sea (except for communication with France in ships built and operated by Frenchmen). His comments on the Kennebec River refer to rocks, pines, and firs (he calls such noble conifers, or evergreen trees, "poor kinds of wood"), a great many oaks, very little tillable land, and an abundance of fish. Champlain says that "the savages who plant the Indian corn dwell very far in the interior." He also tells us that the Indians, during the heavy snows of winter, attach "a kind of racket" (snowshoes) to their feet and hunt big "beasts" (moose and deer) with great advantage, "since these animals cannot walk on the snow without sinking into it." Champlain further says that the Indians "dress themselves in winter in good furs of the beaver and the moose" and that "when they do not hunt, they live on a shellfish, which is called the clam." All this, of course, was hearsay and reported by the Indian interpreter, as Champlain entered the Kennebec at Long Reach about July 4 or 5 and left the river about July 10, or twenty-four days after George Waymouth in the *Archangel* had sailed for Dartmouth (where he arrived on July 14, 1605). The Frenchman Champlain, in his exploration of the Quinibeque (Kinibeque, Kennebec, or Sagadahoc) River, followed the Englishman Waymouth by about a month. The Frenchman was primarily interested in 1605 in finding "a pleasant land for cultivation," free from intense cold and ice, but the Englishman thought of ships, of shipbuilding and of harbors, of deep-sea fisheries, and of trading with ocean transport.

After Champlain had abandoned his first settlement at St. Croix and Champlain and De Monts (following the loss of twelve of the forty-five colonists during the winter of 1605-

1606) had evacuated the much better sight of Port Royal (Nova Scotia) in 1607 and transferred their interests to trading for furs well inland on the St. Lawrence watershed, Pierre Biard, the French Jesuit priest, who had arrived at Port Royal from France in 1611, made an exploratory cruise of the Maine coast as far to the southwest as the Kennebec River in October-November of that year, with the object of locating a site for a mission. This French priest wrote of his impressions of the Kennebec and of what his Indian guide-interpreters had learned of the English Popham Colony, which had annoyed and worried the Indians during 1607-1608. At the time of Biard's voyage, English fishermen were in the Monhegan-Pemaquid area, and two English vessels had shortly before captured a French ship, whose master, Captain Plastrier, had endeavored "to resist this usurpation of the English so obstructive to the rights of His Majesty, for it is well known to all that the great Henry [IV—died 1610] . . . gave to M. des Monts in the year 1604, all this region from the 40th degree North to the 46th." Captain Plastrier was freed by the English, later, and permitted to sail for home on parole after paying a fine for poaching in English waters and pledging that he would never appear to trade or fish off the coast of "Virginia" again.

Pierre Biard and sieur De Biencourt arrived at the mouth of the "Kinnibequi, 80 leagues from Port Royal, the 28th of October, day of St. Simon and St. Jude" (1611). When they commenced their voyage upstream, the Frenchmen met Indians on the river, who promptly and treacherously guided them into shallow water on the west near the river's mouth. Biard tells us little of the Kennebec itself except that the splendidly planned and built Popham Colony, with its St. George's Fort, was no place for a settlement. He and his companions were looking—as was Champlain before them—for tillable fields to grow crops and raise cattle. They had no interest in timber, in shipbuilding, or in ships and ocean trade; they wanted to plant a little bit of agricultural France in the New World and save the souls of the Indian infidels by enslaving them, under the guise of religion, to work for them without pay—for their education and salvation. Biard and De Biencourt spent but little time on the Kennebec, for after leaving the mouth of the river, they called at the island of Emmetenic (Monhegan), where they saw "many boats" of fishermen, and set sail from there for Port Royal on November 6, "as the season urged us on."

Capt. John Smith (1579-1631), during his exploration of New England in 1614, made the fifth survey of the lower stretches of the Kennebec that is known to have been made by a European (or white man), and he followed Waymouth (English, June 1605), Champlain and De Monts (French, July 1605), Raleigh Gilbert (English, September 1607), and Biard and De Biencourt (French, November 1611). Captain Smith, in his "Description of New England" (written in 1615 and describing his explorations, findings, and impressions of the "Northern Virginia" coast during his voyage of the preceding year), says: "Up this river [Sagadahoc, or Kennebec], where was the western plantation [the Popham Colony] are Aumuckcawgen, Kinnebeck, and divers others; where there is planted some corne fields. Along this river 40 & 50 miles I saw nothing but great high cliffes of barren Rocks, overgrowne with woods; but where the salvages dwelt, there the ground is exceeding fat and fertill." Smith had his eye on sites for settlements and was looking for locations with plenty of tillable land, so that the colonists would be self-supporting as far as necessary food (crops and cattle) was concerned; he also had his mind on ocean fisheries for food and trade, but was not particularly interested in shipbuilding, for following up the Jamestown, Va., colonial idea, England would build all the ships required, handle the ocean trade, and even supply the boats needed for water transport.

There is no subject connected with most of the first two centuries of the occupation of America by Europeans about which so little is known as the small vessels built and employed in navigating its waters—river and coastal. We know that in the seventeenth century small craft (shallops, sloops, ketches, etc.) were built in quantity, and in the eighteenth century, larger vessels—more venturesome on the deep seas—such as schooners, brigs, and barks were built and used in trade, going on longer and still longer voyages as the years went by.

There is practically no record in existence of shipbuilding in Maine and on the Kennebec River between 1607 and the middle of the eighteenth century, although it is well known that shipbuilding and shipping flourished on the Kennebec and adjoining waters after the first Popham settlement had been abandoned. Carl C. Cutler has said that, as Maine was settled, shipbuilding rapidly became the major industry of the colony and that there was hardly a cove or river head on its extensive shore front which did not have its shipyard. History tells us that a ship carpenter who came over to the Plymouth people in 1624 soon died, but not until he had built two shallops, one of which was employed in the fall of 1625 "to carry a load of corn on a trading voyage to the Kennebec River." As some of the original Popham colonists did not return to Britain, it is probable that those who stayed were the hardiest, most courageous, and most venturesome and that they settled on the Maine coast and certain parts of the Kennebec and contiguous lands, which benefited by a system of wonderful waterways—ideal for traffic and trade.

Maine-built vessels from the very first have been deep-sea craft. Water travel in Maine was primarily ocean, and the latitude is such that heavy winds and seas are not uncommon. Whereas the Dutch settling around the Hudson River and Long Island Sound and the colonists still farther south on the Delaware and Chesapeake used generally protected waters for trading and built shallops or open boats with sails and oars, the Pilgrims and early colonists in Massachusetts and Maine soon learned that decked-in craft and canvas as a means of propulsion were necessary for ocean work. In the second decade of the seventeenth century, English fishermen-traders and boat builders lived around the mouth of the Sagadahoc, Damariscove, and Pemaquid, and we read that shortly thereafter the coast "was studded" with English fishing operations and that "there was some homesteading." The fishermen and, later, the cutters of timber and the tillers of the soil (who became traders) built their own ships—and generally sailed them to find and supply a market for their product.

The Plymouth Colony in 1630, with a trading grant, formed a company to develop "both sides of the [Kennebec] river for a great distance from its mouth inland." The land was about thirty miles from east to west and about fifteen miles north and south and had the river running through its center; a trading post, which had been established in 1628 at the Indian village of Koussinoc (or Cushnoc) about forty miles from the river's mouth, was at about the geographical center of the grant and the location of the present city of Augusta—the capital of the State of Maine. We are told that the Plymouth Colony, in establishing this trading post, was primarily interested in bartering with the Indians for furs to be sent to England. It is said that "ships were built from the fine timber growing in the region" to carry the furs to the Plymouth Colony, for there was no such timber available at Plymouth for the building of ships as was found in profusion around the banks of the Kennebec River.

Christopher Lawson was probably the first real settler within the geographical limits of the present city of Bath, and he had established himself there in 1639 or 1640. Major Thomas Clarke and Capt. Thomas Lake, two men "gifted with more than ordinary vision and enterprise," planned "an industrial and commercial empire" on the Kennebec River and "did in or about the year 1650 and from and after that time . . . cause to be built several ships, boats and vessels, which they fitted out and victualled and loaded them with produce for Boston and other parts." These two energetic and capable pioneers formed the historic firm of Clarke and Lake and succeeded the company created by the Plymouth Colony. It is said that they "established a great business with a center at Rowsick Town (part of Bath) and built and operated vessels." We hear of activities in the region in 1659 of John Layton, shipwright, and in 1660 of John Pritchett, mariner; in 1661 the names of Thomas Davis and John Larrabee, whose progeny were famous shipbuilders a century and a half or more later, appear in records. Young William Phipps (or Phips), the future knight and governor, served as shipyard apprentice from 1669 to 1673 at the Clarke and Lake yard and built ships on his own account at a yard on the east bank of the Kennebec at Woolwich—his birthplace.

The first titles to the territory on which Bath stands were obtained from the aboriginal inhabitants. The great sachem whose rule extended over the many tribes of Indians living in the country around the lower Kennebec basin was known as "Robin Hood"; from him and subordinate sagamores, Robert Gutch, an Englishman who reached the region from Salem, Mass., obtained title to territory that mainly comprised what is now the city of Bath by a deed dated May 29, 1660. Gutch lost his life by drowning in 1667 and left a son John and six daughters. Of the daughters, one, Lydia, married a William Rogers, a name famous in later Bath shipbuilding history. The center of Clarke and Lake's business activities was "Rowsick Town" (now Arrowsic) between the present village of Phippsburg—named after Phipps, the shipbuilding governor of the seventeenth century who "had sailed to a baronety on a Kennebec-built ship"—and the city of Bath. A section of Sagadahoc, designated as Kennebec and referred to as a town (including the present site of the city of Bath), appeared in the records of 1665. History tells us that "in 1670 there were thirty families on the east side and twenty on the west side of the Sagadahoc, not counting Woolwich" (which is today the village on the east side, or left bank, of the Kennebec River directly opposite the city of Bath).

Explorer Waymouth had thought in 1605 that the Indians called the Kennebec River the "Sagadahock," or "Sachadehock," for he referred to it in his report as this "most excellent and beneficial river of Sachadehock capable of shippinge for traffique of the greatest burden." (Other explorers in the early years of the seventeenth century called it the Quinibequy, Kিনি-bequi, or Kinnebeck—also giving their authority as Indian usage.) For a century or more the settlements on the lower Kennebec were known as "Sagadahock," which is now the name of the county (Sagadahoc) of which Bath is and has been for years the capital center. In 1716 the town of Georgetown was incorporated; it comprised the present site of Bath and included what is now West Bath, Phippsburg, Winnegancee, Woolwich, Georgetown, and Arrowsic. Names that were later prominent among Bath wood shipbuilders and made history, such as Lemont, Donnell, Rogers, Drummond, Robinson, etc., appear in the earliest records of the Sagadahock-Georgetown-Long Reach settlement. Among the list of grantees in the instrument dated June 16, 1736, dealing with the construction of a meeting house, the first public building in Georgetown, appear the names of John Minott as well as William Rogers, Thomas and John Lemont, Patrick and James Drummond, and William Kelley—names famous in Bath wood shipbuilding a century and a half later; also the name of John Parker, shipwright.

It was not until 1747 that Sagadahock, or Georgetown, as a settlement of Anglo-Saxons, was safe from Indian raids, and colonists could build, develop, and plan for their future with confidence. In 1781 the settlement at Long Reach, known as the Second Parish of Georgetown ("with an area of about twenty-seven square miles, in length about nine miles and in breadth about three"), had become so important in trade and shipbuilding that it seceded from Georgetown. Thereafter it became known as "Bath" after one of Britain's prime ports of ancient days located on the River Avon, twelve miles southeast of Bristol and described as "the most nobly placed and best-built city in all England"; for we are told that in the eighteenth century "the American settlers at Long Reach then active in the shipping business sent their vessels constantly to that mart of trade and commerce."

John Lemont built vessels on his New Meadows property (a few miles northwest of the present site of Bath) prior to 1745, and as early as 1743, Jonathan Philbrook and his sons were constructing sailing vessels on the southeastern extremity of the point which is now Bath's business center. Capt. William Swanton's shipyard was at the foot of Bath's present Summer Street, and later he had a yard which is now the foot of South Street. Swanton built vessels on contract, and of him historians say, "He was actively engaged in shipbuilding from 1762 until the Revolution and was the founder of Bath's shipbuilding industry." Swanton's first vessel—the first ship built by contract in the American colonies—was the *Earl of Bute*. As before stated, this sizable craft was built in 1762 for a Scotch merchant, and it is known

that the following year "a ship was built for an English merchant named Jenness." In 1764, Swanton built the *Rising Sun* for a Mr. Ayles, which was followed a year later by a vessel named the *Moon*, and it is said that his yard continued to turn out one or more ships a year until the Revolution brought about a suspension of operations. Of the numerous ships credibly reported to have been built by William Swanton, names are now known of fifteen and meager statistics are available for only four. Joshua Raynes (a surname important in the 1850's in connection with the building of clippers on the Piscataqua) appears on records as having built the sloop *Union* in 1772, but it is known that Raynes began building vessels in the Bath region about the same time as Captain Swanton.

When Captain Waymouth made the first exploration of Maine centering around the Kennebec River in 1605, he was deeply impressed with the fine timber trees for ships growing in profusion. Capt. John Smith cruised along the Maine coast and up the Kennebec in 1614 and noted the splendid stands of great pine trees, tall and straight, that would make masts and spars for the largest of ships. During the complete last half of the seventeenth century and as long as England dominated the American colonies, it considered New England its most valuable source of supply for timber needed in British shipyards. For well over a century, the white pine forests of Maine and New England furnished "the Royal Navy with great masts." When the wars with continental powers cut off Britain's source of supply of European-grown timber, England turned to its American colonies in desperate need of forest products for shipbuilding and particularly long timber for masts.

From the Piscataqua through Casco Bay and the Kennebec River region, this mast trade of the colonies with England was important, but the settlers on the Kennebec did not take kindly to it. They wanted to build ships in quantity themselves instead of furnishing the materials for British shipbuilders, and the interest of the crown in Maine timber for shipbuilding stimulated Maine colonists to build ships for their own use with this excellent timber. Maine was a province deemed of importance and value primarily because of its forests, and as the years advanced the timber growing inland and near its river banks caused settlements to be planted, trees felled, lumber sawn, and ships built to carry the forest products to market—just as, from the earliest days, ships were built in settlements on the coast to catch deep-sea fish and then transport them, after salting, to the markets of the West Indies, the islands in the eastern Atlantic, and the Catholic countries of western Europe. Therefore, from the first, Maine was a shipbuilding province, and William H. Rowe has written that from the time "when her pine forests were furnishing the masts and spars that helped to make Britannia ruler of the waves, until the close of the era of the wooden sailing vessel, Maine merited the title of Mother of the Wooden Ship. This is one of her most glorious heritages."

It was only a few days after the historic clashes between the British and the colonists at Lexington and Concord, Mass., on April 19, 1775, and the firing of the first shot in the War of the Revolution that Georgetown (Bath) patriots on the Kennebec, Maine, drove the British masting agents from the river and refused to permit them to take any more Maine trees to be used in the building of British ships of war. This Georgetown incident is worthy to be ranked in importance with the famous Boston Tea Party in the history of the colonies' Rebellion against the arbitrary laws of England and its domination—void of justice and of consideration for the desires, needs, and well-being of New Englanders.

In an historian's list of "Bath men who took a prominent part in the Revolution," as colonists opposed to Great Britain, appear forty-six names, of which twenty-five are conspicuous in the record of Bath shipbuilding in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the list are six Lemonts, three Sewalls, two Shaws, two Philbrooks, and representatives of each of the following families: Berry, Crooker, Donnell, Farrin, Mitchell, Raynes, Ring, Swanton, Trufant, Turner, Weeks, and White. These are all names of importance in the history of the wood shipbuilding industry of the Kennebec River and the province of Maine.

From early days, the part of the New World of the Europeans now known as Massachusetts was renowned for its fisheries and the territory that became Maine, "The Pine Tree State," for its timber. The forests of Maine furnished the background for the marine history of the state and caused it—and specifically the Kennebec River and the city of Bath—to become the greatest wood shipbuilding center of the world. Robert P. Tristram Coffin, in his excellent book on the Kennebec River, speaks of the forests of Maine, hundreds of miles deep, on both sides of the Kennebec "coming right down to its back doorstep." He also refers to the peculiar characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon settlers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries: "Quick as quicksilver in mind, full of Yankee love of mechanical gadgets, downright and solid and honest and yet full of imagination and daring." Continuing, he writes:

Every man who had a farm with its feet in the Kennebec built himself a ways, borrowed his neighbors' adzes and mallets, got the oxen dragging down the long logs, and built himself a second house that could go out on the globe where money was to be made; David Trufant, at Trufant's Creek, Davis, Clarke and Lake, Swanton, Clapp, Jonathan Hyde, and William King. The new kind of traveling houses slid into the Kennebec and started off on

their travels. They grew rapidly in size, taller, and caught more of the wind in their sails. They took Kennebec lumber and Kennebec fish to the West Indies and brought back marketable cargoes. Many of them paid for themselves in one trip. They began to nose their way across the Atlantic to England and beat the English at their own national game of commerce.

In colonial days, the Kennebec was a noted timber, lumber, and shipbuilding river, and its vessels as well as its timber products were in great demand outside the province and the country. Following the successful outcome of the Indian, French, and Revolutionary wars and the impetus given the opening up and settlement of the territory, the Kennebec was crowded with vessels sliding down its shipyard ways and putting out to sea not only to carry Maine products but also to engage in the world's ocean-carrying trade. Coffin has written: "Every farm that touched the Kennebec had a ship making, and farmers dropping their wheat cradles and taking a turn with a mallet. A father laid down a keel almost as often as he begot a son. A new boy and a new brig to make him his living." And, again, we read that Maine wooden sailing ships were unique in the early days. "They were not aggregations of the work of specialists. They were built by families. From keel to topmost spar they were another such thing as a farmhouse. They were members of a family, like a son or daughter. Sons and daughters often had a share built into them, as they had their own rooms built into the family house when it was going up. Every bit of work that went into them was a labor of love. Many of them were built at home, and the children played among the shavings inside the ribs of them just as they played in woodshed or barn. Yankee captains kept house at sea, around the earth. Their wives went along with them oftentimes and made a rolling cabin a home. Many Maine babies were born on the other side of the globe. Maine men went on their honeymoons around the world. A wife did her family shopping in Europe and the Orient. Her home was the wide world."

Coffin also tells in his inimitable fashion the reason why Maine ships outlasted all other wood sail and why the Down Easter survived against the fierce and relentless competition of iron and steam for almost half a century following the collapse, depression, and panic associated with the essentially uneconomic clipper ship boom of mid-century.

There were good reasons why Kennebec ships led the world. One was, they were better ships. They were built solid, they carried the biggest cargoes, being almost square in their holds amidships, their masts were very tall, and the seamen could pile on the canvas to a fare-you-well. And they did. They went past the best from Bristol and Liverpool and were gone over the horizon almost before the British could call them crazy Yankees. They could be built more economically than any ships going. They were honestly made, and yet full of gadgets for handling

canvas and making sailing easy. They were as solid as Maine manhood. And they were beautiful. A bow high and fine and a sheer like a sea gull's wing. The clippers of New York and Massachusetts could beat them in speed, but those ships carried smaller cargoes, they were for looks more than business, and they had faded like ghosts when the sturdy Bath ships were still swinging along on all the seas.

There were better reasons still. The Maine seamen were the highest paid and the best in the world. They were mechanical-minded and followed

the sea for the love of it. They were lords of creation, living a hundred feet over the sea on the cobwebs of the rigging, among the American stars and close to the sun. They had the eagle in them and the great American pride.

Their masters were cut from the same cloth. They were not hired men. They were owners or part owners of the ships they sailed. They were business agents in foreign ports and shrewd buyers and sellers.

Colonial Shipping and Shipbuilding Immediately prior to the Revolution

Several historians tell us that by the year 1760 the New England provinces were building annually some three to four hundred trading vessels, to say nothing of a multitude of small craft for fishing along shore. "The coast from New York Harbor to Eastport, Maine," writes Henry Hall, our government historian, "was one long row of shipyards, and wherever there was a village planted by the sea, there some vessel was to be seen in course of construction."

During the year 1769, the "entrances" to all parts of the American colonies that now comprise the United States amounted to 332,146 tons; the "clearances" totaled 339,302 tons, of which 99,121 cleared for Great Britain, 42,601 for southern Europe and Africa, 96,382 for British and foreign West Indies, and 101,198 for the continent of America and the Bahamas. These figures are of interest, and they show that the percentage of American colonial products exported to the mother country—six years before the War of the Revolution—was only 29.2 per cent of the total exports; moreover, only 41.7 per cent of all exports crossed the Atlantic to northern and southern Europe, Africa, and Mediterranean ports, and 58.3 per cent went to the islands of the Caribbean, West Indies, and Central and South American ports. The 1769 aggregate value of the imports was stated at £2,623,412 and the exports as £2,852,441, of which Great Britain sent £1,604,975 of goods to the colonies and received £1,531,516 of stated value in return.

Before the Revolution, the American colonies challenged "the traditional supremacy of the Baltic" in the field of timber products. New England white pine was admittedly supreme and in great demand for masting, and it was unequaled as a soft, strong, and durable lumber for construction work and other purposes where quality was needed. American hardwood furnished most of the barrel staves, hoops, and headings required abroad, and white and live oak supplied the framing for a large part of Britain's merchant ships. Such timber was generally substituted for the fine "old English oak" that had become virtually "cut out," even though reforestation had been in effect for many years. America was Britain's source of supply for marine stores, resin, tar, pitch, turpentine, etc.; also tanbark, potash, hides, and peltries. Tobacco was an export of prime importance. The southern colonies shipped abroad large quantities of rice and indigo, while the middle colonies exported a good deal of wheat, corn, and flour.

Reports of colonial commerce in the early 1770's show that a vast amount of business was being done with the West Indian islands. In a year, the middle colonies exported about 1,000,000 bushels of wheat and corn and 36,000 tons of flour and wheat; while New England shipped 42,000,000 ft. of pine and oak, 62,000,000 shingles, whole houses in sections, small boats, cart wheels, 300,000 quintals of dried fish, 22,000 barrels of salted meats, cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry as well as potatoes and turnips. The sugar islands of the West Indies had always been an excellent market for New England fish and lumber, but as the planters found it cheaper to import practically all the food for the slaves rather than divert labor to grow it,

the market broadened greatly in the eighteenth century to the advantage of the middle as well as the New England colonies.

The American ships in the West Indian trade generally returned with profitable cargoes, the article most often imported being molasses. In 1771, 4,159,008 gallons of molasses officially entered the colonies, of which about one-half was utilized for making rum—distilled chiefly in Newport, Boston, Medford, New York, and Philadelphia. During that same year, 2,160,790 gallons of West Indian rum were imported and some 213,200 gallons of heavy wine, mostly Madeira but also some port. Part of the rum was exported in American ships and bartered on the African coast for Negro slaves, ivory, and palm oil, and quantities were sent "to fortify" the fishermen of Newfoundland, etc. However, it is estimated that the colonials themselves consumed about 4,000,000 gallons of rum and some 200,000 to 250,000 gallons of heavy wines per year. Whereas exports to Great Britain were principally tobacco, rice, indigo, naval stores, etc., from the southern colonies and masting, forest products, and furs from New England, the quantity of imports was very large, with the balance of trade always greatly in favor of Britain, particularly in its trade relations with the northern maritime provinces. The colonies imported about 1,500,000 bushels of salt per year, about 150,000 pounds of pepper and paprika, some fifty different kinds of British textiles, a quarter of a million hats and large quantities of ladies' and men's apparel, a great amount and assortment of drugs, a wide variety of manufactured articles for home and farm use, etc. This extensive ocean commerce was of great importance to the prosperity of the colonies, and it not only furnished a good profitable business for American shipbuilders, shipowners, and merchants but also provided a livelihood for great numbers of hardy seamen. At the beginning of the Revolution, America was a great shipbuilding country, and, it is said, "the colonies were sending to sea two thousand ships manned by thirty-three thousand men."

According to official figures (adjusted because of admitted error), colonial ship construction probably did not exceed 4,000 tons in 1700, but it averaged about 35,000 tons per year, or nearly nine times as much, some seventy years later. Most historical records of early American-built ships deal with only the large ships built, and most writers have been local boosters and propagandists. As a contrast to the reports on the building of big ships during the eighteenth century and to show how widely the shipbuilding was spread throughout the colonies prior to the Revolution, it is interesting to note that in the year 1769 twelve of the American colonies along the Atlantic Coast launched 389 vessels. They were, however, of small size as were practically all ships built at that time, the aggregate register of the 389 vessels being only 20,001 registered tons and the average per vessel a scant 52 tons. These figures of production (taken from Lord Sheffield's "Review of American Commerce" and the Journal of the House of Commons), divided among the shipbuilding states, are as follows:

Colony	Number of Vessels Built	Tonnage		Colony	Number of Vessels Built	Tonnage	
		Total	Average per Vessel			Total	Average per Vessel
Massachusetts	137	8,013	59	Virginia	27	1,269	47
New Hampshire	45	2,452	55	New York	19	955	50
Connecticut	50	1,542	31	South Carolina	12	789	66
Pennsylvania	22	1,469	67	North Carolina	12	607	51
Rhode Island	39	1,428	37	New Jersey	4	83	41
Maryland	20	1,344	67	Georgia	2	50	25

Of all the 389 vessels built in 1769, 113, or 29 per cent, were square-riggers (i.e., three-masted ships or two-masted brigs) and 276, or 71 per cent, were schooners and sloops, most of which, however, as was the custom of the time, carried yards and square topsails.

It is surprising that the Southern States did not rise to prominence as shipbuilding communities in relation to the Northern States. Whereas the latter were favored with large white pine trees suitable for masting and fairly abundant quantities of white oak, the Southern States had a much superior live oak, and in later years a large percentage of American ships were built with oak timber and hard pine planking shipped to New England yards from the South.

In 1769 the four New England States of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut (the present State of Maine was included in the colony known as Massachusetts) built 271, or about 70 per cent, of the number of ships and 13,435 tons, or over 67 per cent, of the total tonnage. The five Southern States of Virginia, Maryland, North and South Carolina, and Georgia built 73, or 19 per cent, of the number of ships and 4,059 tons, or 20 per cent, of the total tonnage. Pennsylvania and New Jersey built 26 of the vessels, aggregating 1,510 tons (about 7 per cent), and New York constructed only 19, or 5 per cent, of the number and 955 tons, or $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, of the registered tonnage of all the craft built in the colonies during the year. The figures show how far back New York stood as a shipbuilding state and that it had not as yet overcome the handicap of the restrictive occupation of the Dutch. Of the vessels built in New York, five were square-riggers, and fourteen were sloops and schooners. During the years immediately preceding the War of the Revolution, New York shipping was increasing at a rapid rate. According to David Ramsay, New York owned 477 vessels in 1762, and the number had advanced to 709 in 1772—a gain of 48.6 per cent in ten years.

But few of the vessels built in the American colonies in 1769 exceeded a recorded measurement of 100 tons, and none, as reported, was of over 200 tons. While the British statistics for the year show an increasing diversity in shipbuilding activity compared with earlier periods, New England still continued overwhelmingly as the shipbuilding area of the colonies. The report of the number of vessels constructed testifies eloquently to the thriving condition of shipping enterprises (and this in spite of the jealousy of English shipbuilders and the repressive and restrictive policies of the British Government); yet the individual smallness of the vessels affords an accurate commentary on naval architecture and marine shipping of the period. Truly the world "had not progressed much beyond the cockleshell stage."

In 1749, the records show, 504 vessels cleared from the port of Boston and 489 entered, not counting coastwise traders and fishing craft. Philadelphia, the same year, had 291 clearances and 303 entries, and New York showed about the same volume of trade as Philadelphia; while Portsmouth, N. H., had 121 clearances and 73 entries, excluding about two hundred coasting vessels.

Capt. Richard Derby (1712-1783), of Salem, who retired from active life at sea and continued his career as a shipowner, merchant, and banker in 1757, can be considered as typical of the leading and most successful colonial shipowners of the period that immediately preceded the Revolution. He declined to arm his ships—either as privateers or as letters of marque—until actual war with Britain compelled him to do so in the spring of 1776. Derby was a peaceful, resourceful trader and, like his contemporaries, succeeded in evading or circumventing Britain's arbitrary Navigation Laws and Trade Acts, which, if conformed with to the letter and in the spirit, would have virtually destroyed the American merchant marine. During the period 1757-1764, Derby did a thriving trade with Bilboa and the Spanish peninsula via Madeira with the ship *Antelope* and the two brigs *Neptune* and *Ranger*, and his smaller vessels made occasional voyages in this service. His Bilboa agent, or "factor," was Gardoqui & Company. Although Derby did not trade direct with England, he established and maintained an account with Lane & Fraser, of London, lodging with this company sizable funds against which his captain, when abroad, could draw by means of letters of credit. For instance, when on one voyage the outward cargo of the ship *Antelope* did not realize when sold in Spain sufficient funds to pay for a certain desired and relatively expensive return cargo, R. Anderson & Company, an English banking and commercial house at Gibraltar, wrote to

Derby: "We shall supply him [the captain of the *Antelope*] with whatever sum he may be deficient against his Bills on London where he tells us he has a Credit lodged for that Purpose." The captains of the Derby ships—in harmony with the American custom—were responsible, as merchants, for (1) disposing of the outward cargo to the best possible advantage at the port (or in the country) of destination and (2) purchasing a profitable cargo, at advantageous prices, for the return passage.

During this same period, Derby operated a fleet of small vessels, which included the square topsail schooners *Pembroke*, *Three Brothers*, *Three Sisters*, *Mary*, and *Charming Kate* and the square topsail "single stickers," or sloops, *Betsy* and *Sally* in the West Indian trade; these craft would generally carry out fish, lumber, grain, and livestock (horses, cows, sheep, or pigs) and return with sugar, molasses, cotton, indigo, or fruits. Occasionally, Derby would send one of his vessels on a triangular voyage, but he seems to have frowned upon the usual colonial triangular trade of "rum, slaves, and molasses"; for on a triangular voyage of the ship *Antelope*, the vessel carried fish, lumber, and rum from Salem to Cadiz, crossed to Tangier, where she loaded a cargo of mules, which she carried to the West Indies, and on the third and last leg of the voyage returned home with sugar and molasses.

The Richard Derby records preserved at Salem show a remarkable similarity of pay for seafaring men. In order to encourage a deep personal interest and obtain the best possible service along trading lines on the part of the captains, Derby, like many other owners, employed them "on primage," which means that they obtained a certain percentage of the profits of a voyage in addition to their regular wage. During the period from 1760 to 1783, the officers and crew of Derby ships received the following monthly wages:

Masters	from £2- 8-0 to £3- 7-0
Mates	" 2- 5-0 " 3- 0-0
Able seamen	" 2- 8-0 " 2-14-0
Common seamen	" 1-17-0 " 2- 8-0
Cooks	" 1- 7-0 " 2- 6-0
Cabin boys—generally	1- 4-0

Both officers and crew were shipped for a round voyage and were paid a month's wages in advance and the balance on their return home.

Richard Derby, in 1736, when twenty-four years of age, appears as master of the "sloop *Ranger* on a voige to Cadiz," Malaga, etc., taking a cargo composed principally of fish. We are told that Captain Derby, with a mate and a crew of four men, made a successful voyage and returned with olive oil, fruits, wine, handkerchiefs, etc. In late 1739, records show that he was master of the "skoner *Ranger*" and trading with St. Martin's in the French West Indies. Like most other colonial skippers trading with the French islands, he was favored (even though prohibited from such business by both French and English laws), as the duty levied on goods exported from the English West Indian islands was $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and from the French only 1 per cent. The following letter of instructions given to Capt. Richard Derby in 1741, when he was master as well as part-owner of the square topsail schooner *Volante* and about to make a voyage to the West Indies, is indicative of the colonial policy that developed through the years of "disdain and contempt" for arbitrary British laws that were believed to be aimed at crippling American commerce and impoverishing the country:

If you should go among the French Endeavor to gett Sale at St. Martins, but if you should fall so low as Statia; & any Frenchman Shou'd make you a good Offer with good Security, or by making your Vessel a Dutch Bottom or any other means practicable in order to your getting among ye French, embrace it among whom if you Should ever Arrive, be sure to give strict orders amongst your men not to sell the least Trifle unto them on any Terms least they shou'd make your vessel liable to a Seizure.—also Secure a permit so as for you to Trade there the next Voyage, wch you may Undoubtedly do by your Factor & a little greasing some others;—also make a proper Protest at any Port you Stop at.

In plain language, this means that Captain Derby, if he found it to the interest of his ship and her owners to do so, was to procure a Dutch registry and make the *Volante* tempo-

rarily into a Dutch vessel and thus not subject to certain restrictive navigation acts. It would seem that it became a simple matter for an American colonial ship to buy such registries for temporary use and masquerade under French, Dutch, Spanish, or English colors if graft was paid, or "a little greasing" applied, to the customs officers in the West Indies.

Capt. Richard Derby, the recipient of this illuminating letter of instructions, was the grandson of Roger Derby, the founder of the family in America, who settled at Salem in 1671 and engaged in maritime trade. Capt. Richard Derby was the leading Salem shipmaster and, later, shipowner and merchant of his day. He lived through the Revolution and was a prominent historic figure in defying Britain's military might in the years immediately preceding the Declaration of Independence. He had six children, three sons and three daughters. But little is known of the eldest son, Richard, but he went to sea and, when twenty-four years of age, was master of the brig *Neptune*. A letter written by him to the Salem home office while he was at Gibraltar in 1758 gives a good idea of trade conditions at that time:

I wrote you the 1st instant by way of Cadiz and Lisbon; since which I have landed my white sugar and sold it for \$17½ per cwt., and my tar I have sold at \$8½ per bbl. I have not as yet sold any of my fish, not at present does there appear to be any buyer for it; but as it is in very good order, and no fear of its spoiling, I intend to keep it a little longer. I am in hopes that this Levanter will bring down a buyer for it. I hope to get \$12 for my brown sugar. We have this day had the *Sallie* delivered up to us and intend to sell her for the most she will fetch; as to sending her to the West Indies, I am sure if

she was loaded for St. Eustia, she would be seized by the privateers before she got out of the road, and having no papers but a pass, would be sufficient to condemn her in the West Indies, if she should be taken by an English cruiser. I have bought 140 casks of claret, at \$10 per cask, which I intend to bring home with me. I have written Alicant for 500 dozen handkerchiefs, if they can be delivered for \$4 current per dozen. My cargo home I intend shall be 140 casks of claret, 20 butts of Mercil wine, 500 casks of raisins, some soap and all the small handkerchiefs I can get.

John, the youngest son of the Salem shipowner-merchant Richard Derby (senior), like his oldest brother Richard, followed the sea and in 1775 achieved fame as the captain of the square topsail schooner *Quero*, which made the historic fast crossing of the Atlantic to England carrying news of the Battle of Lexington and beating by a couple of weeks or so on the passage the British "express packet ship" *Sukey*. Capt. John Derby was also the master of the letter-of-marque ship *Astrea* (built in 1782), which on the return passage of her maiden voyage brought the first news to America of the end of the war with Britain and the agreement reached in regard to peace terms. John Derby (1741-1812) was master of a vessel engaged in the West Indian service when he was twenty-two years of age. The following letter written by him to his father during his first voyage in command of a ship is a human as well as historically interesting document, as through it we glean side lights of the operation of colonial vessels in the West Indian trade at the close of the Seven Years' War:

In Sight of the Rolserfer
28 March—1763

Hond. Sir.—I am about to wright a Letter that is not agreeable to me. Nither will it be to you I beleave. I met with the misfortune of loosing all my anker on the Banck & was abliged to put back to Providence to refit & sailed from there 2 days ago & this day met Capt. Boudetch from the Havana who tells me of the bad marckets there is there. & now Sir I am undertaking a thing grait consequence but Sir I hope it will turne out for the best but Sir if it does not I hope it will be overlocket by you. That is I am about to put away for Charlestown in

South Carolina. I whould have proseaded as far as Havana as it was but being afraid of lengthening time & of our wines growing bad thought it best to mack the best of our way for Charlestown which is all the marckets we have to trust too now. I shall endeaver to macking payable on my arivall at Charlestown. If I should think of any whare else that was lickly for a better market I whould prosead let it be whare it whould. Excues haist as night is coming on. Capt. Boudetch can enform you of any particulars relating to my affairs. My duty to you and my mother.

Your dutiful son

John Derby

Elias Hasket Derby (1739-1799), the second son of Capt. Richard Derby, never went to sea. When a young man, he entered his father's counting house and was trained to carry on the shore management of the extensive shipping and mercantile business, which included not only foreign trade but also the operation of a large wholesale and retail store and a considerable banking business. Elias H. Derby practically operated the Derby fleet during the Revolu-

tionary War, and he was one of America's two greatest shipowners and merchants at the turn of the century, the other being William Gray (1750-1825), also of Salem, but later of Boston, Mass. Gray was an historic figure, a most able man of vision and courage, and a pioneer in American trade expansion on the Seven Seas.

In a report made by Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to the House of Representatives dated February 2, 1791, regarding the whale and cod fisheries were listed statistics of the whale fisheries of Massachusetts from 1771 to 1775 that give quite definite information regarding the status of the deep-sea colonial whaling business during the few years preceding the Revolution. This statistical record (condensed and rearranged) for the Massachusetts whaling fisheries alone is as follows:

Hailing Port	Vessels Fitted out Anually	Tonnage		Seamen Employed		Annual Take in Barrels	
		Total	Average per Ship	Total	Average per Ship	Spermaceti	Whale Oil
Nantucket	150	15,075	100.5	2,025	13-14	26,000	4,000
Dartmouth	80	6,500	81.3	1,040	13	7,200	1,400
Wellfleet	30	2,600	86.7	420	14	2,250	2,250
Boston	20	2,000	100.0	260	13	1,800	600
Martha's Vineyard	12	720	60.0	156	13	900	300
Falmouth (Barnstable County)	4	300	75.0	52	13	400	—
Swansey	4	300	75.0	52	13	400	—
Lynn	2	195	97.5	28	14	200	100
Barnstable	2	150	75.0	26	13	240	—
Total	304	27,840	91.6	4,059	13.34	39,390	8,650

Of these vessels, 183, or 60 per cent, were employed in the northern whale fisheries and 121, or 40 per cent, in the southern. The whalers in the northern fisheries averaged about 75 tons and those in the southern about 115 tons each. The quantity of oil brought in from both the northern and southern fisheries was stated as 1,250,785 gallons of sperm and 272,475 gallons of whale oil. The right whales gave ten pounds of bone for each barrel of oil, and this bone sold for about 15 cents a pound. One-quarter of the oil of the sperm whales came from the head and sold for \$150.00 per ton, or \$18.75 per barrel. Plain sperm oil sold for \$100.00 per ton, and right whale oil, which was darker and of a "rank odor," brought \$50.00 per ton. The number of ships engaged in the colonial whaling business in 1775 other than those owned in Massachusetts was estimated at 56 and the tonnage at about 5,000 tons. It would seem, therefore, that immediately preceding the War of the Revolution, the colonies had 360 vessels engaged in the deep-sea whale fisheries, aggregating approximately 33,000 tons and carrying about 4,850 men. These little ships, which averaged only about 90 tons, were often discoverers and pioneers. They braved the fiercest gales at sea and generally traveled in uncharted waters. They had the hardiest, most courageous and resourceful crews, and when well handled—as they usually were—and favored by Dame Fortune, they often paid for themselves on their first voyage, thus making the net return from all subsequent voyages and catches clear gain.

Robert G. Albion says that the colonial merchant marine in 1700 amounted to a thousand vessels, many of which were employed in the important carrying trades of the empire. By the time of the Revolution, the number of "colonial-built" under British register was 2,342, or a fourth of the total by number. By tonnage, the proportion was greater, for according to Usher, in *THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH SHIPPING*, the tonnage of the total fleet on British registers in 1774 was about 600,000 tons, and of this, 210,000 tons (36 per cent) were in colonial-

built vessels. John G. B. Hutchins is authority for the statement that as late as 1790 "424 American-built ships, measuring some 101,000 gross tons, remained on the British registers, although nearly a wooden ship's lifetime had elapsed since the Revolution had interrupted the supply." In "A Brief Examination of Lord Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the United States" made in 1791, we are informed that the best American ships were then being sold at a price of about \$34 per ton, which is about 62 to 76 per cent lower than the prices of from \$55 to \$60 per ton given for English-built vessels. Hutchins says, "During the colonial period, prices of vessels built in North America generally ranged from £3 to £4 per ton, compared with prices of from £5 to £7 for English-built ones. It is not surprising, therefore, that the colonial shipbuilding industry prospered."

Colonial Merchant Seamen at War and Privateering before the Revolution

Colonial merchant seamen got a lot of experience in privateering during England's wars with Spain and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Armed Massachusetts-built and manned ships hunted Dutch merchantmen on the seas as long as the Dutch owned the Hudson River region and Manhattan, with the surrounding country, was known as New Netherland. From the earliest days of exploration of the New England coast, dating back to the exploits of Sir Samuel Argall, armed English merchantmen had fought to keep the French from either settling in or trading with Virginia and New England. In 1613, Argall, in the privateer *Treasurer* of 130 tons (14 guns and sixty men), fought and drove the French from Saint Sauveur on the Penobscot, captured their "big ship," the *Jonas*, destroyed all the property that could not be taken as worth-while plunder, and carried the survivors as prisoners to Virginia. This was promptly followed by the spoliation and destruction of all the French settlements northeast of the Penobscot—at St. Croix and Port Royal. Later, American colonial ships as privateers were encouraged by England to wage war on the merchant ships of its enemies, which were generally the greatest competing sea powers—Spain, France, and the Netherlands.

The American colonists started early as privateersmen, or as "militiamen of the sea," for on April 15, 1649, Roger Williams wrote from Rhode Island to John Winthrop, of Connecticut, about a prize that had been taken and brought into port by a Captain Clarke. During the same year, a Dutch vessel, under the command of Captain Blauvelt, also brought a prize into Newport, which, the governor found, was an illegal capture, as it "had been taken during a truce." However, the Rhode Island dissenting Puritans, whereas strong in religion, had some rather peculiar ideas in the realm of mundane law, ethics, economics, and justice. We are told that the townspeople "had need of the cargo and wanted to obtain possession of it," the Dutch seamen "wanted to sell and pocket the prize money," and as no government ship was armed to enforce the law, the Rhode Islanders got the cargo, the Dutchmen their money, and "everybody was satisfied." During the war between the Commonwealth of England and Holland ("The First Dutch War"—1652-1654), caused by commercial and colonial rivalry, the colonies were authorized by the British Government to issue commissions to privately owned armed vessels, which were directed "to use their exertions to offend the persons and property of the enemy." Trouble developed on Long Island between the Dutch and their Indian allies and the Puritans, and Rhode Island alone commissioned and manned four privateers in response to an appeal for help from the Massachusetts Puritans. We are told that these vessels "fought desperately with complete success and took many Dutch ships as prizes."

One of these Rhode Island privateers was commanded by William Dyer. His wife Mary, a Quakeress, twenty years later, died a martyr's death on Boston Common at the hands of the intolerant Puritans, who had presumably sailed from England earlier in the century in search of a land that would guarantee to them religious liberty and freedom from oppression.

Upon the walls of the Rhode Island Senate chamber, among paintings of the governors of the colony, hang portraits of John Wanton and William Wanton, who were famous privateersmen. These men were Quakers, and upon the outbreak of Queen Anne's War (or the War of the Spanish Succession) in the early years of the eighteenth century, they, with other Rhode Islanders, engaged with alacrity in privateering activities against the French and Spanish. We read in regard to New England and particularly Rhode Island privateersmen: "Many were stimulated, no doubt, by the success of Charles Wager, who, owing to his brave conduct in conflict with an enemy privateer, had been taken into the service of the British navy, where he gained rapid promotion. Later he was knighted and appointed first lord of the British admiralty, a member of the privy council, and an influential member of Sir Robert Walpole's administration. He was also, by the way, the first to lay down the rule which gave the common sailor the right to share in prize money after a victory." Many stories are told of the strategy of the Wanton brothers when, not having any armed ships of their own powerful enough to engage well-armed and manned French privateers that were molesting colonial commerce and making depredations on seashore properties, they, nevertheless, captured the enemy vessels. One French privateer, "superior in tonnage and metal to anything in the colony," was seized by the Wanton brothers, who rowed at night to the Frenchman when she lay at anchor in the bay and "firmly inserted wedges between the rudder head and the stern-post," so that the ship was unmanageable and could not be steered. The next morning the Wantons brought out their own armed ship and, attacking the Frenchman vigorously with all their might "on the quarter, where a gun could not be brought to bear against them," forced the helpless privateer to surrender.

On another occasion, a powerful French privateer inflicted great damage on Narragansett trade, and no proper vessel was available in Rhode Island to drive her off. The Wantons, again resorting to strategy, took a big unarmed sloop, ballasted her, and then filled all the possible space below decks with fighting men well armed with cutlasses and small arms. The sloop, with only a small and innocent-looking crew in view on the deck, sailed as if going on a trading voyage. When the privateer was sighted, the sloop acted to avoid the Frenchman, and in the chase that followed the sloop was overtaken. A cannon shot was sent across the Rhode Islander's bow; whereupon the colonial skipper and helmsman seemed to be panicky. "They bore up and, passing under the stern of the privateer, their vessel was laid alongside and firmly made fast," following which the armed men who had been hidden rushed aboard the enemy craft and soon gained command of her. The ship was unable to use any of her guns in the fight, and most of her big crew was below and those on deck so taken unawares that but few shots were fired in an engagement that was as brief as it was momentous.

The war between England and France that broke out in 1739 (and ultimately merged into the War of the Austrian Succession) was popularly known as the "War of Jenkins' Ear," and it had a decidedly maritime and commercial foundation. While Robert Jenkins, an English master mariner, was sailing home in 1731 in the brig *Rebecca* from the West Indies, his ship was boarded by a Spanish guardacosta, whose commander rifled the English vessel's holds, made himself extremely officious and generally obnoxious, and, when complaints were registered by the outraged captain, responded by quickly cutting off one of Jenkins' ears and presenting it to him as a memento of Spanish justice. The English captain preserved his ear in West Indian rum and, upon his arrival home, stated his grievance to the king (George II). The incident lived in the minds not only of seafaring men but also of the general public; it increased in dramatic power with the years and became a contributory reason for the war that started following the repetition of the story in 1738 to an indignant House of Commons. It was in this war caused by popular clamor, which started as a colonial and commercial quar-

rel between England and Spain, that Britain first appealed to the American colonies to supply some men for an empire war. With the story of "Jenkins' Ear" used as propaganda, the northern colonies fitted out privateers to wage war at sea against the Spanish and furnished about four thousand troops for the British admiral's (Vernon's) expedition against the Spanish strongholds in the Caribbean, or West Indies—the British Empire's first united undertaking against a foreign foe.

Admiral Edward Vernon (1684-1757), as a member of the British Parliament, clamored for war with Spain, and his remarks were viewed with favor by the maritime American colonies. Vernon, at his own request, was given the command of six ships, and on November 22, 1739, he captured Porto Bello on the Isthmus of Panama from the Spanish, with a loss of only seven men, but his later ventures were not so fortunate. In 1740 he failed in an attack on Cartagena, and the following year he and Gen. Thomas Wentworth were unsuccessful in a joint naval and military campaign to take Santiago de Cuba. (Lawrence Washington, the half brother of George Washington, was one of Admiral Vernon's staff, and when in 1743 Lawrence rebuilt the family homestead on the Potomac River in Fairfax County, Virginia, he named it Mount Vernon in honor of his former commander.) The British naval operations against the Spanish were creditable, and the colonials won glory at sea. However, the troops that landed at Guantanamo during the summer of 1741 in the campaign against Santiago de Cuba were beaten not by the Spaniards but by the climate and disease. The British reported that of five thousand troops put ashore, two thousand died in four months' time, but historians tell us that whereas the colonials "came through nobly" in the War of Jenkins' Ear, of the four thousand men supplied the British expedition, "most of them perished in the tropics." This experience of the courageous, resourceful, and individualistic colonials under the command of arrogant, brutal, and stupid British officers was not conducive to imperial good will, and it had a deep and far-reaching aftereffect that influenced American reaction to the British appeal for help in the French and Indian wars that followed. Historian Leland D. Baldwin, writing of the War of Jenkins' Ear, says:

The raw North American levies, castigated by the English commanders as "all the Banditti the Country affords," did not resemble the broken-spirited cattle who have always composed the British regular army; the mismanagement and abuse of British officers helped to plant the seeds of the Anglophobia which had flourished so luxuriantly in North America and

which had so much to do with the inception of the Revolution. And yet the Americans won the only considerable successes which British arms could boast. Spanish depredations on the North American coast were met by a wave of privateering enterprise which broke the back of Spanish mercantilism and led to the overdue reforms of the next decades.

During the war, Georgia, the youngest of all the American colonies, proved a thorn in the side of the proud Spaniards. General Oglethorpe, the governor, carried the war to St. Augustine and would have taken that fortress with his "motley army" if a fleet of powerful Spanish naval vessels had not intervened; later, in 1742, when the Spanish attempted to invade Georgia in force, the troops that landed were handled roughly and driven into a bloody and "tragic retreat."

It is significant that when New Englanders decided in 1745 to proceed against Louisburg on Cape Breton Island in the interest of their fisheries and coastal trading, the Massachusetts adventurers who took part in the expedition would have nothing to do with the British—either army or navy. They planned and executed the venture themselves and, under their own officers and using their own ships, engineered and brilliantly carried forward to a successful conclusion a campaign that is without parallel in the annals of war.

It was in the period of King George II's war of 1739 with the Spanish (the War of Jenkins' Ear), which later grew into a conflict between Britain and France and Spain combined, that the American colonists were at the height of their loyalty to the "mother country." England encouraged the colonies in every possible way, when it was at war, "to go privateering," to protect its commerce to the greatest practicable extent by means of armed merchant ships, and to inflict the greatest possible amount of harm on the merchant fleets and trade of enemy nations. At this time, Newport had grown to be an active commercial

port, the triangular trade of rum, slaves, and molasses was very prosperous, Rhode Island merchants were full of enterprise and the spirit of adventure, and Narragansett sailors responded to the lure of prize money in privateering against the merchant fleets of France and Spain. Among the Rhode Island privateers of this period that became well known because of their success in depredations against Britain's enemies were the *Revenge*, the *Tartar*, the *Virgin Queen*, the *Caesar*, the *St. Andrew*, the *Duke of Marlborough*, the *King George*, the *Prince Charles of Lorraine*, the *Phoenix*, the *Prince Frederick*, the *Defiance*, and the *Reprisal*. Ralph M. Eastman has written of Rhode Island privateers of this period:

There was but little objection then to the profession of privateering, as the moral sentiment of the civilized world had not yet been roused against it. England and Spain were at war, and the West Indian seas were white with the sails of national fleets and private armed vessels. Privateering afforded a vent for the active and restless spirits of the colonies; and it was not without some creditable associations, for the life of a privateersman was full of the charms of novelty, adventure and risk. These privateers went out each in its chosen path; this one

to intercept the African cruiser, to capture her cargo of human flesh; that one for the West Indian trade; a third voyaged to the Spanish Main hoping to encounter some richly laden galleon; while a fourth would go to the banks of Newfoundland to intercept the commerce of the enemy with the Canadas. . . . It was the practice in the early days to capture a prize, have it condemned and, if adapted for the service, to have it fitted and commissioned as a privateer, in this way augmenting greatly the number of the captor's cruisers.

At times, great disaster followed the ambitious owners of privateers, but none seems more worthy of mention than the bad luck of Godfrey Malbone, of Newport, R. I., who in 1745 "built two large privateers and fitted them for sea." These vessels were placed under the command of Captain Cranston and Captain Brewers, respectively, with orders to sail in company and cruise the Spanish Main. Historians tell us: "According to the custom of the time their joint horoscope was cast, and the figure disclosed that they should sail on Friday the 24th of December of the year 1745. Manned by four hundred men, they left port in a violent snowstorm and were never afterward heard from. It was said that in this disaster perished the heads of two hundred Newport families."

It was in the war against France which broke out in 1744 that "American privateers first began seriously to assert themselves as a distinctive sea force." (This was the year before the New England fishermen's successful campaign against the French of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island, Canada.) A large number of privately owned, armed, and well-manned colonial merchant ships put to sea on their own responsibility, at their own risk, and made independent cruises against the enemy to further the cause of Britain and "line their own pockets." Any peaceful American trader during this period was liable to capture not only by the French as a ship of the enemy but also by English privateers either because of claimed "trading with the enemy" or for violation of one or more of Britain's multitudinous Navigation Laws, or Trade Acts; hence it was deemed necessary by many American shipowners to arm and man their vessels for defense. The next step was to send such armed merchantmen out as privateers to prey against enemy shipping, for it was felt that more money could be made by an aggressive ship of war than by any merchantman—armed or not—that sought to continue in trade on the high seas. We are told that the profits made by the crews on some of the cruises of these colonial privateers were enormous; that very frequently the share of a common sailor netted him a hundred pounds for a single voyage. As high as a hundred and sixty pounds return from one relatively brief cruise is recorded—a respectable sum (reported as "a fortune") for a seaman in the middle of the eighteenth century. In June 1744, the American privateers *Hester* and *Polly* brought a French cocoa-laden brig into New York Harbor, and the share of the prize given to each American sailor was 11,000 pounds of the vessel's valuable cargo.

In August 1745, the colonial privateer *Clinton* captured and brought into New York the large and heavily armed French sloop *La Pomona*, which carried 14 guns and a crew of forty-three men. American seafarers were often noted for unusual acts of humanity and gallantry during a period of war, and here is an instance. *La Pomona* and her cargo, which consisted of 237 casks (87,500 lbs.) of indigo, 88 casks of sugar, and 15 bales of cotton, were confiscated;

but when the colonial tars boarded the French sloop, none of the passengers, officers, or members of the crew of that vessel was plundered as was customary, for a thorough searching, with the seizure of all valuables found aboard, was almost universal. We are told that the French captain of *La Pomona* was so affected by the "unexpected gallantry and delicacy" shown by the American privateersmen that, upon arrival in New York, he gave a party to the officers and crew of the *Clinton*. It was described as "a very handsome treat," which included "an ox roasted whole" and "a hogshead of punch."

During the wars with France and Spain preceding the Revolution, the American privateers were good fighters, but when it was possible to gain their objective by strategy rather than broadside shooting and the spilling of blood, they did not hesitate to use their heads rather than their arms. An outstanding instance of "a peaceful capture" is the taking in 1746 of the heavily armed and manned, well-laden, sizable French ship *Rising Sun* (carrying 22 "big guns" and a large crew) by the colonial privateer *Prince Charles* of 308 tons, 24 carriage guns (mostly 9-pounders), 34 swivels, and a crew of about two hundred men. The *Prince Charles*, commanded by Captain Tingley, was French built and, after capture by the Americans, had been refitted as a privately owned ship of war; because of her size, armament, and complement, she was described as "the stoutest vessel fitted out of North America." The *Rising Sun* was one of a fleet of French merchantmen being convoyed by three men-of-war. Conscious of her power and ability to take care of herself, she had become separated from the body of the fleet and was encountered by the *Prince Charles*, which had been hanging onto the outskirts of the convoy for days, looking for a chance to attack stragglers. It is said that had the *Rising Sun* and *Prince Charles* met squarely and fought it out, a desperate, bloody battle would have resulted with the outcome by no means certain, as both were big and heavily armed vessels. However, Captain Tingley disguised his ship in a measure, armed a lot of his men like marines, and put British grenadier caps on their heads. Boldly running up alongside the *Rising Sun* in the dusk, he proclaimed his vessel to be a regular British man-of-war and demanded immediate surrender. The hoax, which was well timed and executed, worked perfectly, and the French ship, feeling that she was hopelessly outclassed in power, surrendered without a shot being fired. The *Rising Sun* had on board, besides specie, 1,117 hogsheads of sugar, 458 casks of coffee, and some general cargo. That she was a big ship is proven by the fact that she drew 18 ft. of water on her arrival off Sandy Hook in early April 1746. A great deal of difficulty was experienced in getting her over the bar and into New York Harbor.

The letter-of-marque ship *Bethel* (a contemporary painting of which—in the Antoine Roux, of Marseilles, manner—is owned by the Massachusetts Historical Society) is typical of the larger armed colonial merchantmen of her day that, under the British flag, gained reputations as privateers. The *Bethel* was a three-masted square-rigged ship, with three yards on each mast and two on a highly inclined bowsprit; she had good freeboard, a long, raised quarter-deck extending to the mainmast, and a high poop running from the mizzen aft. This ship, owned by the Quincy family of Boston, was armed with 14 guns, but carried only 38 men; yet in 1748, by sheer Yankee bluff, nerve, and courage, she captured a Spanish treasure ship of 24 guns and 110 men, which, we are told, was "worth the better part of an hundred thousand pounds sterling." Samuel E. Morison, writing in his *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS* of conditions in the eighteenth century prior to the Revolution, says:

Massachusetts enjoyed peace for three quarters of the period from 1713 to the Revolution. In wartime her fishing fleet was dismantled, but the fishermen found exciting employment on armed merchantmen bearing letters of marque and reprisal; . . . so congenial, in fact, did our provincial seamen

find privateering, that many could not bear to give it up when peace was concluded. In consequence, not a few were hanged in chains on Bird Island or Nix's Mate, whereby every passing seaman might gain a moral lesson.

Boston was the largest town in the American colonies until 1755, when it was passed by Philadelphia, but Boston retained its position as "the principal mart of trade in North America" for a much longer period of time and was primarily a deep-sea port interested in foreign trade and deep-sea voyages. In times of war, England not only encouraged but also urged Yan-

kee shipowners to arm their ships and "Down East" sailors to go privateering. England supplied the colonials with the opportunity for schooling and experience in the realm of privateering, which was to be used against the mother country during the Revolution and the War of 1812; moreover, England's Navigation Laws for about a century had caused colonial merchants, shipmasters, and seamen to embark in illegitimate trade and receive a grounding in individualistic responsibility, resourcefulness, and self-protection that stood them in good stead when they turned their attention from smuggling to privateering. There was, moreover, on the ocean at least, a great difference between declared and real peace. John R. Spears writes:

From the beginning of the eighteenth century until well past the middle, England was constantly at war with France and Spain in spite of treaties which were made from time to time to provide for peace. There was never a day from 1700 to 1763 when the ships of either nation were free to sail the seas unmolested. . . . According to the documents that remain, these long wars were seemingly no more

than disputes over boundaries or efforts to avenge some such personal injury as that when Captain Jenkins had his ear cut off by the Spaniards while sailing near the coast of Cuba. But as seen now, each seemingly petty quarrel was but a feature of a prolonged struggle between races for the commercial control of the New World.

Privateering as a method of warfare reached its zenith in the middle of the eighteenth century, with armed merchantmen scouring the seas and often reaping a fortune for owners, masters, and crew. England, when struggling for its own economic advantage, prestige, and marine power, capitalized its American colonies and used their ships unscrupulously for its own selfish ends. It was of this period, with the great nations at war and England fighting for control of the seas, that Thomas Carlyle wrote: "Shall half the world be England's for industrial purposes . . . or shall it be Spain's for arrogant-torpid, sham-devotional purposes contrary to every law?" He adds, "The incalculable Yankee Nation itself, biggest phenomenon (once thought beautiful) of these ages—this too . . . lay involved." Following 1763—after American shipowners had been "encouraged in the utmost latitude" for long years to help fight England's battles and weaken England's foes—Britain was quick to clamp down on America's maritime ventures and assumed rights and privileges, enforce the archaic and virtually ignored English Navigation Laws, and do all things possible to suppress the growth and initiative of the colonial merchant fleet.

We are told that in the eighteenth century New York alone commissioned forty-eight armed colonial-built merchant ships, carrying 675 guns and 5,530 men, to prey on the mercantile marine of England's enemies as the British fought for commercial supremacy on the high seas. It has been said that New York grew strong because of England's wars rather than in spite of them. The New York papers, at times, devoted considerable space to the listing of prize ships brought into New York Harbor by privateers "to the great enrichment" of owners, masters, officers, and crews. Upon the arrival at New York in 1744 of the American colonial privateer *Launceston* with a captured French ship (the *St. Francois Xavier* of 300 tons), the *POST-BOY*, a weekly local paper, said: "This is the fifteenth vessel taken from this ship. She was saluted by all our privateers, and several other vessels, and the general Acclamation of the People, as a Testimony of the Sense they have of the signal Service done by this gentleman [Sir Peter Warren] during the continuance of the war." Warren was present, in charge of a British naval squadron, when the French fortress of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, formally capitulated to William Pepperell of the Piscataqua in June 1745. The New Englanders, on their own volition, had besieged and subdued the fortress and thus obtained for Britain possession of the French settlement, which for years had harbored French privateers and threatened the livelihood of New England fishermen. This was a fight of New England fishermen and improvised privateers against the regular army forces of France and its mercenaries, and the New Englanders started the battle and finished it with a glorious victory, without receiving any help whatsoever from British military and naval forces. Sir Peter Warren, in command of a British squadron, arrived at Louisburg just in time to participate in the surrender and taking-possession ceremonies, but the British publicists saw to it that Warren, being English, received a measure of credit for a brilliant triumph, against tremendous odds;

to which he contributed nothing at all. He was not there either when the strategy was planned or when the fortress and town, with its outlying and secondary harbor forts, were taken. It is interesting to see that a man lauded by England, knighted as a naval hero, and frequently referred to as the "brave Commodore Warren" should be master of a New York privateer. Evidently, even British naval men felt the lure of prize money to be won by marine operations outside of the scope of the regular navy, and we are told that Sir Peter Warren acquired title to a big farm of some three hundred acres on Manhattan Island, part of which was about the site of Greenwich Village.

The following advertisement from the weekly *POST-BOY* in 1744 is typical of many printed in New York papers about that time calling for sailors to man the colonial privateers:

For a Cruise on a Privateering Voyage
against His Majesty's Enemies

fitted and equipped as a Ship of War for said
voyage, and will sail in 20 Days.

The Ship *Tartar*, JOHN MACKY, Commander,
Burthen 300 tons, 18 Carriage and 20 Swivel Guns,
120 Men. Flush Fore and Aft; being completely

All Gentlemen, Sailors and Others inclined to go on
said Cruize, may repair to the Sign of the Crown &
Thistle, in Front Street, where the Officers Attend,
and the Articles are to be seen and signed.

In the same publication, issue of September 3, 1744, we read: "'Tis computed there will be before winter one hundred and thirteen sail of privateers at sea from the British-American colonies, most stout vessels and well manned. A naval force, some say, equal that of Great Britain in the time of Queen Elizabeth." This seems to be a surprising statement considering that the British fleet in Elizabeth's reign broke the hitherto predominant Spanish sea power by the defeat of its armada in 1588. However, the British Navy in Elizabeth's day was largely privately owned (i.e., privateers), and the armada was defeated not by British ships of the line in an orthodox "stand-up-and-fight, broadside-to-broadside" battle with the big and cumbersome Spanish naval vessels but by the elements, psychological conditions, and chaos resulting from the hornet stings of the English and the lack of organization, discipline, and spirit on the part of the Spaniards coupled with numerous manifestations of incompetency.

The *Sturdy Beggar*, a New York privateer commanded by Captain Troup, was a ship carrying 26 guns and a complement of 200 men, which made her a powerful fighting vessel. A majority of the colonial privateers of this period carried heavy armaments and big crews, "the average," Maclay says, "probably being not far from 18 guns and 130 men, making them really more formidable than the average cruiser of that day."

In *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK* (a W.P.A. writer's project), we read that in 1754-1763, during the French and Indian War, "a fleet of one hundred and twenty-eight privateers brought home eighty prizes valued at a million pounds sterling." This does not say how many of these privateers were colonial-built or owned ships. Probably the most hotly contested and hardest fought battle between an American and a French privateer during the war was that waged in January 1758 between the colonial-owned and manned *Thruloe* of 14 guns and 84 men, commanded by Captain Mantle, and the French private armed ship *Les Deux Amis* of 10 larger caliber guns and 98 men, with Captain Felix in command. The battle was at short range for most of the time and ended at close quarters. The records show that the ships seem to have been well matched, each having an advantage over the other in some division of power. The action lasted over two hours, and a contemporary account of the engagement says that *Les Deux Amis* did not strike her colors "until 300 powder flasks and 72 stink-pots" had been thrown aboard her. The report of the casualties shows 37 Americans and 80 Frenchmen killed or wounded—or some 65 per cent of the men engaged in the combat, which is an extremely high figure for naval engagements of that type and period.

The operation of the English Navigation Laws had so encouraged colonial smuggling and illegitimate foreign trading that in times of war such practices were continued. What was known as the "Flag of Truce" was used at times by the colonials as a protection in the carrying of contraband goods and was devised to facilitate the exchange of prisoners. Ships sailed from colonial ports, with men captured by privateers aboard, for a destination such as a

French-owned West Indian island, where these men were exchanged for "such of our countrymen as may have fallen in the enemy's hands." It is said to have been scandalous the way these ships sailing from and to New York were used by the "rapacious mercenaries" of that port to carry a profitable illegitimate cargo both ways, carefully stowed in the hold or lower 'tween decks. A letter from an indignant New Yorker, who signed himself "Free-Trader," addressed to the editor of *POST-BOY* and printed in that paper dated June 6, 1748, says:

Can it be unknown to you that scarce a week passes without an illicit Trader going or coming into this Port, under the specious name of Flags of Truce, who are continually supplying and supporting our most avowed enemies, to the great loss and

damage of all honest traders and true-hearted subjects? . . . Let me beg you to sound the alarm . . . that all may know how the whole community, for the private benefit of a few mercenaries, must soon be engulfed in ruin and destruction.

In addition to "becoming fabulously wealthy" by privateering, many New York merchants "turned a pretty penny in shipping food supplies to the French Armies" and in doing for personal gain many things that, while profitable to themselves and New York, were opposed to the well-being of the British Empire—or, at least, of its English overlords. Governor Hardy endeavored to put a stop to all "trading with the enemy." He embargoed "all ships clearing out with provisions, but such as are loading or to be laden for His Majesty's Islands or Plantations." Notwithstanding this drastic measure, the illegitimate trade evidently flourished, for it is said that New Yorkers promptly found means of circumventing the decree and of establishing trade through devious means with the foreign islands. John C. Miller, in *ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION*, says:

If Americans angered the British Government by doling out aid to British armies during the Seven Years' War, they sealed their infamy by largely nullifying the British blockade of the French and Spanish West Indies by supplying them with provisions and carrying away their sugar and molasses. Americans had always been fertile in expedients for violating British laws, and Yankee ingenuity was seen at its best—or worst, in the eyes of Englishmen—in devising ways and means of running the blockade of the foreign sugar islands. They persuaded the colonial governors to sell them flags of truce which enabled them to go to the foreign West Indies to release British prisoners. The governors were wrought upon by means of "pitiful Stories of Relations laying in French Dungeons" to grant the flags

of truce; but the ships that sailed under this dispensation were observed to return far more heavily laden with molasses and sugar than with relations. Other ships set sail for Jamaica with provisions, but discharged their cargo at a beleaguered French island and returned with a hold bulging with contraband. William Pitt, a staunch friend of the colonies, was deeply angered when he learned how American merchants were setting profits above patriotism; other Englishmen, less well-disposed, were eager to make Americans pay dearly for having protracted the war in the West Indies. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, for instance, urged in 1763 that the colonies be punished for their transgressions during the war by depriving them of most of their time-honored liberties.

Lieutenant Governor De Lancey reported to London in 1758 that he had credible information that there were some New York colonial-owned vessels "trading with the French at Cape Francois in Hispaniola." The English encouraged the colonials to equip and send out privateers to fight the French, and evidently the Americans were glad to do so if the ventures were profitable to themselves. New York, however, the great center and perfectionist in smuggling and illegitimate trade (although at times Boston ran it a close second), was always conscious of making money in carrying cargoes where they would sell at a good profit as well as in acts of piracy (or privateering) where a foreign ship and her cargo were stolen by superior armed force on the high seas. It is said that "five hundred provision-laden vessels docked at Monte Christi in 1760, and most of them came from American colonial ports." Monte Christi was the principal seaport on the northern shore of Hispaniola (Haiti), and we are told that this illegal colonial trade with the French West Indies, in flagrant disregard of British laws, helped to prolong the English-French wars.

Whereas Britain was the Mistress of the Seas during the last half of the eighteenth century as far as naval power was concerned, its tremendous fleet of unarmed and slow merchant ships was very vulnerable to the attacks of foreign privateers. Martin, a French writer, in his *HISTORY OF FRANCE*, says:

From 1756 to 1760 French privateers captured from the English more than twenty-five hundred merchantmen. In 1761, though France had not, so to speak, a single ship-of-the-line at sea, and though the English had taken two hundred and forty of our privateers, their comrades still took eight hundred and twelve English vessels. The ex-

planation of the number of these prizes lies in the broad prodigious growth of the English shipping. In 1760 it is claimed that the English had at sea eight thousand sail; of these the French captured nearly one-tenth despite escorts and cruisers. In the four years from 1756 to 1760 the French lost only nine hundred and fifty vessels.

The wars of England with the French, Spanish, and Dutch during colonial days and the general lawlessness on the high seas caused American merchant ships to arm themselves for their own protection, and this meant carrying a large number of extra men to man the "great guns," or cannon, placed aboard as well as muskets, pikes, and cutlasses and the gaining of experience in fighting with guns and in repelling boarders. Privateering and piracy on the high seas were in evidence from the days that American merchant ships first ventured on long-distance ocean voyages. During the wars between the great naval powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the capturing of merchant ships of neutral powers by belligerents and the almost constant use of blockades and embargoes, conditions became so bad that American ships had either to arm and man to protect themselves or to remain in port. As marine trade was vital to the economic well-being of the colonists, American vessels defied the naval ships, privateers, and pirates of other nations and put to sea to handle their export and import cargoes. While not, in privateer fashion, looking for a fight, ordinary merchant ships (other than vessels commissioned as English colonial privateers in times of declared war) sailed to protect themselves from capture by belligerent national enemies, foreign blockading fleets, privateers, and pirates. Even American coasting vessels were compelled to arm and carry extra men who knew not only how to work a ship and her sails but also how to handle cannon and a musket or cutlass effectively. Marvin, quoting from old records, tells of the big crews on colonial ships and mentions "the clearing from Boston for Caroline of a sixty-ton vessel with ten men, or twice as many as such a craft would now carry; the clearing for Jamaica of a larger ship with one hundred and forty men and fourteen guns; the sailing for Barbadoes of a one hundred and fifty-ton vessel with eighteen men, as many as would now be found aboard a thousand-ton ship, and the sailing of a two hundred-ton vessel with twenty men for Nevis."

One outstanding characteristic of the American merchant fleet was the small number of colonials required to operate a ship at sea, and it was said that Americans would work a ship with dispatch and rare ability using only half the men that the very economically minded Dutch found necessary to put on one of their ships of similar size and type. Apparently, therefore, the big crews on American colonial merchant ships got lots of training at sea in the manning of guns and swivels and the use of the musket, pike, and cutlass. The early American sailors were active and embraced all their opportunities to learn to fight as well as to "hand, reef and steer"; presumably, they seldom, if ever, avoided a fight and the practical use of their armament if they had a ghost of a chance with the odds against them because of superior enemy force.

Capt. Richard Derby, of Salem, Mass., born in 1712, occupies a prominent place in the history of the United States not only as a leading and progressive shipmaster and merchant but also as a patriot. (He was the father of Capt. Richard Derby, Jr., of Elias Hasket Derby, and of Capt. John Derby.) Derby had a large fleet of vessels of from 50 to 100 tons, which were used generally in the direct West Indian trade carrying out dried fish, lumber, and provisions and returning with sugar, molasses, cotton, etc., or bringing up some rice and naval stores from Carolina. Derby also accumulated goods in his Salem warehouse and sent assorted cargoes to Spain and Madeira and brought back wine, salt, fruit, oil, etc. During the Seven Years' War, generally called in America "The French Wars" or "French and Indian Wars" (1756-1763), Derby heavily armed his little vessels and ran the gauntlet of the French privateers. Records show that he mounted from eight to twelve cannon on his ships, mostly 6-pounders, "with four cannon below decks for close quarters." The orders to his captains were to continue trading as usual, "go peacefully wherever possible, but fight if you have to." It would seem that the

orders were obeyed, for the Derby ships continued in profitable trade and either skillfully eluded or outfought French (and English) privateers, many of which were pirates.

On February 26, 1775 (fifty-two days before the clash of British regulars and Massachusetts minutemen at Lexington and Concord), Colonel Leslie, with a British battalion of infantry from Boston, was stopped in his march by Salem patriots at the North River drawbridge, when the soldiers attempted to seize certain munitions and nineteen cannon that had been collected for the possible use of the provincial congress; of these nineteen cannon, eight had been taken from Capt. Richard Derby's ships, which had used them against the French and in the interest of the British in the war of 1756-1763. Moreover, the man who took command of the situation in the critical emergency that developed and defied the British troops to use force was Captain Derby (then sixty-three years of age). It is said that he roared across the stream as if he were on his own quarter-deck: "Find the cannon if you can. Take them if you can. They will never be surrendered." Colonel Leslie and his troops returned to Boston not only without the cannon and the munitions that they had been sent to seize but also without being permitted, by the many hundreds of quickly assembled armed patriots, to set foot in Salem.

Capt. Abe Whipple, of Providence, R. I., of *Gaspé* fame, who was in command in the first overt act of resistance against British authority in America, was encouraged and trained "to fight for England" as a privateersman during the wars of Britain with its commercial maritime rivals. In the Seven Years' War, Whipple, in the *Game Cock*, became a dreaded terror to the French and Spaniards when he was waging war on the high seas for "Britannia's glory" and for the pecuniary gain of the privateer's owners, command, and crew. This experience, "Captain Abe" later capitalized for the benefit of his homeland, and Rhode Islanders claim that "The Commodore" (Abraham Whipple) "captured more enemy vessels than any other American privateer during the Revolution."

American colonial sailors were generally well trained for war at sea, and when the Revolution came, the powerful British Navy, with its numerous fleets of fighting ships of all classes, put an end to American ocean commerce and forced the slow and cumbersome type of colonial craft to lay up in port. However, the fast and well-canvased vessels went to sea with their armaments and men skilled in the use of them and, in the fight for liberty and independence, made a great record privateering. The Continental Navy never grew to be more than of insignificant size and importance and was no real factor in the war for freedom; but the American people owe a vast debt of honor to the privately owned colonial merchant ships of the Revolution and to the well-trained and courageous men who manned and handled them.

The Louisburg Expedition—an Adventure of Seafaring New Englanders

The capture of the strongly fortified and heavily armed French fort of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island (then called Ile Royale, which with Acadia—Nova Scotia—and the country back on the mainland was known as "New France") by a colonial expedition in 1745 was an adventure of New England seafaring men, particularly of Massachusetts and Maine, led by Col. William Pepperell (originally spelled Pepperrell). The son of a shipbuilder and fisherman of the Piscataqua, Pepperell was born at Kittery, Maine, on June 27, 1696. After studying surveying and navigation, young Pepperell joined his father in shipbuilding, fishing, and general trading business, in which he became proficient. He was commissioned a captain of the

militia in 1717 and by 1726 had advanced to be a colonel. He served in the Massachusetts General Court in 1726-1727 and in the Governor's Council for thirty-two years, until his death at Kittery, Maine, on July 6, 1759, when sixty-three years of age. He was president of the council for eighteen years and also Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas from 1730.

This unusually versatile Maine man—shipbuilder, fisherman, trader, surveyor, navigator, lawyer, statesman, and soldier—was given the command of a fleet of fourteen armed and about ninety unarmed transports, all merchant vessels and many of them fishermen, carrying a force of about 3,800 New Englanders, and all the ships were manned by volunteer sailors experienced in general trading and the fisheries. Colonel Pepperell placed the vessels of the fleet under the orders of his naval aide, Capt. Edward Tyng, but Pepperell personally planned and supervised the carrying forward of the entire expedition. The ships sailed from New England ports in several divisions and met at a rendezvous off Cape Canso, Nova Scotia. During the month of April 1745, the vessels of the squadrons were arriving at the appointed meeting place, and after some delay caused by ice, the fleet sailed on April 30 and was off Louisburg the next day. It is said that the Massachusetts (including the province of Maine) force consisted of 3,000 men and that there were 516 in the Connecticut contingent and 304 men from New Hampshire—a total of about 3,820 men.

In strength and importance, Louisburg under the French regime was second only to Quebec in the entire domain of New France, and the fortification "had been erected at an enormous expense." Louisburg evidently dominated the entrance through Cabot Strait to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the waters around Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. The city itself was the center of the cod fisheries and the home port, or rendezvous, of French privateers and pirates that preyed on the American colonial fishing fleet and northern New England coast trading vessels. Contemporary authorities declared Louisburg to be "the strongest fortress in the New World," and we are told that "for twenty-five years, the French had been strengthening its defenses until it was called the second Dunkirk." Bancroft says:

Its walls raised on a neck of land on the south side of the harbor, forty feet thick at the base, and from twenty to thirty feet high, all swept from the bastions surrounded by a ditch eighty feet wide, were furnished with one hundred and one cannon, seventy-six swivels and six mortars; its garrison was

composed of more than sixteen hundred men; the harbor was defended by an island battery of thirty 22-pounders and a royal battery on the shore having thirty large cannon, a moat and bastion; all so perfect that it was thought two hundred men could have defended it against five thousand.

The heavy masonry forts at Louisburg mounted 42-pounders, and the heaviest guns carried by the New England expeditionary fleet were 22-pounders; yet a lot of 42-pounder shot was cast and taken along "because every man in the fleet was entirely confident that 42-pounders would soon be captured from the enemy." Such was the optimism of the Americans; they had "sublime faith in themselves." The expedition was brilliantly managed, planned, and executed and was handled in an entirely different manner from British or French naval and military campaigns. The colonists defied tradition, ignored the strategy and dictates of military science, and proceeded along original, unorthodox, and unexpected lines. They overcame formidable handicaps and surmounted "impassable" barriers in their stride, exhibited wonderful morale, courage, and resourcefulness, and achieved all their objectives with a minimum loss to themselves of men, equipment, and time. American soldier-sailors won a great land battle by using New England seamen's methods of overcoming difficulties. They were destitute of siege guns, but with a view of supplying this deficiency, they quickly captured, to the great surprise of the French, twenty-eight 42-pounder guns in order to use their colonial-cast shot and, it is said, were irrepressible. "Their rude disregard for convention gave opportunity to their resourcefulness and contributed to the evolution of military science."

New England had lost large numbers of men in the recent ineffectual campaign in the Caribbean under Admiral Vernon and had been subjected to insufferable humiliation at the hands of arrogant and incompetent British officers. The expedition against Louisburg was to be a strictly American colonial affair without any British bossing, interference, or help. It was undertaken with crusading zeal, and the enthusiasm of the four thousand New Englanders,

when viewed in relation to their wretched and inadequate equipment and ignorance of military tactics, caused Benjamin Franklin to make the deprecating remark that some people "seem to think that forts are as easy taken as snuff." Baldwin writes of "the comic-opera expedition of bumpkins and codfishermen led by a country merchant." This remark reads amusingly, but is far from the truth; moreover, the statement that "the first evidence of divine favor took the form of Sir Peter Warren in command of a few English ships" is incorrect and savors of the acceptance of English claims (after the victory). British naval vessels took no part whatsoever in the bombardment and storming of Louisburg.

The French fortress settlement of Louisburg was deemed "impregnable" not only by the French but also by the British Royal Army and Navy, and the Louisburg campaign was planned and executed by the American colonists without any help from the outside. The British themselves had no knowledge of it until the main citadel of Louisburg—defended by exhausted French regulars, Swiss troops, and French militia—was crumbling under the devastating bombardment of New England sailors and about to fall, at which time a British naval squadron arrived to take part in the capitulation of the fortress after having contributed absolutely nothing in ships, men, or strategy to its demolition. The French governor, Du Chambon, was warned by spies of the coming of the New England colonists following a meeting in Boston of the legislature of Massachusetts (then including New Hampshire and Maine), which by a single vote approved the sending of an expeditionary punitive force of sailors and volunteers to attempt to clean the French out of a fortress that was threatening to interfere seriously with the peaceful fishing of American colonials on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The sailors making up the New England expedition were fighting for the chance to make a living and for freedom of the seas. The French, upon the approach of the Americans in their flotilla of "puny fishing boats" (which, nevertheless, had journeyed without loss in the stormy North Atlantic just when the ice was breaking in April), branded the New Englanders as "an ignorant and unmilitary rabble." When the sailors and volunteers landed to attack the forts from the shore side, they were described as "a poorly armed lot who cannot march or even keep step or position"; also as "an undisciplined, careless and free, unmilitary army who know nothing of war." Louisburg was "impregnable by all the rules of warfare—marine or land"; but the New Englanders, led by Pepperell, paid no attention to the rules and were undaunted by the proclaimed impossibilities of experts. A few days later, the French defending Louisburg called the New England "sailors, shipbuilders, and woodsmen" mad; they were proving themselves a dangerous foe because they were "mad" and did things that, being "impossible," should never have been attempted.

William Vaughan, a youth from the Piscataqua and son of Lieutenant Governor Vaughan, of New Hampshire, was landed with some four hundred men to destroy outlying French storehouses up the bay, which were defended by strong forts to beat off any English naval attack. Col. William Pepperell ordered a roundabout land approach, and the valuable French warehouses, with their contents, were taken in a surprise attack at night and destroyed by fire. Taking advantage of the panic among the French created by this fiery and most unexpected destruction, young Vaughan pressed on and, with only thirteen men, captured the nearby Grand, or Royal, Battery, which dominated the northern and northeastern portion of the harbor and the area east and northeast of the central citadel of Louisburg. Vaughan's official notification of this amazing capture of a great fort, sent by a runner to Colonel Pepperell, is a classic: "The Third day of May, 1745. May it please your honor to be informed that by the grace of God and the courage of thirteen men, I entered the Royal Battery at about nine o'clock and am waiting for a reinforcement and a flag. Rations—28 42-pdr. cannon; 2 18-pdr. cannon."

As the small attacking force had no flag, one of the young men climbed the lofty flag pole and secured his red shirt to the top; this has been called "a bit of triumphant vanity," but attempts made by the French to retake the fort were beaten off. The captured guns were soon conditioned, not so much to defend the fort from French attack from the bay but to fire upon and assist in the destruction of the town and citadel of Louisburg, which the Grand, or

Royal, Battery had been built to defend. Very early in the campaign, the longheaded fishermen-colonials had obtained possession of French guns to use the 42-pounder cannon balls that they had so optimistically brought with them—to the amusement of the conservative and staid Boston leaders, who at no time were enthusiastic as to the outcome of "the bold but foolhardy expedition."

Even the loss of the warehouses and the Royal Battery did not much disturb the egoistic equanimity of the defending French military leaders; for they were positive that Louisburg, with its citadel and island (harbor bottleneck) fort, could never be destroyed from the sea and that the town could not be attacked by artillery from the land side because of a deceptive and impassable bog. The French were much amused at the New Englanders' first attempt to bring up a gun to attack the fortress of Louisburg from the land side; the cannon sank in the bog and gradually disappeared from sight. The soldiers and citizens of Louisburg were jubilant and scornful, but the New Englanders, instead of giving up the attempt to get guns over the bog "as any sane men commanded by an experienced and competent officer would have done," put their shipwrights and woodsmen immediately to work. A Portsmouth ship carpenter, Lieut. Col. Nathaniel Meserve, directed operations to get the heavy cannon across an "impassable morass." During the next night, a sledge of timber 16 ft. long and 5 ft. wide, carrying a cannon, was hauled by two hundred men—spread out but harnessed to the sledge with rope traces and breast straps—who dragged it "inch by horrible inch" successfully through the bog. Oxen could not be used for this work, as they, like the cannon on wheels, would have bogged down quickly and disappeared.

The French were astonished and bewildered when at break of day the sentry on the ramparts reported that during the night the despised New Englanders had brought a cannon over an "impassable" bog and mounted it, protected by hastily thrown up earthworks, on Green Hill within a mile from the king's bastion. The attacking "mob of sailors and woodsmen" worked each night and during periods of fog until they had planted six cannon in a fine strategic position to bombard the defenses of the town; they could not do this work in the daytime, as they were exposed to the fire of the French defenders. The shipbuilder Meserve—who had constructed several of the transports used during this expedition—and a few experienced shipwrights were in fact the engineer corps during the campaign, planning and making breastworks and bridges as well as transport equipment, building barracks, etc. The New Englanders, who were novices in the art of war on land, dug angular trenches and worked up close to the city walls; they were constantly on the attack and showing initiative and quickly broke up attempts by sorties to capture their gun positions. The fleet of armed colonial merchantmen hammered the citadel and island fort with its artillery, and when Louisburg capitulated the cannon of the island fort had been rendered virtually useless and its ammunition was expended. The New England forces had poured "9,000 cannon balls and 600 bombs into the town."

Hostilities were suspended under a flag of truce, and Louisburg petitioned for an armistice June 15, 1745, or forty-three days (about seven weeks) after Vaughan and thirteen men had captured the Grand, or Royal, Battery. The terms of surrender given to the French on June 16 by Colonel Pepperell (and the British admiral who had arrived just in time to participate in the glory of the capitulation, having taken no part in the destruction and capture of the fortress) were the same as those which Pepperell had offered the French on May 7, but in greater detail. The French force that surrendered to Col. William Pepperell and his New Englanders consisted of a stated "nineteen hundred men." Louisburg was occupied on June 28 by New England troops—a conglomeration of sailors, shipwrights, and woodsmen, but "all resourceful, courageous men and good shots." The French said that their appearance as a conquering army was not impressive, as "they shuffled along and did not know how to march." The defeated and humiliated French regulars and Swiss mercenary troops presumably did know how to march, parade, and maneuver, but they did not know how to fight in the American sailors' way. Possibly, the British Navy, which sailed into Louisburg harbor the same day that the colonial army occupied the city, gave an impressive performance of dignity, but it was the "despised

New England rabble"—and not the British Royal Navy—that had captured the "impregnable" city and so humbled the arrogant French that Governor du Chambon, upon his return to France, was incarcerated in the Bastille in Paris.

It was a shock to the British as well as to the French that a major fortress could be reduced according to plans developed and executed by a "New England merchant at the head of a body of fishermen and farmers." William Pepperell, in recognition of his outstanding achievement, was made a baronet and given a commission as colonel in the British Army. In February 1759, he received the rank of lieutenant general. It was said by contemporaries that the choice of William Pepperell, of Kittery, as commander-in-chief of the Louisburg expedition was a "very wise and fortunate one," for in addition to possessing a certain amount of military experience as colonel of a regiment of militia, he had an amazing faculty in handling men. He was described as "a born leader," whether the field was in commercial ventures or military campaigns. Pepperell had a mind of his own and great force of character. He was determined, energetic, and strong willed; yet he was the soul of honor, conspicuous for his fidelity, constancy, and reliability and was an "extremely tactful, humane, sympathetic, and popular man." In addition to his strength of resolution, he possessed just those qualities that were needed to lead brave and adventurous men who wanted to do things and would chafe at unnecessarily formal and meaningless discipline.

When the Louisburg expedition was planned, Capt. Daniel Fones was given command of the armed merchantman *Tartar*, a Rhode Island privateer, to convoy the few Connecticut transports. Keeping to the east of the squadron laden with soldier-sailors, the *Tartar* fell in with the French frigate *Renomme*, deliberately contrived to attract her attention, and led her away from the convoy on a long fruitless chase. The *Tartar* proved that she could outsail the heavily armed and manned French frigate, which was powerful enough to have captured, destroyed, or dispersed the Louisburg-bound flotilla; in the meanwhile, not a single ship of the much-vaunted British Navy was on hand to protect the American fleet of small merchant ships at sea or to assist them in making a landing on Cape Breton Island. During the siege of Louisburg, nine hundred well-armed French and Indians in four vessels and sixty large war canoes attempted to cross the Bay of Fundy and attack the New England forces in the rear. The *Tartar*, with a strongly reinforced crew, was directed to destroy this menacing force, and it is said that she succeeded in repulsing the invaders "with considerable slaughter." Two of the guns of the *Tartar* are now in Washington Square, Newport, R. I. This Yankee privateer on two occasions rendered most valuable naval aid in contributing to the success of the Louisburg expedition.

The colonial privateer *Shirley*, a ship mounting 20 guns and under the command of Captain Rouse, completed in May 1745 the work assigned her as an escort vessel in the Louisburg expedition, and instead of lying idle off the port "where she could be of no active service," she went to sea against the French. During this privateering cruise, the *Shirley* captured eight French vessels, most of which carried guns for either attack or defense, and two of them were heavily armed ships of substantial size and put up a determined resistance. For this praiseworthy achievement "in the king's service," Captain Rouse was given a captain's commission in the Royal Navy. The New Hampshire colony sloop *Abigail*, under the command of Capt. John Fernald, also took part in the expedition. She assisted other New England vessels in the capture of a ship from Martinico and in the retaking of one of the transports. Later, the *Abigail* took part in the chase of the French frigate *Renomme* and the destruction of the village of St. Peter's, although blockading operations occupied most of her time.

Admiral Peter Warren, in charge of the British fleet in North American waters, was not invited by the colonials to participate in the attack on Louisburg, and he at no time was consulted in regard to strategy or procedure. It is said that he arrived with a squadron off Cape Breton Isle in early May, but he never got close enough to bombard the fortress or to render any naval aid of any kind whatsoever to the Americans. Warren claimed that a powerful English fleet (of, it was said, "eleven vessels") had kept up a "stout blockade" out of sight of

the coast to prevent aid from reaching the besieged French. Possibly he did this, for it was reported that a French 64-gun relief ship, the *Vigilant*, with stores and troops aboard, had been captured offshore by a British fleet early in June. Admiral Warren was a "canny man," with a good measure of "a Britisher's luck," and evidently he personally profited handsomely by being at Louisburg after the New Englanders had captured the "impregnable fortress." At his request, the French flag was kept flying over Louisburg for a few days after the surrender and the American occupation, and he placed his ships out of sight of vessels making the port, so that "two richly laden Indiamen and one South Sea whaler, valued at three million dollars," were decoyed under the guns of the fortress and captured. (Another report says that Warren, by deception, "trapped many ships, including three laden with Peruvian silver and valuable supplies.") These merchant ship seizures benefited Warren personally to no small degree, for in addition to the high honors given him in England because of his "meritorious achievements at Louisburg," his share of the prizes that his fleet was credited with taking at that port was stated as £60,000. On the other hand, Pepperell, who, it is said, "had mortgaged himself for £10,000" to help finance the expedition, did not receive a penny. It was Pepperell's planning and ingenuity, with rare personality expressed in tact and patience, that were responsible for the great military victory. Pepperell is described as an able, just, and resourceful leader who held his men together by winning their respect; Warren as a "heady and contemptuous Britisher." Apparently, the British naval tars on shore leave at Louisburg, after the surrender of the fortress, were taught to have respect for the "despised Yankees." One of them wrote, "If they had a pickax and spade, they would dig a way to Hell itself and storm that stronghold." Unfortunately, the New England besieging army suffered for a while from widespread fever and dysentery, but practically all recovered. When Louisburg fell, there was no plundering (another American innovation in the art of prosecuting war), and a large number of the Yankees left behind to garrison the captured territory for the British were victims later of a deadly plague that almost depopulated Louisburg.

The action of the British, a little later, in handing Louisburg (which had been captured by the Americans to protect their fisheries and commerce from the French) back to the French in exchange for Madras in faraway India did not "sit well" with the Yankees. The American colonies were given no voice in the matter, and their interests were ignored. It was openly said that Britain's course was "dictated by pique," but the arbitrary act of the mother country—without making any attempt to sound colonial opinion—operated as one of the many steps taken by the British that ultimately led to the War of the Revolution.

*"Keeping the Colonies in a Firmer Dependence
upon the Mother Country"*

One of the annoying conditions and prime causes that led to the American Revolution was Britain's attitude toward the colonial merchant marine. Through the first half of the eighteenth century, the British Empire was fighting a world war, and its warships could not enforce its exclusive and arbitrary Navigation Laws. By mid-century, "Yankee skippers were trading all over the world, and the hostilities allowed them to learn the privateering habit, to dabble profitably around the fringes of piracy, and even to get into the slaving trade, which had hitherto been a monopoly of the Crown." After the general peace of 1764, England became determined to enforce its Navigation Acts and protect all British ships in their privileged exclusive trade even "if it takes the entire British Navy to do it." Large numbers of British frigates that had been fighting the Dutch, French, and Spaniards were diverted to police the

trade routes of the Western Ocean. British privateers augmented this impressive fleet, and "every Yankee ship sailing in evasion of the laws was fair game." Since practically all American shipping on the Seven Seas was operating in technical violation of the bigoted and unjust British Navigation Laws, "wrath and consternation swept the colonial ports from Georgia up to Maine." A large part of American shipping idly anchored in colonial harbors, and unshipped cargoes glutted the docks. Both coastwise and deep-sea freight rates soared, commodity prices advanced, and "Americans were smitten in the pocketbook—ever a man's most sensitive region." J. H. Thomason, Jr., writes that this condition became one of the immediate and burning causes of the Revolution. He continues:

The historian must seek the causes for upheavals not in sentiment, nor even in principles; and the shrill utterances of politicians are but surface symptoms. The springs of revolutions and of wars lie in such things as freight-rates, and imposts; in the

prices of fish and meat and oil and wheat and timber. When Parliament passed the Navigation Acts, she sowed the seed of separation; when she attempted their enforcement, she made the thing inevitable.

It must be said that the average American colonist refused generally to obey the British Navigation Laws that sought to enslave him. The act of Parliament of 1672 clearly states the intent of English legislation: ". . . keeping the colonies in a firmer dependence upon the mother country; making them yet more beneficial to it, . . . it being the usage of other nations to keep their plantation trade exclusively to themselves." All this (it was with delicious hypocrisy set forth) was for "maintaining the greater correspondence and kindness between subjects at home and those in the plantations." The colonists paid but little attention to any English laws that they considered unjust, and British resident officials found themselves virtually powerless to enforce legislation of the Parliament and government regulations and decrees emanating from London if the American people deemed the law unreasonable, unwarranted, arbitrary, and oppressive. So long as England was at war with European powers, it was too occupied to send naval vessels to America to overawe the colonists, and nothing short of a complete and effective blockade of the entire American coast would have affected the acts of the colonials, whose independent spirit and self-sufficiency were outstanding and unique in the history of peoples. William H. Clark says:

Every colonial was in America for one reason, among others; that one reason was freedom, freedom from religious and political persecution. To gain it, the colonists had risked their lives and their fortunes in crossing the Atlantic in frail ships. To keep it, they had toiled endlessly. And, to develop it, they braved the common dangers of hostile Indians, cold winters and hot summers, and the multitude of privations necessary to colonial beginnings. Thus, the colonials were characteristically antagonistic to control by a parliament three thousand miles away. Really, the Revolution did not begin in

1776; it had its roots as early as the late 1600's, when England first sought to scupper the American merchant marine. They had in an amazingly short time formed the habit of doing whatever they happened to believe was best for them, as Americans. Despite English laws, they sought their colonial good. Being naturally law abiding, they justified this law-breaking by believing that they were entitled to appeal to "higher laws"—those of the common rights of man, a philosophy crystallized later on for all time in the introduction to the Declaration of Independence.

During the turbulent eighteenth century, colonial merchant vessels engaged in trade on the high seas ran afoul of both British and French privateers, which quite frequently operated as pirates. It is amazing that under the conditions encountered American seamen were not swept from the ocean and driven ashore to earn their bread; yet "with an immense tenacity of purpose, these briny forefathers increased their trade and multiplied their ships in the face of every manner of adversity." That there was a very fine line drawn between piracy and privateering is evident from the experience of Capt. Michael Driver, of Salem, during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), when Britain was at war with France. American colonial shipowners were being urged by the British to arm their merchant vessels and put big crews aboard not only to protect the ships but also to go aggressively after every French vessel that they encountered at sea. Captain Driver was a man of peace and a trader with no "stomach" for fighting. He sailed from Salem in July 1759 in the schooner *Three Brothers* of 56 tons on his lawful business, unarmed and with a small crew, bound for the French West Indian island of

St. Martin's with a cargo of fish, lumber, oil, and some wine and raisins. Soon after leaving port, while jogging along and "minding his own business," he was captured by a privateer—not a French but a British one—named the *King of Prussia* (9 guns), commanded by Capt. James Inlicito. Notwithstanding the English colors flying on the *Three Brothers*, the Englishman fired nine shots at the schooner and, when she was hove to, ordered Captain Driver to come aboard with two members of the crew. The pirate then sent his lieutenant aboard the colonial vessel and took "a quantity of fish and 797 pieces of eight" out of Captain Driver's chest. A prize crew was then put on board the *Three Brothers*, Captain Driver was permitted to return to his vessel, and under orders the course was laid for Spanishtown, a favorite rendezvous for buccaneers at Virgin Gorda, one of the Virgin Islands. Here, Captain Inlicito discharged the American schooner and sold as much of the cargo as he could, following which the lieutenant of the *King of Prussia* took the prize vessel to Antigua. Captain Driver was confined on board his schooner for several days. When allowed to land, he soon found that he could obtain no redress; so he left his ship with what remained of her cargo and took vessel for Salem, where he reported the circumstances of his capture to the owner, Richard Derby. A protest and claim of £1,334-13-4 for ship and cargo were registered, but no compensation was ever made, as the vessel was "trading with the enemy."

Early in 1762, Captain Driver, in command of Richard Derby's sloop *Sally*, was returning home to Salem from the West Indies when his vessel was seized by the French privateer *La Tigre*. This time he was given better treatment than when he had fallen into the hands of the British, under whose flag he sailed. The French told Driver that they did not want his sloop, but that there was a war on and he could ransom his vessel by the payment of 4,000 livres. They took the first mate off the *Sally* as security for the ransom, following which she was allowed without further molestation to proceed to Salem. Derby, co-operating with Furlong and Titcomb, of Newburyport, who also had a man held as hostage for a captured vessel, put Captain Driver in command of his schooner *Mary* and fitted her out as a cartel to sail under a flag of truce to Cape St. Francois in Haiti. The *Mary* sailed from Salem on June 2, 1762, with all the necessary specie and papers for the ransom; but the flag of truce and Captain Driver's explanations meant nothing to Capt. James McDonald of the English privateer *Revenge*, who, "contrary to the law of nations," seized the *Mary* off the Bahamas, took all the specie and two of the crew, and sent her into New Providence as a prize on the ground that she was bound for a French port. Captain Driver made lawful protest, stating that from the nature of the voyage, being bound as a cartel and in ballast, he was not violating the rules of war. After a delay of over two months, by an order of the British Court of Admiralty, his rights were recognized on August 12 and the schooner and specie returned to him. The *Mary* sailed from New Providence on August 14 and reached Cape St. Francois on August 27, where the ransoms were paid and the two hostages taken on board. Captain Driver started back to Salem, but his troubles were not yet over. As the *Mary* was leaving the harbor, the commanding officer of the port came aboard, took off the unfortunate hostages, and placed them on board a French frigate, under the command of Captain Blanch, then sailing for Santiago de Cuba; a prize crew was put on the *Mary* and Captain Driver compelled to sail with the frigate. The *Mary* was detained at Santiago for over three months, and when on December 3, 1762, the hostages were again set free and the American schooner permitted to depart, her provisions and stores were practically gone. During her long stay in port, teredos had bored into her underwater planking, and the vessel was leaking badly. Therefore, Captain Driver crossed to Port Royal, Jamaica, where he careened the schooner, made repairs, and took on food, fresh water, and supplies. From there, he sailed for home and at last arrived in safety.

The losses incurred by Messrs. Derby, Furlong, and Titcomb on this ill-fated voyage were reported as "£300 more than had been sent out as ransom, or £800 between them." The owners and interested parties presented a list of grievances and vigorous protests to the British colonial government of Massachusetts. They were forwarded to Governor Shirley at New

Providence and to London, but were merely filed and ignored. Captain Driver had occupied a period of three years in endeavoring to make one trading voyage between Massachusetts and the West Indies in small unarmed vessels. During this time, he had been captured twice by British pirate-privateers (who, being under the same flag, were supposed to protect him against the depredations of the French, with whom the British were at war) and twice by the French. The first capture by a French privateer was an incident of war and to be expected. However, after the ransom money demanded had been paid, a vessel of the French Navy repudiated "the sacred honor of France" and resorted to piracy. During the Seven Years' War, England was urging colonial shipowners to arm their vessels, "go privateering," and attack French commerce; at the same time, Britain was permitting its armed merchantmen to commit acts of piracy, under the guise of privateering, upon the unarmed or weakly protected vessels of its American colonies. Ralph D. Paine well says that peaceful colonial traders were "helpless against intolerable aggression" on the high seas; such men as Captain Driver, his shipowners and crews "were a prey to every scurvy rascal who misused a privateering commission to fill his own pockets" and, it should be added, to the avarice and prejudice of British officials connected with the Admiralty Courts and to the hatred of many French naval commanders who in their frenzy of patriotism, coupled with lust for wealth, had no respect for justice and law.

Another exasperating seizure suffered by Richard Derby, of Salem, during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) was that of his ship *Ranger*. At Gibraltar, he purchased from the authorities a French ship that had been seized and as a prize had been condemned to be sold by the British Admiralty Court. Capt. George Crowninshield was sent from Salem to Gibraltar to take command of Derby's big new purchase, and the ship was laden with wine for the West Indies, where, upon discharging, she loaded sugar and sailed for Leghorn, Italy. Hardly had the unarmed *Ranger*, engaged in peaceful trade, cleared the islands when she was captured by four English privateers (or pirates) and taken to the Bahamas. The Derby-owned ship was condemned by the British Court of Admiralty because she had no register, which, being a foreign prize bought from the British at Gibraltar, she could not obtain until her arrival at an American port. It was also decreed that she was guilty of "trading with the enemy," but evidently, at the time, she had the status of a neutral because of temporary registry. However, in those days, any unarmed American-owned vessel trading in the West Indies, regardless of what she was or where she was bound, ran a risk of being captured and condemned by either the British or the French, unless she could pay "the court" a satisfactory sum to be released.

The capture of the *Ranger* incensed Richard Derby because of the facts of the case and also because, as he affirmed, had the vessel reached Leghorn, he would have been able to sell the ship and cargo for fully \$70,000. On the advice of Massachusetts lawyers, Derby sent his son John in a small vessel "with specie and a letter of credit" to Nassau, but he accomplished nothing. The British demanded that if Derby wanted the *Ranger*, he would have to buy her again and pay the full price as he had at Gibraltar and, in addition, the market price for the ship's cargo of sugar. Derby thereupon wrote to his counsel in London to take the matter up with the head office of the British Government, but he was unable to obtain any redress. In this letter, Derby stated that during the three years that had just passed, fully two hundred American vessels had been captured by armed craft operating under the British flag and taken into Nassau; that all these vessels had been condemned except those that were able to pay the court more than the captors; and that Admiralty Judge Bradford and Governor Shirley, who had gone to the Bahamas in poverty, left for home with fortunes of £30,000. The capture of colonial ships by armed English vessels, he affirmed, had "set the country on fire," and he prayed for a change of policy on the part of the British, a cleansing of their avaricious, unscrupulous, and unjust Admiralty Courts, and a reversal of the Nassau Court decree in regard to the *Ranger*. Derby's appeal fell on deaf ears in London. The thoroughly aroused Salem shipowner continued his fight in the *Ranger* case for years and sent another

vessel to Nassau to serve an inhibition on the courts, but all his protests, appeals, and legal moves got him nowhere. He never received from the British at Nassau or London one iota of satisfaction, and all that he had put into the *Ranger* became a total loss.

The *Ranger* episode occurred at a time when, as a Massachusetts shipowner expressed it, "England is urging us to arm our [merchant] ships and fight and capture the ships of her foes [the French]. But our [unarmed] trading vessels are the prey to the armed pirates [or privateers] of both the English and the French, and I fear that unless we heavily arm our ships and put big crews aboard to fight off all marauders of the sea—English as well as French—trading will become impossible and our vessels will have to remain in port." Many colonial shipowners and captains emphatically declared that the English privateers were worse than the French. Robert E. Peabody says that "during the sixteen-month period between July 1, 1760, and November 1, 1761, no less than twenty-three Salem vessels trading to the West Indies were captured by the French"; that "New England vessels ran as much risk of seizure by English ships as by French." Richard Derby, as we have seen, affirmed in his letter to London that during a period of three years "fully two hundred colonial vessels" had been captured by the English and taken to the one port of Nassau in the Bahamas.

Marine insurance rates, because of these conditions, were naturally high during the Seven Years' War. A few odd insurance bills that are still in existence of Richard Derby's account with John Higginson, agent, show a rate of 23 per cent paid on the schooner *Three Sisters*, bound from Salem to Santo Domingo, and 15 per cent on the return passage. On the ship *Lydia*, bound to Madeira in 1760, the insurance rate was 11 per cent. The same ship, on a voyage from Salem to Jamaica the following year, paid 14 per cent on the outward passage and 10 per cent on the run home.

Notwithstanding the fact that the American colonies had been irritated by and had waxed indignant over the British Navigation Laws that had been passed at intervals since the middle of the seventeenth century and were of steadily increasing severity, it was not until after 1750 that the acts of the British with respect to these laws became a major bone of contention between the colonies and the mother country, and not until after 1764, when peace was obtained in Europe and the British fleet was ordered to enforce the tyrannical acts, did Americans become thoroughly aroused and exasperated by the unfairness and imperiousness of the English Government. American colonists, after more than a century of experience with the mother country, had gravitated to the point that they did not care whether arbitrary and essentially unfair laws were on the statute books, provided no earnest and consistent attempt was made to enforce them. They were willing to continue to wink at oppressive laws if they were permitted to operate unhampered under them. In the 1750's, the British commenced to throw bombshells at American ships and colonial complacency, and they did it through the contemptible medium of piracy. Masking as privateers, English pirates were encouraged to seize American vessels, take them to English ports, and claim them as prizes because the ships were being operated in violation of the moth-eaten British Navigation Laws, which colonial shipowners, masters, and merchants had been generally ignoring for a century. The British Government was behind this piratical attack on American shipping and considered the outrageous procedure so helpful to the British merchant marine that "judges were paid special fees by the Crown for every colonial ship they awarded to the privateers." The reaction of Americans to the official British attack on their ships through pirates was a small replica of that which flamed in the colonies a few years later following the passing of the Stamp Act. If England had used its navy and accredited government-armed ships in the fifties to attempt to enforce unacceptable and arbitrary laws, Americans would have protested vigorously, but they would not have been as incensed as they were by the British Government's acting surreptitiously, hiding behind unscrupulous pirates, and "fixing" the courts so that a just judgment on all border-line cases—of which there were many—was practically impossible.

Following the European peace of 1764, England came out in the open to destroy the American merchant marine and, in doing so, hastened the Revolution. British naval vessels in

large numbers, being released from service in Europe and from fighting England's foes on the Seven Seas, were sent to America "to seize and capture" all American ships which were evading the Navigation Laws. Not only were colonial ships and their cargoes confiscated and their crews fined and imprisoned but also American seamen were forcibly impressed into the British Navy, and there were many instances where entire crews of colonial merchantmen were arbitrarily taken to serve as sailors—against their strongly expressed will—in British vessels of war.

During the eighteenth century, prior to the Revolution, British merchants and manufacturers found the American colonists "rapidly becoming their best customers" as American shipping and trade increased. David Ramsay says that the exports of Great Britain to the colonies alone in 1772 equaled its entire exports of 1704 and that in the early 1770's "one-third of the shipping of the British Empire was engaged in the colonial trade." British mercantilists talked of the British Empire as the best of all possible empires because its imperialism was primarily commercial, and while no part of the empire was intentionally exploited without cause and compensations, yet "the good of the whole" was the guiding principle of the mother country's colonial policy, with the contention that in the end all units of the empire brought into balance by economic conditions would benefit. The southern agricultural colonies, with their tobacco, rice, indigo, naval stores, cotton, etc., fitted well into this picture, but the situation in regard to New England was very different. The northern colonies lacked valuable staples required by the mother country and did not readily fit into the British mercantilists' idea of a rightly ordered empire. The natural exports of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine were timber and fish, but Britain itself was a great and self-sufficient fisheries nation, and the extent of its timber imports was limited. From the first, New England and the northern colonies in general were of themselves unable to produce and ship, in quantity, desirable essentials to the mother country in exchange for British manufactures. This condition, therefore, forced the colonies either "to shift for themselves," evade restricting navigation acts, and by ingenuity and courage develop foreign trade and use their natural resources in barter to survive and prosper or "to step on Britain's mercantilist toes hard" and become, like England (which was similarly handicapped by a lack of exportable raw materials), a manufacturing, or industrial, country.

New England had the timber both to export and to build ships, so the Yankees took to the sea, built ships for the fisheries (being close to the best fishing grounds in the world), transported their fish and forest products to overseas markets, and shipped all the masts, timber, and lumber to Britain that the mother country would absorb; then, to keep themselves alive and pay the bills of British merchants for the manufactures that the colonists needed, they evolved deep-sea trading practices in violation of England's arbitrary navigation decrees, but which were deemed by the colonists as "necessary for their very existence." In operation, these practices evidently brought prosperity to British mercantilists as well as to the colonists themselves. Because of their ingenuity, enterprise, and determination to live and prosper, whether in compliance with or outside of England's arbitrary and selfish laws, the colonials naturally came into competition in some trades with British merchants, who by virtue of their vast financial resources and long-established business enjoyed a considerable advantage over their American rivals. However, as John C. Miller says: "The colonists were by no means outclassed; ships could be built cheaper in New England than elsewhere in the British Empire; New Englanders possessed a canniness in trade that staggered even the Scotch; and they were the masters of the art of slipping a cargo of contraband past the inefficient and unmanned [British] colonial customhouse." England, in its relations with America, enjoyed the advantage of a substantial balance of trade, and throughout the entire colonial period the exports from Great Britain were far larger than imports in its trade with the northern colonies; yet the merchants of both countries prospered as long as the Yankees were given a chance to live through noncompliance with the drastic Navigation Acts, which dated back to Cromwell's time and the first years of Charles II's reign.

However, as the years advanced, constructive statesmanship and farsighted economic good sense became increasingly lacking in England. The evils of credit developed, with the British charging high interest rates and high prices for goods sold. Thomas Jefferson asserted that the British merchants conspired to get the southern planters in debt by offering easy credit. Gradually, prices for colonial products were lowered and interest rates on the debt advanced until it was said that Virginia planters became merely "a species of property annexed to certain mercantile houses in London." English mercantilists undoubtedly fleeced the South, which according to British standards was a perfect unit of the empire because of its ability to grow and export staples that Britain needed. It was declared that the southern colonies, absolutely dependent upon England for their manufactured goods, paid from 25 to 40 per cent more for such goods than would have been the case had they enjoyed free trade; moreover, it was claimed that the British abused their monopoly by making the South a dumping ground for inferior products, and they were accused of cheating not only on quality but also on weights and measures. The Parliament declared paper money illegal in the colonies and prohibited the exportation of specie from the mother country, as "mercantilism dictated that gold and silver be kept at home." When the Seven Years' War ended, the colonies were selling Britain only about 60 per cent of the amount of their purchases from England, and specie naturally moved across the Atlantic to the mother country.

George Washington, in disgust at the trade tactics of the British in regard to credit and prices, had refused to grow tobacco for them at the low price set and had turned to raising wheat "to free himself from the English stranglehold." He declared that as things were going in the sixties, with the British control of American production and commerce and an unhealthy, impossible one-sided balance of trade, the specie and wealth accumulated by Americans would "centre in Great Britain, as certain as the needle will settle to the Poles." The result was a severe money shortage in the colonies during the reign of George III, which, with "the threat of high taxes, helped to create the conditions from which the radical spirit in America sprang."

Richard Derby, the shipowner and merchant of Salem, wrote in 1765:

The late act of Parliament [the sugar and colonial currency acts of 1764—the Grenville Acts] has put it out of the people's power to pay money for the necessaries of life, because the duties, arising by the late act [and attempted rigid enforcement of all the

old Navigation and Trade Acts], have almost deprived us of our gold currency already; for all the money that is paid for duties is sent home and will finally put a stop, if not entirely ruin, the trade of the country and the people in it.

The Grenville Acts provided for a great increase in the duty upon foreign wine if brought into the colonies direct from the producing countries, the object being to make Americans obtain their Spanish and Portuguese wines not from the wine-growing islands but from England. If an American ship loaded wine at, say, Madeira or the Azores, the cargo would have to be taken to England, "laid on the shore," and duty paid thereon before it could be reloaded in the vessel and transported to a colonial port. A letter has been preserved showing that Richard Derby in 1765 ordered the captain of his schooner *Patty*, then at Madeira, not to load wine for the return voyage but to obtain good bills in exchange in London or Lisbon, and if wine was the only return cargo procurable, to buy it at one-fourth less than the price of the previous year or it would not pay the cost of the duties.

The southern colonies were agricultural and well fitted into the British mercantilists' scheme of things, with the government doing the bidding of British merchants and manufacturers, "who pursued their own interests even at the expense of the colonists." The northern colonies were maritime, and until that part of the country could be developed with manufactures of its own (which would inevitably compete with England), their existence depended on ocean trade in all such commodities as they could obtain and handle and over all such trade routes as they could find and develop without paying any more regard than was necessary to the restrictive Navigation and Trade Acts. Britain suggested the paying of bounties to the colonies if they would produce raw materials and commodities that the mother country

needed and thus operate to make the empire self-sufficient. Bounties were given for the production of naval stores, pitch, silk, and wine; but whereas some of these were appealing to the South, they were of no benefit to New England, and the object of the bounties was to keep the colonies from manufacturing for themselves and becoming independent of British producers of manufactured goods. Because of the location, climate, and nature of the country, New England was compelled by necessity—if it was to survive and develop—to be competitive with Britain, for its future was maritime and ultimately in manufacture and trade. As John C. Miller says:

The Puritans found that their salvation lay in manufacturing on their own and in pursuing that "coy mistress, trade" over a large part of the world in order to scrape together enough cash to pay for the goods they imported from Great Britain. . . . By engaging in the slave trade, making rum, exploiting the fisheries, manufacturing for the middle and southern colonies, as well as for their own use, and

acting as middlemen between land-bound colonists and English businessmen, they found profitable outlet for their energy and capital. The freightage, commissions and charges for services and credits paid by the colonial consumer helped build the American seaports and laid the foundations for many of the early American fortunes.

The whole conception of Britain's empire, being commercial, tabooed the very thought of any colony's competing with or not being dependent upon the mother country. The *raison d'être* of an empire with its colonies, according to the English mind, demanded that the colonies exist solely to increase the wealth, power, prestige, and glory of the mother land, which was the dominating and all-important state. If colonial manufactures interfered with the markets and profits of English manufactures, then colonial activities in that field would have to be restricted or eliminated. In the mid-eighteenth century, certain British laws passed by Parliament affecting the colonies were in fact not merely an extension of the older Navigation and Trade Acts but the restrictive and prohibitive measures of British mercantilists and industrialists who were "in the saddle." Not only was any colonial-produced commodity "enumerated" and made subject to drastic, restrictive, and expensive Navigation and Trade Acts as soon as it became important (either as a competitive item or as a volume product on which Britain could assess duties) but also arbitrary legislative prohibitions were resorted to when such were deemed better fitted to cope with a situation that was developing in the colonies to the annoyance and claimed financial harm of British producers and merchants. The British Parliament forbade Americans to ship "wool, woolens, and hats" from one colony to another, and the penalty for such intercolonial trade was the seizure by the British Government of both ship and cargo. In 1750 the erection of mills operating with metals was prohibited, and Americans were required to send their iron to England, whence it would be returned in manufactured form. It is surprising that Americans at that time made but feeble protests at such tyrannical legislation, but prior to the termination of the Seven Years' War in 1763, the colonies did not take seriously the British laws affecting trade and manufacture. Such unjust and arbitrary acts had never been accepted by the colonists or enforced by the British, and America had become a land of illegitimate traders, smugglers, and lawbreakers as far as British statutes were concerned. Nevertheless, all British acts intended to restrict American freedom and restrain or subjugate colonials added to the totality of infelt criticism and discontent. The fuel of resentment had been piling up through the years, and it was well said by a Pennsylvanian: "When all this black roll of inposition is view'd together, what a shocking series of partial, tyrannic oppression do they present."

George III, who was determined to be a king in every sense of the word, with subservient ministers and Parliament, took the first step to incite the colonists to rebellion when in 1764 he approved the Grenville Revenue Acts, ordered the strict enforcement of all the British Navigation and Trade Acts, and decreed that the powerful British Navy (then freed from enemy wars) and the full military might of Britain should be used to attain his stated objectives. The Stamp Act, Townshend duties, and the Coercive Acts quickly followed as revenue measures to tax the colonies, without their consent, for part of the cost of operating the British Empire and to support troops of occupation planted in the colonies ostensibly for their

defense (when the empire was at peace with all nations) but in reality to serve as an impressive royal police and as an intimidating and repressive military force.

Troops quartered in the towns, enforcement of the Navigation and Trade Acts, the British Navy's patrolling of the ocean trade routes and blockading of the American coast, persistent British attempts at taxation and Parliament's insistence on the right to tax when and as Britain chose without the colonists having any voice in the matter—all acted as inflammable oils poured upon a fuel pile that had been gradually built up in the colonies since the day that the first British Navigation Law was passed. The Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770, came close to starting the fire of revolt, but the Lexington and Concord clashes of Massachusetts farmers, in defense of their rights, homes, and property, against British regulars started a conflagration of rebellion against oppression that ended in the winning of independence by a people who refused to be exploited indefinitely or made subject to the despotism of any overseas power.

II.

BRITAIN INCITES THE COLONISTS TO REVOLT

THE PROHIBITIVE DUTIES and arbitrary restrictions established by the British Acts of Trade and Navigation were hateful to all red-blooded colonists. Through these "universally disgusting," cramping, and humiliating laws, the British treated Americans as a subject people existing only "for the glory of England" and sought to secure English commerce for English ships. No merchandise could be imported into the colonies except in English vessels navigated by Englishmen. A list of goods restricting the articles of trade that would be permitted export movement from the colonies was prepared by the government in London and sent to America, the British fleet, and elsewhere for enforcement. Another restrictive Navigation Act—which, like others, had been technically in effect for more than a century but not enforced—required the American colonies to send certain of their products only to Britain and to buy all foreign articles needed for colonial consumption solely from Britain. In 1764 the British passed a sugar act and, by placing a duty on sugar and molasses, sought to restrict as well as profit by the colonial West Indies trade. The Stamp Act of 1765, with British troops then being quartered in America, was rightly deemed by Americans "a direct and violent attack on our dearest privileges." The colonies had suffered much from an arrogant, selfish, and avaricious mother country, but the worm was about to turn and open rebellion was brewing.

Massachusetts — the Spearhead of the Revolution

Massachusetts became the spearhead of the American Revolution because its interests were primarily maritime and its well-being was threatened by the policy of George III and his ministers. A century earlier, Sir Josiah Child had written that Massachusetts Bay was the most "prejudicial plantation" to the mother country. He went on to say that instead of trading only with England and producing only such goods as England decreed, Massachusetts would act and trade as it pleased, "trye all ports," do business with England's trading rivals, and drive English ships from colonial commerce. The colonies, in order to live, had to trade abroad, and prosperity was built upon and could continue only under conditions that permitted freedom of trade. Gradually, as the English passed their Navigation Laws and Acts of Trade, the "free trade" of the Americans became "smuggling" and law violation to the English; but since all the money gained by Americans in their "free" and foreign trade was spent in England for the purchase of manufactured goods, the British Government, outside of occasional attempts to enforce the laws (which efforts were dismal failures because of the very definite attitude of the colonies), overlooked the situation or winked at the conditions existing until George III ascended the throne in 1760. Following the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the

ministers of King George decided to enforce all the English navigation and trade statutes and make the American colonists a truly subject people.

During the Seven Years' War, notwithstanding all the criticisms made by the British of American merchants who were accused of setting profits above patriotism, Massachusetts—one of the worst offenders on the score of smuggling, running blockades, and trading with the enemy—so distinguished itself that William Pitt declared that this "loyal province" had fulfilled his highest hopes. We are told that instead of raising 2,300 troops to fight the French and their allies, Massachusetts produced an army of 7,000 men "besides maintaining a twenty-gun ship of war and an armed sloop." Furthermore, the colony offered to send "several thousand men to England to prevent a French invasion of the mother country." Americans were, nevertheless, charged with following, particularly in the West Indies, a mercantile "trading-with-the-enemy" policy that prolonged the war. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, at the close of hostilities in 1763, went so far as to urge that the American colonies be punished for the transgression during the war by depriving them of their time-honored liberties.

The peace between the European powers liberated the British fleet from the task of fighting its foes and capturing the merchant ships of its foreign rivals, so that England's powerful navy could be used to stamp out colonial trading irregularities. Troops were sent from England "to occupy" the colonies, enforce collection of customs and taxes, and make the colonials a law-abiding people of a dominated British "possession." The order as given was expressed in such brutal candor as "get every penny due," demand complete subservience to the English Government and loyalty to the king, and "break the spirit of the damned Yankees." Throughout New England, the intense Puritan spirit, developed through nearly a century and a half of independence and self-reliance, seemed to be threatened not only in the economic and political realm but also in that of religion, and "fear lest the English Church would induce the government to establish a colonial episcopate caused much discussion and led to plans for joint action on the part of Dissenters in self-defence." As a result of the tyrannical acts of the British Parliament, Massachusetts patriots first proposed and organized the boycott as a retaliatory measure of peaceful but potent protest. The Boston patriots leading the fight in the colonies in opposing compliance to Britain's despotism were not bellicose revolutionists but level-headed, well-educated citizens—philosophers, lawyers, businessmen, and veritable statesmen—who were ardent in demanding their just rights and freedom from arbitrary and unconstitutional external domination in a land of liberty.

James Otis, of Boston, Champion of Liberty

It has been said that the first important manifestation of rebellious discontent with the operation of English law in New England came when Paxton, the collector of customs, petitioned the court for "writs of assistance," established in the reign of King Charles II, which would enable the customs officers to enter and search homes, warehouses, etc., in the exercise of their duty. Much opposition to Paxton's tactics was aroused in Massachusetts, the legality of the writs was questioned, and the case was brought before the Superior Court. At this time, James Otis (1725-1783), a famous American lawyer, author, and patriot, held the office of attorney general, and it was his duty to appear on behalf of the government. Otis not only refused to press the case against the liberties of the people and resigned his office but also appeared for the people against the issuance of the writs. The case was argued in Boston in February 1761, and Otis' dramatic plea was built largely around the legal axiom that "an Englishman's home is his castle." The remarks of Otis were "fervid in their eloquence" and

"fearless in their assertion of the rights of the colonists." He took the occasion to go far beyond the specific question at issue; he dealt generally with the underlying relation between the English in America and the home government and argued that even if authorized by an act of Parliament, the writs then before the court were null and void, as they violated fundamental human rights. The court, which was British in its views, naturally sustained the officers of the crown, who had operated in harmony with the legislation enacted by Parliament; but Otis achieved his objective in profoundly stirring the American people and in serving notice to England that the colonists had rights of which they were fully aware and which they did not intend to have arbitrarily taken from them by legislative acts of the mother country. John Adams (1735-1826), second president of the United States, said of the plea made by James Otis in the Superior Court in Boston during February 1761: "Then and there the child independence was born." Throughout the sixties, no American was so frequently quoted, denounced, or applauded by the various factions of the British Parliament as Otis, and during that decade he was often referred to in the English press as the recognized head and chief of the rebellious spirit of the New England colonists.

James Otis became, with Samuel Adams, a leader in Massachusetts of the Popular Party, which, it is said, by 1763 was "of formidable proportions." Otis was essentially a democrat, and while he was a Royalist in the sense of advocating allegiance to the king, he avowed that he sought to overthrow "some who have no natural or divine right to be above [him] and chiefly owe their grandeur and honors to grinding the faces of the poor and other acts of ill-gotten gain and power." Otis stood for universal suffrage and shocked the governing class in England and Tories in America when he said that "right reason and the spirit of a free constitution" require "representation of the whole people"; that there was "no good reason" why in Britain as well as in the colonies "every man of a sound mind should not have his vote"; . . . that "if a man has but little property to protect and defend, yet his life and liberty are things of some importance."

The Proclamation of 1763 — Western Lands

The Ottawa Indian chief, Pontiac (1720-1769), at the instigation of French hunters and traders and with promises of help from France, organized the Indian tribes between the Great Lakes and the lower Mississippi and in May 1763 attacked twelve fortified English posts and laid siege to Detroit. There was much bloodshed, but the "Conspiracy of Pontiac" virtually ended when, late in the year, the Indians withdrew from Detroit, having learned that the French had signed a peace treaty with the English, although some of the tribes did not sue for peace and release their prisoners until Colonel Bouquet gave them a crushing defeat at Bushy Run in 1764.

What was known as the Proclamation of 1763 was presumably a temporary and hastily drawn British policy intended to keep American white settlers east of the Alleghenies and out of the Indian hunting grounds. It was an emergency measure to save lives and reduce at a critical time one of the causes of border warfare. Americans naturally expected that the restrictions specified in the Proclamation of 1763 would be withdrawn when peace was made with the Indians, but this was not done, and the British order to the colonials to keep east of the Alleghenies was kept in effect until the Americans won their independence and resumed their westward advance. The Proclamation of 1763, maintained after the close of 1764, was an irritant to the southern and middle colonists and, apparently, an intentional one. That it was part of a deliberate British Government plan of restriction, confinement, and encirclement of

the Atlantic colonies was demonstrated by Lord North's Quebec Act of June 1774, which extended the southern boundary of the French (and Roman Catholic) province of Quebec down to the Ohio River and westward to the Mississippi. According to the British press of 1765-1774, American colonists should be kept where Britain's armed might could reach them, and an "American Paradise" was visualized west of the Alleghenies, to which disgruntled colonists could migrate and throw off the yoke of British sovereignty. British merchants were advised that the Proclamation of 1763 protected them, for if it was removed, there would be a retreat of debtors over "the almost inaccessible Allegheny Mountains," and Englishmen would be defrauded by the unscrupulous Americans. A colonial in debt, it was said, "might sell off his stock and clamber over the American Alps with the money in his pocket, and there he would be nearly as safe from his creditors in England as if he was beyond the verge of nature." Moreover, the New America "over the mountains," which would be an "independent state" beyond the reach of the British Navy or even the far-reaching arm of the empire's military might, would be a manufacturing country and handle practically all of the American business that had been enjoyed by British manufacturers and merchants and had proved so profitable to them. Gen. Thomas Gage, in charge of the British troops at Boston when rebellion was brewing, urged that the Proclamation of 1763 be retained; for he maintained that it was to the British interest "to keep the settlers within reach of the seacoast," where the army and navy could get at them, dominate their actions, and "cramp their trade."

As late as September 8, 1774, Lord Dartmouth (1731-1801), secretary of state for the colonies (known as the "Psalm-singer" and after whom Dartmouth College was named), wrote to Governor Dunmore of Virginia that efforts to promote western settlements were "a gross Indignity and Dishonour to the Crown and an act of equal Inhumanity and Injustice to the Indians," even if the Indians were willing to sell their lands. Dunmore was reproved by Dartmouth for having permitted certain western lands to be surveyed, and the order was definitely given to permit of no more surveys west of the mountains. Patrick Henry, we are told, was one of the many colonials whose plans were upset and pocketbooks possibly affected by this arbitrary British ruling. It appears that George Washington could not believe that the British would be so foolish as to attempt to keep the Proclamation of 1763 in effect indefinitely. By prohibiting the settlement and development of the country to the west, the British Government came into direct opposition to the wishes and intent of American colonials.

With the collapse of the Pontiac conspiracy and the defeat and weakening of the Indians, an irritant that ran concurrently with the continuing in effect of the Proclamation of 1763 was the determination of the British to plant an army of ten thousand men in the colonies for their defense. No standing British army had been considered necessary for their protection when the empire was at war with France and Spain, and it was logically felt by Americans that the British plan of establishing an army of regular troops in the colonies was not to defend them from a foreign enemy but to subjugate them, dominate the economic and political life of the people by military might, and keep the colonies as possessions of Great Britain by armed force if need be.

The Sugar Act of 1764

The end of the Seven Years' War found Great Britain with a vast empire and a great debt, as winning the war had cost a lot of money. The national debt had reached what was at that time "the staggering total" of one hundred and forty million pounds, carrying an interest of about five million pounds a year. It was freely said in British political circles that America

must be made to stand the expense of a large army quartered there and, furthermore, contribute generously to the paying of the interest on the British debt—in the creation of which the colonies had had no voice.

George Grenville had the reputation of being a businessman and financier possessing "a zeal for economy and thrift" when he was made Chancellor of the Exchequer by George III. The Molasses Act of 1733 was about to expire, and as the royal orders to Grenville were to get money out of the colonies, he gave the molasses and sugar trade his consideration as instructions went forth to enforce all the British Navigation and Trade Acts and use naval power (and military force, if necessary) to do so. The British Molasses Act of 1733 had been steadily violated by Americans, for conformity to its provisions would have ruined New England trade. It was generally admitted that "this illicit trade was essential to the survival of New England commerce." Occasionally, a British politico-economist would suggest "the lowering of duties on molasses to a reasonable level that the Americans can and will pay," for such would result in "a big increase in revenue." We are told that about the time Grenville took office, it was costing Britain "eight thousand pounds to collect customs duties in the colonies of two thousand pounds"; that "seven hundred thousand pounds worth of merchandise were being smuggled annually into the colonies." British officials were being made rich, "the merchants' pay being more generous than the king's"; hence both graft and smuggling were rampant. Unjust laws, their violation, and the elements of expediency adopted in pursuing illicit trade had resulted in a condition where, it was said, a New Englander derived "his right of cheating the revenue and of perjuring himself from the example of his fathers and the rights of nature." George Grenville's job was to get revenue from Americans to help pay for the war that, primarily, was an armed conflict between England and France for world domination. The British claimed that the war had been fought in the interest of the American colonists, but they generally branded it as an "imperialistic war, waged by England for her own aggrandizement and by which she had been enriched with the spoils of two hemispheres." Furthermore, the great national debt had been contracted by England in the furtherance of its ambitions coupled with its extraordinary extravagance. The ministers and Parliament were responsible for the extent of the debt, and as they had attained their objectives, it was only right that they should pay the price (the result of their own acts) and "pay the piper, without whining about it"—or seeking ways and means to unload a good part of it on the American colonies.

The British West Indies had a somewhat rival and competitive, jealous and hostile feeling toward the American continental colonies. The northern colonies were not dependent on the British West Indies for their molasses or as a market for their fish, lumber, horses, etc.; both were within the British Empire, which fact was at times mutually beneficial, but if New England had been dependent on the British West Indies, "the Yankees," it was said, "would have starved to death." Statistics show that of the molasses imported annually into Rhode Island, only 18 per cent came from the British West Indies. Of the British islands, Jamaica alone offered molasses in any quantity, but the price demanded was high. American ships could get what they wanted at the French islands at a relatively cheap price, as the French did not make rum (it would have competed with their grape brandy industry), and the sugar plantations in the French West Indies would have had to dump their molasses if the Americans had not taken it off their hands. Furthermore, the British West Indies was an inadequate market for the products that the American colonies had to dispose of in trade. It was estimated by contemporaries that in 1760 the northern colonies produced a hundred thousand barrels of flour, besides vast quantities of lumber, fish, beef and pork, etc., which had no market except in the French, Dutch, and Spanish West Indies. "Moreover," we are told, "the colonists' most profitable trade lay here; their fish, lumber and provisions sold at double the price they brought in the British islands, netting the colonial merchants a fat profit of 30 per cent." The American colonists wanted the trade of the British West Indies, but the French, Dutch, and Spanish were their best and most valued customers, and this trade the British

planters sought to kill with their demands on London that all commerce between the foreign sugar islands and England's continental American colonies be prohibited. John C. Miller writes:

In seeking ways and means of raising a colonial revenue—certain to bring joy to British taxpayers—George Grenville hit upon rum and thereby made that intoxicant one of the essential ingredients of the American Revolution. For by taxing molasses—the raw material from which rum is manufactured—Grenville threatened New England with ruin, struck a blow at the economic foundations of the middle colonies, and at the same time opened the way for the British West Indies—whom the continental colonies regarded as their worst enemies—to wax rich at the expense of their fellow subjects on the mainland. Perhaps the bitterest rivalry within the empire lay between the British West Indies planters and the New England merchants and rum distillers. New England floated in a sea of rum, and

without a free flow of molasses from the French West Indies, the Saints would be left high and dry. . . . The molasses procured from the foreign islands was carried to the New England distilleries, where it was manufactured into rum to be sold to thirsty Americans, Indians, and fishermen on the Newfoundland banks. Rum was also extensively used in the so-called triangular trade. New England ships, heavily laden with this potent liquid, . . . crossed the Atlantic to the coast of Africa, where the rum was exchanged for slaves. The slaves were carried to the West Indies and exchanged for specie or for more molasses with which to manufacture more rum to be used in the purchase of more Negroes.

British mercantilists benefited greatly by the colonial trade with the West Indies, whether direct or triangular; for this trade was the northern colonies' chief source of specie, and by it Americans were enabled to buy large quantities of British manufactures despite an adverse trade balance due to relatively small exportations from New England and the middle colonies to Britain.

The original Molasses Act of 1733 was enacted by the British as a compromise measure when they felt constrained to reject the British West Indies' plea for total prohibition of trade between the foreign Caribbean Sea islands and the British mainland colonies. The act was intended to be regulatory commerce legislation under the guise of a revenue measure. It imposed a duty of six pence a gallon upon foreign molasses imported into New England and operated as a challenge to the American colonies. Ignoring the disciplinary intent, they set about to pick up the gauntlet thrown contemptuously at them, protect their hard-earned business, defy the British by violation and repudiation of the law, and, in so doing, win the support—effectual even if unexpressed—of the British manufacturers and merchants, who could always be expected to be friendly and co-operative for the common good toward valued customers giving them a good volume of profitable business. New England merchants survived the Molasses Act of 1733 only by paying but little, if any, attention to it, and the Rhode Island governor wrote that the commerce of the colony was being maintained by the deliberate nullifying of an act of the British Parliament. In 1763, when Britain was searching for ways and means to increase revenue, the commissioners of customs urged the reduction of the molasses duty and the strict enforcement of British commercial laws in the colonies as a means of increasing the customs revenue of the British Government. Moreover, it was claimed that New England rum was more highly esteemed than British rum and was underselling the British-made liquor on the African coast. As England wanted to hold its position in the slave trade, it was necessary that it take steps to meet this American competition, and the best way to do it was to increase colonial costs by a duty that would be collectible (by means of drastic, new regulations to be enforced, if need be, by His Majesty's navy and armed forces).

Grenville's Sugar Act of 1764 lowered the duty on foreign molasses imported into the British colonies from six pence to three pence per gallon. This act, unlike the Molasses Act of 1733, was intended not to prohibit and curtail commerce but to tax it and raise revenue. The stated purpose and preamble of the law declared: "It is expedient that new provisions and regulations should be established for improving the revenue of this Kingdom, . . . and . . . it is just and necessary that a revenue should be raised . . . for defraying the necessary expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the British colonies and plantations in

America." New Englanders were generally indifferent in regard to the provisions of the Sugar Tax, for the duty on molasses was only half of that stated in the old 1733 act; however, they had cause to become vitally interested in and deeply concerned over the new and drastic measures being taken to enforce the act, with an increased and rejuvenated organization and the co-operation of the Royal Navy. The actions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the British Government in regard to the Sugar Act of 1764 gave Americans a rude jolt and a bitter pill to swallow, for the duty required by a dead-letter law was supplanted by one carrying a lower rate, which was an insufferably high tax simply because it was to be collected. When Britain became determined to enforce the Navigation and Trade Laws, Grenville attempted to suppress smuggling by what has been described as "enmeshing the colonial merchant in a web of red tape." The procedure adopted materially added to the annoyance and expense of the shippers, but George III's order to the Royal Navy to aid in the enforcement of the Acts of Trade angered the colonials far more than customhouse regulations. Whereas "red tape" had no terrors for experienced and resourceful American smugglers, the great fleet of the British Navy (with not much else to do, as the empire was at peace with the world) was an entirely different matter. A contemporary New England paper expressed the concern of the merchants when it said: "Men of war, cutters, marines, with their bayonets fixed, judges of Admiralty, collectors, comptrollers, searchers, tide waiters, land waiters, with a whole catalogue of pimps, are sent hither not to protect our trade, but to distress it."

The Sugar Act brought a stagnation of trade and depression to New England, but its operation had practically no effect upon southern commerce and prosperity. The Massachusetts House of Representatives, through a committee, corresponded with the other colonial assemblies and, by so doing, probably laid the groundwork for a procedure that was used more effectively later. An attempt was made in the provinces directly affected by the act to retaliate by a boycott on British merchandise and thereby bring a measure of economic pressure on Britain. It is said that the enforced economy in New England brought a return of Puritan simplicity and drabness to life—and this while the British West Indies prospered. A few leaders of thought in Massachusetts looked beyond the West Indies and the British planters located there (who were benefiting by the Sugar Act and "buying cheap and selling dear" to the discomfiture and at the expense of New Englanders) and talked of the vital point of the Grenville law, which challenged the American doctrine of "no taxation without representation." Samuel Adams, among the few who were articulate, declared that the Sugar Act was no mere regulation of trade but a tax admittedly levied for revenue and, therefore, a definite and deliberate move looking toward a broader and heavier taxation of the colonies by the British Parliament, with no consideration whatsoever being given to the views, well-being, and fundamental liberty of Americans.

The Stamp Act of 1765

The Stamp Tax, introduced by the English statesman George Grenville (1712-1770) and passed by the British Parliament almost without debate, became effective November 1, 1765. This act, enacted thoughtlessly by Parliament, evidently with no idea that it would meet with resistance in the colonies, became one of the most important causes of the American Revolution. Historians tell us that the Stamp Tax applicable to the American colonies was one of the most popular taxes ever passed by Parliament—partly "because the members were not taxing them-

selves or their constituents" and also because of a general feeling throughout England that America should be made to pay a much larger part of the "Empire expenses." Benjamin Franklin said that this bill—which was to raise a tempest in the colonies—slipped through the House of Commons with less heated debate than many turnpike bills aroused. Apparently, no one in England questioned the right of Parliament to tax the colonies as it saw fit or disputed its sovereignty over its subjects overseas.

The Stamp Act was a revenue measure, and the object was the raising of money "to pay the expenses of the French and Indian War." However, other official British statements say that England had decided to tax the colonies to cover the cost of troops stationed in America, reported to amount to £350,000 per year, and it was felt that the best way in which this could be done was through the extension of the Stamp Tax. In the act of 1765, Grenville is said purposely to have made the rates low in order to establish with a minimum of resistance that "particular kind of tax" in the colonies. He estimated the yield as only £60,000 annually at the start, which was so small that it was thought that the tax would meet with no opposition of importance; then, after the new principle of taxation had been put into effect and accepted, the rates could be set "at a more reasonable level" to bring into the British Treasury the revenue desired.

The leaders of thought among the Whigs in the colonies seem to have been unanimous in condemning the Stamp Act as a very definite repudiation by the British Government of the fundamental rights and liberties of Americans. Closely following its passage, the law was pronounced invalid by patriots on the ground that the colonies, being without representation in Parliament, had not assented to it. The mental attitude of the patriots in regard to this all-important matter of "taxation without representation," which Grenville by means of his Stamp Act sought to foist upon the American people, did not have its origin in the colonies but expressed a principle founded upon the teachings of John Locke, England's greatest philosopher and authority on government. Locke had declared that taxation without the consent of the people is in violation of "Natural Law" and invades the "fundamental law of property"; such tyrannical action, he had affirmed, "subverts the end of government" and justifies rebellion on the part of the people against oppression and despotism. It was Locke who, with his "Law of Nature" and the supremacy of the "Moral Law," either inspired or at least supported and gave substance to the colonials' "Higher Law," and it was Locke who first contended that the "Law of Nature" had forever joined taxation and representation. Therefore, it was logical for American patriots to maintain that taxation of the colonies without their consent was subversion of the ends of government and that the British Parliament, in seeking tyrannously to draw a revenue from the colonies by means of arbitrary taxation, was acting in opposition to the "Law of Nature" (and the "Moral" and "Higher Law")—or contrary to the will of God.

Throughout the country, the Stamp Act was looked upon as an attempt on the part of the British at despotic taxation without representation, and the colonists insisted upon the right to be taxed only by an assembly in which they were represented. The most ardent resistance to the measure, along practical legislative lines, seems to have occurred concurrently in the minds of patriots in Massachusetts and Virginia; for at the time that Patrick Henry presented his famous "Resolves" to the House of Burgesses in Virginia (and got most of them adopted), James Otis proposed in the Massachusetts House of Representatives that an intercolonial congress be summoned in order that the provinces might act in concert against the Stamp Act. The Otis resolution was adopted and the colonies invited to send delegates to a Stamp Act congress to be held at New York in October 1765. Many of the colonial assemblies passed resolutions of protest against the Stamp Act, and nine of them sent accredited delegates to the congress. John Adams, of Boston, wrote in August 1765 that the opposition of the colonies to the Stamp Tax was a part of "the never-ending struggle between individualism and corporate authority"; but it was far more than that, for it showed the determination of Americans to be ruled by governments of their own choosing (their

ected assemblies), while expressing as a free people their allegiance to the crown through whom the empire would be held together as a world power for the common good of each and all of the units comprising it.

From the first, the colonists of maritime Massachusetts, chafing under attempted enforcement by the British of the Sugar Act of 1764, strenuously resisted the Stamp Act. They intimidated and forced the resignation of the official stamp distributor, and on August 26, 1765, defying the leadership of patriots, a mob of Bostonians got out of hand and, in what has been described as the "most destructive and disgraceful riot of the period," expressed their hatred of the British Stamp Act by attacking and wrecking the home of Lieut. Gov. Thomas Hutchinson (1711-1780), the high ranking royal representative resident in the province. This violence was followed by an almost universal refusal of Massachusetts businessmen to use the stamps. Trade came to a standstill, and even the courts closed for lack of triable cases, for the law required stamps to be affixed not only to invoices and other written evidence of business transactions but also to writs and all legal documents. It was particularly unfortunate that the Boston mob should have vented its wrath so destructively upon Hutchinson. Although he had "recognized the legality of the Stamp Act," he had not, as claimed by some Bostonians, instigated the passage of it; actually, he had urged its repeal, declaring that he considered the measure "inexpedient and impolitic," and had even asserted that taxation should be left in the hands of the colonial assemblies. The attempt of the British arbitrarily to impose the Stamp Act on the American colonies met with failure from the start, and of all the colonies and centers of population, Massachusetts and Boston led in organized, intelligent, and earnest opposition. Much of the credit for uniformity of action and co-operative effort in making the Stamp Tax ineffectual and invalid in Boston was due to the Caucus Club, of which the leader of policies was Samuel Adams (of Boston Massacre, Boston Tea Party, and Lexington-Concord fame), whose activities caused his contemporaries to give him the title of "Father of the American Revolution."

The Stamp Act was responsible for the organization of the Sons of Liberty, which was formed by patriots throughout the colonies. They took their name from Colonel Barré's reference to the Americans during a debate in the House of Commons, in which he praised the spirit of the colonists; nevertheless, he affirmed the right of Parliament to tax and added, "The more sensible people in America will not deny it." The American patriots accepted the name that Barré had conferred upon them, but repudiated his argument, asserting that they would be Sons of Liberty in fact as well as in name and would resist all forms of oppression. It has been said that the network of Sons of Liberty clubs throughout the colonies "marked the first effective intercolonial union and paved the way for the later Continental Congresses."

Riots were nothing new in American seaports, and this condition was partly due to the resistance of colonials to the efforts by the British forcibly to impress men for the Royal Navy. However, what became known as Stamp Act riots were not the violent acts of proletarians but the physical protests of incensed men, who, in impressive efforts to preserve American liberty, operated without regard to class or wealth to intimidate royal officers and subservient Tories. Men such as John Hancock, of Boston, John Morin Scott and William Livingston, of New York, William Allen, of Philadelphia, and Christopher Gadsden, of Charleston, S. C., represented wealth, family, position, and education; yet they were identified as leaders in what the British called "base and lawless mobs," and the disconcerted crown officers had to admit that the mobs were either led or supported by "persons of consequence."

New York staged a dramatic protest against the Stamp Act, and while it was not as lawless as the one in Boston, it threatened for a time to become more so. New York was indignant at the sending of large numbers of armed troops into the colony, following George III's determination to enforce all the archaic Navigation Laws and Acts of Trade,

and the recently enacted Sugar Act aimed at destroying the colonials' valuable West Indian trade. In 1764 warships carrying troops from England arrived at New York to intimidate the people and thereby "enforce collection of customs" and, in co-operation with the British Navy (then patrolling the West Indian trade routes and virtually blockading American ports), to put "teeth in the Sugar and Molasses Acts." All other laws on the statute books of England, it was decreed by the British, would have to be complied with by the colonials to the letter, and at all times proper respect must be shown to "the king's men" in the country. Smuggling was to be stopped by drastic methods. The colonists were to export nothing except in British ships, unless the British inspected the cargo en route; exports were to be sent first to Great Britain and their final disposition determined there, but only after all goods had been landed and duty paid thereon; trade between the various colonies was restricted and subject to British regulations.

In 1765 the English ship *Edward* reached New York with the first stamps to be used in the colonies in harmony with the provisions of the British Stamp Act, stipulated to become effective on November 1, 1765. These stamps were consigned to James McEver, the newly appointed distributor. Because of the belligerent spirit of the colonials in their opposition to the new law, he refused to accept delivery of the stamps and hastily resigned his position "in fear of his life." The New York Sons of Liberty, who had forced the resignation of McEver, burned in effigy the acting governor, Cadwallader Colden (born in Scotland, February 17, 1688; a noted scientist, physician, and man of letters). After first taking the stamps to his own residence inside Fort George, Colden was compelled to surrender them to the members of the City Council, by whom they were locked up in the City Hall until all British official attempts to enforce the law were abandoned. While the merchants of New York met in Burns' City Arms Tavern to develop their plans for a boycott, the turbulent Sons of Liberty, demanding "more [physical] action and less talk," drafted an ultimatum with a threat, which, written the evening of October 31 and delivered to the British acting governor on November 1, 1765, included the following: "We can with certainty assure you of your fate, if you do not this Night solemnly make oath before a magistrate, and publish to the People, that you will never . . . endeavor to introduce or execute the Stamp Act." Colden was also simultaneously advised by the bellicose Sons of Liberty that if he gave them any trouble and did not conform to their wishes, they would hang him "upon a signpost as a memento to all wicked governors."

Much of the "violent belligerency" of the New York mob during the closing days of October and in early November 1765 was evidently due to the personality and attitude of Colonel James, who had charge of the one hundred fifty British troops stationed at New York. James was one of "the damned superior, God Almighty British officers" who expressed his contempt for colonials on every possible occasion. He had infuriated the patriots by declaring that he would "cram the stamps down your throats" and that if they resisted, he would drive them all out of the town "for a pack of rascals with four and twenty men." On the night of November 1, New Yorkers, some three thousand strong, gave attention to Colonel James and acted as if they would storm the fort. The blustering British colonel hid behind the ramparts of the fort, but the mob took vengeance on him by "wrecking his furniture, burning his library, and drinking up his cellar." When Governor Moore arrived at New York on November 18, he found the community orderly and attending to its business as usual but paying no attention to the Stamp Tax or any other British laws or to British authority. Lieutenant Governor Colden and the insufferably arrogant Colonel James were "quaking behind the barricades of the fort." Moore promptly set about winning the good will of the people, but he could get nowhere with them until he promised that he would take no measures whatsoever looking to the enforcement of the Stamp Act. After this declaration was made, it is said, the enmity of New Yorkers was removed, and the colonials—both Whigs and Tories—"conducted themselves as proper and loyal subjects of the crown."

In combating the Stamp Tax, the colonials followed generally the previously expressed views of James Otis and other Massachusetts patriots, and they sought to draw their arguments from British precedents and the history of the Anglo-Saxon race in Britain and America. The two fundamental British rights that, it was asserted, were violated by the Stamp Act were the right to be taxed only by an assembly in which the people were represented and the right to trial by jury. The tax was a direct grievance, and the second right that the British were attempting to violate came merely from the practical application of the policy of "taxation without representation" and was occasioned by the extension of the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts. The colonials claimed that the British Parliament was not representative of the whole empire and that, for purposes of levying taxes, the American colonial assemblies were the only legislative bodies representative of the people.

The Stamp Tax was invalid from the start; stamps were confiscated or destroyed and their distribution prevented by force if gentler means of persuasion failed. Colonial executives proved powerless—and had no inclination—to enforce the law by military action. The number of British troops in the colonies as well as their location was such as to have made futile and humiliating any attempt by government to use them in the emergency. This fact proved to be "a lesson" that the British "took to heart," but when they endeavored to profit by experience, the Boston Massacre, Lexington, Bunker Hill, and armed rebellion resulted. Benjamin Franklin later remarked that if there had been a British army in the colonies in 1765 and it had attempted to enforce the Stamp Act, it would have merely advanced the Revolution by ten years. Few of the politically appointed Tory stampmasters ever sold any stamps, and most of them, promptly realizing that discretion was the better part of valor, resigned their commissions. Governor Franklin of New Jersey promised William Coxe, stampmaster, all necessary protection in the carrying out of his duties, but when Coxe compared the size and spirit of the mob with the protection available, he quickly abandoned his office without making any effort to execute it. Zachariah Hood, of Maryland, made a show of resistance to the will of the people and then fled when his store was pulled down and he himself burned in effigy. In South Carolina, the stamps were placed in Fort Johnson for safekeeping, but the British garrison of fourteen men capitulated without resistance when the fort was stormed by a hundred fifty armed Sons of Liberty. Colonel Mercer, the Virginia stampmaster, saw the mob and, notwithstanding the governor's insistence that he serve, resigned his office and set sail for England. Some of the stamps sent out from England never left the ships that brought them over, and some of the ships were moved out into deep water to keep the stamps away from patriots' bonfires.

Governor Wentworth, in his letter of December 16, 1765, to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, asserted that it had been demonstrated by the reaction of the colonists to the Stamp Act that it was impossible for a royal governor to exercise "one single act in the administration of government, if it appears repugnant to the sentiments of the people." Notwithstanding that the governor of Connecticut took an oath to enforce the Stamp Act, the Sons of Liberty "buried the Stamp Act in a coffin with the king's colors flying over it," and they buried the royal governor in effigy also. William Franklin, the royal governor of New Jersey, in a letter dated November 13, 1765, addressed to Benjamin Franklin in London, wrote: "For any Man to set himself up as an Advocate for the Sp Act in the Colonies is a meer Piece of Quixotism, & can answer no good Purpose whatever, and if he is an Officer of Govt. he not only becomes obnoxious, but is sure to lose all the Authority belonging to his Office."

Englishmen criticized severely the timing of the Stamp Act in relation to the quartering of an army of ten thousand British regulars in America, which Grenville's plans called for, and it was freely said in the winter of 1765-1766 that it was bad judgment to attempt to put the Stamp Act into effect in the colonies without the British fleet and army at hand to enforce it. The difference in the temper of the people in relation to the Stamp Act in the various domains under the British flag in the Americas is indicated by the fact that Canada

(Halifax and Quebec) and the West Indian islands (Jamaica and Barbados) accepted the law without opposition. Whereas there was some demonstration of resistance at St. Kitts in the British West Indies, this was allegedly caused by sailors on American colonial ships in the harbor, "who acted as if they were at home." On November 1, 1765, the day that the Stamp Tax was presumably to become effective, the colonials commemorated the occasion with draperies of crape, flags at half-mast, muffled pealing of bells, and funerals of liberty—which, it was said in Massachusetts, died at the age of 145 years, having been born at the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers from the *Mayflower* at Plymouth in 1620.

British merchants clamored at the decline in American trade, and the Parliament felt obliged to repeal the act in the spring of 1766 as "a matter of expediency." The "save-face" statement was also made in England that "so great was the opposition to the act in the colonies that the proceeds from the duty were far less than the cost of collection." The British persisted in their ignorance of and lack of sympathy with the demands of the American colonies, and when the Parliament annulled the obnoxious and unworkable Stamp Act, this repeal was accompanied by the passage of a statute known as the "Declaratory Act," which affirmed the principle that Britain had "the right to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever." It was said that "the merchants of England saved the country from humiliation at the hands of her unruly children overseas," but the British Parliament, with the people of Great Britain almost solidly behind it, would never have repealed the Stamp Act if it could have avoided it, for Britain was determined not to renounce willingly "one iota of our authority over every part of the empire." As a matter of fact, the Declaratory Act had to be passed before Parliament would move to repeal the Stamp Act, and in the Declaratory Act, Parliament, without a single dissenting vote in the House of Commons, reaffirmed its authority over the colonies and declared that they always had been, "are and ought to be" subject to the British Parliament as well as the crown. We are told that in England the Declaratory Act—which was deemed very important and was highly popular—and the repeal of the Stamp Act were known as the "Twin Brothers," and Americans were warned that one could not be considered apart from the other.

News of the official repeal of the Stamp Act was received with "great joy" in America. The Sons of Liberty in New York celebrated by putting up a liberty pole in The Fields (part of which is now known as City Hall Park), while the assembly ordered the erection of statues of King George III and of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (1708-1776), who had been opposed to the Stamp Act and was popularly known as "The Great Commoner." Americans declined to take seriously the Declaratory Act, as did Britain, but they rejoiced in the repeal of the Stamp Act and an admission that the authority of Parliament was strictly limited "by God, Nature and the British Constitution" and Locke's philosophical treatises on the creation and limitations of government. The colonial assemblies of representatives elected by popular vote were the parliaments of Americans, and in the Virginia House of Burgesses it was suggested that the Declaratory Act of the British be laid upon the table for the inspection of members, who could then declare their own rights. "Thus one Declaration of Rights will stand against another, and matters will remain in status quo."

The administration with Lord Rockingham (Charles Watson Wentworth; 1730-1782) as prime minister lasted only from July 1765 to August 1766; but while it was in power, following the fiasco of the Stamp Act, it sought to appease the colonists and "bind up their wounds." The duty on molasses was reduced from three pence to one penny per gallon, and British as well as foreign molasses was taxed; free ports were opened in the West Indies to permit the colonists to trade with the foreign islands, and bounties upon colonial products were increased. The taxing at one penny per gallon of imported molasses from every source, British or foreign, did not silence the complaints of New England merchants; for according to the Newport MERCURY one penny was a tenth of the value of a gallon of molasses, and a 10 per cent tax was not easily borne. The northern colonies, laboring under the economic disadvantage of a balance of trade greatly in favor of Great Britain, demanded the removal

of real fundamental grievances that operated, under intent, to restrict and discourage colonial commerce. In 1764 the issuance of paper money as legal tender was forbidden in all the colonies. Because of this unfavorable trade balance, what hard money there was in America flowed quickly to England. This scarcity of money resulted in a most serious condition, particularly in New England and the middle colonies, that embarrassed business and stifled trade.

George Grenville, who had been First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer from April 1763 and was responsible for the passing of the Stamp Act, was dismissed when the Rockingham ministry was formed in July 1765. Grenville became "the goat" and never again held office. George III is said to have "disliked Grenville intensely" and to have blamed him for poor judgment in alienating the American colonies from the mother country, but the king had personally fully endorsed the Stamp Act before it was presented to Parliament. In August 1766, the "Rockingham Whigs" were dismissed by King George because of the divided condition of the country and "waning revenues," and William Pitt was invited to form a ministry. Pitt, "The Great Commoner," was popular with Americans. During political debates, he had denounced the tyranny of the Stamp Act, opposed the Declaratory Act, and asserted that he loved the Americans for their British independence of spirit; that he knew that the colonials needed only appeals to their sense of justice and to their patriotism to become a "willing, giving people." In the House of Commons, Pitt said, "I rejoice that America has resisted [the Stamp Act]." Later, as Lord Chatham, he asserted in the House of Lords that while the imperial Parliament might legitimately impose duties for the regulation of imperial trade, any tax levied solely on the Americans should be voted only by the Americans themselves. At the time of the repeal of the Stamp Act (1766), Chatham told the peers: "It is not repealing this act of parliament, it is not repealing a piece of parchment, that can restore America to our bosom; you must repeal her fears and her resentments; and you may then hope for her love and gratitude."

*Patrick Henry, the Immortal Patriot-Orator, and
Lord Dunmore, Royal Governor of Virginia*

Patrick Henry (1736-1799), a Virginian and son of a well-educated Scotsman, was one of the most outstanding American patriots and orators. George Mason (1725-1792), a fellow Virginian and a prominent American statesman (also a near neighbor and a lifelong friend of George Washington) said of Patrick Henry: "Had he lived in Rome about the time of the first Punic War, when the Roman people had arrived at their meridian glory, and their virtue not tarnished, Mr. Henry's talents must have put him at the head of that glorious commonwealth." Patrick Henry was a "western" and not a "tide-water" Virginian, but after failing in business ventures he took up law and was admitted to the bar at Williamsburg in 1760, when twenty-four years old. In 1763 he became famous for the brilliant defense of his rural clients in the famous "Parson's Cause," which was a suit brought about by the custom of paying the clergy in money or tobacco according to the state of the market. In his oration to the jury, Henry pronounced certain actions of the British Government as a highhanded encroachment upon colonial liberty and declared that "a king, by disallowing acts of this salutary nature, from being the father of his people, degenerates into a tyrant and forfeits all rights to his subjects' obedience." Henry won his case, the jury awarded the plaintiff, the Rev. Mr. Maury, one penny damages, and the young lawyer-orator became a politician to

be reckoned with as well as a courageous patriot and the idol of the common people of Virginia.

Two years later (in 1765), after the House of Burgesses had dispatched a petition to the king and a memorial to the House of Commons protesting the Stamp Act, Patrick Henry upset the equanimity of the assembly with a speech that vibrated through the colonies, brought joy and hope to the harassed patriots of the maritime provinces of New England, and shocked the self-complacent Britishers and American Tories. He was described by a contemporary writer as "moderate and mild and in religious matters a saint but ye verry Devil in Politicks." Henry unexpectedly urged the House (of which he had been a member for less than a month) to adopt a number of "Resolves" that he had written, and those which he presented and were passed not only declared resistance to the Stamp Act but also asserted the right of the colonies to legislate for themselves independent of the control of the British Parliament. In his speech urging the adoption of his "Virginia Resolves," Patrick Henry said: "Caesar had his Brutus, Charles the First his Cromwell and George the Third" (here he was interrupted by vociferous Tory cries of "Treason") "and George the Third," he reiterated, "may profit by their example. If this be treason, make the most of it." In his "Resolves," Henry was willing to go much further than the Virginia House of Burgesses, so he kept two in his pocket, presented seven, and saw the first five of them adopted by close votes. The "Resolves" passed proclaimed that Americans possessed all the rights—and the identical rights—of Englishmen; that the principle of no taxation without representation was an essential part of the British Constitution; and that the elected Assembly of Virginia alone possessed the right to tax Virginians.

All of Patrick Henry's seven "Resolves" were given general publicity in the colonies, and whereas some were deemed "shocking" and "treasonable," yet many Americans were in accord with and prepared to support the first five of them. John C. Miller says:

Henry had in fact expressed what thousands of colonists were thinking but dared not speak. His resolves dispelled the indecision and doubt which had prevented effective resistance to the Stamp Act; where the Old Dominion trod, the other colonies did not fear to follow. The resolves . . . made

certain that resistance would be based upon a denial of Parliament's right to tax the colonies. . . . As the other colonies took their stand beside Virginia in the defense of American liberty, the issue which ultimately divided the British Empire was for the first time clearly joined.

In 1775, in the second revolutionary convention of Virginia, Patrick Henry, regarding war as inevitable, presented resolutions for arming the Virginia militia and supported them in a speech with the dramatic peroration: "I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death."

Virginia supported with zeal the Revolutionary movement in the colonies and, with Massachusetts, took the lead in the early Continental Congresses. If John Murray, Earl of Dunmore (1732-1809), the royal governor of Virginia had had a British army at hand to support him, fighting would most probably have broken out in Virginia at about the same time as it did at Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts. After Dunmore had removed the powder stored in Williamsburg to a British naval vessel and refused to return it, Patrick Henry, at the head of the Hanover minutemen, reinforced by other patriots, encircled Williamsburg and compelled the English governor of Virginia to pay for the colony's powder, which had been disposed of illegally. Henry's armed forces prevented Dunmore from precipitously moving his person, his family, and the seat of government to a British man-of-war anchored near the mouth of the York River, although later the restriction in regard to Dunmore's movements—but not to the seat of government—were removed.

Dunmore had gained the enmity of Virginians by dissolving the assembly in 1772, 1773, and 1774 because of its expression of "revolutionary sentiments." In a spirit of angry retaliation for the "rebellious acts" of the Virginia colonists, the royal governor was guilty of one of the most senseless and unscrupulous British acts that operated to speed up the Revolution; he promised emancipation to all the Negro slaves who flocked to his standard and thus issued

a call for a racial war. Lord North, by his Québec Act, had introduced the religious phase into the British controversy with the colonists and sought to intimidate Protestant Americans and, if necessary, fight them with Roman Catholic Canadians. Lord Dunmore went even further and attempted to weaken the patriots of the South by means of a civil war between the whites and the blacks. Furthermore, it was maintained that Dunmore not only held meetings with leading Negro "trouble-makers" but also was "intriguing with the Indians to attack the frontiers" and that British agents were secretly arming the slaves. Dunmore's attitude and actions caused the patriots to proclaim themselves "the champions of white supremacy," as they vigorously denounced the "hellish plot" of the British Government. The specter of "the black domination of the South" was too much for even Tory southerners, who naturally connected Dunmore's promise of emancipation, in return for Negro support, with the British Government's refusal to permit Virginia to prohibit the importation of more slaves. (For some time Virginians had felt that the Negroes in the colony were too strong numerically and that unless the blacks were kept out, Virginia would cease to be "a white man's country.") A contemporary paper expressed the views of many southern patriots and their reaction to Dunmore's emancipation policy as follows: "Hell would be ashamed of such mean and more than brutal attempts to destroy us, and the devil would blush at the impudence of the man who would have the effrontery to recommend a re-union with so barbarous a government."

Continued friction between the governor and the Burgesses of Virginia led that elected and representative body later to declare that Dunmore, in boarding a British warship and leaving the colony, had abdicated. Early in 1776 (before the American Declaration of Independence), the British governor returned to England with his family, but not before he had in a spirit of vindictiveness caused much damage to be done along the seaboard. Norfolk, the largest town in the colony, had been furiously bombarded on January 1 by British warships under orders of Lord Dunmore, who followed this up by putting sailors ashore to set fire to the warehouses along the water front and to sizable combustible buildings in an effort to destroy the "rebel town" completely. It is said that "the Dunmore conflagration burned for three days until all the buildings except St. Paul's Church were destroyed."

The Mutiny Act of 1765

Among the grievances of the colonies developed by the British laws passed during the Grenville administration was the Mutiny Act of 1765, which as originally drawn gave the British the right to quarter troops in the private homes of Americans. Colonial antagonism and resistance toward this provision caused it to be modified, but in its altered form it gave British officers the right to quarter troops in vacant houses, empty barns, and other structures in towns and villages where barracks were not available. The Mutiny Act, suspect from the first, before long became "an intolerable bit of tyrannical legislation," for by it American assemblies were required to provide "barracks, fuel, candles, vinegar, salt and beer or cider" for British troops; in addition to the British Government's claiming by law the right to plant soldiers of the regular army in any colonial community, by act of Parliament England could compel the colonies to supply its troops with necessities and pay the bills for "defending, protecting and securing" the colonies. Through the Mutiny Act, the British Parliament—if troops were sent to America—could violate the principle of "no taxation without representation" as it had attempted to do through the medium of Grenville's Stamp Act. American patriots declared that there was no essential difference between the British Parliament's taxing the colonies direct and "requiring colonial assemblies to lay taxes on their constituents to serve the

ends of parliament" and that the British were endeavoring "to achieve by stealth and strategy what the Stamp Act had failed to do by forthright methods." To back up the contention of Americans, Sir William Blackstone, the distinguished English jurist and the acknowledged authority on constitutional law, declared that the Mutiny Act was a tax.

Massachusetts promptly acted to nullify the Mutiny Act. In 1766 a British ship with royal artillery aboard was driven into Boston Harbor by severe gales, and the storm-bound troops "took refuge" at Castle William. Request was made by the commanding officer of Governor Bernard for barracks and supplies, and the council approved the requisition in harmony with the provisions of the Mutiny Act. Instantly, the Whigs were in a turmoil, and under the guidance of James Otis the elected assembly refused to vote supplies for the troops. Otis accused the councilors of "betraying the liberties of their country by inserting acts of Parliament into the provincial law book."

Most of the colonies followed the lead of Massachusetts in part with the exception of Pennsylvania, which obeyed the mutiny law to the letter and thereby acknowledged its authoritativeness. New York, the British army headquarters in America, refused outright to obey the Mutiny Act, as it imposed an unconstitutional tax, but concurrently the legislators agreed to honor "royal requisitions" for supplies for the troops. The other colonies, neither as ardent and bold as Massachusetts and New York nor as weak and subservient as Pennsylvania, resorted to circumlocution and half measures while seeking to support technically their constitutional principles and preserve their liberty of action. The Mutiny Act of 1765 and its repudiation by the colonies made possible or materially encouraged the enactment by the British Parliament of the Townshend Acts of 1767 and led to the Boston Massacre of March 1770 and later to Lexington and Concord (April 19, 1775) and armed Revolution.

The Townshend Acts of 1767

It is unfortunate that Chatham (the elder Pitt) became ill in 1767 and that Charles Townshend (1725-1767), an English politician who was slated to be removed from office, rose to power and swayed the ministry and Parliament to further acts that irritated the American colonials. Townshend has been well described by English historians as a man "possessing boundless wit and ready eloquence, marred by an unexampled lack of judgement and discretion." Townshend, failing in his endeavor to obtain needed funds by means of British taxes turned his attention to America and pledged that he would find a revenue in the colonies with which to meet a deficit caused by a reduction in the rate per pound in the British land tax. Townshend, "the witty and reckless," evidently hypnotized Parliament by what were described as "sparkling champagne speeches." Even though his associates were not in sympathy with his views, the "Townshend Acts" were pushed through Parliament just prior to his sudden death (September 4, 1767). Shrewd English observers declared that this legislation would bring in an insignificant amount of revenue and would "lead to the loss of the American colonies." The Act of Trade and Revenue required the collection in the colonies of British duty on imports of glass, lead, painters' colors, paper, and tea; therefore, it opened anew the controversy over taxation without representation. Another bill legalized writs of assistance and established a board of commissioners of the customs in America; while a third bill suspended the functions of the Assembly of New York until it should comply with the terms of the Mutiny Act and appropriate funds to support His Majesty's armed forces.

The Townshend Acts reaffirmed by legislative fiat Britain's broad and almost limitless power of taxation, which threatened the liberties and well-being of the colonists and was being used to strangle the foreign trade of America and make it a servile, subject people. These acts not only deprived the colonial assemblies "of the power of the purse" but also provided that money raised by duties upon certain commodities should be used "for defraying the charge of the administration of justice and the support of civil government" in the colonies. The highly controversial and repudiated "Civil List" was to be created in British America by an act of Parliament. As Miller says: "Townshend ingeniously sought to take money from Americans by means of parliamentary taxation and to employ it against their liberties by making colonial governors and judges independent of the assemblies. No measure could have been more certain to encounter opposition in the colonies." The unexpected death of Townshend in the fall of 1767 at the age of forty-two years deprived him of seeing the reaction in the colonies to the Townshend Acts. The Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768 was an admirable and moderate document drawn up not to express the radical and revolutionary views of leading Massachusetts patriots but to produce a set of principles that the other more conservative colonies would feel that they could support. Thus a united front could be presented to Britain. The Circular Letter of 1768, while conciliatory and moderate in many respects and while acknowledging the British Parliament to be "the supreme legislative power over the whole Empire," emphasized the limitation of control of both Parliament and the crown over the colonies and reiterated the previously expressed contention that the British Empire was governed by a fixed constitution based upon the immutable laws of nature. The power of the purse, it was maintained, was vested exclusively in the colonial-elected assemblies; no taxes—internal or external—could be imposed by the British Parliament upon Americans, for the principle of no taxation without representation was one of the basic laws that neither the crown nor Parliament could constitutionally set aside. Americans were not represented in the British Parliament and never could be, so the idea of imperial federation was impossible of realization.

In England, however, the Massachusetts Circular Letter was regarded as "little better than an incentive to rebellion," and the ministry, seriously affected in straight thinking by the illness of Chatham, was kept in power long enough for one of its members to add fuel to the flames that flared from the Townshend Acts. Lord Hillsborough, the new secretary of state for the colonies, showed his thorough unsuitability for this high office by the preparation of a British Ministry's Circular Letter, in which tact was sadly lacking and harshness with threats substituted. This Hillsborough letter, later repudiated by influential members of the British cabinet, did more than the Massachusetts Circular Letter to unite the colonies. It caused Americans to think seriously of the necessity of taking "steps to preserve our liberties." We are told that George Washington, after reading it, "loyal to England as he was, declared his readiness to take up arms in defense of American freedom."

Hillsborough's "Ministerial Mandate," also referred to as an "ill-starred despatch," is briefly and effectively described by historian John C. Miller as follows:

It declared that because the Massachusetts Circular Letter was calculated "to promote an unwarranted combination and to excite open opposition to the authority of parliament" the colonial governors were instructed to order the colonial assemblies to take no notice of it whatever, "which," he [Hillsborough] observed, "will be treating it with the contempt it deserves." Assemblies which insisted upon approving the Massachusetts letter were to be prorogued or dissolved immediately.

As for the Massachusetts General Court, it was to be required to rescind the Circular Letter on penalty of being dissolved by the royal governor. No Massachusetts Assembly, declared Hillsborough, would ever sit down to business in the colony until it had declared its "disapprobation of that rash and hasty proceeding." This clearly implied that the British Government was prepared to compel submission even if it were necessary to deprive the colonists of their representative institutions.

Lord Hillsborough's letter, obviously intended "to frighten" Americans, made the colonists from New England to the Carolinas "fighting mad." The Massachusetts House of Representatives, by a vote of 92 to 17, refused to rescind the Massachusetts Circular Letter, and

most of the seventeen rescinders were purged at the next election. Gradually the colonies commenced a boycott of British goods and by nonimportation agreements developed economic reprisals against Great Britain. In July 1769, Charleston, S. C., went beyond most of the other colonies when it made the objective of the boycott not only the repeal of the Townshend duties but also the abolition of the new board of commissioners of the customs and the curtailment of the power of the Admiralty Courts. A "Buy American" campaign developed, the habits of the people changed, and Benjamin Franklin went so far in the advocacy of using domestic and home-grown materials that he urged the substitution of whisky made from American grain for the generally used rum manufactured from West Indian molasses. The country commenced to be interested in manufactures, and a New York paper said in April 1768: "Let us be ashamed to be dependent on other countries for our manufactures. . . . Let it be our glory to make use only of such articles as are manufactured in this country."

John Dickinson, in "Letters of a Farmer," denied *in toto* the authority of the British Parliament to tax the colonies. His expressed views were generally accepted in America, but met with no favorable response in England. The resolutions against the Townshend Acts passed by the various colonial assemblies and the petitions sent to England accomplished nothing as far as changing the actions of the king and his ministers was concerned, and even "large majorities" in Parliament, it is said, agreed with the crown that "the Americans were opposed to all restrictions and that in Massachusetts treason or misprision of treason had already been committed." To make matters worse, George III and his ministers conceived the policy of killing the spirit of rebellion in the colonies by the arrest and punishment of the colonial leaders, and to permit of this they resurrected an old law enacted in the reign of Henry VIII for this purpose. The statute provided for the punishment in England of offenses against the crown committed outside the realm. The "royal officers" in Massachusetts were instructed to collect evidence against various popular leaders in Boston, with a view to their capture by force and their deportation to England for trial and punishment. This act and expressed desire and policy of the British were more than a threat and naturally exasperated the colonials. Nothing that the king and his ministers could have done would have been more destructive of harmony than this law; it operated to pour oil on the fires of revolt and fan the flames of a gradually rising rebellion. The Virginia House of Burgesses, which under the leadership of the eloquent Patrick Henry had passed the most important resolutions expressing determined opposition to the Stamp Tax, again made strong addresses and resolutions of protest.

It would seem that, above all, Britons in general could not rid themselves of the notion—which grew to be a conviction—that the American colonials were an inferior species. The attitude expressed by Lord Hillsborough was typical of the British thought of the day: "I trust we shall never use the language of supplication to beg that our subjects will condescendingly yield obedience to our inherent pre-eminence." The colonists refused to become reconciled to British exploitation and persistently resented the attitude of the imperialists that they were the sheep and British merchants and manufacturers the shearers; that they, in fact, existed only for the enrichment and the power and glory of Britain. The Boston GAZETTE (April 29, 1765) asserted that it was not ordained that Englishmen should have an "indefeasible right to the agonies, toils and bloody sweat of the inhabitants of this land, and to the profits and products of all their labors," and a Pennsylvania paper (July 4, 1774) declared that the British Parliament had no right "to crush their native talents and to keep them in a constant state of inferiority."

British orators and writers in the 1760's and 1770's referred to Americans as "insignificant dependants" and to their "low birth and general inferiority." It was affirmed that it would be "an insufferable humiliation" to all good Englishmen "to treat the colonists as equals." British mercantilists demanded the economic subordination of the colonists, and the ministry, Parliament, and people themselves were determined to keep them under political subserviency. It was asserted that "the very word *colony* implies *dependancy*"; that Englishmen were, therefore, masters and colonists mere subjects. There could be no partnership in the British

Empire and no equality between the mother country and the colonies, which were mere possessions. Charles Townshend—responsible for the hateful Townshend Acts of 1767, which taxed colonials without giving them any voice in the matter—declared that “sooner than make our colonies our allies I would wish to see them returned to their Primitive Desarts.” The “upstart” colonists, we read, must not be permitted to dictate to “true-born Britons.” England must exact obedience from the colonies—“if necessary with the rod” or the gun. During the years preceding the War of the Revolution, Benjamin Franklin had but faint hopes of reconciliation between the mother country and the colonies because of British assumption of superiority and mastership, and he asserted that the British despised Americans too much ever to yield a point or co-operate with them on a friendly basis of human equality. Even American Tories going to Britain were shocked by the assumed superiority of the English born, who humiliated them with talk of “our colonies, our plantations.” Samuel Curwen, an old Philadelphian, said that “it picques my pride” to hear Americans referred to “in such terms and with such airs as if our property and persons were absolutely theirs, like the ‘villains’ and their cottages in the old feudal system.”

The Grafton ministry in England succeeded that of Chatham in 1768 and early considered the repeal of the Townshend duties; Lord North followed Townshend as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The new cabinet was evidently agreed that the duties were “unprofitable and mischievous,” anti-commercial and unfortunate; that they had stirred up a hornets’ nest; that the revenue they yielded was insignificant compared to the losses sustained by British trade due to the colonial boycott; that they injured British manufactures and merchants and served as “premiums to encourage American manufactures.” Lord North vigorously fought repeal of all the Townshend duties, for he felt that Parliament should exercise its rights under the Declaratory Act and tax Americans to remind them of its sovereignty over all parts of the British Empire. Grafton, the head of the ministry, was for complete repeal of all duties, but North’s arguments prevailed, and by a vote of five to four the British cabinet decided to retain the tax on tea while repealing the duties on all other commodities taxed under the Townshend Acts.

The attitude of the colonies convinced the British Parliament that the Townshend Acts, like the Stamp Act before them, could not be enforced in America; hence, on all articles except tea, Parliament repealed the import duties that it had levied in 1767 and declared that the tax on tea would be maintained as a token to emphasize a basic principle—the claimed right of the Parliament to tax the colonies. This policy of the British did not please the Americans, who declined to compromise when a prime factor affecting their liberties was concerned, and the one in question was fundamental and all important, involving as it did taxation without representation and arbitrary legislation without regard to the knowledge and consent of the governed.

As a result of the Declaratory Act and the reaffirmation of its principles through the Townshend Acts, the retaliatory American policy of nonintercourse and the use of the boycott had been effectively called into play. New York was more Tory than Boston and at times gave all the colonies deep concern by the actions of its assembly, but when it came to trading, of all the colonial ports, New York most rigorously enforced the Nonimportation Agreement. While Boston reduced its imports from Great Britain by about one-half during 1769, New York cut its imports from £482,000 in 1768 to £74,000 in 1769. In *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK*, we read:

In one year 1768-1769, the port’s official imports from Great Britain dropped from nearly half a million pounds to a negligible figure whose custom duties were estimated at forty shillings [two pounds]. The Provincial Assembly was forbidden to pass any other act whatever until it had appropriated funds to support His Majesty’s armed forces. The

colony had to submit to Parliament’s taxation and also had to consent to taxing itself and giving up money for the army of occupation. For the second time Parliament sought to cure boycott with repeal (1770) while retaining—in affirmation of the monarch’s prerogatives—a token tax of threepence on a pound of tea.

The British Parliament did not nullify the Townshend revenue act and, by so doing, express any change of views and policy as far as principles of taxation were concerned. The act was revoked in 1770 on the specious plea that the duties were "uncommercial because they were levied on British manufactures," but the tax on tea was not repealed, and the preamble to the act was retained and with it the principle of taxation. Upon the accession of Lord North to the premiership of England in 1770, the king had become virtually supreme, and in both Britain and America forces were lining up for a struggle on the question of the right of a British Parliament to tax the colonies as set forth in the original Declaratory Act and reaffirmed in subsequent legislation. It has been well said that following 1770, in the controversy between the colonies and the mother country, the question of revenue was largely obscured "by that of right and power."

The Boston Massacre of 1770

King George III, we are told, was indignant at the "chronic defiance" and evident "disloyalty to the crown" as expressed by the merchants of Boston. In 1768 he insisted that several regiments of English regular troops be sent to the town as a display of the force that he "would not hesitate to use if necessary" to obtain the thorough compliance of his American subjects with any and all laws that the British Parliament had passed or might enact in the future and with all decrees and regulations issued by his ministers or by appointed representatives of the crown. The British press expressed generally the opinion that the "Boston mob" needed to be taught a lesson and that measures should be taken to show "those Braggarts their Insignificance in the Scale of Empire" and, if necessary, to reduce Boston to "a poor smuggling Village." Lord Grafton saw trouble ahead if "in these critical times" troops were dispatched to Boston, but having just formed his ministry (succeeding that of Lord Chatham), he obeyed instructions of the crown and the pressure of public opinion and sent four regiments of British troops to Boston "to preserve order."

The Boston patriots were determined to offer resistance if the British troops should attempt to land. However, at a convention of delegates from Massachusetts towns, the rural vote outnumbered the urban, and "fighting Sam Adams" was compelled to yield to the wishes of the majority that "no blood be shed." The British regulars, therefore, were permitted to land at the Puritan metropolis in September 1768 without a shot being fired. The Boston citizens refused to house or provide quarters for the troops, so they established a camp on the Common. During the early summer of 1769, Grafton withdrew two of the four regiments that composed the garrison at Boston and sent them to Halifax, leaving only the Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth Regiments. The numerical lessening of the "army of occupation" did not reduce the tension in Boston, and in October 1769 a mob "threw sticks and stones" at a detachment of British troops, forcing them to break ranks. One shot was fired by a panicky soldier, but it caused no injury. Colonel Dalrymple, reporting the affair to his superior officer, General Gage, on October 28, 1769, said: "This is but a prelude to some motion more consequential, at least never was the popular Insolence at such a pitch."

Early in 1770, a free-for-all fight developed between a party of soldiers and some ropewalkers, which was soon followed by another brawl. We are told that when the king's men were roughly handled and forced back to their barracks "swearing vengeance," word spread

throughout Boston that the feud was to be settled by an outright battle between the townspeople and soldiers. Feeling ran high, and friction was inevitable. At last, on March 5, 1770, it is said, a group of Bostonians heckled and harassed an English soldier who had been placed on sentinel duty near the customhouse. A squad of soldiers coming to the support of the sentinel, under the command of Capt. Thomas Preston, recklessly fired on an extremely annoying but unarmed group of citizens, killing five and wounding six persons. This episode came to be generally known as the "Boston Massacre." The military might of Britain had replied to the irritating vocal taunts of colonials by musketry, bloodshed, and murder.

Captain Preston stoutly maintained that he gave no order to the troops to fire. Nevertheless, the command to "fire" was distinctly heard, and the response was prompt and fearful, as the volley was complete and the soldiers emptied their guns. There is no question regarding the provocative and hostile attitude of some of the crowd, and it was claimed that one of the soldiers was "knocked down"; also that the mob "advanced to the points of the bayonets." However, this could not be true if Captain Preston was correct in his statement that when the troops fired, he was between the soldiers and the mob, directly in the line of fire, and came perilously near to being struck himself. The evidence shows that Captain Preston did prevent a second volley from being fired and that "he struck up the firelocks of the soldiers with his own hands" and gave the order to retreat double-quick to camp. Armed Bostonians assembled quickly, prepared to avenge the "Massacre of the Innocents" by a wholesale massacre of the British troops, but influential Boston patriots who had been called "firebrands" by colonial Tories prevented any physical acts of reprisal. Although some of the British troops and their officers were hit by missiles on their retreat to camp, not an American shot was fired and no Britisher was injured sufficiently to require medical attention.

The moral character and breadth of view of certain American patriots are evidenced by the fact that John Adams (a second cousin of Samuel Adams), aided by Josiah Quincy, Jr., undertook the defense of the British soldiers who had been arrested after the "Boston Massacre" and charged with "causing the death of five persons, inhabitants of the colony." The trial, surprisingly, resulted in the acquittal of the officer who had commanded the company of British regulars and of practically all of the soldiers, but two were found guilty of manslaughter. The convicted men, we are told, claimed "benefit of clergy" and "were branded in the hand and released." John Adams showed a great measure of personal courage in taking the most unpopular side in this case. With the populace generally demanding capital punishment for murder, he proved through unimpeachable testimony that the affair was not one-sided; that there had been much provocation and a misunderstanding in regard to the attitude and orders of the commanding officer; and that only two soldiers, goaded beyond their capacity of endurance, had fired with the deliberate intent to kill. (Evidently, many of the other soldiers who did not have "murder in their hearts" were poor marksmen and irresponsible through sheer fright, for two shots could not have killed five people and seriously wounded six others.)

There is no doubt that at least two of the British soldiers had been deliberate killers, with malice aforethought. Montgomery, the original sentry, had started the trouble by threatening to rip open with his bayonet a crowd of hecklers and throwers of snowballs (as well as invectives) and by stepping out of his sentry box to hit an abusive young boy. This same Montgomery fired straight at the breast of Crispus Attucks, a giant of a man armed with only a stick, but whom he admittedly greatly feared. Private Kilroy, a notorious "bad man" of the regiment, deliberately aimed at Sam Gray, who had given him a good trouncing at the ropewalk brawl, and evidently sought "to get even." Other fatalities—the murderers of whom were seemingly "whitewashed"—were James Caldwell, a mate of a coasting vessel, Sam Maverick, who was holding a twelve-year-old by the hand, and

Patrick Carr, "the Irish teague" who, shot through the abdomen, lived for four days. Before his death, he declared that he had seen mobs and shooting by soldiers in Ireland; that the British soldiers on King's Street, Boston, were being roundly abused (vocally) by the populace—more, he thought, than they could be expected to stand without retaliation—and that they evidently fired in self-defense. Carr went so far as to say before he passed away that he did not blame whoever hit him and "had malice toward no one." It would seem that Patrick Carr and John Adams saved from condemnation the eight British soldiers who fired on the people and the officer in command.

After the first reaction of horror and indignation had spent itself, with a logical demand for "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," the upright conduct of John Adams and his eminently just handling of the case evidently added to his popularity with the Boston patriots. In the year following the Boston Massacre trial, he was elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives by a vote of almost four to one. However, the "cautious" John Adams fully believed that when he announced his decision to defend the British soldiers against the charge of murder, he would not have a friend or client left and would be forced "to retire to Braintree and his cows." He wrote that the case "compelled me to differ in opinion from all my friends, to set at defiance all their advice, their remonstrances, their raillery, their ridicule, their censure, their sarcasm, without acquiring one symptom of pity from my enemies." John Adams and his associate junior counsel, Josiah Quincy, were insulted and ridiculed on the streets of Boston, and for some time they seemed to stand alone; they were brave and just men as well as great patriots. Adams opposed the Stamp Tax in 1765 and thereafter was "impatient for the separation of the colonies from Great Britain." On June 7, 1776, he seconded the Lee resolution before the Continental Congress that "these colonies are, and of a right ought to be, free and independent states," and with Jefferson, Franklin, Livingston, and Sherman, Adams served on the committee of five appointed by the Congress to draft a Declaration of Independence.

The Boston citizens acted with restraint under the circumstances, but seeing that troops could not be located in the town without danger to both Bostonians and the soldiers themselves, they demanded the withdrawal of the regiments to a fort in the harbor. Samuel Adams (1722-1803), the American statesman and patriot, who became known as "Man of the Town Meeting," headed a committee of citizens that met acting Governor Hutchinson and demanded that the British troops stationed in Boston be withdrawn from the town. Hutchinson demurred, showed a tendency to procrastinate, and sought to compromise by moving one regiment only; but the Bostonians were firm and delivered an ultimatum to the effect that "both regiments be removed and that at once or else—"

The Boston Massacre, which was not a clash between the British regular soldiers and American colonials who had armed themselves in defense of their homes and liberties but a one-sided use of gunpowder and arbitrary force, occurred five years one month fourteen days before the historic fight between armed colonials and the British "lobster-backs" (or "bloody backs") at Lexington and Concord. The memory of the Boston Massacre kept alive the hatred of the colonials toward British despotism and military rule. The ground in King's Street where the patriots had fallen became sacred ground, on which, Lathrop tells us, the children of patriots were enjoined not to walk without the knowledge that "your feet slide on the stones bespattered with your father's brains." Niles writes that as time went by the Whigs regretted more and more that they had permitted the British soldiers to leave Boston alive, for after the massacre they richly deserved "to have had their Bones piled up on the Common as a Monument of Massachusetts Bravery." The fifth of March became known and celebrated as Massacre Day, and one of the survivors who never recovered from his wounds (Christopher Monk) was a living martyr to the cause of liberty and, it is said, was "paraded on Massacre Day for the edification of the patriots." John Hancock, in his Massacre Day oration of 1774, pointed to Monk as a living misery

and tragedy of British oppression. Benjamin Church, speaking on Massacre Day, referred to British troops as "brutal banditti" and as "grinning furies gloating o'er their carnage." After the "Massacre," Bostonians were never permitted by ardent patriots and Whigs to forget those "corpses wallowing in gore upon our Exchange."

An outbreak did occur in Boston on March 5, 1775, when Joseph Warren (1741-1775), American physician, soldier, and patriot, delivered the annual Massacre Day oration, but "the Whigs bridled their tempers and, in spite of provocation by the redcoats, refused to be drawn into beginning hostilities." The ardent and brilliant Dr. Joseph Warren, president of the Third Provincial Congress and an active member of the committee of public safety, was unfortunately killed in battle at Bunker Hill on June 17 (three months and twelve days after delivering his patriotic Boston Massacre speech). It is significant and indicative of the spirit of cultured patriots that when he met his death, he was fighting for American liberty as a volunteer in the rank and file, even though he had been commissioned as a major general on June 14, or three days before the battle took place.

The effect of the Boston Massacre was to build up resentment against the British not only throughout the province of Massachusetts—both maritime and rural—but also in all the American colonies. However, the fundamental spirit of New Englanders, who proposed to obey only the "Higher Law" and do what seemed good to them, "continued to grow and flourish," being fertilized by martyr's blood. It would seem that the people of the shipping community of Salem were primed and ready for open rebellion some time before the fateful day of April 19, 1775, when the British fired upon the colonials once more, but this time the minutemen replied with shot and put the proud "redcoats" to rout. On March 5, 1771, the first anniversary of the Boston Massacre, the following inflammatory proclamation, aimed at keeping alive the indignation of a subject people and at arousing a spirit of rebellion against despotism maintained by military force, was published in the Salem GAZETTE, framed conspicuously in a border of black in token of mourning:

As a Solemn and Perpetual Memorial:

Of the Tyranny of the British Administration of Government in the years 1768, 1769, and 1770;

Of the fatal and destructive Consequences of Quartering Armies, in Time of Peace, in populous cities;

Of the ridiculous Policy and infamous Absurdity of supporting *Civil Government by a Military Force*.

Of the Great Duty and Necessity of firmly opposing Despotism at its first Approaches;

Of the detestable Principles and arbitrary Conduct of those *Ministers* in Britain who advised, and of their *Tools* in America who desired the Introduction of a Standing Army in this Province in the year 1768;

Of the irrefragible Proof which those ministers themselves thereby produced, that the Civil Government, as by them Administered, was weak, wicked, and tyrannical;

Of the vile Ingratitude and abominable Wickedness of every American who abetted and encouraged, either in Thought, Word or Deed, the establishment of a Standing Army among his Countrymen;

Of the unaccountable Conduct of those *Civil Governors*, the immediate Representatives of His Majesty, who, while the *Military* was triumphantly insulting the whole LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, and while the blood of the Massacred Inhabitants was flowing in the Streets, persisted in repeatedly disclaiming all authority of relieving the People, by any the least removal of the Troops:

And of the Savage cruelty of the IMMEDIATE PERPETRATORS:

Be it forever Remembered

That this day, THE FIFTH OF MARCH,

is the Anniversary of

BOSTON MASSACRE IN KING ST. BOSTON,
NEW ENGLAND, 1770.

In which Five of his Majesty's Subjects were slain and six wounded, By the Discharge of a number of Muskets from a Part of Soldiers under the Command of Capt. Thomas Preston,

God Save the People!

Salem, March 5, 1771.

*Rebellion in the Waters of the Narragansett — the
Burning of the GASPE*

During the period 1763-1775, British arrogance and ruthlessness in marine matters poured fuel on the fire of indignation that swept over the colonies. It was on water and not on land—as is generally supposed—that the first overt act of resistance by American colonials to British authority occurred. In 1764 armed British vessels were placed at various points along the American coast from the Penobscot to the Chesapeake (principally from Casco Bay to Cape Henlopen) to patrol and virtually blockade the ports and enforce the Navigation and Trade Acts. The armed schooner *St. John*, commanded by Lieutenant Hill, was evidently the first of the British vessels stationed in Rhode Island waters, and Lieutenant Hill's orders were to examine every vessel trading in the waters assigned to him for revenue police duty and see that the cargoes were legitimate and the prescribed levies paid thereon. A brig arrived in port, discharged and loaded at Howland's Ferry. Lieutenant Hill, who had plenty of opportunity to check up on her while she was at the pier, ignored the vessel until she had proceeded to sea, when he followed and compelled her return to port as a suspected smuggler. Investigation proved that the sailing and cargo were entirely regular, and the brig was set free, but only after a great deal of time had been lost and the owner of the vessel subjected to unwarranted expense. If the brig had been examined before sailing, no financial hardship to the owners would have resulted and no embarrassing business delay. It was evident that Lieutenant Hill, with malicious intent and expressing an attitude toward colonial shipping that had become far too common, had deliberately planned the procedure to annoy the colonials. History tells us that "the whim of a supercilious naval officer not only caused loss but also aroused indignation" and that an armed sloop was fitted out to destroy the *St. John*; also that a company of Newport patriots gathered to attack her and were prevented from punishing the British for their arrogance and disdain of the colonials and their financial and trade interests only by the arrival in the harbor of another of "the king's ships," the man-of-war *Squirrel*. We are told, however, that although the colonists were deterred by superior British naval force in their attempt "to take or sink" the *St. John*, yet they ventured so far in their expression of open rebellion as to land on Goat Island, seize the battery, and open a "fire of defiance" on the British warship.

The continuation of events in the Narragansett area well illustrates the general pattern of humiliation, insolence, persecution, and mental cruelty pursued with "haughty and lordly" tyranny by officious and arbitrary British naval officers to the detriment of "the despised colonial shippers and seamen" during the eleven years that preceded the Lexington incident and the recognized beginning of the "shooting" Revolution. While the people were still fretting at the deliberate, annoying, expensive, and thoroughly unwarranted interference by the *St. John* with the colonial trading brig, the British man-of-war *Maidstone* dropped anchor in the bay and immediately began to impress American seamen into the British Navy. The entire crew was taken from a colonial brig that had just reached her home port after "a year-long voyage to the coast of Africa." Even if the vicious practice of impressment was to be tolerated, the needless cruelty of forcibly taking men away from the very threshold of their homes, after they had not seen their families and friends for a year, was indicative of inhumanity. We read that the British naval officers of that period, in their dealings with the colonials, "found pleasure in cruelty" and in the irritating expression of despotic powers conferred upon them by King George III and his ministers in harmony with acts of Parliament, which considered the Americans a subject people. The relatives of the impressed and ill-treated colonial seamen were too few and disorganized to rescue the men by force, for the units of the British Navy in the bay were far too strong.

Their attempts to obtain redress were scornfully denied, but the feelings of the Americans were expressed when they captured one of the *Maidstone's* boats lying at the wharf and, dragging it through the streets to the Common, burned it in front of the courthouse amid the derisive shouts of the people.

In 1768 the British customs officers stationed in Boston arbitrarily seized the American sloop *Liberty* for discharging without payment of British-imposed duties on a cargo of wine consigned to John Hancock. This resulted not only in rioting and the sending of two regiments of English regulars to Boston but also in the entering of many suits against Hancock, which, if successful, would have caused the confiscation of his estate and ruined the Boston merchant. As a result of the controversy and the ensuing legal battles, Hancock was thrown into the camp of the James Otis and Samuel Adams patriots, and his resentment against the British Government and its methods and policy of taxation without representation was greatly increased.

The British Crown officers in the late 1760's had been commenting on and worrying about "the powerful smugglers' rings of Newport and Providence," and evidently Rhode Island merchants smuggled openly and aggressively, with little or no interference from the British Government. In 1770 the collector of customs was mobbed at Newport, and the Superior Court of the colony, we are told, "refused to grant general writs of assistance to the British customhouse officers."

The sloop *Liberty* was destined to become an historic vessel. When armed and fitted out by the British as a sloop of war, she was put under the command of Captain Reid and sent by the commissioner of customs to Newport, where the vessel made herself generally hated by the Narragansett Bay shipping fraternity because of Captain Reid's "extraordinary zeal and unwarranted arrogance." While cruising in Long Island Sound on July 17, 1769, the *Liberty* arbitrarily seized a colonial brig and a sloop owned in Connecticut and took them into Newport. Captain Packwood, of the brig, had duly reported his cargo and had conformed to all the requirements of law. After waiting two days and finding that no proceedings had been instituted against him, Captain Packwood went aboard the *Liberty* to protest at the unfair treatment he was receiving. One report says that Captain Reid was ashore at the time, but apparently either Reid himself or the officer in charge became annoyed at Packwood's remarks, and as the boat was returning shoreward from the *Liberty* the order was given the British marines "to shoot the disrespectful Yankee." The colonials pulled vigorously out of range, several musket shots struck the boat, but fortunately no one was hit. Upon landing, Captain Packwood wrathfully told of his experience in the town, and that night the citizens of Newport, exasperated by the highhanded and unwarrantable proceedings of the British, acted in reprisal. The *Liberty* was boarded by a strong force in a surprise attack, her cables were cut, and she was sent adrift after all the crew had been driven ashore. As she came to rest "near Long Wharf," the colonials again boarded her, cut way the masts, and threw her armament overboard. On the returning high tide, the sloop drifted to Goat Island. On the following night, patriots burned her, and she became a total loss. The British shouted "Treason," threatened the colonials, and sought to apprehend and punish the rebels who flouted British authority and destroyed the property of the king. However, there is no record of the arrest or punishment of any of "the mob" that participated in the destructive raid.

In March 1772, the British armed schooner *Gaspé* made her appearance in Narragansett Bay. This vessel soon earned a despicable reputation, for her Commander, Lieut. William Dudingston, evidently acted in the belief that "every American sailor was a lawless smuggler and every American citizen a criminal" and that it was his duty as a loyal subject of the crown "to inflict every damage to American ships and insult to American citizens" within the power of the forces placed under his command. Lieutenant Dudingston was described as "a fire-eating sea dog" who was determined "to stamp out smuggling without regard for the sensibilities of the damned colonials." John R. Bartlett tells us: "He stopped all vessels including small market

boats without showing his authority for doing so; and even sent the property he had illegally seized to Boston for trial, contrary to an act of Parliament which required such trials to be held in the colonies where the seizures were made." Contemporaries tell us that Dudingston, when stopping a boat, threw the cargo about, here and there, without regard to the damage and resultant loss to the owner and carrier. He was credited with being "prone to loot boats carrying farm produce." Dudingston is also reported to have expressed the prevalent view of the officers of the Royal Navy stationed in American waters when he affirmed that every colonial vessel, whether innocent or not, "should be subjected to every inconvenience rather than let one smuggler [or lawbreaker] escape" and that Americans were the lowest class of people in the social scale. According to the Newport MERCURY (November 9, 1772), Dudingston was even reported to have said soon after he appeared in Narragansett waters that he would be delighted to see Newport burn about the heads of its citizens and that if such a pleasing misadventure should occur, he would be "damned" if he or his crew would do anything whatsoever to help to put out the fire.

Dudingston, in the *Gaspé*, energetically cruised in the waters of Narragansett Bay and vicinity, stopping, boarding, and examining every vessel he came upon and "threatening to blow every recalcitrant skipper out of the water." The merchants, shipowners, and populace who collectively in Rhode Island constituted what the British called "the smuggling fraternity" were outraged by the tactics of Dudingston, and to the colonials he became "an enemy to the rights of man"—and an obnoxious, swashbuckling, and inhuman one at that. Contemporary papers charge that the British naval lieutenant was "haughty, insolent, and intolerant, personally ill treating every Master and Merchant of the Vessels he boarded, stealing Sheep, Hogs, Poultry, etc., from the Farmers round the Bay, and cutting down their Fruit and other Trees for Fire-Wood; in a Word, his Behavior was so *piratical* and provoking that Englishmen could not patiently bear it."

Rhode Islanders chafed and sputtered and then became articulate in vociferous resentment. Dudingston was declared to be "more imperious and haughty than the Grand Turk himself" and a cruel pirate operating under the king's flag. It would seem that the resistance and rebellion of the colonials caused Dudingston to redouble his efforts to make himself as obnoxious as possible in the Narragansett region. After he seized the sloop *Fortune*, carrying twelve hogsheads of rum, and sent her to the British Court of Admiralty at Boston, Lieutenant Dudingston wrote to Rear Admiral John Montague, the British naval commander in New England waters: "I am not ignorant of the statute to the contrary." However, in sending the *Fortune* to Boston, he well knew that the Massachusetts court "would be more likely to condemn the sloop." The zealous colonist-baiting and lawbreaking British naval lieutenant was not censured for his provocative act in violation of the law that the British were posing as strictly enforcing "to the letter," but was "highly commended" by Admiral Montague. We are told that Dudingston, knowing that many of his seizures were illegal, was afraid to put his foot ashore, as many suits at law were threatened against him by the owners of goods and vessels that he had taken. A suit begun in Rhode Island by the owners of one of the cargoes illegally seized and sent to Boston resulted in a judgment against the British officer, and complaints of these proceedings were duly made. Joseph Wanton, colonial governor of Rhode Island, sent letters to Admiral Montague at Boston, protesting against the outrages, which brought forth the following arrogant reply from the British admiral:

I shall report your two insolent letters to my officer [Lieutenant Dudingston] to his Majesty's secretaries of state, and leave to them to determine what right you have to demand a sight of all orders I shall give to officers of my squadron; and I would advise you not to send your sheriff on board the king's ship again on such ridiculous

errands. . . . I am also informed the people of Newport talk of fitting out an armed vessel to rescue any vessel the king's schooner may take carrying on an illicit trade. Let them be cautious what they do, for as sure as they attempt it, and any of them are taken, I will hang them as pirates.

The *Gaspé* naturally became an object of intense colonial hatred. Finally, on June 8, 1772, going in chase of the *Hannah* (a packet sloop plying between Newport and Providence and harmlessly operating as a sort of regular ferry between the towns), the *Gaspé* was led with devilish subtlety by Capt. Benjamin Lindsey of the American light-draft vessel over a shoal off Namquit (now Gaspee) Point, where the deeper-draft *Gaspé* went firmly aground. The *Hannah* was a well-known sailing packet that traded regularly over the one inland water route on the Narragansett and did not put out to sea. She meticulously complied with all the laws and was subject to inspection at any time when in port, but her owners and commander took pride in closely maintaining a schedule for the convenience of their patrons. Dudingston knew all this, but took it into his head to be officious and annoy the packet and then waxed indignant when the *Hannah* outsailed and eluded him. Upon arrival at Providence, Captain Lindsey told his story of being chased by the *Gaspé*, and others added to the humiliation by reciting incidents of persistent annoyances and insults since the *Gaspé* arrived in the bay. The citizens of the town, thoroughly aroused, decided that British insolence had gone far enough and that the time had come to teach Dudingston and the officers of the *Gaspé*, the Royal Navy, and the British Government a lesson.

Contemporary records suggest that it was felt that the *Gaspé* might be able to refloat herself "on the night high tide," which was about three o'clock the next morning. Therefore, if the Rhode Islanders were to take advantage of the ship's helplessness (as far as maneuvering was concerned), prompt action was necessary. We are told that "shortly after nightfall a drummer went through the streets of Providence crying that the *Gaspé* was aground" and summoning the citizens to hasten to a stated rendezvous, "where an expedition was gathering to dispose of the hated schooner once and for all." The attack, planned and led by the most prominent as well as, evidently, the most capable citizens of Providence, was brilliantly executed. Among those who took part were Capt. Abraham Whipple, who had become rich privateering against the French and Spanish; Capt. John Burroughs Hopkins, who, with Whipple, later became a captain in the Continental Navy; and Capt. John Brown, who was the owner of the *Hannah* and other vessels and reputed to be the wealthiest man in Rhode Island. The English man-of-war, aground, was taken by surprise by eight boat-loads of determined colonials indifferently armed—some with only clubs and paving stones), who stole up on her with muffled oars in the dark and were swarming aboard before a general alarm could be given. It is said that on the approach of the boats, Dudingston was awakened, went on deck, and, "mounting the starboard gunwhale in his nightshirt," hailed a boat alongside. Captain Whipple replied: "I am the sheriff of Kent County, I have got a warrant to apprehend you, so surrender, God damn you." Dudingston, in a burst of rage and profanity, refused. Shots were fired, and the *Gaspé* was quickly taken and the crew disarmed. The hated, arrogant Dudingston collapsed with bullets in his arm and groin, crying out, "Good God, I am done for." It was soon evident that the naval lieutenant's wounds were not serious, so Whipple made sport and threatened him. Holding a handspike over the man's head, Whipple shouted: "Let me dispatch the piratical dog." The colonials then had the satisfaction of seeing and hearing the haughty, intolerant colonial-baiting Dudingston plead that his life be spared. Contemporary accounts of the incident say that he was "turned loose in an open boat" as were his men after the aggressive ones had been clubbed into submission and the impudent ones had been "taught to have better manners" and more respect for the Yankees. The *Gaspé* was then burned to the water's edge. It appears that, although the British naval vessel was ransacked and then destroyed, there were no casualties on either side.

Abraham Whipple, who later became known as "The Commodore," was born in Providence, R. I., on September 9, 1733. He was an active privateer in the Seven Years' War and, operating under the British flag in the *Game Cock*, was a "sea hornet" dreaded by the French, Spaniards, and the buccaneers of every race. Rhode Island historians say that in the engagement with the *Rose* in 1772, Whipple "fired the first gun of the Revolution on the water."

The claim is also made that "on one cruise, he took 23 prizes to the value of a million dollars, and probably captured more enemy vessels than any other American privateer during the Revolution." In 1780, Commodore Whipple was captured by the British when he was endeavoring to relieve the besieged city of Charleston, S. C., and he was held a prisoner until the close of the war.

The news of the "*Gaspé* affair"—greeted with satisfaction throughout the colonies—created a "terrific wave of indignation in England" and, it has been said, "was one of the prime causes of the greater severity on the part of the crown which forced the final explosion of war." The attack on the *Gaspé* was not the work of a mob but a spontaneous outburst of anger on the part of colonials at the outrages being perpetrated by the British Government and its representatives upon American shipping. It was a definite indication that long-suffering colonials had received about all the abuse from a domineering, contemptuous, and unsympathetic government that they intended to stand without organized revolt. It preceded by less than three years Lexington and Concord and the shooting of the Revolution. The *Gaspé* incident proved that the time had come when the Americans, in defense of justice, would do more than merely evade unjust British-imposed laws. Lord Dartmouth, speaking in England of the burning of the *Gaspé*, declared that the colonials were now "levying war against the king."

For a while, the English Government seemed reluctant to take retaliatory measures and inaugurate definite, revengeful reprisals against the Rhode Islanders for "their guilt in the *Gaspé* affair," but the Tories on both sides of the Atlantic ranted about colonial Whig "licentiousness that had grown into treason" and the "atrocious offence" humiliating to the crown and all king's men (Loyalists or Tories). Gov. Thomas Hutchinson, of Massachusetts, wrote denouncing the American Whigs and asserting that "if the *Gaspee* rioters are not punished, the [Tory] Friends to Government will despond and give up all hopes of being able to withstand the [Whig] faction." Finally, the ministry in London appointed "a Commission of Enquiry to examine into the *Gaspee* affair and to hold suspects for trial in England." This act, with the threat of taking colonial "suspects" in handcuffs for imprisonment, trial and punishment in England, made American patriots out of the Whigs. The British Government offered a reward of one thousand pounds for the apprehension of the leader of the attack and five hundred pounds for any of the participants, at the same time promising pardon to anyone who would make disclosures. The commission was condemned as a court of inquisition before it reached Rhode Island, and it was said that its presence on American soil would of itself be "the most insulting violation of the rights of Americans that could be devised."

The royal commissioners, who sat on the case from January to June 1773, obtained no evidence or information in Rhode Island other than that it was a "downright democracy" (which the government in London probably well knew) and that the ringleaders were unidentified "men of estate and property" who enjoyed the respect, loyalty, and ardent protection of the entire community. No suspects could be found "to be sent to hang at Tyburn on the Thames," and the commissioners were amazed at the lack of knowledge of the *Gaspé* incident of the Rhode Islanders and their singularly short memories, for in all other matters the colonials seemed very observing and mentally alert and retentive. Suffering from intimidation, even Lieutenant Dudingston and certain members of the *Gaspé's* crew—who seemed to have had an excellent opportunity to identify Capt. Abe Whipple, the aggressive Bucklin (who shot Dudingston), and others—proved poor witnesses for the crown. The commissioners finally confessed their failure to obtain evidence from any source sufficient to charge any person with being a party to the act of treason. Instead of finding and punishing the guilty colonists, the British Government contented itself by making Lieutenant Dudingston a captain in the Royal Navy because of the humiliation and sufferings that he had received at the hands of Capt. Abe Whipple and the Providence patriots. The return of the royal commissioners to

England, with their mission unaccomplished, incensed British officials and the Tories in the colonies. The collector of customs in Rhode Island wrote that their departure, with an admitted failure to apprehend at least a few of the many culprits, marked the end of security to British Government servants in the colonies and "an end to collecting and enforcing the acts of trade." The Tories commented on the scandalous "affront to Britain," with the king, ministers and Parliament "laughed at by the Rhode Islanders and held in derision." John C. Miller, in *ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION*, rightly says:

On the other hand, this triumph over the British government was heady wine to colonial radicals; the indecision, rapid veering from appeasement to severity, and the inability of the government to punish the colonists effectively, encouraged Americans to regard the Atlantic as a barrier beyond which the long arm of Great Britain could not reach. Colonists seemingly need have little fear of punishment from the doddering old lady overseas. Certainly, the failure of the British govern-

ment to punish the scuttlers of the *Gaspée* was a direct encouragement to Bostonians to stage the Tea Party. After the Rhode Island commission had revealed the weakness of the British government, Admiral Montague concluded that the Bostonians were "almost ripe for independence, and nothing but the ships [British naval vessels in Boston Harbor and around the Massachusetts coast] prevents their going greater lengths, as they see no notice taken from home of their behaviour."

It is generally admitted that the *Gaspé* incident, followed by the sending of a British commission of inquiry to Rhode Island to examine into the affair and "hold suspects for trial in England," brought the various American colonies closer together and gave a strong impetus to co-operation for mutual advantage and union against oppression or domination from overseas.

It is amazing in these days of loose talk and publicity to learn that in pre-Revolution times the colonists could and did "keep their mouths shut" and think and act for the common good without regard to monetary gain. It is apparent that practically everybody in Providence, R. I., knew that John Brown, "one of our most respectable merchants," engineered the *Gaspé* adventure, that Capt. Benjamin Lindsey got together "eight of the largest longboats in the harbor with five oars each" and with trusty shipmaster friends had them at Fenner's Wharf near James Sabin's place (a house of board and entertainment for gentlemen), and that Sabin's was the rendezvous announced throughout the town by a man who traveled the length and breadth of the place, not surreptitiously but with beat of drum. Everybody knew that Abraham Whipple was chosen commander of the enterprise and John Burroughs Hopkins his lieutenant by popular vote. Others of note who took part "in the carrying out of the will of the people" were known to be Benjamin and (Capt.) Samuel Dunn, Joseph Bucklin (who shot Lieutenant Dudingston), Dr. John Mawney, Benjamin Page, Turpin Smith, Capt. Joseph Tillinghast, Simeon H. Olney, Colonel Bowen, a Mr. Dickenson, etc.; yet when British officials offered big sums of money for information regarding the identity of any leaders or ordinary participants of the *Gaspé* affair, it is to the credit of Roger Williams' old town that not a single person "squealed"—neither Tory nor Whig—and Providence stood firm as a bit of united America against its would-be master.

It is significant and suggestive of the rapid expansion westward of the young republic that after the War of Independence had thrown Britain's Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act of 1774 into the discard (with their "hemming-in" and western boundary restrictions), Capt. Abraham Whipple of *Gaspé* fame should spend many of the last years of his life and die at Marietta, Ohio, a city directly south of Cleveland on the Ohio River, at the mouth of the Muskingum, and that in 1803, when seventy years of age, he should take an ocean-going square-rigged ship, the *St. Clair* of 104 tons (built by the Devols at Marietta), down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to New Orleans, where she took a cargo of pork and flour to Havana and then sailed to Philadelphia. The inscription on the tombstone of the hero of the *Gaspé* adventure reads:

MERCHANT SAIL

Sacred to the memory of
COMMODORE ABRAHAM WHIPPLE
 whose naval skill and courage will ever remain
 The Pride and Boast of His Country
 In the Revolution he was
 The First on the Seas
 To hurl defiance at proud Britain. Gallantly
 leading the way to wrest from the mistress
 of the ocean her sceptre, and there to
 wave the star-spangled banner. He
 also conducted to the sea the first
 square-rigged vessel built on the
 Ohio, opening to commerce
 resources beyond calculation.

Born, Sept. 26, A.D. 1733

Died, May 27, A.D. 1819

Aged 85 years.

The Narragansett, with its notorious molasses and rum trade ("the hot-bed of smugglers, privateers, and lawlessness"), was not the only part of the Atlantic seaboard to experience the "arrogance and ruthlessness" of officers of the British Navy. The *Boston GAZETTE AND COUNTRY JOURNAL* of September 25, 1769, illustrates how the British Government, through its armed forces, proceeded to teach "the damned Yankees" to show a proper respect for King George and his representatives. With episodes of this nature by no means unusual, it is no wonder that loyalty was chilled, resentment increased, and a fighting spirit aroused.

On Friday last a Coaster belonging to Scituate was passing one of the ships of war in this harbour, when they dous'd their mainsail, but it not being quite to the satisfaction of the commanding officer of the Ship, they sent their boat on board and upon the officer's stepping upon the Sloop's deck he

immediately drew a cutlass with which he struck the master of the Coaster on the cheek, which cut a gash near three inches long, after which he damn'd him for not showing more respect to the King's Ship and then cut the halliards of the mainsail and let the sail run down upon deck.

*The Boston Tea Party of December 1773 and
 Colonial Reaction to the Tea Act*

Three English ships bearing cargoes of East India Company tea arrived at Boston and moored at Griffins' Wharf, and these shipments became a major bone of contention and a matter for controversy. The Americans refused to unload the ships or receive the cargo if it remained subject to tax. Adams sought to have the loaded ships returned to England, but this the British declined to do. Gov. Thomas Hutchinson insisted that if the tea was not unloaded before midnight of December 17, 1773, it would be seized by the customhouse authorities for nonpayment of duty. If this procedure was followed, the Boston patriots had cause to believe that the tea would be sold secretly and the money used to pay the salaries of British officials. At a town meeting held on December 16 at Faneuil Hall, an unsuccessful "eleventh-hour" attempt was made to persuade Hutchinson to release the tea ships and let them leave port, so Samuel Adams, in his concluding remarks, said, "This meeting can do nothing more to save the country." Following this public assembly of prominent and responsible Boston citizens, the "Mohawks" got into action. A company of fifty men, all masquerading and indifferently disguised as Indians, went aboard each of the three tea ships, which, we are told, then "lay

under the guns of the British men-of-war in the harbor," and under the eyes and protection of hundreds of citizens "who covered the waterfront" broke open the 342 chests, or cases, of tea and threw the contents into the harbor. This was no mob action. The affair was conducted with almost military discipline by selected, responsible men and was a carefully planned and cold, premeditated deed of patriots. No royal officer could get near the ships, and no resistance was offered the "Indians." There was no physical force used of any kind except that required for hoisting the tea chests from the hold, breaking them open, and heaving them overboard. We are told that the sailors aboard the ships were friendly and co-operative and helped in the work of destruction. It is a matter of record that no part of any of the three ships or of their cargo and stores was damaged; "all that was found missing the next morning was the tea."

The attorney general of Massachusetts pronounced the destruction of the tea to be "treason," but he was unable to build up a case or get evidence against any individual, as the identity of the "Indians" was a well-kept secret. The Boston Whigs defended the "Tea Party" as an "act of self-defense." It was asserted that since "the great law of Nature and Reason has possessed every Society with a Right to defend itself from Ruin, without having Recourse to Books or Statutes, or recorded Customs," the destroying of the tea was "legitimate resistance of tyranny within the definition laid down by John Locke," the English philosopher (1632-1704). According to the contemporary colonial press, the destruction in Boston of the British tea under the conditions prevailing was a "glorious illegality" perpetrated by "a band of virtuous patriots; . . . an act of absolute moral and political necessity, and therefore exempt from even good laws." The Boston Tea Party was a definite act in defiance of Britain's arbitrary domination through laws enacted by a Parliament—or decreed by a king and his ministers—three thousand miles away without regard to justice and the rights, liberties, and interests of the governed. Britain retaliated with the Boston Port Bill, the closing of the port of Boston to all commerce, the sending of large forces of troops to the city, and an expressed determination to "ruin the town and punish the rebels."

The historic Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, proved to be the first of a series. In March 1774, "over a score of chests of tea" arrived in Boston for New England merchants, but "as the tea bore the hated tax," the "Indians" again went to work and destroyed it. The New York patriots, or Whigs, felt strongly about the tax on tea and refused to permit any tea to be landed as long as the tax was assessed. Governor Tryon was expected by the Tories "to cram the tea down the throats of the Sons of Liberty," and an attempt was made to land the tea and store it pending instructions from the British Government. Tryon ordered His Majesty's sloop *Susan* to convoy the tea ship to the wharf, but two thousand citizens met in the New York City Hall and organized to prevent the tea from being removed from the ship. Had the governor of New York succeeded in making good his boast and putting the tea ashore, there would have been an outbreak of violence in New York about the same time and possibly on the same day (December 16, 1773) that the tea was destroyed in Boston; for "thousands of patriots" would have rushed to the water front, with equally fatal results to the tea and any crown officers who stood in their way. Governor Tryon's caution and good sense averted "lawless mob action" at that time, but New York had a tea party of its own, a few months later, in the early spring of 1774. In *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK*, we read:

The decks of the *London*, Captain Chambers, were a poor setting for an international incident. She had only eighteen cases of tea on board, and Chambers, after first denying that they were there, claimed them as his own. Although this ruse failed, the attempted deception so angered the citizens that they caused Chambers to be held at Fraunces' Tavern while they boarded the *London*. Watched by a large number of spectators, including bandsmen who chose "God Save the King" as a suitable musical accompaniment, they then threw the

eighteen cases of tea into New York Harbor. Captain Lockyear's ship, the *Nancy*, just missed the party, arriving in port on the eighteenth and leaving on the twenty-third, tea still aboard. Lockyear knew his errand was dangerous but had a trick in reserve. On arrival he asked permission to go ashore to buy provisions for the return crossing. Once on land he visited agents and discussed deliveries. Militant citizens rushed him back on board ship, where he stayed, virtually incommunicado, until the *Nancy* sailed.

At Greenwich, N. J., on the lower Delaware, the tea aboard the ship *Greyhound* was burned by a "local tribe" of "Indian" patriots. A ship carrying tea to Boston was wrecked on Cape Cod; much of the tea aboard that was washed ashore was burned by the patriots, but a part of it was secured by the Tories and turned over to the British for storage, to the chagrin and great disgust of the Whigs elsewhere. Samuel Adams wrote that had he known that the Cape Cod "Indians" were so weak and negligent of their duties, the Boston braves would have "marched on snowshoes to do the business for them."

Portsmouth, N. H., the residence of Governor Wentworth, an ardent Royalist, was believed by many to be a "Tory Town" that had close and profitable business relations with Britain through shipping. At a town meeting on December 16, 1773, Portsmouth colonists declared that the action of the British Parliament was a "direct attack upon the liberties of America"; that "laying a duty upon teas landed in America, payable here, is a tax whereby the property of Americans is taken from them without their consent." By a resolution passed with enthusiasm, the East India Company was warned that if it brought tea into Portsmouth for sale, the citizens would stop at nothing to prevent its being landed and sold. This action, whereas generally popular with the men of the community, did not sit so well with the women—both Whig and Tory; for according to the New Hampshire GAZETTE of February 18, 1774, the Matrons of Liberty, at a meeting held at the home of a Mrs. Susanna Spindle, resolved "that the merchants under a pretence of guarding our liberties, prevented the landing of the East India Company's tea; and at the same time sell their own at such an extravagant price make it evident it is not our interest, but their own private gain they are pursuing."

On Saturday evening, June 25, 1774, the British mast ship *Grosvenor* (Captain Brown) took Portsmouth by surprise and quietly landed and stored in the customhouse twenty-seven chests of Bohea tea. News that the "pernicious, destructive, troublesome commodity" had been landed in violation of the expressed decision of the citizens of Portsmouth percolated through the town Monday morning, and at a special town meeting held that day, it was voted to take steps promptly to see that the tea was not distributed and consumed in the colonies. A guard was appointed "to keep the tea secure," and Edward Parry, to whom the tea was consigned, was required to reship the tea and given two weeks to get it out of Portsmouth. Parry acted promptly, under compulsion, and secured the sloop *Molly* (Capt. Benj. Partridge) to carry it to Halifax. The tea was carted with ceremony but without injury through the streets and placed aboard the vessel. On the evening of June 28, a few men, described as mariners, "endeavored to excite a mob to destroy the tea and the vessel hired to export it," but the sober-minded citizens and officials co-operated to prevent violence. The *Molly* sailed unmolested from Portsmouth with her cargo of tea, and the local paper (New Hampshire GAZETTE) wondered how long "the Blasted Herb" would "keep the whole continent in Ferment, the Duty on which operates in so violent a manner on the minds of the Inhabitants not only in the sea-port towns, but the whole Country in General, that it will require the most cooling Medecines, and the best skill of the ablest political Physicians to prevent the Body Politic from great Convulsions."

The British were persistent and refused to take warning. In September 1774, the mast ship *Fox* (Captain Norman) reached Portsmouth with thirty chests of tea, which was also consigned to Edward Parry. His business quarters suffered some injury, and only quick and effective means of handling the situation on the part of influential citizens, in co-operation with the authorities, prevented serious violence and direct action; upon Parry's agreeing to ship the tea promptly to Nova Scotia, a town meeting appointed a committee to keep guard over it and see that it was got out of the town without delay. When a third shipment of tea arrived at Portsmouth several weeks later, the patience of the populace was exhausted, and Governor Wentworth reported that "the people have actually burned a brig and 2,320 lb. bohea tea imported in her." This attack on the tea ship actually marked the beginning of the Revolution in New Hampshire, and it was quickly followed (after news was received that General Gage was about to send troops to Portsmouth) by the capture on December 14, 1775, of Fort William and Mary by Sons of Liberty. They were led by the marines Capt. John Langdon and Capt.

Thomas Pickering, and the fort's armaments and munitions were removed and taken upriver. Although the small garrison fired on the raiders with three 4-pounders, the attack on the British fort, which dominated the entrance to the Piscataqua, was described as "bloodless."

In Charleston, S. C., some tea was seized by the customhouse officers for nonpayment of duty and stored. The Whigs would have destroyed the tea, but were restrained from violence, as it was owned by the East India Company. They felt that they had to give selfish thought to their bounty upon indigo and their export rice business to southern Europe. However, after permitting the tea to be landed, they took effective steps to see that no duty was paid on it, and the tea was not sold until after independence was declared. (It was also reported that the people of Charleston had "caused the tea of the East India Company to be stored in damp cellars where it spoiled.") In November 1774, however, a shipment of tea was thrown into the Cooper River at Charleston, "while crowds standing on the wharves watched the spectacle and cheered." The colonists of South Carolina, it was said, had developed a sense of freedom too fully to submit to measures which they regarded as subversive to the fundamental principles of liberty, and following their little "Tea Party" a general committee of patriots practically assumed control of the province. In Annapolis, Md., both the cargo of a tea importer and the ship carrying it were burned, and the colonists generally sang "the American Tea Deum" with so much earnestness that the importation of tea completely ceased. Even smuggled tea was proscribed, for the patriots would take no chance on any shipment of taxed tea getting into the country. Under patriotic pressure, tea disappeared in all the colonies. Whole chests of tea were burned upon the village commons, and no good American would own a pound or drink a drop of it. The colonials, who, like the British, had been great tea drinkers, were "weaned from the teacup to the coffee cup," and—strange as it may seem—Americans, after the passing of 170 years, have never returned to the old habit but remain a coffee- instead of a tea-drinking people.

Coercive Acts of 1774 and the Assembling of the First Continental Congress

The Boston Tea Party shocked the complacent, arrogant British, and all political parties talked of punishment for the "criminal" act of "New England fanatics." Even the Whigs declared that the day of appeasement was over and that Boston should be required to make restitution. Lord North was shocked that Bostonians had rebelled at "a relief instead of an oppression," for he declared that they had risen up against a tax on tea that really made the tea cost the colonists less than ever before; therefore, the dispute could no longer be considered as one concerning taxation. It was a question as to whether or not Britain had any authority whatever over the "haughty American Republicans." In North's reaction to the Tea Party, we find a refusal to consider taxation in principle but only from the economic standpoint of "pennies per pound," and we get a glimpse of the fear that the political movement in the colonies was led by "Republicans." George III called for immediate retaliatory action, punishment, and reprisals and declared, "We must master them." The press said that no "true-born Briton" could stand the insults and abuse being heaped upon England by the perverted agitators and firebrands in "our own colonies" and that unless the spirit responsible for such acts was eliminated, root and branch, it would destroy the empire and put to shame proud Britain—"the Mistress of the Seas, the conqueror of France and Spain, and the terror of the evildoers of the world." Prompt chastisement of the impudent and disloyal Americans was

demanded of the government, for Englishmen would not permit "a petty little province, the creature of our own hands, the bubble of our own breath," to hurl defiance at them—the master race.

It was never considered in England that the Boston colonists were the descendants of men who were probably the first English revolutionists in spirit and who had migrated from England to escape oppression—religious, economic, and social—and seek the particular type of freedom to which they aspired in a new world away from England's cramping restrictions, which affected their bodies and souls. Britain did generally agree, however, that the Bostonians were the most hateful of all its colonists—with the town "a nest of rebels and hypocrites" that had been "obstinate, undutiful and ungovernable from the very beginning" and had perpetrated "more atrocious acts of outrage" than the people of any other part of the American colonies. The press declared that "it would be best to blow the town of Boston about the ears of its inhabitants and to destroy that nest of locusts." It was also urged that "about one hundred of these puritanical rebels be hung." It was while a spirit of vindictiveness and demands for punishing the "disloyal colony" were sweeping over England that Lord North introduced and Parliament passed, with evident enthusiasm and virtual unanimity, the Coercive Acts of March and June 1774, which made revolution inevitable and armed rebellion of the colonies against the mother country only a matter of time.

The Boston Port Bill, a distinctive punitive measure and the first of North's Coercive Acts, was passed by the British House of Commons on March 25, 1774, by an overwhelming majority and "without a division." The bill provided that the port of Boston, the metropolis of the Puritan maritime colony, be closed to all shipping and become a dead commercial center until the spirit of its citizens had been broken and they had admitted their error, done penance, made retribution, and acknowledged the overlordship of the British Government by paying the East India Company in full for the tea destroyed at the Tea Party. Furthermore, the colonists were to compensate the revenue and government officers for all losses that it might be claimed had been sustained and give to the crown, together with abject apologies, satisfactory evidence of Boston's good intentions in the future. The Boston Port Bill shows how little Britain understood its American colonies. Lord North contended that the bill would isolate Boston; that rival colonial ports would benefit economically and in prestige by the act and, therefore, would be drawn nearer to the mother country and driven farther away from the Puritan rabble-rousers. Instead, the North bill made the citizens of Boston "martyrs to American liberty." While Bostonians asserted that they would burn their city to the ground before they would accede to the demands of the British, other colonies that had staged their own little tea parties (or had had the intent to do so if the ships carrying English tea had not hurriedly left port) wondered why Boston had been singled out for so much honor in the fight for liberty. Nearby ports, such as Salem and Marblehead, Mass., and Newport, R. I., solidly supported the Boston patriots, who "so nobly stood as a barrier against slavery," and deemed the Boston Port Bill "a blow to all colonies." On June 1, 1774, when the port act went into effect, the day was marked quite generally throughout the country as one of mourning. Orations were made; in some towns the shops were closed, flags hung at half-mast. Demonstrations occurred, and muffled bells rang "a solemn peal at intervals from morning till night." Philadelphia and New York celebrated the day with as much colonial patriotism as did Boston. In New York effigies of British oppressors, British-dominated colonial governors, and the devil were paraded through the streets and burned. In Connecticut the memorial ceremony consisted of the public burning of the port act and its execution by the official hangman "in honor to the immortal goddess of liberty."

The southern colonies reacted to the Boston Port Bill as did those of New England and the middle provinces. The Carolinas and Virginia supported the Boston patriots. Some of the members of the Virginia Assembly signified their sympathy with Boston by fasting on "Port Act Day," and the burgesses voted that the British attack on Boston was an assault upon all the colonies. George Washington asserted that if the Bostonians bent their knees to the Eng-

lish, the colonies would see "one province after another fall a prey to despotism." Carolinians feared that if the British succeeded in their plan to discipline and punish Boston, other offending seaports would be dealt with and Americans would become "the most abject slaves of the earth." If Boston submitted, a South Carolinian asserted, the people of South Carolina could expect to see "our courts of justice removed, our harbour blockaded, navigation stopped, our streets crowded with soldiers," and Charleston, then a flourishing port, neglected and eliminated as a trading center.

Committees of Correspondence had by 1774 become "the most formidable revolutionary machine created in the American colonies," there being a network of such committees covering both rural and urban districts alike from north to south. The first of these committees, dealing with political—not religious and sectarian—matters, had been formed by Samuel Adams in Boston in late 1772 following the *Gaspé* incident and Britain's determination to erect a civil list in Massachusetts by paying the salaries of the royal officials from the revenues collected in the colonies. The Boston Committee of Correspondence, believing that its town could be saved from ruin only by drastic counterblows aimed at British manufactures and commerce, urged an immediate suspension of trade between the colonies and Britain and prepared the draft of a "solemn league and covenant" pledging that Americans would have neither import nor export trade relations with Britain until that country repealed its Boston Port Act. This suggested organized boycott and drastic economic reprisal was, however, too much to ask of the merchants of New York and Philadelphia, a majority of whom were Tories. New York suggested that a Continental Congress be called to consider the matter in all its phases, to which the Philadelphia Committee of Correspondence finally agreed. The royal governor of Virginia dissolved the assembly, but the burgesses met at a tavern and solemnly voted in favor of the meeting of representatives from the colonies at a Continental Congress.

In the meanwhile, Boston, being on the verge of starvation, received prompt and abundant quantities of food and supplies from other parts of the country, and thus the fundamental solidarity of the colonies was conspicuously demonstrated to the British, who had hopes that Lord North's blockade "would starve out the Boston rebels in a month's time." We are told that New York patriots promised Boston enough food to withstand a ten-year siege; while Brooklyn Whigs, sending 125 sheep to Boston, declared that, if necessary to thwart the devilish acts of the British tyrants, "we are ready to march in the van and sprinkle the American altars with our hearts' blood." A thousand barrels of flour reached Boston from Philadelphia, nine thousand bushels of wheat and corn from Virginia, and several cargoes of rice from Charleston. It is said that "a flock of sheep was driven from Connecticut to Boston by Major Israel Putnam (1718-1790), who had a farm at Pomfret, Conn."

Before the Continental Congress convened, the British Parliament had passed more of Lord North's Coercive Acts. The Massachusetts Government Act of May 1774, which followed the Boston Port Bill by about two months, was intended to purge the Puritan colony of its democracy and "republican notions" by changes in the Massachusetts constitution. The act provided that councilors should be chosen by the crown instead of being elected by the House of Representatives and that they should hold office only "for and during the pleasure of his majesty." The powers of the royal governor were greatly increased, as he was given authority to appoint and remove judges without consent of the council, and restrictions were imposed upon holding town meetings. Therefore, the new constitution reflected aristocratic and monarchical principles, brought the colony under the direct jurisdiction of the mother country, and crucified the democracy and liberty that New England colonists had always asserted as their right and that they had no intention of having taken away from them by a king, ministry, and Parliament across the ocean three thousand miles away. "An Act for the Impartial Administration of Justice" (so-called) protected government officers and employees, magistrates and soldiers from trial by juries in the colony, when indicted for offenses claimed to have been committed in support of government, if the royal governor felt that "a fair trial could not be had in the province" and if he was of the opinion that it might be to the interest of the

defendant to transfer the case to England or another colony. This act became known in Massachusetts as the "Murder Act." The patriots asserted that under its provisions every person in the colony was exposed "to the lawless violence of a soldiery"; that every villain in the employ of the British Government (whether he wore a uniform or not), although guilty of a heinous crime, could evade punishment by being tried in Britain, where no evidence could pursue him. A Quartering Act required that local authorities find quarters for troops, if barracks were not available, wherever and whenever the royal governor should direct.

North's second batch of Coercive Acts, aimed as was the first at the recalcitrant rebels of Massachusetts, was declared to be another Boston Massacre—not like that of March 1770, "when the lobster-backs shot and killed our unarmed compatriots in cold blood," but "a massacre by English parliamentary despotism of American liberty." The Boston Committee of Correspondence, in general concurrence with the views of New England Whigs, contended that North's Coercive Acts affecting the government of Massachusetts were unconstitutional and should be ignored. In a letter of August 1774, it wrote: "No power on earth hath a Right without the consent of this Province to alter the minutest title of its Charter or abrogate any Act whatever made in pursuance of it, and confirmed by the Royal assent. . . . We are entitled to life, liberty and the means of Sustenance by the grace of Heaven and without the king's leave."

It was the third of North's Coercive, or Intolerable, Acts that in many respects hurt most the British cause in the American colonies and turned many Tories into Whigs. This legislation, known as the Quebec Act of June 1774, gave no democratic rights, such as a provision for an elected assembly, to Quebec, which was kept under the control of an appointed royal governor and council, but it recognized the Roman Catholic religion as legal within the province. Then it "slapped all the British colonies from New England to Georgia in the face" by extending the southern boundaries of the British-dominated Roman Catholic province to the Ohio River and westward to the Mississippi, with the admitted intent of preventing the westward migration of population from the colonies with shore frontage on the Atlantic—a movement that had begun from the middle and southern colonies and was becoming increasingly popular. Unfortunately, too much attention was given by the American patriots (who were overwhelmingly Protestant and in New England generally rabid Puritan) to the religious phase, which, if dealt with fairly, would have to be considered as tolerant and praiseworthy. But actions in regard to religious matters in the 1770's have to be viewed in the light of conditions in effect at the time. The British Government was tolerant in the matter of religion not because of its desire to perform a worthy act in the realm of religious freedom and tolerance but because of its intention to play a very smart political and economic move. The religious phase, coupled with the geographical extension, was diabolically planned to restrict, weaken, and "hem in" the Protestant colonies, which were becoming "increasingly troublesome because of their democratic notions" and belligerency. The "Papal Scare" can be ignored; nevertheless, it existed in 1774 and had to be reckoned with. Even Alexander Hamilton wrote that "a superstitious, bigoted Canadian Papist, though ever so profligate, is now esteemed a better subject to our Gracious Sovereign George the Third, than a liberal, enlightened New England Dissenter, though ever so virtuous." It might be well in passing to ask why, if England was sincere in its expression of religious tolerance toward the Canadians, the same spirit of liberalism was not applied to Ireland, which was near at hand and needed it far more. However, with the application of a policy of religious toleration toward Quebec (which was worthy and laudable—no matter what the intent might have been), there was absolutely no occasion for the extension of the borders of the province so far to the south to keep the Canadian Catholics loyal and happy. The placing of the southern borders of the province at the Ohio River was intended to irritate, humiliate, and confine the rebellious American colonists, and Lord North, following the Lexington clash of April 1775, declared that the Canadians "might be armed to assist in crushing the American revolt."

The Quebec Act operated to turn over territory in what is now western New York, a part of Pennsylvania, all of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota to the province of Quebec, and this act ruined the developing prospects of many good citizens of the middle and southern Atlantic colonies. Such men as George Washington and Patrick Henry as well as less prominent but, nevertheless, important men in Pennsylvania and Virginia had interests and investments in the West, and it was felt by many that colonization must expand to the westward. Britain was justly accused of deliberately acting—for political reasons essentially opportunistic and punitive—to deny to Americans their “manifest destiny” in expanding “the frontiers of freedom” and to prevent the spread of English culture and of English liberties over the American continent. Prior to the passing of the Quebec Act, the Coercive Acts of North had been aimed only at Massachusetts, and whereas New England stood solid in support of the retaliatory views of the Boston patriots, the middle colonies talked “firmness, prudence, and moderation.” Virginia, however, the home of the patriot Patrick Henry, expressed its intentions to support at the forthcoming Continental Congress the boycott views set forth in the solemn league and covenant of the Boston Committee of Correspondence. The Virginia delegates to the Congress, meeting in convention August 1, 1774, resolved, if American grievances were not redressed, to import no British merchandise after November 1, 1774, and to export no tobacco to Britain after August 10, 1775. It was only shortly before the Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia in September that news of the Quebec Act reached the colonies, and the effect was electrical. The colonies bitterly resented Britain’s last belligerent coercive move, which was aimed not at Massachusetts alone but at the civil liberties, property, and religion of all Americans. North had gone too far, and as a result a majority—that was a fervid one—of each of the colonies in both the towns and the rural districts was at last convinced that Britain was determined to subjugate America, so the colonists acted co-operatively in defense of their rights and their liberties.

The Continental Congress was made up of good Americans, with the majority inclined to moderation and to attempt conciliation with Britain. One contemporary asserted that it was composed of the “ablest and wealthiest men in America,” many of whom took the risk of losing their all by revolution. William Pitt (1708-1778), the Earl of Chatham in England, declared it to be “the most honorable assembly of statesmen since those of the ancient Greeks and Romans in the most virtuous times.” The radicals were decidedly in the minority, and the Tories were sure of the outcome that would make for peace, an understanding with Britain, and the straightening out of all misunderstandings—but this was before the general national reaction to the Quebec Act commenced to be felt. The New England “firebrands” conducted themselves decorously at the Congress, and there were no “rabble-rousing speeches” by the ardent orators of Massachusetts. The delegates from the southern colonies suggested the most drastic acts, and a South Carolinian urged that the British troops of occupation be attacked. Patrick Henry, of Virginia, asserted that the empire was already dissolved, and Richard H. Lee, also of Virginia, proposed the Nonimportation and Nonexportation Agreement. The maritime provinces did not take kindly to the plan, also advanced and backed with ardor by Virginia, that the Congress in its list of colonial grievances go back no further than 1763 (the year of the end of the Seven Years’ War, when Britain became free to devote its attention and power to the colonies). New England delegates most naturally felt very bitterly about the wrongs done the shipping and mercantile interests of the maritime colonies by the British Navigation Laws and Trade Acts, but it agreed to go along with the program proposed by the planter colonies (Georgia was not represented at the First Continental Congress, although it sent delegates to the second one) and state the American grievances caused by acts in the reign of George III and starting with the ministry of Grenville. It would seem that the First Continental Congress had no idea of a separation from the mother country, but was determined to insist on the rights and liberties of the colonies and, if necessary, fight for them.

Paul Revere (1735-1818)—the Mercury or Hermes of the Revolution, who became known as "the Patriot Express"—had hurried to New York and Philadelphia to post the colonists there in regard to the coercive Boston Port Bill and solicit their support. In late September, Revere again appeared at Philadelphia, bearing to the Congressional delegates a copy of the resolutions adopted on September 9, 1774, by the Suffolk County Convention (called in lieu of the proscribed town meetings in Massachusetts). Revere also reported on Britain's military operations in and around Boston. He denounced as sensational and false the "Powder Alarm," which had reached Philadelphia, of Britain's laying Boston in ashes and butchering the citizenry, but he did report that General Gage had seized some colonial cannon and was preparing to fortify Boston Neck. The Suffolk "Resolves," which became of historic importance in the American Revolution, repudiated all the British Coercive Acts. They affirmed that taxes should be collected by the provincial congress and withheld from the royal government until the constitutional government of Massachusetts had been properly acknowledged by Britain; that preparations of a military nature should be made, so that the colonists would be in a position to resist any aggressive attack by British troops, and if a patriot leader should be seized by the British, then the colonists would be justified in retaliating and in imprisoning any or all "servants of the present tyrannical and unconstitutional government" on whom they could lay hands. On October 8, 1774, Congress approved the Suffolk "Resolves," which had been presented to it officially in the form of a resolution by James Warren, a Massachusetts delegate; but the people of Massachusetts were advised that, as far as could "possibly be consistent with their immediate safety and the security of the town," they were to behave peacefully toward the "troops of occupation." Congress, by this act, while urging a firm and temperate conduct and denouncing aggression on the part of the colonists, nevertheless, put its seal of approval upon a war waged in resisting attack and in defense of American rights and liberties.

The Continental Congress voted for nonintercourse with Britain, and under the name of the "Continental Association" agreements were made along the lines of nonimportation, nonexportation, and nonconsumption together with encouragement of domestic agriculture and manufacture and the organization of local committees to carry all these measures into effect. The North Coercive Acts were met by American boycott of British trade, and coercion by patriots was to be applied in America to Tories and others who declined to accept and obey the terms of the association. The Nonimportation and Nonconsumption Agreement became effective against the British Isles and British West Indies on December 1, 1774, and nonexportation was scheduled for September 1775 (but South Carolina rice was exempted). The members of the First Continental Congress sent a petition to the king, whom they addressed as their "Most Gracious Sovereign," and assured him that if he would turn his "royal indignation" upon the incompetent men in the ministry who were prosecuting most "irritating projects of oppression," all would be well within the empire. (New Englanders and the maritime interests did not believe this, but for harmony's sake went along with the majority.) Addresses were sent to the people of Great Britain, Quebec, and the colonies. However, it is a significant fact that no address was sent to either of the houses of Parliament, for the British Parliament, in which the American colonies had no representation, had by its acts proved itself to be spineless, insular, prejudiced, and ignorant—the mere tool and "rubber stamp" of the intolerant, tyrannical ministries appointed by the crown. (It is significant that George III showed signs of insanity as early as 1765, that his madness in 1788 was unmistakable, and that he had to be put under restraint—a strait jacket; in 1811, after "bouts of madness" in 1801, 1804, and 1810, his insanity was acknowledged to be permanent, and a regency bill was passed.)

It was the conviction of the majority of the First Continental Congress that the waging of an economic war (and not a military one) would be sufficient to win the day. However, the Massachusetts delegates, with their experience in having the British military forces in

and around Boston, were definitely not of that opinion. "I expect no redress," said John Adams to Patrick Henry, "but, on the contrary, increased [British] resentment and double vengeance. We must fight." Henry replied, "By God, I am of your opinion." Later he predicted, "The next gale from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms." The winter was barely over when in the early morning of April 19, 1775, the British regulars fired on the farmer militia at Lexington, Mass. The result was the murder of the colonists defending their rights and homes, followed by acts of resistance, retaliation, and bloody warfare, from which the colonials emerged as victors.

*British Troops in Massachusetts and the Clash
with Colonial Minutemen at Lexington
and Concord — April 1775*

When Gen. Thomas Gage (1721-1787), the first British military governor of Massachusetts, arrived from England in May 1774, he was entrusted by King George and his ministers with the task of carrying out to the limit, "without fear or favor," all the provisions of the Boston Port Act. For some unaccountable reason, Gage moved the seat of government from Boston to Salem (the second town of importance in the colony), and Salem did not take kindly to the quartering of two companies of British regulars in its vicinity. Although these soldiers were forced to encamp beyond the outskirts of the town, their "very presence was obnoxious and humiliating to a freedom-loving people." Gage, very foolishly, further outraged public opinion by arbitrarily appointing councilors—a prerogative of the provincial assembly. An act of the British Parliament eliminated the councilors who had been named by the Massachusetts Assembly, or General Court, in session at Boston, and Gage adjourned this body and ordered it to reconvene in Salem on June 7, 1774. When the assembly met in Salem, it first passed a resolution protesting against its removal from Boston at the whim of the British military governor, and it adopted a resolution appointing five delegates to the Congress at Philadelphia "to consult upon measures for the restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the colonies." Gage represented military might and imperial despotism, and the action of the assembly, which savored of compromise following a discussion between equals, so angered him that he dissolved the provincial assembly; in so doing, he let it be known that the Americans could petition and supplicate the crown in abject humility, but had no rights to present their views or protest in regard to the wrongs to which they claimed that they were being subjected. The king might be merciful or even kindly, but his ministers would not even discuss—not to mention argue—matters affecting the British imperial policy with subject people who were honored by being permitted to live as serfs under the flag and protection of the British Crown.

Gage suppressed town meetings, but Salem defied him and called one for August 24 to choose delegates to a county convention; whereupon Gage, according to a contemporary, showed "indecent passion, denounced the meeting as treasonable, . . . spoke with much vehemence of voice and gesture, threatened, . . . and ordered up the troops." Nevertheless, the meeting was held (in the open air), following which the citizens quietly dispersed. Gage retaliated by placing the so-called leaders under arrest and "declared with an oath that he would transport every man of the committee" to England. The British frigate *Scarborough* was about to sail from Massachusetts Bay to England, and, we are told, "three thousand men

of Salem and nearby towns armed themselves with muskets" to rescue their fellow townsmen and prevent their being carried on board a British warship as prisoners to be "tried, jailed and punished in England for having committed no offense save that of asserting their basic rights and manhood." The Salem "embattled farmers and sailors" served notice on General Gage that if he employed the British troops to "enforce any further punishments" to members of the elected committee or to any other law-abiding Salem (or Massachusetts) men, they were "ready to receive any attack they might be exposed to for acting in pursuance to the laws and interests of their country, as becomes men and Christians." Gage was compelled "to back down," and in September he transferred his troops and the seat of government to Boston. He asserted that he would enforce the odious Boston Port Bill and all other British laws "by military law and an army of twenty thousand men if need be," with the support of "the great and invincible British Navy, whose sails whiten the oceans of the world."

Following the removal of British troops from Boston as a result of the deplorable "massacre" of March 5, 1770, the patriot leaders had repeatedly declared that no British soldiers would ever again be permitted to occupy the town of Boston; yet it seems that no physical resistance was offered by the colonials when General Gage sent several regiments of regulars to take possession of the town in 1774. The troops were generally unwelcome, being hated and made uncomfortable by the Whigs and pampered by the Tory minority, whose ranks were being constantly swelled by Tory refugees—mostly of position and means—from outlying districts. They moved to Boston (to escape from the presence, acts, and influence of patriots in the province) to such an extent that Edmund Burke, in the British Parliament, referred to Boston as "an asylum for magistrates." Boston refused to provide barracks for the troops, and the Committee of Correspondence ordered Boston carpenters not to do work for the army; no lumber was permitted to enter the town for the British, and Boston merchants refused to sell them any materials. The troops once more encamped on Boston Common (as they had prior to the "massacre" of 1770), and they were domiciled there in tents until well on in November 1774 and until General Gage could get lumber and building materials, carpenters and bricklayers down from Nova Scotia to erect barracks for the army. For a couple of months, most of the soldiers were kept busy on construction work in a race against the cold, snows, and ice of winter.

There is no doubt that the British troops behaved badly in and around Boston, for contemporary records reek with accounts of robberies, rapes, murders, and abuse perpetrated by "these fiends." The "savage barbarity" of the troops made the streets and all women unsafe. Stores were broken into, coaches attacked, patriots tarred and feathered and ridden on rails. During the winter of 1774-1775, the "menaces of blood and slaughter," it is said, "reverberated through the New England countryside" and became "increasingly ominous." The Continental Congress had declared against aggression in any form, but had approved of the colonists' taking defensive measures. Committees of observation were appointed to watch the movement of troops in Boston, and the patriots were determined to restrict the area of British occupation. The word was passed around that if the "redcoats" dared to venture far from Boston, they would meet with a "warm reception."

The colonists, in defense of their liberties and rights and in order to cope with any aggressive military act on the part of the British, formed an organization of sorts called the "minutemen," who were supposed to be a drilled and armed skeleton military force prepared to meet promptly and defend their homes, neighbors, and province in case of an emergency. Quietly, these minutemen sought to accumulate some stocks of weapons, munitions, and supplies. The Tories say that at this time "sedition flowed copiously from the pulpits," and it is written that "some clergymen even handed out pikes and muskets to the men after preaching a sermon on the iniquities of antichrist and his boon companion Lord North." Massachusetts generally became as anti-British as the fervent Boston Sons of Liberty. At far-away rural Great Barrington, a group of farmers, we are told, surrounded the courthouse

and stopped British-dominated legal proceedings. A judge in Berkshire County was "pulled bodily from the bench," and in many parts of New England courts of justice were forcibly closed and the British or Tory judges forced to resign their offices. The Whig element, which was made up of the patriots among the colonials, became increasingly incensed at the intolerant, dominating British, and the outbreak of fighting "the bloody soldiers" in New England during the spring of 1775 waited only upon a move by the British troops that would fulfill "the conditions of a defensive war laid down by the Continental Congress."

Prior to the clash at Lexington and the ignominious retreat of the much-vaunted regulars, the British had a very low opinion of the Yankees as fighting men on land, although they seem to have acknowledged colonial prowess afloat. Captain Evelyn was of the opinion that no matter how loudly the "rebels" might rant and bluster, they would scuttle to cover in time of danger. The British Army could make the conquest of New England without any real fighting; all it had to do was to march and the Yankee militia would offer no problem that could not be met by "an experienced sheep herder." Major Pitcairn, in March 1775 (a month before the clash at Lexington and Concord), declared, "One active campaign, a smart action, and burning two or three of their towns will set everything to rights." Pitcairn evidently did not appreciate the bold front and courage of the Yankees at Salem on February 26, 1775, and their "withholding fire and abstaining from aggression" were looked upon as indicative of cowardice. Whereas the Salem minutemen attained their objective—kept possession of their cannon and military stores and forced the British troops to march away, with their mission not accomplished, in what became known as "Leslie's Retreat"—Pitcairn contemptuously wrote of the incident, "The people got arms and paraded about, and swore if he [Leslie] had stayed half an hour longer they would have cut him to pieces." In the *ST. JAMES CHRONICLE* of November 17, 1774, an Englishman wrote of the Yankee militia:

It is a curious Masquerade Scene to see grave sober Citizens, Barbers and Tailors, who never looked fierce before in their lives, but at their Wives, Children or Apprentices, strutting about in their Sunday Wigs in stiff Buckles with their Muskets on their Shoulders, struggling to put on

a Martial Countenance. If ever you saw a Goose assume an Air of Consequence, you may catch some faint Idea of the foolish, awkward, puffed-up Stare of our Tradesmen; the Wig, indeed, is the most frightful Thing about them, for its very Hairs seem to bristle up in Defiance of the Soldiers.

A little later, at Lexington, the British regulars were to learn that wigs were mere "window dressing" and had no part in the making of a soldier, for Yankees clad in their nightshirts on the morning of April 19 gave the "lobster-backs" their first proof of Yankee bravery and solid worth. General Gage himself asserted that New Englanders could be awed into submission by a display of force, and he said that the Yankees "will be Lyons whilst we are Lambs but if we take the resolute part they will undoubtedly prove very weak." However, Gage was quite inconsistent, for he wanted an army big enough not to fight the colonials on even terms numerically but to overwhelm the "rebels." In his official reports to London, Gage asserted that his sizable and well-equipped army was too weak to cope successfully with even such poor-spirited creatures as the Puritan saints. He wrote: "If you think ten Thousand Men sufficient, send Twenty, if one million is thought enough, give two; you will save both Blood and Treasure in the End." Gage begged London for more and more troops, but talked big and boastful to Bostonians and leaders in the province, swearing "by the living God that if there was a single man of the king's troops killed in any of their towns he would burn it to the ground." He added: "What fools you are to pretend to resist the power of Great Britain; she maintained last war three hundred thousand men and will do the same now rather than suffer the ungrateful people of this country to continue in their rebellion."

The British general, James Wolfe (1727-1759), who defeated the French under Montcalm (mortally wounded in the fray) and took Quebec on September 13, 1759, had had experience with American colonial volunteers in Canada. He expressed merely the prejudice of British Army officers toward colonials when, despising them for their independent spirit, democracy, and originality in both thought and act, he declared that "in general" they were "the dirtiest,

most contemptible, cowardly dogs that you can conceive." He continued: "There is no depending on them in action. They fall down dead in their own dirt and desert by battalions, officers and all. Such rascals as those are rather an encumbrance than any real strength to an army." (Later, Wolfe modified this harsh and intolerant, biased judgment.)

Gen. Thomas Gage had seen service in the British Army in America since 1754 and served against the Indians and French in General Braddock's disastrous expedition, which fell into an Indian-planned ambush and was not only surprised and routed but also virtually annihilated in July 1755. This experience alone should have given Gage respect for American methods of war; for the colonials, who knew how to fight both the Indians and the French, had protested against Braddock's massed army formations in conspicuous red uniforms, which marched, helpless against practically unseen foes, to their death. In 1758, Gage was in Canada and served in Amherst's operations against Montreal. He was made governor of Montreal in 1761 and two years later was given command of the British forces in America. In both the Virginia-Pennsylvania section and Canada, Gage had had opportunity to see colonials fight, but he evidently concurred in Wolfe's belief that they were too undisciplined, too erratic, too unreliable, and too democratic to fight, even if he did not go so far as to brand them as "contemptible, cowardly dogs." During Gage's service with Braddock's army, Daniel Dulany tells us, the colonists in Maryland were "treated as slaves, and as arrogance unchecked knows no bounds, the military soon silenced the civil power, property became dependent on the moderation of a licentious soldiery, triumphing over the sanction of laws, and the authority of magistracy." Throughout the colonies in the sixties and seventies, the arrogance and airs of consequence of the English Army officer made him appear to think himself as "a Being which resembles the Gods." The Americans were "boors" of "insulting rudeness . . . picked up from a dunghill," and as the colonials were "distinctly an inferior breed," their democracy became "a stench in the nostrils of aristocratic British officers."

In February 1775, General Gage heard of "some stores of munitions and several cannon" that had been accumulated by the provincial congress at Salem and sent Colonel Leslie with 250 British regulars in a transport to Marblehead with orders to disembark there, "march across to Salem and seize all this material of war." Major Pedrick, a colonial patriot of Marblehead, seeing the British ship arrive, mounted his horse and galloped to Salem, some two miles away, giving the alarm and warning of this invasion. The minutemen of the county armed and assembled at the North River drawbridge on the outskirts of Salem. It was a Sunday afternoon, and they soon congregated in force and were "a determined and angry bunch of men" on the defensive. Colonel Leslie threatened to fire a volley of musketry and clear the road, but the drawbridge was raised, and Capt. John Felt, of Salem, replied: "You had better not fire, for there is a multitude, every man of whom is ready to die in this strife." Parson Barnard urged peace and, pleading with Colonel Leslie to return peaceably with his troops to Boston, said: "You cannot commit this violation against innocent people, here on this holy day, without sinning against God and humanity." Capt. Richard Derby (1712-1783), the respected Salem shipmaster and merchant whose ships had fought for British colonial trade against the French, Spanish, and pirates on the high seas (and who had supplied 8 of the 19 cannons that the British were planning to seize), defied the British with dignity and courage and ultimately suggested a formula that Colonel Leslie accepted to salvage at least part of an inevitable "loss of face" if he did not fight and partially succeed in his mission. The drawbridge was lowered. The British infantrymen marched across it and immediately wheeled and marched back, returning directly to their ship and Boston without the desired cannons, ammunitions, and stores. It is well that they did so, for upon hearing the news further companies of armed minutemen, many of whom were sharpshooters, were marching "double-quick" to the Salem bridge. They were determined to stop the British, and many of them were "aching for a fight."

It is amazing that during this episode, preceding the similar mission of British troops to Concord by some three and a half months, not a shot was fired. This speaks well for the control that Colonel Leslie had over his soldiers, for some of the colonials—"fed up" with

the British—hurled insulting taunts at the "lobster-backs" and yelled, "Fire and be damned to you." The only casualty in the adventure seems to have been a slight bayonet thrust, which did not prove fatal or even serious, received by one Joseph Whicher, of Salem, when he and his companions successfully prevented some of the British troops from crossing the river in boats. Evidently, the colonials, notwithstanding their vociferous invectives, were under discipline. It is to their credit that a soldier's aggressive act with a weapon of war, resulting in the shedding of a good colonial's blood, was not immediately followed with musketry and a general fight such as occurred later at Lexington and Concord. If the British had opened fire, their force of 250 men (all infantry) would have been annihilated. In addition to the well-armed militia under Col. Thomas Pickering that faced them at Salem, we are told by contemporaries that "a thousand men between sixteen and sixty years of age" assembled under Colonel Orne at Marblehead and were under orders "to station themselves behind the houses and fences along the road prepared to fall upon the British on their return from Salem, if it should be found that hostile measures had been used by them; but if it should appear that no concerted act of violence upon the persons or property of the people had been committed, they were charged not to show themselves, but to allow the British detachment to return unmolested to their transport."

Notwithstanding the failure of the expedition to Salem, General Gage persisted in his efforts either to obtain or destroy all munitions and weapons that might be accumulated and held in reserve by the colonials. Subsidized Loyalists, "Tories," and government-employed spies or sleuths reported that the colonials had munitions and weapons stored at Charlestown and Concord. Some of this material was destroyed by a detachment of 260 British troops sent by Gage secretly up the Mystic by boat to Charlestown. We are told that "early in March 1775, the guard on Boston Neck seized over 13,000 cartridges which the patriots were attempting to smuggle into the country." However, when in April 1775 a secret expedition was dispatched to take or destroy the "rebels' military stores" at Concord, the colonials were "tipped off" to the plans under foot by Paul Revere (making his historic ride) and Dawes, and the country was roused. When the British troops reached Lexington, they found a small company of minutemen—hastily assembled—on the Common. It was very early morning, and the colonials were greatly outnumbered and had had no time to organize and develop plans to stop the advance of the British. In response to the orders of Colonel Smyth of the 10th Regiment to rush "the peasants" with loaded muskets and fixed bayonets, they proceeded to clear the way and continue to their objective. Blood was shed, eight Americans were killed and ten wounded by shots and bayonets, and the indifferently armed but courageous colonial militia gave way. The English regulars in force proceeded to Concord, but, although they "destroyed some powder," did not achieve their purpose, as practically all of the stores had been removed to safety. At Concord, another clash occurred between the British troops and the colonials, in which both sides lost men. The conflicts at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, initiated the real American armed Revolution and in fact the American War of Independence. However, independence was not seriously thought of by the colonials at the time and was not declared until about fourteen and a half months later.

The British expedition to Concord had two objectives: (1) to seize or destroy military stores and (2) to capture—alive if possible—John Hancock and Samuel Adams (known, through spies, to be at a certain house in Concord). Even at this late day, the ministry in London, with the king, was firmly convinced that, as expressed in the PUBLIC LEDGER of April 7, 1774, "if Hancock and Adams could be brought to trial in England and punished in a manner to strike terror among the other colonial rabble-rousers, the rebellion would collapse." The British did not find Hancock and Adams in the house where they were supposed to be "in hiding," so the soldiers fired it and wantonly burned other homes and buildings. The contemporary written and printed claims by the colonials of British atrocities during this expedition make horrible reading and seem too extreme and senseless to be true—as do the statements made later by the English of American cruelty to the wounded British; but the highly educated Dr.

Joseph Warren, who never intentionally exaggerated or made statements for sheer propaganda purposes, declared that the British soldiery was guilty of "depredations, ruins and butcheries hardly to be matched by the armies of any civilized nation on the globe."

When the English regulars commenced their march back to Boston from Concord, they were harassed by indignant colonial patriots, who had the good sense not to line up in regimental order against better-armed and drilled forces. The withdrawal of the British soon became a retreat, which in turn became a rout. The original proud and impressive columns of seasoned regulars were saved from complete annihilation only by making contact with a large body of English troops, which had been sent out from Boston to reinforce them and cover their retreat to a point where heavy artillery could protect all the British troops and discourage their "stinging foes" from inflicting further punishment.

The first encounter between British "Ministerial" troops and colonial militia caused the government in London great concern, and consternation was evident throughout England. The American "peasants" had not run when they saw British regulars as Lord George Germain and other leading Tories as well as military authorities had predicted. Whatever running occurred was done by the British. Edmund Burke, the parliamentarian, declared that the so-called "march" of the British back to Boston from Concord was "a most vigorous retreat—twenty miles in three hours—scarce to be paralleled in history; the 'feeble' Americans who pelted them all the way could scarce keep up with them." It was generally admitted that "the flower of the British armed" hurriedly retired under fire from Concord to Boston without accomplishing its mission, but whether the retirement was described by contemporaries as "orderly," a "precipitous flight," or an "overwhelming rout" depends on the truthfulness, knowledge, or sympathies of the narrator. One patriot declared, "The sight of our troops under arms threw them [the British] into a panic, from which they did not recover in a Flight of 20 miles."

The British contemporary writers—both military and civil—were in agreement in asserting indignantly that the colonial militia did not fight fairly and in accordance with the rules of the game and the generally accepted standards for waging warfare; for when the regulars fired, instead of standing as targets, the American peasants "ran" to the nearest protection "like devils" and from cover "poured a murderous fire" on the retreating British. Such action proved, it was said, that the American militiamen were "neither soldiers nor gentlemen." The English militarists and their publicists further objected to the "unsportsmanlike tactics" of the Americans in "skulking from tree to tree" and taking pot shots at the troops; also in crawling and loading "on their bellies" instead of standing upright on their feet, like men, and thereby presenting a fair target to the British while they recharged—all in conformity with the traditional and "approved European fashion."

The Tories, who feared an overthrow of the ministers, were sufficiently impressed with the seriousness of the "British reverse" at Concord and Lexington that the leaders even officially assured the English people that Great Britain still had its navy to use against the American colonists and that "great things could be expected of the Mistress of the Seas despite reverses on land."

The blood shed at Concord and Lexington gave the Revolution its first martyrs in a battle waged in defense of American liberty, rights, lives, homes and property. The Boston Massacre was a military murder of the unarmed; Lexington and Concord showed that the colonies had profited by the experience of March 5, 1770, and henceforth would defend themselves against British injustice, intolerance, and military might. John Dickinson, the Philadelphia lawyer and "conservative patriot," said that at Lexington the British had begun an "impious war of tyranny against innocence" which aimed at destroying liberty everywhere in the empire. It was further declared that the "embattled farmers" of Massachusetts had been slaughtered "because they had striven to defend the British Constitution," their only offense being that they were "freemen seeking to maintain their liberties." The

tradition of fundamental liberty had taken such firm root in the American colonies that in 1775 Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), of New York, American patriot and statesman, declared: "The rights we now claim are coeval with the original settlement of these colonies."

Paul Revere (1735-1818), American patriot and honored express courier of the Revolution, was an engraver, a silversmith, a talented worker in metals in a broad field, and a pioneer in the production of copper spikes, etc., for shipbuilding. He discovered the secret of rolling copper and sheathed the frigate *Constitution* and many ships; also the State House dome in Boston, the roof of the New York City Hall, and other public buildings. Paul Revere was an ingenious man, "a buoyant and versatile Yankee." He cast cannons and bells, set up a powder mill, printed money, and even carved false teeth. He lived in times of great stress, strife, and intrigue, but through the years of growing bitterness he was a veritable rock of strength as well as a most resourceful asset on the side of the patriots both preceding and during the War of the Revolution and the trying post-war years.

In addition to Revere's important journeys from Boston to New York and Philadelphia in May 1774 (following the arrival of news of the Boston Port Act) and the carrying of the Suffolk Resolves from Boston to the First Continental Congress at Philadelphia in September 1774, Revere went from Boston to Portsmouth, N. H., in early December 1774 with a message to the Committee of Safety and a copy of an order prohibiting the exportation of military supplies. The result of this important mission was one of the first military exploits of the Revolution, for Portsmouth patriots organized companies of militia and captured Fort William and Mary at Newcastle on December 14, 1774. This fort, which was held by a weak force of British who withdrew under pressure, was strategically located to guard the entrance to Portsmouth Harbor and command the waters of the Piscataqua. Paul Revere's most famous exploit was his "pony express" midnight ride from Charlestown to Lexington on April 18-19, 1775, to give warning "all along the way" of the approach of the British troops who had been secretly dispatched from Boston, in force, to capture or destroy colonial military stores at Concord and to arrest John Hancock and Samuel Adams, so that these patriots could be sent "home to England, handcuffed . . . to pay a debt outstanding of old arrears due to Tyburn tree" (the name of the famous Middlesex gallows on deadly Never Green and a place of public execution since the twelfth century).

On April 24, 1775, General Gage sent his official dispatches to England with a report of the clash at Lexington and Concord by the "especially fast and able Royal Express" packet *Sukey* (Captain Brown), and he was anxious that the king and his ministers should first hear news of the fighting from him. On April 22, the provincial congress met at Concord and appointed a committee "to take depositions *in perpetuam*, from which a full account of the transactions of the troops under General Gage in the route to and from Concord on Wednesday last may be collected to be sent to England by the first ship from Salem." It was planned to obtain from the colonists who participated in the fight a personal description of the battle and thus clearly show that it was the English who had begun the engagement. These depositions, together with a public letter to the English people and authoritative newspaper accounts of the affair, were all to be sent to Franklin and Lee, the colonial agents in London. They were then to be available for the perusal of the English people, and digests of the material giving the unvarnished facts were to be spread among the newspapers and broadcast throughout Great Britain. It was said that the provincial congress desired to act promptly and report truthfully regarding what had actually happened during the British expedition to Concord "in order to prevent the *Sukey's* dispatches from operating a public injury for the colonies and in order to keep the English people from getting only a fallacious account of the tragedy they [their troops] had begun," a clash between British regulars and Massachusetts rural minutemen which Joseph Warren feared would lead to "the horrors of a most unnatural war"; hence the resolve to call for a fast vessel to sail to England with the colonial account of the most regrettable and unfortunate affair.

Capt. Richard Derby, Jr., of Salem, a member of the provincial congress, advised his father of this plan, and old Mr. Derby immediately offered congress one of his vessels for this service. Accordingly, on April 26, the congress ordered that "Ye Honabl Richd Derby, Esqr be & he hereby is impowered to fit out his vessel as a packet to Great Britain in ye Service of this Colony & to Charge ye Colony with ye Hire of ye Vessel & all other expenses which he shall be at for port charges Victuelling, necessaries, etc." The vessel selected by Mr. Derby for this special voyage proved to be the little and unobstrusive schooner *Quero* of 62 tons, a "good sailer," one that could be quickly fitted out without causing any suspicion and that might be expected to arrive at her destination and depart without attracting much, if any, attention. To command the vessel, Mr. Derby suggested his son, Capt. John Derby, and on April 27 the congress gave the master of the *Quero* his orders as follows:

In Committee of Safety, April 27, 1775. Resolved that Captain Derby be directed, and he hereby is directed, to make for Dublin, or any other good port in Ireland, and from thence cross to Scotland or England and hasten to London. This direction is given, that so he may escape all cruisers that may be in the chops of the channel,

to stop the communication of the provincial intelligence to the agent. He will forthwith deliver his papers to the agent on reaching London.

J. WARREN, *Chairman*

P. S. You are to keep this order a profound secret from every person on earth.

On April 28, Capt. John Derby received the depositions, letters, and papers and sailed during the night four full days after the bigger and reputedly fast "Royal Express" packet *Sukey* had sailed. Whether or not the instructions as to port of destination given Captain Derby by the committee were a "blind" is not stated, but the *Quero* was at or off Southampton on May 27, having made a passage of 29 days, and Captain Derby appeared in London with his papers and affidavits the next day. The British express dispatch ship, although she had urgent orders to "crowd all sail" and make the best possible time, did not get her news to London before the second week of June. In early June, Lord Dartmouth wrote that he had no word from America, but three days before, the account of the incident as prepared by the provincial congress and printed in "a Salem newspaper" had been made public in England. On June 12, 1775, the London press compared the reports of the Lexington incident as sent by General Gage and as printed in the ESSEX GAZETTE of Salem, and the comments made were not favorable to the behavior of the English command and troops. The records show that the *Sukey* arrived with General Gage's dispatches on June 9, or thirteen days after Captain Derby had delivered the news; the British express packet ship, therefore, took 46 days to make a passage negotiated by a diminutive Yankee vessel—not built for speed alone—in 29 days. At the commencement of the Revolution, American merchant craft driven by Yankee skippers were showing their class comparatively with British-built and manned vessels.

It is just as well that Captain Derby did not loiter in England after delivering his "depositions and letters." Lord Dartmouth, the secretary of state, summoned Derby to come before him and give a verbal account of the affair, as a general desire had been expressed that the bearer of such alarming news should be "taken up and examined." But Captain Derby was "wise to the ways of the English," and "he had disappeared as suddenly and quietly as he had come." Ex-governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts, who was then in London, wrote in his "diary":

It is said that Darby left his lodgings the first instant and is supposed to have sailed and that he had a letter of credit from Lane on some house in Spain. Mr. Pownall [assistant secretary of state] sent to Southampton to inquire and the collector knew of no such vessel there. It is supposed he left

her in some small harbor or inlet and came in his boat to Southampton. Pownall was of opinion Darby was gone to Spain to purchase ammunition, arms, etc. Darby has said to some that he had a vessel gone or going to Spain with a cargo of fish; to others that he was going for a load of mules.

The article printed in the ESSEX GAZETTE dated Salem, April 25, which was carried to London by Capt. John Derby and made "publick" by Benjamin Franklin either the evening of May 28 or the morning of the next day, reads, in part, as follows:

SALEM, April 25.

Last Wednesday, the 19th of April, the troops of his *Britannick* Majesty Commenced Hostilities upon the People of this Province, attended with circumstances of cruelty not less brutal than what our venerable Ancestors received from the vilest savages of the Wilderness. The Particulars relative to this interesting Event, by which we are involved in all the Horrors of a Civil War, we have endeavored to collect as well as the present confused state of affairs will admit.

On Tuesday Evening a Detachment from the Army, consisting, it is said, of 8 or 900 men, commanded by Lieut. Col. Smith, embarked at the Bottom of the Common in Boston, on board a Number of Boats, and landed at Phip's farm, a little way up Charles River, from whence they proceeded with Silence and Expedition, on their way to Concord, about 18 miles from Boston. The People were soon alarmed, and began to assemble, in several towns, before Day-light, in order to watch the Motion of the Troops. At Lexington, 6 miles below Concord, a Company of Militia, of about 100 Men, mustered near the Meeting House; the Troops came in Sight of them just before Sun-rise, and running within a few rods of them, the Commanding Officer accosted the Militia in words to this Effect:

"Disperse, you Rebels—Damn you, throw down your Arms and disperse."

Upon which the Troops huzza'd, and immediately one or two Officers discharged their Pistols, which were instantaneously followed by the Firing of 4 or 5 of the Soldiers, and then there seemed to be

There follows a list of the names of the provincial casualties, numbering 38 killed and 19 wounded, with accusations of savage and barbarous behavior on the part of the British troops. The writer then goes on to say:

I have seen an account of the Loss of the Enemy, said to have come from an officer of one of the Men of War; by which it appears that 63 of the Regulars, and 49 Marines were killed, and 103 of both wounded; in all 215. Lieut. Gould of the 4th Regiment, who is wounded, and Lieut. Potter of the Marines, and about twelve soldiers, are Prisoners. . . .

The issue of the *ESSEX GAZETTE* that was broadcast generally by Benjamin Franklin and Capt. John Derby in London, reprints of which were spread throughout the British Isles, contained an editorial, or leading contributor's article, signed "Johannes in Ermo." This has been described as "a battle hymn in prose, the voice of a free people in arms, indomitable at white-heat." The following is part of "the message it flung to the mother country overseas":

Great Britain, adieu! no longer shall we honour you as our mother; you are become cruel; you have not so much bowels as the sea monsters toward their young ones; we have cried to you for justice, but behold violence and bloodshed! your sword is drawn *offensively*, and the sword of New England

a general discharge from the whole Body; Eight of our Men were killed, and nine wounded. In a few minutes after this action the Enemy renewed their March for Concord; at which Place they destroyed several Carriages, Carriage Wheels, and about 20 barrels of Flour; all belonging to the Province. Here about 150 Men going toward a Bridge, of which the Enemy were in Possession, the latter fired and killed 2 of our Men, who then returned the Fire, and obliged the Enemy to retreat back to Lexington, where they met Lord Percy, with a large Reinforcement, with two Pieces of Cannon. The Enemy now having a Body of about 1800 Men, made a Halt, picked up many of their Dead, and took care of their Wounded. At Menotomy, a few of our Men attacked a Party of twelve of the Enemy (carrying stores and Provisions to the Troops), killed one of them, wounded several, made the Rest Prisoners, and took Possession of all their arms, Stores, Provisions, &c., without any loss on our side. The Enemy having halted one or two Hours at Lexington found it necessary to make a second Retreat, carrying with them many of their Dead and Wounded, who they put into Chaises and on Horses that they found standing in the Road. They continued their Retreat from Lexington to Charlestown with great Precipitation; and notwithstanding their Field Pieces, our People continued the Pursuit, firing at them till they got to Charlestown Neck (which they reached a little after Sunset), over which the Enemy passed, proceeded up Bunker Hill, and soon afterward went into the Town, under the protection of the *Somerset* Man of War of 64 guns.

The Public most sincerely sympathize with the Friends and Relations of our deceased Brethren, who gloriously sacrificed their Lives in fighting for the Liberties of their Country. By their noble, intrepid Conduct, in helping to defeat the Forces of an ungrateful Tyrant, they have endeared their Memories to the present generation who will Transmit their Names to Posterity with the highest Honour.

defensively; by this stroke you have broken us off from you, and effectually alienated us from you. O, Britain, see you to your own house!

King George the third, adieu! no more shall we cry to you for protection, no more shall we bleed in defense of your person. Your breach of cove-

nant; your violation of faith; your turning a deaf ear to our cries for justice, for covenanted protection and salvation from the oppressive, tyrannical, and bloody measures of the British Parliament, and putting a sanction upon all their measures to enslave and butcher us, have *Dissolved our Allegiance* to your Crown and Government! your sword that ought in *justice to protect* us, is now drawn *with a witness* to destroy us! Oh, George, see thou to thine house!

General Gage, pluck up stakes and be gone; you have drawn the sword, you have slain in cool blood a number of *innocent* New England men—

Capt. John Derby, upon his return to America, reported to the provincial congress and visited "head-quarters." When he left London, General Gage's report had not been received by Lord Dartmouth at Whitehall, and the "Royal Express" packet *Sukey* had not been reported at any port of the English Channel; neither did he see her on his run home. The records of Captain Derby's statements of expenditures on this important and splendidly executed, patriotic mission, preserved in the State House at Boston, show that the worthy skipper declined to include in the bill any charge for his personal time and services. It is of interest to note that Capt. John Derby, who carried the news to England of what proved to be the beginning of the War of the Revolution, was also the shipmaster to carry home to the United States the first tidings of peace in 1783, when he arrived from France in the letter-of-marque *Astrea* with the message that a treaty had been signed. John C. Miller, in *ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION*, writes:

It is significant that the Whigs' [patriots'] version of the battle, replete with British atrocities in all their gruesome detail, was the first to reach the people of England and America. A large batch was rushed to Franklin in London with instructions that printed copies be sent to every town in Eng-

land and to the Lord Mayor, aldermen, and members of the Common Council of London. General Gage accused the patriots of stopping the posts, breaking open the mails, and removing letters in order to prevent the British account of the battle from getting abroad.

The colonials could not possibly have delayed the arrival of Gage's dispatches, with the report of the fight, that Gage sent to London. They were forwarded in a British express packet under British command and with a well-armed British crew from the British-held and blockaded port of Boston, and the voyage was made across a British-patrolled and dominated sea long before the first American privateer of the Revolution made her appearance. However, the Massachusetts patriots undoubtedly did take adequate precautions to see that their reports of the Lexington and Concord clash, in which the British were the undoubted aggressors, were received by the Whig leaders in the other colonies before the country became inundated with "British lies." It is said that the patriots' account of the battle reached North Carolina about two months before a letter was received from General Gage giving his report of the action. The royal governor of North Carolina asserted that this delay had been fatal to the Loyalist, or Tory, cause, as in the interim Whig propaganda had been effective in "confirming the seditious in their evil purposes, and bringing over vast numbers of the fickle, wavering and unsteady multitude" to the Whigs' party.

The following letter from Richard Derby to one of his captains in the West Indies gives an interesting idea of how affairs looked to the veteran Salem shipowner and patriot during the month following the Lexington clash and a month before the Battle of Bunker Hill:

Salem, May ye 9, 1775.

Capt. Danl. Hathorn of Schooner *Patty*, West Indies.

I suppose you will be glad to hear from home, but things are in such a confused state I know not what to write you. Boston is now blocked up by

at least 30,000 men. We have had no action since ye 19 of April which was very bloody. They, ye Regulars, came out in ye night, silently up Cambridge river, and got almost to Concord before day, so that ye country had a very short time to get out. Had we had one hour longer not a soul

of those bloodthirsty creatures would ever have reached Boston. However, they got a dire drubbing so that they have not played ye Yankee tune since. We have lost a number of brave men but we have killed, taken and rendered justice, I believe, at least 8 to 1, and I believe such a spirit never was, everybody striving to excel. We have no Tories, saving what is now shut up in Boston or gone off. There hath not been as yet any stopping of ye

trade, so I would have you get a load of molasses as good and cheap and as quick as you can and proceed home. If you have not sold and ye markets are bad where you are, you have liberty to proceed any other ways, either to ye Mole, Jamaica, or to make a fresh bottom, or anything else that you may think likely to help ye voyage, but always to keep your money in your own hands.

Two Massachusetts men stand forth pre-eminently in the events that, following the crowning of George III as king in 1760, gradually but inevitably led to the rebellion of the colonists, the War of the Revolution, and the birth of a new and independent nation. These men were Samuel Adams, born in Boston on September 27, 1722 (a relative of John Adams, of Quincy, and a member of the family descended from Henry Adams, who emigrated from Devonshire, England, to Massachusetts in 1636), and John Hancock, born at Quincy on January 23, 1737. Both were well-educated men. Samuel Adams graduated from Harvard in 1740 and then studied law, and John Hancock graduated from the same university in 1754 and entered the mercantile house of his uncle, Thomas Hancock, of Boston, who had adopted him (and upon whose death in 1764 he fell heir to a large fortune and a prosperous business). Both of these men were conspicuous in the events following the Boston Massacre and the staging of the Boston Tea Party and as leaders in opposition to the Boston Port Bill. When the British governor, Gen. Thomas Gage, sent English regular troops to Lexington and Concord on April 18-19, 1775, their commanders had orders not only to take or destroy the "materials of war" stored at Concord by the colonial militia but also to capture Samuel Adams and John Hancock, reported to be staying at Lexington or Concord. These two men were believed by the British to be the leaders of the spirit of rebellion that was sweeping through Massachusetts and all the American colonies. The military mission of the British, in force, was "a secret expedition," but Paul Revere and William Dawes gave warning, aroused the sleeping minutemen, and saved the lives of the patriot leaders. When Governor Gage attempted to pour oil on troubled waters and issued on June 12, 1775, a proclamation of pardon to the colonials who had resisted and defeated the armed British regulars in the exercise of their lawful duties (through the attempted destruction of property and the capture of the people's leaders), he expressly exempted both Samuel Adams and John Hancock from what, in his presumption, he represented as a magnanimous royal pardon for acts of disloyalty and rebellion. Their offenses, the proclamation read, were "of too flagitious a nature to admit of any other consideration than that of condign punishment," which meant transportation to England if they were captured and ignominious death.

As James Otis' vigor declined (and for years Otis was a very sick man), Samuel Adams took his place as the champion of the colonists in steadily opposing taxation by acts of the British Parliament, in which America had no representation. Samuel Adams fought against all suggestions for compromise. He advocated nonimportation and the use of the power of the boycott. He stood firm for "Natural Right" and urged a close co-operation of the colonies and a Continental Congress. He was the author of many of the revolutionary Massachusetts documents, including the famous "Massachusetts Resolves" and the circular letter to the legislatures of the other colonies. An English historian has said: "There can be no question that Samuel Adams was one of the first American political leaders to deny the legislative power of parliament and to desire and advocate separation from the mother country." As a Massachusetts delegate to the Continental Congress from 1774 to 1781, Adams strove for harmony between the various colonies and vigorously opposed any concession to the British Government. Both Samuel Adams and John Hancock signed the Declaration of Independence—the latter, as president of the Continental Congress, having the honor of being the first man to affix his name to that historic document.

The Battle of Bunker Hill — June 1775

Following the good work of the minutemen at Lexington and Concord, where untrained colonials routed some eighteen hundred British regulars and put them to "ignominious flight," with admitted casualties four times as great as the Americans suffered, the British attacked a newly occupied and unfortified colonial position on Breed's Hill (Bunker Hill), Charlestown, on June 17, 1775. They were repulsed twice, but the third assault gained the objective—and this only because of an overwhelming superiority in number of British manpower and artillery and the support of a powerful fleet. The British lost 1,054 men, killed and wounded; the Americans, 390 men. The significance of the Battle of Bunker Hill was in its moral effect. Lecky, the English historian, wrote:

It roused at once the fierce instinct of combat in America . . . and dispelled [following the Lexington incident] . . . the almost superstitious belief in the impossibility of encountering regular [British] troops with hastily levied volunteers.

. . . No one questioned the conspicuous gallantry with which the provincial troops had supported a long fire from the ships and awaited the charge of the enemy, and British soldiers had been twice driven back in disorder before their fire.

The Battle of Bunker Hill was a brilliant military achievement for the colonials, for twelve hundred men of an untrained and poorly equipped voluntary militia had withstood the savage assault of some three thousand British ground troops (aside from the supporting artillery fire of the fleet) and had fought until their ammunition fell short and the expected reinforcements with supplies failed to arrive. The Americans stole a march on the British when they occupied Bunker (more properly Breed's) Hill, and it was to prevent the colonial militiamen from entrenching themselves in this strong position, which, it is said, "commanded the harbor and city of Boston," that the British launched a frontal attack in force before the Americans had time to bring up batteries and construct defenses. The Battle of Bunker Hill finally ended with the British in possession after the provincials' ammunition had been expended, but the colonials withdrew in good order and inflicted "staggering casualties" upon the British. It is an established and generally admitted fact that the Americans retired from their positions "only because they ran short of ammunition" and that as long as the supply lasted, they continued to fire and "mowed down the attacking British." The battle was reported as a "great victory" to the people of England, but when the facts became known an Englishman declared, "Another such victory and there will be no one left to bring the good news home." The once greatly feared British Lion, it was said, had become decrepit, and "no American need fear to thrust his head in its mouth." According to one contemporary paper, the colonial Whigs were convinced that "the teeth are harmless, the claws are impotent and this British Lion that has frightened our children here will, we are persuaded, turn out nothing but a Scottish ass from the Isle of Bute."

It has been said that at the Battle of Bunker Hill an "irregular peasantry, commanded by a physician," had again proved that Americans were a match for British regulars. (The physician referred to, Dr. Joseph Warren, fought not as the general in command—for he had not then received his commission—but as a volunteer in the militia, or citizen army, and he was killed during the battle.) Richard Price, the English radical, wrote of the colonials, "We expected to find them a cowardly rabble who would lie quietly at our feet and they have disappointed us." General Gage, with the experience of Bunker Hill following Lexington and Concord, wrote to the British ministry at London and warned that the colonial rebels were "not the despicable Rabble too many have supposed them to be; These People Shew a Spirit and Conduct against us, they never shewed against the French, and everybody has Judged of them from their former Appearance and behavior, when joynd with the King's Forces in the last War, which has led many into great mistakes. . . . They are now Spirited up by a Rage

and Enthousiasm, as great as ever people were possessed of." The Americans proved themselves to be courageous as well as excellent marksmen, and after Bunker Hill it was the British and not the colonials who were discouraged and lacked heart as far as the military situation around Boston was concerned. The colonial troops continued the siege of Boston, and after they occupied Dorchester Heights closely overlooking the town, General Howe—who had superseded Gage in command of the British forces—found his position untenable and decided to withdraw. The city was evacuated on March 17, 1776, some three and a half months, before the Declaration of Independence; henceforth during the War of the Revolution, Boston was never again the theater of war, although the British Navy blockaded the port.

*The British Move Their Forces and Center
of Operations against the Rebellious
Colonists from Boston to New York*

New York had a strong Tory element and became an abode for Tory refugees, who found it to their interest to leave their homes in colonies where Whigs were in an unquestioned majority and Sons of Liberty were active. It is said that "more Tory newspapers and tracts were published in New York than in all the other colonies combined" and that New York "particularly distinguished itself in propagating Toryism." The New York Assembly refused to adopt the Continental Association, but local committees looked to the Continental Congress for authority rather than to the government of the colony. With conservatives in control, these committees operated to keep themselves clear of charges of "treason" or "rebellion." In 1775 the New York Assembly moved to separate itself entirely from the Continental Congress and sent a separate petition to the king. The New York Tories denounced the "republicanism" of New England and Virginia and particularly "the firebrand Whigs" of Massachusetts. While the chain of colonies regrettably acknowledged that New York was its weakest link, the British ministry was happy to see New York's several acts that denoted loyalty, and King George III publicly expressed his pleasure at New York's faithfulness. However, notwithstanding the Toryism of New York, that colony had sufficient mercantilism permeating its ranks to stand definitely in opposition to the British Declaratory Act and the right of Parliament to tax the colonies.

The provincial assembly of New York, whereas it sent accredited delegates to the First Continental Congress in 1774 at Philadelphia, veered Royalist for a time and not only refused to accredit delegates to the Second Continental Congress (one of whose purposes was the creation of the Continental Army) but also actually voted military supplies for the British troops garrisoned in the colonies. As a result of its acts, the New York Assembly lost popular support, and the people of New York province, meeting in conventions, elected delegates and accredited them to the Second Continental Congress. In April 1775, at the time of the Lexington and Concord conflict between the Massachusetts minutemen and England's regular troops, New York citizens staged an orderly "insurrection," broke into the armory, and seized six hundred muskets, which, we are told, were distributed to "the most reliable and trustworthy." A voluntary corps was formed and a local government set up representative of the people. Britain was declared an enemy, its mails in New York were seized, and two sloops—with supplies aboard for the British at Boston and Halifax—were unloaded and the cargoes confiscated.

By June 1775, New York had redeemed itself. Isaac Sears, at the head of three hundred men, had demanded and obtained the keys of the customhouse, and the patriots closed the port.

The members of the British garrison withdrew from the fort to a warship in the harbor and evacuated hurriedly, leaving their arms, ammunition, and baggage behind—"glad to get out of the clutches of the rebels with their whole skins." Dr. Thomas Cooper, president of King's College and a prominent Tory pamphleteer, was attacked by Whigs, who broke down the college gate, and Rivington, the Tory printer, fled to a British warship for sanctuary. For a year the patriots were "in the saddle" in New York, but that city was "a peaceful and loyal settlement" in the minds of the British as "compared with the volatile Boston," and it was to New York that the British military forces withdrew when they considered it the better part of valor to evacuate Boston in March 1776—eleven months after the clash with the minutemen farmers at Lexington and nine months after the Battle of Bunker Hill.

On June 29, 1776, General Howe arrived at Sandy Hook with some nine thousand British soldiers, and they commenced an aggressive campaign to take the city on July 3—the day before the historic Declaration of Independence. By the end of August, following the arrival of Hessian and Hanoverian mercenary troops and a large force of British soldiers under General Clinton, some "thirty thousand fighting men representing the crown" were in New York and its vicinity, and the British Navy controlled the harbor and the ocean approaches to the city. It was in New York Harbor on August 17, 1776, that the first submarine in history, designed and built for war purposes, attempted to attack a man-of-war. David Bushnell's *Turtle*, a "submersible" with a "one-man crew," operated by Serg. Ezra Lee of the Continental Army, made an attempt to sink the British frigate *Eagle* of 50 guns. Bushnell was a classmate of the patriot Nathan Hale at Yale, and his submarine used a "magazine . . . shaped like an egg . . . with 130 pounds of gunpowder" for a torpedo, which had to be attached to the bottom of a vessel and then, after the submarine worked clear, exploded by a fuse. Sergeant Lee succeeded in getting the *Turtle* in position under the *Eagle's* bottom, but experienced bad luck, so his efforts to blow up the vessel failed. He was unable to attach the "deadly egg" to the *Eagle's* underwater hull "owing probably to the ship's copper and a lack of pressure" (or power in the device intended to attach the magazine to the enemy ship). The "torpedo," later liberated by Lee as he attempted to escape British soldiers on Governor's Island in the early morning, drifted into the East River, where it exploded. General Putnam described the premier submarine venture in naval warfare as "courageous but unfortunate," and Gen. George Washington referred to the undertaking as "an effort of genius."

*Economic and Political Grievances of the
Colonies and the Persistent Demand
for Freedom from Oppression*

John C. Miller, in *ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION*, says that "the immediate threat to American liberty and well-being after 1765 came not from the restrictions imposed upon colonial trade and manufacturing, but from Parliament's efforts to raise a revenue in the colonies"; that "it was the invasion of Americans' political rights by Parliament after the Peace of Paris which precipitated the struggle between the mother country and colonies and inspired the ideals and slogans of the American Revolution." The spirit of rebellion among the colonists against arbitrary British law and the restriction of liberty was born by reason of the Navigation and Trade Acts. It grew because of expressions of British tyranny through the years and the constantly increasing assumption of superiority of the Britisher toward the colonial, and from 1764 to 1774 inclusive, it came close to bursting into flame as the one-time

ignored and repudiated laws began to be enforced with vigor and Americans came more and more to be treated as a subject people and of inferior class and worth. When the Navigation and Trade Acts were enforced, American liberty was challenged, and American pocketbooks suffered. The political, economic, and social phases of the Revolution were interwoven in the same fabric. Economic grievances did not play a part secondary to political issues in the events that led to the Revolution as has been claimed, for the political phase was never deemed of much importance by the colonials until it began to be used in earnest (backed by military might) to take money away from them by customs duties and then through the Sugar Act of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townshend Acts of 1767, and the Tea Act of 1773. These were revenue measures, arbitrarily enacted without the consent of the colonies. They were combated vigorously because of "taxation without representation" and fought from the political standpoint of a despotic attack on liberty and the rights and privileges of colonial-elected assemblies; yet the fact remains that the laws so repugnant to Americans merely continued a principle inaugurated in the Navigation and Trade Acts of Cromwell and Charles II, and the British Coercive Acts of 1774 (Boston Port Act and Quebec Act) were primarily military and political measures presented by a weak ministry and hurriedly passed by an ignorant Parliament as punitive and threatening statutes. The Quebec Act, most unfortunately for the peace of the world, introduced the religious phase.

With a vigor and passion that surprised the mother country, the colonials fought the British legislation of 1764-1774 because concurrently with the passing of the Sugar Act of 1764, all the obnoxious old Navigation and Trade Acts of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were to be enforced. Americans were not generally pinched by the acts of the British Parliament until the reign of George III, when laws had to be considered seriously as statutes affecting the lives of the colonists in both an economic and political sense. Liberty was just as precious in the 1660's as it was in the 1760's, but it was not until 1764 that American liberty was threatened through tax measures to the degree that brought into the foreground of thought the entire principle of taxation and the constitutional right to tax. "No taxation without representation" became the battle cry of the Revolution. However, the economic phase was not secondary to the political, but gave more meaning and virility to the demand for freedom from oppression. Another very important element that led to armed rebellion was the revolt of an essentially democratic people that desired to rule itself (excluding the Tory "loyalist" minority) against the aristocracy of the period as exemplified by the British Crown and lordly officials and the arrogance of the self-satisfied and "superior" English in general toward the subject colonials. The rebellion proved to be a revolution in fact, with democracy making more definite advances than had been attained in the English revolutions of a century earlier and more logical and defensible gains than came from the bloody French Revolution of 1789-1799.

David A. Wells, in *OUR MERCHANT MARINE*, emphasizes the effect upon the minds of the people of Britain's combativeness toward the American colonial marine interests—their ships, merchants, seafaring men, and ocean commerce—which led through resentment and revolt to independence. Wells writes:

The enactment of arbitrary laws on the part of Great Britain to prevent her American colonists from freely participating in the carrying trade and commerce of the ocean was, however, a sore grievance, and ultimately, as is well known, constituted one of the prime causes of the American Revolution. They were, furthermore, from the very first either openly or secretly resisted and evaded; and under their influence the colonists became a nation of law-breakers. Nine-tenths of their merchants were smugglers [because of their refusal as a matter of principle—as well as of economics—to conform to the provisions or even acknowledge the validity,

of unjust laws]. One-quarter of all the signers of the Declaration of Independence were bred to commerce, to the command of ships, and to contraband trade. Hancock, Trumbull (Brother Jonathan) and Hamilton were all known to be cognizant of or participants in contraband transactions, and approved of them. Hancock was the prince of contraband traders, and with John Adams as his counsel was appointed for trial before the Admiralty Court in Boston, at the exact hour of the shedding of blood at Lexington, in a suit for five hundred thousand dollars penalties alleged to have been incurred by him as a smuggler.

These historic facts clearly reveal the views of the founders of the new American republic regarding "the justice or the expedience of laws" enacted by the British Parliament for the restriction of commerce and the freedom of trade. Men such as Hancock, Trumbull, and Hamilton, it has been said, "were merchants before they became statesmen." Because of their practical personal experience in the realm of commerce and economics, they had become convinced that Britain, through arbitrary and selfish laws aimed at restraining the colonies from engaging freely in operations of trade and industry and from enjoying the fruits of their labor, "contravened their natural rights, re-affirmed the principle of slavery, and became their enemy." These merchant-patriots, who became revolutionists, merely put into practical effect an American philosophy that had been steadily developing and becoming more articulate with the years; i. e., that every evasion of unjust British statutes affecting the economic and political life of the colonies was a blow in favor of natural inherent rights and human liberty. Wells says, "Hence also the origin of that count in the indictment against the king of Great Britain embodied in the Declaration of Independence 'of cutting off our trade with all parts of the world.'"

Notwithstanding the tradition and custom of European countries that "whatever of advantage one nation gained in commerce necessarily entailed an equal and corresponding loss by some other nation" and the succumbing later of the United States to the effect of illiberal international habits affecting trade, the fact stands forth pre-eminently that the wisest American patriots, merchants, and statesmen who founded the republic advocated most consistently as a fundamental policy of the new nation of the western world the general development of the idea of free commerce and unrestricted trade with all peoples. They vigorously denounced the universally prevalent conception that treaties of commerce between nations should be mere agreements "to secure special and exclusive privileges to the contracting parties" that would in practice operate to antagonize the commercial interests of all other countries. The American revolutionary viewpoint was expressed in the treaty of commerce entered into by the United States with France in 1778. The American commissioners who negotiated this treaty were "determined to attempt to inaugurate a more generous policy and establish a precedent for freer and better commercial relations between different countries than had hitherto prevailed." The revolutionary American-French treaty of 1778, accordingly, agreed to avoid "all those burdensome prejudices, which are usually sources of debate, embarrassment, and discontent," and to take as the basis of agreement "the most perfect equality and reciprocity." The fundamental principle adopted as a guide in the drafting of the treaty was declared to be that of "founding the advantages of commerce solely upon reciprocal utility and the just rules of free intercourse." The leaders of the American Revolution were both consistent and sound in their basic beliefs regarding commerce and what was early known as "free trade." Unfortunately, France was an extremely weak, erratic, and essentially selfish nation with which to make an idealistic commercial treaty. Its opportunism, vacillation, and willingness to crucify principles in the national interest, to embarrass Britain, the Mistress of the Seas (and its "arch-enemy"), and to further its dream of empire founded on the Napoleonic sword did not permit the basic idea of "equality and reciprocity" set forth in the American-French treaty of commerce ever to have a chance to prove its virtue, eradicate old prejudices, and lead to much-needed reforms in international trade.

A Marine Lexington at Machias, Maine

It was not the waters of Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Long Island Sound, or any in proximity to the trading ports of the well-inhabited sections of the American colonies that were to stage the first clash of arms at sea between a British naval vessel and the patriots but those of faraway Machias, which in 1775 was the extreme easterly outpost of the colonists. Machias was the only point in Maine beyond the Penobscot where any "considerable number of white men have found lodgment," and they were in many respects "seemingly unrecognized" and apparently almost without the pale of colonial jurisdiction. Following the fight between British troops and Massachusetts minutemen at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, a rapid concentration of British regulars in Boston made it necessary for the royal government to provide barracks, and lumber for this purpose and for "the general defense of Boston" was greatly needed by the British. Accordingly, Ichabod Jones, of Boston, the Tory merchant, was requested by the authorities to take two vessels owned by him (sloops of about 80 tons each) with a load of provisions to be exchanged for lumber and, under the protection of the British armed cutter *Margaretta*, proceed to Machias (where, it was known, there was a lack of food due to the British blockade of the Maine coast). The *Margaretta*, under the command of Lieutenant Moore of His Majesty's Royal Navy, convoying the two Boston-owned merchant vessels, arrived in the Machias River on June 2, 1775 (forty-four days after the fight at Lexington and twelve days before the battle of Breed's—or Bunker—Hill was to occur). It was assumed that the people of Machias had heard nothing of the Lexington episode. The next day Lieutenant Moore landed and circulated a paper among the inhabitants for signatures "as a prerequisite to their obtaining supplies of any provisions"; according to the terms of this paper of agreement, the people of Machias in return for greatly needed foodstuffs were to "indulge Captain Jones in carrying lumber to Boston and to protect him and his property at all events."

On June 6, the people of the settlement (or village and environs) held a meeting and decided not to grant Lieutenant Moore's request for lumber, as vague rumors of the fight at Lexington had reached them, and "the arrival of these vessels in quest of this particular kind of lumber confirmed the news in the minds of the townsfolk." Lieutenant Moore then moved the *Margaretta* and anchored her off the village, where the vessel's guns would command the houses. This had the effect of changing the attitude of many of the residents under the warship guns, and at a second meeting a majority voted to allow Ichabod Jones to obtain the lumber and to permit the citizens individually to purchase provisions. Many voted against this resolution, and when the ship tied up to the wharf, Jones distributed provisions only to those who had voted in his favor. This gave offense to a large number who greatly needed the foodstuffs and supplies and were denied them, and these people conspired "to seize Jones and put a stop to his mission of securing lumber." Lieutenant Moore was positive that the colonists in this "outpost of civilization" were entirely ignorant of the Lexington occurrence, and in true British fashion he expressed arrogance and superiority. Seeing that a liberty pole had been erected on the village green, he demanded that it be removed and threatened to fire upon the town. The Machias storekeeper, Stephen Jones, proved to be a diplomat in this situation and persuaded Lieutenant Moore to resort to no act of force until Jones could assemble a town meeting, "when perhaps the people would agree to take the pole down," for this was a matter that was outside the power of individuals to handle.

Following the demand of Lieutenant Moore in regard to the liberty pole, Machias people secretly sent word to Pleasant River village (about twenty miles distant to the westward) and to a few other straggling settlements within reach, asking for reinforcements. Before this aid could come, however, the citizens of Machias held a secret meeting in the woods behind the

village on Sunday, June 11, at which the project of capturing "the crown boat" and her convoy was discussed. Benjamin Foster, of East Falls, Machias, was delegated to proceed to East Machias to secure a schooner lying there, which, it was felt, could be used to advantage in this undertaking. When reinforcements arrived, Lieutenant Moore saw some of them "crossing the stream on logs, holding guns in their hands," and he quickly boarded the *Margaretta* and prepared for trouble. He then dropped his vessel "below the Narrows," sending word to the people of Machias that he would destroy their town if they persisted "in hostile demonstrations." Defying the British threat, the patriots seized the two sloops, and on one of them, the *Unity*, forty men went aboard. Only two of these men had ever seen military service, and they, Morris O'Brien and Benjamin Foster, had served in the expedition against the French at Louisburg in 1745 (or thirty years before) and were too old for hard, aggressive warfare. Jeremiah O'Brien (born in 1744 and, therefore, thirty-one years old), a son of Morris O'Brien, was chosen captain of the *Unity*, and Edmund Stevens was elected his lieutenant. The *Margaretta* of the British Navy was armed with four 3-pounders and 14 swivels, was well manned, and had a well-stocked armory of small arms and ammunition, cutlasses, etc. The *Unity* had no cannon, and a contemporary asserted that the men aboard her carried as their total equipment for warfare "twenty guns, many of which were mere fowling pieces, carrying scatter shot, and of powder, ball and shot no more than three rounds to each firearm; other weapons consisted of thirteen pitchforks, a few scythes and ten or twelve axes."

The *Margaretta* was fired on by patriots on the highland overlooking the Narrows, where the vessel was anchored, so Lieutenant Moore moved her. He captured a small sloop owned by Toby, of Machias, and a vessel belonging to Robert Avery, of Norwich, Conn., coming into Machias from the Bay of Fundy. Needing spars, he took them from the Connecticut craft; also all her provisions and stores of value. On June 12, the *Unity* set sail after the *Margaretta*, and with her went the second of Ichabod Jones's lumber sloops, under the command of Benjamin Foster, with twenty men (indifferently armed) aboard and no cannon or swivel guns. In the report of the Machias Committee of Safety to the "Honorable Congress of Massachusetts Bay" dated June 14, 1775 (three days before the historic Battle of Bunker Hill), we read: "During the chase our people built their breastworks of pine boards and anything they could find in the vessels that would screen them from the enemy's fire." The armed British and unarmed (except with men) colonial vessels came together "at the entrance to our harbor," and Lieutenant Moore gave the order to fire on the rebels. One of the first shots killed a Machias man, but an expert marksman on the *Unity* with a "wall piece" (a heavy musket that was fired when supported by the hastily erected "breastworks") picked off the English helmsman and quickly cleared the poop of men. The *Margaretta* became unmanageable, and the American ships were expertly maneuvered to keep well away from her big guns, while they were worked into position for boarding. Lieutenant Moore personally fought bravely until he collapsed "shot through the breast with a brace of musket balls," and by sheer audacity and superior marksmanship (with no shot wasted) the *Unity* and her companion American sloop captured the king's ship. The engagement was reported as lasting "for near the space of an hour." Only two colonials were killed and five wounded, but unfortunately Robert Avery, of Norwich, Conn., held a prisoner on the *Margaretta*, was also killed. The British casualties were reported as five killed and nine wounded. (Lieutenant Moore died in Machias village the day after the battle.) A "brave" British officer, Midshipman Stillingfleet, was found after the *Margaretta* struck her colors, hidden below decks, where he went to escape "the devastating fire of the rebels" who had no cannon, but few muskets, and practically no ammunition. The colonial sloops took the *Magaretta* into port, where her armament was transferred to the *Unity*. The Machias Committee of Safety wrote: "We propose to convey the prisoners to Pownalborough Gaol as soon as possible." The colonial council, then in session at Cambridge, tendered Jeremiah O'Brien a vote of thanks and gave him the custody of his prizes.

News of the "Machias Lexington" greatly enraged British Navy officials, and they quickly sent two armed sloops, the *Diligence* and the *Tapanagouche* (or *Tapuaquish*), from Halifax to punish the insolent Yankee rebels. One of these sloops carried "8 guns and 50 men," and the other was rated as "sixteen swivels" and was also presumably well manned. Jeremiah O'Brien, in the *Unity* (now armed with 4 guns and 14 swivels), and Benjamin Foster, in the coasting vessel *Portland Packet*, came in contact with the British armed sloops in the Bay of Fundy on July 12, 1775, and by excellent strategy and seamanship succeeded in engaging each of the ships separately and in capturing both of them by the aid of superb marksmanship "coupled with audacity." For this brilliant exploit, Jeremiah O'Brien was made a captain in the Massachusetts State Marine. With his last two prizes, the *Diligence* and the renamed *Machias Liberty*, O'Brien went cruising for British vessels. He quickly recaptured an American schooner with a British prize crew aboard; also a British armed cutter and two barges carrying thirty-five men under the command of a lieutenant of the British sloop-of-war *Falcon*. The *Machias Liberty*, with O'Brien in command, and the *Diligence* (Captain Lambert) cruised off the New England coast and were highly successful in their operations against the British for about a year and a half—notwithstanding that Admiral Graves sent out a squadron of four war vessels under Captain Mowatt to "overawe" the Down East Yankee rebels. (Mowatt was the man who, when unable to get masts for the British Navy at Falmouth, Maine, bombarded and virtually destroyed the town in October 1775.)

Captain O'Brien entered the privateer service in 1777 and commanded the New Hampshire armed ships *Little Vincent*, *Cyrus*, and *Tiger*. In September of that year, he captured a vessel carrying a cargo of pork from Ireland for the British Army. This craft had been taken as a prize originally by an American privateer and had been recaptured by *H.M.S. Scarborough* before being seized by Captain O'Brien.

In 1779, Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien, his brother John, and others built the privateer ship *Hannibal* (20 guns and 130 men) at Newburyport. This vessel, after making many captures, ran afoul of two large and fast British frigates in 1780. Following a chase of forty-eight hours, she herself was seized and her officers and crew imprisoned in the ill-famed British prison ship *Jersey* at New York, from which Captain O'Brien was transported to England, thrown into Mill Prison, and "made the object of personal ill-feeling." In 1782, he escaped, reached France, and returned to America about the time hostilities ceased. The first iron (steel) warship of the new United States Navy built in New England east of Boston was named *Machias* after the town of the "Marine Lexington" fame. (This vessel was built by the Bath Iron Works, of Bath, Maine, in 1890-1892.) Later, a torpedo boat of the U. S. Navy was named *O'Brien* in honor of Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien.

While Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien was languishing in British prisons, his brother, John O'Brien, kept the family name alive in shipping circles by his audacious work in command of the American sailing brig *Hibernia*, a vessel carrying six 3-pounders and a crew of sixty men. This brig, which he personally owned, was fast enough to escape from the clutches of powerfully armed British craft, and she took many rich prizes.

*The British Force the Maritime Colonial
Interests into Rebellion*

Notwithstanding all that an intolerant, suppressing, and vindictive British Government could do, the dauntless American colonial seamen—stoutly resolved to sail and trade as they pleased—increased their deep-sea trade until shortly before the Revolution. We are told that “the New England fleet alone numbered six hundred sail.” Its captains felt at home in many distant ports, and “they trimmed their yards in the reaches of the Mediterranean and the North Sea or bargained thriftily in the Levant.” The closing of the port of Boston by the British on June 1, 1774, only one of the several “Intolerable Acts” of that period and considered by Parliament as merely a mild retaliatory measure aimed at a people who had repeatedly flouted the crown and the authority of Parliament, actually threatened the very life of the maritime province. The Massachusetts colonists could not be excluded from the sea without losing their main dependence, and this arbitrary and essentially foolish act, instead “of cowing the Yankee Saints” as England fully expected it to do, drove them into open rebellion—not only the seafaring element of the province but also the farmers “in back,” who demanded the essentials of liberty for all as well as the use of the ocean for the exportation and importation of goods. The Boston Port Bill united the colonies against Britain; whereas the ministry predicted that as the measure would favor other American ports to the detriment of Boston, the sections benefited would cause a split in the unity of the colonies and that such peoples would do nothing to assist Boston in the dilemma in which it found itself because of belligerent disloyalty. Britain had passed the Boston Port Act to punish Boston (and the surrounding region) and intimidate the rest of the colonies. It operated not only to weld the shipping interests of the country together—for that any of the fraternity should be barred from the sea aroused bitter resentment and their fighting spirit—but also to show all the colonies to what lengths Britain, with its powerful navy, was prepared to go along lines of blockade and a suspension of ocean trade to force free people to do its will and thereby lose their liberty and put on the humiliating yoke of servitude.

The colonial whalers explored and hunted in distant seas, took the initiative, and led all British and foreign competitors by a very wide margin. In 1762, 78 whalers cleared American ports, somewhat more than half being from Nantucket. In 1770 this little island port alone sent out 125 whalers, which, although averaging no more than 90 tons each, “battered their way half around the watery globe and comfortably supported six thousand people who dwelt on a sandy island unfit for farming and having no other industries.” New England’s prime marine interests, besides the building of ships, lay in the fisheries (deep-sea, off the Banks, and whaling) and the forests and the exporting of fish and forest products. The British Parliament, at the suggestion of Lord North, was guilty of its final act of asinine provocation in 1775, when it passed an act forbidding the colonies to those export markets, in which every New England seacoast town was vitally concerned, and steps were taken to drive their fishing fleets from the Banks and their haunts off Newfoundland. This British law aimed “to rob six thousand sturdy men of a livelihood afloat and to spread ruin among the busy ports, such as Marblehead and Gloucester, from which sailed hundreds of pinks, snows and schooners.” It is pleasing to know that when Lord North’s proposal to kill the colonial fisheries was enacted into law, a protesting minority of twenty-one peers of the realm declared: “We dissent because the attempt to coerce by famine the whole body of the inhabitants of great and populous provinces is without example in the history of this, or perhaps, of any civilized nation.”

Lord North was determined to do everything within his power to suppress colonial marine trade, lessen the demand for American ships, and discourage and weaken colonial shipbuild-

ing; for at the outbreak of the Revolution, America was building at least a hundred sizable ships a year, and according to Lloyd's Register, colonial ships, numbering 2,342, amounted in tonnage to well over a third of the total British registry. The law forbidding the export of fish and the British antagonism toward the colonial fisheries aroused the furious enmity of the seamen engaged in that trade. It has been truly said: "The sailormen bothered their heads very little about taxation without representation, but whetted their anger with grudges more robust. They had been beggared and bullied and shot at from the Bay of Biscay to Barbados, and no sooner was the Continental Congress ready to issue privateering commissions and letters of marque than it was up anchor for them and away to bag a Britisher."

In the spring of 1775, Admiral Graves of the British Navy, who had his headquarters at Boston, acting upon the request of Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire, sent the frigate *H.M.S. Scarborough* (Captain Barkley) and the sloop-of-war *H.M.S. Canceaux* (Lieutenant Mowatt) to Piscataqua. Captain Barkley immediately commenced to make himself obnoxious to the seafaring and shipowning interests and merchants of Portsmouth and of the entire Piscataqua area. Trade was interfered with, and fishermen were forbidden to go offshore to the Grand Banks. Impressment of sailors for the Royal Navy became a common occurrence, and in May 1775 the *Scarborough* seized two coasters, laden with corn, flour, and pork, as they were entering the harbor. Food was becoming scarce in the colony, but notwithstanding the pressing remonstrances and earnest pleas of representatives of the people, backed by the solicitation of Governor Wentworth, Captain Barkley refused to release the two colonial vessels and sent them under the convoy of the *Canceaux* to Boston for the use of the British naval and military land forces there.

The New Hampshire GAZETTE of June 2, 1775, says that at this time the commanders of British Navy vessels operating on the American coast received general orders "to take every provision vessel that should be met with, on every station, and to send them forthwith to Boston." Because of the actions of the arbitrary British with respect to colonial coastwise and deep-sea commerce, the fisheries, and the impressment of sailors, trade soon became stagnant on the Piscataqua as at other British-blockaded ports. Tory merchants, with the governor's backing, made some sort of "informal agreement" with Captain Barkley to the effect that they would co-operate so as not to starve out each other; however, the British Navy had to consider not only the demands of the king's forces (sailors, marines, and a few companies of soldiers) at the mouth of the Piscataqua but also the large and increasing bodies of troops at Boston. The mutual understanding, such as it was, naturally proved unsatisfactory, for the British assumed the policy of taking all that they wanted and could get by arbitrary power without regard to justice and the needs of the people—and this while stifling commerce and robbing many of the colonists of their means of livelihood.

A local fishing vessel proceeding to sea to catch fish needed as food for local consumption was stopped by Captain Barkley and a member of her small crew seized to be held "as hostage for a deserter from the *Scarborough*," whom, Barkley declared, the people of Portsmouth were hiding and protecting. By this time, matters had gone so far that this incident—decidedly trivial when compared with the numerous acts of despotic power and humiliation that had preceded it—was used to provoke definite retaliation. A boat from the *Scarborough* sent to Portsmouth for provisions on August 10, 1775, was taken by force of arms by Captain Pickering and a crew of men, following which the boat was "loaded on a team" and paraded through the town. A contemporary issue of the New Hampshire GAZETTE tells us: "The Committee of Safety, finding it inconsistent with the Peace and good Order of this Town that any Communication should be kept up between the Ship *Scarborough* and the Town, Therefore Voted, that henceforward no Boats pass or repass from the said Ship for the Town of Newcastle without a permit from this committee." This action resulted in an almost complete blockade, for Captain Barkley stopped all shipping entering or leaving the river, including coastal fishing boats. On the other hand, the British blockade decree discouraged the move-

ment of provision vessels, and as Barkley could get no food from the shore, the *Scarborough* was compelled to sail for Boston on August 23, 1775, as her stores were practically depleted.

Notwithstanding the presence of the *Scarborough* and *Canceaux* of the Royal Navy at the mouth of the Piscataqua throughout the spring and summer of 1775, several colonial vessels engaged in foreign trade ran the blockade, and following October 1775, New Hampshire as well as other colonies made definite efforts, in harmony with a resolution of Congress, to export "as much provision or any other produce except horned cattle, sheep, hogs and poultry . . . for the importation of arms, ammunition, sulphur and salt petre." Apparently, the adventurous seafaring fraternity of Portsmouth had a measure of good luck in October 1775 that operated to the benefit of the entire community, for the British ship *Prince George*, blown off her course by a heavy southerly gale and somewhat in distress, was sighted off the Piscataqua and soon thereafter boarded and captured by armed men, who brought the vessel to Portsmouth and secured her safely to the town wharf. The ship was loaded with 1,892 barrels of flour. She had sailed from Bristol, England, and was bound to Boston, with her cargo consigned to the British authorities for "the use of the ministerial army." This capture is generally credited to Capt. Titus Salter, whose schooner *Ann* had been seized by *H.M.S. Scarborough*. Salter retaliated by intercepting the big British ship with her cargo of flour, which was wanted by General Gage's British forces at Boston and also badly needed by both Washington's army and the people around the Piscataqua.

As the year 1775 advanced, Elias Hasket Derby, Richard Derby's second son, took over the active management of the Derby vessels, which hailed from Salem. Young Derby was one of the Massachusetts merchants who affirmed that he was "a man of peace." However, the actions of the British in seizing three of his little vessels when northbound from the West Indies in the winter of 1775-1776 convinced him that "if he wished to keep his ships out of the enemy's hands and also profitably employed, he must give up his role of peaceful trader and meet the enemy at their own game." The first experience that caused the Salem merchant in mid-1776 to abandon peaceful trading, arm his ships as letters of marque, or privateers, so that they could not only protect themselves in trade but also "go out looking for the enemy," is of interest, for a letter has been preserved written by Derby himself on this subject. The vessel was the square topsail schooner *Jamaica Packet* (Captain Ingersoll), which, unarmed and on a peaceful passage from Jamaica to Salem, was seized in January 1776 by a British cruiser and taken into Boston. Mr. Derby, writing of this affair and of the events that transpired, says:

The [British] captain who took him [Captain Ingersoll] deprived him of all his papers, and kept them until the trial came on, when the bill of stores was missing from the papers. The court condemned one cask of rum and one cask of sugar for want of the bill of stores, but acquitted the vessel and cargo. Capt. Ingersoll could not get leave [from the British] to sell the cargo. He applied, from time to time, to have the interest delivered and could not succeed; but after a time, and when the enemy were near leaving Boston, he obtained leave to sell so much of his cargo as would be sufficient to repair his vessel, with a view to leave Boston with the fleet, which he was desirous of doing, hoping thus to save the interest. When the [British]

fleet and army were leaving Boston [General Howe and his forces evacuated the town and harbor March 17, 1776, over three and a half months before the Declaration of Independence], they came and took most of the rum on board the transports; the soldiers and sailors, and others, came in the time of confusion and cut his sails from the yards, and made them into bags; they cut the hoops from the hogsheads of sugar, and took most of it away. Not being satisfied with that, the day they quitted the town they came and cut the fasts from the wharf, when the schooner drove down river and went ashore on one of the islands, and was there burned by the British, by which I lost better than £3,000 sterling.

About this time, much anxiety was felt in regard to three of the Derby vessels then in the West Indies about ready to sail for home, so Capt. Allen Hallett was dispatched in the schooner *Nancy* to St. Nicholas Mole, Haiti, with a letter of credit for £1,000 to be laid out to the best advantage and a long letter to Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee, a trusted shipmaster in charge of the Derby interests in Hispaniola. This letter, which has been preserved, reads in part as follows:

If this letter should meet you at the Mole, you may ship me, by any vessels bound to Cape Ann, Newbury, Ipswich, or near to it, some cotton, cocoa, sugar, molasses, duck, cordage, powder, or any other article you think may answer, as I make no doubt that any goods will make 100 per cent. But do not send any indigo, as that is contrary to the association, but any foreign goods you have a right to bring.

Worsted stockings & Middleing Linen for shirting is at Present much wanted, as is Pins, Silk & Cotton Handkfs. & Writing Paper, all which articles is worth at least 150 per cent, more than common, and £150 Sterling well layd out in such articles will leave more Profit than any Westindia goods, but they must not come (in a vessel) with an English Clearance, & neither must any of them be taken from Jamaica, as it would be in direct Violation of the Association, which I do not mean to break.

* * * *

I shall depend on your advising him [Captain Hallett] in all matters. He has no Clearance & therefore suppose it not safe to go to Jamaica for a Clearance, but you will judge of that. He has two Registers & if you think it safe & Best he may go down to Jamaica as from the Mole in Ballast belonging to Dominica, but I suppose he may be as safe with a Cargo of Molasses, Sugar, Cocoa, & Cotton from the Mole without any Clearance at all, Provided it is consigned to some Merchant in Nova Scotia & the French Clearance to agree with that. The reason of my wanting his Papers so, is I think if he is taken there, he must be safe if he is leased to that government. I have ordered Hallett to throw all the Papers over in case he gets taken, but I do not think of loosing her as the Schooner sails very fast. If not taken & if he meets an Easterly Wind, as it will be the right season of the year for it, he will stand a good chance to get into some of our Harbours on the North Shore, & I am well assured if he does well & has a good

Cargo of Goods, he will make not less than 100 per cent after Paying the Insurance and charge which at present is high. I have insured the Schooner out & while she lay at the Mole against all Risques at ten per ct. but if she goes to Jamaica it is to be 5 per ct. more, so that the Insurance down will be not less than 100 Dollars. At present I have not made Insurance home as suppose I cannot at this time get it done under 25 per ct. & shall not make any at present for by the last acct. from England it seems they are tired of this unnatural War, but of that you can form a much better judgement than we can here, as it is seldom we have accounts that are to be depended on.

There are many difficulties in carrying on business at this time, and I should be sorry to hear of your going to Halifax, or of doing anything, however small, contrary to the Association of the Continent; and you may depend upon it, that if the present dispute should continue the next summer, that there will be no less than 100 sail of privateers out from the continent, and I suppose the interest of mine, as Jamaica or Halifax property, must share the fate of other things, if taken. But may the Almighty Disposer of all things order the councils of the wicked administration to come to naught. . . .

The times at present are such I cannot determine what will be for the best, and must therefore leave it wholly to you, not doubting the business will be conducted with care. Should so large a fleet come on this coast in the spring as is talked of, I should think it not best to ship so much to the Northward or otherwise; but it is now said that commissioners are appointed to come over to accommodate affairs, but I doubt it. I commit you to the Almighty's protection, not doubting that we shall once more carry on business at Salem in peace and safety.

From your friend

ELIAS HASKET DERBY

Captain Silsbee disposed of Captain Hallett's cargo promptly, and the *Nancy*, well laden, again started for home on March 20 and arrived safely at Falmouth (Portland), Maine, during the latter part of April. Captain Silsbee, probably because of the nature of the cargo in the other three Derby vessels, delayed dispatching them to the north and even made a visit to Jamaica "to learn the latest news." When they were finally sent home, even though Silsbee used his best judgment, two of the vessels fell into British hands, and this disaster brought the Derbys to a decision. Up to that time, they had engaged only in peaceful commerce; henceforth, as they wished to continue their operations at sea, they would have to arm their vessels and be prepared to use force against force. In June 1776, the Derbys armed their first vessel, the *Sturdy Beggar* of 90 tons, with 6 carriage guns and put twenty-five men aboard her. On June 13, the Massachusetts Council gave Capt. Peter Lander a commission to command the vessel and "make Reprisals on the Enemys of the united Colonys of North America agreeable to the Laws and Regulations of this Country." During the years 1776-1782 inclusive, the Derbys armed twenty-three privateers and sixteen letter-of-marque vessels and sent them to sea to keep their flag afloat during the War of the Revolution.

*British Mastings, the King's "Broad Arrow,"
and the Revolution*

Maine had always, at heart, opposed the British policy of the king's "Broad Arrow" and the arbitrary confiscation for naval uses of the finest white pine trees. The royal interpretation of "private property," as set forth originally for the economic protection of the personal owners of land, had rendered that term nugatory, and all desired trees—wherever they were growing—were being virtually commandeered by the British. In 1771 the proprietors of the Kennebec Purchase declined to submit the question of property rights to the British-dominated courts, and the owners, who included James Bowdoin, Sylvester Gardiner, and Benjamin Hallowell (men who had towns named after them), presented a patent of purchase from New Plymouth dated 1649. At about the time of the incidents of Lexington and Concord (April 18-19, 1775), where "once the embattl'd farmers stood and fired the shot heard round the world," Georgetown (Bath) patriots on the Kennebec armed themselves and forcefully stopped and put to flight Edward Parry, a Londoner, and his mastwrights, who were hewing great pines that had been brought down the Kennebec by the spring freshets. They were to be placed aboard British mast ships, which lay at anchor in the river ready to carry them to the royal naval dockyards. Fearing capture at the hands of "the armed mob," the frightened mastwrights threw down their adzes, took to their boats, and rowed to the empty British vessels, which dropped down the river. The rebellious colonists seized the masts; also a further supply that lay at nearby Brunswick. Parry narrowly escaped hanging. He was imprisoned for a year and forced to give a bond of £2,000, while the masts never reached England. A month later, the British, although supported in their demands by a big king's ship (*H.M.S. Scarborough*—Captain Barkley), were frustrated by aggressive colonists in an attempt to get two shiploads of masts out of Portsmouth and the Piscataqua.

At Falmouth (Portland), the most dramatic episode occurred in the cutting off of the colonial naval mast supply for Britain. A very large mast ship of "about a thousand tons" named the *Minerva* had been launched, and the masts were on hand for her cargo, but when the ship was completed, the colonials would not allow them to be loaded notwithstanding the presence and threat of *H.M.S. Canceaux*. Her commander, Captain Mowatt, was an intolerable blusterer and a strutting, loud-talking martinet. After an exhibition of his contempt for patriot-colonists, "the rash Colonel Thompson" kidnapped him and kept him a prisoner in solitary confinement for several days "to cool off" the denunciative and tyrannical English naval officer. We are told that Captain Mowatt, after being "detained ashore as the unwilling guest of the colonial patriots," was released with admonitions, which he ridiculed and ignored. "With his feathers all ruffled," he sailed from Falmouth on May 16, 1775, in the *Canceaux*, accompanied by the empty *Minerva*, to report the affair to Admiral Graves, then in command of the British blockading fleet on duty off the New England coast. (This was about a month after the incidents at Lexington and Concord.)

Three weeks later, the *Minerva*, with the British sloop-of-war *Senegal* (14 guns), returned to Falmouth and made an attempt to load the masts. At the time that the *Senegal* was dispatched to oversee the loading of the *Minerva*, Admiral Graves is reported to have said to Capt. Philip Crandall, of Harpswell (Casco Bay), whom he had taken prisoner: "If the damned rebels will not let her load, I will send some ships and beat the damned town down about their ears." In the meanwhile, the colonists had towed the masts to safe shallow waters inland and hidden them where they were "protected by nature and an armed, determined guard"; moreover, the patriots persistently refused to give up the masts and defied and "treated roughly," but without any shooting and killing, the armed landing parties that sought to locate them. According to one report, the British searched in vain, and the *Senegal*

and *Minerva* went to the Presumpscot River; but all the masts were out of reach and concealed, and the thoroughly aroused colonials, by strategy and force, seized the boats, men, and arms that were dispatched by the British warship to find and gain possession of them.

Being unable to accomplish the objective, *H.M.S. Senegal* and the empty mast ship *Minerva* sailed for Boston early in July. Meanwhile, the British Admiralty had ordered the naval commanders in American waters to secure "all possible masts for the king" and to use the force necessary to fulfill the mission. Captain Mowatt, thirsting for revenge for his kidnapping and the indignities suffered at the hands of the rebels, influenced Admiral Graves to send a squadron to Falmouth and either obtain the much desired mastings by the landing of a strong force or make good Mowatt's threat to punish the rebels for their interference with "the king's business." To enjoy the spectacle, Captain Mowatt, "at his most earnest solicitation," was aboard one of the British warships, which took up battle positions off Falmouth on October 17, 1775, and, with no opposition from an unprotected town, methodically and diabolically proceeded to bombard and lay Falmouth in ashes. It is said that, contrary to the original instructions, no attempt was made by the British to put strong landing parties ashore and obtain the masts by force if negotiations failed, but that Mowatt influenced the commanders of the squadron and thus the prime object of the expedition was "to punish the damned rebels."

This was aggressive and revengeful war, with the bombardment not of fortifications, military objectives, and armies of an enemy but of a people, its homes, churches, and places of business. The masts at Falmouth, however, like those of Georgetown (Bath) on the Kennebec and those at Portsmouth on the Piscataqua, never reached British hands. Steadily throughout the years of the Revolution, enemy forces harassed the Yankee rebels of Casco Bay and the coasts of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, and they established a strong military and naval post at Castine, Maine. The affair of the liberty pole and British naval arrogance at Machias in June, followed by the destruction of Falmouth by naval bombardment in October 1775, fired the entire New England coast and did much to unite the colonies in their resistance to the contemptuous British, which led not only to open revolt but also to the Declaration of Independence. There were frequent "incidents" and clashes between the British and Americans in which the coast towns suffered, such as Norfolk, Va., Gloucester, Mass., New London, Conn., etc. As the war progressed, Sir George Collier sent boat expeditions up Maine rivers either to capture masts for the Royal Navy or burn the ships loading masts and spars for France. The object of the British—to impoverish American colonists and drive their ships from the seas—was well evidenced when on September 5, 1778, a powerful fleet and armed force under the command of Earl Grey attacked New Bedford, Mass., burned "seventy ships" (mostly whalers), and practically destroyed the town.

Colonial Naval Adventures with British Vessels Preceding the Declaration of Independence

A number of spirited naval episodes took place between American patriots and the British from the time that British regulars commenced an aggressive shooting war against the colonials (Lexington, April 19, 1775) until the Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776). In April 1775, several whaleboats, manned by determined patriots and commanded by Capt. N. Smith, captured the British schooner *Volante* (tender of the king's hated frigate *Scarborough*) in Martha's Vineyard. Following the Battle of Bunker Hill and the arrival of

George Washington in the Boston area, the American general, "on his own responsibility," borrowed two Massachusetts vessels—the schooners *Lynch* and *Franklin*—and sent them to Canadian waters "to intercept military supplies consigned to the British." The *Lynch* was equipped with 6 guns and 10 swivels and carried seventy men, and the *Franklin* had 4 guns and 10 swivels and sixty men. In the fall of 1775, these two vessels seized ten prizes and captured Governor Wright, of St. John's. As Elbridge Gerry wrote to John Adams, "All of the vessels were released, however, as we had waged a ministerial war, and not one against our most gracious sovereign." In the spring of 1776, the *Franklin* (Capt. James Mugford) captured the English ship *Hope* loaded with military supplies, tools, gun carriages, and 1,500 barrels of gunpowder for the British Army, all of which found its way instead to the colonial forces.

On September 2, 1775, acting under general powers, Washington as commander in chief wrote to Nicholas Broughton, of Marblehead: "You being appointed captain in the army of the United Provinces of North America are directed to take command of a detachment of said army and proceed on board the schooner *Hannah* at Beverly lately fitted out with arms, ammunitions and provisions." Evidently, American privateers had been cruising before this time without Continental or United Provinces commissions, for the claim has been made that this little ordinary fishing schooner, owned by Col. John Glover (with a residence at Marblehead and a wharf and fishing business at Beverly), was "the first commissioned [United Colonies] privateer of the War of the Revolution." General Washington was a soldier, and he appointed officers of the army to command the privateers that he sent to sea; but most, if not all, of these men had marine experience, and they saw to it that sailors who had enlisted in the army were deputized to man the vessels. We are told that Captain Broughton, who had orders from Washington to put to sea on the *Hannah* and "take all vessels sailing to or from Boston in the service of the British Army," obtained "a detachment from Col. Glover's regiment of Marblehead fishermen, well fitted by experience for the purpose," before he "hoisted the flag on the *Hannah* and sailed on his first cruise." On September 7, 1775, Captain Broughton addressed Washington as follows: "I beg leave to acquaint your excellency that I sailed from Beverly last Tuesday with a fair wind and proceeded on my course. Took a ship off Cape Ann and sent her into Gloucester." This prize, which was the English ship *Unity*, is said to have been the first taken by a regularly commissioned Massachusetts vessel.

Washington also sent out the little American armed merchantmen *Lee* and *Harrison* "to harass the enemy and obtain supplies for the Continental Army." On November 29, 1775, the *Lee* (Capt. John Manly), with 4 guns and a complement of fifty officers and men, brought into Cape Ann Roads the British vessel *Nancy*, which she had captured at sea. This proved to be a rich haul and a veritable godsend to the Continental Army stores, which, it was said, "would have waited eighteen months for the manufacture of a like quantity at home." The *Nancy* had on board 2,000 muskets and bayonets, about a hundred thousand flints, 8,000 fuses, 31 tons of musket shot, 3,000 round shot for 12-pounders, a 13-inch mortar, two 6-pounders, numerous barrels of gunpowder, and 50 "carcasses," or large frames for combustibles, which were used by the British for setting buildings on fire. Closely following this most important capture, the *Lee* fought an engagement on December 8, 1775, with four British vessels forming a convoy, beat off the largest armed ship, which mounted 8 guns, and captured the other three. They consisted of the armed *Jenny* (2 guns and twenty men), with a cargo of provisions; the *Concord*, loaded with dry goods; and the brig *Hannah*, with a cargo of rum. These prizes were all taken safely into port, and we are told that "the *Hannah's* cargo alone netted twenty-five thousand dollars to her captors." In early December 1775, the *Harrison* seized the British schooner *Industry* and the sloop *Polly*; she also encountered the British cruiser *Falcon*, which she eluded by clever seamanship after inflicting "considerable injury" on the enemy.

The colonial vessels reported as being armed and fitted out by Gen. George Washington when the Continental Army was around Boston and before Congress and the Naval Committee commenced to handle naval matters directly were:

Name of Armed Merchantman	Names of Officers		
	Captain	First Officer	Second Officer
HANCOCK	John Manly	Richard Stiles	Nicholas Ogilby
LEE	Daniel Waters	William Kissick	John Gill
FRANKLIN	Samuel Tucker	Edward Phittiplace	Francis Salter
HARRISON	Charles Dyar	Thomas Dote	John Wigglesworth
LYNCH	John Ayers	John Roche	John Tiley

Also the WARREN, commanded by Capt. William Burke.

There are records showing that Washington, while in the vicinity of Boston, sent out seven schooners and a brigantine to prey upon the British Army supply lines and that Capt. John Manly, a real sailor of Marblehead, was made commander of this fleet of privateers under Continental Army control. During the fall of 1775, a colonial whaleboat carrying 3 swivels and twenty-two men (Capt. B. Borner) captured an armed English sloop equipped with 6 guns and also recaptured two American vessels, with British prize crews aboard, off the North Carolina coast. In December 1775, four small boats under the command of Capt. James Barron seized a British naval tender in Chesapeake Bay. On November 11, 1775, the *Defense*, a South Carolina merchantman that had been given a light armament, was attacked (while sinking some hulks in Hog Island Creek, Charleston Harbor) by the British ship *Tamar* (16 guns) and the schooner *Cherokee* (6 guns).

On November 14, 1775, South Carolina put the armed merchantman *Prosper* in commission, with Capt. Clement Lemprière in command, "for the defense of the colony." On December 21, 1775, North Carolina authorized the arming and fitting out of three merchant vessels "for the protection of our coast trade," and the sloop *Sally* was armed for "river defense." At about this time, Virginia established "a board of commissioners to superintend the colony's naval affairs."

On November 23, 1775, a fleet of British transports arrived at Boston under the convoy of the royal frigate *Tartar*. All the ships entered the harbor except the ship *Hunter* and a brig, which anchored outside. Two American privateers on patrol thereupon daringly attacked and boarded the two British vessels separated from the rest of the fleet (and the protection of the *Tartar*) and, after pillaging them of portable valuables, set the ships on fire. However, an armed British vessel (the *Raven*) that had been assigned to guard the entrance of the harbor and "protect Boston Light" (then under reconstruction) was brought to alert by the noise of the firing and was able to get to the burning vessels in time to save them from total destruction. This attack was reported to the British Admiralty as "the height of impudence" on the part of the "exasperating rebels."

Edgar S. Maclay, in *A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS*, tells us that "from November 13, 1775, to the evacuation of Boston by the British March 17, 1776, thirty-one English vessels, while endeavoring to gain port, were captured by the vigilant Americans." Most of these seizures can be credited to private enterprise, and all were made by armed colonial merchant vessels, generally of small size, that had been built for peaceful trading and not for war.

An interesting encounter between heavily armed British transports and "damned rebel sea hornets" was that in which the Massachusetts armed merchantmen *Lee* (Captain Waters) and *Defense* (Captain Harding) and three diminutive New England privateers took part as the British forces—naval and military—were preparing to attack New York. The *Lee* and the small privateers (functioning as scouts) had contacted the two powerfully armed and manned British transports *Annabella* and *Howe*, and after a running fight the British had succeeded in evading the Americans by making Nantasket Roads. The *Defense*, sailing from Plymouth, was

sighted by the *Lee* and the situation explained; whereupon Captain Harding boldly ran his vessel into the Roads and between the transports, and after an hour's action the British vessels struck their colors, having sustained casualties in the fight of eighteen dead and about forty wounded (as against no deaths and nine wounded on the *Defense*). On the transports were about two hundred British regulars of the 71st Regiment, who were taken prisoners with their officers. The next day, the scouting privateers discovered and the American vessels captured a third British transport, the *John and George* (6 guns), having on board besides a good-sized crew another hundred soldiers, so within two days the daring private armed colonial vessels captured three well-equipped British transports, with the surviving members of their crews, and "three hundred men of one of the best English regiments in America." Other early records give the *Defense* (and supporting colonial vessels) credit for the capture in June 1776 of "four British transports loaded with supplies and more than 350 Scottish troops." A little later in the summer of 1776, the American privateer brig *Massachusetts* (16 guns), under the command of Capt. D. Souther, captured a large armed British brig, which carried a crew of twenty-eight men and had on board "a complete company of dragoons."

In June 1776, the American armed sloop *Lady Washington* (Captain Cunningham) was attacked off Boston by four British armed barges fitted with swivel guns and armed men. The "*Lady*" beat off the Britishers, killing several of them and wounding many more. Shortly afterward, the *Lady Washington*, near the same spot, captured a British ship from the West Indies loaded with a cargo of rum, sugar, and cotton.

The diminutive Pennsylvania armed sloop *Chance*, mounting only 4 guns and under the command of Capt. J. Adams, in May 1776, captured the sizable British ship *Lady Juliana* with a valuable cargo aboard. At about the same time, the *Cornet*, an armed merchant ship hailing from the Delaware and mounting 24 carriage and swivel guns, fought a "hammer-and-tongs" engagement for three hours off St. Kitts with a heavily armed and manned British privateer and had the best of the fight, but during the night, which quickly followed the combat, the Englishman—partly dismasted—managed to escape and limp into the nearby British port.

Early in 1776, the colonial brig *Despatch* left Philadelphia for a passage across the Atlantic under command of Capt. S. Cleaveland. When remonstrated with for sailing in an unarmed ship in such troubled times, Cleaveland replied: "I have a good crew and no guns because I cannot buy any to mount on the brig, but my men are well armed and we will either capture some guns at sea or buy some in France. In any event the *Despatch* will be a well-armed brig when you see her again." It is said that when a few days out, Captain Cleaveland, by strategy and audacity, got alongside an armed British vessel, captured her by boarding, and, after transferring the Britishers' guns to his own brig, continued his voyage. Having some guns aboard, Captain Cleaveland evidently found it easier to bluff and capture more, and the *Despatch* quickly became a well-equipped privateer.

Just before the Declaration of Independence, the little brig *Nancy* left Philadelphia mounting 6 guns. On June 29, 1776, she was chased by a powerful British sloop of war near Cape Henry and, to escape capture, was run on a shoal near the land. To prevent the brig from falling into the hands of the enemy, her crew took ashore everything of value that could be moved from the *Nancy* and then blew up the vessel.

The Pennsylvania Council of Safety, on July 6, 1775, passed a resolution under which Robert White and Owen Biddle were appointed a committee to arrange for the construction of a fleet of gunboats to be used in the defense of the Delaware. At least fourteen of these little craft are known to have been built, and they were named *Bull Dog*, *Burke*, *Camden*, *Chatham*, *Congress*, *Convention*, *Delaware*, *Dickinson*, *Effingham*, *Experiment*, *Franklin*, *Hancock*, *Spitfire*, and *Warren*. They were all apparently galleys, armed with either two or three guns, and carried crews of from twenty to fifty men. The first of these craft was the *Bull Dog*, launched from the shipyard of Manuel, Jehu, and Benjamin George Eyre in Philadelphia on June 26, 1775, and the others soon followed. The Pennsylvania armed galleys evidently did

not all stay in Delaware waters, for there is a record of the *Spitfire's* taking part on August 3, 1776, in an attack on the British warships *Phoenix* and *Rose* in the Hudson River, and in this action the *Spitfire* reported four casualties (one man killed and three wounded).

The Connecticut privateer *Warren* (Captain Phillips), in June 1776, captured an armed British transport mounting 4 guns, with a hundred soldiers aboard. Earlier, in May (under Captain Coas), she had taken the British sloop *Betsey and Polly*, and during June-August, with Captain Phillips in command, she captured the British ship *Isaac and Picary* and a well-armed brig (3 carriage and 10 swivel guns), with an unusually valuable cargo aboard, which included a quantity of gold dust and ivory. Before the close of the year, this successful privateer was unfortunate enough to fall a victim to the powerfully armed and fast-sailing British frigate *H.M.S. Liverpool*.

In October 1775, the *Ranger*, a Pennsylvania vessel "hastily fitted out for harbor defense" under Captain Hume, attacked and captured what was described as "a West India privateer." Hume waged an aggressive battle against the British armed vessel, got his command alongside, and, while holding the *Ranger* by grappling irons, sent his men aboard the enemy, where in hand-to-hand combat they killed forty men, wounded many more, and captured the privateer.

The officers and crews of the early privateering vessels commissioned by Washington received the same pay as officers and privates in the Continental Army, and in order to make the service appeal to seafaring men who were experienced in privateering and interested in the gamble thereof, Washington decreed that, in addition to the base pay, one-third part of the value of every vessel and cargo taken, after condemnation in the Courts of Admiralty, should be spread as prize money among the officers and crew of the privateer making the capture. The relation of the prize money distribution among officers and men was set at: each mariner, 1 share; the master's mate and gunner, $1\frac{1}{2}$ shares; the master, 2 shares; the second lieutenant, 4 shares; the first lieutenant, 5 shares; and the captain, 6 shares. A differentiation quickly developed between the prize money given the crew of a privateer that had to wage a serious fight to make a capture and one that seized an unarmed merchant vessel or one so lightly armed that she put up merely nominal, or token, resistance; if the vessel captured was armed sufficiently to attempt resistance of consequence, the fraction of the total value of the prize to be given to the crew of the early (Washington) government privateer making the seizure was raised from one-third to one-half. To get men to serve on any government vessel, the food as well as conditions of employment had to compete with what privateers offered their men; hence it is interesting to note the following daily allowance of provisions for each officer and mariner prescribed by the state as of October 12, 1776: 1 lb. of bread; 1 lb. of beef or pork; 1 gill of rice ($\frac{1}{2}$ pt. of peas or beans or 1 lb. of potatoes or turnips might be substituted for the rice); 1 gill of rum. In addition to the above daily rations, $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of butter and $\frac{1}{2}$ pt. of vinegar were allowed weekly.

As early as March 23, 1776, the Continental Government passed legislation bearing upon privateering, for a resolution was enacted as of that date which says:

Resolved that all ships and other vessels, their tackle, apparel and furniture, and all goods, wares and merchandises, belonging to any inhabitant or inhabitants of Great Britain, taken on the high seas, or between high and low water mark, by any armed vessel, fitted out by any person or persons, and to whom commissions shall be granted, and being libelled and prosecuted in any court erected for the trial of maritime affairs, in any of these colonies, shall be deemed and adjudged to be law-
ful prize; and after deducting and paying the wages, which the seamen and mariners on board of such captures, as are merchant ships and vessels, shall be entitled to, according to the terms of their contracts, until the time of the adjudication, shall be condemned to and for the use of the owner or owners, and the officers, marines and mariners of such armed vessel, according to such rules and proportions as they shall agree on.

The following reproduction of instructions given under date of April 3, 1776, to the commanders of American privateers and merchant ships having commissions as letters of marque is of interest as an early official act of the Continental Congress:

IN CONGRESS,

Wednesday, April 3, 1776.

INSTRUCTIONS to the COMMANDERS of Private Ships or Vessels of War, which shall have Commissions or Letters of Marque and Reprisal, authorizing them to make Captures of British Vessels and Cargoes.

I.

You may, by Force of Arms, attack, subdue, and take all Ships and other Vessels belonging to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain, on the High Seas, or between high-water and low-water Marks, except Ships and Vessels bringing Persons who intend to settle and reside in the United Colonies, or bringing Arms, Ammunition or Warlike Stores to the said Colonies, for the Use of such Inhabitants thereof as are Friends to the American Cause, which you shall suffer to pass unmolested, the Commanders thereof permitting a peaceable Search, and giving satisfactory Information of the Contents of the Ladings, and Destinations of the Voyages.

II.

You may, by Force of Arms, attack, subdue, and take all Ships and other Vessels whatsoever carrying Soldiers, Arms, Gun-powder, Ammunition, Provisions, or any other contraband Goods, to any of the British Armies or Ships of War employed against these Colonies.

III.

You shall bring such Ships and Vessels as you shall take, with their Guns, Rigging, Tackle, Apparel, Furniture and Ladings, to some convenient Port or Ports of the United Colonies, that Proceedings may thereupon be had in due Form before the Courts which are or shall be there appointed to hear and determine Causes civil and maritime.

IV.

You or one of your Chief Officers shall bring or send the Master and Pilot and one or more principal Person or Persons of the Company of every Ship or Vessel by you taken, as soon after the Capture as may be, to the Judge or Judges of such Court as aforesaid, to be examined upon Oath, and make Answer to the Interrogatories which may be propounded touching the Interest or Property of the Ship or Vessel and her Lading; and at the same Time you shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Judge or Judges, all Passes, Sea-Briefs, Charter-Parties, Bills of Lading, Cockets, Letters, and other Documents and Writings found on Board, proving the said Papers by the Affidavit of yourself, or of some other Person present at the Cap-

ture, to be produced as they were received, without Fraud, Addition, Subduction, or Embezzlement.

V.

You shall keep and preserve every Ship or Vessel and Cargo by you taken, until they shall by Sentence of a Court properly authorized be adjudged lawful Prize, not selling, spoiling, wasting, or diminishing the same or breaking the Bulk thereof, nor suffering any such Thing to be done.

VI.

If you, or any of your Officers or Crew shall, in cold Blood, kill or maim, or, by Torture or otherwise, cruelly, inhumanly, and contrary to common Usage and the Practice of civilized Nations in War, treat any Person or Persons surprized in the Ship or Vessel you shall take, the Offender shall be severely punished.

VII.

You shall, by all convenient Opportunities, send to Congress written Accounts of the Captures you shall make, with the Number and Names of the Captives, Copies of your Journal from Time to Time, and Intelligence of what may occur or be discovered concerning the Designs of the Enemy, and the Destinations, Motions, and Operations of their Fleets and Armies.

VIII.

One Third, at the least, of your whole Company shall be Land-Men.

IX.

You shall not ransom any Prisoners or Captives, but shall dispose of them in such Manner as the Congress, or if that be not fitting in the Colony whither they shall be brought, as the General Assembly, Convention, or Council or Committee of Safety of such Colony shall direct.

X.

You shall observe all such further Instructions as Congress shall hereafter give in the Premises, when you shall have Notice thereof.

XI.

If you shall do any Thing contrary to these Instructions, or to others hereafter to be given, or willingly suffer such Thing to be done, you shall not only forfeit your Commission, and be liable to an Action for Breach of the Condition of your Bond, but be responsible to the Party grieved for Damages sustained by such Mal-versation.

By Order of Congress,

JOHN HANCOCK PRESIDENT

It was not until the Declaration of Independence in July 1776 and the knowledge and acceptance of this declaration throughout the colonies that Americans generally realized that they would have to resort to open hostilities to defend their rights and manhood. In 1776, American shipowners, unable to ply their usual trade, went privateering, but prior to the era of patriotic privateering for personal profit, there was a period of over a year when the colonials gained glory on the ocean and in coastal waters with no thought in mind except the weakening of the enemy, the defense of the homeland, and the obtaining of needed supplies. Not all American maritime enterprises were successful prior to the late summer of 1776, when privateering and the fitting out of colonial merchant ships as armed state and Continental cruisers began in earnest, but an overwhelming percentage of them were—and these generally in the face of great odds. American courage on the water was amazing and at times savored of foolhardiness, while expressing a great measure of contempt for the prowess of the Britisher. Edgar S. Maclay says:

From 1774 to 1776, the enemy claims to have captured the following vessels belonging to the rebelling colonies: The *Belisarius* of twenty guns; the *Hussar* of twenty-four guns; the *Sullivan* of eighteen guns; the *Tobago* of twelve guns, and the *Warren*. These vessels nowhere appear in American records; but although some of them, while classed in British accounts under the general head "American," doubtless belonged to other North American colonies aside from the thirteen in revolt, yet one or two of them may have been correctly traced. The fact that this list includes vessels

taken as early as 1774 [covering a period of over fifteen months before the clash at Lexington] also leaves room for the supposition that some of them may have been unarmed coasting vessels arbitrarily detained by the British blockading ships. The private armed brig *Washington*, Captain Martindale, carrying ten guns, ten swivels and eighty men, was captured off the coast of North Carolina by the British frigate *Fowey* and carried into Boston. This vessel, together with four other ships seized by the enemy, was left in Boston in a dismantled state after they evacuated that city.

There was a merchant ship (probably armed) *Belisarius* and a privateer schooner *Warren* (Capt. I. Thorndike) carrying 6 guns and fifty men, and both vessels hailed from Salem, Mass., during the Revolution, but records of their dates, ownership, performance at sea, and end are not available. This *Belisarius* should not be confused with a ship of that name built by Enos Briggs at Stage Point, Salem, which was launched in October 1794 for George Crowninshield & Sons. This vessel, of 261½ tons, carried 16 guns and made some record voyages to India and the East Indies. She was chased by an English frigate, but outsailed the warship; she reached her end in the Bay of Tunis in April 1810.

The various colonies, with the exception of New Jersey and Delaware, armed merchant vessels to protect their harbors and commerce as soon as the shooting war began. Massachusetts led in the number and activities of the vessels of its State Navy, and South Carolina ran second as far as deep-sea craft was concerned. A Continental Navy, composed of armed merchant ships, came into existence and was under the direction of the naval and marine committees, which appointed Esek Hopkins (1718-1802), of Newport, R. I., commander in chief of the navy. He was commissioned by the Continental Congress in December 1775, and in January 1776 he hoisted his flag as admiral of the eight armed merchantmen that then constituted the navy of the colonies in rebellion. Esek Hopkins was a brother of Stephen Hopkins, a former governor of Rhode Island and a member of the Naval Committee. Whereas Esek Hopkins had spent some years of his life at sea and had been in command of a privateer during the Seven Years' War, most of his time had been spent ashore managing a fleet of merchant vessels. The appointment was undoubtedly a political one, and Hopkins soon showed that he was thoroughly unfitted for the job. In February 1776, the fleet sailed from Delaware, amidst tremendous enthusiasm, with "particular orders" given Hopkins to proceed to Chesapeake Bay "to search out and attack, take or destroy" all enemy ships found there—if the enemy force was not greatly superior to his own. After executing this assignment, he was ordered to proceed southward and overcome such forces as the enemy had in North and South Carolina waters; then, "having completed your business in the Carolinas, you are without delay to proceed northward directly to Rhode Island, and attack, take and destroy all the enemy's

naval force that you may find there." At the conclusion of these "particular orders," Hopkins was told that in case of unfavorable winds or weather or any unforeseen accident or disaster, he, as admiral of the fleet, was expected to follow his own best judgment.

One cannot have any respect for the mentality of a group of men posing as a Naval Committee that would give such senseless orders to the commander of a fleet of eight small and indifferently armed merchant ships when the enemy referred to was the "proud Mistress of the Seas," with a force of some 270 well-armed, protected, and manned warships of the Royal Navy sailing the seas, a large number of which would singly be quite capable of blasting the entire improvised American Continental Navy squadron out of the water. The records show that in June 1775 the British had 30 warships on station in New England, and a year later 70 such vessels were definitely assigned to patrol duty in American colonial waters. The committee evidently expected that Hopkins' little fleet of mediocre vessels would clear the entire American coast from Georgia to Massachusetts of British war vessels—an asinine hope, backed up by a "magnificently ridiculous" order.

Hopkins, however, apparently paid no attention whatever to the "particular orders" given him; for on leaving the Chesapeake, he directed the captains of the various ships of his fleet to sail "on their own" to a stated position off the Bahamas. After the vessels assembled at the stipulated rendezvous, they proceeded to Nassau, where, encountering no resistance, they captured from the fort 88 cannon, 15 mortars, and a quantity of shot and ammunition. John Paul Jones, who headed the list of the five first lieutenants sailing in the fleet under Hopkins and who was well acquainted with the Bahamas, is believed to have been responsible for the strategy that made possible this initial Continental Navy adventure. The fleet sailed from the Bahamas to Rhode Island, but when off Long Island, the five vessels then forming the squadron of the Continental Navy were boldly attacked at night by a relatively small vessel of the British Navy, *H.M.S. Glasgow*, a sloop of war of 20 guns under the command of Capt. Tryingham Howe, R.N. For three hours, the *Glasgow*, well handled, fought the confused American armed merchantmen (which exhibited no sign of squadron direction and tactics) and inflicted a lot of punishment before she sailed away in the dark. The British casualties were reported as four; the American, twenty-four. During this cruise, particularly after leaving the Bahamas and during the engagement with *H.M.S. Glasgow*, Esek Hopkins, the first commander in chief (admiral) of the American Navy, proved his incapacity, and this ended his active naval career. Hopkins and two of his captains were tried for breach of orders and censured, but politics was "in the saddle," and Hopkins continued in power until summarily dismissed by Congressional action in 1777.

From the days of mid-1775 closely following the Battle of Bunker Hill and long before the Declaration of Independence and the British attack on New York, George Washington had emphasized the need of marine power if the colonies were to wage a successful war, and he was the first Continental military officer to send out armed merchantmen to harass the enemy's supply lines at sea. As the War of the Revolution continued, Washington more and more pressed the need of the insurgent colonies' developing marine power, and it was because of the French Navy rather than the French Army that Washington welcomed with enthusiasm an alliance with France. This alliance, with the general attitude of the penny-pinching and overcautious French, proved to be a tremendous and bitter disappointment to Washington, who, through the years 1778-1782, unceasingly pleaded for France to show a bit of its much-vaunted naval power. "What we want," he declared, "is not fleets and armies which seem to be quite content to be blockaded in hospitable ports, but a loan of money ['the sinews of war'] and a few good French squadrons to cruise off our American coast and restore a good measure of commerce."

III.

THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE DURING THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

Armed Colonial Merchantmen Contribute Largely to Victory

THE MERCHANT SHIPS of the American colonies played an important part in the Revolution. They had no navy; yet they were at war with England, which owned the largest and most powerful navy in the world. A few cruisers were built by the colonies, and a few ships were bought and armed abroad under difficulties. Some notable single-ship actions were fought, but following 1776 the number of vessels on the American Continental list steadily and rather rapidly lowered. It has been authoritatively declared that at the end of the war only one vessel of the navy was available and conditioned for real fighting; all the others had been captured or destroyed.

The naval force of the thirteen colonies in rebellion against Britain, which in mid-1776 declared their independence, was at no time other than woefully and pitifully small in comparison with "the mighty fleet of Britannia, the proud Mistress of the Seas." Lord Sandwich (after whom the modern sandwich of the restaurant and the quick or readily portable lunch is named), during his tenure as first lord of the admiralty, operated through an economy coupled with incompetency and indifference to lower materially the standard and fighting power of the British Navy. Yet contemporary Englishmen boasted of their vast war fleet "whose sails dotted the Seven Seas," and shortly after the Battle of Bunker Hill it was said that the Royal Navy was equipped, as a foundation and background to its great fleet of armed merchantmen (privateers and letters of marque), "with speedy, powerful frigates and sloops of war to seek out and destroy any enemy ships and wipe out any concentration of naval power"; that numerous ships of the line (as battleships, or floating fortresses), said to be "the peer in destructive power of any ships the world has ever seen," were prepared "to batter down land defenses" or "destroy anything that floats" with their "flaming thundering broadsides" from the largest caliber guns afloat.

The British boasted of their "countless merchant marine" and of their navy, which was always prepared to protect British commerce in any and all parts of the world. Britain had recently emerged from the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) with glory, and its prestige, confidence, and intolerant conceit had been increased by victories and demonstrated naval superiority. When the War of the Revolution broke, the British vauntingly declared that they had the ships, the men, and the determination (as they had the blind and ardent fanaticism) to uphold their right—developed and promulgated throughout the years—to dominate the oceans of the world and everything afloat. They held this as a "Divine Right" given by the Almighty exclusively and unquestionably to Englishmen, and it was bluntly expressed in the British seaman's "Bible of the Sea," which every officer and apprentice treasured, studied,

and "swore by." The New England colonials, being primarily a maritime people, sought in rebellion by means of privateering to capitalize on their seamanship and put to good account, for their home land and cause, the knowledge gained in fighting Britain's enemies at sea. Privately owned ships were armed, manned, and commissioned to sail and "harass the commerce" of the conceited and complacent Britishers, and these American merchantmen, improvised into vessels of war by private enterprise, took large numbers of British privateers and merchantmen, with their cargoes, as prizes and inflicted what was admitted to be "terrific losses" on the enemy.

The damage done at sea during the Revolutionary War was positively not one-sided. British privateers augmented the numerous vessels comprising the war fleet of the powerful British Navy. The colonial domestic food fisheries were severely harried and their valuable export business ruined in salt, or cured, product. To the great elation of the British, the whaling industry was practically destroyed for the period of the war, and deep-sea trading, except such as was handled by fast armed merchantmen (i. e., letters of marque), was virtually suspended as the war progressed and the British blockade of the American coast became more effective through sheer weight of numbers of king's ships and enemy armed vessels. Privateering, however, gave the idle whalers, fishermen, and the seamen of trading vessels employment, and privateering operated to develop daring seamanship still further and strengthen the American marine aptitude and tradition. Moreover, the experience of Americans with privateering against the British in 1775-1777, which proved to be quite different from depredations against the French, Spanish, or Dutch, resulted in a breaking-away from English leadership in the realm of naval architecture and ship construction; for as the war continued, America built vessels of superior design, with a quality and speed that were in advance not only of British shipbuilding but also of that of the world, particularly when the ships were sailed by "dare-devil Yankees." At an early date, American builders did away with high quarter-decks (such as "cursed" the French-built *Bonhomme Richard*, which Capt. John Paul Jones had to use in his historic fight), eased the water lines, and balanced a model sail-carrying power with appropriate spars and a spread of canvas, while achieving new triumphs in both handiness and seaworthiness. The latest privateers built in America during the War of the Revolution were relatively large, high-class merchantmen that made powerful and fast cruisers in time of war and led all competition in peaceful ocean commerce on the Seven Seas.

The greater number of captures of ships made by both sides during the War of the Revolution occurred during the earlier period of hostilities, where the element of surprise was relatively great and small, slow, and unarmed vessels were easy prey for any fast and armed foe. As the war progressed, the small, slow colonial ships were swept from the seas as were British ships of similar type unless they sailed in naval protected convoys. In the early days of the war, American privateers were often pathetically small and inadequately armed, and many were slow craft of British merchant type, which were easily captured by the enemy's sloops of war and privateers of size that were well armed and built for speed. When the war broke out, American privateers carrying 10 guns and forty to fifty men were considered sizable and adequate for the service; but four years later a ship, to qualify as a first-class privateer, had to have an armament of "a score of heavy cannon" and a complement consisting of "a hundred and fifty to two hundred trained men." To operate successfully, make money through captures, and escape from bigger and more heavily armed enemy vessels, a privateer had to be large enough to fight and stand up to anything afloat that she could not run away from, which meant that she had to be powerful enough to engage a fast ship-rigged British cruiser or the largest of the English armed merchantmen and privateers. Notwithstanding the fact that a sizable fleet of American colonial merchantmen and privateers was captured and sailed into British harbors, the depredations of American privateers—which were the cream of the colonial merchant marine—on the high seas and around the British

coast were so great, or at least spectacular, harassing, and generally disturbing, "that the anguished wails of English shippers and owners, augmented by the complaints of consumers, exerted ultimately a powerful influence for peace." It was the American armed merchantmen hovering around the British trade routes that proved the great thorn in the side of the much-heralded, self-satisfied, and boastful Mistress of the Seas. It has been well said:

That the American flag did not disappear altogether from blue water is in itself strong testimonial to the tough resourcefulness of the Yankee skipper; that it made itself a decisive factor in the war at sea indicates something like genius. Further, lacking the treasure and munitions the merchant keels brought in, Washington's army could hardly have survived.

Edgar Stanton Maclay, in *A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS* (1899), says that the American maritime forces were a powerful factor not only in attaining independence (1775-1783) but also in maintaining it (1812-1815) and that privateers, i.e., armed merchant ships, "were a most important, if not predominating, feature of our early sea power." Maclay says: "The government war vessels [in the Revolutionary War]—built, purchased or hired—numbered 47, or including the flotilla on Lake Champlain, 64 vessels of all descriptions, carrying a total of 1,242 guns and swivels. This force captured 196 vessels. Of the privateers there were 792, carrying more than 13,000 guns and swivels. These captured or destroyed about 600 British vessels." Evidently, Maclay makes a distinction between a privateer and a letter-of-marque vessel, both of which were armed merchantmen. He is also authority for the figures from which the following table has been compiled:

Year	Number of Armed Vessels		Number of Guns Mounted	
	Privateers	Government-owned Craft	Privateers	Government-owned Craft
1776	136	31	1,360	586
1777	73	34	730	412
1778	115	21	1,150	680
1779	167	20	2,505	462
1780	228	13	3,420	266
1781	449	9	6,735	164
1782	323	7	4,845	198

The authenticity of these figures is questioned in regard to the number of guns. In 1776 the average armament of the 136 privateers stated could not have been 10 carriage guns, as a total of 10 such guns was considered a large armament for a colonial privateer at that time; in 1782, American privateers carrying 20 or more guns were the rule rather than the exception, so the average of 15 guns per privateer in 1782 evidently does not understate the truth. With the increase in size and power of the American privateer went a more than corresponding increase in complement, for if privateers were fortunate in making captures, the prizes had to be manned and men had to be carried when leaving port for this purpose. Whereas in 1776 a single privateer carried a crew of from 30 to 60 men, some six years later the complement for a first-class ship of this type had increased to 150 or even 200 men. It is estimated that the 73 privateers of 1777 carried about 730 guns and 2,600 men (the 136 of 1776, about 900 guns and 3,400 men); while the 323 privateers of 1782 mounted about 5,250 guns and carried well over 30,000 men.

The reduction in the number of privateers reported for 1777 as compared with 1776 is due to the fact that immediately following the commencement of the real shooting war, a large number of very small, lightly armed, and relatively slow vessels put to sea with foolhardy patriots aboard. Such craft sought to harass the enemy's merchant shipping and

take prizes, but notwithstanding the courage and seamanship of the command and complement, they proved unable either to defend themselves or escape by flight when they were sighted and attacked by sizable and well-armed British privateers and vessels of the Royal Navy, which were numerous in American waters and on the various trade routes. Only the larger, better-armed, and faster of the early American privateers survived the first few years of the war, and luck in operations of this type was also a very important factor.

It is well to bear in mind that as the number of American government-owned vessels, or cruisers, rapidly diminished, Congress frequently called upon American privateers to perform specific work and undertake certain missions in the national interest and that, with the reduction of government naval craft, there was an increased demand throughout the country for more and better (bigger, more heavily armed, and faster) privately owned ships of war—either privateers or letters of marque. Privateers were never intended to fight the king's ships, which were armed and manned with the one thought of making them fighting machines as destructive and efficient as their type and size would permit. However, it is of interest to note that whereas United States naval vessels built exclusively as warships and vessels converted, armed, and fitted out as Continental, or government, cruisers captured twelve British war vessels, the privately owned and operated armed merchant craft took sixteen such vessels and that as the War of the Revolution reached its close, the navy of the United States consisted almost entirely of privateers.

Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, U.S.N., an international naval authority, says that the loss of American merchant ships during the War of the Revolution should have been expected to be far more than the loss of British merchantmen, for the British merchant marine had a powerful navy with a tremendous number of vessels to protect it, and English cruisers or privateers "were better supported and individually more powerful" than the colonial armed merchant ships. He adds: "The extension of American commerce had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother country. When the war broke out, it was as great as that of England herself at the beginning of the century."

Privateering during the War for Independence

There is no authentic record of how many armed colonial merchantmen fought the British as privateers during the Revolutionary War. It is known that at least 1,699 privateers were bonded by the Continental Congress, and many armed merchantmen that had no commissions from the Continental Congress were commissioned and sent out by the colonies to wage war on the enemy. Historians have said that Massachusetts owned over six hundred privateers during the war for American independence and that "of this number, one hundred and fifty-eight hailed from Salem." However, Ralph D. Paine has compiled a list of privately owned armed merchantmen that hailed from Salem, Mass., during the Revolutionary War, and this list—which most probably is not complete—gives the name, description, command, etc., of 196 vessels mounting 1,965 guns and carrying 7,631 men; 16 of these ships mounted from 20 to 28 guns, and 20 of them had complements of from 100 to 160 men. Spears, writing of privateers during this period, says: "More than two hundred were owned in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. The fleets of the Delaware, the Chesapeake, and of Charlestown were considerable." Samuel E. Morison, in *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHU-*

SETTS, says that the success of the colony in privateering was its greatest contribution to the common cause in the fight for independence, and he writes:

Six hundred and twenty-six letters of marque were issued to Massachusetts vessels by the Continental Congress and some thousand more by the General Court. Privateers were of little use in naval [fleet] operations as the disastrous Penobscot expedition proved; but they were of very greatest service in preying on the enemy's commerce, intercepting his communications with America, carrying terror and destruction into the very chops of the channel, and supplying the patriot army with munitions, stores and clothing at Johnny Bull's expense.

It is generally stated by authoritative historians on both sides of the Atlantic that during the War of the Revolution the Americans sent to sea over two thousand privately owned armed merchant ships to prey on British commerce and that these vessels "mounted upwards of 18,000 guns" and were operated by "about 70,000 men." It is also said that over 16,000 British seamen were captured by the Americans during the war, and the loss of this large number of sailors "was grievously felt by both the British Navy and mercantile marine."

Records of both privateer and letter-of-marque commissions and bonding and of vessels captured are not absolutely definite, as the same ship may have been commissioned or captured more than once under different names. Moreover, not all of the American-commissioned privateers were sizable, well-armed ships. Some, such as the *Deane*, which mounted 30 guns and carried 210 men, were relatively powerful, well-armed and well-manned craft, and it is said that there were "forty American privateers of the force of 20 guns and 100 men or larger." However, the optimism and humor of the colonials expressed themselves in queer ways, for the little fishing smack *Wasp* went out as a privateer with nine men and no cannon, and historians tell us that many vessels put to sea without cannon, "expecting to capture guns from the enemy."

The following is a list of the most powerfully armed privately owned vessels hailing from Salem, Mass., during the War of the Revolution. Some of the biggest of these ships (such as John Derby's *Astrea*, first commissioned in 1782) were letter-of-marque trading vessels; this fact accounts for the relatively small crew for a craft with such a strong battery of carriage guns.

Name of Privately Owned Vessel	Rig	Number of		Name of Privately Owned Vessel	Rig	Number of	
		Guns	Men			Guns	Men
GRAND TURK	Ship	28	140	SCOURGE	Brigantine	20	80
ROVER	Ship	24	100	EXCHANGE	Ship	20	60
PORUS	Ship	22	100	ASTREA	Ship	20	50
ESSEX	Ship	20	150	BLACK PRINCE	Ship	18	160
RESOLUTION	Ship	20	130	BUCCANEER	Ship	18	150
CONGRESS	Ship	20	130	HECTOR	Ship	18	150
JUNIUS BRUTUS	Ship	20	120	BRUTUS	Ship	18	100
BUNKER HILL	Ship	20	110	KENDRICK	Ship	18	100
EAGLE	Brig	20	110	LOUIS DE GRANDE	Ship	18	100
CICERO	Ship	20	100	PILGRIM	Ship	18	100
DISDAIN	Ship	20	100	PUTNAM	Ship	18	90
RHODES	Brig	20	90	GENERAL GALVEZ	Ship	18	40
RATTLESNAKE	Ship	20	85	FRANKLIN	Ship	18	35

The following is a list of the twelve most lightly armed privately owned Salem vessels, which were fitted with four or fewer carriage guns. (Some small vessels, such as the schooners

Beaver, Hornet, and Lark and the sloop *Sharpe*, were sent to sea fitted with no carriage guns, but with ten swivels each.)

Name of Private Armed Vessel	Rig	Number of		Name of Private Armed Vessel	Rig	Number of	
		Guns	Men			Guns	Men
EXCHANGE	Schooner	2	15	FANNY	Brigantine	4	12
HARKEY	Galley	2	18	PATTY	Sloop	4	16
HENRY	Schooner	4	10	LANQUEDOCK	Schooner	4	25
ADVENTURE	Brig	4	10	SPRING BIRD	Schooner	4	25
ELIZABETH	Brig	4	10	WILLING MAID	Schooner	4	25
TITUS	Sloop	4	11	DELIGHT	Schooner	4	40

The sloop *Minerva* and the schooner *Manete* were each fitted with 6 light guns, but carried only 10 men. The brigantines *Aurora* and *Commerce* had also 6 small guns and a crew of only 12 men.

The spirit of Louisburg was as evident in 1775-1783 as it was in 1745, but at first the Americans were too eager, emotional, reckless, and foolhardy in their marine ventures against England. It has been well said that the assurance of some of these hardy and courageous men was "both absurd and sublime." We are told that many "ramshackle boats" mounting only one or two old guns and with twenty or thirty men aboard sallied out from the home port in the quest of glory and gold and were ignominiously captured by the first British cruiser that sighted them, without the brave men aboard ever having a chance to wield a cutlass or really fight.

However, American colonial sailors, trained in the fisheries on the Banks, in whalers, merchantmen, and slavers, made "a host of incomparable seamen that were destined to harry the commerce of Britain under the new-born Stars and Stripes." Some had had experience in real privateers, and many had served in armed merchantmen and in times of nominal peace had successfully fought "the marauders of Europe or whipped the corsairs of Barbary in the Strait of Gibraltar." As Ralph D. Paine well says: "Never was a race of seamen so admirably fitted for the daring trade of privateering as the crews of these tall sloops, topsail schooners and smart square-riggers, their sides checkered with gunports, and ready to drive to sea like hawks." The call was essentially patriotic, but there is no question that the lure of adventure and of possible profit made privateering popular. The recruiting ships' officers, walking the streets of the various ports between Baltimore, Md., and Portsmouth, N. H., with fifes and drums and leading to a tavern rendezvous, sought to enroll all able-bodied seamen "who had a mind to distinguish themselves in the glorious cause of their country and make their fortunes."

Winthrop L. Marvin, in *THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, has written:

From July 1775 to December 1777, American shipowners had received commissions for one hundred and seventy-four of their idle ships as privateers. These vessels mounted 1,836 cannon, and their crews comprised from nine to ten thousand sailors. New Hampshire, with only twenty miles of coast line and one port, Portsmouth, had sent out eight privateers before the end of 1777; rich and patriotic Massachusetts, fifty-three; Rhode Island, six; Connecticut, twenty-two; New York, though her great port was held by the British, seven; Pennsylvania, thirteen; Maryland, twenty-one; South Carolina, six; and North Carolina,

three. Some of these early privateers were extraordinarily successful. Several of them took as many as twenty British prizes in a single voyage, and one is said to have taken twenty-eight prizes. Of course, this was exceptional luck. . . . While the war enriched some American shipowners, it impoverished others. Not all privateers came home with wealth and glory. A large number never returned at all. . . . Twenty-two vessels with more than a thousand men are said to have vanished (i.e., to have sailed away and never again been heard from) from the Massachusetts town of Newburyport on the Merrimac.

Maclay states that down to the close of 1777, "one hundred and seventy-four of our privateers got to sea" and that if we take the British figures of vessels captured, this means "our amateur man-of-war-men averaged more than four prizes each"; also, "allowing the moderate estimate of fifteen men to each captured British merchantman, we have a total of 10,995 prisoners made on the high seas by our enterprising and daring privateersmen." Moreover, these prisoners were not like Hessian mercenaries, who could be replaced for a few pounds per head, but they were experienced sailors and "a class of men absolutely necessary to England's existence as a great power and a class she could not afford to lose." The same thought is expressed by historian Ralph D. Paine, who, writing of this early part of the war and the activities of American privateers, says: "Over ten thousand seamen were made prisoners at a time when England sorely needed them for drafting into her navy. To lose them was a far more serious matter than for General Washington to capture as many Hessian mercenaries who could be replaced by purchase." Contemporary American writers said that "the people [colonials] have gone mad a-privateering" and that "the enemy's coasts [British Isles] are swarming with our armed ships." There is evidence to show that too many colonial privateers cruised off the Canadian coast looking for British vessels bound in or out of Halifax, St. John, and the St. Lawrence ports; for we are told "they got in each other's way and wasted a lot of time chasing each other." On more than one occasion, a small, lightly armed American privateer, seeking to escape by flight from a big and powerful fellow countryman, threw overboard valuable guns, equipment and stores—a great loss to the young country in dire need of such articles of war.

Hall says that while the losses to the owners of American privateers were at times very large, "their gains were sometimes immense." He mentions the ships of one Newburyport merchant who, it was claimed, built the first privateer of the Revolution. They took 23,360 tons of British shipping as prizes, carrying 2,225 men; these captured vessels sold, with their cargoes, "for 3,950,000 specie dollars."

During the crucial years 1775-1777 and until the French Navy joined forces with the colonies against Britain after Saratoga (the turning point of the war), it was American armed merchantmen and not the American Navy that had kept open communications with Europe; that had carried envoys and dispatches across the Atlantic, transported specie, brought much-needed arms, ammunition, and supplies for the colonial armed forces, and impressed Europe with the fighting faith, determination, resourcefulness, and the not-to-be-denied spirit of the Americans battling for liberty. As Marvin says: "If we had depended on our navy alone for all this service afloat in the Revolution, we should have leaned upon a breaking reed." Moreover, as the war continued, colonial privateers became increasingly important, and by the time that peace was declared practically all of America's naval strength lay in armed merchantmen.

Prior to the Revolution, colonial merchantmen usually went to sea armed for protection against pirates or national enemies, and they carried enough men who well knew how to man the guns and use the small arms effectively as well as work the ship. When the war came, the British fleet practically put an end to American commerce; the slow vessels owned in the colonies were laid up in ports and sheltered in protected waters, and the swift and handy ones became privateers. American historians have probably unduly glorified the achievements of the privateers during both the War of the Revolution and that of 1812, but Spears, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, leans far the other way and says: "American independence was not won, as so often claimed, by the privateers; it was not even forwarded." It cannot be said with any measure of truth that American independence was won by the exploits of privately owned armed merchantmen, but these vessels—privateers and letters of marque—operated as the greatest contributory factor because of their effect upon British commerce and upon the state of mind and economic well-being of the British. To say that independence "was not even forwarded" by the work of American pri-

vateers shows an amazing ignorance of history and of the all-permeating psychological influences at work in Britain that ultimately led to peace between war-weary peoples. Spears continues: "If the accounts of gains and losses could be posted ledger fashion, the struck balance would show that, while the captured goods were at times almost the only resource of the colonists needing goods of foreign manufacture and while, too, a few individuals were enriched, the losses of the ship merchants as a class, and of the country, far outweighed the gains."

Spears refers to further real losses to the American cause due to glorified privateering (a word that came to have the same onus in the wars with Britain, in 1775-1783 and 1812-1815, as the word "profiteering" in the Civil War and the World War of 1914-1918) and says:

There is abundant evidence to show that the successes of the few made gamblers and even thieves of many merchants. While two frigates were on the stocks in Rhode Island, the timber belonging to the government was stolen for use in privateers. Still another evil influence is found in the fact that the magnified stories of privateer work made the people believe that the greed of the merchants would serve to defend the new-born nation from foreign aggression better than a navy could do; and not until the War of 1812 was brought upon us was the miserable delusion dispelled.

The belief of the people, indicated in the latter statement, was not entirely wrong. American privateers were far better handled and manned than American warships. As soon as the Continental Congress took a hand in equipping and operating naval vessels and appointing the officers to command them, the outstanding qualities that had permeated American privateering—impudence with audacity, resourcefulness, brilliant handling, and unequalled courage—began to disappear. Political appointments and contracts, with government red tape, seniority rules, ideas of prestige, etc., do not make for superior forces and unprecedented achievements on either sea or land.

George Washington advocated naval activities aimed at British commerce from the start of the war, and when he was in charge of the army around Boston in 1775, one of his first acts was to arm merchantmen and send them to sea to prey on ships bringing supplies to America for the British land forces. Benjamin Franklin, writing to the colonial committee on foreign affairs from Paris on May 26, 1777, said: "I have not the least doubt but that two or three of the Continental frigates sent into the German Ocean with some less swift-sailing craft, might intercept and seize a great part of the Baltic and northern trade. One frigate would be sufficient to destroy the whole of the Greenland fisheries and take the Hudson Bay ships returning." But America had no frigates or any vessels of the type Franklin visualized. However, the Marine Committee sent the little cruisers *Reprisal* and *Lexington* (armed merchantmen) and the small cutter *Dolphin*. They cruised around the Irish coast and took fifteen prizes, which they sold in France. Captain Connyingham followed by depredations in British waters with the *Surprise* and the *Revenge*, and shortly after Capt. John Paul Jones made his historic cruise in the *Ranger*. These hostile activities of American armed vessels together with the frequent cruises of privateers in British waters were responsible for a condition of panic that prevailed in the British Isles in 1777 and 1778.

A London periodical in 1777, in its news, printed the following written by its correspondent regarding the daring and audacity of an American privateer operating in the supposedly well-guarded and patrolled English Channel:

An American privateer of twelve guns came into one of the ports of the Jersey Islands in the English Channel yesterday morning, tacked about on the firing of the guns from the Castle, and just off the island took a large brig bound for this port, which they have since carried into Cherbourg. The American privateer had the impudence to send his boat in the dusk of the evening to a little island off here called Jetto, and unluckily carried off the Lieutenant of Northley's Independent Company with the garrison adjutant, who were shooting rabbits for their diversion. The brig they took is valued at thirty-five thousand dollars.

That early historians appreciated the importance of the work performed by American privateers during the War of the Revolution (and before the alliance with France was signed on February 6, 1778) is indicated by the following quotation from *NAVAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES* by Thomas Clark, published in 1814:

The success of the American privateers, during the year 1777, in the capture of English merchantmen, was extremely great. Their daring spirit and boldness was unparalleled. Their enterprizes were no longer confined to the American seas. The coasts of Europe were now covered with them. The shores of Great Britain were insulted by these privateers in a manner their hardiest enemies had never dared to attempt. Even the coasting trade of Ireland was rendered insecure. Into so great a state of alarm were the linen merchants thrown, that they petitioned for, and obtained a convoy for the linen ships between Newry and Dublin, and Dublin and England. This was a circumstance before unheard of. The British merchants were forced to adopt the mortifying expedient of chartering foreign vessels, particularly French, to transport English goods to the continent of Europe. Thus was the immense naval force of Great Britain rendered incompetent fully to protect her own shipping, by the privateers of a country that possessed

not a single sail of the line, and that had been only a year in existence as a nation.

The countenance given to American privateers by the French court alarmed the English ministry. The *General Mifflin* privateer had committed great depredations along the English coasts. On entering the port of Brest, she saluted the French admiral. After the deliberation of an hour and a half, the admiral returned the salute in form, as to the vessel of a sovereign and independent state. Lord Stormont, the British ambassador at the court of Versailles, was much irritated at the procedure. He threatened to return to London if they should continue thus to countenance the Americans. In consequence of his representations, an order was issued, requiring all American vessels to leave the ports of France. Notwithstanding this order was positive, yet so many evasions were practised, and the execution of it was so relaxed, that the American ships still continued to frequent the French ports and to equip and refit in them.

The *General Mifflin*, referred to by Thomas Clark, has a confused record on the pages of history. It is said that she was under the command of Capt. Daniel McNeil, "noted alike for his eccentricities of character and bravery as an officer," when he and his vessel and flag received a salute from a French admiral at Brest. There is an account of a 12-gun armed American merchant brig of this name under Capt. J. Hamilton, which in 1776 captured many valuable ships in British waters and participated successfully in fights with privateers of larger size and superior power. The following advertisement for men, which appeared in the *MORNING CHRONICLE & GENERAL ADVERTISER* of Boston, issue of Thursday, March 23, 1780, under the caption, "The Private Ship of War," and signed by George Babcock, commander at Boston, under date of March 13, 1780, definitely places the vessel, her hailing port, armament, and captain as of that time:

General Mifflin, mounting 20 six-pounders, will be ready to sail by the 1st of April. All Gentlemen, Officers and Seamen that intend to make their For-

tune, under my command, are requested to repair on Board said ship, by the 25th of this Month, where good Encouragement will be given.

Among the exploits of the *General Mifflin* was the capture of a large British ship loaded with valuable wine; also an action with a powerful English privateer mounting 18 carriage guns and carrying a crew of eighty men, which she captured after the Britisher had suffered twenty-two casualties, including the commander.

As early as the spring of 1776, with the connivance of the French Government, American vessels were received into French ports, and supplies were being sent from France to America in exchange for desired goods such as tobacco. Soon colonial privateers were bringing their prizes into French harbors, and the French—always selfish in their motives and at times avaricious—benefited by the trade, while at the same time they enjoyed seeing their arch-enemy weakened and British commerce suffer from the attacks made on it by American privateers. France toyed with American agents and commissioners for nearly two years, deceived Britain, and lent encouragement to the "insurgents"; but not until news reached France that Burgoyne, the British general, had been forced to surrender to the Americans near Saratoga on October 17, 1777, did France act decisively in the recognition of the Ameri-

cans, and the French alliance of February 1778 led to war between Britain and France in the summer of that year.

At a special inquiry into colonial depredations on British commerce, Alderman Woodbridge, testifying at the Bar of the House of Lords on February 6, 1778, affirmed that "the number of ships lost by capture or destroyed by American privateers since the commencement of the war is 733, of which, after deducting for those retaken and restored, there remained 559, the value of which, including the ships, cargoes, etc., amounted, upon a very moderate calculation, to £1,800,633 - 18 shillings." The records show that Woodbridge further stated that the average value of a ship and cargo trading to Jamaica was £8,000 on her outward and £10,000 on her homeward voyage; that insurance before the war "was 2 per cent to America and 2-1/2 per cent to North Carolina, Jamaica, etc."; that insurance to America, Africa, and the West Indies "is now more than double, even with the convoy, and without the convoy, unless the ship is a ship of force, 15 per cent." William Creighton, also appearing before their lordships, said that "the losses suffered by British merchants in consequence of the captures made by the American privateers have amounted to at least £2,000,000 in October last [1777]" and that "by this time [early February 1778] they cannot be less than £2,200,000." An English writer in 1778 said, "The war in a military and naval sense is not going so disadvantageously to our cause; but against our successes we must place the capture by American privateers of a thousand British merchantmen and their cargoes valued at not less than £2,600,000 sterling."

Captain Bucklon of the Rhode Island privateer *Montgomery* (16 guns), on his return in 1776 from a cruise in the English Channel, reported that "the rate of insurance in England has risen to 30 per cent on vessels sailing in convoy and to 50 per cent for those sailing without convoy." These stated rates, it would seem, were far higher than the truth, but that there had been "an unprecedented rise in marine insurance rates" and that they "had risen to an alarming level" was generally reported from England.

Spears says that of the 773 British ships captured by the Americans as referred to by Woodbridge before the House of Lords, about three-quarters of them were safely taken into port as prizes; but he adds that "the British cruisers captured and sent into port 904 American ships, which brought the captors £2,000 each on the average." He continues:

The losses of the American owners were of course much larger. Worse still, the American ships were all eventually driven from the seas save only as a few of the largest and most powerful were able to dodge and outsail the frigates and sloops-of-war which the British sent in pursuit of them. . . . Only a few ships remained in com-

mission to float the flag of the "new constellation" at the end of the War of the Revolution, but it was a matter of no small significance that these ships were on the average far superior to those that had formed the American merchant marine in colonial days.

Spears is wrong when he implies that practically all American ships, including privateers and letters of marque, were driven from the seas during the War of the Revolution. That was the fate of the vessels of the Continental Navy, but positively not of armed privately owned ships. Whereas the number of American government-owned war vessels in 1782 was only 20 per cent of that in 1777 (and the gun power 48 per cent), the number of privateers had increased over 4.4 times and the gun power 6.6 times during the same period. Many an individual or a community in the colonies owned far fewer vessels at the end of the war than at the beginning, but the ships that survived were generally bigger and faster vessels and better fitted to challenge Britain and all other maritime nations for the world's ocean trade.

After Britain emerged from the Seven Years' War as the dominant Mistress of the Seas, it is quite evident that as a naval military power, she not only seemed content to rest on her laurels but also, under the administration of John Montagu, the 4th Earl of Sandwich (1718-1792), woefully neglected the fleet in both ships and men. Sandwich was the first lord of the admiralty in 1748 and steadily from 1771 to 1782. It was said by British authorities, "For

corruption and incapacity Sandwich's administration is unique in the history of the Royal Navy." Albion and Pope write: "Sandwich probably did more damage to the navy entrusted to his care than any hostile French admiral was ever able to do. Under his guidance, the splendid fighting machine that had thoroughly smashed the French in the last war was but a ghost of its former self. Its ships were too few and too rotten. Its admirals were incompetent or disgruntled." This condition was certainly of vast benefit to the British colonies in revolt, for during about the first three years of the war, America, with no navy at all, boldly entered upon hostilities at sea with what was still—notwithstanding the decadence under Sandwich—the most powerful navy supplemented by the greatest fleet of armed merchant ships in the world.

As the War of the Revolution advanced, the American Continental Navy grew weaker in both numbers of vessels and guns, and the size and power of the British Navy greatly increased in the aggregate on the Seven Seas and specifically as regards the fleets assigned for service off the North American Atlantic Coast. It is said that about thirty vessels of the Royal Navy were assigned to the American North Atlantic station in June 1775; a year later, the fleet had been increased to seventy vessels; in the spring of 1778, it was said to total ninety ships and in the fall of that year "about a hundred and ten to a hundred and twenty sail." Excluding privateers and auxiliary vessels, the British Navy List of 1778 includes 180 warships mounting 6,926 guns, of which 89 vessels carrying 2,576 guns were stationed off the shores of the American colonies in revolt. The American Navy at the close of 1778 consisted of 14 vessels (many of which were armed or converted merchantmen) mounting 332 guns; the British fleet blockading the American coast alone was, therefore, about $6\frac{1}{2}$ times larger in units and 8 times more powerful than the entire American Navy. During the War of Independence, America lost 24 Continental naval vessels mounting 470 guns, but the British lost 102 king's ships (or vessels of the Royal Navy) carrying 2,622 guns; the British loss was, therefore, $4\frac{1}{4}$ times as many naval units and over $5\frac{1}{2}$ times as much gun power as that of the Americans.

Some "authoritative" historians say that American vessels captured about eight hundred ships of all kinds from the English during the War of the Revolution, but this grossly understates the total and, in fact, covers only the first part, or stage, of the war. It was reported that during the year 1776 the Americans captured 342 British vessels, of which 44 were regained by the British, 18 released, and 5 burned. English reports said that "commerce suffered heavy losses at the hands of American privateers and cruisers," and a London publication stated that "the damage to the West India trade alone amounted to about two million dollars." The number of British vessels captured by the Americans during the year 1777 was reported as 467, making 809 for the two years 1776 and 1777 only. From 1778 on, it was extremely difficult to differentiate between American and French captures of British vessels, as many of the prizes of American ships were taken or sent to French ports and sold there. As the war continued, the ports of other countries, such as Spain and Holland, received the prizes taken by colonial vessels; in fact, many American privateers operated out of foreign ports. It is also of significance to note that records show that the Massachusetts port of Salem alone accounted for four hundred British vessels as prizes during the war.

Hale estimates that three thousand British ships were captured by the Americans during the War of the Revolution and that the losses severely crippled the commercial prosperity of England. Gomer Williams, in his history of the Liverpool privateer, goes so far as to say that the Revolutionary War in America put an entire stop to the commercial progress of that Lancashire west coast port. The demoralizing effect on the marine trade of the British Isles occasioned by the exploits of American privateers and armed cruisers (which were generally merchant ships and, in fact, privateers handled by the government instead of private owners) was so great that Silas Dean, an American commissioner in France, writing in 1777 to the Marine Committee, said: "It effectually alarmed England, prevented the great fair at Chester, occasioned insurance to rise, and even deterred the English merchants from shipping

goods in English vessels at any rate of insurance. So that in a few weeks forty French ships were loaded in London on freight—an instance never before known.” British merchants not only demanded of their government naval ship convoy protection for their merchantmen engaged in trade to distant ports but also refused to let their linen ships sail from Ireland to England until the government supplied naval escort ships. We read: “It was the venturesome American privateer, which haunted the Irish Channel and caused great injury to the port of Liverpool and resulted in the Dublin linen fleet sailing under naval convoy to Chester.” A contemporary English newspaper, referring to these conditions brought about by “impudent rebel privateers,” said: “In no former war, not even in any of the wars with France and Spain, were the linen vessels from Ireland to England escorted by warships.”

That the American privateersmen played a very large part in winning the War of the Revolution is evident from a study of historical records dealing with the psychology and morale of the British and the mental reaction that affected the acts of the average Englishman. Twenty-nine years after peace had been declared, but with the War of 1812 about to break out, the leading and most authoritative publication of London said of the colonials:

Everyone must recollect what they did in the latter part of the American war. The books at Lloyd's will recount it, and the rate of assurances at that time will prove what their diminutive strength was able to effect in the face of our navy and that when nearly one hundred pennants were flying on their coast. Were we able to prevent their going in and out, or stop them from taking our trade and our storeships even in sight of our garrisons? Besides, were they not in the English and Irish Channels, picking up our homeward-bound trade, sending their prizes into French and Spanish ports to the great terror and annoyance of

our merchants and shipowners?

These are facts which can be traced to a period when America was in her infancy, without ships, without money, and at a time when our navy was not much less in strength than at present [1812]. The Americans will be found to be a different sort of enemy by sea than the French. They possess nautical knowledge, with equal enterprise to ourselves. They will be found attempting deeds which a Frenchman would never think of, and they will have all the ports of our enemy open, in which they can make good their retreat with their booty.

No matter what later-day historians of an increasingly prevalent “debunking” school have written or may write, the fact remains that the colonial and Yankee privateers during the War of the Revolution attained a measure of extraordinary success and wrote brilliant pages in our national history. Privateering, by its very nature, was a game of give and take and a weapon that cut both ways. It has been the tendency of many writers, hero worshippers, Anglophobes, jingoists, and intolerant, biased nationalists to over-extol certain splendid and audacious revolutionary achievements while back-peddling, ignoring, or glossing over the numerous failures and heavy losses. It has, moreover, been truly said that the weakness of privateering in the days of the Revolution and of the young republic was that “it was wholly offensive and could not, like a strong navy, protect its own commerce [and shores] from depredation.” However, it is a glorious fact—pleasant and glowing for any American in these days to recall—that, as Paine says, “an inchoate nation without a navy, with blockading squadrons sealing most of its ports, with ragged armies on land which retreated oftener than they fought, had private armed ships which dealt the maritime prestige of Great Britain a far deadlier blow than the Dutch, French and Spanish were able to inflict.” Paine also writes: “In England, there resulted actual distress, even lack of food, because these intrepid seamen could not be driven away from her own coasts and continued to snatch their prizes from under the guns of British forts and fleets.” The same writer adds that “the plight of the West India colonies was even worse,” which is a statement of fact attested by preserved contemporary correspondence.

An Englishman, writing home in 1777 from Grenada (the southern island of the Windward Islands group of the Lesser Antilles at the eastern end of the Caribbean Sea) gives not only some facts regarding the result of the work of the “armed merchant ships of the American rebels” in their fight for liberty and independence but also, from the British standpoint,

an idea of the effect—material and psychological—on British commerce of American privateering activities:

Everything continues exceedingly dear, and we are happy if we can get anything for money, by reason of the quantity of vessels taken by the Americans. A fleet came from Ireland a few days ago. From sixty vessels that departed from Ireland, not above twenty-five arrived in this and neighboring islands, the others, it is thought, being all taken by American privateers. God knows if

this American war continues much longer we shall all die of hunger. There was a ship from Africa with four hundred and fifty negroes, some thousand weight of gold dust and a great many elephant teeth—the whole cargo being computed to be worth twenty thousand pounds—also taken by an American privateer, a brig mounting fourteen cannon.

Another letter that has been preserved, written by an Englishman in Jamaica in 1777 (which, like the letter from Grenada, deals with marine conditions before America received any benefit from its alliance with France), tells of the havoc created in British commerce by the depredations of American privateers. "Within one week," the correspondent says, "upward of fourteen sail of our ships have been carried into Martinique by American privateers."

During the War of the Revolution, the chief British naval base in American waters was at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and it was to Halifax that most of the American vessels captured in the northwestern Atlantic were taken as prizes by enemy warships and privateers. British historians tell us of the great toll taken by the king's ships on American vessels engaged in commerce and privateering and refer to "the large and never-ending fleet of seized rebel ships carried into Halifax," which, it is said, was the handiest port to which to take vessels captured on the transatlantic run west of Long. 35° as well as those seized off the maritime provinces and a good part of the American coast. However, Admiral Arbuthnot of the Royal Navy, writing from Halifax at the end of 1777, after the war had been in effect for nearly two years, did not paint for the consideration of the British Government any pleasing picture of the "invincible British sea power" and the expected rapid annihilation of American commerce. He reported: "I wish it was in my power to give your Lordships a more favorable account of the disappointment of the rebels in their attempts on our trade, which they have really cut up almost without molestation, our cruisers having been looking out for their trade . . . while our enemies have been too successful in distressing ours in small vessels at hardly any expense."

Albion and Pope, in *SEA LANES IN WARTIME*, say that an analysis of the Halifax vice-admiralty records indicate that between 1776 and 1783 the British libeled there 201 American vessels and reported the recapture of 90 British craft, which can be classified as follows:

Type of Vessel	Number of Vessels	
	American	British
Ship-rigged merchantman	11	22
Brig-rigged merchantman	31	57
Schooner-rigged merchantman	83	4
Sloop-rigged merchantman	53	5
Total number of merchantmen	178	88
Privateers	23	2
Total all vessels	201	90

It is significant that most of the captured American vessels were small craft, only 6 per cent of the seized merchantmen being three-masted ships and less than 24 per cent two- and three-masted square-riggers (i.e., brigs and ships). A very large percentage of the schooners and sloops were diminutive coasting vessels, and many of the square-riggers, particularly the

brigs, were relatively small. Assuming an average tonnage of 170 tons for the ships, 115 tons for the brigs, 85 tons for the schooners, and 50 tons for the sloops, the total tonnage of the 178 American merchantmen libeled by the British at Halifax would be 15,140 tons. Possibly there are duplicates even in these figures, for some vessels were captured more than once during the war, and names were often changed by new owners. In 1782 the captain of the British letter-of-marque ship *Thorn* at Halifax declared that the vessel had been seized four times during a period of five years; the *Thorn* was engaged in commerce and was well armed, carrying eighteen 6-pounders.

Not all American privateers were operated by the patriots in revolt against the mother country, for the sections occupied by British troops sent out some Tory, or Royalist, privateers that waged war upon the rebel Whigs. William Tryon (1729-1788), as British governor of New York (who as the commander of a corps of Tory "Loyalists" invaded Connecticut and burned Danbury, Fairfield, and Norwalk in 1779), began giving out royal commissions for letters of marque in September 1778 and, it is claimed, "in six months issued 121." It is said that these Tory privateers aimed at French and colonial commerce and "brought in 165 prizes valued at \$1,200,000." Most of the New York-commissioned Tory privateers were very small boats, but they made captures and for a while practically blockaded the Delaware until Pennsylvania moved effectively to rid the river of the "pirates." A few Tory privateers sailed from Newport, R. I., during the period when it was in the hands of the British (December 1776-October 1779). All captures by American Tory privateers hailing from Canada, New York, Newport, British West Indies, etc., are credited among the seizures made by the British.

When the mother country, by her arbitrary Navigation, Trade, and Coercive Acts, sought to weaken, make subservient, and chastise "the refractory Americans," she well knew in the early 1770's that a War of Rebellion was a possibility, although she refused prior to Lexington and Bunker Hill to consider it a probability. When the English did give thought to a war with the American colonists, the people of all classes and walks of life visualized it as solely a land war which Britain would wage, principally with mercenaries (probably Russians or Hessians), across the Atlantic far from home; the conflict would be settled in short order by Britain's naval ability to transport troops across the ocean and by military might, which England expected to obtain by opening its purse rather than risking many British lives. It was thought that the war would be fought in the Protestant English colonies of America; that the Catholic French colonies of Canada would assist the English in return for religious freedom and a promised extension of territory in the West, which would operate to confine and cramp the belligerent Atlantic colonies. The final stages of the war were expected to be fought in an "American wilderness" far removed from any possible chance of interference with the empire's interests in any other part of the world. The British merchant, as Maclay well says, looked forward to a war with the American colonies "with no small degree of complacency," for "in spite of the provisions of the Navigation Acts, which were designed especially to protect him from colonial competition, he keenly felt American rivalry for the carrying trade of the world. It would cost several million pounds annually to send Hessians to America, but this would be more than offset by the British merchant's securing the colonists' share of commerce." Before hostilities really commenced, the English considered that the war would be merely a good spanking for the Americans. While it was being waged, the British would obtain trade and economic benefits that in the ultimate would balance the expense, and when it was all over, the humiliated and contrite colonists would be made to stand the entire costs of the war with interest. Britain at no time thought that American armed merchantmen as privateers and as government cruisers would appreciably interfere with British commerce on the high seas—not to mention their crossing the Atlantic and throwing England's own coast into continual alarm. The British Navy was deemed invincible in numbers and quality of naval vessels. The American coast would be blockaded and colonial shipping

would be entirely inactive until the brief war was over, the end being hastened by starvation and internal revolt of the populace against its "fire-brand leaders."

When armed colonial merchantmen put to sea as privateers, letters of marque, and governmental cruisers, Britain was shocked, and when the "Yankee rebels" would not "play dead" as expected, but actually became aggressive and carried the war to British shipping and England's shores, then the astounded Englishmen accused the Americans of "not playing fair." The unexpected to the English mind was wrong and immoral. When Britain commenced to wage war on its American colonists, it felt that it held all the cards and could dictate the nature of the conflict as well as the outcome. England guessed wrong. However, it was the attacks of colonial ships on British commerce that caused the mother country grievous injury as well as loss of prestige and not any military land actions (not even Saratoga nor Yorktown) that struck the mortal blows and won independence for the thirteen colonies. The value of the land victory of Saratoga in 1777 was of particular importance—indirectly in a naval sense; it caused France to enter into an alliance with the colonies in February 1778 and Spain in April 1779, which ultimately resulted in a world-wide commercial and naval war that benefited the cause of America in its fight against the proud and intolerant Mistress of the Seas.

Maclay estimates that during the War of the Revolution American government cruisers (almost all of which were converted or armed merchant vessels) and privateers took 800 British ships as prizes valued at \$23,880,000 (apparently a gross understatement of fact if the period intended to be covered was the entire duration of the war); he figures that the privateers captured about three-quarters and the government-operated vessels about one-quarter of this total. All the prisoners taken by the American land forces during the war (including 1,000 at Trenton, 8,000 at Saratoga, and 7,000 at Yorktown) have been placed at some 22,000 men. Those captured by the marine forces, it has been said, "could not have been short of 16,000 men." Maclay writes:

To the American people, who for generations have been taught that our independence was achieved almost entirely by the efforts of our land forces, . . . these statements of the comparative values and amount of work done on sea and land will prove a matter of surprise. Every reader of American history is familiar with the capture of Stony Point and its British garrison of 543 men; of Ticonderoga with its garrison of 50 men; of the battle of Trenton, with nearly 1,000 prisoners. But it is doubtful if many have heard of the capture of 300 British soldiers with their colonel, in two

transports, by the little state cruiser *Lee*, of the 200 Highlanders and 20 army officers of the 71st regiment by our *Andrea Doria*, of 24 British army officers by Capt. John B. Hopkins' squadron [all of these vessels were merely armed merchant vessels]; of the 240 Hessians captured by the privateer *Mars*, of the company of dragoons taken by the privateer *Massachusetts*, of the 63 Hessian chasseurs made prisoners by the privateer *Tyrannicide*, of the capture of a colonel, four lieutenant colonels and three majors by the privateer *Vengeance* and of the capture of 100 soldiers by the privateer *Warren*.

In all the peace agitation that developed in the British Isles as the war progressed and in all the memorials presented to Parliament to make peace with America and end the war, the prime and at times the only argument given was the injurious and distressing effect on the British economy of the unprecedented destruction of merchant ships by American privateers and the associated great loss of trade and business (production as well as sales) and of valuable cargoes. Maclay has said: "A careful review of British newspapers, periodicals, speeches in parliament and public addresses for the periods covered by these two wars [the War of the Revolution and the War of 1812] will show that our land forces, in the estimation of the British, played a very insignificant part, while our sea forces were constantly in their minds when 'the American war' was under discussion." It is an indisputable fact that "the wrath and fear" aroused in England by the actions of American privateers were far greater than the results of any of the colonials' victories on land, and the statement has been made that in 1777, the year of Bennington and Saratoga, "the men at sea in our merchant ships transformed into privateers almost equaled the strength of the Continental Army under the immediate command of Washington." As Washington had from nine to eleven thousand

men in his army in the campaign of 1777, this statement checks with the previously mentioned report that there were about ninety-five hundred men manning 174 American privateers commissioned during the eighteen months ending December 1777.

Marvin says that the audacity of the Yankee privateersmen was astounding and that the American people owe a vast debt of honor to the private armed ships of the Revolution; but, with respect to the exploits of the regular navy, the opinion of this historian—like that of most other authoritative writers—is not high. He writes:

The Continental Navy was in the main a poor experiment. At no time was it a formidable factor in the war. Its ships were for the most part small and weak; its crews ill disciplined; its commanders distinguished more for personal intrepidity than for the professional skill and wisdom which could only come from long naval experience. John Paul Jones won his most famous victory in a French-built ship and our only American-built frigate which came out of the war with a brilliant reputation was the swift and beautiful *Alliance*, launched at Salisbury Point on the Merrimac and so shamefully mishandled in the battle of the *Bon Homme*

Richard and the *Serapis* by the traitor and madman Landais. Indeed, the *Alliance* was almost our only frigate which came out of the Revolution in any way whatever. Nearly all of our other regular ships were destroyed or captured in the course of the war by overwhelming British squadrons. The thirty Continental cruisers of 1776 had shrunk in 1781 to nine, carrying one hundred and sixty-four guns. But in the same year the American privateers, converted out of merchantmen, and managed by individual shipowners, numbered four hundred and forty-nine, mounting in all 6,735 guns.

When peace was proclaimed in the United States on April 11, 1783, only the *Alliance*, *Deane*, and *General Washington* were on the Navy List. The navy was disbanded, the officers and men discharged, and the three surviving vessels ordered sold in the interest of economy. The only real warship of the trio that was afloat and serviceable in the spring of 1783 was the beautiful, fast, and powerful 32-gun frigate *Alliance*, and she was converted into an Indiaman. In 1787, under Capt. Thomas Read (formerly of the U.S. Navy), the *Alliance* sailed for China in merchant trade.

There is no doubt that privateering was much preferred by the average American officer and sailor to operating on national armed merchant ships under the control of the Continental Congress. The merchant marine was just as well manned and well officered as the navy was wretchedly operated and deplorably managed by politically appointed nincompoops. Seamen were, in fact, driven by naval incompetence and unfair treatment to privateers that were privately owned and operated and sent to sea to capture prizes, the value of which was equitably divided between owners, officers, and crew, with the Continental Congress obtaining nothing.

Privateering as waged in the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century, which includes the period of the American Revolution and the War of 1812, has been described as "a sordid, unlovely business." We are told that the privateersman sailed and fought for his own gain, and many historians affirm that the ruling motive was a greed for profit rather than an ardent love of country. Whereas there is some truth in the allegation, nevertheless, it appears that the criticism is far more extreme than the facts warrant, and the application of the principle of privateering in the only practicable, possible way certainly saved the national honor, which a weak, wrangling, political and sectional government seemed to do its utmost to crucify—in matters both naval and military. Fortunes were won by private individuals in the ownership and operation of privateers, but in this respect it is unfair to say "regardless of the public service." Fortunes were also lost. It has been said in disparagement of privateers that "shares in lucky ships were bought and sold in the gambling spirit of a stock exchange"; but this fact—assuming that it is true—does not reflect on privateering, for all ships owned by private interests had their fractional shares bought and sold in the market and if good luck (with unusually good officers and crews) boosted the prices of some, corresponding ill-fortune depressed the prices of others. It is true that it became almost impossible to recruit men for the navy, for seamen preferred the privateers, and this for many reasons. Under private ownership, the sailors received wages that were actually and

promptly paid to them and not merely promised and then evidently forgotten or delayed by red tape, inefficiency, or lack of funds as in the case of the government-owned and operated ships. Then, the privateers had much more competent and experienced commanders and officers than the Continental ships, for they were selected because of demonstrated ability and not by reason of political wire-pulling; furthermore, seamen serving in a privateer got a real share of the booty and in a scientific amount that followed a reasonable and just formula of distribution—something that could not be said for anything the navy or the government handled.

We are told that many a privateer's company, in full, signed articles in one or two days' time and that "some were mustered between noon and sunset." In the early days of the war, the ships put into the Continental naval service got enlistments of seamen readily, but the experience of such men soon discouraged others, and sailors who had served in armed merchantmen shunned the navy ships and would not willingly have anything to do with them. State-owned vessels were often as bad as the Continental ships. Ebenezer Fox (one of the ship's company), writing of the efforts to obtain sufficient men for the *Protector*—a vessel armed with 20 guns—bought by the State of Massachusetts, said:

The recruiting business went on slowly, however, but at length upwards of three hundred men were carried, dragged and driven aboard; of all ages, kinds and descriptions; in all the various stages of intoxication from that of sober tipsiness to beastly drunkenness; with the uproar and clamor that may be more easily imagined than described. Such a motley group has never been seen since Falstaff's ragged regiment paraded the streets of Coventry.

This condition is a reflection on the government ships and their management rather than on privateers, which it has been quoted to denounce. Privateer owners and officers were not to blame if seamen declined, while in their normal minds, to enlist willingly in the naval service. Privateers captained and officered by enthusiastic and patriotic men who had gained a good reputation at sea in handling and driving merchantmen, armed or unarmed, had no difficulty in signing on crews that knew the ships and the command, and most of these privateers were manned locally with able seamen of the community. At first, patriotism induced sailors to enlist in the navy, but the incompetency of command, idleness due to red tape, and the operation of officialdom created and sustained by deplorable politics, with an almost unbelievable "damned unfairness of treatment," caused seafaring men to avoid the navy and seek to serve their country by fighting its enemies where they would get lots of action and excitement, have the leadership of able and courageous men who were always looking for a fight with the enemy and not trying to avoid it, and, moreover, receive their pay when it was due and their full share of the loot. Patriotism under conditions that reflect efficiency, produce action, and compensate equitably for a man's services is much more effective in its results for the country's good than the same spirit hampered by incompetency, red tape, and delay, lack of vision, vigor, courage, and resourcefulness on the part of leadership, and "damnable injustice" in the realm of material compensation or reward.

The writing of Ebenezer Fox merely reflects a situation associated with getting together a crew by force and strategy when a logical appeal for services failed. The conditions he describes existed in the manning of the British naval ships that banked not on voluntary enlistments but on press gangs, rum, and a compulsory retention, with the use of flogging (cat-o'-nine-tails), which was a form of brutal slavery to get a crew and keep it on a ship. During the packet ship, clipper ship, and Down Easter eras and up to the end of merchant sail, as the incentive and enthusiasm of crews waned and young men of ambition forsook following the sea as a career, seamen were procured for ships at the various ports by pimps (who were usually boardinghouse keepers), and rum, dope, and the economic force of debt were more and more generally used to obtain the needed number of men for a ship's fore-castle. However, America never "emptied its jails," as did proud Britain, in order to get the human "hearts of oak" to fight the country's enemies at sea; neither has America press-ganged or enslaved men to fight its wars. No men in the history of sail ever went to sea to fight for

their country with more willingness, eagerness, and enthusiasm than did the sailors and their officers who made up the entire complement of an American privateer—both in the days of the Revolution and later in the War of 1812, which was essentially a seamen's war for freedom from British oppression.

The articles of agreement under which colonial privateersmen sailed during the War of the Revolution are substantially set forth in the following typical document covering the conditions affecting enlistment and service on the privateer ship *Rover* of Salem, mounting 24 guns and carrying a crew of 100 men, under the command of Capt. James Barr, Jr., in 1781:

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

Concluded at Salem this Seventh day of May, 1781, between the owners of the Privateer Ship *Rover*, commanded by James Barr, now fixing in this port for a cruise of four months against the Enemies of the United States of America, on the first part and the officers and seamen belonging to said Ship *Rover* on the other part as follows, viz.:

Article 1st. The owners agree to fix with all expedition said Ship for sea, and cause her to be mounted with Twenty Guns, four Pounders, with a sufficiency of ammunition of all kinds and good provisions for one Hundred men for four months' cruise, also to procure an apparatus for amputating, and such a Box of medicine as shall be thought necessary by the Surgeon.

Article 2nd. The Officers and Seamen Shall be entitled to one half of all the prizes captured by Said Ship after the cost of condemning, etc., is deducted from the whole.

Article 3rd. The Officers and Seamen agree that they will to the utmost of their abilities discharge the duty of Officers and Seamen, according to their respective Stations on board Said Ship, her boats and Prizes, by her taken, and the Officers and Seamen, further agree that if any Officer or Privateer shall in time of any engagement with any Vessel abandon his Post on board said Ship or any of her boats or Prizes by her taken, or disobey the commands of the Captain or any Superior Officer, that said Officer or Seaman, if adjudged guilty by three Officers, the Captain being one, shall forfeit all right to any Prize or Prizes by her taken.

Article 4th. The Officers and Seamen further agree that if any Officer shall in time of any engagement or at any other time behave unworthy of the Station that he holds on board said Ship, it shall be in the power of three officers, the captain being one, to displace said Officer, and appoint any one they may see fit in his place. That if any Officer belonging to said Ship shall behave in an unbecoming character of an officer and gentleman,

he shall be dismissed and forfeit his share of the cruise.

Article 5th. The owners, officers and Seamen agree that if any one shall first discover a sail which shall prove to be a Prize, he shall be entitled to Five hundred Dollars.

Article 6th. Any one who shall first board any Vessel in time of an engagement, which shall prove a Prize, Shall be entitled to one thousand Dollars and the best firelock on board said Vessel, officers' prizes being excepted.

Article 7th. If any officer or Seaman shall at the time of an Engagement loose a leg or an arm he shall be entitled to Four Thousand Dollars; if any officer or Seaman shall loose an Eye in time of an Engagement, he shall receive the Sum of Two thousand Dollars; if any officer shall loose a joint he shall be entitled to one thousand Dollars, the same to be paid from the whole amount of prizes taken by said Ship.

Article 8th. That no Prize master or man, that shall be put on board any Prize whatever and arrive at any port whatever, Shall be entitled to his share or shares, except he remain to discharge the Prize, or he or they are discharged by the agent of said Ship, except the Privateer is arrived before the Prize.

Article 9th. That for the Preservation of Good order on board said Ship, no man to quit or go out of her, on board of any other Vessel without having obtained leave from the commanding officer on board.

Article 10th. That if any person Shall count to his own use any part of the Prize or Prizes or be found pilfering any money or goods, and be convicted thereof, he shall forfeit his Share of Prize money to the Ship and Company.

That if any person shall be found a Ringleader of a meeting or cause any disturbance on board, refuse to obey the command of the Captain, or any officer or behave with Cowardice, or get drunk in time of action, he shall forfeit his or their Share of or Shares to the rest of the Ship's Company.

Privateers, being armed merchantmen, owned, equipped, and operated by private parties (but bearing a commission from the government), were sent to sea to take prizes, and good crews were obtained for them by the policy of dividing a substantial part of the spoils among the officers and members of the crew in lieu of wages. This system induced not only the best of the seamen but also a relatively high class of adventurous fighting men to enter the service; hence during the War of the Revolution, with the lure of profit added to the urge of pa-

triotism, a new class of seagoing men developed, who became known as "gentlemen sailors" or "gentlemen seamen." Many of these men were of good families, well educated and trained in the use of arms, and although landsmen adventuring afloat, they were welcomed by the commander of a privateer and given special duties and privileges. Such men were really the forerunners of the modern marines, and whereas not assigned to the ordinary work of the sailors, they formed a sort of marine guard ranking between the officers and the regular crew.

Much has been written of the injustice that resulted from the operation of American privateers, and it has been said: "There was nothing of glory to boast of in fetching into port some little Nova Scotia coasting schooner with a cargo of deals and potatoes, whose master was also the owner and who lost the savings of a lifetime because he lacked the men and guns to defend his property against spoliation." This is true in a sense, but the owner-captain of the little schooner mentioned was not, as claimed, the victim of a barbarous and piratical spirit; he was the victim of the principle and necessary acts of physical war, where the individual and his interests, his wealth, and his life have to be subordinated to the national interest. Privateers captured merchantmen just the same as naval vessels would if they had the same chance and ability to overhaul a fleeing foe. Food and essential materials are contraband, and all enemy floating tonnage is of military value. In a state of war, a privateer cannot be condemned for doing what a warship flying the national naval ensign would be required to do by regulations and general orders, and it is just as much in the country's interest for a privateer to capture an unarmed schooner loaded with food and materials, with the crew profiting by the capture, as it would be if the seizure was made by a government-owned man-of-war, with the crew getting (after unconscionable delays) a small part of the loot and many others who contributed in no way to the capture receiving much more.

A merchantman engaged in ocean trade during times of war has always had to take the risk of capture by a more heavily armed and more powerful ship of the enemy. Marine insurance is available to cover such risks and has been for several centuries. The American privateersmen were no "barbarous pirates" as some writers have claimed, and they were generally humane, reasonable, and even "gentlemanly" in their conduct as compared with the privateers (many of the real pirate variety) of Britain, France, and other countries that had been harassing the colonial merchant marine for long years. However, no American or British privateer or naval ship ever deliberately sank a ship belonging to a warring nation with passengers aboard. The hardy privateersman of the American colonies was human to the extent that it would have been not only abhorrent and unthinkable but also impossible for him to wage the kind of war that would drown innocent women and children and, furthermore, any class of noncombatants or even helpless, defeated sailors. The Yankee privateersman would seek to sink with gusto and relish any fighting foe, but when the flag was struck and the battle won, he would concern himself with the health and life of his prisoners until he could put them ashore or place them upon another vessel. It remained for Germany, in the "highly civilized" twentieth century, posing as a master race of great and unequalled culture, to inaugurate the sinking by torpedoes, without warning, of passenger vessels and the drowning of women and children—many of them neutrals—who had embarked on a vessel flying an enemy flag. This self-assumed leader of a new world and social order also makes it a practice to machine-gun seamen in small boats and in the water while they are struggling to survive and reach safety—something but very few barbarous buccaneers of centuries ago would have been guilty of even if they had had the weapons and the opportunity. "Strafe" is a German word, and it is only natural that a people with Germany's obsession and spurious "culture" of self-satisfaction and senseless, cruel bias should defy all humanitarian principles and wantonly and ferociously bomb to destruction open towns, civilians, hospitals, schools, and children—the helpless and defenseless. The Nipponese "Sons of Heaven," with their peculiar, assumed, and essentially ignorant pseudo-culture, could, of course, be expected to follow their devilish teachers and even go them one better in waging hellish war. With these current facts in mind, it is refreshing to recall that the worst of the colonial and British privateers-

men were humane and, in fact, "religious" compared with the egoistic, merciless, and ruthless barbarians waging aggressive war of insolent and intolerant domination—or extermination—in the twentieth century of the so-called Christian Era.

Among the first of the American privateers to put to sea at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War was a trio of Massachusetts-owned armed merchantmen, all of which were "Yankees in name, spirit and action." Indeed, YANKEE, in both the Revolution and the War of 1812, was a favorite name for privateers; for during a period of forty years, several such craft bore the simple name *Yankee* and in addition to the *Yankee Hero* and *Yankee Ranger*, there were the *Yankee Lass*, *Yankee American*, *Yankee Porter*, and the *True-Blooded Yankee*. One of the early trio of Massachusetts "Yankees" was a sloop named the *Yankee* that carried 9 guns, 16 swivels, and a complement of forty-three men. The record of this privateer well illustrates the bravery and foolhardiness of many of the American privateersmen in the years 1775-1777. Under the command of Captain Johnson, the *Yankee*, making for English waters, captured two sizable and valuable well-armed British merchantmen, the *Creighton* and *Zachara*, in July 1776. Each of these seized vessels, laden with sugar and rum, was as powerful and carried as many men as the *Yankee*, and when it was necessary to put a prize crew aboard the captured vessels, Captain Johnson well realized his dilemma; nevertheless, he placed some of his men aboard each of the prizes and proceeded to escort the captured ships to an American port. Before reaching their destination, however, the prisoners in the prizes rose against their captors, regained possession of their weapons and control of their ships, and then, in concert, attacked the *Yankee*. She had only a skeleton American crew (and several belligerent British officers as prisoners) aboard to operate the sloop and not sufficient men to work the vessel, man the guns, and fight the determined enemies she had aboard her all at the same time. There could be only one outcome to this uneven fight, and the two British ships, because of united action and an overwhelming superiority of both man- and usable gun-power, gained possession of the once proud *Yankee* and took the American privateer as a prize to Dover, England, where Captain Johnson and his men were thrown into Mill Prison—not as prisoners of war but as captured pirates and rebels.

The second of the trio of early Massachusetts "Yankee" privateers was the *Yankee Hero*, a merchantman brig of 14 guns and a complement of forty men. She was commanded by Capt. J. Tracy, but before she was able to get in many whacks in her efforts to cripple the commerce of the enemy, she had the bad luck, in June 1776, to run afoul of the exceedingly fast and powerful British frigate *Lively*, and this ship of the Royal Navy compelled the "rebel privateer" to strike her colors after she was disabled and badly mauled and seventeen of her crew were dead or severely wounded. It is said that, although the *Yankee Hero* was outsailed, she fought a ship of four times her fighting power and bravely resisted capture, even though from the first her position was hopeless.

The *Yankee Ranger*, the third of the Massachusetts trio of "Yankee" privateers, was evidently more fortunate than the other two, but little authentic information has come down to us of her exploits. It is known, however, that this "Bay State privateer," on one cruise in August 1776, took three British merchant brigs as prizes and sent the captured vessels, which were loaded with cotton, coffee, and oil, into port.

The experience of the early privateer *Yankee* of Massachusetts recalls the disaster that later befell the Connecticut privateer *Eagle* at the end of a highly successful cruise, during which she overreached herself. It was the ambition of many American privateers to capture "one prize for every gun," but unless the vessel was well manned when she commenced her cruise, with sufficient seamen aboard to furnish prize crews for the vessels captured, the attaining of the privateer's objective was apt to end disastrously. When operating with a minimum crew, every ship had to keep men available to sail and protect her from both the prisoners that she might have aboard and a cruising enemy ship. (These prisoners usually consisted of the officers and principal persons found upon a seized vessel.) In 1778, Capt. E. Conkling took out the Connecticut privateer *Eagle*, which mounted 6 guns and carried

thirty men. This small armed merchantman captured six prizes and reached thereby the goal, or zenith, of privateering success, but she had been too "lightly manned" to take care of so many prizes on one cruise, and her feat caused her undoing. Conkling, with a skeleton crew and a large number of prisoners of a resourceful character aboard, was very vulnerable, and the prisoners secretly organized and, taking advantage of a favorable opportunity, rose in revolt, obtained arms, and gained possession of the *Eagle*. They put to death all the officers and crew except two boys and sailed the vessel for a British port. However, while the *Eagle* was proceeding to her new port of destination, the American privateer *Hancock* hove in sight and recaptured her—but thirteen good American seamen were dead. The *Eagle* is reported to have been blown up in or around New York in 1779, when a fire aboard reached her magazine. (If she was in New York, she had evidently been seized again by the British.)

In September 1778, the Pennsylvania 10-gun brig *Gerard* (Captain Josiah) encountered the American privateer sloop *Active*, which had been very successful in capturing enemy vessels and had taken too many men aboard from her prizes. These prisoners, at an opportune moment, rose in revolt and gained possession of the *Active*, but the timely arrival of the *Gerard* changed the situation. The *Active*, with all the prisoners aboard, was escorted into the Delaware.

About this same time, another privateer, the sloop *Providence*, commanded by Captain Conner, of Pennsylvania, captured on a cruise the British ship *Nancy*, the brigs *Chase* and *Bella*, and the schooner *Friendship*. A prize crew put on the *Nancy* was overpowered by the large number of prisoners aboard, but the *Providence*, suspecting that something was wrong, gave chase, recaptured the British ship, and escorted her as a prize into port.

One of the most successful of the Massachusetts privateers during the early period of the Revolutionary War was the sloop *Revenge* of 12 guns (Capt. J. White). In August 1776, she is reported to have captured six British vessels, one of which she set free after loading with prisoners that were too numerous for her to handle on either the *Revenge* or her four retained prizes. The vessels captured on this extremely profitable initial cruise were: ship *Anna Maria*, laden with sugar and rum; ship *Polly*, with a cargo consisting principally of wine; and the two brigs *Fanny* and *Harlequin*, loaded with rum, molasses, and sugar.

In September 1776, the Massachusetts-owned sloop *Republic* of 12 guns (Capt. Foster Williams) captured two valuable British ships and sent them into Boston; one of these prizes was the *Julius Caesar*. At about the same time, the schooner *Independence* of 6 guns (Captain Nichols) is credited with capturing six enemy vessels, while another Massachusetts armed vessel, the *Independency*, captured a British brig. (This prize was evidently retaken later by the prisoners aboard her, who greatly outnumbered the Americans sailing her to a colonial port and, through strategy, obtained possession of arms.) Another Massachusetts privateer, the schooner *Dolphin* (Captain Leach), in September 1776, captured the English brig *Royal George*, heavily laden with provisions, and a sizable sloop with a cargo of cured fish. About the time that the *Massachusetts* was taking (in September 1776) a British armed transport brig with dragoons aboard, the *Joseph*, a brig mounting 8 guns, captured a British schooner, followed a little later by an English ship with a valuable cargo aboard. The Massachusetts armed brig *Hannah and Molly* (Captain Crabtree), during a cruise in Nova Scotia waters in the autumn of 1776, captured five British vessels: a sizable ship (mounting 4 carriage and 8 swivel guns), a brig, two schooners, and a sloop. Another Massachusetts privateer, the *Rover* of 8 guns (Captain Forrester), in the fall of 1776, captured four British vessels—the snow *Lively* and the brigs *Good Intent*, *Mary and James*, and *Sarah Ann*—and while attacking the well-armed ship *Africa*, which was stoutly resisting a shot from the *Rover*, ignited the powder stored in the magazine of the British vessel, blew her up, and killed twenty-three of the twenty-six men aboard her.

In October 1776, the Massachusetts schooner *Liberty* of 6 guns (Captain Pierce) took a British ship carrying a cargo of salted fish and lumber from Canada to the West Indies, and

the privateer brig *Charming Peggy* of 12 guns (Capt. J. Jauncey) seized a British vessel laden with provisions. About the same time (October 14, 1776), the little Massachusetts schooner *General Gates*, mounting 6 guns and under the command of Capt. B. Tatem, captured a British schooner. However, while off the Piscataqua, the *General Gates* herself was attacked and taken by the heavily armed and much larger British brig *Hope*. Captain Tatem lost his schooner, but he and his men refused to be taken prisoners and succeeded, by means of a small boat and by swimming, in escaping the foe and getting ashore. Other Massachusetts privateers reported as taking important prizes during the early years of the War of the Revolution were the sloop *Speedwell* of 8 guns, under the command of Captain Greely, and the successful topsail schooner *America* of 10 guns (Captain McNeil), among whose captures was a British ship laden with rum, sugar, wine, and logwood.

As late as April 1779, the audacious spirit of 1776 was in evidence when the little Massachusetts schooner *Two Brothers*, mounting only one gun and with a crew of twenty-five men under Capt. W. Gray, put to sea "to harass the enemy." It is said that some volunteers joined the craft at Salem, and—surprising as it may seem—the little schooner, with one gun and a crew of lionhearted daring men, captured a British privateer mounting 8 guns, with a complement of sixty men. In 1780, there is a record of a little 2-gun schooner, the *Chance*, commissioned as a privateer in Pennsylvania under the command of Capt. N. Palmer, with a complement of only fifteen men; yet this little craft took at least one British vessel, a sizable sloop, as a prize.

It was said that New Hampshire privateersmen proved that Governor Wentworth's prophecy of 1770 was correct, for at that time the governor had said: "Our province is yet quiet, and the only one, but will, I fear soon enter. If they do, they'll exceed all the rest in zeal." Of over a hundred armed merchantmen, the first privateer to sail from the Piscataqua to prey on British commerce during the War of the Revolution (1775-1783)—duly commissioned by the Continental Congress—was the *Enterprise*, described as a schooner under the command of Capt. Daniel Jackson, with papers dated January 27, 1776. (This vessel was also later referred to as a brig.) Other early Portsmouth, N. H., privateers were the brig *Putnam* of 12 guns (Captain Harman), credited with capturing a British ship and four schooners on an early cruise (a brig of this same name and armament appears among the list of Rhode Island privateers and early in the war, under the command of Captain Ferguson, is credited with capturing four English ships and later, under command of Capt. C. Whipple, with taking two snows and a brig and fighting a severe drawn action with a well-armed enemy ship); the sloop *Harlequin* of 14 guns (Captain Shaw); the ship *Portsmouth* of 20 guns; and the schooner *McClary* of 6 guns (Captain Parker). "*Harlequin*" seems to have been another popular name for vessels at the time of the Revolution, for in addition to the New Hampshire sloop bearing this name, the Massachusetts privateer *Revenge* and the Narragansett privateer *Montgomery* each captured, in 1776, British craft having this name—one a brig and the other a ship. Later, New Hampshire people had cause to brand the name as "damned unlucky," for when leaving the Piscataqua, a fine new *Harlequin*, sailing in the fall of 1814 against the British, ran almost straight into the 74-gun *Bulwark* and, after only twenty-six hours at sea, was captured before she ever fired a gun.

John Langdon, who was a member of the Naval Committee of the Congress and agent for the Portsmouth Continentals, invested heavily in privateers and owned a part of each of the government-commissioned and bonded armed merchant ships *Alexander*, *Amphitrite*, *Hector*, and *Portsmouth*, the brigs *Bennington*, *Fair American*, and *Swan*, and the sloops *Blossom*, *Fox*, and *Hazard*. On the other hand, Samuel Cutts, of Portsmouth, was conscientiously opposed to privateering and capitalizing patriotism for personal profit and, after the war was over, wrote: "Not being concerned in privateering (which I could not make consonant to my feelings) I was left at the peace without any trading stock."

The New Hampshire privateer *Hampden* (22 guns; 150 men) was a fine vessel. On March 8, 1779, under Capt. Thomas Pickering, she engaged for two hours in an indecisive

fight with a big British East Indiaman of twice her size, which mounted twenty-six 9-pounder and eight 4-pounder guns. The privateer suffered twenty-one casualties killed and wounded. Under Capt. Titus Salter, the *Hampden* took part in the unfortunate Penobscot expedition. She was captured by the powerful British naval squadron and later converted into a king's cruiser.

In November 1777, a group of ten Piscataqua proprietors drew up articles for building a brigantine privateer, the *General Sullivan*. On April 8, 1778, it was decided to lengthen the vessel "so as to mount two more guns on a side," and Captain Ladd agreed for the sum of £1,250 "to take the brig *General Sullivan* from Portsmouth to Exeter and lengthen her . . . in a proper manner." Later, Hackett, Hill, and Paul were appointed to perform the work at Newmarket, and Hackett did the work, changed her over to a ship (of 14 guns), and received for the job £1,500 "and one barrel of New England rum." Captain Dalling, with a crew of 100 men, took the privateer to sea in July and came back with the British ship *Caledonia* as a prize. Capt. James Manning then assumed command of the *General Sullivan*, and on her next cruise the privateer sent the armed British ship *Mary* (8 guns) into port loaded with flour. Each proprietor received thirty barrels from the prize, and the rest was sold to the people of Portsmouth. In the summer of 1780, the *General Sullivan* made her richest haul when she captured and sent safely into port as a prize the British brigantine *Charlotte*, with a cargo aboard said to have been valued at the incredible figure of £350,000. In 1782, under her original master, Captain Dalling, the *General Sullivan* captured the ship *Harriet*, which the British, by a daring attack, had cut out of Gloucester harbor, had manned, and were taking to Halifax.

The following characteristic advertisement for seamen for a Piscataqua privateer is from the columns of the New Hampshire GAZETTE:

My Jolly Tars take Notice—

That the remarkably fast-sailing Privateer *Cutter Greyhound*, is now compleatly fixed for, and next Wednesday will sail on a Ten Weeks Cruise. Those hearty Lads who are desirous of embracing the Golden Opportunity of making their own

Fortunes, must immediately apply at the Rendezvous at Mr. Shortridge's on Spring Hill, where they shall receive every Encouragement that a generous Soul can wish.

THOMAS ROACH, COMMANDER

Portsmouth, July 27, 1781

Rhode Island, or Narragansett, privateers made good records in the French wars, the War of the Revolution, and the War of 1812. Among the early private armed merchant vessels to make successful cruises against the enemy in the Revolutionary War was the *Diamond* (Captain Chase), which during the months of July and August 1776 captured the three British ships *Jane*, *Star* and *Garter*, and *Friendship*, the snow *Portland*, and the brig *Mars*; in August 1776, the privateer *Eagle* (Captain Paine) took three British vessels—a ship loaded with rum, sugar, and cotton, the ship *Venus*, with a cargo principally of mahogany, and the brig *Virginia* loaded with tobacco; in October 1776, the privateer brig *Favorite* (Captain Coffin) captured an English ship and a schooner, both with good cargoes aboard; and in 1778, this same privateer, with Captain Lamb in command, is reported to have captured a British ship laden with logwood and armed with 16 guns; in the fall of 1776, the privateer *Industry* of 10 guns (Captain Child) captured a British brig, but when she endeavored to take a ship that was fully as well armed as herself and had a larger crew aboard, the fight that ensued resulted in a drawn battle of over two hours' duration, and when the vessels decided to discontinue hostilities and call it even, the Narragansett privateer had eight casualties (two dead and six badly wounded) and the British are said to have suffered far worse; in October 1776, the Rhode Island privateer ship *Montgomery* of 16 guns (Captain Bucklon) is said to have captured the British ships *Harlequin*, *Isabella*, and *Rover* and the brigs *Henry* and *Devonshire*—a "bag" of five sizable and valuable prizes. Capt. Thomas Whipple is also credited with taking the Narragansett privateer *Independence*, mounting 10 guns, on a cruise during the early days of the war. Apparently, there were three Captain Whipples, one of whom was the famous "Abe," or "Commodore" Abraham

Whipple, and three American privateers bearing the challenging name of *Independence*, which hailed from Massachusetts (a 6-gun schooner), Rhode Island (a 10-gun vessel), and Pennsylvania (a 10-gun ship). It was the privateer *Independence* of Pennsylvania, commanded by Capt. Thomas Truxton (who was to achieve fame later in a battle against two French frigates) that during a cruise in 1777 captured a British brig, a sloop, and a large sugar-laden ship mounting 16 guns that did not strike her colors until after a stiff fight.

The Connecticut privateer sloop *Broom* of 10 guns (Captain Knott), during the four days August 3-6, 1776, is credited with capturing four British vessels—the ship *Charles and Sally*, the snow *Ann*, and the two brigs *Caroline* and *John*; all were engaged in the West Indian trade and were laden when seized with rum, sugar, and dyewoods (fustic). Among other successful early Connecticut privateers, in addition to the *Warren*, were the *Spy*, *Shark*, and *Washington*. The *Spy* and *Shark* were connected with Captain Hopkins' Continental squadron for a time, but in August 1776 the *Spy* captured the British ship *Hope* and in September the schooner *Mary and Elizabeth*, both vessels being laden with coffee and sugar. There are records of the activities of the *Shark* for several years, and on a cruise in 1779 she is credited with taking four prizes. The *Washington* (Captain Odiorne), in September 1776, captured a British snow with a very valuable and acceptable cargo of cannon aboard (badly needed by the American forces); also a brig (*Georgia*) and a schooner, both of which were laden with sugar and rum.

In October 1776, the Pennsylvania privateer brig *General Montgomery*, mounting 12 guns and carrying 100 men, encountered a convoy of about a hundred British merchant sail protected by several fast-sailing and powerful men-of-war. The American armed brig, by clever seamanship, took the ship *Thetis* by cutting her off from the fleet; the prize carried the usual West Indian cargo of sugar and rum. The early Pennsylvania privateer snow *Ranger* of 14 guns (Captain Hudson) captured two British storeships laden with valuable military supplies. There is a record of a Pennsylvania 14-gun privately owned brig named the *Sturdy Beggar*, which, with eight other American vessels, was captured in May 1778 in Croswell Creek by a powerful British naval and military, expeditionary and punitive force (including two schooners, four gunboats, four galleys, and twenty well-armed light-draft barges) under the command of Captain Henry of the Royal Navy and Major Maitland. The name "*Sturdy Beggar*" is a rather unusual one, and it happens to be that of the first privateer of Richard (and Elias H.) Derby, of Salem, a schooner of 90 tons, mounting 6 guns and carrying twenty-five men, which first received a Massachusetts commission on June 13, 1776. Later, there is a record of the Salem privateer *Sturdy Beggar* in the form of a "Rendezvous Bill" dated August 8-September 10, 1781, and she is described as a "Privateer Brig" with "Captain George Williams agent."

In 1779 the 14-gun privateer brig *Hibernia* of Pennsylvania fought several indecisive actions, but won honors as a fighting ship. Commanded by Capt. R. Collins and manned with only thirty-five men, she fought off an attack by a king's cruiser of 14 guns and eighty men. Later, under Capt. J. Angus, the *Hibernia* fought a big and well-manned British snow mounting 16 guns and had the best of the battle, following which (while feeling the effects of a severe engagement) she was attacked simultaneously by three well-armed British vessels—two topsail schooners and a topsail sloop. By good seamanship coupled with courage of a high order and fine gunnery, she beat off all her opponents. The *Hibernia* lost two killed and eight wounded.

There were two (or possibly more) Pennsylvania privateer brigs named *Holker* in service in 1779. One of 16 guns, commanded by Captain Lawler in April, captured a British topsail schooner of 10 guns and forty-eight men and two armed sloops; in June, she took a big British brig of 16 guns after a fierce fight of an hour and a half, during which Captain Lawler and four others were killed and sixteen wounded (the enemy casualties numbered twenty-six, of whom six were killed). A second *Holker*, commanded by Capt. George Geddes, carried 10 guns and thirty-five men. This privateer, in June 1779, cap-

tured the armed British ship *Diana*, which had aboard as part of her cargo 80 cannons, 60 swivel guns, and 10 bronze mortars (coehorns), and followed this most acceptable prize by taking three British brigs loaded with rum and sugar and a sloop (6 guns) with a cargo of dry goods aboard.

Captain Geddes, of Philadelphia, who in 1779 was in command of the 10-gun privateer brig *Holker*, two years later was in command of the American privateer *Congress*, a ship of 24 guns with a complement of 200 men that was ordered by the government to search out, take, or destroy the British Navy sloop-of-war *Savage* (16 guns) commanded by Captain Sterling, R.N., who had been making destructive piratical attacks along the coast line south of the Delaware. His objectives were not those connected with military operations but private estates, which he plundered for psychological reasons as well as for loot. Captain Sterling—as did many other commanders of the king's ships stationed off the American coast—would send his boats ashore, generally at night, on these piratical forays, which would seem to be in opposition to the so-called rules for conducting war between civilized nations, and on one occasion he made a destructive pillaging raid on Washington's estate at Mount Vernon. Captain Geddes, in the *Congress*, came up with the *Savage* on the morning of September 6, 1781, and quickly proved that the *Congress* could outsail and outmaneuver the heavily armed, protected, and manned British naval vessel. After a fierce engagement, in which Captain Sterling was killed, the *Savage* struck her colors, with the casualties (killed and wounded) according to British reports thirty-three, while those of the *Congress* were also heavy, being stated as thirty. Unfortunately, Captain Geddes could not get back to port with his prize, for both vessels were later taken by a powerful British frigate and carried into Charleston.

There is a record showing that a 16-gun brig *Holker*, commanded by Capt. R. Kean, of Pennsylvania, captured the British cutter *Hypocrite* of 16 guns in February 1781 and engaged in a drawn combat with the British 18-gun ship *Experiment* in the West Indies in 1782. We are also told that the *Holker*, in company with the American privateer *Fair American*, a brig mounting 14 guns and commanded by Captain Chaplin, of Connecticut, captured four merchantmen in October 1781 and that in March 1782 the *Holker* was one of four American privateers that as a squadron attacked a fleet of British armed ships at Tortola in the West Indies.

In August 1779, the privateer brig *Mars* (14 guns), under the command of Capt. Y. Taylor, of Pennsylvania, captured the British armed sloop *Active* (12 guns) off New York and shortly thereafter took the armed transport brig *Polly*, with 214 Hessian mercenary troops aboard, and a British snow of 14 guns and a crew of 45 men.

On June 12, 1780, the privateer sloop *Comet* (10 guns), under the command of Capt. C. Harris, of Pennsylvania, by brilliant strategy and seamanship, captured eight British merchantmen that were part of a big convoy bound for New York; the prizes were sent to and all reached Philadelphia.

Although New York was in the hands of the enemy from the time of the Declaration of Independence to the end of the war and some of the New York "Loyalists" equipped privateers to wage war on the patriots, a few New York-owned privateers put to sea and raided British commerce. One of these vessels was the armed sloop *Montgomery* (Capt. William Rodgers), which, on a cruise in 1776, captured four British vessels—two brigs, a schooner, and a sloop. Another New York privateer, the *Schuyler* (Capt. J. Smith), in June 1776, captured a British ship that had twenty colonial prisoners aboard, and in August the *Schuyler* took five British vessels as prizes and recaptured an American vessel that was in the hands of the enemy.

When the British blockaded the port and took the city of New York, the environs, and harbor, including domination of the East and North rivers, New Jersey was deprived of an ocean outlet from its maritime settlements. However, at least one New Jersey privateer, the

schooner *Enterprise* (Captain Campbell), put to sea in July 1776 and did a great deal of damage to enemy commerce. This armed merchantman, on July 22, captured the British ship *Nevis* "after a spirited action" that lasted an hour and the ship *Earl of Errol* (6 guns), which had a cargo said to have been valued at \$100,000. During the months of July and August 1776, the "audacious *Enterprise*" also captured the British ship *Lancaster* (4 guns and sixteen men), the ship *Black Snake*, the ship *Modesty*, and the snow *James* (twenty-three men), all of which were engaged in the West Indian trade and were laden generally with rum, sugar, and molasses.

A diminutive privateer named the *Skunk*, commissioned in New Jersey, was a mere boat mounting only 2 guns and carrying a crew of less than twenty men. This little craft, during her eventful career, made an amazing record; she captured and sent into port nineteen British vessels, some of the prizes being of considerable value.

One of the first privateers to sail from the Chesapeake to make war on British commerce was the topsail schooner *Baltimore Hero*, which evidently made her initial cruise mounting 6 guns and under the command of Capt. T. Waters. Later, she is credited with carrying 14 guns. In 1779, with Capt. J. Earle as master, she outfought and captured a British privateer schooner that mounted 14 carriage guns. The privateer *Bennington*, a sloop mounting 6 carriage guns and 4 swivels, commissioned from Maryland, when under the command of Captain Craig in 1779 with only fifteen men aboard, fought and captured a British privateer mounting 12 carriage guns. An early Baltimore privateer was the sloop *Betsey* of 10 guns (Captain B. Dashiell). The name "*Betsey*" was evidently a very popular one for private armed American vessels during the War of the Revolution, as each of the following colonies owned privateers bearing that name: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Maryland had two—one a sloop and the other a brig (under Captain Brice in 1777 and Captain Brudhurst in 1778). The "*Beaver*," for some unknown reason, also seems to have been a rather popular name for early American privateers. New York had a 6-gun sloop *Beaver* that apparently operated with success throughout most of the war, as there are records of her cruises covering the years 1776-1781 inclusive. Connecticut had a relatively large 12-gun schooner bearing this name commissioned as a privateer in 1778 (Captain Scoville), and Pennsylvania had a privateer *Beaver* commanded by Capt. W. Harris.

One of the first privateers to put to sea from the Carolinas during the War of the Revolution was the *Cornet* of Charleston, a brig mounting 14 guns and commanded by Capt. J. Turpin. On November 2, 1776, the *Cornet* captured the British ship *Clarissa*, laden with lumber and with forty Negro slaves aboard; shortly thereafter, she also took as prizes the British schooner *Maria* and the sloop *George*.

Whereas the winter of 1777-1778 has been termed "the darkest hour of the Revolution," such a designation applies only to American land operations, for on the ocean this was a period when a relatively small number of American privateers not only were making themselves felt but also were terrorizing the British; it was also the turning point in America's marine war, and from that time privateering on a more sensible basis, with bigger, better-armed, and faster ships, was in evidence. It is well that privateering and the use of armed American letter-of-marque vessels increased following the year 1777, for government-owned and operated navy vessels were on the decline, and the country had to look to its privately owned armed ships to wage war against the British.

In 1778 the Massachusetts privateer brig *Hazard* of 16 guns (Capt. John Foster Williams) made a cruise, capturing a British brig and a schooner, but the following year she engaged in two real battles in which she showed her class as a fighting ship. On March 16, 1779, off St. Thomas, she attacked the big English brig *Active* (mounting 18 carriage and 16 swivel guns and carrying 100 men), which surrendered to her after a spirited conflict that lasted only thirty-seven minutes. The *Hazard's* casualties were three killed and five wounded, but the *Active's* were thirteen men killed and twenty seriously wounded. A little

later, with only fifty men aboard, the *Hazard* encountered an English bomb ship mounting 14 carriage guns, with a complement of eighty men. The Englishmen, with their superior well-armed force, made several attempts to board the American privateer, but were repelled with heavy losses; both vessels were damaged in this conflict, and the *Hazard* was unable to follow up her advantage. This American armed merchant ship was one of the many that, after being called upon to do naval fleet work in the badly planned and executed Penobscot expedition, were burned in August 1779 to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The Massachusetts privateer *Marlborough* (Captain Babcock) had a splendid record during the war, taking twenty-eight prizes, one of which was an English slaver with three hundred African Negroes aboard. Another Massachusetts privateer, the brig *Vengeance* (18 guns), under the command of Captain Newman, had the unusual experience in September 1778 of capturing two important and reputedly fast, well-armed and manned British packet ships—one four days after the other—and of outsailing as well as outfighting these enemy express vessels, one of which was carrying seven high-ranking officers to join their regiments in America; the first of the captures was the *Harriet* (16 guns; forty-five men) and the second the *Eagle* (14 guns; sixty men). The *Vengeance*, under the command of Captain Thomas, was another victim of the ill-fated Penobscot expedition, and she was destroyed on August 14, 1779. Two months after the loss of this privateer (October 1779), another American privateer *Vengeance* (16 guns; sixty men), commanded by Captain Deane, fought the big British privateer brig *Defiance* (14 guns; seventy-two men) and captured her after a well-contested action, during which the American casualties (killed and wounded) were eight and the British fifteen.

On September 19, 1778, the Massachusetts privateer *General Hancock* (20 guns; 150 men), under the command of Captain Hardy, fought the big 32-gun British ship *Levant* and, after an action of three hours, blew her up with a lucky shot that landed in the British ship's magazine; only eighteen men of the entire complement of the *Levant* survived, and they were taken prisoners.

On January 9, 1779, the Massachusetts privateer ship *Protector* (26 guns), under the command of Capt. John F. Williams, fought the big English privateer *Admiral Duff* (30 guns) and after an hour and a half's fierce engagement got the better of her when a shot from the *Protector* penetrated her opponent's magazine and blew up the ship; fifty-five of the crew of the *Admiral Duff* were saved and taken aboard the American ship as prisoners. Shortly after this battle, the big British frigate *H.M.S. Thames* chased the *Protector*; a running fight ensued, but the American privateer escaped from the powerful and fast vessel of the Royal Navy.

Another fine privateer sacrificed during August 1779 in the naval and military expedition against the British fort at the mouth of the Penobscot was the Massachusetts ship *Black Prince* (18 guns; 160 men), built in 1778. On her first cruise, this ship captured three armed British vessels—a snow and two brigs.

The Massachusetts fishing village of Beverly (settled by Roger Conant in 1626), which is about two miles north of Salem and "across the creek," quickly took a prominent place during the stirring days of the Revolution as a port from which sailed those "hardy seamen who wrought such havoc with the shipping of the enemy." It is said that the first privateer owned in and sailing from Beverly was the brigantine *Retaliation*, owned by Josiah Batchelder, Jr., and others and commanded by Capt. Eleazer Giles. This vessel (later described as a brig) carried 10 guns and seventy men and was very successful in her early cruises. In the late summer of 1776, she ran up against "a Tartar" in the shape of a courageously manned and excellently handled British ship, which, while mounting only 2 swivel guns, kept the Americans off for two hours before striking her colors. During the latter part of 1777, the *Retaliation* was captured by a powerful British warship and carried into Halifax.

There is preserved a copy of an interesting early handbill used by the owners and command of the little brigantine privateer *Washington* of 7 guns when they were seeking a crew for that vessel:

Now fitting for a PRIVATEER.

In the Harbor of BEVERLY, the Brigantine *Washington* a strong, good vessel for that purpose and a prime sailer.

Any Seaman or Landsman that has an inclination to MAKE THEIR FORTUNES IN A FEW MONTHS may have an opportunity by applying to JOHN DYSON.

Beverly, Sept. 7, 1776.

Another early Beverly privateer was the schooner *True American* of 6 guns and fifty men, owned by Andrew Cabot, which first sailed in company with Capt. John Manly, of Marblehead, whom General Washington had appointed to command a "state privateering cruiser." Capt. John Buffington, of Salem, then evidently took the *True American* as a letter of marque to Bilboa, with a crew reported as twenty-five men. After the ship had been discharged, the rig was changed to a brig, more men were signed on, and the vessel was taken on a privateering cruise in the Bay of Biscay. At this time, Bilboa was the great European rendezvous for American armed merchantmen, and Captain Lee of the *Hawk*, upon reaching Salem in the fall of 1776, reported seeing eighteen American privateers in the port of Bilboa when he sailed.

A prominent and successful Beverly privateer that did effective work against British shipping for several years during the War of the Revolution was the *Oliver Cromwell*, a relatively large merchant ship of her day, which mounted 16 guns and carried a crew of 100 men. The vessel was owned by George, John, and Andrew Cabot, Joseph Lee, and others, and on her first cruise, under the command of Captain Cole, eleven prizes were taken. In August 1781, when "dogging" a Quebec fleet, the "*Cromwell*" was captured by a fast and powerful British frigate and taken to Newfoundland.

The privateer ship *Pilgrim* of 18 guns and 100 men is said to have been "the most famous and successful of all the privateers sailing from Beverly during the War of the Revolution." Under command of Capt. Hugh Hill, of Marblehead, described as "a daring and reckless privateersman" and a "throw-back" from the days of Drake, this vessel carried the war to the British in their own waters. The story is told of a French officer's disliking Captain Hill's robust manner and plain speech in a cafe at L'Orient and pompously declaring, "I will send my seconds to you in the morning, Sir." Hill quickly got to his feet, walked over to the Frenchman, who was sitting with his friends, and said, "Seconds and morning be damned. What is the matter with here and now," while he drew two pistols from his belt and offered the Frenchman his choice. There was no duel, and the French officer quickly forgot all about an imagined insult. Among the many prizes taken by the *Pilgrim* was the ship *Francesco di Paula*, and the capture of this vessel, which became the cause of protracted litigation, came near producing international complications with Spain. The incident also gives an interesting side light on the panic-like fear of the British and of the extreme steps resorted to by some owners to protect their vessels from what they pleased to call "American rebel pirates." The *Francesco di Paula* was in fact the ship *Valenciano*, entirely English owned, with an English crew, and commanded by an English skipper, Capt. Peter White. The British, in order to protect their property from American privateers, changed the name of their ship, placed her under Spanish colors, and employed Joachi di Luci to pose upon fitting occasions as her commander. The *Francesco di Paula* was condemned in an American court, but the case was appealed to Congress, where the fear of offending Spain kept the matter undecided for a long time. Finally, the ship herself was condemned and the cargo returned to its owners. In 1780, Capt. Joseph Robinson took command of the *Pilgrim*, and the ship's success as a profitable privateer continued. Probably her hardest-won prize was the big and powerful British privateer *Mars*, captured only after a grueling fight of three hours, during which the English captain was killed and the casualties aboard the British craft ran high.

The following illustrates how some members of the crew aboard Beverly-Salem privateers sold part of their prize rights in a single cruise to speculators in order to get some needed

cash in hand before embarking on a voyage. The brigantine *Lyon* referred to was evidently the *Lion* of 16 guns and fifty men, and Capt. Benjamin Warren was for some time in command of this vessel, having succeeded Capt. Jonathan Mason.

An Agreement between William Cox of Beverly and Stephen Waters of Salem that I Wm. Cox do for the Consideration of Thirty Six pounds L money Sell to the Sd. Stephen Waters one half of a Single Share of all prizes or prize money that Shall be Captured by the Briggn. *Lyon*, Benjamin Warrin, Commander, During her Crouse from the Day She Sailed from Salem till the Sd. Briggn. *Lyon* arrives Back to Salem again as Witness whereof I have sett my hand this Twentieth day of December one thousand Seven hundred and Seventy Seven

his
Wm. X Cox.
mark

Witness

G. Wm. Patterson
Salem

December 20th 1777

Sr. please to pay to Stephen Waters or his order the Neat proceeds of a Single half Share in the Briggn. *Lyon* and you will oblige Sr. your humble Servant

his
Wm. X Cox.
mark

The sailors' shares in privateers and letters of marque were negotiable in areas with seaport towns (such as Salem, Beverly, Marblehead), and they commanded a relatively high or low price according to the record and reputation of the vessel and of her commander, the season of the year, the profitable "takes" of other privateers about that time, knowledge (if any) of the nature, course, and probable duration of the cruise; also, of course, the necessities of the seller, the number of such shares being offered in the market (relation of demand and supply), and the gambling propensities of the buyer. Contemporaries tell us that "sailors' shares" were considered an attractive speculation during the war and that they were at times divided like lottery tickets into halves, quarters, and eighths and circulated on the market. We also read: "It was necessary for a married or improvident mariner, upon signing for a cruise in a privateer, to make some provision for his family or creditors, and as this could not be done by obtaining an advance on his wages [no wages were paid on privateers, but they were on letters of marque], he was often obliged to sell part and at times even the whole of his shares." Contemporary writers tell us that it was rather common for a seaman to sell in advance of his cruise in a privateer "half of his share of the forthcoming prizes" and that it was "a favorite speculation for merchants to buy" these privateering shares. During the War of 1812, however, it evidently became a rather hard and fast rule that "no seaman may sell more than half his share in advance."

That men operating privateers and letters of marque realized the value of publicity is evident from the following Massachusetts Bay newspaper item:

MORNING CHRONICLE & GENERAL
ADVERTISER

Hail Liberty Divine, and Peace, First-Born of
Heaven!

Vol. II Thursday, March 23, 1780 Numb. 75
For Amsterdam

The Ship *Rambler*, Benjamin Lovett, Com-
mander, mounted with 16 six-pounders, at close
Quarters, navigated by 50 Men or upwards, will

sail by the 20th of April, at furtherest, for freight
on board said Ship, either from hence to Amster-
dam, or from thence to this continent; apply to
Messieurs Job Prince and Co. or Mr. Charles
Sigourney in Boston; Mess'rs John and Andrew
Cabot, or the commander on board said ship, at
Beverly, where they may know the Terms on
which freight will be received.

Beverly, March 20, 1780

As early as November 1, 1775, an act was passed by the Massachusetts legislature empowering the council to commission with letters of marque and reprisal any person (or persons) within the colony to fit out and equip any vessel, at no expense to the state, for the defense of the colonies, with general authority to take all vessels of the enemy. The master of the private armed vessel was required as principal to give bond (with the names of two acceptable, responsible parties as sureties) in order to satisfy any claim that might be made of illegal capture. The bond was placed at \$5,000 for vessels under 100 tons and at \$10,000 for

vessels of 100 tons and over. The masters of these privately owned vessels were further put under bond not to take deserters from the Continental Army, and Massachusetts later required that "no soldier from the Continental Army or any man not a citizen of Massachusetts" be signed as a member of the crew. The handling of prisoners by the command of privately owned armed vessels gave the Continental Government much concern, as privateers preferred to avoid the carrying of prisoners as much as possible, for they were dangerous and expensive. In many cases, the prisoners from many prizes would be grouped in some relatively worthless prize and set free to make port home or get aboard some friendly national vessel if they could do so—and they most generally did. Prisoners were an extremely dangerous freight for privateers to carry, but privately owned ships were required to furnish bonds, which specified that the crews of any vessels captured should be brought ashore and turned over as prisoners of the state. Notwithstanding the fact that English prisoners were needed in America as material for exchange, it is evident that this prisoner bond was evaded quite often by privateers and usually by letters of marque.

The following is a copy of a bond filed with the State of Massachusetts Bay guaranteeing the turning-over of prisoners as might be captured by Capt. John Conway of the privateer *Terrible*, owned by Samuel Pote, James Laskey, and others in the Marblehead-Beverly-Salem area:

Know all men by these presents
That we John Conway Mariner
as principal Saml Pote & James Laskey
of Marblehead

As sureties are held and stand firmly bound to the Hon. Henry Gardner Esq.; Treasurer of the State of Massachusetts Bay, in the Sum of Four Thousand Pounds, to be paid to the said Henry Gardner Esq; Treasurer and Receiver-General of the State aforesaid, or to his successor or successors in the said Office, in Trust for the Use of the said State, to which Payment well and truly to be done, we do bind ourselves, our Heirs, Executors and Administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by these Presents. Sealed with our Seals and dated this twelfth Day of May in the Year of our LORD 1779—

The Condition of this Obligation is such that whereas it is necessary that all Persons taken at Sea on board of Prizes, should be brought into

this or some of the United States, to the End there may be a Number sufficient to redeem such Subjects of the United States as may fall into the Enemy's Hands; and also that all Persons in the Pay of this, or any of the United States, should be effectually prevented going on Board any Armed Vessels. Now if the said John Conway as commander of the Armed Vessel called the *Terrible* shall well and truly put on Shore and deliver to the Commissary of Prisoners in some of the United States, all Prisoners by him captured and shall not carry out with him any Person in Pay of this State, or any Officer or Soldier belonging to the Continental Army, then this Bond to be Void, otherwise to remain in full Force and Virtue.

Signed, Sealed and Delivered
in Presence of

H. J. Sibley	John Conway
Jn. Dall	Samuel Pote
James Laskey	

An historic privateer in the War of the Revolution was the Maine-built and owned sloop *Wintbrop* of 13 guns, with Capt. George Little in charge and Edward Preble, of Portland, second in command. The *Wintbrop*, built for the express purpose of protecting the northern New England coasting trade, which had suffered much from the depredations of the enemy, was very successful in her work and captured many British armed merchantmen. She took two British privateers on her maiden cruise. The outstanding adventure of the cleverly handled *Wintbrop* commenced when she recaptured a sloop belonging to William Gray, of Salem, which had a prize crew aboard, from the armed British brig *Meriam*, a vessel that had been for some time "a thorn in the side" of the *Wintbrop* and a terror to American vessels sailing around the Penobscot and Kennebec. Gray's captured sloop was proceeding to a British-held fishing port in the Penobscot, to which place the *Meriam* had herself sailed for supplies. Upon learning this, Little and Preble developed the daring plan of taking the *Meriam* "from under the guns of the enemy." The *Wintbrop*, being a sloop herself, was readily disguised to resemble the Gray sloop, and while Gray's vessel was ordered to keep her position at sea, the *Wintbrop* proceeded boldly to the Penobscot harbor, where she arrived as planned in the evening. When passing the fort, she answered the hail of "What

ship is that" with "*The Meriam's Prize*" and then ran alongside the brig. Someone on board the *Meriam* cautioned the sloop, but Preble, with no guns visible on the *Wintthrop*, said that he had been ashore on a reef and had lost the vessel's anchors and cables. He requested that a line be thrown to him, which was done. As soon as the *Wintthrop* was warped alongside the *Meriam*, Preble and his men jumped on board the brig and, in harmony with a prearranged plan, took command of the British vessel, most of the men aboard being below and the officers being in their cabins dressing to go ashore. Some of the Americans slipped the cables, others made sail, while still others quickly overcame all resistance, as the audacious surprise attack caught the British thoroughly off guard and unprepared to make any serious gestures to cope with it. The two vessels quickly made their way out of the harbor, and the garrison in the fort, although it fired, evidently was unaware of what was happening and certainly had no intention of firing upon Englishmen or an English vessel with Englishmen aboard—even if she did act queerly. It is said that when the *Wintthrop* was out of range of the guns of the fort, Captain Little, who had not fired a shot during the entire adventure, "triumphantly let off thirteen skyrockets"—apparently one for each of the original states of the Union. We are told that before returning to her home port, the *Wintthrop* captured two more prizes, and she sailed into the harbor one of a flotilla of five vessels. One was an armed British vessel of force superior to her own, two were laden enemy merchantmen, and the fifth was William Gray's recaptured sloop.

The privateering service became the training school for officers of the navy of the young republic, and it is said that sixty of the American privateersmen who fought for independence during the War of the Revolution later became captains in the United States Navy. Joshua Barney, who served his country so well in the War of 1812, as lieutenant in 1779 with Capt. Isaiah Robinson in the tobacco-laden trading brig *Pomoma* (which had at first a queer conglomeration of guns aboard and 35 men) made an historic passage from the Chesapeake to Bordeaux and en route gave the English privateer brig *Rosebud*, mounting 16 carriage guns and carrying a crew of 100 men, such a pronounced "licking" that her commander (Captain Duncan) upon his arrival at New York, when reporting his casualties of 47 men killed or wounded, charged the American with "unfair fighting." Upon arriving in France, Captain Robinson purchased eighteen 6-pounder guns, enlisted 35 more men (increasing the complement to 70 men), and, after loading the *Pomoma* with a cargo of brandy, sailed for home in August 1779. On the passage, the *Pomoma* captured an English privateer mounting sixteen 6- and 9-pounders and carrying a crew of 70 men, which Lieutenant Barney sailed as a prize to Philadelphia.

Capt. Alexander Murray, who later served the United States with distinction in the wars with France and Tripoli as a captain of the navy, as commander of the armed merchant brig *Prosperity* (mounting five 6-pounders and carrying 25 men), while on a passage to St. Croix in 1781 with a cargo of tobacco, fought for two hours and beat off a large and well-manned English privateer that mounted 14 carriage guns; on his return, he took as a prize a British packet ship. Captain Murray also commanded the privateer *Saratoga* (a brig mounting 12 guns) and the *Revenge*, *General Mercer*, and *Columbus*, each fitted with 10 guns. Capt. John Barry of the U.S. Navy served at various times in the privateer *Rover* (a ship carrying 24 guns), the *Delaware* (a 10-gun brig), and the *General Montgomery* (a 6-gun brig).

In 1779, Capt. Thomas Truxton had command of the armed merchant ship *Andrew Caldwell* (10 guns), and later, in the privateer *Mars* (a ship mounting 24 guns), he cruised in British waters and sent a number of prizes into French ports. In 1781, Truxton was selected by the U.S. Government to command the privateer *St. James* (20 guns and 100 men) on an important special mission to France. The British, hearing through secret service of the voyage, deputed a fast and powerful sloop of war of the Royal Navy to intercept and capture the *St. James*, and the ships met soon after the passage commenced. Heavy fighting occurred, but the American privateer beat off the man-of-war and completed her mission without further molestation. Captain Truxton had command of the American ship *Commerce* (14 guns and

50 men) in December 1782, when she fought to a standstill a British brig of 16 guns and 75 men and a square topsail schooner of 14 guns and 80 men and sailed away only when a powerful English frigate of the Royal Navy hove in sight to capture "the impudent Yank." It is said that in this uneven battle the *Commerce* had one man killed and two wounded; whereas the British losses were stated as "38 casualties—14 killed and 24 wounded."

Capt. Stephen Decatur (Senior), father of the famous American commander of the War of 1812, etc., was in charge during the War of the Revolution of the privateers *Royal Louis*, *Fair American*, *Rising Sun*, *Retaliation*, and *Comet*. In July 1781, while in command of the *Royal Louis*, a ship of 22 guns and carrying a complement of 200 men, Decatur fought a great battle with the British cruiser *Active* and succeeded in capturing this strong vessel of the Royal Navy. Capt. Daniel Waters, who had to his credit the capture of the British troopship *Defense* in 1776 while in command of the privateer *Thorn* (16 guns), in 1778 fought the British naval brigs *Governor Tryon* (16 guns) and *Sir William Erskine* (18 guns) combined in an audacious single engagement and, after a battle of two hours, caused both of these king's ships to strike their colors. While sailing for Boston with his prizes, Waters captured the English ship *Spartan* (18 guns and 97 men).

Maclay, in *HISTORY OF THE NAVY* (1901), states that "one of the noteworthy features of the struggle for American independence was the prominent part that private enterprise took in the operations on the sea," and he adds that "while not a single Continental cruiser was taken by British privateers, sixteen English cruisers, mounting in all two hundred and twenty-six guns, were taken by American privateers or by private enterprise." The following is a list of the American captures:

Name of British Cruiser	Number of Guns	Captured by	Name of British Cruiser	Number of Guns	Captured by
HICHINBROOK	14	Privateer	SANDWICH	20	Boats from Charleston
YORK	12	Boats from land	GERMAIN	20	Privateer
ENTERPRISE	10	Boats from land	SAVAGE	14	Pennsylvania state cruiser
WEST FLORIDA	14	Boats at Pensacola	CONGRESS		
HOPE	14	Privateer	SNAKE	14	Privateer
HARLEM	10	Privateer	GENERAL MONK	20	Pennsylvania state cruiser
COUREUR	14	Privateer	HYDER ALLY		
ACTIVE	14	Boats from New York	ALLEGIANCE	14	Privateer
EGMONT	8	Privateer	PRINCE EDWARD	14	Privateer

Of the sixteen British cruisers mentioned above, nine were captured by American privateers, two by state cruisers (converted merchantmen), and five by small boats operated from the shore.

Toward the end of the War of the Revolution, with the navy practically nonexistent, the armed merchant ships of the United States commenced as privateers to work together in harmony to attain desired objectives. Concerted attacks were made not only against more powerful armed British vessels but also against enemy squadrons and enemy-held towns. In addition to the attack on a fleet of armed British ships at Tortola in the West Indies, a squadron of four small American privateers united in an operation against and the capture of Luenburg, a little town on the shore near Halifax, Nova Scotia, in Canada. The vessels of the American fleet were the *Scammel*, commanded by Capt. Noah Stoddard, of Fairhaven (opposite New Bedford, Buzzard's Bay, Mass.); the schooner *Hero* of 9 guns and 25 men (Capt. G. Babcock) and the brig *Hope* of 6 guns and 35 men (Capt. H. Woodbury), both

Massachusetts privateers; and the 2-gun cutter *Swallow* of New Hampshire under Capt. J. Tibbetts, with a complement of 20 men. The four American vessels, apparently under the leadership of Captain Stoddard, had only some 25 guns and about 115 men, but they put ashore a strong and competent landing force (said to have been 90 men) under Lieutenant Barteman, two miles below the town. The New Englanders marched rapidly with the intention of surprising the inhabitants, but the Canadians were alert and greeted the invaders with heavy musketry as they entered the town. The privateersmen—notwithstanding that they were from four separate ships—functioned as a well-disciplined and thoroughly competent expeditionary force. They quickly burned the commanding officer's headquarters and a blockhouse in the northwest of the town, spiked two 24-pounders, and drove the defenders into a blockhouse to the south, where with good protection they opened a brisk fire on the invaders. Lieutenant Barteman thereupon signaled the fleet, and the *Hero* soon got the range and poured some 4-pound shots into the blockhouse with such good effect that the defenders were compelled to surrender themselves as prisoners of war. Two 18-pounder guns were spiked and the town relieved of practically all its beef, pork, flour, rum (20 puncheons), and dry goods. The "royal magazine" was seized and taken upon the *Scammel*, Colonel Creighton and several prominent citizens were made prisoners, and under the guns of the four American privateers a ransom for the town of £1,000 was demanded and obtained. A contemporary, writing of the deportment of the well-disciplined privateersmen ashore, said: "The strictest decorum was observed toward the inhabitants, their wearing apparel, household furnishings and personal belongings being inviolably preserved for their use." We are further told that "on the side of the brave Sons of Liberty [the invaders] three were wounded" and that "on the part of the abettors of oppression and despotism [the Canadian Royalists, or Tories] the number of slain and wounded was unknown, only one of the slain being found."

Naval authorities such as Captain Mahan have expressed the opinion that privateers were less effective as a means of injuring the enemy than government-owned armed vessels. This is correct as far as taking prisoners was concerned and would be positively true if the government-owned warships had been built as naval vessels and, therefore, had been capable of both offensive and defensive operations and if the personnel had been able and the officers selected because of experience and demonstrated qualifications and not because of political influence or seniority; it would be unquestionably correct if, in addition to a competent command and a good morale, or esprit de corps, in evidence throughout the complement, the vessels' commanders had been under the strict discipline of an able seagoing commodore or admiral and all the units of a squadron schooled in fleet tactics. However, as the War of the Revolution advanced, the naval strength grew more and more to consist of privateers and letters of marque, i.e., armed merchant ships owned and operated by private capital—or what has been termed "private men-of-war," or "militiamen of the sea." The colonies had no money either singly or collectively, the armed forces were not paid, and it would have been impossible to raise by taxation even five or ten per cent of the money put by adventurous and patriotic citizens into the arming and operation of merchant ships. Furthermore, the red tape and a certain kind of rigid discipline associated with the operation of government vessels did not appeal to the men fighting for freedom and independence; the freer and fuller life of a privateersman was far more to their liking; moreover, they were sure of their pay and of all their agreed-upon personal share of every prize captured, and they sailed as democratic partners with the owners and their officers and shipmates in hazardous adventures. Again, not only was state ownership of cruisers and privateers proven to be infinitely less efficient than private ownership but also government-owned and operated war vessels could not be manned without impressment, and such an arbitrary resort to force could not be countenanced in any fight for liberty. If American privateers had not hoisted their flags and sailed to harass the enemy's commerce, the "Don't tread on me" flag and later the Stars and Stripes would have been completely swept from the seas in the War of the Revolution.

*Jonathan Haraden—a Typical Famous Privateersman
of the Revolutionary War*

Jonathan Haraden (1744-1803) was one of America's great heroes of the sea in the fight for independence. Ralph D. Paine has said: "The United States Navy, with its wealth of splendid tradition, has few more commanding figures than Captain Jonathan Haraden, the foremost fighting privateersman of Salem during the Revolution and one of the ablest men that fought in that war, afloat or ashore." Haraden, after experience in a commissioned "state naval vessel," or government-owned ship of war, turned to letter-of-marque ships and privateering. From early days, he was an ardent champion in advocating the use of privately owned and operated commissioned armed ships to fight the British and help the cause of the colonists. America needed supplies, and Haraden maintained that the best way of obtaining them was by the capture of British cargo-laden ships and that the best way "to hurt England and make her feel the war" was "through the pocketbooks of her merchants" and the seizure of her merchant ships. Haraden rebelled at the red tape, poor leadership, inefficiency, and political domination connected with the state and Continental navies; he ridiculed the idea of using colonial merchant ships in navy formations and for naval purposes as if they had been designed and built as men-of-war. During the War of the Revolution, he advocated the use by the American colonists of letter-of-marque ships that would carry cargoes both ways, maintain American trade, bring into the country such foodstuffs and supplies as were greatly needed, and through strong armament and big crews act as privateers while operating on trade routes, effect valuable captures "to help the cause of liberty," and work the greatest possible measure of destruction on the merchant marine of the British—their most vulnerable point of attack.

Jonathan Haraden and John Paul Jones believed in common that the way for the American colonies to fight England at sea was through attacks on its merchant shipping. Britain was invincible as a naval power, and America had no navy and could never hope to build one during the war that would be sizable or powerful enough to become a factor in the fight for independence; yet the two men differed greatly on how attempts should be made to harass, weaken, and partially destroy the British merchant fleets. In the early days of the war, both men were commissioned as officers on government-owned and operated naval craft, which were, of course, nothing but merchant vessels that had been acquired by "the state" and armed. From the start, both experienced the inefficiency, injustice, procrastination, and weaknesses of a politically dominated organization. Jonathan Haraden quickly rebelled, resigned his commission, and, taking command of a letter-of-marque ship, went into privateering while engaging in commerce. John Paul Jones, notwithstanding his disgust of conditions in the operation of the American Navy and the almost unbelievable humiliation, injustice, and handicaps to which he was steadily subjected, remained true to his ideal that, in spite of all the faults of the provincial and Continental governments and the Navy Department, all fighting ships should be naval vessels commanded by commissioned naval officers and manned by naval crews under the discipline and restrictions of "sworn-in" armed forces (whether on land or sea); that privately owned armed ships preying on the shipping of the enemy—whether commissioned by the government or not—were nothing but pirates and freebooters; that the prime motive of their activities was not patriotism but selfish avarice and that the possible military value of their adventures was always secondary to the lure of quickly acquired wealth for private gain.

Both Haraden and Jones were splendid naval strategists and fighters, and both consistently fought for their country in a spirit of pure patriotism permeated, particularly in the case of Jones, by an intense hatred of the British Government. Haraden was one of the best and most spectacular privateersmen in the American War of the Revolution and, because of his

pure motives and honor as well as success, is worthy of being singled out as representative of a type of competent and courageous commander of colonial-built and owned merchantmen that, well armed and manned, roamed the high seas in trade and struck terror into the hearts of the British. Whether as a letter-of-marque-man, as a privateersman, or as master of his craft when operating a dispatch and supply ship running between the colonies and France, Haraden was always looking for either a fight or the capture (or destruction) of a British vessel. Although he would fight "at the drop of the hat" if his ship had any possible hope of survival when pitted against numerically superior force, he always maintained that the successful accomplishment of his mission was paramount—whether it was the delivering of dispatches, the carrying of munitions, supplies, and food to the Continental Army, or the delivery of a cargo of merchandise.

Haraden is credited with capturing "one thousand British cannon afloat" and with "counting his prizes by the score." This splendid seaman did far more to win the independence of his nation than many a landsman whose military achievements won the recognition of the government and an honored place in history. Paine says that Haraden must be ranked "as one of the ablest sea-fighters of his generation" and that he was "a merchant mariner" who "stands out, full-length, in vivid colors against a background that satisfies the desire of romance and thrillingly conveys the spirit of the time and place."

Haraden captured a surprisingly large number of armed enemy ships by sheer nerve and with but little fight and some without firing a shot. So great was the belief of his crew in the infallibility of his judgment that, we are told by one of his company, "if Capt. Haraden picked up a glass to sight a vessel and ordered the helmsman to steer for her, the word went round the ship, 'If she is an enemy, she is ours.'" An American lad who had once sailed with Haraden as a ship's boy, held as prisoner aboard a British "brig-of-war," shouted when he saw the *General Pickering* approach the English vessel: "My master is on that ship and I shall soon be with him. He takes everything he goes alongside of and he will soon take you." Historians tell us that "the skillful seamanship of the American put the British vessel in such a position that her guns could not be used to advantage and after a brief and futile fire from her deck swivels and small arms she was obliged to haul down her colors" and become one more prize to the credit of the intrepid Haraden. A contemporary said of this famous American privateersman: "Easy going to a fault when ashore, he was swift as lightning and sure as death in his grasp of essentials when afloat and his coolness and audacity never forsaked him." An onlooker who witnessed one of his fights against great odds said: "Haraden fought with a determination that seemed superhuman and although in a most exposed position, where the shot flew thick around him, he was all the while as calm and steady as if he were amid a shower of snowflakes." Again, we read: "It seemed as if Haraden's composure increased with the deepening peril, and the more critical the situation, the more consummate was his skill in meeting it. Amid the rain of round and case shot, he appeared as much at ease as if he were safe in his Salem home."

Many sayings have come down to us attributed to Haraden during his exploits at sea: his frequent stentorian orders to enemy ships, "Haul down your colors at once or I'll fire into you"; "Strike or I'll sink you, by God"; to the officer of the deck, "She is bigger than we are, but I shan't run from her. Keep the ship on her course, sir"; and to his crew when fighting against great odds, "Don't throw away your fire; be firm and steady and we'll take her"; when off Bilboa, "Take particular aim at their white boot-top"; and again when up against heavy odds in the shape of three enemy armed ships, "Do your duty, men, and we'll take them all, one after the other." An unintentional compliment to Haraden's fighting ability came from a captured British captain who could not believe that the *General Pickering*, which had almost sunk his ship and caused him to strike his colors, was as small as she was. When, in answer to a question put to the mate, he was told that the armament of the "*Pickering*" was fourteen 6-pounders and that she had about forty men and boys aboard, he blurted out in anger, "You're a damned liar; no ship so lightly armed and manned could inflict such damage."

Born in Gloucester, Mass., in 1744, Jonathan Haraden went to work as a boy for George Cabot, a merchant of Salem, and soon thereafter went to sea and had a command in the merchant service at the beginning of the Revolutionary War. One of the first of two vessels commissioned by the Massachusetts colony as state vessels of war was the brigantine *Tyrannicide* (also referred to as a "brig" and as a sloop with square sails), owned by Richard Cabot, the son of George Cabot. Haraden was appointed lieutenant of this "state war-ship," which was commanded by Captain Fisk. She has been described as "a modest vessel with a formidable name." On her first cruise, the Yankee craft, which apparently mounted 14 guns and had a crew of about ninety men, fought a "king's cutter" bound from Halifax to New York with important documents and materials aboard. On June 13, 1776, the *Tyrannicide*, following a spirited action that lasted an hour, captured the British square topsail packet schooner *Despatch* (carrying 8 carriage and 12 swivel guns and thirty-one men) after her master, Captain Gutteridge, had been killed. In July the "state privateer" captured the British armed ship *Glasgow* and the following month took the brig *St. John* and the schooner *Three Brothers*. In 1777 the *Tyrannicide* was with the brig *Massachusetts* when they captured the British bark *Lawnshale*, and on this cruise the *Massachusetts* is also credited with capturing seven British vessels, one of which had sixty-three Hessian chasseurs aboard. On March 29, 1779, the *Tyrannicide*, when off Bermuda, fought and captured the English brig *Revenge* (14 guns; eighty-five men).

Haraden distinguished himself in the various engagements in which the audacious *Tyrannicide* took part and later was promoted to the command of her. During the ill-fated Penobscot Expedition, in which thirteen American privateers participated, it was definitely proven that a fleet of highly individual armed merchantmen, with no leadership and inexperienced in squadron action and fleet discipline, was of little use in naval operations. When pitted against heavily gunned and well-protected ships functioning as a unit and all designed and built solely for war purposes (including the bombardment of forts with their heavy shore batteries) and manned with exceedingly large crews (to work the ship and all its guns, fight with small arms, board the enemy, and make forages and raids ashore), the *Tyrannicide* was burned with almost all of the other American merchant craft of similar type to keep them from falling into British hands.

After this experience, Haraden, preferring individual freedom of action, chafing under government political control, and sensing the hopelessness of state, or Continental, naval fleet actions (with improvised and essentially weak armed vessels) against highly organized and powerful British men-of-war, obtained his release from state naval duty. Soon afterwards, Haraden was given command of the *General Pickering*, a Salem merchant ship of 180 tons, which was fitted out as a letter of marque, mounting fourteen 6-pounders and carrying a crew of forty-five men and boys. The "*Pickering*" sailed for Bilboa, Spain, in the spring of 1780 with a cargo of sugar. Before Captain Haraden had his ship's crew "hammered into shape," he was attacked by a larger and more powerful British "cutter" mounting 20 guns, which was beaten off after a running fight lasting about two hours. In the Bay of Biscay, the *General Pickering* overtook at nightfall a British privateer much larger and more powerful than herself, which proved to be the topsail schooner *Golden Eagle* mounting 22 guns (57 per cent more than the "*Pickering*") and carrying sixty men. Coming alongside in the dark, Haraden exercised his outstanding ability to bluff, and he shouted through his speaking trumpet to the commander of the British vessel, "This is an American frigate, Sir. Strike, or I'll sink you with a broadside." The English were evidently caught unprepared, and the master of the *Golden Eagle* promptly surrendered his vessel without firing a shot, fully convinced that he was striking his colors to a powerful American naval frigate. Haraden put a prize crew aboard the English privateer, with orders to follow the *General Pickering* into Bilboa.

As Haraden's ship and her prize approached the Spanish port, the large English privateer *Achilles* of 42 guns and 140-150 men (a vessel of thrice the theoretical fighting power of the "*Pickering*") intercepted the American ship and her prize. The *Achilles* was described

as "one of the most powerful privateers out of London" and "a big, heavy-armed and well-manned ship more in the class of a sloop-of-war." The wind died down as evening approached, and the *Golden Eagle*, which had drifted far to leeward and out of the protecting gunshot of the "*Pickering*," fell an easy prey to the *Achilles*, which put a prize crew aboard her and then maneuvered into position so as to be able to attack the *General Pickering* at dawn. Captain Haraden made no attempt to escape from the *Achilles* and make port during the night (which he could have done, as his ship was "just outside the harbor" of Bilboa); but while the captain of the *Golden Eagle*, who was a prisoner on board the *General Pickering*, expressed his elation at the change in his luck and talked of the size, power, speed, and handiness of the *Achilles* and the prowess of her British captain and crew, Haraden, unruffled as he paced leisurely to and fro and planned his fight, quietly remarked, "I shan't run from her." In the early morning, after having cleverly maneuvered the "*Pickering*" between the land and a line of shoals, Haraden told his crew that he had no doubt "that we will beat the Britisher." The "*Pickering*" could muster a crew of only some thirty men, as the remainder had been placed aboard the *Golden Eagle* as a prize crew, but it is said that Haraden "harangued so eloquently" the prisoners aboard his ship and offered them such a large reward for voluntary services that "a boatswain and ten men offered to fight with the American crew."

Business relations between the merchants of Massachusetts and Bilboa had been close before the War of the Revolution, and as the Spaniards did not like the English, Bilboa during the war was not only a good port with which to trade but also a convenient harbor on the eastern shores of the Atlantic in which to sell American-taken prizes, have repairs made after a fight, and refit. It was also a place where many American owners had agents from whom money could be obtained on account, and whereas Spaniards at times thought that the American privateersmen on shore leave caroused too much and got too rough, yet they liked money, were natural enemies of the British, and were, therefore, pro-American.

The memorable battle of the *General Pickering* and the *Achilles* occurred on the morning of June 4, 1780, and we are told that not only "thousands from the city of Bilboa thronged the shore front to witness the exciting fight" but also "fishing boats, cutters, and small vessels and boats of all types crowded the waters" outside of the battling arena. Robert Cowan, who witnessed the fight, stated that the very deeply laden *General Pickering*, "compared to her antagonist, looked like a longboat by the side of a ship." Haraden was fearful of the *Achilles*' getting alongside and boarding him with a vastly numerically superior crew (almost four to one), and he cleverly placed his ship so as to obtain protection from shoals, while exposing the *Achilles* "for over two hours to a raking broadside fire." The British ship was relatively close to the "*Pickering*," and towering like a tall-sided frigate over the "Yankee" (which was "riding deep"), she found it difficult to sweep her; whereas the "*Pickering's*" low broadsides repeatedly swept the decks of the *Achilles* with fearful effect and, moreover, kept up a steady pounding of the British ship's hull around the white "boot-top." When ammunition was running short, Haraden resorted to the expedient of "cramming the muzzles of his guns with crowbars," which "flew like a flight of huge iron arrows, made hash of the enemy's decks and drove the gun crews from their stations, doing so much damage generally that the *Achilles* decided it was time to seek safety in flight."

Another report says that after a fight of nearly three hours, the British captain found his ship making water so badly from the many shots through her side near the water line—and with his decks a shambles, the rigging in tatters, and the masts splintered so that he feared the ship would soon be unmanageable—that he was compelled to haul off and escape the deadly enemy fire and reach a place of safety where repairs could be made or sink. Haraden, whose seamanship was evidently flawless, handled his vessel so as to avoid the *Achilles* while he poured deadly broadsides into her. When the *Achilles* sought safety in flight, the "*Pickering*" was handicapped in chasing her because of the proximity of the shoals, but was worked clear in masterly fashion and started in pursuit. With "a mainsail as large as that of

a ship of the line," the Britisher was able, when out of gun range, to draw away from her opponent. Haraden, it is said, had offered his gunners a cash reward if they should carry away a mast of the *Achilles* and so disable her that the "*Pickering*" could draw up alongside the enemy and renew the engagement, but her abrupt withdrawal and the spreading of canvas on the *Achilles* as well as the position of the "*Pickering*" in relation to the shoals and the channel permitted the British ship to get rather quickly out of the range of Yankee guns. We are also told that the *Achilles* had no cargo aboard, merely ballast enough to make her stiff. Being light, she had a great advantage as far as speed was concerned over the heavily laden *General Pickering*, which was being operated as a letter-of-marque ship in legitimate trade and not as a cruising privateer.

When Haraden saw after a three-hour stern chase that he could not possibly overtake the big defeated English privateer, he recaptured the *Golden Eagle* and made port with his prize. Upon arrival at Bilboa, Captain Haraden found himself a popular hero. We are told: "The crowd swarmed to his landing place, caught him up, and carried him through the streets at the head of a triumphant procession of thousands. Numerous dinners and public receptions followed to honor this hero of one of the most spectacular engagements in all privateering annals." Because of the number of spectators who witnessed the battle between the *General Pickering* and the *Achilles*, it has been referred to by later-day historians as "the *Keersarge-Alabama* fight of the Revolution."

Returning to the United States, the *General Pickering*, while well off the coast, encountered in October three armed British merchantmen sailing in company from Halifax to New York; they were the ship *Hope*, cut for 16 carriage guns (and, it has been said, with 14 aboard), the brig *Pomone* of 12 guns (also reported as of 14 guns), and the cutter (or square topsail sloop) *Royal George* of 14 guns. When sighted, the Britishers flew signals and formed in line. It was said that "one of the vessels alone in size, guns and manpower well matched the *General Pickering*." Captain Haraden assured his men that he had no doubt whatever that "if you will do your duty, we will quickly capture the three vessels." We are told by an observer, "This he did with great ease by going alongside of each of them, one after the other." This required naval strategy of a high order and a vast amount of audacity, courage, confidence, and resourcefulness as well as superb seamanship, for he attacked one ship after the other and kept them from uniting against him.

The *General Pickering*, under the command of Captain Haraden, made many voyages between American and French ports, bringing back large quantities of munitions, stores, and supplies needed by the Continental Army. Later on, the ship was given a somewhat heavier armament, which stood her in good stead in several remarkable engagements. On still another occasion, Haraden in the "*Pickering*" is credited by some historians with capturing three British ships that, combined, carried an armament of 42 or 44 guns (but this reported feat would seem to be an error). At times, Haraden resorted to camouflage and, it is said, "disguised his vessel so that it appeared to be a plodding merchantman." On one occasion, with her fighting power well concealed, her fore-topgallant mast and yard down, and drags out astern to check her speed, the "*Pickering*" was chased by two alert British privateers, which had made themselves obnoxious by recapturing some of his prizes, so he set a trap for them. Letting the first one come close, "Haraden stripped off the painted canvas screens that had covered his gun ports, fired a devastating broadside, and captured the enemy without more ado." The second privateer was also shortly in the possession of the ingenious Yankee skipper by means of strategy. The English colors were run up on the "*Pickering*" above the Stars and Stripes as if she had been captured, following which Haraden went after the second British privateer, successfully deceived her commander, and, when alongside, blasted her with such a terrific and destructive broadside that, being entirely unprepared and helpless at such close quarters, she quickly struck her colors.

While in the *General Pickering*, Captain Haraden attacked a heavily armed Royal Mail packet bound to England from the West Indies. We are told that this packet was "a tough antagonist and a hard nut to crack," being "one of the largest merchant vessels of her day and equipped to defend herself against privateers." One report says that she had "20 large guns and a complement of 70 men." Ralph D. Paine, in *THE OLD MERCHANT MARINE*, writes of this encounter:

They battered each other like two pugilists for four hours and even then the decision was still in the balance. Then Haraden sheered off to mend his damaged gear and splintered hull before closing in again. He then discovered that all his powder had been shot away excepting one last charge. Instead of calling it a drawn battle, he rammed home his last shot in the locker, and ran down to windward of the packet, so close that he could shout across to the other quarter deck, "I will give you five minutes to haul down your colors. If they are not down at the end of that time, I will fire into you and sink you, so help me God." It was the

bluff magnificent—courage cold-blooded and calculating. The adversary was still unbeaten. Haraden stood with watch in hand and sonorously counted off the minutes. It was the stronger will and not the heavier metal that won the day. To be shattered by fresh broadsides at pistol range was too much for the nerves of the gallant English skipper, whose decks were already like a slaughterhouse. One by one, Haraden shouted the minutes and his gunners blew their matches. At "four," the red ensign came fluttering down and the mail packet was a prize of war.

This description, whereas emotionally extreme as to the "one last charge," etc., nevertheless, is substantially correct, and when Haraden could not win by force of metal, he brought psychology into play. In this case, "the Yankee skipper, finding himself in desperate straits, conceived the plan of frightening his antagonist into surrender." It is said that when the American prize crew went aboard the captured British packet, it found "the aged governor of the island from which the ship had sailed seated in an armchair on deck with a heavy blunderbuss at hand," but a bullet from the "*Pickering*" had passed through both cheeks and mouth, "causing a disastrous wound."

Captain Haraden liked a well-canvased, sizable, very heavily armed, and well-manned ship for a privateer—but "not too big." His experience with a great British ship-of-the-line confirmed his judgment. During a voyage to France, he got close to an English battleship one night, and at daybreak, with no wind, escape seemed impossible. However, manning his sweeps, "three of which were sheered off by enemy shot," he rowed the "*Pickering*" out of danger. Haraden was brave but not foolhardy, and he well knew when not to risk his ship and the lives of his men.

In 1782, Captain Haraden was in command of the privateer, or letter-of-marque ship, *Julius Caesar* of 14 guns and carrying forty men, which, it is said, he handled with "great bravery and skill" and to the great profit of the owners and all aboard the ship. In a letter written in 1782 by an American in Martinique to a friend in Salem, Mass., we have evidence of some of Haraden's activities in this new command:

Captain Jonathan Haraden in the letter of marque ship *Julius Caesar*, forty men and fourteen guns, off Bermuda, in sight of two English brigs, one of twenty and the other of sixteen guns, took a schooner which was a prize to one of them, but they both declined to attack him. On the 5th ult., he fell in with two British vessels, being a ship of eighteen guns, and a brig of sixteen, both of which he fought five hours and got clear of them. The

enemy's ship was much shattered and so was the *Caesar*, but the latter's men were unharmed [this should not be taken literally]. Captain Haraden was subsequently presented with a silver plate by the owners of his ship, as commemorative of his bravery and skill. Before he reached Martinico, he had a severe battle with another English vessel which he carried thither with him as a prize.

In the *Julius Caesar*, Haraden is said to have "fought successfully several engagements against two ships at a time." However, on one occasion, he evidently met his match in a large heavily armed English privateer (also said to have been two armed English vessels—a ship and a brig) that exchanged hard blows with him for over two hours without either ship's gaining any noticeable advantage. Captain Haraden ended his report on this drawn battle by saying, "Both parties separated, sufficiently amused."

Capt. Jonathan Haraden died at Salem on November 23, 1803, when fifty-nine years old. A memorial tablet placed by the Sons of the American Revolution on his old home reads in part: "A patriot distinguished for his daring skill and success as a commander of armed vessels in the War for American Independence. . . . He was a hero among heroes and his name should live in honored and affectionate remembrance."

*Silas Talbot—a Militant Commander of Armed Merchantmen
during the War of Independence*

Silas Talbot, popularly known and described in histories as one of the great American "privateersmen" during the War of Independence, was unique inasmuch as for a while he actually held concurrently, by act of Congress, commissions as lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army and captain in the navy. He became famous for his maritime exploits when connected with the army and for his operation of a so-called "army privateer." Talbot was also probably the founder of the United States Marine Corps, and he did brilliant work with Continental soldier-sailors during the first few years of the War of the Revolution. Whereas John Paul Jones was a navy man in every sense of the word and Jonathan Haraden, after a brief experience as a commissioned officer in a Massachusetts state vessel of war, became an ardent and successful privateersman, Silas Talbot joined the armed forces of his country soon after hostilities commenced in the spring of 1775 and continued fighting the enemy during much of the war in government-operated and manned but privately owned armed merchantmen. Talbot is also of historic importance, as one of his outstanding achievements was the successful waging of war against the American Tory-owned privateers of the British-occupied and dominated ports of New York and Newport, R. I. Technically, Talbot does not qualify as a privateersman, for he was a commissioned officer in the Continental armed forces, and the vessels that he commanded were not privateers but armed merchantmen, chartered (or otherwise acquired) and operated as cruisers under the naval flag and the supervision and management of the Navy Department and government committees functioning through the orders and control of Congress.

Silas Talbot, although a soldier, was primarily a seaman. Born in 1751 at Dighton, Mass. (on the Taunton River, which runs into the Narragansett), young Talbot shipped at the age of twelve as a cabin boy on a small coasting vessel. In 1772, when twenty-one years of age, he was a successful and prosperous shipmaster, as he had built himself a house at Providence, R. I., with his own earned money. Stirred by the encounters between the Massachusetts minutemen and the British regulars at Lexington and Concord (April 19, 1775), Talbot felt that there was a need of men to fight the English on shore. He joined a Rhode Island regiment, of which he was commissioned captain on June 28, 1775, and took part in the operations before Boston, which led to the British evacuation of that town and locality on March 17, 1776. While traveling with the Continental Army under Washington from Boston to New York, Talbot had a marine diversion en route, as he was deputed to assist Capt. Esek Hopkins in getting his squadron (just back from the Bahamas) from New London to Providence. Following the accomplishment of this mission and with the Hopkins squadron "safe in the desired haven," Talbot rejoined the army before New York, where he thought he would see more action. Captain Talbot was in command of a fire ship that, in accordance with a developed plan, fouled the big British 64-gun ship-of-the-line *Asia* and burned fiercely. The British succeeded finally in extinguishing the flames, but the enterprise made such an impression on the commanders of the fleet that the three warships at anchor

seven miles above the city (to assist the land forces in their operations against Washington's army) slipped their cables and, falling down the river, anchored below New York. Talbot and his men reached the New Jersey shore in safety, but he was very badly burned. For this gallant undertaking, Congress promoted Talbot to the rank of major. In the British attack in November 1777 on Fort Mifflin, Talbot was shot through the wrist and was incapacitated soon after by a ball that penetrated his hip. Being totally disabled, the brave officer was taken to the hospital at Princeton and later to his home in Providence until his wounds were healed and he could walk again.

In the campaign of 1778, a French fleet under Count d'Estaing, which was off the American coast, agreed to co-operate with the American land forces and drive the British out of Rhode Island. The Continental Army, under General Sullivan, did its part, and Major Talbot constructed a fleet of eighty-six flat-bottomed boats to transfer the army from the mainland to Rhode Island. Embarkation of the troops began on August 9, and the American Army, after gaining the island, moved southward to attack the British garrison at Newport when the French fleet opened fire from the sea. Count d'Estaing played the Americans false. He lost his nerve and did not attack in harmony with the plan of strategy developed, and his failure to co-operate caused the Americans to use their boats once more and withdraw their forces to the mainland.

After the French fleet sailed from the Narragansett to Boston (where there were no British forces to fight), the British decided to close the Sakonnet River, or eastern Rhode Island water passage, to the Americans and converted a stout 200-ton brig to a floating fort protected against boarders by high nettings and equipped with eight 12-pounders and 8 swivel guns. This craft, named the *Pigot* (after Sir Robert Pigot, who was in charge of the British garrison at Newport), was anchored in a suitable strategic spot in the middle of the Sakonnet River, and the important commerce through that channel was completely stopped. Maj. Silas Talbot determined to capture or destroy this troublesome British floating fort and obtained General Sullivan's permission to fit out the small coasting schooner *Hawk* of 70 tons for this purpose. Armed with only two 3-pounders and with sixty volunteers aboard, the *Hawk* sailed from Providence. Through ingenuity and strategy of a high order and a thorough knowledge of ships, Talbot quietly, in the dead of a moonless night, got his little schooner in contact with the *Pigot* and, with a kedge anchor lashed to his bowsprit, tore such a wide opening in that vessel's protective net against boarders that his men swarmed aboard after a grapnel effectively held the two crafts together. The *Pigot* was taken entirely by surprise before she could fire a single cannon, and the *Hawk's* picked crew, with a volley of small arms, quickly took possession of the enemy vessel. It is said that Lieutenant Dunlop, the British commander of the *Pigot*, wept when told that his powerfully armed fort had been captured by a little Yankee schooner armed with only two 3-pounder guns. It is also said that whereas several British seamen were wounded, not a single man on either side was killed in this encounter and that not one of the American force was injured sufficiently to warrant medical attention. Talbot secured all the Britishers below decks and, in defiance of the enemy fleet, got the *Hawk* and her prize to port and later marched his prisoners to Providence. A contemporary writer, referring to this exploit, said: "The good effects resulting from this well-planned and bravely executed enterprise were numerous and extensive. The spirit of the people, which by the failure of the late attempt on the English garrison at Newport had been greatly depressed, was raised, and the intercourse by sea, which, to the immense prejudice of this part of the country, had been long shut up, was now opened." For this courageous, brainy, and successful adventure, Congress promoted Talbot to the rank of lieutenant colonel, while the General Assembly of Rhode Island presented him and his first assistant (Lieutenant Helm) with swords.

Stimulated by the successes with the unarmed fire ship against the battleship *Asia* and the little and pitifully weak *Hawk* against the floating fortress *Pigot*, Talbot next developed a plan for destroying the British 50-gun ship *Renown*, which the enemy, late in 1778, sta-

tioned off Rhode Island. Talbot's plans were ingenious and introduced new methods of warfare, but unfortunately the old vessel with which he was all ready to make an attempt to capture a powerful British man-of-war was frozen in, and when navigation opened in the spring, the *Renown* was ordered from the station. For much of what we know of the life of Silas Talbot, we are indebted to historian Caritat, who, in his *LIFE OF SILAS TALBOT*, appears to have differentiated well between legend and fact in describing the exploits of his hero during the War of the Revolution.

Early in 1779, General Gates, commanding the Continental Army in the Northern Department, reported to General Washington that the American Tories in New York were transforming some of their merchantmen lying in that port into private cruisers and sending them forth to prey on the coastwise trade, with the result that in a short time American commerce in the vicinity of New York had been almost annihilated, especially in Long Island Sound and the waters of Connecticut and Rhode Island. "This means," said Gates, "that it has become almost impossible for the army to secure needed provisions." Washington's response was to suggest the fighting of Tory privateers with American ships "of like type." Colonel Talbot was ordered to take the little square topsail sloop *Argo* of 100 tons, equip her with guns, and with a picked crew of volunteers from the Continental Army put to sea "to cruise after the mischievous Tories and punish them."

The *Argo*, which became known as an "army privateer," was in fact not a privateer at all, for although she was privately owned, she had been taken by the Continental forces without the permission of her owner (Nicholas Low, of New York) and was being operated by the government with commissioned army officers and enlisted men. However, it is well to note that Colonel Talbot was a merchant sea captain and that the men who volunteered in all his naval escapades were primarily seamen who had enlisted in the army to see some real fighting; many of them were disgusted with the landlubbers and political appointees who were in charge of the government-owned ships, whose policy—strictly opposed to that of such men as John Paul Jones and Silas Talbot—seemed to be to remain safely on shore or at anchorage in port and avoid the danger and inconvenience of a fight. Talbot mounted twelve 6-pounders on the *Argo* and with a crew of sixty men sailed from Providence in May 1779 looking for "Tories, the British and trouble."

Talbot proceeded around the east end of Long Island and sighted a sail which proved to be the New York Tory privateer *Lively*, mounting a battery the same as that of the *Argo* (twelve 6-pounders), under the command of Captain Stout, of New York. During a hard chase of five hours, the Tory sought to avoid a fight, but Talbot caught up with her and compelled Captain Stout to strike his colors, following which Talbot sent the *Lively* to port with a prize crew aboard. The *Argo* then ran offshore and captured two armed English merchantmen, which were headed for New York heavily laden with goods from the West Indies. Both of these enemy ships surrendered when the *Argo* ran alongside, and with prize crews aboard they were taken into Boston.

Not only the Tories of New York but also those of Newport, R. I., had been fitting out privateers to wage war against American merchantmen and colonial commerce. Captain Hazard, a native of Rhode Island, had been well esteemed in the Narragansett region until he took command of the stout brig *King George*, mounted fourteen 6-pounders on her decks, and with a crew of eighty "Loyalists" put out to sea as a Tory privateersman for "the base purpose of plundering his old neighbors and friends." Col. Silas Talbot (once Captain Talbot of the colonial merchant marine) knew Capt. Stanton Hazard and was particularly anxious to meet and square accounts with "the renegade Rhode Islander who made Newport his base" and had captured many American vessels. The inhabitants of the seacoast towns kept Talbot pretty well posted on the actions and probable plans of Captain Hazard, and Talbot, on his second cruise in the *Argo*, encountered the *King George* south of Long Island, ran alongside of her, hailed Hazard by name, and, "cursing him in double-shotted phrases for the traitorous swab that he was," delivered a broadside, grappled and boarded her. We

are told that the seagoing infantry (the pioneers of the United States Marine Corps), "scrambling well armed and determined over the bulwarks, tumbled the Tories down their own hatches without losing a man." A prize crew took the humiliated *King George* and her complement into New London, the once boastful "stout brig" having struck her colors to a smaller and more lightly armed sloop notwithstanding that she had a third more men aboard than her captor. The capture of Captain Hazard and his Tory privateer, we are told by contemporaries, caused great rejoicing along the coast. The brig arrived in port amid the cheers of the populace, and "even the women, both young and old, expressed the greatest joy."

Following the capture of the *King George*, the *Argo* seized an American privateer that was in the hands of a British prize crew and sent her into New Bedford. Talbot then captured the British merchant brig *Elliott* (6 guns), bound from London to New York with a valuable cargo of dry goods and provisions aboard, and sent her as a prize to New London. Up to this time, Talbot, in his "army privateer," had taken six vessels (including the recaptured American privateer)—all without serious fighting; two were Tory privateers and three armed English merchantmen, two of which were heavily armed and popularly described as privateers.

Talbot had developed the members of his crew on the *Argo* to a high state of efficiency, and "they were anxious to test their mettle against that of a worthy foe." In August 1779, the men on the little Yankee sloop sighted a sail which soon gave promise of a real struggle, for she was the English privateer *Dragon* of 300 tons, mounting fourteen 6-pounders, manned by eighty men, and looking for a fight and "another rebel ship to capture." We are told that the battle between these two antagonists was fought for "four hours and a half within pistol-shot range." The *Argo* got a real taste of severe sea fighting and suffered great losses; however, Talbot persisted and had the satisfaction of dismasting his opponent, following which the Englishman, being unmanageable and having her deck covered with dead and wounded, surrendered. At the time that the *Dragon* struck her colors, the *Argo* was in a sinking condition, "with water in the hold almost up to the gun deck." Men had to be swung over the sides to plug the shot holes, and the sloop was repaired so that the pumps were able to clear the vessel of water. The *Dragon* had a prize crew placed aboard, and shortly thereafter the undermanned and crippled *Argo* ran afoul of another English privateer, the brig *Hannah* of 200 tons, armed with twelve 12-pounders and two 6-pounders. Although the English brig was twice the size of the little *Argo*, was more heavily armed, and had twice as many fighting men aboard, Talbot's "impudent one-masted craft" promptly attacked her adversary and was more than holding her own in another bloody fight when another American privateer, the *Macaroni* of Pennsylvania (a small brig mounting only 6 guns and carrying twenty men, with Captain Keybold in command) hove in sight to render assistance; whereupon the *Hannah* surrendered, and the *Argo* sailed into New Bedford with her prizes (the *Dragon* and the *Hannah*). We are told:

When the *Argo* returned to port with her two prizes, she was so much shivered in her hull and rigging by the shot which had pierced her in the last two engagements that all who beheld her were astonished that a vessel of her diminutive size could

suffer so much and yet get safely to port. The country people came down from a considerable distance, just to see Colonel Talbot and his prizes and to count the shot marks on the *Argo*.

On September 17, 1779, Congress gave Silas Talbot a commission as captain in the navy and further declared that his pay as lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army should continue until he could be employed by the Marine Committee. Henceforth Talbot was a captain in the navy, and the days of Colonel Talbot and his "army privateering" were over. After refitting, the *Argo* again put to sea and, while skirting the southern coast of Long Island, fell in with the American privateer *Saratoga*, a much larger vessel hailing from Providence, R. I., under the command of Captain Monroe. When off New York Harbor, the ships discovered the New York Tory (and English-built) privateer *Dublin* (Captain Fagan) leaving port. The *Dublin* was a relatively big vessel and mounted fourteen 6-pounder guns, but Tal-

bot conceived the strategy of the *Argo's* encountering the *Dublin* alone at first, in order not to frighten the Tory privateer back to port. The *Saratoga* sailed away with the understanding that she would return when the *Argo* and *Dublin* were engaged in deadly combat and administer the coup de grâce. In accordance with the program, Captain Talbot came to blows with the Tory, but the *Saratoga* had trouble with her steering gear, and for over two hours the *Argo* battled the *Dublin* alone, enjoying a slight advantage, when the *Saratoga* finally stood in toward the enemy and gave her a whole broadside, following which the Tory privateer struck her colors and was taken as a prize into Egg Harbor. The next day, the *Argo*, operating alone, seized the British merchant brig *Chance* of 200 tons, bound from London to New York, laden with supplies for the invading army; she also was taken as a prize to Egg Harbor.

Shortly afterwards, the *Argo* pursued an artfully disguised ship of the line, which could have blown her out of the water with a broadside of 30 guns. The command of the ambitious little *Argo*, thinking that he was chasing a large transport bound for the West Indies and not seeing any sign of guns or gun ports, got close in when the wind died out. Fortunately, Captain Talbot discovered the trap in the nick of time, got out his sweeps, and set all hands on the job of pulling the ship to safety—but not before some damage was done. Only the faulty firing of the British permitted the *Argo* to escape, as several shots did hull the sloop, some of which were 32-pounders. The big ship proved to be the *Raisonnable* (64 guns) of the Royal Navy, which was proceeding from New York to join the British fleet in the West Indies. When the breeze sprang up, the *Argo* quickly pulled away from her mammoth antagonist and effected her escape.

It has been said that in the eighteenth century "men fought and slew each other with a certain courtesy and with a fine, punctilious regard for the etiquette of the bloody game." This is illustrated by a contemporary account of the meeting of Talbot with the British privateer brig *Betsey*, pierced for 16 guns (but carrying only twelve 6-pounders at the time) and with a crew of thirty-eight men. The *Betsey* had a Scotch skipper, and as the vessels approached each other and displayed their colors, Talbot called out before opening fire, "You must now haul down those British colors, my friend." The commander of the brig is said to have coolly replied with a dignity and elaborateness worthy of a Chesterfield, "Notwithstanding I find you an enemy, as I suspected, yet, Sir, I believe I shall let them hang a little bit longer—with your permission—so fire away, Flannigan." This exchange was promptly followed by a spirited cannonade for about an hour, when, "the Scotchman, having all of his officers and many of his men killed or wounded, surrendered." The *Betsey* was bound for New York and, it is said, had on board "two hundred and fourteen puncheons of rum." Shortly after this, Captain Talbot captured a sloop from New Providence bound for New York with a cargo of supplies for the British Army.

Being in need of repairs and reconditioning, Captain Talbot returned from this cruise to Providence only to find awaiting him there orders from Congress to return the *Argo* to Nicholas Low, her owner, for the sloop that had served her country so well "had been seized without the owner's permission, as he could not be reached when she was needed for important work." As an "army" and a "navy" so-called privateer, the little *Argo*, under Talbot's command, had taken twelve prizes and "had rendered inestimable service to the American cause not only in ridding the southern coast of New England of Tory privateers and in taking valuable prizes, with three hundred prisoners, but also in opening navigation so that the army, under General Gates, could receive much-needed supplies."

The following chantey from BALLADS OF RHODE ISLAND, published 1782, under the caption "Captain Silas Talbot," shows the esteem in which the "Yankee privateer" captain was held by American seamen; also that the term "clipper ship," applied to a ship built primarily for speed, was in use in New England as early as the War of the Revolution.

Talk about your clipper ships, clipper ships,
clipper ships,
Talk about your barquentines, with all their spars
so fancy;
I'll just take a sloop-o'-war with Talbot, with
Talbot (Si Talbot),
An' whip 'em all into 'er chip, and just to suit my
fancy.

So heave away for Talbot, for Talbot, for Talbot
So heave away for Talbot, an' let th' capting
steer;
For he's the boy to smack them, to crack them,
to whack them,
For he's the boy to ship with, if you want to
privateer.

Captain Talbot's next command was the "private cruiser" *General Washington*, a Providence-owned vessel on which were mounted twenty 6-pounder guns, and the complement was stated as 120 men. This square topsail schooner was not built for or owned by the navy, but was evidently chartered by the Continental Government to be used as a navy ship engaged in cruises and raids on merchant shipping as if she were a privateer. As long as Talbot was on the *Argo*, many of his old "marines," or able seamen-soldiers (who had enlisted in the Continental Army), remained with him because of personal respect and affection as well as patriotism and a knowledge that they were serving their country well and getting lots of action. While Talbot was waiting for a second ship, most of the *Argo's* crew drifted away—disgusted with the Navy Department, which did not give them a reasonable part of the value of the prizes taken nor even the regular navy (or army) pay due them. Experienced and competent American seamen generally (officers as well as men) wanted nothing to do with either the Continental or state navies, but Captain Talbot—as did Capt. John Paul Jones—believed in a government-owned and operated navy rather than privately owned and operated armed ships. Talbot remained loyal to his ideals, even though such a course of action meant a pronounced financial loss to himself, delayed action, an inferiorly fitted-out ship, the handicap of incompetent and confusing executive orders, and probably a poor makeshift crew.

The *General Washington* is an historic vessel, for during the space of three years she was an armed merchantman, or privateer, a chartered warship of the Continental Navy, a British cruiser (renamed *General Monk* after being captured by the British), a prize owned by Philadelphia merchants when she was taken by their armed merchant ship *Hyder Ally* (Captain Barney) in the early spring of 1782, and a United States cruiser with her old name of *General Washington* restored when purchased by the government in April 1782. In late 1783, she became the only vessel of the navy of the young republic, and she was sold to re-enter merchant service in 1784. The *General Washington* is described by most historians as a swift-sailing craft and an excellent privateer, but it has been suggested that she was not the formidable vessel that would naturally have been expected of a cruiser of her size, armament, and stated complement, for the schooner was somewhat sluggish and as an American Government warship was not as well fitted out, equipped, and manned as she would have been if privately owned and operated. The excellent, courageous, and resourceful command of Captain Talbot was not sufficient to overcome the fundamental handicaps, and although the *General Washington*, soon after sailing on her first voyage as an armed cruiser, captured a valuable merchantman bound from Charleston to London (which was sent into Boston as a prize) and another British ship that had sailed from the West Indies for Ireland (which was recaptured by the enemy before making an American port), she soon met disaster because of an apparent lack of speed and inability to sail away from superior forces. Running up to Sandy Hook after making the second capture, Talbot got too close to the strong British fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot. When he saw what he was up against, he put all the sail on the "*Washington*" that the vessel had, and as the wind was strong she should have made her escape and run away from any British naval vessels except fast frigates and sloops of war; but Talbot's new command was evidently neither a fast ship nor a good sea boat, and a British ship of the line, the *Culloden*, overhauled the *General Washington* and captured her.

Some historians say that a Captain Walker was in command of the *General Washington* on her first cruise; that she fought a drawn six-hour battle with an 18-gun English ship and a 6-gun brig and escaped capture from some British war vessels by "superior seamanship and fine running qualities" before a favorable breeze, but that she fell an easy prey to Admiral Arbuthnot's squadron. In the historic encounter on the Delaware between the *General Washington*, renamed *General Monk* and carrying twenty carriage guns and a crew of 120 British sailors (after being well fitted out in harmony with British Navy tradition as a king's ship), and the quickly converted merchant ship *Hyder Ally*, "pierced for sixteen 6-pounders," with a complement of 110 men, the *General Washington* had an advantage in size, weight of armament, and number of crew, but the *Hyder Ally* beat her decisively, and after a fight of half an hour's duration, she surrendered to the Philadelphia merchants' vessel. The *General Washington's* casualties were twenty dead and thirty-three wounded, whereas the *Hyder Ally's* were fifteen all told, of whom only four were killed.

Whether or not Captain Walker was on board at the time, Capt. Silas Talbot was captured with the *General Washington* by the British ship-of-the-line *Culloden* in the summer of 1780 and taken aboard H.M.S. *Robuste* (Captain Crosby). His much-needed service for his country during the Revolutionary War was over, as he was confined in the prison ship *Jersey* in New York Harbor, transferred to England in the notorious H.M.S. *Yarmouth* (Captain Lutwedge), and lodged in Plymouth jail. Talbot did not get back to the United States until well on in 1782, and he was then an ill man, suffering from the effects of incarceration and rough treatment as a British "rebel." There is no record of Captain Talbot's activities prior to the end of the fight for independence, but he continued to be attached to the navy and in 1799 was in command of the famous frigate U.S.S. *Constitution*.

*The GRAND TURK of Salem, Mass., a Privateer with
a Unique Record during the Last Years
of the Revolutionary War*

The privateer *Grand Turk* was built early in 1781 for Elias Hasket Derby, of Salem, Mass., by Thomas Barstow at his Two Oaks yard in Hanover, Mass. She was known in Salem as "the great ship," and although her length of hull was stated as "not quite one hundred feet long," she was a big ship for her day, being high-sided and beamy and of lofty rig. The *Grand Turk* was a full-rigged three-masted ship with four yards on each mast; her single top-sails were tremendous, and she was fitted with much fore-and-aft canvas and carried, in addition to two square sails on the bowsprit and jib boom, an unusual "ring-tail sail" attached to the end of the spanker (like a fore-and-aft studding sail) and a "water sail," which was bent below the spanker boom aft of the taffrail.

Elias Hasket Derby (1739-1799), a son of Capt. Richard Derby, of Salem, Mass. (born in 1712), was a wealthy merchant engaged in foreign trade whose business was crippled by the war. Instead of laying up his ships, Derby "diverted his ability and abundant resources" into privateering and, it is said, "was interested in at least eighty of the privateers out of Salem." Ralph D. Paine, in *THE OLD MERCHANT MARINE*, says of Derby and his activities during the War of the Revolution:

He soon perceived that many of these craft [Salem privateers] were wretchedly unfit for the purpose and were easily captured or wrecked. It was characteristic of his genius that he should establish shipyards of his own, turn his attention to naval architecture, and begin to build a class of

vessels vastly superior in size, model and speed to any previously launched in the colonies. They were designed to meet the small cruiser of the British Navy on even terms and were remarkably successful, both in enriching their owner and in defying the enemy.

The *Grand Turk* was Derby's best and biggest ship built during the war. She was largely paid for in goods rather than in money and was launched in May 1781, and on June 13, 1781, a commission was issued to the "ship *Grand Turk* of 28 carriage guns and 120 men to cruise against the enemies of these United States" under the command of Capt. Thomas Simmons. No details of the privateer's first voyage are available other than a statement covering the sale of the two British brigs *Defiance* and *Venus* captured, which netted £1,504-2-6—half to the owner and half to the captain and crew.

A second commission was issued to the *Grand Turk* on September 29, 1781, to cruise once more "against the enemies of the United States" under the command of Capt. Joseph Pratt. This voyage commenced October 26, 1781, and the privateer sailed directly to enemy waters and boldly took up her station off the southern coast of Ireland. The first capture—made well in sight of the Irish coast—was of the English ship *Mary*, a large vessel homeward bound from Jamaica and laden with "900 hogsheads of sugar, some coffee and kampeche wood." Captain Pratt put the English crew ashore and proceeded with both his ships in the direction of Spain. The British brig *John & Grace* was next captured, and the three vessels were anchored in Bilboa Harbor on December 16, where the prizes were quickly sold for 820,276 reales (about \$41,000), one-half of which was turned over in cash to Captain Pratt and his crew and the balance remitted to the owner. The *Grand Turk* left Bilboa March 13, 1782, and arrived at Salem May 4, returning by way of the West Indies and capturing three more British vessels—the schooner *Triton*, the brigantine *Thomas & Betsy*, and the schooner *Primrose*—which as prizes netted £3,960. It was said: "This one voyage alone more than repaid the *Grand Turk's* fortunate owner for her cost, and no doubt was the means of setting up many of her crew in comfortable circumstances for the rest of their lives. At the same time she rendered a valuable service to the American cause in harassing British commerce and in carrying the war up to the very shores of Great Britain."

The third cruise of the *Grand Turk* (July-September 1782), also under Captain Pratt, resulted in the capture of two British vessels, the ship *Ann* and the brigantine *Rambler*. The fourth and last privateering cruise of the *Grand Turk* commenced in the fall of 1782 under the same command, and she sailed for the West Indies. When a few days out, she captured the British ship *Minerva* and sent her to Salem under a prize crew. On December 17, the *Grand Turk* arrived at Saint Pierre, Martinique, with the big English brig *Mary* taken a few days before (this vessel bore the same name as the rich prize captured on the *Grand Turk's* second cruise into Bilboa, although that vessel was ship-rigged). The brig *Mary*, bound from England to Jamaica, was one of the best prizes ever taken by the *Grand Turk*, as she was laden with English dry goods and foodstuffs, and the ship and her cargo netted 102,335 livres when sold at Saint Pierre. Soon after leaving Martinique on December 26, 1782, Captain Pratt sighted a squadron of the British Navy, six warships in all, most of which were powerful and fast frigates. On this occasion, the wisdom of building the *Grand Turk* for speed proved itself, as the fastest of the British frigates was no match for the Yankee privateer in the chase that followed. However, Pratt crowded on so much sail that the fore-topgallant mast was badly sprung, and the ship put into Montserrat (then owned by the French) for repairs. After sailing again, the *Grand Turk* captured the British sloop *Polly* of Barbados and sent her with a prize crew to Martinique, where the vessel and her cargo sold for 12,324 livres and the nine Negro slaves who were aboard fetched 8,695 livres net.

West Indian waters at this time were alive with British frigates and sloops of war, and the *Grand Turk*, putting into Saint Pierre the end of January and Basse Terre, Guadeloupe, on February 22, 1783, for supplies and news, apparently made no captures and spent most of her time dodging formidable British warships that were protecting British merchantmen and looking for her and other American (and French) privateers. In early March, however,

the *Grand Turk* captured the British ships *Echo* and *Active* and the snow *Sally & Polly*. The *Echo* and the *Sally & Polly* were taken to Martinique, where they netted 27,064 livres at the usual auction, and the ship *Active* was sent to Salem with a prize crew. On March 12, the *Grand Turk* gave chase off Saint Kitts to a British ship bigger than herself and overhauled and captured her; this vessel proved to be the full-rigged ship *Pompey* of London (400 tons), a reputed fast sailer armed with 20 guns. When the English ship was boarded, her captain declared that the seizure was illegal, as peace had been declared, but Captain Pratt, knowing nothing about peace, said that the Salem court would justly decide that issue. He sent the *Pompey* to Salem with a prize crew, and the court ruled that she was a fair capture, as it was on March 24, 1783, or twelve days after the seizure by the *Grand Turk* of the *Pompey*, that Congress issued orders recalling "all armed vessels cruising under commissions from the United States of America." It is interesting to note that George Crowninshield, a merchant of Salem, bought the *Pompey* at public auction and renamed her *America*. She was the first of three ships owned by the Crowninshield family to bear this name, one being the privateer *America* that was famous in the War of 1812.

The *Pompey* was the last of the captures of the *Grand Turk*. On April 7, 1783, she sailed from Saint Pierre, Martinique, for Salem, arriving home April 30, and when she dropped her anchor in Salem Harbor, her career as a privateer terminated. The above record of the *Grand Turk's* known captures gives fifteen vessels (two on each of Cruises 1 and 3; five on Cruise 2; six on Cruise 4), but contemporary writers say that the privateer "captured no less than 16 enemy vessels" in the period of twenty-two months and that, "as all her prizes came safely to port, she added materially to the wealth of the new country at the expense of the old." Robert E. Peabody has written:

The *Grand Turk* did a great service to the country in harassing British commerce. . . . It is impossible to compute the total value of her spoils, as the accounts of sales of some of her prizes are missing, while the vagaries of exchange in those days make it difficult to estimate the equivalent in our money of the prize sales of which there is record. Yet when it is realized that the *Pompey* alone was worth as much as the *Grand Turk* herself; that the *Pompey* was only one of several good-sized ships captured, and that in nearly all cases the cargoes were of as much value as the ships themselves, it may be safely said that in less than two years the

Grand Turk paid for herself many times over. Furthermore, the *Grand Turk* was only one of Mr. Derby's privateers, and many of his smaller vessels enjoyed a fair measure of success as well. Thus, while aiding his country's cause by capturing English ships, Mr. Derby was at the same time amassing a very considerable fortune of his own. The close of the war found him the owner of three good-sized ships and a number of brigs and schooners, in place of the half dozen little craft with which he had traded to the West Indies and Spain in colonial days.

Ralph D. Paine, the marine historian, in *THE SHIPS AND SAILORS OF OLD SALEM*, says that at the beginning of the war Elias H. Derby owned "seven sloops and schooners" and that when peace came, in 1783, he had "four ships of from three hundred to three hundred and fifty tons which were very imposing merchant vessels for that time."

Samuel Curwen, a Loyalist, or Tory, of Salem, had found the revolutionists and patriotic spirit of his fellow townsmen too much to tolerate and had taken refuge in England. On February 10, 1780, he wrote from Bristol, England, to another Salem Tory (who had also established residence in Britain) and denounced privateering as a piratical evil and its effect upon the "redistribution of wealth" in their old home town as follows:

It is a melancholy truth that while some are wallowing in undeserved wealth that plunder and Rapine has thrown into their hands, the wisest and most peaceable and most deserving, such as you and I know, are now suffering from want, accompanied by many indignities that a licentious and lawless people can pour forth upon them. Those who a few years ago were the MEANER people are now by a Strange Revolution become almost the only men in Power, riches and influence; those who

on the contrary were leaders in the highest line of life are very glad at this time to be unknown and unnoticed, to escape insult and plunder and the wretched condition of all who are not Violent Adopters of Republican Principles. The Cabots of Beverly, who you know had but five years ago a very moderate share of property are now said to be by far the most wealthy in New England; Hasket Derby claims the second place in the list.

We also read that "E. H. Derby's province tax is £11,000 and his neighbors complain that he is not half taxed"; also that "Nathan Goodale by an agency concern in privateers and buying up shares, counts almost as many pounds as most of his neighbors." Aside from the mention of the fortunes of Derby, the Cabots, and others gained through the ownership of privateers and of Goodale through buying up shares of the crew's "half-lay" in privateer cruises, the Salem Tory's letter is of significance, for it reveals the British—and "Loyalist" American—viewpoint that the capture of a British merchantman, whether armed or not, by a lawfully commissioned American privateer was "plunder and Rapine," but that the seizure and confiscation of an American merchant vessel by a British privateer were lawful and proper. An American patriot demanding justice and liberty was a "Violent Adopter of Republican Principles," but a Tory was a peaceful citizen subjected to "insult and plunder" because of his political, social, and economic views. History reveals that during the War of the Revolution the Tory American "Loyalists" were apt to be just as aggressive as the "King's men" and as violent as the rebels, or insurgents, who, refusing to be a subject people governed by tyranny and intolerant despotism, were the real patriots and waged an eight-year war for liberty and democracy.

Elias Hasket Derby wanted to be "a peaceful merchant," but when the British seized three of his vessels in early 1776 while bound to Salem from Jamaica, he found that he could no longer continue in peaceful trade with the West Indies and Spain, so he decided to arm his ships and either trade with letter-of-marque vessels or cruise with out-and-out privateers. On June 13, 1776, the Massachusetts Council issued a commission to Capt. Peter Lander to command Elias H. Derby's schooner *Sturdy Beggar* of 90 tons (fitted with 6 carriage guns and carrying a crew of twenty-five men) and "make reprisals on the enemies of the United States of America." In a later published list of Salem privateers that were commissioned during the War of the Revolution, the *Sturdy Beggar* is described not as a square topsail schooner but as a brig, and she is said to have carried 8 guns and sixty men and to have been commanded during her career by Capt. Daniel Hathorne and Capt. Edward Rowland. There is an interesting tavern bill on record made out by Jonathan Archer, Jr., to "Captain George Williams, Agent, Privateer Brig *Sturdy Beggar*," which is a charge against the owner of the vessel for the cost of the "rendezvous" expense of entertaining during the time spent in signing up a new crew. The "Rendezvous Bill" covers a period from August 8 to September 10, 1781, and itemizes 67-½ "Bowls punch," 36 "Bowls Chery tod," and 9-½ "Grog," and the total charge made by "mine host" (Jonathan Archer) footed the tidy sum of "fourteen pounds, seventeen shillings and fourpence." It was said against privateering that "rendezvous entertainment" drew away from the naval service the best class of recruits, but besides "free drinks" ashore, there were many reasons why American seamen preferred to serve in ably handled privately owned and operated armed ships rather than in politically officered and operated state and Continental cruisers (which were also armed merchantmen).

Three months after the *Sturdy Beggar* was commissioned as a privateer, Elias H. Derby and another Salem merchant fitted out Derby's West Indian trader *Revenge* with 12 guns and sent her out as a commissioned privateer to prey on British commerce. On her first cruise as an armed vessel, we are told, the *Revenge* captured four English ships engaged in the Jamaica trade, which yielded "733 hogsheads of sugar besides other cargo." In a later published list of Salem privateers that saw service during the war, the *Revenge* is described as a square topsail sloop mounting 10 guns and commanded by Capt. Benjamin Dean. That the prize money of even the earliest privateers in the War of the Revolution "was counted before it was caught" (and that seamen sold in advance part of their share in the ventures) is shown by the following bill of sale executed by one of the complement of the *Revenge*:

Beverly, ye 7th 1776

Know all men by these presents, that I, the subscriber, in consideration of the sum of sixteen dol-

lars to me in hand paid by Mr. John Waters, in part for ½ share of all the prizes that may be taken during the cruize of the privateer sloop called the *Revenge* whereof Benjamin Dean is commis-

sioned commander, and for the further consideration of twenty-four dollars more to be paid at the end of the whole cruize of the said sloop; and these certify that I the subscriber have sold, bargained and conveyed unto the said John Waters,

or his order, the one-half share of my whole share of all the prizes that may be taken during the whole cruize of said sloop.

Witness my hand.

P. H. Brockhorn

An endorsement on the back of this preserved document records that John Waters received the sum of twenty pounds for "parte of the within agreement," which return gave him a handsome profit on the speculation. We are also told that available records indicate that "Salem merchants plunged heavily on the risks of privateering by buying seamen's shares for cash." Trading was evidently brisk in the fractions of community-owned privateers, of which there were many among the approximately two hundred different craft commissioned as Salem-owned private armed ships during the War of the Revolution.

Robert E. Peabody says that in the fall of 1777 Derby's name appears "as owner or part owner of numerous privateers sailing from Salem, and between that year and 1781, he was interested in no less than twenty-six of these armed ships." Ralph D. Paine writes that when Elias H. Derby found his trading activities ruined by the Revolution, "he swung his masterly energy and large resources into equipping privateers." We are told that "after as many shares as possible had been subscribed for in financing any Salem privateer, he would take up the remainder, if more funds were needed." Paine says that it has been claimed that Elias H. Derby "was interested in sending to sea more than one-half of the one hundred and fifty-eight privateers that hailed from Salem during the Revolution." Government naval records show, however, that commissions were granted to Salem shipowners and commanders for 196 vessels designated as "private armed ships of war," and it is said that these vessels carried 1,965 guns and 7,631 men. As the war progressed and the demand for the necessities of life in the American provinces increased, Derby sent out vessels as letters of marque, and these carried commercial cargoes, were fully armed, and held a commission from the government authorizing them not only to protect themselves if attacked during their voyages but also to capture any enemy ships met on their way. As a matter of fact, many letter-of-marque ships were operated as cargo-carrying privateers.

Prior to the building of the *Grand Turk*, Elias H. Derby's ships were of about 100 tons (the usual size for the West Indies trade), but in the fall of 1780, experience, investigation, and a study of the records had convinced Derby that 100-ton topsail schooners, brigs, or sloops of the usual model (copied from the British) were inefficient as privateers. The slow, small British merchant craft had been driven from the seas, and British commerce was moving generally in big, well-armed vessels, often in convoys, and frigates and sloops of war more powerful and faster than American privateers were "dotting the ocean" and policing all British trade routes. Derby had become impressed with the superiority of the lines of French hulls for speed; hence his venture in the building of the 300-ton *Grand Turk* to be used as a privateer to hold her own with British cruisers during the war and to be available for opening up long-voyage trade routes on the Seven Seas after independence was won. The *Grand Turk* was not modeled or sparred after any French ship. Elias H. Derby, owner, Thomas Barstow, builder, and Capt. James Gibaut, superintendent of construction, co-operated to design and build a distinct new type of American ship, which was intended to capitalize the knowledge gained from the French but to be better and faster for her type and carrying capacity—with an eye to ocean commerce in the future—"than any vessel afloat that they knew or had heard of."

The record of the *Grand Turk* as a privateer is a peculiar one. With a brave crew seeking adventure and rich prizes and an able, resourceful commander, the "great ship" of Salem, although she captured sixteen enemy vessels, never really engaged in a fight. It would seem that she was never injured by enemy shot and did not have a man killed or seriously wounded aboard her from enemy gun or musket fire, cutlasses or pikes. The *Grand Turk* was equipped, manned, and always ready to fight, but her commander was not foolhardy, and when in the

proximity of powerful British naval units, she had speed enough to show her heels to them. Speed permitted the Derby ship to overtake any vessel she set out to catch and to run away from powerfully armed and well-manned naval craft for which she was no match. It is said, however, that the *Grand Turk* never refused battle with any armed merchantman or privateer and never ran away from an enemy ship that did not have twice as much gun power as she had.

The following is a list of the armed merchant vessels fitted out by the Derbys (generally under the direction and supervision of Elias Hasket Derby) during the War of the Revolution and the dates when commissioned as recorded in the Massachusetts archives:

Date Commissioned	Name	Rig	Type of Armed Vessel	Derby Ownership
June 13, 1776	STURDY BEGGAR*	Schooner	Privateer	Whole
Sept. 4, 1776	REVENGE	Sloop	Privateer	Part
Oct. 8, 1777	ROVER	Sloop	Privateer	Part
Dec. 19, 1777	CONGRESS	Schooner	Letter of marque	Part
Dec. 22, 1777	CENTIPEDE	Schooner	Privateer	Part
Jan. 21, 1778	PATTY	Sloop	Privateer	Part
Feb. 25, 1778	SCORPION	Schooner	Privateer	Whole
Apr. 10, 1778	LEXINGTON	Schooner	Privateer	Part
Apr. 18, 1778	FRANKLIN	Brigantine	Privateer	Part
May 22, 1778	CENTIPEDE	Schooner	Privateer	Part
July 20, 1778	CONGRESS	Schooner	Privateer	Part
July 23, 1778	SCORPION	Schooner	Privateer	Part
Oct. 16, 1778	FRANKLIN	Brigantine	Privateer	Part
Mar. 29, 1779	OLIVER CROMWELL*	Ship	Privateer	Part
Mar. 30, 1779	FRANKLIN	Brigantine	Privateer	Part
Apr. 15, 1779	HUNTER	Ship	Privateer	Part
Apr. 15, 1779	FAME	Brigantine	Privateer	Part
Aug. 3, 1779	ROEBUCK	Brigantine	Privateer	Part
Aug. 3, 1779	CENTIPEDE	Schooner	Privateer	Part
Oct. 28, 1779	THREE SISTERS	Ship	Letter of marque	Part
Nov. 25, 1779	SALEM PACKET	Ship	Letter of marque	Whole
Nov. 25, 1779	NANCY	Sloop	Letter of marque	Whole
Mar. 22, 1780	HASKET & JOHN	Brigantine	Letter of marque	Whole
Apr. 18, 1780	LEXINGTON	Brigantine	Letter of marque	Whole
Apr. 18, 1780	FAME	Brigantine	Letter of marque	Whole
Aug. 5, 1780	HASKET & JOHN*	Brigantine	Letter of marque	Whole
Sept. 25, 1780	MORNING STAR	Sloop	Privateer	Part
June 13, 1781	GRAND TURK	Ship	Privateer	Part
Sept. 4, 1781	YOUNG RICHARD	Brigantine	Letter of marque	Part
Sept. 29, 1781	GRAND TURK	Ship	Privateer	Part
Sept. 29, 1781	PATTY	Ship	Letter of marque	Part
Nov. 29, 1781	SALEM PACKET	Ship	Letter of marque	Part
Nov. 29, 1781	LEXINGTON	Brigantine	Letter of marque	Part
Feb. 12, 1782	EXCHANGE*	Ship	Letter of marque	Part
Feb. 2, 1782	FLY	Schooner	Privateer	Part
May 9, 1782	LEXINGTON	Brigantine	Privateer	Part
June 29, 1782	PATTY	Ship	Letter of marque	Part
June 29, 1782	SALEM PACKET*	Ship	Letter of marque	Part
Dec. 16, 1782	ASTREA	Ship	Letter of marque	Whole

*Captured by the enemy.

The first armed merchantman owned by the Derbys, of Salem, Mass., was the schooner *Sturdy Beggar*, commissioned as a privateer on June 13, 1776; the last of their vessels to sail as an armed merchantman during the War of the Revolution was the ship *Astrea* (Capt. John Derby), commissioned six and a half years later (on December 16, 1782) as a letter of marque.

The following statement gives the number and type of the Derbys' armed merchantmen, including their rig, as commissioned by the government during each of the seven years 1776-1782 inclusive:

Year Commissioned	Number of Armed Merchantmen			Number of Armed Merchantmen				
	Privateers	Letters of Marque	Total	Ships	Brigantines	Topsail Schooners	Topsail Sloops	Total
1776	2	—	2	—	—	1	1	2
1777	2	1	3	—	—	2	1	3
1778	8	—	8	—	2	5	1	8
1779	6	3	9	4	3	1	1	9
1780	1	4	5	—	4	—	1	5
1781	2	4	6	4	2	—	—	6
1782	2	4	6	4	1	1	—	6
Total—1776-1782	23	16	39	12	12	10	5	39

Whereas the *Grand Turk* (built in 1781) was a privateer, the Derbys, as the War of the Revolution progressed, engaged less and less in outright privateering and built or converted most of their merchantmen into "letters of marque," sending them trading. Being well armed and manned, these vessels were fully able to protect themselves, attack any enemy ship that they encountered, and take prizes while they were engaged in voyages for profit. Evidently, the Derbys found more money in trading with well-armed merchantmen (that were to a great extent cargo-carrying privateers) than in sailing out-and-out privateers, which went on cruises in ballast—and with empty holds—looking only for enemy ships and plunder. It would seem that, as the war continued, commercial voyages must have been very profitable, for S. Curwen, in his *JOURNAL AND LETTERS*, wrote in 1780:

In New England a dollar bill is worth only 2-2/3 of an English half penny [2-2/3 cents]. Pins at 1s apiece [24 cents], needles at 2s [48 cents], . . . butter 6s [\$1.44] per lb., rum eight dollars per gallon, molasses two dollars, brown sugar 10s [\$2.40] per lb., loaf sugar 15s [\$3.60], Bohea tea seven dollars per lb., coffee five dollars. Irish pork

sixty dollars per barrel, lemons 3s [72 cents] apiece, wood twenty dollars a cord, ordinary French cloth twenty-two dollars a yard, hose nine dollars a pair. A suit of clothes which would cost five guineas here [England] would cost five hundred dollars in Boston.

With such prices prevailing in America, it can readily be understood why the Derbys found it more profitable to operate letter-of-marque armed merchantmen than privateers.

The Penobscot Expedition of 1779—a Fiasco and the 1745 Louisburg Campaign in Reverse

From the days of the earliest settlers up to the commencement of the War of Independence, a period of almost a century and a half, the dominant characteristic and trend of the colonists had been individualistic. Not only the people themselves but also each group forming a separate colony—while expressing nominal allegiance to the British Crown—demanded

freedom. With the ascension of George III to the throne (in 1760), the end of the Seven Years' War (in 1763), and Britain's need of money to pay war debts (and the interest thereon), a new order of domination and regimentation developed to which the colonists objected, but they were handicapped in resisting because of their extreme individualism and their backwardness in uniting in a common cause against conditions that threatened the life, well-being, and liberties of all. During the French and Indian Wars, the outcome of which would certainly affect the American Anglo-Saxon colonies, only Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York contributed their quota of troops and money; the British were left to do most of the fighting, and colonial merchants pursued a policy of continuing their normal foreign trade, even to the point of trading with the enemy. In 1754 commissioners of seven colonies met at Albany, N. Y., to discuss Indian affairs and work out a plan of united action in the interest of all. Benjamin Franklin developed what became known as the "Albany Plan of Union," which promised to strengthen the defense and security of the colonies and bore a marked resemblance to the later Articles of Confederation. Even though all the commissioners agreed to the plan, not one of the colonies would accept it, as all maintained that the proposed union of action against a common menacing foe represented too great a surrender of power and loss of liberty. Alden and Westcott rightly say:

The New England colonies could work tolerably well together, but not with New York; New York, Maryland and Virginia resented the lack of protection Pennsylvania gave to the western frontier and her policy of nonresistance; each colony was inter-

ested in its own problems but suspicious and jealous of the other colonies as they dealt with theirs. The real union of the English settlers in North America and their descendants was destined to be of slow growth.

It was the British Government, backed by overwhelming majority votes of Parliament, that by arbitrary, despotic, and coercive acts drove the thirteen colonies ultimately into a union, which, though weak in binder, nevertheless proved of sufficient adhesive power to take up arms against the mother country, declare the independence of the colonies, and successfully wage a war of approaching eight years' duration in order to gain liberty from oppression.

Extreme individualism severely handicapped the military efforts of the colonies and made the war a protracted and long drawn-out affair. Both land and naval operations suffered as a result of this fundamental colonial characteristic, and when the war ended, the United States possessed no navy, but had only a number of effective privately owned and operated armed vessels. Colonials were excellent seamen. They conformed to the rules of organization and discipline on board a single ship and honored, supported, and were loyal to their captains; but captains would not work together under a commodore in fleet action, and when a squadron was formed, even of Continental or state naval ships, they seldom held together or acted as a squadron for more than a brief period. The Louisburg Expedition in 1745 was successful because it was a Massachusetts province affair, brilliantly planned and executed, and the men engaged in it were all marine-minded and were fighting to protect their means of livelihood; this, moreover, was a land operation with a specific local objective, and the men fought well as individualists under a very tactful leader, who was one of them. What is known as the Penobscot Expedition of 1779 was just as much of an ignominious fiasco and disgrace as the Louisburg campaign had been a glorious victory, but the colonial adventure in the Penobscot was a naval affair requiring ships of war, fleet action, naval squadron leadership, and naval discipline. America had no warships, no knowledge of planned and carefully executed fleet action, and neither naval leadership nor disciplined naval seamen. Also, the Louisburg affair was a campaign against the French, whereas the Penobscot Expedition was aimed against the British, and there was all the difference in the world in the caliber and strategy of the opposition encountered. The Penobscot Expedition of 1779, against a fortified and garrisoned British post and a settlement of Royalists, was an unfortunate and calamitous venture that did much to discourage private enterprise in the fitting-out of privateers in New England during the latter part of the War of the Revolu-

tion. It has been said that 1779 proved to be "a year of disaster for the merchants of Massachusetts," for following a period when privateering had been proving "most lucrative," their privately owned armed merchantmen were employed by the state in an expedition to the Penobscot, "which afforded neither glory nor profit," and "its unfortunate conclusion left these gentlemen adventurers with little heart for new undertakings or means to make them had they wished to."

The British, feeling the need during the war of a secure and convenient naval station nearer to Boston than Halifax, Nova Scotia, or St. John, New Brunswick, established a base and erected a fort near Castine at the mouth of the Penobscot. This naturally proved to be a source of irritation to the marine interests of Massachusetts, so that colony determined, "at its own expense," to seek to capture and destroy the British stronghold of Fort George. In June 1779, it was reported that General McLein had landed two regiments of British regulars at Castine and that three sloops of war had been assigned to the station. (One report says that Castine was "defended by big cannon and eight hundred men.") Massachusetts decided to act at once, as it was claimed that the merchants of Boston and the Salem and Newburyport areas were being greatly harassed in trading and in patriotic privateering operations by the British occupation of Castine, with its fortified naval base. What historians have described as "the most impressive and probably the strongest naval force furnished by New England during the Revolution"—but which was obviously the queerest and most heterogeneous assortment of vessels—sailed from Boston for the Penobscot on July 19, 1779. The fleet evidently consisted of nineteen armed vessels "mounting 324 guns" and twenty-one transports—a total of forty sail; of the armed vessels, thirteen were privateers, three state cruisers (the entire navy of the State of Massachusetts), and three cruisers of the Continental Navy. It was certainly a strange and mixed naval force, lacking cohesion and any semblance of unity or balance. The vessels of the Continental Navy were: the ship *Warren* of 32 guns (Capt. Dudley Saltonstall), the brig *Diligent* of 14 guns (Captain Brown), and the brig *Providence* of 12 guns (Capt. Hoysted Hacker). Capt. Dudley Saltonstall was in command of the fleet, and the expeditionary military force was under the direction of Gen. Solomon Lovell; but there was evidently no supreme commander such as Col. William Pepperell in the successful Louisburg campaign of 1745, and this lack of an authoritative executive military and naval head and strategist, with an absence of the necessary organization and discipline, proved the undoing of the expedition.

A number of privately owned ships in charge of highly individualistic commanders—each considering primarily his own vessel and the interest of owners, master, officers, and crew, with private gain and protection of private property—could not possibly form a naval fleet, obey orders unselfishly, and act only for the common good. The loss of one of the three small Continental cruisers would be borne by the country, but the loss of a privateer was at the expense of a few individuals. This fact alone made privateers unsuited for naval operations. Moreover, privateers, being armed merchant ships, were neither built nor equipped for bombarding forts, and after being subjected to a lot of punishment and damage from heavy shore batteries, even if they succeeded in taking a land position, privateers had no compensation forthcoming in the shape of a tangible prize that could be sold to give a return to private individuals for the venture and the risk, expenses, and losses sustained.

The Penobscot Expedition was doomed from the start if any real and aggressive organized British naval and military resistance was to be encountered, and this for three reasons: (1) the nature of the armed fleet, its absolute lack of homogeneity, cohesion, and fitness for the work being undertaken, coupled with the predominating force represented by privateers and the attitude of the colonists manning these privately owned vessels; (2) the unfitness of the land troops and their lack of suitable artillery, needed equipment, and supplies; (3) an absence of authoritative and responsible leadership, coupled with no co-operation between the army and navy forces, no planned strategy, and no discipline. The privateersmen, we are told, "were extremely loath for the service." "It was only by threats and bribes that they

were forced to go along at all. Their heart was not in it." These privateersmen—from the high command down to the humblest member of the crew—were accustomed to hunt and fight alone, "on their own," using their own methods, making their own decisions, and taking the decrees of fate without excuses. As Esther Forbes says in her life of Paul Revere: "Organizing them [privateers] into a regular expedition was about like harnessing so many sea gulls. Incredibly brave, ferocious as wild hawks on occasions; on others they simply made sail and left." Give an American privateer sea room and he was a veritable eagle—the king of birds of prey—not a sea gull; but as a unit of a squadron, he was likely to be as impotent as a sparrow.

Brig. Gen. Solomon Lovell was placed in command of twelve hundred militiamen, with Gen. Jeremiah Wadsworth second in command and Lieut. Col. Paul Revere in charge of a hundred artillerymen. We are told that the expedition had a further personnel of "800 marines aboard the ships." With twelve hundred militiamen, there were only "500 stand of arms" among them, and the heavy artillery with which Colonel Revere and his "hundred Matrosses" were supposed to reduce Fort George consisted of only "three 9-pounders and 4 field pieces." Whereas 1,200 gallons of rum and 1,200 gallons of molasses appear among the list of stores put aboard the flotilla, the food supplies shipped consisted primarily of 9 tons of flour, 10 tons of salt beef, and 10 tons of rice.

The fleet reached Boothbay on July 21, and General Lovell called for a halt and a review of the troops. We are told that the result added to a prevailing feeling of pessimism, for "there came off the ships and lined up on shore such a collection of 'scare crows' as even the American Revolution in its fourth year rarely brought together." With Massachusetts "pretty well bled of manpower between the ages of 16 and 50 years," the men and boys got together for the Penobscot campaign consisted in large part of what was termed "sweepings." General Wadsworth affirmed that one-quarter of the militia appeared to be "small boys and old men unfit for service," and Adjutant General Hill said of them: "If they belonged to the train band or alarum list they were soldiers, whether they could carry a gun, walk a mile without crutches or only compos mentis sufficient to keep them out of fire and water." Moreover, many of the arms "were out of repair."

The great flotilla entered Penobscot Bay on July 25, and from that time on, Commander Saltonstall apparently had no control whatsoever over the ships and was either unable or incompetent to get any semblance of fleet discipline or to operate the squadron of fighting ships as a unit. The military and naval division of the expedition failed to co-operate. There was not only no head but also not even a board or committee in command, and whereas some meetings of the many ranking officers were held on board the flagship *Warren*, no ideas of strategy were forthcoming and no plans of operation developed. General Lovell, who could have been expected to obtain a fair measure of discipline among his troops when ashore, had but little jurisdiction over them when they were spread among a fleet of ships, with each captain operating his vessel to suit himself. There was incompetency as well as jealousy in evidence among the officers of the military forces. In a period of some three weeks, the expedition wasted valuable time and devoted most of its energies to bickerings. Some troops landed, stormed a height, got some guns in place, and looked as if they were going to take the fort, but they did not press their advantage home. Two British sloops of war maneuvered in the river, but most surprisingly nothing was done to take them, although they would have fallen into American hands easily or been destroyed if the government cruisers led by the *Warren* and backed up by one or two privateers had gone after them. Apparently, the commanders of the British sloops knew the waters of the Penobscot much better than did the American masters, and when Saltonstall was urged to proceed against the British sloops, which calmly defied the impressive but unorganized American armada of merchant ships (some armed and some unarmed), he retorted, "I am not going to risk my shipping in that damn hole."

We are told that the action ashore against Castine was delayed, as it was found that the troops were ill prepared to attempt to storm the British position; their armament and equipment were deemed inadequate, so they calmly awaited reinforcements when speed of action was all important. The privateers were also not disposed, with their relatively light armament and lack of protection, to fight it out with shore batteries, and it would seem that the Continental and state cruisers (all but one of which were nothing more than armed merchant ships of the privateer type) did little, if any, bombardment of Fort George. News of the contemplated expedition and later of the actual sailing of the American fleet from Boston had reached Castine, New York, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, and given the British time to organize for action. On August 14, 1779 (twenty days following the arrival of the Massachusetts expedition), the British fleet appeared in force off the Penobscot and immediately, with the smaller king's ships that had been scouting and keeping in contact with the American vessels for some time, had an homogeneous British squadron that took command of the situation. This fleet, as it assembled for operations against the American marine and military forces and took up positions with the intent "to capture or destroy all the units of the enemy and permit none to escape," consisted of the following vessels of the Royal Navy under the command of Sir George Collier: the *Raisonnable*, a 64-heavy gun ship of the line, or "battleship"; the three fast, well-armed and protected 32-gun frigates *Greyhound*, *Virginia*, and *Blonde*; the two 20-gun sloop-of-war *Galatea* and *Camilla*; the 18-gun sloop-of-war *Nautilus*; and the three 14-gun brig-rigged warships *Otter*, *Albany*, and *North*. This British squadron of ten ships, mounting 260 guns (from medium size to very heavy caliber, with many long-range guns) and carrying 1,600 men of the Royal Navy, was trained in fleet action, and it quickly showed what disciplined, well-educated naval units could do when confronted with a rabble of individual armed merchantmen without fleet leadership or any concerted plan of action for either attack or defense. The American ships were caught unprepared either to defend themselves or get out to sea for flight from the superior foe. The ships scattered in all directions, but most of them ran up the river, where they were destroyed to save them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The Penobscot Expedition was more than an ignominious defeat; it was an inexcusable fiasco, and through it many fine American privateers and three Continental cruisers were lost. It appears that practically all the militiamen who had been landed near Castine regained their transports. Commodore Saltonstall was accused of "leading his ships into a trap where they were all captured or burned," and we are told: "Attempts on the part of General Lovell to collect his soldiers proved unsuccessful, and the survivors straggled back to Boston in small detachments, suffering great hardships on the way." It would seem, however, that Captain Saltonstall was at no time in a position "to lead" the fleet anywhere, either "into a trap" or to victory, and that General Lovell could not "collect his soldiers" when they were spread aboard a large number of ships, each in command of a captain whose sole idea was to try to save his ship from powerful enemy guns. Most of the American ships with troops aboard ran themselves aground, and many armed and unarmed vessels fled up the Penobscot River where the bigger of the British ships could not follow; but the soldiers and sailors, humiliated in defeat, each blamed the other branch of the service for the catastrophe. The militia insisted on getting ashore and away as quickly as possible from the pursuing and relentlessly punishing English ships. If it had not been for the transports and the mass confusion of troops and sailors, most of the privateers might have fought creditably against the British upriver and have defied capture (at least for a long period of time and until troops had appeared to augment the British naval force); however, disorganization was complete and verged on panic, so most of the American vessels were hurriedly run ashore and burned to keep them from being taken by the English.

It has been said that almost instantly following the firing of the big guns of the British ship of the line and the three frigates, each of the forty commanders of forty American ships (less than half of which were armed) had a mind of his own on how to act and not one

with any idea of squadron action or fleet discipline. It made no difference whether the commodore or ranking officer of the expedition was competent or not, and the fact that he was inexperienced and without the qualifications for fleet leadership had little, if any, bearing on the outcome. As soon as the British fleet, with its heavily armed battleship and frigates, got within range and opened a destructive fire on the relatively poorly armed and unprotected American merchant ships, chaos developed. With escape by the open sea cut off by well-placed British naval vessels, each of the captains of the helpless American ships fled and sought to save his men from either death or capture, while sacrificing the ships to keep them from becoming of value to the enemy.

General Lovell wrote in his journal: "To attempt to give a description of this terrible Day is out of my Power. . . . To see four [big-gun, powerful and fast] ships pursuing seventeen sail of Armed Vessels, nine of which were stout Ships, Transports on fire, Men of War blowing up every kind of Stores on Shore, throwing about, and as much confusion as can possibly be conceived."

Paul Revere, in his account of the tragic day, says:

Our armed ships had got abreast of the Point [Fort Point]; they soon overtook the transports who had got under way (the Enemy pursuing). When the transports found that the Armed Vessels all went ahead of them, they ran on shore and landed their men in the utmost confusion. The ordnance brig, in which was most of my men, was the last who came on shore. I got most of my men together in the edge of a wood, but while my Boat was get-

ting some men from a schooner, who had lost their boat, I was separated from them (all but two officers and eight men), they taking into the woods, I supposing they were gone up the river. I followed in my boat (it being Sun down) expecting to overtake them; after searching till 12 o'clock for them, I went on board a transport which had got up the River and stayed till Day light.

The next day (August 15), Revere spent on the river looking for his men and at night went on the *Vengeance*, whose master (Captain Thomas) informed Revere that he had landed some of his men, was getting provisions out of his ship for the soldiers and sailors, and would "burn his Vessel in the morning." On the 15th, Revere refers to General Lovell's "coming down" stream and saying that he was "a going to bring up his men to make a stand"; Revere says that later he found "a considerable body of men" at Grants Mills. Evidently, Revere, two officers, and eight men encamped in the woods a mile in from the river the night of the 15th and next morning started a trek for Fort Western (Augusta) on the Kennebec, where they arrived, following which Revere wrote: "I found most of my officers and men; after supplying them with what money I could spare, I ordered them to Boston by the nearest route."

Robert Graves writes:

Those of the Bostonians who escaped to the shore found themselves a hundred miles from any base and without a morsel of food. A grand argument then ensued between the sailors and soldiers, the latter accusing the former of cowardice, the former

returning the insult, and, weapons being snatched up, sixty men fell in fratricidal battle. Hundreds more perished of famine or exhaustion on their march back through the wilderness to the settled parts of the province.

As a fighting force, the Revolutionary army taking part in the Penobscot Expedition was quickly annihilated by the British naval squadron, which destroyed both the American ships (capturing a few) and all the so-called "organized" land forces. The best thing that can be said about the expedition is that, considering the nature and magnitude of the tragedy and catastrophe, it evidently resulted in the loss of relatively few lives; the greatest suffering and losses were apparently from hunger and fatigue on the long walk through the Maine woods and "wilderness" back to civilization and home. The total casualties of the Americans—dead, wounded, lost, and captured—were later stated as 474 men, and the losses of the British were reported as only 13 men.

The Penobscot undertaking resulted in complete and discreditable failure, but the disaster was due primarily to lack of organization, discipline, planning and authoritative command. Alden and Westcott, in *THE UNITED STATES NAVY—A HISTORY*, have said: "The

affair afforded a lesson which history shows is hard for our people to grasp: an assembly of ships is not a fleet, and a military force of men individually capable and strong but without organization and training is ineffective." More than that, it proved that merchantmen with a few guns aboard and manned by volunteers were only privateers and not men-of-war or naval vessels, whether operated by private owners or a state or Continental marine (or naval) committee; that privateers were ineffective in fleet actions and were of use only in depredations on merchant vessels and, therefore, as commerce destroyers. Personal bravery had little, if anything, to do with the matter. The physically fit individual men of the Penobscot Expedition were probably as brave and may have been gifted with the same initiative as those who took part in the glorious Louisburg campaign, but whereas the men of 1745 were given a chance by fate to prove their splendid heroism and resourcefulness, those of 1779 (i. e., thirty-four years later) were not. The cards were stacked against them, and the end should have been foreseen before they sailed from Boston. A thoroughly organized and disciplined naval force of relatively great power scattered like chaff a group of disorganized vessels, unfitted for the fray, that never functioned as a squadron and had no leadership and no discipline. Courage in such encounters is of little avail unless one has an intelligent plan of action (both aggression and defense) and the weapons of war. The Americans at the Penobscot had neither the ships nor the long-range guns of proper caliber to attack the fortifications of Castine or stand up and fight with big-gunned ships of the British Navy; being without organization and a well-laid plan, their defeat was a rout, and they became a mere rabble, which scurried ashore to escape the enemy's gunfire and then had a long and punishing trek home afoot.

This defeat of the revolutionists was due not to cowardice or lack of fighting ability of the crews who manned the American ships but to the ignorance and incompetency of the Congress and to the crude politics of the leaders of the various colonies. The Congress seemed most stupidly to believe that it could run a war without money; a country and a government without taxes; a navy, consisting of only a few armed merchantmen, without a head and with commanders appointed politically regardless of experience and other qualifications. Only ships of the line could be expected to fight heavily armed vessels and shore batteries, and the revolutionary forces—as well as the navy of the republic in the War of 1812—did not possess a single one. During the War of the Revolution, the American Navy could not boast of even one real frigate designed and built exclusively for purposes of war. The *Raleigh*, *Warren*, *Hancock*, *Randolph*, and *Alliance*, designed as frigates, were built to serve as cruisers in the navy during the war and for use in the merchant marine afterwards. All of these were lost in the war except the *Alliance* (the best of the lot), and she, the last ship of war of the American revolutionists, was sold as a West Indiaman following the peace of 1783. Lightly armed merchantmen, such as those which composed an overwhelming percentage of the vessels of the Revolutionary Continental Navy, in a stand-up fight at sea were merely "gun fodder" for heavily armed naval vessels built exclusively to fight and both "to give and take" heavy broadsides of solid iron. Armed merchantmen, if fast, made splendid privateers and commerce raiders when manned by American sailors, but to survive they had to be able "to show their heels" and get away from more heavily armed naval ships that were built for defense as well as attack. It was suicidal for the Massachusetts authorities to send American armed merchantmen firing light shot—and that only a short distance—against a British fleet that, in addition to heavy brigs and sloops of war, had as its main fighting units a ship of the line and three frigates, which four vessels averaged about 40 heavy (big-bore) long-range guns each. Moreover, with most of the officers politically appointed, the American ships had no experienced squadron commander and no fleet discipline; whereas the British naval forces, under able command, functioned as an efficient and relentless machine of destruction.

The victorious Louisburg Expedition of American colonists was well led by Pepperell of the Piscataqua. It was primarily a Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine expedi-

tionary force escorted and carried by armed merchantmen, but essential discipline was in evidence throughout; politics took no part in the actual planning and executing of the campaign or in the appointment of the masters of the ships and the officers of the fighting force. Louisburg was won by strategy and by the resourcefulness of maritime Americans, who were given a fair chance to prove their superiority as fighters over the French troops. The colonial armed merchant ships did not attempt to outslug shore batteries in a frontal attack and, most fortunately, did not have to fight heavily armed British naval vessels that were veritable floating fortresses. The same type of men (other than in age and physical fitness) who won a glorious victory against tremendous odds at Louisburg in Canada lost discreditably at the Penobscot in Maine, and the fault with the disgrace attached was not theirs.

The Massachusetts Board of War estimated the cost of the Penobscot Expedition at £1,139,175, but the loss was far greater than the value of ships destroyed; the calamity hit privateering hard and caused a great loss of confidence in naval leadership as well as in the organization and officers of the militia and in the ability of the forces to co-operate on land and sea for the common good. Charges and countercharges flew thick and fast, and no one who participated in the adventure came out of it with any reputation. Commander Saltonstall suffered the most. He was court-martialed, and most people placed the blame on his shoulders and demanded that he be shot. The troops blamed the fleet, and the sea captains blamed the militia officers. Saltonstall later, as the "bold and resourceful" captain of the privateer *Minerva*, seems to have done much to redeem himself, but there is all the difference in the world between the command of a fleet and of a single vessel. It was the *Minerva* that after a hard fight captured the English armed merchantman *Hannah* with an important cargo valued at £80,000. This loss so enraged the British that it was responsible for their attack on New London, where Saltonstall had his home. Incidentally, Paul Revere, whose reputation suffered at the Penobscot as did that of Dudley Saltonstall, was credited with "owning a piece" of the *Minerva* and with making a lot of money out of the prizes seized by that privateer during the last years of the war.

John Paul Jones—"I Have Just Begun to Fight"

John Paul Jones (1747-1792), American naval officer and an historic figure during the War of the Revolution, was a Scotchman born in the parish of Kirkbean. He was the son of John Paul, a gardener in the employ of Robert Craik (a member of Parliament), and of Jean Macduff, the daughter of a Highlander. The young son of John Paul, named after his father, went to sea when twelve years of age, being apprenticed to a shipmaster, and his first voyage was to Virginia. Later, the youth occupied an acting midshipman's berth for a brief period, following which he was third mate on a British slave ship, which made two voyages between the Guinea coast and Jamaica. When nineteen years old, he transferred to another slaver as first mate and served in this capacity for two years, when, "becoming disgusted with the slave trade," he took passage home to England. On this voyage, both the captain and first officer died of fever. John Paul assumed command and took the vessel safely to port, following which he continued in the ship as master and supercargo, making two voyages to Tobago (Trinidad, British West Indies). When his employers dissolved partnership, John Paul purchased the *Betsey* and again sailed for Tobago. Putting all his capital into a cargo, the young captain-owner intended to pay his crew when the cargo was delivered and sold, but the crew did not care for such an arrangement and mutinied. During a fight that followed, John Paul killed the leader of the men, and there being no

Admiralty Court sitting in Tobago and fearing a long imprisonment while awaiting trial, he deserted his property, fled the island, and passed into obscurity for a time. At Tobago, he was John Paul, a young, able, and ambitious British shipowner, and when he appeared in Virginia as a young marine adventurer of some twenty-six years of age, he was John Paul Jones, having added Jones to his name to throw the British off his track. There is a legend that John Paul, in his escape from Tobago, served for a while on a pirate ship.

As an exile in Virginia, John Paul Jones met Joseph Hewis, a member of the Marine Committee of Congress. Impressed with the ability and ardor of Jones, Hewis procured for him a commission as a senior lieutenant in the new Continental Navy, and with this in his possession John Paul Jones entered the limelight and the pages of American history in Philadelphia in 1775. The first Navy List, submitted by the Naval Committee and approved by Congress in 1775, gives the names of Esek Hopkins as commander in chief and Dudley Saltonstall, Abraham Whipple, Nicholas Biddle, and John Burroughs Hopkins as captains; the list of five first lieutenants is headed by John Paul Jones, and there are five second and three third lieutenants mentioned. The first assignment given Lieutenant Jones was to arm and man the merchantman *Alfred*, which he handled with unusual ability. He was virtually in command of this vessel in the expedition against New Providence in the Bahamas under Commodore Esek Hopkins (1718-1802) and Capt. Dudley Saltonstall. We are told that "Jones' familiarity with the island proved a large factor in the success of the attack." Captain Hopkins' squadron consisted of the following merchantmen, all pierced for guns and hurriedly converted into warships in the emergency, as were privateers, and none of them was built with any of the requirements of naval warfare in mind:

Name	Rig	Number of Guns	Name	Rig	Number of Guns
ALFRED	Ship	24	PROVIDENCE	Brig	12
COLUMBUS	Ship	20	HORNET	Sloop	10
ANDREA DORIA	Brig	14	WASP	Schooner	8
CABOT	Brig	14	FLY	Schooner	8

The *Alfred* (named after Alfred the Great, who is credited with being the founder of the British Navy) was the old merchant ship *Black Prince*, and the *Columbus* was the merchantman *Sally*. The commander in chief, Esek Hopkins, and the next senior captain in rank, Dudley Saltonstall, as well as the senior first lieutenant, John Paul Jones, apparently all sailed on the *Alfred*, which was the flagship of the squadron. Capt. Abraham Whipple commanded the *Columbus*, Capt. Nicholas Biddle the *Andrea Doria* (named after the Genoese admiral), and Capt. John Burroughs Hopkins, son of Capt. Esek Hopkins, the *Cabot* (named after John Cabot, the discoverer of North America). From the start, the Hopkins-Burroughs Providence and Rhode Island political influence in the navy was clearly and directly evident in the person of Stephen Hopkins of the Naval Committee, Esek Hopkins as commander in chief, and Capt. John Burroughs Hopkins. (Two of the five captains were Hopkins', and Capt. Abraham Whipple was from Providence). One of the lieutenants was Ezekiel Burroughs, and others were known as personal or political friends of the Hopkins-Burroughs Rhode Island group. John Adams wrote that the *Providence*, one of the very first ships of the new Continental Navy, "was named for the town where she was purchased [by Stephen Hopkins of the Continental Naval Committee], the residence of Governor Hopkins and his brother Esek, whom we appointed the first captain"—and the first commander in chief, or admiral, of the American Navy.

Other vessels purchased in 1775 that formed the nucleus for the navy of the Revolution—all of which were merchant vessels "pierced for guns"—were the brig *Lexington* (16 guns), the brig *Reprisal* (16 guns), and the brig *Hamden* (14 guns), the sloop *Independence* (10 guns), the sloop *Sachem* (10 guns), and the sloop *Mosquito* (4 guns).

Early in January 1776, First Lieut. John Paul Jones had the honor at Philadelphia of hoisting the first flag on a duly commissioned vessel of the American Navy. What was then known as the "grand Union flag," consisting of thirteen stripes representing the thirteen American colonies, with the English Union Jack in the field, was displayed; but Lieutenant Jones also ran up the historic yellow silk flag bearing the device of a pine tree and a rattlesnake, with the motto, "Don't tread on me"—and this was the flag of the Revolution and an admonition to Britain to be backed by the thunder of guns on land and sea.

Whereas the clash at Lexington had occurred on April 19, 1775, followed on June 17 by the Battle of Bunker Hill, it was not until October of that year that the Continental Congress took serious measures in regard to the creation of a naval force for defense. The actions of the British, both naval and military as well as political, compelled attention, and during October 1775, Congress created a Marine Committee and authorized the fitting-out of four armed vessels. Until November 1775, Congress had given no consideration to a possible permanent separation from England, and it had issued orders to all colonial armed forces, both on land and on sea, carefully to refrain from any acts of violence that could be construed as open rebellion. The British, however, were not so considerate or hesitant in committing hostile acts, and many law-abiding American merchantmen that were engaged in trade and had cleared from port in strict conformity with the acts of Parliament were seized and confiscated by British cruisers (king's ships) as well as by British privateers. When Britain bombarded and burned Falmouth (Portland), Maine, and ruthlessly attacked other coast settlements, the demand of colonials was for retaliatory action, and on November 25, 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the capture of any armed vessel employed against the colonies or any transport or tender engaged in carrying munitions of war to the British Army or Navy. On March 23, 1776, Congress—with cause and by reason of great provocation—took still more decisive measures against Britain. Letters of marque were issued, and thenceforth all government and privately owned cruisers of the colonies were authorized to capture any vessel—armed or unarmed—sailing under the British flag.

The vessels of Captain (or Commodore) Hopkins' squadron, when leaving Philadelphia, were ordered to meet at a rendezvous off Cape Henlopen at the mouth of the Delaware. However, the *Hornet* and *Fly* found the going too rough, and they abandoned the voyage, reducing the squadron to six armed merchant vessels mounting 92 guns. Hopkins had orders to seek out and capture or destroy the British fleet that had been devastating the coast and, under the direction of Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, had not only bombarded Norfolk on January 1, 1776, but also sent men ashore to set fire to that part of the town that had survived the destructive fleet cannonading. Evidently, orders meant little to Hopkins, and hearing that no British fleet was in the Bahamas and that New Providence was "feebly garrisoned," he determined to sail there and endeavor to obtain some military equipment and stores. After the fleet arrived at the Bahamas, the Americans met with but little resistance and, following the campaign outlined by John Paul Jones, put men ashore and removed cannon, mortars, ammunition, and a substantial quantity of desirable stores, took Governor Brown and a few prominent residents as hostages, and sailed away without sighting a British vessel.

Proceeding to the Narragansett, the American squadron, on April 4, 1776, off Long Island, captured the small British tender *Hawke* (6 guns) and the next day took the "bomb-brig" *Bolton* (12 guns). A little after midnight on April 6, however, *H.M.S. Glasgow* of 20 guns and 150 men either audaciously sailed into the midst of the American squadron or got in by mistake, but in any event the British man-of-war not only inflicted a lot of damage to and caused consternation in Hopkins' fleet but also, when she was ready to depart, sailed away, and none of the American armed merchant ships was in a position or in condition to stop her. The *Cabot*, the first of the Continental Navy squadron to notice the presence of the *Glasgow*, was quickly disabled; Capt. John Burroughs Hopkins was seriously wounded, while the "master" and several of the men were killed. The log of the *Alfred* says that

after the *Cabot* was made hors de combat, "the enemy's whole fire was then directed at us," with the result that the *Alfred's* steering gear was damaged. Captain Saltonstall and Lieut. John Paul Jones fought well, and fortunately the *Providence* entered the fight and did some effective shooting, as the *Alfred* became unmanageable due to the fact that her wheel was shot away.

The episode of the *Glasgow* and a 20-gun ship's getting away from a colonial squadron of some five sizable armed merchant vessels (two of which mounted 24 and 20 guns, respectively) of fully four times her numerical gun power, as Maclay says, was due not to "any lack of spirit on the part of the Americans, but to the want of experienced officers, organization and discipline." It is generally felt that on this entire cruise "Admiral" Esek Hopkins proved his "thorough incompetency to command either a squadron or a single vessel of war"; that Capt. Dudley Saltonstall showed courage and determination and was fortunate in having "a resourceful fighting devil as a lieutenant" (John Paul Jones). However, Saltonstall, who, in command of the *Trumbull* on April 9, 1777, captured two armed British transports laden with military stores off New York, was the unfortunate captain of the *Warren* (32 guns) and commodore of the entire fleet of American armed vessels (Continental and state cruisers, privateers, and transports) that took part in the disgraceful and humiliating fiasco on the Penobscot in August 1779. Capt. Esek Hopkins, who felt that his squadron was in no condition to continue the relatively short distance to Providence, his destination, put into the nearest port, New London. Whereas he reported a highly successful cruise, emphasizing the New Providence exploit and minimizing the *Glasgow* affair, yet he declared his inability to take the fleet the few miles up the coast from the Thames to the Narragansett and appealed to George Washington for help in the form of some two hundred men who as volunteers (and with some experience with ships) would help him to sail the vessels to Providence. The *Glasgow* episode had an extremely bad effect on the morale of seamen serving on American ships and did much to make it extremely difficult thereafter to get seafaring men of worth to enlist in the navy.

Captain Howe of *H.M.S Glasgow* (according to Schomberg's HISTORY OF THE BRITISH NAVY) reported four casualties, only one killed and three wounded, and Captain Hopkins declared the total American casualties for the entire fleet were ten killed and fourteen wounded. It would seem that both reports understated the truth, for whereas we know that the American squadron could not proceed a relatively short distance up the coast without the help of two hundred new men, the CONTINENTAL GAZETTE of May 29, 1776, had this to say of the *Glasgow*: "Just before the *Glasgow* came into the harbor it was plainly perceived by the holes in her sails that she had standing, and by the hanging of her yards, that she had been treated in a very rough manner."

Captain Howe of the *Glasgow* was highly complimented by the British admiral on the station for his courageous and brilliant work in attacking and doing great damage to a vastly superior squadron of "rebel ships of war" and in ably defending himself and escaping from them. On the other hand, the immediate jollification in the colonies, expressed when the news was first given out by Hopkins of his glorious naval achievements, soon turned to doubt and then to censure as the real truth became known. In June, inquiries were made by Congress into the conduct of Captain Hopkins; on October 16, 1776, a vote of censure was passed upon him; and on January 2, 1777, he was formally dismissed from the service.

Esek Hopkins (1718-1802), "the first admiral of the U.S. Navy," was born at Scituate and belonged to "one of the most prominent Puritan families in New England." At twenty years of age, he went to sea and three years later married into a prosperous family of Newport, R. I., becoming a "desk commodore" of a fleet of seventeen merchant vessels. His attempt to operate the Continental Navy showed a pronounced lack of ability both ashore and afloat. Following his dismissal from the navy "for the good of the service," Hopkins retired from further activities with ships and during the remainder of his life played a prominent part in politics. He died at Providence, R. I., in 1802 at the age of eighty-four years.

At the time of the Declaration of Independence, the American Navy consisted of twenty-five armed vessels classified as cruisers mounting 422 guns of various small caliber, and at that time, in addition to privately owned armed vessels that preyed on American commerce and fought its privateers, the British Navy admittedly had seventy-eight men-of-war mounting 2,078 guns stationed on the Atlantic Coast of North America. Of the twenty-five vessels of the American Navy, nineteen were ordinary merchantmen that had been acquired, pierced for guns, and fitted out for waging war on enemy commerce.

The value of the prizes captured by naval vessels went, according to rulings, two-thirds to Congress and one-third to the officers and crew making the capture. But the government and Navy Department heads did not play fair with the men; they appropriated for the high command of the fleet and the executives of the navy a substantial part of the one-third that was due the command and crew of the vessel that captured the prize and, instead of giving the prize money for specific captures to the officers and men taking the prize, spread the money among enrolled officers and men of the entire national (Revolutionary, or Continental) navy. The result was that officers and sailors who did not go to sea—who took no chances and did no fighting—benefited in prize money to the same extent as those active and aggressive real fighters who had undertaken all the risks of "hazards of the deep" and of "coming to grips" with the armed might of Great Britain. Moreover, the government did not even pay its sailors; on a privateer, seamen promptly received their compensation and predetermined full share of the booty, but in the navy many sailors served for years and received nothing unless their captains, as did John Paul Jones, paid the men out of their own pockets.

An illustration of how a politically dominated Navy Department treated the seamen on an armed merchant vessel is to be found in the early exploits of Capt. John Paul Jones. In May 1776, Jones received command of the armed merchant sloop *Providence* of the revolutionists' navy and did convoy duty for a while, successfully guarding vessels engaged in carrying supplies for the defense of New York. In August 1776, Jones was nominated for a captain's commission, and this was followed (in response to his urgent requests) by orders to undertake a cruise of "six weeks or two or three months" and prey upon British merchant shipping, which was much to the young captain's liking. He sailed in the *Providence* from Philadelphia August 21 and returned from his cruise to Newport, R. I., October 7. On this voyage to harass the enemy, Jones, on several occasions, showed seamanship, quick thinking, resourcefulness, and an exhibition of strategy of a high order. He chased a sail that proved to be the powerful and fast British frigate *Solebay*, but succeeded in avoiding capture by sheer nerve coupled with adroit maneuvering. It was said that "by this clever artifice Captain Jones saved a ship to the navy and drew much attention to himself by his bold and skillful seamanship." During forty-six days spent at sea on this cruise, the little and lightly armed American craft, splendidly handled, captured sixteen prizes flying the British flag, sent eight of them with prize crews into American ports, and destroyed the other eight. The vessels seized as prizes were one ship, six brigantines, and one sloop; the vessels sunk or burned consisted of one ship, one brigantine, and six sloops (the total drain on the British merchant marine being two ships, seven brigantines, and seven sloops). According to the law and the promises made the men, one-third of the value of the eight prizes—ships and cargoes—should have been fairly distributed among the command and crew of the *Providence* in harmony with an officially stipulated and generally circulated schedule of fractions. However, the men on the *Providence*, who had been to sea and risked their lives in destroying eight ships in their country's interest and bringing eight ships into port as prizes to the further damage of their country's enemy, after being put off and forced to wait an unwarrantedly long time for their prize money, finally (to their sorrow and articulate indignation) received only ten cents for each dollar due them. The other nine-tenths was paid to men enrolled in the navy in some capacity or other—who were not entitled to a penny—and much of it to "the higher-ups" holding shore jobs.

Esek Hopkins, who had been politically appointed as brigadier-general by Rhode Island

and commissioned by Congress as commodore, or admiral, in charge of the Continental fleet in December 1775 (as George Washington had been placed in command of the army) was a grossly incompetent man, fearful of going to sea. While "keeping himself on shore and at home out of harm's way," Hopkins kept one-twentieth of all prize monies for himself and gave fractions to his staff and friends in the Navy Department. After these executive pilferings, he spread what was left among the officers and crew not of the one ship that had taken the prizes but among the entire fleet, including all the ships swinging safely at anchor, some of which were commanded by landlubbers who, like Hopkins himself, although full of excuses for inactivity, were fearful of going to sea.

An outstanding officer in the young American Navy, John Paul Jones was opposed to using privately owned armed ships to prey on the commerce of the enemy. He was an experienced slaver, knew something of piracy, and had received some schooling in the British Navy. John Paul Jones, being a Britisher, was unfortunately neither a Northerner nor Southerner and, therefore, did not receive the support and backing of either faction, with the result that he was constantly humiliated by the government he sought loyally to serve. Although he commanded the first war vessel to fly the Stars and Stripes and had the most brilliant record of any naval commander, he was sidetracked in seniority of command and denied promotion fully warranted by his record, and men with political backing—some of whom had served with him as subordinates—were placed over him.

On November 2, 1776, Capt. John Paul Jones, who had been put back in the *Alfred*, sailed under orders for Newfoundland. (The *Providence* had been given to Capt. Hoysted Hacker, who had political pull.) Captain Jones had endeavored to enlist men for the *Alfred* in Newport, R. I., and promptly ran up against the preference of seamen to ship on privately owned armed vessels and go privateering rather than sail in government "Navy ships." Jones was incensed at the conditions existing, and as he denounced "the lack of patriotism in men who preferred gold to rendering service to their country," he handled the situation in a very highhanded and thoroughly British way. The privateer *Eagle*, in command of Captain Field and with a good crew of able seamen aboard, left Newport and anchored in Tarpaulin Cove off Naushon Island. The following day, Captain Jones took out the undermanned *Alfred*, laid her alongside the *Eagle*, "and took from her, by force, twenty-four men to complete the *Alfred's* complement." Captain Hacker, in the *Providence*, who was to sail with Jones, soon "gave up" after the vessels got to sea and because of "severe weather" returned to port with his ship (a good seaworthy craft). Captain Jones was blocked by heavy ice in his attempts to release some imprisoned Americans on the Isle Royale, but he burned British fish warehouses on the Nova Scotian coast. When off Cape Canso, the *Alfred*, after sharp engagements, captured three British vessels, one of them being the *Mellish*, a 10-gun transport carrying 150 men and heavily laden with supplies (including 10,000 suits of uniforms) for General Burgoyne's army at Montreal. Among other captures made was a Liverpool-owned "privateer" of 16 guns, which seems to have been a letter of marque. When nearing Boston with eight prizes, Jones sighted the British frigate *Milford* (32 guns) and by strategy and rare seamanship lured her away from his fleet of captured British vessels, seven of which reached port safely with their prize crews. Evidently, Jones both outsailed and outmaneuvered the British warship and brought the *Alfred* into Boston Harbor without much delay.

It is authoritatively said that Jones paid off the crews of the *Alfred* and the *Providence* out of his own pocket, receiving no reimbursement from Congress until after the war. When Captain Jones returned home, however, after a most successful cruise, he found that navy seniority rules and the consideration of experience, ability, and record of performance had been discarded in his absence, that "politics was in the saddle," and that he had been placed as low as No. 18 on a new list of navy commanders that had been drawn up, it is said, "in a pathetic attempt to satisfy all the colonies, each of which wanted representation" and its favored sons given navy commissions—without regard to individual fitness, justice, and the nation's highest good. By a resolution of October 10, 1776, Congress declared that the num-

ber of captains in the navy should be twenty-four, and the order of their relative rank was set forth. With the removal of Esek Hopkins, seniority rules would have made the navy's leading captains: (1) Dudley Saltonstall, (2) Abraham Whipple, (3) Nicholas Biddle, (4) John Burroughs Hopkins, (5) John Paul Jones, and (8) Hoysted Hacker; but the action of Congress, which was primarily due to politics and sectionalism, resulted in making James Nicholson (for reasons unknown) the senior captain. John Manly, a privateersman of ability, ranked second. Hector McNeil, who was placed third, was later (in 1777) denounced by the country "in unmeasured terms" for his action as commander of the *Boston* (24 guns) in not going to the assistance of the *Hancock* of 32 guns (Captain Manly) and the British 28-gun frigate *Fox*, which had an American prize crew aboard, when they were attacked by British vessels "under his very eyes," and Congress, "obeying the dictates of popular clamor, dismissed him from the service." Dudley Saltonstall, who failed miserably with the badly planned and wretchedly executed Penobscot Expedition, was placed fourth in the list; Nicholas Biddle, who died an heroic death on the *Randolph* in March 1777, was fifth. Abraham Whipple had been demoted from third to twelfth place; John Burroughs Hopkins from fifth to thirteenth place; John Paul Jones, with a brilliant career, from sixth to eighteenth place; while Hoysted Hacker, who had been ninth on the April 1775 list, was placed sixteenth in October 1776, but Hacker, a much inferior man, instead of being three places behind Jones, was put two places ahead of him and given command of a vessel (the brig *Providence*) that was ordered to accompany Jones in the *Alfred* on an expedition in which Jones was given responsibility for the success of the mission. A glance at the Navy List of October 10, 1776, tends to explain why competent seafaring men—officers and seamen—preferred privateering to service on Continental naval vessels, which were under the domination of Congress and of a politically appointed naval, or marine, committee.

Captain Jones, after his return from an eminently successful cruise in the *Alfred*, was then subjected to a year of "petty bickerings, maladministration, and abortive schemes," under which he chafed, and it was generally felt by his friends and fellow seamen that he should have "dumped the navy and gone privateering." Many of the owners of the better class of American privateers sought to interest Captain Jones in their vessels, but notwithstanding the outrageous treatment that he received at the hands of the navy executive officials and Congress, Jones held firm to his belief and finally was given the command of the *Ranger*, launched at Portsmouth in May 1777. It was John Paul Jones who said of privateering: "As an officer in the American Navy, I can serve neither myself nor even my best friend in any private line whatever, unless either the honor or interest of America is the premier object. And who can say such of that damnable business of privateering." Yet the government drove American officers and men into privateering, and it is well for the honor of the country that private interests were willing to send out ships at their own risk to harass the enemy's merchant marine, capture prizes, and destroy such ships and cargoes as they could not hope to take to port and dispose of at a profit, with due regard being given for the well-being of the prize crew.

English historians have steadily maintained that Capt. John Paul Jones, in his operations in the *Ranger* off the British coast in the spring of 1778, was a privateersman and a pirate. This is positively untrue, for Jones was a commissioned captain in the United States Navy and was in command of a regular United States cruiser. The following is a copy of the letter written by a government naval committee to Captain Jones:

Philadelphia, May 9, 1777

John Paul Jones, Esq.

Sir: Congress have thought proper to employ you on a voyage in the *Amphitrite*, from Portsmouth to Carolina and France, where it is expected you will be provided with a fine frigate; and as your present commission is for the command of a particular ship,

we now send you a new one, whereby you are appointed a captain in our Navy, and of course may command any ship in the service to which you are particularly ordered. You are to obey the orders of the Secret Committee. Sir, etc.

John Hancock
Robert Morris
William Whipple

The following letter was also addressed by the Continental Committee on Foreign Affairs to the American commissioners in France:

Philadelphia, 9th May 1777

Gentlemen: This letter is intended to be delivered to you by John Paul Jones, an active and brave commander in our Navy. Our design of sending him is (with the approbation of Congress) that you may purchase one of those fine frigates that Mr. Deane

writes us you can get, and invest him with the command thereof as soon as possible.

Robert Morris
Richard Henry Lee
William Whipple
Philip Livingston
Committee on Foreign Affairs

The intention was for Jones to sail to France in the French letter-of-marque ship *Amphitrite*, with other American officers and a crew, to take over and man the *Indien*, a single-deck frigate building in Holland, which it was proposed to arm with heavy Swedish 36-pounders, rename the *South Carolina*, and send into British waters under the American flag. Owing to complications and difficulties affecting transfer, with the delay involved, Captain Jones did not sail on the *Amphitrite*, but was ordered to proceed to Portsmouth, N. H., and take command of the cruiser *Ranger*, then building for the United States Navy. The *Ranger* was a sloop of war of 308 tons, mounting 18 guns, and it is said that Jones did not like many things about her planned rigging and "altered her into a fast ship." Evidently, Jones also used "privateering methods" in signing up a crew and seemingly did the "rendezvous entertaining" at his own expense. We are told that when Capt. John Paul Jones was fitting out the *Ranger* in the spring of 1777, many New England lads "forsook privateering to follow the fortunes of this dashing commander in the service of their country." On tavern doors and on important notice boards of seacoast towns was posted the following "broadside," or proclamation, adorned with a woodcut of a full-rigged fighting ship and other marine and privateering symbols, which was a call to arms and for sea service and was evidently worded to appeal to the imagination of youthful patriots:

Great
Encouragement
for
SEAMEN

ALL GENTLEMEN SEAMEN and able-bodied LANDSMEN who have a Mind to distinguish themselves in the GLORIOUS CAUSE of their COUNTRY and make their Fortunes, an opportunity now offers on board the Ship *Ranger* of Twenty Guns (for France) now laying in Portsmouth in the State of New Hampshire, Commanded by JOHN PAUL JONES Esq: let them repair to the Ship's Rendezvous in Portsmouth, or at the Sign of Commodore MANLEY in SALEM, where they will be kindly entertained, and receive the greatest Encouragement. The Ship *Ranger*, in the Opinion of every Person who has seen her is looked upon to be one of the best Cruizers in America. She will be always able to Fight her Guns under a most excellent Cover; and no Vessel yet built was ever calculated for sailing faster, and making good Weather.

Any GENTLEMEN VOLUNTEERS who have a Mind to take an agreeable Voyage in this pleasant Season of the Year may, by entering on board the above Ship *Ranger*, meet with every Civility they can possibly expect, and for a further Encouragement depend on the first Opportunity being embraced to reward each one agreeable to his Merit.

All reasonable Travelling Expenses will be allowed, and the Advance-Money be paid on their Appearance on Board.

In CONGRESS March 29, 1777

Resolved

That the MARINE COMMITTEE be authorized to advance to every able Seaman that enters into the CONTINENTAL SERVICE, any Sum not exceeding FORTY DOLLARS, and to every ordinary Seaman or Landsman any Sum not exceeding TWENTY DOLLARS, to be deducted from their future Prize-Money.

By Order of Congress
JOHN HANCOCK, President

The *Ranger* was far from being Captain Jones's idea of what a vessel built for war should be, and while he did all that could be done to remedy her faults, he failed in his persistent attempts to get enough money to condition, equip, and outfit the new sloop of war. Jones complained bitterly at the government red tape, lack of system, and, it would

seem, incompetent executive supervision, which caused him to proceed to sea with "only one set of sails and these of inferior cloth," with insufficient stores, a pronounced shortage of necessary supplies, inadequate equipment (and some on board was of poor quality and unsuited for the service), and to crown it all, after urging men to enlist with him and making promises to them, he had to sail "with only one barrel of rum aboard for the crew." It is said that when Captain Jones sailed for France on November 1, 1777, he carried twenty-five Nantucket whalers aboard and had a really fine American crew. This passage was important, as the ship was taking to the American commissioners dispatches announcing the surrender of Burgoyne and his "formidable army" at Saratoga, which event led to the open American alliance with France and to war between France and America's enemy—Britain. Notwithstanding that Jones crowded on canvas and made a fast transatlantic crossing, he paused long enough on his journey to take two prizes.

The experience of France in wars on the continent of North America had taught that nation to have respect for Americans as enemies, and France, since early 1775, had merely been biding its time to see how it could capitalize the rebellion against British rule in the American colonies to its own selfish advantage and its schemes of revenge aimed at Britain. Soon after Captain Jones arrived in France with the news of Burgoyne's surrender, the feeling developed that the colonies were well on their way to defeat the British without any outside help and that if France desired to profit by American belligerency against Britain, its arch-enemy, it would be required to act at once. The *Ranger* arrived at Nantes on December 2, 1777, and shortly thereafter the French king and ministers received the news of Saratoga. On December 16, the American commissioners of Congress in Paris were officially advised that the king was ready "to recognize the independence of the United States and to make with them a commercial treaty and contingent defensive alliance." This treaty, momentous in its necessary consequences, was then drafted and discussed, and after the necessary approval, it was signed on February 6, 1778.

Even up to the sailing of the *Ranger* and her arrival in France, it had been planned that Captain Jones should take command of a "splendid new frigate" building in Holland for the Continental Government, but this was not to be, as the British Government, suspecting the ownership of the new vessel, threatened to seize her; whereupon the Dutch quickly transferred ownership in the frigate to France, and France declined to pass her on to America notwithstanding the earnest pleas of Benjamin Franklin and John Paul Jones. From Nantes, Captain Jones convoyed a number of American merchantmen to Quiberon Bay and placed them under the protection of a squadron of the French fleet commanded by Admiral Le Motte Piquet. From this French naval officer, Captain Jones, after certain negotiations, secured a salute to the Stars and Stripes—the new flag of thirteen rebellious American colonies fighting for their independence—and this almost two months before the treaty of alliance was signed between France and the United States. Jones, writing to the American commissioners at Paris of this event, said:

I am happy to have it in my power to congratulate you [as representatives in France of the United States] on my having seen the American flag for the first time recognized in the fullest and completest manner by the flag of France. I was off this bay on the 13th inst. and sent my boat in the next day to know if the admiral would return my salute. He answered that he would return to me as the

senior American Continental officer in Europe the same salute as he was authorized to return to an admiral of Holland, or any other republic, which was four guns less than the salute given. . . . Finding that he really told the truth, I was induced to accept his offer; the more as it was an acknowledgement of American independence.

A little later in the same year (1778), Capt. Daniel McNeil, in the 20-gun American privateer *General Mifflin*, demanded and received a salute from the French admiral at Brest, which occurrence so incensed the British that it almost led to an "international incident" and the withdrawal of the British ambassador from France.

After refitting the *Ranger* at Brest and making her "as near shipshape as seemed possible" and when, following negotiations, it seemed futile ever to expect to gain possession of the Holland-built *Indien* (which was to have become the *South Carolina*), Captain Jones embarked on the *Ranger* and took her to sea "to distress the enemies of the United States." Sailing from Brest on April 10, 1778, Captain Jones, on the 14th, captured and destroyed an English brigantine, on the 17th, off Dublin, seized the ship *Lord Chatham*, which he sent with a prize crew into Brest, and on the 19th sank a British schooner loaded with barley. During the very early morning of April 23, Captain Jones made an unprecedented and audacious attack on the harbor, forts, and shipping of Whitehaven, a seaport of Cumberland, England (then said to be "a city of nearly fifty thousand inhabitants"), to "put an end," as Captain Jones said in a memorial to Congress, "by one good fire in England, of shipping, to all burnings in America." Shortly after midnight of the 22nd, two boats, with thirty men, put off from the *Ranger*, one under Captain Jones and the other under Lieutenant Wallingford, with a program of action well defined. Wallingford, who had orders to fire all the shipping on the north side of the harbor, failed in his mission and abandoned all attempts at destruction "because the candle went out" on which he had relied as a means for starting fires. Captain Jones, with only a handful of sailors and handicapped by Wallingford's failure, seized the two lightly garrisoned forts by scaling the walls and using strategy and sent his men to burn the shipping. Once again Jones encountered bad luck, as the men claimed—as had Wallingford—that their candles had become extinguished. By this time, it was dawn, but Jones entered a house, secured tinder and candles, and started with the work of destruction. A large ship was boarded and set on fire. This vessel, according to the log of the *Ranger*, "was surrounded by at least an hundred and fifty others, chiefly from two to four hundred tons burthen, and lying side by side, aground, unsurrounded by the water, the tide being out." Captain Jones got his men in their boat and, alone on the end of the pier, kept a constantly increasing and angry crowd of Englishmen at bay with his pistols until he saw the flames burst through the deck of the fired ship and rapidly ascend the rigging. He then retired, entered his boat, and pulled for the *Ranger*. The Americans were fired on by the people ashore who had small arms and by two of the vessels in the harbor armed with cannon, but the guns of the two forts were spiked and helpless.

Unfortunately, through a lack of a reliable means of carrying fire and quick inflammables, a good part of Captain Jones's ambitious plan failed, but the results proved his plan to have been a good and feasible one, and he not only terrorized the British but also made impotent the fortification of an important harbor. While he did some damage to shipping, it was evident that, with a little luck and more time, he would have practically destroyed the whole of it. The Americans suffered no casualties, but one of the crew deserted when ashore, turned traitor, and did much to arouse the inhabitants to combat the Americans who, he shouted as he ran from house to house, had landed and were firing the ships. Because of the limited capacity of a single boat, Captain Jones could carry off to the *Ranger* as prisoners of war only three of the many soldiers of the garrison that he had captured.

An English description of the episode published in the GENTLEMAN'S MAGAZINE, with the object of allaying the fears of the panicky population of most all of the seacoast towns of the British Isles, reads: "The town of Whitehaven, in Cumberland, opposite the Irish Coast, was suddenly alarmed by a party from an American privateer, who landed in the night and set fire to one of the ships in the harbor, with a design to burn the town, which, however, was providentially prevented by the exertions of the inhabitants, who extinguished the flames before they had reached the rigging." The raid was not by a privateer but by a small government cruiser, with a commissioned naval officer in command. The object was positively not to burn "the town" but to destroy only the shipping in the harbor. Nothing was said in this British magazine of the taking of Whitehaven's two protecting forts, the spiking of all the guns, and the capture of the garrisons. Other reports say, "One large ship was destroyed by fire, and some of the vessels nearby were seriously burned."

Because of the brutalities and indignities to which Americans captured by the British during the war were being subjected when incarcerated in prisons and prison ships, Captain Jones conceived the idea of securing the person of a prominent Britisher of rank and of holding him as a hostage to share the same fate as certain American officers of merit, honor, and standing then in the hands of the English. Jones had been born in the parish of Kirkbean, stewartry of Kirkcudbright, on the southern coast of Scotland, where it runs west across the Solway Firth from England. He well knew as a boy the River Dee, and the country seat of Thomas Douglas, the 5th Earl of Selkirk (1771-1820), on St. Mary Isle at the mouth of the river, so he decided to seize Selkirk. On the night of April 23, the nobleman's palatial home was surrounded and the complete estate searched, but the mission was unsuccessful, as the earl was absent. Captain Jones's orders to his men were emphatic: "No pillaging of any kind and no bloodshed or fighting except in self-defense." Later, when the expeditionary force was back on the *Ranger*, it was discovered that a few of the men had taken some of the family plate, but Jones confiscated it and promptly returned it to the owners, with a polite note expressing regret for the action of his men.

By this time, the coasts of northwestern England, the south of Scotland, and northeastern Ireland were fully aware of the presence of a "rebel American pirate" in their locality, and orders were flying around to capture him. The British sloop-of-war *Drake*, anchored in the Roads of Carrickfergus, was one of the vessels that was expected "to seek out and destroy" the American, but evidently she was reluctant to enter combat, although she was a sizable ship-rigged vessel, mounted 20 guns, and carried a crew of 151 men. Captain Jones, hearing from fishermen of the proximity of the *Drake*, went in search of her and resorted to strategy to get her to pursue him and fight. The *Drake*, taking extra fighting volunteers aboard so that her complement was somewhere between 170 and 190 men, finally was forced into a fight by the maneuvering of Captain Jones, which turned out to be "a square yardarm and yardarm" affair, conducted with great spirit for an hour and four minutes, when the *Drake* struck her colors. When the British man-of-war surrendered, she was badly injured, with both her commander (Captain Burdon) and the first lieutenant mortally wounded.

Captain Jones, writing in his official report of the condition of the *H.M.S. Drake* after the fight, makes mention of "her fore and maintopsail yards being both cut away and down on the caps, the topgallant yard and mizzen gaff both hanging up and down along the mast, the second ensign which they had hoisted shot away and hanging on the quarter gallery in the water, the jib shot away and hanging in the water, her sails and rigging entirely cut to pieces, her masts and yards all wounded and her hull very much galled." The *Ranger's* injuries were comparatively slight. Upon the capture of the *Drake*, the Americans were able to count forty-two British casualties; whereas those of the *Ranger* were eight, of whom two were killed (one being Lieutenant Wallingford) and six wounded. During the battle, the *Ranger* had on board a total of 123 men (or about sixty fewer than the men on the *Drake* when the engagement commenced and twenty-eight fewer than that vessel's regular complement), and she carried 18 guns as against 20 mounted guns on *H.M.S. Drake*. It was said that this sea battle between a British naval vessel and an American cruiser was fought during the evening of April 24, 1778, in mid-channel and "in plain view of three kingdoms." The following day, while making repairs to the *Drake*, Captain Jones captured and sank a large British brigantine and then sailed with his prize northward and, skirting the western coast of Ireland, made for France, where he arrived on May 8 after what has been termed "a daring and short cruise of 28 days unsurpassed in the annals of naval history."

Following this naval adventure, Maclay says, "the name Paul Jones became a synonym of terror throughout the coasts of Great Britain, and he was the object of hatred and malicious misrepresentation." Contemporary writers speak of the "effrontery and daring" of Capt. John Paul Jones, his "clever resourcefulness," and his "audacious courage." He certainly succeeded through his raids on the English and Scotch coasts, his capture of many

laden merchantmen, and his victory over a larger and more powerful vessel of the Royal Navy—which he took as a prize to France—"in striking terror to the hearts of the British." Captain Jones not only carried the war to British home waters and jarred complacent Englishmen but also, by his brave deeds, made himself a great hero in the eyes of the French.

The old fore-castle song of "Paul Jones and the *Ranger*," which Yankee seamen the world over sang lustily in later years, describes her escape from a big and powerful British ship of the line and four other vessels of the Royal Navy off the "Head of Kinsale" on the *Ranger's* maiden cruise. The last two verses of this old song are:

Up spake our noble captain then,	"Out booms, out booms," our skipper cried.
As a shot ahead of us past;	"Out booms and give her sheet,"
"Haul snug your flowing courses,	And the swiftest keel that ever was launched
Lay your topsail to the mast."	Shot ahead of the British fleet.
Those Englishmen gave three loud hurrahs	And amidst a thundering shower of shot,
From the deck of their covered ark,	With stern sails hoisted away,
And we answered back by a solid broadside	Down the North Channel Paul Jones did steer
From the decks of our patriot bark.	Just at the break of day.

Captain Jones was never pleased with the *Ranger*, although he got much out of her. His personal views regarding the ship are clearly expressed in a letter that he wrote to Benjamin Franklin on June 1, 1778 (twenty-four days after the return of Captain Jones to Brest, following his successful cruise against the British): "The *Ranger* is crank, sails slow and is of trifling force. Most of the enemy's cruisers are more than a match." Captain Jones tried his best to get a better and more powerful ship or, better still, a squadron with which to operate off the coasts of the British Isles—particularly England; but he was unsuccessful in this objective and did not even have the opportunity to take out the *Ranger* again. For several months, inactivity was forced upon him by lack of funds and "cheap politics," and during this period Jones was compelled to support both himself and his men. The French honored him, but did not help him one iota when it came to spending a franc.

Later, the *Ranger* returned to America under a different commander and generally fought well. In April 1779, the *Ranger* (Captain Simpson), in company with the *Warren* of 32 guns (Capt. John B. Hopkins) and the *Queen of France* of 28 guns (Captain Olney), captured a British privateer of 14 guns and late the next day took seven out of a fleet of nine British vessels (two escaped in the night), which were carrying supplies and some troops from New York to the British forces in South Carolina and Georgia. The vessels captured—all of which were taken by the American squadron to Boston—consisted of the *Jason* (20 guns; 150 men), *Maria* (16 guns; 84 men), *Hibernia* (8 guns; 45 men), three brigs, and a topsail schooner, all of the vessels being heavily laden with military supplies and stores; among the prisoners taken were 21 English army officers on the way to join their regiments.

In July 1779, the *Ranger* (18 guns; under Captain Simpson), *Queen of France* (28 guns; under Captain Rathbourne), and the *Providence* (28 guns; under Capt. Abe Whipple) fell in with a large British fleet of merchantmen being convoyed by a 74-gun ship of the line and several frigates, or sloops of war. The American squadron succeeded in getting possession of eleven valuable prizes, of which three were recaptured by the British before reaching port. However, the eight vessels seized that did reach Boston had cargoes valued at over a million dollars, and it is said that "from a pecuniary point of view" this was the most successful cruise of the war. We are told: "One of the boys of the *Ranger*, fourteen years old, who less than a month before had left a farm to ship in this cruiser, received as his share [of the prizes] one ton of sugar, from thirty to forty gallons of fourth proof Jamaica rum, some twenty pounds of cotton and about the same quantity of ginger, logwood and all-spice besides seven hundred dollars in money." If this is true, then it is evident that the division of prize money to the crew of a government ship had changed very materially since the days of Commodore Esek Hopkins' and of Capt. John Paul Jones's early commands.

On May 12, 1780, when the British took Charleston, the 18-gun *Ranger*, the 28-gun *Providence*, the 28-gun *Queen of France*, and the 24-gun *Boston* were either captured or de-

stroyed. This was a great blow to the United States and left the navy with only six war craft: the 32-gun frigates *Alliance*, *Confederacy* and *Deane*; the 28-gun frigate *Trumball*, the 20-gun ship *Duc de Lauzun*, and the 18-gun ship *Saratoga*. The *Saratoga* foundered in 1780, and the British captured the *Confederacy* and *Trumball* in 1781, leaving only the *Alliance*, *Deane*, and *Duc de Lauzun* on the Navy List in 1782. To this was added the *General Washington*, a privateer commissioned in 1780, which had been captured by the British and renamed *General Monk* and again taken by the Americans in 1782. It is said that in June 1783 the one-time privateer *General Washington* was the only United States war vessel in commission and that she was sold in 1784.

The American Congress and the Navy Department of the government treated Capt. John Paul Jones shabbily in regard to commands and recognition of outstanding service. Yet Captain Jones served his adopted country most loyally in the fight for liberty, and this notwithstanding gross injustices and persistent humiliations that would have overwhelmed with bitterness a smaller man. The last outrage to which he was subjected was being given the command of the more than fifty-year-old French East Indiaman *Duc de Duras*, a laid-up and discarded vessel of ancient pattern with a high poop and a rotten hull. The "*Duras*" had been condemned by her owners as worn out as a merchant vessel and declared to be "fit only as a hulk" if taken from the marine graveyard where she lay. This old and cumbersome "tub" was christened *Bonhomme Richard* and converted, in France, into an armed cruiser of the American Revolutionary Navy. Although entitled to the steady command of a powerful first-class frigate, Jones was treated abominably by both the American and French governments. He was told that the French would furnish him with such a vessel as a flagship and a squadron to command, so that he could continue to wage war on the British, but for about nine months or so the American Navy captain failed to get anything out of the French except indefinite promises. His well-worded letters making requests went for nought, so at last he commenced an aggressive personal campaign in harmony with one of Poor Richard's maxims (by Dr. Franklin), with the result that he got at least some action out of the French Government as the following letter shows:

Versailles, February 4, 1779

To John Paul Jones, Esq., Commander of the
American Navy in Europe

Sir: I announce to you that His Majesty has thought proper to place under your command the ship *Duras* of forty guns, at present at L'Orient. I am about, in consequence, to issue the necessary orders for the complete armament of said ship. The commission which was given you at your departure from America will authorize you to hoist the flag of the United States, and you will likewise serve

yourself with powers which have been remitted to you to form your equipage with American subjects; but as you may find too much difficulty in raising a sufficient number, the King permits you to levy volunteers until you have a sufficient number, exclusive of those who are necessary to manoeuvre the ship.

De Sartine

P.S.—According to your desire, Sir, I consent that the *Duras* takes the name of the *Bonhomme Richard*.

It was in gratitude to Dr. Franklin that Captain Jones gave the flagship of his promised squadron the name of the pretended almanac-maker, *Le Bonhomme Richard*, and the maxim which had impressed Jones and which led to his personal work among members of the French Court and Government reads that a man is advised, "if he wishes to have business faithfully and expeditiously performed, to go on it himself; otherwise, send." Captain Jones was given a ship by the penny-pinching French, but she was such an "antiquated piece of junk" that no Frenchman would ever have hoisted his country's flag over her; moreover, she was an obsolete merchantman and not a warship. However, in Jones's mind, anything was better than nothing, and the American captain promptly went to work to make a warship out of "the ship *Duras* of 40 guns." The vessel was pierced for 28 guns on her main deck and was so high-sided that he caused 12 ports to be cut on the lower deck. According to the official report of Captain Jones, the old *Duras*, when equipped as a warship, carried 28 guns on her main deck, but he had to take only 12-pounders, as the 18-pounders ordered were not procurable. Six old 18-pounders were mounted on the lower deck, and eight 9-pounders were placed on the

quarter-deck and forecastle, making 42 guns in all. It is said that all the vessel's armaments and equipment were taken from French dockyards and consisted of "odds and ends" for which the French Navy had no use. Captain Jones protested at the quality of the ordnance being put aboard his ship, and the following extract from a letter from General Lafayette to him bearing on this matter is of interest: "I think you are extremely right in refusing such guns as would expose your reputation, the lives of your men, and even the honor of your flag." Captain Jones picked out the six best of all the 18-pounders offered to him, but would not take chances with any more of that caliber. Therefore, the ship as she went to sea had a main deck battery of only two-thirds the weight of shot that had been intended. It would have been far better to have left ashore the six 18-pounders placed on the lower deck, for the first two fired in action burst, killing most of the men who worked them and blowing up the deck above; the remaining four guns of this type and size were necessarily discarded, as the men refused to handle them. The *Bonhomme Richard* was not only deprived of her heaviest battery because the French put defective ordnance aboard but also subjected to a serious loss in her complement in killed and wounded and pronounced damage to the ship's structure when the two guns used exploded.

Capt. John Paul Jones was promised by the American and French governments the command of a squadron of American and French warships and privateers. He had been commissioned by Congress; his mission to Europe to command a fine frigate as early as the spring of 1777 had been "with the approbation of Congress." The Committee of Foreign Affairs had informed the American commissioners in France that Captain Jones "takes with him his commission to France." Dr. Franklin, duly authorized by Congress, had appointed him as the commander of the American-French squadron, and De Sartine, the French Minister of Marine, who had addressed him as "Commander of the American Navy in Europe," had concurred in the appointment of John Paul Jones as commodore of the squadron; yet Captain Jones, from the start, was never for one moment in actual command of the American-French fleet. It was said that orders had been given the commanders of the other vessels sailing with Jones to use their own judgment and follow or disregard the "commodore's" orders as they saw fit; to leave the squadron and abandon Jones and the *Bonhomme Richard* whenever they deemed it desirable to do so. It is evident that such orders were given the captains of all the French vessels, and the captain of the American frigate *Alliance* was a Frenchman and the most insubordinate of all.

The original squadron under "Commodore" Jones consisted of the improvised cruiser *Bonhomme Richard* (42 guns—theoretically) as flagship, the 32-gun frigate *Alliance* (Capt. Pierre Landais), the 30-gun armed merchantman *Pallas* (Capt. Denis Nicholas Cottineau), the armed merchant brig *Vengeance* (Captain Ricot), and the French 18-gun naval cutter *Cerf* (Captain Varage). When the squadron finally sailed on its mission, it had supposedly been augmented in strength by the French privateers *Monsieur* and *Granville*.

From the date of the first sailing from L'Orient on June 19, 1779, disputes arose in regard to command. Captain Landais, the French commander of the American frigate *Alliance*, claimed seniority by virtue of his commission, which had been issued direct by the American Congress, whereas, he falsely asserted, Captain Jones's commission had come "only from Dr. Franklin." (The commission of Captain Jones, issued direct by the American Congress, antedated that of Captain Landais by nineteen months.) The second and final sailing of the squadron from a French port was from L'Orient on August 14, 1779. Four days later, a large Dutch ship, with a British prize crew aboard, was captured. That night the commander of the *Monsieur* took from the seized vessel certain things which he desired, put one of his officers aboard the prize, and endeavored "to sneak her away" from the fleet for his own private gain. "Commodore" Jones promptly acted and sent the prize into L'Orient, and the French privateers *Monsieur* and *Granville*, having had enough of the American commodore's naval discipline, separated from the squadron and did not rejoin it. (The *Monsieur* was shortly thereafter taken by the British.) On August 21, a brigantine from Limerick for Lon-

don was captured and sent as a prize into L'Orient, and Captain Jones wrote that on August 24, a day after the squadron had made Cape Clear (the southwestern tip of Ireland), "Captain Landais came aboard the *Bonhomme Richard* and behaved toward me with great disrespect." Landais, "in the most insolent manner and language," criticized certain things which had happened over which Captain Jones had no control and was in no way responsible; "he persisted in his reproaches" after proof had been given him that his assumptions were erroneous. Continuing, Captain Jones wrote:

He was affronted because I would not, the day before, suffer him to chase without my orders, and to approach the dangerous rocks [the Shallocks] where he was an entire stranger, and where there was not sufficient wind to govern a ship. He told me that he [a Frenchman] was the only American

in the squadron, and was determined to follow his own opinions in chasing when and where he thought proper, and in every other matter that concerned the service, and that if I continued in that situation three days longer, the squadron would be taken.

Sailing leisurely north, the *Bonhomme Richard* and the relatively swift-sailing *Alliance* made important captures off the Flannan Isles and Cape Wrath, as they got in the path of vessels that had been ordered to proceed from London to American ports by the circuitous route to the north of Scotland "to escape capture by American privateers and cruisers." Making the appointed rendezvous off the north Scottish coast and Fair Isle (south of the Shetlands), only the *Bonhomme Richard*, *Alliance*, *Pallas*, and *Vengeance* of the five naval vessels and two privateers—a total of seven sail—were on hand. On September 4, after a pilot from the Shetlands had boarded the flagship, Captain Jones signaled the ships of the squadron, calling a council of his captains to consider information received and decide on future movements. The commanders of the *Pallas* and *Vengeance* responded, but Captain Landais ignored the order as he did several more signaled from the flagship to the *Alliance*. A letter sent to him by Captain Jones brought forth a disrespectful and impudent response, and after waiting a while at the third and last rendezvous for the *Cerf*, which failed to appear, the squadron proceeded south in the direction of the Firth of Forth. On September 8, after a persistent disregard of all signals from the flagship, Captain Landais abandoned the squadron and sailed to the east. His departure took the only real warship from the fleet and left Captain Jones with only three armed merchant ships.

Hearing that a 20-gun British sloop of war was anchored in the Firth of Forth, Captain Jones resolved to take her as a prize and levy a ransom price on the city of Leith under the threat of his squadron's guns. A heavy gale prevented him from carrying out his intentions, and the storm was of such violence that a prize taken on September 14 foundered. By this time, both Captain Ricot of the *Vengeance* and Captain Cottineau of the *Pallas* had come to the conclusion that Captain Jones's plans for action on and off the English coast were too bold and hazardous for their blood. Insubordination developed to the point that these masters served notice on the "commodore" that if he did not give the order to leave the waters of the English coast on or before September 22, the *Pallas* and the *Vengeance* would sail off on their own for a safer theater of action. On September 19, the *Vengeance* chased several merchantmen, sank one, and in violation of orders "ransomed" the others. On September 21, a coal-laden brigantine was sunk and another taken as a prize. The next day the *Bonhomme Richard* and *Vengeance* were off Flamborough Head and, after chasing two sail, discovered them to be the *Alliance* and the *Pallas*.

At this time, the complement of the *Bonhomme Richard* was down to 320 men, all told, because of some desertions (and an incident connected therewith) off the southwest coast of Ireland and the necessity of furnishing some men for the prize crews of the eighteen vessels captured that, with their cargoes, were deemed worth taking the risk of sending into port. In a letter to De Sartine, the French Minister of Marine, written at the time the cruise started, Captain Jones placed the complement at "three hundred and eighty officers, men and boys, inclusive of one hundred and thirty-seven marine soldiers." On September 23, a great British fleet of forty-two sail was sighted. Not knowing the nature of the vessels, Captain Jones had

to act quickly with thoughts of possible attack, defense, and flight. Unavoidably but fortunately only temporarily, he was compelled to leave a pilot boat, with Lieut. Henry Lunt and sixteen men aboard (who were chasing a brigantine), to their own fate, and this necessary and regrettable act reduced the *Bonhomme Richard's* complement to only one lieutenant (Richard Dale) and 304 men. Captain Jones was further handicapped in fighting his ship with the knowledge that he had "several hundred English prisoners in her hold."

Apparently, the British fleet consisted of forty merchant sail and two men-of-war. When the presence of Capt. John Paul Jones became known, the merchant ships scurried for safety into nearby harbors or under the protecting guns of Scarborough Castle, while the two warships bore down to cover the flight. At this critical time, Captain Landais of the *Alliance* not only refused to obey the orders of the flagship or even to co-operate with Captain Jones in the fight that was inevitable but also influenced Captain Cottineau of the *Pallas* to ignore Captain Jones. The *Bonhomme Richard* maneuvered to engage the big British frigate, and at the last moment Captain Cottineau evidently had a change of heart and sailed to engage the smaller British naval sloop, while Captain Landais, in the *Alliance*, held aloof "in mutinous indifference." The British vessel that the *Bonhomme Richard* had to fight was the new 50-gun frigate *H.M.S. Serapis*, the latest and best example of British naval architecture and construction for a 50-gun frigate, and she had been in commission only a few months. This vessel, rated and often referred to as a 44-gun frigate, had an armament of twenty 18-pounders on the lower gun deck, twenty 9-pounders on the main deck, and ten 6-pounders on the quarter-deck and forecastle. These fifty guns threw 600 pounds of metal, and she had a complement of 320 men. This compares with a weight of metal of 408 pounds for the guns of the *Bonhomme Richard* that could be used against the enemy and a complement of 304 men.

The British vessel that the *Pallas* of 30 guns, under Captain Cottineau, engaged was the *Countess of Scarborough* under the command of Captain Piercy, R.N., which carried twenty-two 6-pounders and 150 men. Captain Cottineau redeemed himself in this battle, and he and his men fought with commendable bravery an action that lasted nearly two hours. Whereas the *Pallas* had a pronounced superiority in number of guns and weight of armament, she was merely an armed merchantman and was in conflict with a king's ship that had been designed and built for naval warfare. Captain Piercy, in reporting the surrender of the *Countess of Scarborough* to the enemy, wrote that he struck his colors after a fight during which she had "all her braces, the greater part of her running rigging, main and mizzen topsails and sheets shot away and seven guns dismantled." Four of his men were killed and twenty wounded. (The stated casualties, being only 16 per cent of the men aboard, seem to have been very low for a defeated vessel.)

Apparently, the *Vengeance*, an armed merchant brig of "Commodore" Jones's squadron under the command of Captain Ricot, did not participate in the fight.

Capt. John Paul Jones was at no time deceived in regard to the quality and character of the vessel that was assigned to him as a flagship and with which he made history. While his ship was undergoing repairs at L'Orient, Captain Jones wrote to Dr. Franklin in Paris: "I have inspected the *Bonhomme Richard*, and it is the constructor's opinion that she is too old to admit of the necessary alterations. Thus circumstanced, I wish to have an opportunity of attempting an essential service to render myself worthy of a better and faster-sailing ship." Fighting alone in an admittedly unseaworthy, badly armed and unwieldy, antiquated craft, with the handicap of a high poop, Capt. John Paul Jones engaged the powerful and fast, excellently conditioned and new British 50-gun frigate *Serapis*, and the record of his fight with this superior vessel will live forever. Jones, by resourcefulness, courage, determination, and sheer grit and with a rotten hull under him, fought a well-handled and much more powerful English ship. Before the old worn-out *Bonhomme Richard* sank beneath the waves, he and his crew had boarded the sound-hulled *Serapis* and—assisted by the sharpshooting of marines in the American ship's tops as she gradually went down—captured her by

hand-to-hand fighting. With his old ship battered and sinking, John Paul Jones's reply to the logical British request for surrender was the immortal retort, "I have just begun to fight."

An outstanding incident in this fight between the *Bonhomme Richard* and the *Serapis*, which naval historians generally agree is the greatest single-ship naval engagement of all time, was the action of the American 36-gun frigate *Alliance*. This new vessel had been promised to John Paul Jones, and if he had commanded the *Alliance*, with power to act without interference, he would have made history with her, for she was generally considered as America's best frigate and ship of war. Congress, however, in a fit of sentimentality gave command of the *Alliance* to Capt. Pierre Landais merely because he was a French naval officer in America and without a command. Congress made no attempt to investigate the record and character of Landais, but "acting emotionally and precipitously" put America's finest warship in his hands because he was a Frenchman, thereby ignoring all legitimate claims of experienced officers of the American Navy and of armed merchant ships to the command of a fine ship. Heavily timbered with sturdy oak to take punishment, the *Alliance* had been built to sail fast and to fire with powerful broadsides; she had effective long-range bow and stern guns and good fighting tops in the rigging. Capt. Pierre Landais' appointment to the command of an American ship led to ill feeling in France and censure of the American Congress by the heads of the French Navy; for Landais, who had come to America convoying supplies from Beaumarchais, had been cashiered by De Sartine for "ungovernable temper, erratic behavior, and insubordination." When Landais was discharged from the French naval service, it was implied that the only possible excuse for his deportment and actions was insanity.

That Congress did actually place an "insane foreigner" in command of America's best warship is proven by Capt. Pierre Landais' record on the *Alliance*. When Capt. John Paul Jones on the worn-out hulk *Bonhomme Richard* was fighting with unsurpassed bravery and resourcefulness in a death struggle with the unquestionably superior *Serapis*, the *Alliance* was sighted bearing down upon the ships engaged in mortal combat. Jones and his men were overjoyed that a real American warship would enter the conflict, engage his foe on the other side, and thus relieve the pressure on his badly battered rotten hull. Imagine the surprise on the English ship and the consternation on the American one when Landais brought the *Alliance* into the fight, not to assist Jones but to fire destructive broadsides into the *Bonhomme Richard* because of his jealousy and hatred of her commander. Landais, on an American ship, continued to pour shot into another American ship until the traitor was sure that this vessel of the American Navy, in which he held a commission, was sinking and beyond hope of saving. He then sailed away, with the *Bonhomme Richard* sinking, as he did not want to have to fight the *Serapis*. Landais thought that his treachery would never be known in America, for the old "*Richard*" was doomed, the impetuous Jones would be killed, any survivors would be incarcerated in dungeons or prison hulks, and the *Serapis*, elated in victory, would give no American ship credit for helping her to overcome a foe. The crazy and unscrupulous Landais miscalculated, however, and the irrepressible John Paul Jones turned an inevitable defeat into a glorious victory. He not only captured the ship that had sunk his vessel but also navigated her into port, with the surviving officers and crew his prisoners of war.

The contemptible and treacherous conduct of Pierre Landais is without parallel in the history of war between so-called modern and civilized nations, but his extraordinary actions are proven by indisputable testimony. The officers of the American squadron, at Texel on October 30, 1779, made an official statement of twenty-five articles, which they "attest and declare upon our words of honor as gentlemen . . . are really and truly matters of fact . . . respecting the conduct of Peter Landais, captain of the frigate *Alliance*" and "will at any time hereafter be ready to prove the same upon oath if required." This voluntary joint statement was subscribed to by the surviving naval and military officers, both American and French,

of the *Bonhomme Richard*, including Lieutenant Dale, Samuel Stacey, the sailing master, and three lieutenant colonels of marines (two of whom were French). The articles deal with instances of Captain Landais' culpable insubordination and prove the man's deliberate attempt to sink the *Bonhomme Richard*. Lieut. Henry Hunt, in the ship's pilot boat, temporarily abandoned by Captain Jones, witnessed the fight and testified to Landais' actions in attacking the American ship from the port side when the *Serapis* was engaging her on the starboard side. Captain Cottineau and other French officers on the *Pallas* certified to Captain Landais' insubordination and his advice "to run away" from the English if they had "more than 50 guns." Even Captain Pearson and his lieutenant of the captured *Serapis*, who, considering their own reputation, would have liked to assert that the English frigate struck her colors to two heavily armed American vessels of war, were taken aboard the *Bonhomme Richard* before she sank and were compelled to admit that "the stern and quarters were entirely beaten in," that the hull was badly damaged and "in the most shattered condition" on the side that the guns of the *Serapis* never reached throughout the entire engagement, and that at no time could the English ship have possibly fired into the *Bonhomme Richard's* stern.

Several persons who participated in the fight were convinced, as expressed in the affidavit dated October 24, 1779, of John Mayrant, midshipman, that "the *Alliance* is manned with Englishmen and firing upon us." In the same document, we read that the actions of Captain Landais in the fight of September 23 proved that "his motive must have been to kill Captain Jones and distress the *Bonhomme Richard* so as to cause her to strike to the *Serapis* and honor himself with the laurels of the day." We also read in the sworn statement of American and French officers that "Captain Landais has acknowledged since the action that he would have thought it no harm if the *Bonhomme Richard* had struck, for it would have given him an opportunity to retake her and take the *Serapis*."

The conduct of Captain Landais caused great indignation in France as well as America. He was not only discharged from all connection with the French Navy but also ordered to leave the country. Later, he was dismissed from the American Navy by Congress, and we are told that "the belief that the man was insane prevented a severer penalty." Notwithstanding delicate international relations, both France and the United States acted very definitely in the denunciation of Landais, and even the cautious and tactful, super-diplomatic peacemaking Dr. Franklin did not hesitate to inform the French captain personally of his views, for in a letter written by Franklin to Landais from Passey on March 12, 1780, following the latter's representations, "explanation and pleas for reinstatement," we read:

No one has ever learned the opinion I have formed of your conduct. I kept it entirely to myself; I have not even hinted it in my letters to America, because I would not hazard giving to any one a bias to your prejudice. By communicating a part of that opinion privately to you I can do no harm for you may burn it. I should not give you the pain of reading it if your demand did not make it necessary. I think you so impudent, so litigious and quarrelsome a man, even with your best friends,

that peace and good order, and consequently the quiet and regular subordination so necessary to success, are, where you preside, impossible. These are within my observation and apprehension; your military operations I leave to more capable judges. If, therefore, I had twenty ships of war at my disposition, I should not give one of them to Captain Landais. The same temper which excluded him from the French marine would weigh equally with me. Of course I shall not place him in the *Alliance*.

The casualties on board the *Bonhomme Richard* and the *Serapis* during their historic fight were the same, as Captain Jones reported 49 killed and 67 wounded—a total casualty list of 116—and Captain Pearson, in his official report of the engagement, gave an admitted loss on the *Serapis* of 49 killed and 68 wounded—a total of 117. However, the explosion of the two 18-pounder guns that were fired off the lower deck battery of Captain Jones's vessel materially added to the casualties on the American ship, but these were self-inflicted losses and not from enemy (or the *Alliance*) gunfire, small arms, or hand-to-hand fighting.

Upon arrival at Texel, the Dutch West Friesian Island port in northern Holland, the captured British war vessels *Serapis* and *Countess of Scarborough* were claimed by France.

British warships sought to blockade the port and exerted pressure on Holland to "expel the American rebels," and in a memorial presented to the *staats-general* of Holland by Sir Joseph Yorke, the British ambassador, the British Government demanded "that those ships and their crews might be stopped and delivered up which the pirate Jones, a rebel subject and criminal of the state, had taken." On December 27, 1779, however, when the pressure became very great, Capt. John Paul Jones boldly took the *Alliance* to sea practically under the eyes of British naval vessels. It was expected that Jones would sail up the North Sea and round the northern Scottish coast on his course home, but the intrepid American captain made a daring run down the English Channel and had the temerity to run the gauntlet of the Straits of Dover and pass close to a powerful British fleet at Spithead. The *Alliance*, on February 10, 1780, was at the Roads of Groix and, after a short cruise in the Bay of Biscay, sailed in June 1780 for the United States.

The English persisted in maintaining that the Americans were rebels and that an American naval officer in command of a duly commissioned (and owned) American Government cruiser was a pirate and, when taken, should be treated as a traitor and a criminal and not as a prisoner of war. The American naval attacks with the armed merchant ships *Surprise* and *Revenge*, commissioned as warships and under the command of Capt. Gustavus Connyngnam, an American officer, were denounced as pirate raids on British shipping, and when Connyngnam was finally captured, he was treated with such severity that the American Congress, by a resolution of July 17, 1778, formally demanded of England the reason for his being "treated in a manner contrary to all the dictates of humanity and the practice of civilized nations." The British were particularly incensed against "the rebel pirate Paul who now calls himself Jones and is a renegade Scotsman and a fugitive from British justice." Captain Jones well knew the fate that awaited him in the event that he fell into the hands of the British, for an ignominious death would surely have followed his capture. The following outrageous and prejudiced views of a London correspondent, void of either fact or plain common sense, published in 1789, express the British attitude toward the American naval hero:

The infamous son of Lord Selkirk's gardener did well in changing his name from John Paul to Paul John, or, as is now more generally accepted, Jones, being the more common surname and of similar sound. The gardener might possibly be an honest man, although the son was everything or anything but that. Like others in the line of iniquity, he began with inferior crimes, and proceeded in regu-

lar gradation to those of the greatest enormity. He plundered his master's Lord Selkirk's house and he murdered multitudes of his innocent countrymen, besides numbers of his own sailors. Renegado-like, he joined the enemies of his king and country, among whom he was distinguished for his barbarity and violence. Polluted with crimes and stained with innocent blood, they detested and abhorred the traitor.

The *Alliance*, the command of which had been promised and should have been given to John Paul Jones, launched at Salisbury Point on the Merrimac River, was described as "a swift, powerful and beautiful fighting ship, the equal to any vessel afloat" of her size and type. She was the only American-built frigate that came out of the war with a brilliant reputation and, as a matter of fact, practically the only real naval man-of-war that our young nation possessed when it won its war for independence. It is greatly to be regretted that Congress did not see fit to throw politics overboard and put John Paul Jones in command of the *Alliance* when she was first commissioned; the combination of man and ship would have contributed many glorious pages to American naval history. As it was, "Commodore" Jones, who won the greatest naval victory for the United States during the entire War of the Revolution, was compelled to do so in an old and condemned armed French merchantman. The now famous *Bonhomme Richard*, fighting beneath the American flag and under the command of a brave, intrepid, and resourceful leader, never came within some three thousand miles of the land she was fighting for and, in fact, had not a great number of native-born Americans among her crew.

During the year following John Paul Jones's brilliant naval victory and capture of the British frigate *Serapis*, the American commodore was in France endeavoring in every possible

way to get a command and to go to sea again to fight the British. He urged that he be permitted to refit the *Serapis* and take her out, but America had no money, and France claimed the ship and was purse-tight. Moreover, France at all times considered only the selfish interests of France—both in power politics and economics—and cared little, if anything, for the interest of America. A generous attitude to an impoverished ally was certainly never evidenced in any of France's relations with the United States, and "Commodore" Jones had plenty of cause to become disgusted with French procrastination and intrigue as well as with American politics. France did not turn over to Jones a squadron or even a sizable ship to command, and the American Congress had no ship for him, so America's greatest naval commander of the Revolution was to see no more real fighting during the war. John Paul Jones wanted ships or even a single sizable fast and sound well-armed ship in order to fight the British, but instead of giving him ships and a chance to fight, Louis XVI made him a chevalier of France and presented him with a gold-hilted sword. Captain Jones did put out to sea in the fall of 1780 in the little *Ariel* (20 guns) lent to him by the king of France, but this frail craft had no stability, rolled her yard ends into the sea, and was soon dismasted. Even with this "floating and yacht-like piece of marine junk," Jones fought and defeated an English ship, but although the Britisher struck her colors, she made her escape during a gale at night.

On February 18, 1781, Captain Jones reached Philadelphia. The American Congress tendered him a vote of thanks for his brilliant services and as a token of its high esteem promised him the command of the new 74-gun ship-of-the-line *America*, then building. However, Jones never walked the quarter-deck of the *America*, as that vessel was transferred by Congress to France at that country's suggestion "in compensation for the 74-gun French battleship *Magnifique*, which was lost in Boston Harbor." For lack of a suitable vessel, Captain Jones never went to sea again in command of a United States naval craft.

The record of the building of the *America* is of importance, for of the three 74-gun warships ordered by the Continental Congress in 1776, she was the only one completed. This vessel—the first ship of the line to be constructed in America—built by Col. James Hackett at Portsmouth, N. H., from the designs of his cousin, William Hackett, was an excellent craft, but work on her was discouragingly retarded by lack of funds and a dearth of practical Congressional enthusiasm. In 1778, construction was entirely suspended, and when resumed in June 1779, orders were given to push the work, but money and supplies were not forthcoming. After the big vessel had been given to France, she was launched on November 5, 1782; she joined the French Navy in the spring of 1783 and was most highly considered. In 1794, at the Battle of Ushant, the *America* was taken by the British under Lord Hood and renamed by them *Impetueux*. This New Hampshire-built vessel (constructed of American oak, which the British Admiralty presumably despised prior to the War of the Revolution) was in the British Navy in 1846 and, therefore, had a life of at least sixty-four years in the water, which speaks well for her construction. The British Admiralty thought so well of the old *America* that they took off the lines, made complete detailed drawings of her, and built several ships for the Royal Navy in the late 1790's and 1800's that were said to be replicas of America's first battleship—designed in 1776.

In November 1783, with the war over, Jones was sent to Paris as agent for the prizes captured in European waters under his own command. In 1787, upon his return to America, he received a gold medal from Congress in recognition of his services. Following the war, there was no future and no opportunity for usefulness for a naval officer in the United States, so upon Thomas Jefferson's advice, Jones accepted an offer made him by Catherine the Great of Russia to reorganize and rebuild the Russian Navy. Jones quickly found Russia to be a hot-bed of unscrupulous political intrigue, with conspiracies and duplicity rampant. He was made an admiral and promised by the crown "supreme command," but apparently no subordinate was required to obey his orders, and his every move was combated by jealous, malicious Russians. It is said, nevertheless, that "in his conflicts with the Turks, Jones displayed great

skill in seamanship and battle." However, not receiving any of the promised support of the throne, Jones returned to Paris a bitterly disappointed and further disillusioned man. He died there on July 18, 1792, at the age of forty-five years after receiving the appointment as American consul to Algiers. It was not until the twentieth century that America really honored the memory of John Paul Jones by bringing his body to the United States escorted by a fleet of warships, and in 1913 the remains were placed in a crypt of the Naval Chapel at Annapolis in belated recognition of Jones's services to his adopted land.

*British Attitude toward the "Rebels" during
the War of the Revolution*

Americans falling into the hands of the English during the fight for independence were treated with the utmost severity; they were branded as captured rebels and traitors—not as ordinary prisoners of war. When Benjamin Franklin as the American representative at the French Court endeavored to exchange a hundred prisoners of the British sloop-of-war *Reprisal* for an equal number of American prisoners incarcerated in the dungeons of Plymouth and Portsmouth, his first inquiries were ignored, and persistency of request finally brought forth from the British the statement: "The King's ambassador receives no applications from rebels unless they come to implore His Majesty's mercy."

England continued to subject American prisoners to especially harsh and inhuman treatment. They were kept penniless, cold and hungry—ill clothed and half starved—and prevented from sending any word home. They were constantly abused by petty tyrants, and in conformity with official suggestions, which were orders, conspicuous malignity was manifested by guards and attendants toward "those unfortunates who happened to be Americans." History tells us that some American prisoners of war were even transported, as if they had been felons, to "the poisonous coast of Africa and the remote East Indies." Others were impressed by force and flogged into service on British warships, and some American whalers were carried aboard British whalers as prisoners and made to work at their trade in the South Seas and teach English sailors the art of whaling à la America. Franklin's persistent and unsuccessful efforts to exchange English for American prisoners in England finally led him to release about five hundred captured British sailors and send them back to their homes in England after all had given him in writing their solemn pledge that they would work unceasingly to have sent to France in exchange for their liberty an equal number of American prisoners. Not a single American reached France as a result of Franklin's magnanimous honor principle of exchange. The honor was all one-sided when the British Government stepped into the picture. England's diabolical and highhanded treatment of captured Americans whose only fault lay in their refusal to stomach the notion of the divine right and infallibility of a crowned king of questionable sanity—supported by an intolerant, worm-eaten aristocracy opposed to the doctrine of the Rights of Man and individual freedom—did much to keep alive "bitter memories of wrong" and give "a keen edge to the subsequent rivalry between the British marine and the ships of the new republic," which led, after persistent British humiliations and American attempts at appeasement, periods of embargo, etc., to the War of 1812.

The following extract from the British official JOURNALS OF PARLIAMENT bears eloquently upon the outrageous methods adopted by the British ministers during the War of the American Revolution:

Mr. Burke moved an amendment by adding these words "saving and excepting the sum of £160,837 which appears, by Sir Guy Carleton's accounts laid before this House, to have been expended for the carrying on of a savage war in a manner contrary to the usages of the civilized nations, against the English colonies in North America; excepting also the sum of £16,000 which appears to have been expended for the same purpose in the southern depart-

ment of Indians; also excepting the sum of £5,000 which hath been expended in carrying on a war of insurgent negroes against the inhabitants of the province of Virginia; and excepting whatever hath been paid out of the said extraordinaries, specified in General Carleton's correspondence, for one hundred crosses and five gross of scalping-knives, the said expenditures being disgraceful to religion and humanity."

It has been truly said that the treatment that American seamen received when taken as prisoners by the British during the War of the Revolution "forms one of the dark pages of English history." The English persisted in their attitude that the Americans captured were not prisoners of war but rebels and traitors. The only fit punishment for a rebel, a traitor, what they chose to call a "pirate," or a man guilty of "treason" was death, and the more mental or physical torture that preceded the final act of punishment, the better.

Americans captured from American naval vessels and the commissioned officers on such ships were treated no better than the prisoners taken from privateers. Petitions were made to the British Parliament in June 1781 (in both the House of Commons and House of Lords) setting forth that American prisoners were with deliberate intent treated with less humanity than the French, Spaniards, or other nationalities; that they received insufficient food and clothing and that inquiries developed the fact that American prisoners were allowed "half a pound of bread less per day" than the prisoners of other countries. Even the British admitted that it was "certainly unwise, by treating American prisoners worse than those of France and Spain, to increase the fatal animosity which has unhappily taken place between the mother country and the colonies, and this, too, at a period when the subjugation of the latter has become so hopeless."

It is said that the treatment given colonial prisoners in the hands of the British in America was even worse following 1777 than that meted out to Americans in British prisons, where, at least, the Parliament acted to a degree as a moderating influence. The prison ships anchored in Wallabout Bay (Brooklyn) held some ten to eleven thousand men, of whom over nine thousand were Americans. They were filthy and pestilential, damp and rotten, cramped jails not fit to house any human being. It was said that the wretched condition of the prison ships was looked upon with favor by the British authorities, who offered escape to the men if they would enlist and serve with the British forces—afloat or ashore. David Sproats, in charge of the fleet of prison ships, boasted that he had "caused the death of more rebels than all the British armies in America."

Members of the crew of the privateer *Portsmouth*, a Piscataqua-owned vessel, captured by a British frigate and taken into Halifax, N. S., addressed a memorial to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, at Exeter, praying that effective steps be taken to bring about an exchange of prisoners. The captured Americans, the revolutionary documents say, were in "distressing Circumstances, many of them dying with the Heat of Close Confinement by Night, and by being Exposed to the Small Pox and other Putrid Distemper by Day. The Prisoners are Discouraged when they have been informed that no public Measures are taken for their relief, but are suffered to bear the Insults of a remorseless and more than Barbarian Enemy, who use every means to Drive them to Despair, or enter into their Service, which they nobly refuse to accept of."

It is interesting to note that, while the British were highhandedly impressing Americans into the British Navy during, prior to, and even after the termination of the War of the Revolution, records reveal that in the years from 1776 to 1780 that navy lost 61,857 of its men, of whom 19,788 men (32 per cent) were lost in battle or from disease, and that the balance of 42,069 men deserted. Some of these deserting sailors were undoubtedly impressed Americans who had been enslaved on British warships, but many a good British tar learned

about the freedom and individual opportunities in the New World and made haste to get on the shore of America or on the deck of an American vessel.

The following statement, expressive in 1780 of the popular feeling in Britain toward the rebellious American colonists, is of interest:

The continuance of the war has become most tedious, and its unpopularity in the army in America as well as among the merchants and manufacturers at home is reflected in the price of officers' commissions which has descended to less than one quarter of their peace-time value. It is evident that the whole of America cannot be conquered while Britain has also to face, single-handed, the united navies

and armies of France and Spain; and the ministry is therefore willing to compound, if King George would consent, by granting the northern states their independence while we retain our conquests in the south. The Americans fear that they will be forced to accept these terms if we continue to hold Charleston, hence they are determined to drive our forces from that city.

A very humane side of warfare, with proof that "blood is thicker than water," is evidenced by the actions of two American privateers in early 1782. The *Lively* (Captain Adams) of Salem and the *Scammel* (Captain Stoddart) of Boston came upon the wreck of the British frigate *Blonde* (Captain Thornbrough) on Seal Island, rescued all hands, and carried them to Cape Race. This was certainly a Good Samaritan act, which not only gave a helping hand to the enemy but also saved the lives of the entire crew of a British frigate when the privateersmen moved to free and take to safety the men of the *Lion* (Captain Tuck), a letter of marque of Beverly, who had been aboard *H.M.S. Blonde* as prisoners of war at the time that the British frigate was wrecked. Capt. Edward Thornbrough, "Commander of H.M. late ship *Blonde*," was so touched by the humanity of the Americans who figured in this incident that, in addition to sending to the British admiral of the fleet official reports eulogistic of the treatment that he and his men had received at the hands of the Americans, he wrote the following letter which was printed in the Nova Scotia GAZETTE of June 4, 1782, in a praise-worthy effort to give the greatest possible measure of publicity to the episode:

To the Printer, Sir: In justice to humanity, I and all my officers and Ship's company of His Majesty's late Ship *Blonde* by the commanders of the American Private Ships of War, the *Lively* and the *Scammel* (Captains Adams and Stoddart), have the pleasure to inform the Public that they not only readily received us on board their Vessels and carried us to Cape Race, but cheerfully Supplied us with Provisions till we landed at Yarmouth, when on my releasing all my Prisoners, sixty-four in number, and giving them a Passport to secure them from our Cruisers in Boston Bay, they generously gave me the Same to prevent our being made Prisoners or plundered by any of their Privateers we might chance to meet on our Passage to Halifax.

For the relief and comfort they so kindly afforded us in our common Sufferings and Distress, we must arduantly hope that if any of their Privateers

should happen to fall into the hands of our Ships of War, that they will treat them with the utmost lenity, and give them every indulgence in their Power and not look upon them (Promiscuously) in the Light of American Prisoners, Captain Adams especially, to whom I am indebted more particularly obliged, as will be seen by his letters herewith published. My warmest thanks are also due to Captain Tuck of the *Blonde's* Prize Ship *Lion* (Letter of Marque of Beverly) and to all his officers and men for their generous and indefatigable endeavors to keep the Ship from Sinking (night and day at the Pumps) till all but one got off her and by the blessing of God saved our Lives.

You will please to publish this in your next Paper, . . . which will oblige your humble Servant,

Unfortunately, the story cannot be ended with this letter and the arrival of the crew of *H.M.S. Blonde* at Cape Race and later at Halifax. Upon the arrival of the rescued crew at the British naval port, it was immediately put aboard the British naval sloop-of-war *Observer* (Captain Grymes) and sent to sea to find and convoy to port the captain and survivors of the crew of a British frigate who were in a shallop. The *Observer* (a large brig-rigged vessel "cut for sixteen guns," but having 12 large cannons mounted at the time) accomplished this mission and, with "one hundred and seventy-five men aboard," sighted on May 28, 1782, near Halifax, the private armed ship *Jack* of Salem (Capt. David Ropes) carrying 12 guns and sixty men. One week before Captain Thornbrough's letter was printed in the Nova Scotia GAZETTE, the members of the crew of *H.M.S. Blonde* were engaged in deadly combat (with conspicuously uneven odds against their Yankee opponent) with another American

privateer hailing from the same port as Captain Adams and the *Lively*, to whose humanity they owed their lives. This has been termed one of "the brutal inconsistencies of war." The *Jack* was not completely manned by a New England crew, but had some "foreigners" aboard who, Chief Officer William Gray reported, "deserted their quarters at every opportunity." The bigger British vessel (which was the captured and refitted Massachusetts-built *Amsterdam* commissioned as a king's ship) worked alongside the Salem privateer, with the object of boarding her and utilizing to advantage the overwhelming superiority that the *Observer* possessed in manpower (three to one). At the first broadside, Captain Ropes of the *Jack* was mortally wounded and thoroughly incapacitated; Chief Officer Gray was injured, but was able to direct the fight brilliantly and resist both grappling irons and the heroic attempt of fifty picked and trained cutlass fighters to board the ship. After a two-hour hammer-and-tongs engagement, the vessels separated to make repairs. The *Observer*, with her great manpower, was able to get the ship's spars and rigging so that she could resume the conflict, but the *Jack* had only ten men left on deck and none available to make needed repairs aloft. Acting Captain Gray had been seriously wounded by a bayonet thrust in the hip while resisting boarders, but fought to the last with the few surviving Yankee members of his crew who were able to move. They could not navigate their vessel or put up much of a fight with her guns and, therefore, lay "practically helpless with a few brave souls aboard." When the *Observer* finally was able to come alongside again, the *Jack* was boarded by an overwhelming force of fighting men, and Gray later wrote that he had "the inexpressible mortification to deliver up the vessel" to a king's ship. Capt. David Ropes died two hours after the *Jack* had struck her flag, having by a strange twist of fate been killed by Britishers that his friend Captain Adams, of Salem, had saved from death on Seal Island a short time before.

The French Contribution and Its Menace to American Liberty

The surrender by Burgoyne of his British army near Saratoga on October 17, 1777 (notwithstanding Washington's defeat at the Brandywine on September 11 and the British occupancy of Philadelphia on September 26), was the turning point of the War of the Revolution, and the disaster to British arms made a profound impression in Europe. For several years, a strong element in the French cause had been seeking a favorable opportunity to resume war with Britain. In the fall of 1776, Congress appointed three commissioners to France, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, with the hope that they would influence France (also Spain and other countries) to recognize and furnish aid to the American colonies that had declared their independence of Britain. It was not until news of Burgoyne's defeat and surrender at Saratoga reached France that the Americans could induce the French to abandon their neutrality and express their sympathy for the struggling young republic in substantial fashion. However, when France felt that the American colonists were going to be strong enough to fight the British and be of some real weight as an ally of France in its intended conflict with Britain, then France, on February 6, 1778, entered into a treaty with the American states, and during the following summer war between France and Britain began. Spain came into the conflict on the side of France in April 1779. Because of marine commercial conditions, the Netherlands was forced into the war against Britain later in the year and, with other states of Northern Europe, undertook to defend the interests of neutrals against the arrogant enforcement by Britain of the rights of detention and search at sea. Following France's entry into the war, the conflict that originated in the revolt of the American colonies expanded into

a commercial and naval war, and Britain was at war—at least on the ocean—with the greater part of Europe.

The treaty of 1778 between the American revolutionists and the French was entered into by the Americans with high hopes that the alliance would result in such great activity by the French Navy in the West Atlantic that Britain's naval force, under a decadent admiralty management, would be so weakened and occupied in defending itself and its merchant shipping against the attacks of the French that the American merchant marine would benefit greatly by a resumption and extension of deep-sea trade. From the first, however, the French deeply disappointed the Americans. A strong French naval force, greatly superior to that of the British, arrived in American waters and was supposed to co-operate with the revolutionist general, Sullivan, and his New England militia in cutting off and capturing the British garrison of Newport, R. I. It has been said that "a common disgust soon arising between those precarious allies, the French took offense and sailed away." They certainly did little or nothing on this occasion to help the American cause, and from the first they sought to dominate the revolutionists rather than co-operate with them against a common enemy. Indeed, the feeling was so strong in New England against the French that one of their officers was killed in the streets of Boston, and the American-French alliance came very close to being terminated, soon after it had been entered into, because of the disappointment of each side in the underlying spirit of its ally. The French were not actuated by any spirit of idealism; their government was Royalist and opposed to revolutionary republicanism or democracy; they wanted to injure England and, if in doing so they helped the Americans, expected pay for their assistance to the revolutionary cause and full recognition of their services. On the other hand, the Americans were, by this time, determined to fight for their absolute independence and freedom. Following the alliance with France, the colonies rejected the peace proposals of the commissioners sent over by the British Parliament, which included all that the revolutionists had originally desired (abnegation of the British "right" to tax America and of any other sovereign claim which stood in the way of the free development of the colonies) and an amnesty for all rebels—if only the link that joined the two countries, i.e., the common fealty to the crown, were not dissolved. The Americans perceived in the attitude of the French in 1778 not only a great sense of superiority but also a desire to control rather than treat them as an ally and an equal, and the fighting British colonists had no intention of substituting a Gallic yoke for an Anglo-Saxon one.

Following the withdrawal of the strong French naval force from Newport, the fleet of America's ally operated primarily in the cause of France, concentrating much of its effort in the West Indies. The British Navy at this time was at low ebb primarily due to the notoriously inefficient and destructive administration of the bigoted, aristocratic, Tory incompetent, the Earl of Sandwich (alias "Jeremy Twitcher"), chief lord of the admiralty, of whom it has been written:

He wickedly threw away Britain's command of the seas; starved the dockyards, lied to the House of Lords about the number of warships in commission, bullied and betrayed his admirals and condemned the few lonely frigates still afloat to choose, in their encounters with the powerful fleets of Britain's ene-

mies (France, Spain, and Holland as well as the American revolutionists) between fighting against dismal odds or running for safety. Oftentimes they chose the former alternative, and men like Howe, Rodney, Hyde Parker, and Keppel sometimes snatched an unhoped-for victory.

It is amazing that any people, government, or king could stand for years the annihilating influence of a chief lord of the admiralty such as Sandwich, who, it seems, with a vicious, wanton intent, set about the destruction of the British Navy by stopping new construction, withholding needed repairs, humiliating capable commands, tightening the purse on worthy and necessary expenditures, and loosening the strings on worthless ones. Sandwich did more to weaken the physical fighting power and the morale of the British Navy than the combined fleets of all England's enemies. Robert Graves, in an historical work of merit (*PROCEED, SERGEANT LAMB*), reporting in the words of a Britisher, describes important marine events of this period with lucidity:

The war was bearing very heavily upon the spirits and pockets of the British people. Toward the end of August 1780 came exceedingly grave news. Our outward-bound East India and West India merchant fleets, sailing in company, had been convoyed by the channel fleet as far south as the northwestern promontory of Spain. There the admiral in command, obeying the explicit orders of the Earl of Sandwich, from Admiralty House, turned homewards; leaving the protection of this glittering prize to a single line of battle ship and two or three frigates. On the 9th of August, the convoy was intercepted by a combined Spanish and French fleet of great strength. The commodore of the escort, being forbidden to engage an enemy that so greatly exceeded him in strength, abandoned the convoy to the enemy. Thus was lost forty-seven West India merchantmen and transports with cargoes valued at £600,000; five large East Indiamen with coin, bullion and other valuables aboard to the amount of £1,000,000; also two thousand sailors, eight hundred passengers, twelve hundred soldiers, eighty thousand muskets and an immense quantity of naval stores destined for

Madras as a means of re-equipping our squadron in those waters that had been mauled in battle with the French. In the memory of the oldest man, the Royal Exchange at London had never presented so dull and melancholy an aspect as on the Tuesday afternoon when the notice of this double loss was issued by the Admiralty. No instance had ever been known in the mercantile annals of England where so many ships had been captured at once, nor where loss was recorded of above one-fourth the sum of this. In the same month, news reached London that an unescorted Quebec fleet of fifteen ships had been met off the Banks of Newfoundland by an American frigate and two brigantine privateers. Only three of our ships escaped. This came as a very serious blow to the garrison and people of Quebec. In the course of this war against the combined fleets of our country's enemies, we lost three thousand merchant ships captured or sunk, besides other naval damage. The fault for these calamities did not lie with British sailors or their commanders, but with the Earl of Sandwich and the Admiralty House.

The French Navy failed badly to come anywhere near American expectations in the war with Britain, for in size, number, and quality France undoubtedly had the ships and—if they had been manned with spirit, properly conditioned, and handled right—could have caused the British much concern and heavy losses, particularly during the years 1778-1780, when the British Navy was still feeling the great paralyzing effects of Lord Sandwich's incompetent administration as first lord of the admiralty. However, whereas the French Navy continued as a threat to Britain during the American War of Independence, it did not function to render one-tenth of the benefits to the revolutionists that they had anticipated, and the greatest helpfulness afforded by France was in the use of its harbors for American ships to take and sell prizes, refit and purchase supplies, etc.

The French, with their indefiniteness, indecision, lack of initiative (or was it courage?), and their extreme selfishness and haggling over extending any credit, were a sore trial to Gen. George Washington. Suggestions for actions made by him for the common good following France's decision in 1778 that it was to the interest of the French to wage war with Britain met with no co-operative response from France as the months and years rolled by. After repeated cool responses and no action from the ministers and military leaders of France, Washington sent to the French on July 15, 1780, by the hands of Lafayette, the following memorandum for concerting a plan of operations against the British:

The Marquis de Lafayette will be pleased to communicate the following general ideas to Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, as the sentiments of the underwritten:

In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the base upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.

A small body of French troops, under Rochambeau, sent overseas to augment the southern colonial army, landed not in the Carolinas or Virginia but at Newport, R. I., after the British had evacuated that port following their occupancy from December 1776 to October 25, 1779. The French claimed that they used Newport as a naval station in 1780-1781, but the British fleet effectively blockaded Newport, and the French occupancy of the Rhode Island port was practically nil as far as assisting in the American fight for liberty was concerned. A second division of Frenchmen who were to cross the Atlantic and fight the British in co-operation with the American revolutionists was locked up at Brest by the British Atlantic fleet. As far as real fighting went, the American revolutionists on land fought the British alone—until the last

scene of the last act; France thought only of France and of its hatred for and persistent desire to injure its arch-enemy.

On December 20, 1780, Washington wrote to Franklin of his great disappointment at not getting French troops over to America (they being blockaded in Brest), but he was even more concerned by the lack of naval power that the French were showing, "which was the pivot upon which everything turned." Washington added that, as a result, "we have been compelled to spend an inactive campaign after a flattering prospect at the opening of it." On January 15, 1781, in a memorandum letter to Colonel Lorens, sent on a special mission to France, Washington said, "Next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority upon these coasts is the object most interesting. This would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive." Ships and money were the burden of Washington's cry throughout the entire period following the alliance with France.

In 1781, after six years of fighting the English, it was openly said by the American colonists that the French had proven more of a hindrance than a help to the American cause because they had "raised hopes which always continually disappointed." The French, moreover, were bitter because they had not received the anticipated "shipments of tobacco, rice, indigo, and such products that they were promised in exchange for the muskets sent." The French, who had a great fleet, blamed the revolutionists, who had practically no naval force at all, for the failure of American commodities shipped to France to reach their destination. Benedict Arnold, in his destructive raids on the Chesapeake, destroyed tobacco warehouses, and, later, Lord Cornwallis, to settle a dispute as to whether or not a prize of four thousand hogsheads of fine tobacco seized in Mrs. Bowling's warehouses should go to Arnold's forces or to the Royal Navy, ordered the tobacco burned. These acts seem to have roused the French from their lethargy, for the Bowling tobacco (and probably much of the other) was the property of the French Government, and these fire losses represented "almost the whole of the revolutionists' annual remittance" to France. In any event, at the end of August 1781, a great French fleet under Admiral Count de Grasse (consisting of twenty-eight ships of the line) arrived in the Chesapeake to the surprise of everyone. No matter what the motive or object of the visit was, the fleet's arrival at that time in those waters proved to be most fortuitous, and France did figure rather conspicuously in the final military coup de grâce of the long drawn-out and wearisome war. At the last, a substantial number of French troops supported the American revolutionists in the fall of Yorktown and capitulation of Cornwallis, which, as far as military operations were concerned, ended the American war fought for independence.

The French fleet in the Chesapeake encountered only two British frigates, capturing one and driving the other far upstream. Some French troops were disembarked to join the command of the Marquis de Lafayette at Williamsburg. In October, Washington's army of American revolutionists, augmented by some French forces from Rhode Island and Lafayette's command, struck at Yorktown, which surrendered after a week's direct attack, and on the day (October 19, 1781) that the capitulation was signed seven thousand British troops under Sir Henry Clinton, after long and inexcusable delays, sailed from New York to the relief of Yorktown. Cornwallis, surrounded by the Americans in Yorktown, had apparently been left to his fate by Admiral Hood (the commander of the British North Atlantic fleet), by Sir Henry Clinton (in command of the British forces at New York), and by Lord George Germaine, of Downing Street, London, who evidently ran the British war office much as the Earl of Sandwich did the admiralty and was responsible for wretched strategy and confusion—boldly giving orders on matters concerning which he knew nothing, ignoring ranking officers to communicate direct with subordinates, and thus creating chaos in the realm of both action and military organization and discipline.

The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown proved fatal to the British cause in America, and in this, which was really the final important act in the War of the Revolution, the French, after years of ineffectiveness and gross selfishness, actually took part and rendered aid to the American fighting forces. In doing so, however, they were not altruistic—not to the slight-

est degree—but were essentially selfish. Again, the French were not, as is generally believed, sympathetic toward the American ideology of individual freedom and democracy. Their government was a decadent absolute monarchy, diametrically opposed to a republican form of government, and the “novel ideas” of the Rights of Man—which were later to obtain such a hold upon the “common people” of France—were picked up in America by Frenchmen fighting not for democracy and liberty but for the French Crown. Robert Graves has written:

The young French officers of the Newport army who travelled about America and were entertained by a vigorous, hospitable and self-sufficient peasantry, impatient of government, returned to Europe and there with great enthusiasm propagated philanthropic notions. Indeed, they lighted a train of gunpowder that blew their own magazine sky-high.

Europe would have been spared thirty years of bloodshed had these red-heeled young philosophers stayed at Court. It is said that Queen Marie Antoinette's party had difficulty in forcing on the unfortunate King Louis XVI the treaty with America. Though not averse to depressing Britain, he regarded it as an unfair measure.

When the British Army at the capitulation of Yorktown defiled past the American and French troops, there were men in command of the French forces, such as the Duke de Lanzen, who were later to die under the knife of the guillotine and men in the rank and file of the French Army who were destined to be their judges, jailers, and executioners. The Marquis de Lafayette himself (1757-1834), who posed as a great democrat, was guilty of inhumanities in the conduct of war, such as the deliberate, selective cannonading of the house where General Phillips, the British soldier, lay dying, causing that general in his last words to say, “Why in the world cannot that vainglorious boy let me die in peace? 'Tis very cruel.” When the revolution that the Marquis de Lafayette, “the rich young French whippersnapper,” had supported in America spread to his own country, the National Assembly of France on August 19, 1792, declared him a traitor. He was incarcerated in fortresses for five years, and no one of influence would intercede for him until Napoleon acted in his behalf. Revolution or no revolution, a friend of America in the 1790's was deemed an enemy of France as well as of England.

The War of the Revolution was won by Americans not because of their courage and superior fighting, tenacity of purpose, or leadership, for the record is pitiable as far as united, intelligent action in a common cause is concerned. It was won because of the stupidity of the aristocratic leadership of the armed forces of the British nation, which during the American Revolution became at war—through arrogance and obtuseness—with practically all the great powers of the world. This fact and the causes which led to the commencement of the Revolution were the work of decadent English Tories, who quite fittingly acknowledged as their liege lord and master a probably originally “well-intentioned” but biased royal would-be autocrat. By standing ignorantly and stubbornly upon a supposed point of “honor,” he plunged two worlds into death and disaster. Later, he went admittedly mad and was put away for years (and, it is said, “was daily whipped by his keepers; and went blind, and lingered on and on among the wreck of his hopes, and could not die . . .”). This poor mad King George, with his obsequious but pampered “nobles” as advisers and executives in government, “dis-membered England of much more than half her territory” and “for the sake of enforcing duties upon tea and other commodities (which would have brought in only a few thousand pounds sterling, even had the expense of collection not greatly outweighed the receipts) precipitated a war which added no less than £120,000,000 to the national debt, already very large, and doubled the interest upon it.” It is said that this war cost the French £50,000,000, but this was due not to the help rendered the struggling American revolutionists but to the war with Britain bitterly waged by the French for France and for France alone, and that primarily on the Seven Seas. At no time during the War of the Revolution was France an honored and reliable ally of the American colonies in their fight for freedom, and for a while, as the war with Britain ended, it looked as if the young nation might have to fight France in order to make its liberty secure. France was an ambitious, mercenary, and dangerous “friend,” but fortunately for the American colonists was required to fight England, and the wars between

France and Britain proved to be a contributory factor in gaining independence for the American colonists.

After Yorktown, Dr. Witherspoon, President of Nassau College at Princeton, N. J., and "the first classical scholar in America," in a speech delivered in Congress, had the following to say in regard to the American marine in the winter of 1781-1782 and the menace of France to American liberty:

Where are your numerous fleets of merchant ships which were wont to cover old ocean? Have you so much as one to convoy your cargoes or save them from capture? Have you any goods to export? Where are your luxuriant glebes and smiling meads? Alas! they are now an uncultivated waste. Your commerce is extinct; the premium of insurance on the very few ships which dare to peep out, never more to see their natal shore, so enormous, seamen's wages so high (for nothing but death or an English dungeon is before them) that ruin and bankruptcy have overwhelmed all descriptions of men; . . . I must thunder in your ears that your trade is anni-

hilated; your fisheries, that fertile nursery of seamen, that fountain of all we could ever boast, are no more.

* * * *

Curse on this French connexion! I see thee [America] prostrate on the ground imploring mercy at the feet of the Gallic monarch. France conquers Britain—which for your sakes, I pray God to prevent. I tremble when I think of the accumulated miseries with which you will be loaded. The French have already cheated you out of Rhode Island, from whence . . . will stream fire to burn your ships and lay your seaports in smoking ruins!

Witherspoon urged the American colonists in revolt to make peace with England and combat the French menace. The liberals in England demanded a complete withdrawal of all British armed forces from America and American waters, whereas King George declared for a continuance of the struggle. The aristocratic incompetent's Lord George Germaine (army) and the Earl of Sandwich (navy) were forced to resign, and the ministry proclaimed a policy of nothing but defensive operations against the Americans; therefore, no engagement of importance was fought thereafter, and a peace treaty was signed in 1783 when Britain, with all the world against it, found it necessary to end a war that it had waged against its own flesh and blood for eight years with no measure of success and at tremendous expense.

At times during the American Revolutionary War, France had ambitious territorial aspirations on the American continent and figured on the possibility and desirability of enlarging its Mississippi domain (which extended from the Gulf of Mexico throughout the entire Middle West, comprising the whole of the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio river basins and embracing almost one-third of the country) through Florida and Georgia and the old French territory of the French and Indian Wars (1756-1763), which covered the area west of the Alleghenies and all of the region around the Great Lakes (except the southeast corner of Lake Ontario), the St. Lawrence River and Lake Champlain territory, and most of Canada.

Not only France but also Spain made war against England during the latter years of the American Revolution and, in doing so, had the intention of winning part of the North American continent for itself. At the time of the revolt of the colonies against arbitrary British rule and selfish dictatorial domination, the government of France was considering making war on Britain and was merely waiting for an opportune time to do so. It felt the time was ripe when recognition was given "the rebellious American-British colonies" and a treaty signed with them on February 6, 1778; this was intended to be provocative and proved to be so, for a few months later France and Britain were at war with each other, and the influence of France brought Spain into the alliance against Britain, with other maritime European nations following in a war primarily for "freedom of the seas." Spain, when it entered the war, was determined to increase its Western Hemisphere domain (which was larger than that of any other European country), to wrest, if possible, the great valley of the Mississippi from the British (and French), and to keep all and consolidate the lower part of the continent of North America, i.e., the territory that was Florida (which Spain then held and which is now the States of Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas), reserving to the French the entire northern Middle West and the territory that is now Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, etc. To this end,

Spain, operating from New Orleans, took possession of Natchez and other posts on the Mississippi and occupied Mobile and Pensacola. France, Spain, and all the other European powers fighting Britain during the last years of the American colonists' struggle for independence were allies of the "rebels" or friendly to them, as it was to the military advantage of the allies to be so, but fundamentally they were fighting England and not idealistically helping the Americans in their battle for freedom. As a matter of fact, all the European countries were royalist and bitterly opposed to the political ideology, i.e., individual freedom, for which the Americans were fighting. France, Spain, and the Netherlands, like Britain, did not want to lose any of their colonies, and after Yorktown and the peace of 1783 it was, in fact, the British—from whom the American colonists had broken away—who kept the French and Spanish so busy defending themselves, their established colonies, and foreign possessions that they had no time and no military and naval forces to carry out their intent of grabbing and holding large parts of the continent of North America for themselves.

*Critical Years for the American Merchant Marine
Immediately Following the Revolutionary War*

American independence was dearly bought on the seas, and when peace came in 1783, it has been said, "No small part of the price was the loss of a thousand merchant ships." But the effect of the war was far greater than the loss of floating tonnage. The seafaring population of the maritime provinces of New England had been seriously affected to the point of approaching depletion by eight years of war, during which these brave, hardy souls had led the country in hazardous adventures against the enemy. The deep-sea fisheries, which had been the chief occupation of coastwise New England, were practically obliterated, and the whaling industry had suffered almost total extinction. The fate of Nantucket, the world's leading whaling center, is a tragic illustration of the destruction wrought by the war. Of a fleet of some one hundred fifty sail, one hundred thirty-four were reported as taken or destroyed by the British, and many of them were seized in foreign waters, far from home, when they were unaware that a state of war existed. The location of Nantucket on a lonely island made it helpless against enemy raids by sea, and the British—particularly jealous of the prowess, achievements, and world leadership of American whalers—destroyed its floating and shore properties without mercy. Many of the younger Nantucket seamen who could get on the mainland fought well for liberty, even though they had been brought up as peace-loving Quakers, and we are told that twelve hundred of them were killed or made prisoners during the Revolution. Not only was the sole industry of Nantucket wiped out by the war but also the heads of over a quarter of its families, in addition to its sons and unmarried men, were killed during the hostilities. We read, "The aftermath of war seemed almost as ruinous along the whole New England coast." Many American seamen, broken in health and mere shadows of their former rugged selves, ultimately drifted back home after long confinement in British prisons, and others finally returned after years of servitude following impressment on British vessels.

It has been said that Salem as a community and a port profited greatly by the War of the Revolution, but was also "hit hard" as far as the loss of property and manpower was concerned. Historians tell us that a total of fully six thousand men signed articles as privateersmen in the taverns of Salem, which was "as many as the total population of the town," and that a large number of these "daring, adventurous souls" never returned from their cruises against the enemy. Yet when the war was over, the spirit of enterprise and of braving the

dangers of the deep continued to show itself, and for many years Salem was the leading seaport of the young republic and a pioneer in opening up foreign trade routes to remote parts of the globe.

The years between the signing of peace with Britain in 1783 and the organization, under the Constitution, of the first Federal Government in 1789, referred to by John Fiske as "the critical period of American history," were years of struggle and discouragement for the American merchant marine. The animosity of the English Tories toward the young nation and its shipping and commerce was intense and expressed with persistent, diabolical fervor. After the peace treaty was signed, the people of the United States became "hated foreigners" who must be punished and devilishly discriminated against for their hostility and rebellion against "their most gracious King" and the "beneficent government" of the British Empire, "on which the sun never sets." American ships and American merchants were not permitted to trade with Britain unless the United States had something to sell for which Britain had great need; then such cargoes would be given entry, but only if they reached a British port in British-owned and operated ships. American commerce was dependent to a large extent on West Indies trade. Before the Revolution, colonial trade to the British West Indies amounted to about eighteen million dollars a year. A British order in council of July 1783 proclaimed that thereafter the trade of the British West Indies must be carried on in British ships, owned and manned by British subjects. This was a deliberate blow aimed directly and solely at the shipowners and shipbuilders of America. A contemporary writer said, "The Ministry suppose they have now put a finishing stroke to the building and increase of American vessels," and it was declared that three hundred sail of West Indiamen, already afloat, would be destroyed by this order of vengeful discrimination. The results of the British order in council in the West Indian islands themselves were appalling and well illustrate the evil that can flow from authority in the hands of vindictive ignorance. We are told that as a result of an anti-American decree of a "beneficent" British Government, "fifteen thousand slaves died of starvation because the American traders were compelled to cease bringing them dried fish and corn during seasons in which their own crops were destroyed by hurricanes."

From 1783 to 1789, the United States was merely a confederation of thirteen petty kingdoms, united in name alone. Congress could make only treaties of commerce, which did not affect in any way the sovereignty of the individual states nor restrain the legislative power of any state from laying imposts and regulating exports and imports. Each state sought to look after its own selfish interest—and "the devil take the hindmost." For some six years after the war, federal co-operation did not exist, and even national pride did not seem to be in evidence. Britain dealt not with the United States of America but with thirteen separate little independent and jealous principalities, and Britain capitalized the situation greatly to its own advantage and encouraged competition, schisms, and distrust between the states, while it diabolically sought to weaken and impoverish all.

Unfortunately, there was a more or less distinct line of demarcation in an economic sense between the northern and southern states, and of the total English-speaking population of somewhat over three million people, almost one-half were in the agricultural South (including Maryland); whereas the other half of the people were in the North, where "commerce was the very lifeblood of their existence." The maritime provinces of New England were absolutely dependent on the sea, but from the Delaware to the Passamaquoddy, it has been well said, "it was a matter of life and death that ships should freely come and go with cargoes to exchange; all other resources were trifling in comparison." The southern states, with their tobacco, rice, naval stores, and indigo (and slave labor—about one-fifth of the population being Negroes), were agricultural and relatively prosperous; for foreign markets were readily available for their products, and Britain would take their exports if shipped in British ships manned by British crews. The northern states had never been permitted as British colonies to develop industries for which they were peculiarly well adapted, so the continued life of the northern and middle states was dependent on commerce while the terri-

tory learned to be self-supporting and self-sufficient. Britain had always looked with a peculiar kind of paternalism and favoritism upon the southern states and had been antagonistic and punitive toward the more democratic and aggressive North. During the last years of the War of the Revolution, it was the hope of Britain that it would succeed in salvaging from its original domains in North America the agricultural South, French Catholic Canada, and the western lands, including the upper Mississippi watershed. As late as the days of the American Civil War (1861-1865), Britain's interest and sympathetic backing were with the southern states. England was persistently consistent for a century or more in seeking to keep the American colonies, or states, from becoming a united nation, and its principal enmity toward the North was because of rivalry in the realm of ships and ocean commerce; for the American maritime states alone of all the territories on the face of the globe challenged proud Britain for leadership in shipbuilding and the operation of ships in commerce on the Seven Seas. Prior to the Revolution, about one-third of Britain's deep-sea merchant ships were of American construction. This was because of the abundance of timber in America, which resulted in a relatively low shipbuilding cost. In 1775, it was said, a white oak vessel could be built in New England for about twenty-five dollars per ton, and a ship constructed of southern live oak (equal to the best of the highly boosted English oak) could be built in the same yard with the same skilled mechanics for about thirty-eight dollars per ton; whereas in Britain or on the continent of Europe an oak ship would cost not less than fifty dollars per ton.

Winthrop L. Marvin, in *THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, says:

Excitable Britons, in 1783 and afterwards, saw in their imagination their country's shipyards transferred to the Merrimac, the Hudson, and the Delaware and King's frigates launched by Yankee hands at Boston, New York or Philadelphia. To save British shipbuilding from what seemed to be sure ruin, the British Government straightway refused British shipowners the privilege of purchasing vessels built in America. As a further protection, an Order in Council restricted the American products which could lawfully be imported into England in American ships to such crude materials as pitch, tar,

turpentine and indigo and masts and bowsprits from our forests. Moreover, it was insisted that American ships should bring to England only the product of the particular states in which their owners resided. In view of the distracted condition of the American States of that day, this stipulation was certainly sardonic. But British post-bellum hostility to our merchant shipping reached its height in the extraordinary pamphlet of Lord Sheffield, who coolly argued that the Barbary pirates, preying on the defenseless commerce of the United States, were really a blessing to Great Britain.

When the War of Independence terminated, the territory of the young republic of the United States extended on the Atlantic Coast from Maine to Georgia inclusive and westward to the Mississippi. The population, including slaves and all residents within the thirteen independent states, numbered somewhere between three and three and a half million. Philadelphia, the largest city, in the first census year (1790) showed a population of 42,520. New York was second, Boston third, Charleston fourth, and Baltimore fifth.

The War of the Revolution brought business practically to a standstill; ships could no longer be built on English account. Although the marine activities of Philadelphia and the Delaware were not so much affected throughout the entire period of the war and the early post-war years as were those of New York, the Hudson River, and Long Island Sound, no merchant ship's keel was laid in a Philadelphia yard between 1775 and 1782, and it is said that the peace of 1783 found Philadelphia in possession of only thirteen merchant ships. The war had seriously affected American manpower in all lines of activity; for not only available seamen but also shipbuilders declined in numbers, and in many cases the quality of artisans' work suffered because many expert shipwrights had fought during the war with gun or cutlass and been killed, seriously wounded, or died in prison. Morison says:

With no British market for our bottoms, and British colonial ports closed to the American flag; with French, Austrians, Germans, Dutch and Swedes competing for our carrying trade, and no government capable of granting protection; the

shipping supremacy of Massachusetts seemed forever ended. According to an official report of the French consul at Boston, about one hundred and twenty-five vessels had been launched annually in Massachusetts before the war. In 1784, only forty-five vessels left

the ways; and twelve of them, built for the French East India service, were so poorly constructed that no more outside orders came. Between 1785 and 1787 only fifteen to twenty [some 12 to 16 per cent of the number in pre-war days] were built annually.

Commencing in May 1783, the English and French fought over the business of exporting goods into the impoverished United States, and the records show that during the balance of 1783, some twenty-eight French and twenty-four English merchantmen brought into Boston Harbor alone about half a million dollars worth of goods (chiefly luxuries), which were "snapped up, mostly on credit, by the merchants of a war-stricken town of about ten thousand people." The American war debt was enormous, and the peace reaction affected for a while the usually sound economic judgment of a naturally frugal and industrious people. It was even felt by some unbiased observers that conditions brought about by the war had "undermined Yankee thrift and energy," and it was feared by a few that "the character of the race had completely changed."

Without a strong central government to defend the young republic and look out for its interest, England was able to proclaim and enforce any hostile policy it chose aimed at American ships, seamen, shipowners, and commerce and be sure that England and its trade would be subjected to no consistent or serious reprisal and no effective retaliation. The maritime provinces were not long in adopting navigation acts forbidding British ships to carry goods out of and imposing a stiff duty on goods that they might bring into the harbors of Massachusetts (including Maine), Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, and in 1785 New York imposed a double duty on imports entering in British ships. However, the northern states had no goods (other than white pine mastings) that Britain desired; moreover, as the states had no hard money and no credit, the restrictive acts affected the British but little, if any. Because of the selfishness and sectional jealousy of the South, no general navigation law was possible of enactment, and prior to 1789 the Continental Congress was nothing but an impotent group of talkers lacking in authority. On April 16, 1785, the merchants of Boston voluntarily agreed, following a patriotic meeting in the historic Faneuil Hall, not to buy goods direct or indirect from the British, who were then seeking, it was claimed, through factors and agents to monopolize the import and shipping trade, and "not to sell or let to them warehouses, shops, houses, or any other place for the sale of their goods." Apparently, British trade with Boston ceased for a while at least, for we are told that "in July 1785 there was not a single British merchantman in the harbor."

At the close of the Revolution, the United States of America had but few seagoing vessels. Spears, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE* (1910), has written:

Only a few ships remained in commission to float the flag of the "new constellation" at the end of the War of the Revolution, but it was a matter of no small significance that these ships were, on the average, far superior to those that had formed the American merchant marine in colonial days. Indeed, they were literally the best merchantmen in the world. And the conditions under which they were to sail, though harrowing to the owners and to all patriotic Americans, were to maintain the standard of the fleet for many years to come.

As late as 1785, the new republic's "registerable" vessels did not exceed a total of 200,000 tons, composed for the most part of craft under 100 tons and measuring less than 70 ft. in length. Very few measured 300 tons and, with the exception of several built primarily as privateers and later converted into merchantmen, almost none was larger. Yet, from this small beginning, because the newly formed nation was marine-minded and felt that the greater part of its future prosperity and power was dependent upon its ships and foreign trade, there grew, at a pace unprecedented in the annals of nations, a great merchant marine. The American fleet steadily maintained its high standard through years of discouragement and distress and developed so that at the turn of the century it had become a pronounced factor in the commerce on the Seven Seas. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States was the acknowledged leader of the world in the quality as well as in the size of its ocean-going ships and in its general maritime achievements and predominance in deep-sea trade.

The War of the Revolution made Americans appreciate more than ever before the quality of speed and handiness in merchantmen; moreover, it gave thousands of American sailors increased experience. They developed an uncanny ability to handle ships under difficult conditions, courage to pile on canvas and take it in, or furl, only at the last moment with dispatch, and drive to the very limit of safety; also resourcefulness and a fine assumption of individual responsibility and initiative. It is no wonder, therefore, that when the war fought for independence ended, the small surviving American fleet of privateers and letters of marque consisted of superior ships, commanded and manned by brave men of demonstrated all-round ability who put the combination of ships and men in a class by themselves.

In 1775, when hostilities commenced, the Derbys of Salem owned seven small schooners and sloops, but at the close of the war they had a fleet of five staunch ships, which consisted of the fine, big, and fast ships *Grand Turk* and *Astrea*, the sizable first-class ship *Three Sisters*, and the brigs *Cato* and *Henry*. The *Three Sisters* had been first commissioned as a letter of marque on October 28, 1779; the *Grand Turk* as a privateer on September 29, 1781; and the *Astrea* as a letter of marque on December 16, 1782. The *Astrea* must have been unusually fast, as on her maiden voyage (in December 1782-January 1783), she went from Salem to France in only 18 days, stopping long enough to fight and capture an English brigantine on the way. Returning, she made the transatlantic passage against heavy westerlies from Nantes (March 12, 1783) to Salem (April 3) in only 22 days (reported as 19 days at sea, or land to land) and brought the first news to America of the declaration of peace. Capt. John Derby was in command on both passages. The *Astrea* was the first Derby vessel to go on a commercial voyage to England, and leaving Salem in August 1783, she proceeded to Alexandria, Va., where she loaded tobacco for London. Later, on a voyage to the Baltic, the *Astrea* made the run from Salem to the Irish coast in only 11 days. In 1784, Elias Hasket Derby bought the English-built ship *Light Horse*, which had been captured and condemned during the war, and sent her from Salem to St. Petersburg, Russia; while in November of the same year, the big ship *Grand Turk* was dispatched from Salem to the Cape of Good Hope. The Derbys are credited with building four big ships during the War of the Revolution, which "became noted for strength and speed," and Spears says that they were from "300 to 360 tons burden." The last prize taken by the *Grand Turk* (Captain Pratt) was the 20-gun British ship *Pompey* of London (a vessel reported as of 400 tons) bound from England to the West Indies with a valuable cargo of provisions. When she was put up for sale at auction in the spring of 1783, George Crowninshield, of Salem, outbid the Derbys and all other competitors, obtained possession of this fine, relatively new vessel, and renamed her the *America*. This British-built vessel, hailing from Salem, saw many years of service in foreign trade and was the first of the three *Americas* owned by the Crowninshield family, one of which was the famous privateer of the War of 1812.

The *Grand Turk* is credited with being the first New England vessel to enter a Chinese port, but New York and Philadelphia merchants united in fitting out a vessel (said to have been of 360 tons), which they renamed the *Empress of China* and sent out from New York to Canton in February 1784. This vessel made a successful round voyage in the oriental trade, and within a few years following the close of the War of the Revolution, American ships were engaged in trade with faraway China, the East Indies, India, and South Africa as well as certain permitted parts of the West Indies and Central and South American ports. Over most of the ocean routes that these vessels had traversed prior to the Revolution, the cards were stacked against them, so they were compelled to travel farther afield and seek new foreign markets if they were to continue to operate and keep the flag of the new republic afloat.

IV.

THE CHALLENGING AND DIFFICULT PERIOD BETWEEN THE WARS OF THE REVOLUTION AND OF 1812 WITH BRITAIN

Post-war Depression in the New Republic—British Antagonism and the Helplessness of America's Unprotected Shipping

AFTER THE TREATY OF PEACE was signed in 1783 that brought the War of the Revolution to an end, American ships became "foreign" to the government of Britain, the ports of the British West Indies were promptly closed to them, and they were barred from other ports by prohibitive duties. Meanwhile, Britain was dumping its own national and empire products into American markets. France and Spain, allies of the colonies during the last years of the war, closed their ports to American ships, and Holland followed suit. With the Mediterranean swarming with pirates, almost all trade routes known to the American merchant marine were barred to its ships.

Before the Revolution, American colonial vessels—as British craft—had built up an important commerce with the British West Indian islands, trading dried fish, lumber, corn, and livestock for sugar, cotton, coffee, rum, and indigo, and this business represented about eighteen million dollars per year. When the Americans lost their British nationality and their ships, being "foreign," were forbidden under heavy penalties to visit any British possession in the West Indies, William Pitt (the younger), then Chancellor of the Exchequer, sought to introduce the spirit of reciprocity into American-British West Indian commerce; but the British shipowners "arose in furious remonstrance," and an order in council of July 1783 proclaimed that henceforth the trade of the islands must be carried on solely in British ships, owned and manned by British subjects. A contemporary writer declared that by this discriminating order three hundred West Indiamen, already afloat, would be destroyed and that "the ministry suppose they have now put a finishing stroke to the building and increase of American vessels."

This blow at the merchant marine of the young republic was not by any means one-sided in its harmful effects, for we read that as a result of the strict enforcement of the regulation and the damage to West Indian crops by hurricanes, "thousands of slaves starved to death [in the West Indies] for want of the 'refuse fish' and other foods which the planters had been accustomed to obtain from America, and even some of the poorer white people died for the same reason." Historians tell us that between 1780 and 1787 fifteen thousand slaves starved in the islands because of the law providing that no imports could be made into the British Empire save in British bottoms and that this law prevented America's dried fish and corn from reaching the islands. However, it was said that this condition was "of small concern to Parliament in contrast to the welfare of the British merchant marine."

An order in council restricted the American products that could be imported into Britain in American bottoms to such crude materials as pitch, tar, turpentine, indigo, and white pine mastings. Moreover, the northern, or maritime, states were sardonically rapped by the decree

insisting that American ships should bring to England "only the products of the particular state in which their owners resided." Parliament also forbade British merchants, who prior to the Revolution had bought over one-third of their floating tonnage from American builders, to purchase any more ships from them. That the United States was being bankrupt was, to England's way of thinking, a happy situation. "If the colonies could not be conquered by arms, perhaps they could be starved until they begged on their knees to return." The fixed and openly expressed determination of the British ministry was "to ruin America through denying her the sea." This policy is epitomized in the brutal advice to Britain and all European marine powers given by Lord Sheffield, in his speech in Parliament in 1784, when he said that England should not take any steps to put down the barbarous pirates who infested the south coast of the western Mediterranean. Indeed, he stated that the pirates were really of great benefit to Britain, since they preyed upon the ships of weak nations that had no navies to protect them (such as the United States), but, through fear of Britain's warships, gave British merchantmen free passage.

Independence deprived the American colonies—which had won their fight and become a separate nation—of their greatest markets overseas. As Morison says, "Johnny Bull slammed his colonial doors in Jonathan's face; would receive his ships on no terms, nor even his salt provisions and codfish in British vessels. He intended to build up his own fisheries and lumber trade." Britain also closed its ports to the product of the American whale fisheries, their only overseas market, and in every possible way sought to ring the death knell to American shipping and maritime enterprise. The double readjustment of an almost impoverished people from a war to a peace basis and from a colonial to an independent status was naturally associated with hardships throughout the country, but the problems were particularly severe in the maritime states, and they suffered the full force of Britain's vindictiveness and malevolence. The prosperity of New England was dependent upon ocean commerce, fishing, export of timber products, and shipbuilding. By 1786 the exports of agricultural Virginia (whose products Britain and Europe wanted) had more than regained their pre-Revolutionary volume; but because of the attitude of Britain—followed to a degree by France and Spain—the exports of maritime Massachusetts were only one-quarter of what they had been in colonial days, and the maritime states experienced their worst economic depression.

Throughout the greater part of the 1780's, the condition of the American colonists and of the newly formed republic of the United States seemed almost hopeless. Domestic industries were practically ruined. After independence had been won, the country suffered even more, because of a chaotic and demoralizing government at home and the ruthless opposition of the nations of Europe. The Revolution had left the thirteen rebellious colonies desperately poor, and they emerged from the war with liberty and hope for the future their only apparent assets; they were not a united people and, with no real government, were a nation only in name. Speaking of the post-war years of the eighties, Daniel Webster referred to them as "a period of depression and distress on the Atlantic coast such as the people had hardly felt during the sharpest crisis of the war itself." He added, "Shipowners, shipbuilders, mechanics, all were destitute of employment, and some of them were destitute of bread." The years between the gaining of independence (1783) and the practical adoption of the Constitution (1789) were "bitter years of poverty and political impotence." John Fiske properly called this time "the critical period of American history." These years were full of struggle and bitter discouragement for the country as a whole and particularly for all directly or indirectly connected with the sea and shipping. The country had gained its freedom, but had not compacted itself into a nation.

The maritime states passed measures intended to protect their shipping interests. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island adopted navigation acts forbidding British ships to carry goods out of and imposing a stiff duty on goods that they might bring into the harbors of the states. In 1785, New York imposed a double duty on goods imported in British ships, but such ships, loaded with British goods, came in increasing numbers into the ports of

the states that had enacted no such protective laws, and, we are told, "American ships lay idle at their moorings." On April 16, 1785, the merchants of Boston met in Faneuil Hall and pledged themselves not to buy goods from "the British merchants, factors and agents," who were seeking to monopolize the import and shipping trade, and "not to sell or let to them warehouses, shops, houses or any other place for the sale of their goods." It is said that three months afterwards "there was not a single British merchantman in the harbor of Boston." However, in a national sense, all these various local and state measures failed. British (and other foreign) ships continued to handle the bulk of American commerce, and no general navigation act could be passed by "the feeble and inharmonious Continental Congress" of a disunited number of states. It was not until 1789 (when Washington became president and Hamilton treasurer under the Constitution then made effective) that the picture changed. The United States then became a real nation, instead of a bankrupt confederation of bickering and "hauling" states, and was able and willing to consider national policies and put them into effect.

Prior to the formation and operation of a real national government, the young republic was in reality a sort of outcast nation, and American ships, lacking a strong government to protect them, were fair game for everyone. If American vessels ran the gauntlet of British warships—with their ruthless policy of search and impressment—and of the many navies operating on shifting blockades and if they escaped the clutches of real pirates and of pirate-privaters (who, operating illegally under respectable flags and with the slogan "Dead men tell no tales," lost no chance to seize an American ship), they were still not safe. As William H. Clark says:

In every foreign port, ingenious tricks bred of greed and nourished by Yankee weakness taxed Americans at every turn. If an American skipper dared to object openly, his ship would be seized and he and his crew would be clapped into jail and held there until unjust fines were paid. Only by cool courage and sheer bluff were American vessels

able to keep at sea at all. The world has fewer remarkable men than the American merchants and sailors of this period, merchants who dared to strain their credit to send ships to sea under such a hazard; sailors who dared to risk their liberty and their lives against the world.

However, "neither hostility abroad nor contumely at home" could daunt the bold, self-reliant, and adventurous spirit of the American marine fraternity, which had survived the War of the Revolution. Deprived of participation in the most important trade with Britain and its colonies and handicapped by Britain, France, and other powers in the established deep-sea trade routes of the world, the merchants, shipowners, and seamen of the young republic were driven to find other markets; they looked for "new seas to conquer" and, in the period of deepest depression and gloom, reached out for the trade of the Far East. Marvin says:

It was the sharp demand of absolute necessity which drove our ships and our sailors to the uttermost parts of the earth. . . . An American ship, large or small, was then an Ishmael of the ocean. It had a flag, but nothing else. There was no government to protect it, there were no consuls to guard its interests in the alien ports which it entered, no line-of-battle ships or frigates to shield the peaceful merchantman with their rows of shotted guns. The English, French, or Dutch traders on the east were sheltered by a recognized nationality and an active naval force, but the American mariners had nothing to depend on but their own cool courage, their breadth of canvas, and the swiftness of their keels. It is difficult to know which to admire the more—the pluck of the Boston, New York, and Salem merchants who freighted ships for those inhospitable seas or the hardihood of the masters and men who executed their commissions. An American vessel, outward bound for India or China was subject to the

risk of being robbed of her best sailors by the press gang of an English frigate almost before she had lost sight of Cape Cod or the Navesink Highlands. In the latitude of the Bahamas began a peril of surprise and seizure by pirates which lasted all the way around the Cape of Good Hope to the harbor gates of Bombay, Calcutta, or Canton. . . . Capture meant almost invariably the extinction of every living soul on board. But safe in an eastern port, the Yankee mariner found his trials not ended but simply altered. Every ingenious resource of tonnage and customs taxation that merciless jealousy could contrive was brought to bear against him, and his ship was confiscated and he and his owners ruined on the slightest pretext of irregularity. It is not strange, therefore, that there were more losing than winning voyages and that, in spite of the vigor and perseverance of individual shipowners, American ocean carrying as a whole did not thrive.

Contrary to the general opinion, the colonial fishing fleet (cod, mackerel, etc.) had been practically wiped out during the Revolutionary War. The fishing schooners that had been converted into privateers were too small as well as too slow and unwieldy for that purpose and were soon either captured or laid up; the remainder of the fleet, having been "high and dry" and neglected for some seven years, was generally in need of more expensive repairs than the vessels were worth, and, moreover, there was no money available to rebuild them. It required four years of careful planning, frugality, and courage to get the equivalent of four-fifths of the American colonial Grand Banks fleet in commission, but it is said that "the boats did not earn enough for the men to see their families through the winter." The war destroyed the important American whaling fleet from Nantucket and Dartmouth (New Bedford, Fairhaven, and Westport), Mass., and only a few vessels remained, the rest having been lost, burned, or captured. By 1789 only about 37 per cent of the pre-war tonnage of Massachusetts whalers had been restored. In writing of economic conditions on the seaboard following the close of the Revolutionary War, Spears says: "So great was the depression of the seafaring part of the population that even the optimistic whalers of Nantucket thought about removing their industry to France, and many of them did migrate." During this period, Britain (the greatest market for whale oil and bone), in an effort to destroy American whaling, placed prohibitive duties upon American whaling products and offered bounties to Nantucket whalers who would migrate to either England or Canada. Some of the whalers did go to Nova Scotia in order to avoid starvation, but most of them—as did those who moved to France—eventually returned home. In 1775, Nantucket owned 152 whalers (about half of the colonial whaling fleet of some three hundred ships, which were manned by over five thousand sailors and brought home annually about sixty thousand barrels of whale oil and substantial quantities of bone); when the War of the Revolution ended, Nantucket owned only 16 whaling ships, the balance of 136 vessels having been either sunk or captured. Aside from the great loss of young unmarried men, of some eight hundred families dependent upon whaling in 1776, 243 were left fatherless. Peace had been hailed with joy by the people of Nantucket, but their hopes were not realized in the eighties. The island was virtually beggared, and its people were brought near to starvation. A contemporary, writing with Yankee humor of conditions during the Revolution and post-war years, said, "The islanders kept themselves alive by taking in each other's washing."

Shipbuilding in America was virtually in the doldrums during the period following the Revolution. With no ports in the British Isles or colonies open to American ships, with British, French, Dutch, Austrian, German, Swedish, and Danish vessels competing for maritime carrying trade, and with no government capable of protecting American foreign or coastwise commerce, the shipping interests of the young republic were apparently doomed. It has been said that following the signing of the peace treaty with Britain, the shipping supremacy of Massachusetts "seemed forever ended." In an official report, the French consul at Boston said that about 125 vessels had been built annually in Massachusetts prior to the War of the Revolution. In 1784 (the first year following the peace), only 45 vessels were launched in the state, and 12 of them were built for French owners, who failed to give repeat orders, so this promising foreign business quickly died. During 1785-1787, only 15 to 20 vessels per year were built in Massachusetts, and the state "found her own harbors thronged with foreign flags and her wharves heaped high with foreign goods." The maritime and western, or agricultural, parts of Massachusetts were no more united within the state than the states within the nation, and civil strife developed. Seaboard militiamen were actually called upon to fight the "up country yeomanry," who were in armed revolt in the winter of 1786-1787. In the struggle of 1788 over the ratification of the Federal Constitution, the Massachusetts Convention approved it by a majority of only 19 out of 355 votes, and the sectional alignment was significant. The maritime counties voted 102 to 19 in favor of ratification, but the inland counties of Middlesex and Bristol, then primarily agricultural, cast 128 votes against and only 60 in favor of the Federal Constitution. Fortunately, the inhabitants of the seaboard won

over those of the farms, and we are told that the Massachusetts rural yeomanry rebellion in 1786, under the leadership of revolutionary officers such as Daniel Shays, "sent such a thrill of horror through the states that conservative forces drew together to create a more perfect union."

It is no wonder that the American merchant marine, during the first several years following the close of the war, was far below that of the later colonial fleet in both size and vigor. In a communication to the First Congress under the Federal Constitution, which convened in April 1789, nineteen Philadelphia shipbuilders reported that they had launched 4,500 tons of shipping per annum before the Revolutionary War, that since peace had been signed they had done little building, and that from an average of three years past, it appeared, they had built "only to the amount of 1,500 tons annually." Ignoring the suspension of business during the war (1775-1783) and the immediate post-war years, the tonnage launched from these Delaware yards during the period 1786-1788 inclusive was only one-third as much per annum as that of the first half of the 1770's. The same general story was told by the shipbuilders of Boston, the Merrimac, the Piscataqua, New York, Maine and other parts of Massachusetts, and the shipwrights of Baltimore and Charleston in the South did not hesitate to express themselves and tell their tale of woe even to their unsympathetic planter neighbors. From the port of Charleston, S. C., came the following communication from the "selfish shipbuilding interests":

From the diminished state of shipbuilding in America and the ruinous restrictions to which our vessels are subject in foreign ports; from the distressed condition of our commerce, languishing under the most disgraceful inequalities, its benefits

transferred to strangers . . . who neither have treaties with us . . . nor are friendly to our commerce . . . it is deemed necessary for us to ask Congress to consider what ought to be done in the matter.

A memorial from the shipowners and merchants of Baltimore to the First Congress (under the new Federal Constitution) reads:

Your petitioners, on whichever side they may turn their eyes, see reason to believe that the United States may soon become as powerful in shipping as any nation in the world. . . . Permit us to add that

for want of national protection and encouragement, our shipping, that great source of strength and riches, has fallen into decay and involved thousands in the utmost distress.

It was in response to a widespread and intense public feeling in the New England and maritime states and throughout the seaboard interested in shipbuilding and shipping and those areas largely dependent for their markets upon deep-sea commerce that James Madison, of Virginia (although himself a free trader), two days after the assembling of the First United States Congress, brought before the house bills to levy duties on foreign ships and foreign merchandise in order to encourage American shipbuilding and protect United States commerce.

Underlying Sectional Prejudice and Division—Antagonism of the South toward the Northern-owned Merchant Marine

The geographic sectional jealousy and prejudice which led to the Civil War between the northern and southern states in 1861-1865 did not, as is generally supposed, first come to light as serious factors in the development of the United States in the forties and fifties; they were in existence before and during the War of the Revolution and were devilishly and most deplorably evident during the trying period of 1783-1789 and in anti-marine matters for years

thereafter. They originated in the early 1600's in the settlements of aristocratic Tory "gentlemen, indentured servants, and soldiers" in Jamestown and the South and in the Pilgrim and Puritan settlements of democratic "common people" struggling for liberty and the elimination of classes in the North. Negro slavery was only an indication of the different psychologies permeating the North and the South. The early indentured British servants were, for the most part, Anglo-Saxon slaves—British-born individuals who were merely poor and unfortunate. As far as the Negro was concerned, the North for a good part of the nineteenth century encouraged and benefited by the slave trade, and northern ships transported slaves from Africa to southern ports. Economic conditions in the South favored the use of Negro slaves, but in the North they were not wanted, as slave labor competed with free white labor; hence the moral wave against slaves in the North was built upon selfishness and the pocketbook. Following the close of hostilities with England, underlying sectional feelings were so strong that there was little national patriotism. That had to be built up with the years. Meanwhile, the hands of the Continental lawmakers were tied, and the country suffered humiliation particularly on the Seven Seas.

After independence was won, it was soon found that the thirteen colonies had paid a tremendous price for liberty. America was bankrupt; seven years of fighting had drained the country of all cash, tangible liquid assets, and resources and had thoroughly upset the economic system in both its production and distribution phases. However, a courageous and resourceful people would have quickly organized itself and gained a victory over the deepest economic depression that the land has ever known if the country had been united and functioning intelligently under a strong central government. Under the Confederation, each of the constituent states was supreme, and the nation politically was deplorably and exasperatingly futile—a condition, by the way, that caused much satisfaction abroad, particularly in England but also in France and Spain.

The American Congress of the 1780's was a pitiable assembly of a few gentlemen who met in a hall hired for the purpose, expressed their opinions on international and domestic matters of moment, and then begged the thirteen sovereign states to take action. The members had no authority and no power to do anything; no money and no power to raise any—not even to pay rental for the hall they hired. Whereas the Congress had been given a few scraps of authority on paper, it was in fact merely a sort of "debating society of respectable gentlemen" who had neither the authority nor the money to do anything constructive or important. If Congress did outline a national policy, it could do no more than suggest such a policy to the states, which could adopt or decline it as they saw fit.

The North and the South were divided from 1607—the earliest year of colonization on the Kennebec and James rivers. The influx of Pilgrims and Puritans to Massachusetts and "gentlemen" planters to Virginia continued the division of characteristics, although both groups were British, and with the Dutch established at New Amsterdam (later New York) and the Hudson River, the northern and southern American colonies of English settlers were two distinct geographic units—New England and the maritime provinces in the North and Virginia (named after England's Queen Elizabeth) and the Carolinas in the South. When the Congress of the Confederation sought to render aid to a northern state for the good of all, it was opposed by the southern states, which could not or would not see why the South should be asked to do anything to help the North and declined to consider the well-being of the country as a whole. For instance, when Great Britain placed such a high duty on masts and spars that the export market was ruined, New Hampshire asked that Congress retaliate by placing an export tax on American commodities shipped to Britain that it evidently needed. The states from the Delaware River north (i.e., the shipbuilding, shipping, and lumber-exporting states) acquiesced, but the agricultural, or planter and slave, states declined to support such a tax except in the export of tobacco. They refused to place an export tax even on rice and indigo, which the South was sending abroad to a market that was most anxious to receive such commodities and quickly absorbed all that was sent. William H. Clark writes:

So weak was the Confederation that abroad the United States was laughed at while, at home, everyone questioned how long it would be before, instead of one nation, English-speaking America would be split into thirteen. Actually, there was little danger of so many new nations setting up in business for themselves, but there was a very grave danger of the new nation splitting into halves. This was so because the North and the South were very sharply divided. The South could always feed itself, and with the

world hungry for its tobacco, rice, indigo, tar and turpentine, there were always foreign ships eager to pay cash for surplus crops. The North from Pennsylvania up was not largely agricultural. It grew only enough food to feed itself, thanks to poorer soil and colder climate, and was thus dependent upon other activities for existence—manufacturing, shipbuilding, lumber, fishing, etc., and every one of these activities hinged upon commerce abroad as the necessary condition for their prosperity.

Whereas the South, with the North, had suffered severely during the War of the Revolution, the South had the power to rehabilitate itself while the North was economically dependent on its shipbuilding, forests, fisheries, and foreign trade. During the fight for independence, the North had lost about a thousand ships suitable for foreign trade, and its extensive fishing fleet—New England's great source of income—had been practically wiped out. There were mechanics available to cut timber and build new ships and sailors idly waiting for a chance to take them to sea, but America had no capital to pay for materials and wages, and because of the vindictiveness of Britain there were few foreign ports to which American ships could sail. If the country had been a really "united" group of states during the five years following the colonies' fight for freedom, it could and undoubtedly would have acted promptly to protect itself from Britain's revengeful, ruthless, and inhuman attempts "to beggar America and bring the rascals back into the British Empire." During the critical, gloomy years of 1783-1788, the southern states did much to help England drive American shipping from the seas and "scupper the plans for the new nation." When the northern states (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York) did enact legislation penalizing the importation of British goods, the other states actually "welcomed British ships and coolly accepted shipments for transport by land or by coasting vessels into the closed states." It is even said that the southern states enjoyed as well as benefited economically by this deplorable situation, but without a real national government and national laws nothing could be done about it.

Southern leaders fought against giving American ships preference over British ships in handling American commerce, claiming that American ships (generally owned in the North), if favored over the foreign ships, would squeeze exorbitant freight rates out of the grower and shipper of southern products such as tobacco, cotton, and rice. In the Virginia Assembly, the "warrior parson" went so far as to ask whether it would not be better "to encourage the British rather than the eastern [northern] marine." Many southerners feared the Yankee northerners in the 1780's as much as they did eighty years later. Incidentally, it was this same sectional prejudice and antagonism expressed against the northern-owned merchant marine of the country by southern politicians and planters (who refused to subsidize steam mail liners over deep-sea trade routes to meet the financial support being given British shipowners by their Parliament and permit of competition on an equal basis) that in the late fifties and the sixties of the nineteenth century killed the United States ocean steam navigation in its infancy and operated to prevent, at a critical period, the development—in the world's interest—of an iron steam deep-sea merchant marine in America to take the place of wood sail, which it took no great prophet to see was inevitably doomed. In the fifties, it was clearly evident that American forests were being rapidly depleted of ship timbers and well known that the ground contained a virtually inexhaustible supply of coal and iron, which, if exploited intelligently and enthusiastically, would give America, in the field of iron steam, the same advantage that it had possessed over England in the realm of wood sail. Moreover, the United States had the benefit of Yankee resourcefulness, ingenuity, inventiveness, originality, initiative, and mechanical ability (approaching genius), something that Britain or, for that matter, the South did not possess. The British favored the South in the American Civil War not only because of southern-grown cotton, which England had come to need,

but also because of the fact that the American merchant marine, which Britain with reason greatly feared, was almost exclusively northern built and northern owned.

New Englanders living on the seacoast or on navigable streams flowing to the ocean appreciated fully, at all times, the importance of the merchant marine to the national economy. From the first days of the young republic, they were ship-minded and positive that the destiny of the United States was on the ocean, that a large and capable merchant fleet was essential to prosperity, and that a bold and vigorous national marine policy was necessary if the United States was to become a first-class power or even survive as an independent nation commanding the respect of the other established powers. Maritime New England chafed through the six years (1783-1789) of political (and sectional) purgatory, with its inharmony, indecision, and inactivity as far as the common good and the welding of the thirteen individual states into a nation were concerned. In 1785, John Adams, indignant and incensed at the shortsightedness of his countrymen and their evident indifference to the merchant marine and the need of taking definite steps to protect and encourage it, wrote from England, decrying with patriotic ardor the apparent ignorance and helplessness evidenced in the impotence and lethargy of the Continental Congress and pleading for action: "This being the state of things, you may depend upon it the commerce of America will have no relief at present, nor in my opinion ever until the United States shall have generally passed navigation acts, and if this measure is not adopted, we shall be derided, and the more we suffer the more will our calamities be laughed at."

Britain, from the first, did all within its power to keep the thirteen states of the young independent nation from being united and from growing strong. It encouraged and capitalized to the full the prevailing spirit of sectionalism and, by demanding diplomatic and economic discussions with representatives of the separate states, went so far as to ignore the Federal Government and brand it impotent or even nonexistent. It was not until after the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 that Britain really recognized the existence of the new republic as a single nation, and it was not until after the outcome of the War of 1812 that Britain became convinced that it had lost "for good and all time" each and all of its American colonies that had rebelled against its domination in the 1770's and won their independence by force of arms in 1783. Until after 1815, Britain, by promoting sectional discord and favoring certain states, had hoped to re-establish dominion over the part of the country that it felt would be of the greatest value as part of the British Empire.

The First Protective Legislation—the Beginning of the "Golden Age" of American Commerce

Through Yankee keenness, daring, and a spirit of adventure, some vessels made splendid profits during the lean and most discouraging years of the eighties of the eighteenth century, but American shipping as a whole was in the doldrums. H. C. Adams says that in 1789 the entire American merchant fleet registered for foreign commerce was only 123,893 tons, while Britain had a fleet of 94,110 tons engaged in American ocean carrying alone. This condition was due not to lack of ability, ambition, or courage on the part of Americans but to the existence of no real operating national government with a definite policy, a navy, and a desire as well as the ability to give some measure of protection to its ships and sailors at sea and to its merchants engaged in foreign trade. The young United States had an abundance of cheap timber, skilled shipbuilders, able merchants, deep spacious harbors, and the best sailors in the world. Its forest products, the catch of its fisheries, and certain agricultural crops such as

tobacco and corn were abundant and admittedly the finest in the world, and the nation was a good market for both agricultural and manufactured foreign products. America, moreover, possessed that intrepid seafaring and trading spirit that makes for maritime leadership. Without, however, the protection and encouragement of a strong and able government—and the possession of a navy that commanded some respect abroad—little could be done on the “lawless ocean,” where the ruthless aggressions of great powers matched in unscrupulous avariciousness only the lustful depredations of pirates infesting trading waters. Until the Constitution became effective in 1789 and the United States henceforth functioned as a nation instead of a group of inharmonious states, American shipping was not only overwhelmingly handicapped in foreign trade but also compelled to fight foreign shipping engaged in its own coastwise trade.

The first act of import passed by the first real Congress of the United States and enacted appropriately enough on Independence Day, July 4, 1789, contained sensible and necessary provisions for the protection of the American merchant marine, which had been in a deplorable condition of decline and decay for fourteen years (1775-1789). In the preamble, this law frankly stated its purpose: “Whereas, it is necessary for the support of the government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid on goods, wares and merchandise imported . . .” The law was, therefore, a revenue measure and a protective tariff act with which all interests of the country—both the agricultural South and the more industrial North—were in sympathy; but, as all fields of American endeavor were to be protected from the competition of the foreigner, it was deemed right and proper (and enough votes to support the reasonable provision were obtained, although not easily from the legislators south of the Delaware) to give American shipowners and seamen the same consideration bestowed upon American manufacturers and planters. This was accomplished—at least to a definite degree—by allowing a discount of one-tenth in tariff duties upon imports brought to the United States in ships built and owned by American citizens.

Following the pioneer voyage of the *Empress of China* to Canton in 1784, American merchants looked far away to the Orient for trade in a greatly disturbed world. By 1789, it was said that the “daring keels” of forty New England ships were engaged in trade beyond the African Cape (Cape of Good Hope) and that Boston, Salem, and New York navigators had found their way to ports of the Far East. Tea was the principal import of these oriental traders, and ginseng was at first a prime article of export. The first American protective legislation, in seeking to encourage trade with distant China and India, provided for discrimination in favor of American over foreign shipping engaged in such trade, as it was known that, up to that time, the commerce of United States ships with the Orient had been spectacular, appealing to and capturing the popular imagination, but that it had not been profitable. The law of 1789, which operated as real protection and discriminated pronouncedly in favor of United States carriers, placed the following duties on tea imported into the United States in American and foreign vessels:

Type and Growth of Tea	Tariff Duty — Cents per Pound		Import Duty Favoring U.S. Ships	
	U.S. Ships	Foreign Ships	Cents per Pound	Percentage
Bohea	6	15	9	150
Souchong	10	22	12	120
Hyson	20	45	25	125
Other green varieties	12	27	15	125

But Congress did not stop here. It was known that England was working to monopolize the oriental (tea) trade and had declared that Americans should buy their tea in England. Powerful British and European East Indies companies were entrenched in the Indian trade and that of certain of the East Indies islands, but they had, up to that time, done little business with China. American ships passing Anjer and sailing to Canton had aroused the antagonism

of these companies, but the newly organized American Congress, made cognizant of these facts, was determined to foster the growth of oriental trade in American bottoms. Therefore, to encourage American merchants to send their own ships to the far eastern port of origin for cargoes, it imposed on teas brought by United States ships from warehouses in Europe a duty of one-third more than on teas transported direct from the Orient. This, it has been well said, "was stalwart protective legislation" as far as the handling of oriental teas in American-built and American-owned bottoms was concerned, and it was naturally effective in driving all foreign shipping from the American tea trade. A United States ship with a cargo of a hundred thousand pounds of assorted teas would accordingly be assessed a duty of \$12,200 less the general 10 per cent differential in favor of American shipping, or \$10,980; while a foreign ship bringing in the same teas would be required to pay a tariff of \$27,800, or about two and a half times as much as the United States ship. It is no wonder that thirty-nine years later (1828) the American Institute of New York, referring to the "complete security" given United States shipping in transporting oriental teas, said, "Your committee believes that there has not been a single pound of tea imported since the passage of the law in question (the acts of 1789) which has not been imported in an American bottom."

Congress, however, was only warming up to its work, and the legislators in favor of protecting American shipping and developing a real national merchant marine gained in both power and courage. On July 29, 1789, an act was passed which levied tonnage duties of 6 cents per ton on American-built vessels entering United States ports, but required foreign-built and foreign-owned ships to pay 50 cents a ton and foreign-owned and American-built ships, 30 cents a ton. This was primarily a revenue measure (and the young republic, being impoverished, was sadly in need of funds), but New Englanders, assisted by New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and southern Atlantic seaboard interests, availed themselves of the opportunity to incorporate substantial American marine protection measures in the bill. This act also provided that American vessels engaged in the coastwise trade should pay the tonnage duty annually, but foreign vessels were required to pay at the time of each entry. It was not until after the harrowing experience of the War of 1812 and after twenty-eight years of struggling with England and France on the high seas (with persistent subjection to humiliation, harassment, insults, destructive arbitrary decrees, capture and confiscation, etc.) that the United States, in 1817, had sense enough absolutely to close American coastal trade to foreign vessels. This reserving to United States vessels the benefits of purely domestic trade—long delayed in enactment—continues in effect and has resulted in the creation and development of the greatest and most effective coastwise (and Great Lakes) shipping fleet in the world.

In 1794, the tariff and navigation acts were amended and made more "energetically effective." Tariff duties on foreign goods were increased, and the spirit of the legislators, eleven years after peace had been made with Britain and independence acknowledged, was "vigorously protectionist" (as it was in all other countries). Six years later, the sailors on American ships benefited by laws based on sound principles, and what was then legislation far ahead of the practice of the times became the basis of seamen's regulations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The early American nation was a seacoast people—an ocean, tidewater, and river people—and, therefore, naturally marine- and ship-minded. The country was settled on the Atlantic coast line from New Hampshire to Georgia, and emigration inland and the development of the Middle West had practically not begun. The national area was all east of the Mississippi River, but most of it was unexplored land. Kentucky was not admitted to the Union until 1792; Tennessee, 1796. (The Louisiana Purchase was not negotiated with Napoleon until 1803; certain southern Alabama and Mississippi lands, 1810-1813; part of North Dakota in 1818 and Florida in 1819.) An overwhelming percentage of the American people lived on or near tidewater, and the ocean, inlets, and rivers were the prime highways for traffic and transportation of persons and goods. As has been well said, "The ocean to

Americans was the most natural and the most inviting field of adventure." It was said of "tide-encircled" Boston, "Each street leads downward to the sea." This same remark would apply to a host of colonial and early American towns and is fully as applicable to New York, America's largest city, as it is to Boston. Marvin says that down the streets and roads of early American towns and villages "went most of the young men who had dreams in their heads and iron in their blood, and they always found ships waiting." He continues:

The years between 1789 and 1828 were the Golden Age of American sea-borne commerce. A far greater tonnage came afterward in the days of the clipper ships, and the actual money value of the country's trade in that old time does not now loom to large proportions. But, relative to population, the American people have never since owned

so much seagoing tonnage as they possessed when Jefferson or Madison was president. They had, in 1807, 12.54 cubic feet of shipping in the foreign trade for each inhabitant and in 1810, 13.43 feet. In 1855, at the high water mark of the clipper era, they had a per capita shipping of only 8.63 feet. Now (1902) it is scarcely one cubic foot.

It is also well to keep in mind that the dollar as an index of value and of buying power was quite different in the early days of the republic from what it is today. H. C. Adams, in *TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES*, says, "The growth of American shipping from 1789 to 1807 is without parallel in the history of the commercial world." In 1789, when the first American Federal Congress convened and before sound protective legislation had been enacted, English ships not only carried practically all of their country's trade but also had over 94,000 tons of ships, or a fleet 'about three-quarters as large as our own, steadily engaged in handling distinctly American commerce. According to Adams, the British tonnage in our carrying trade, because of the operation of the American protective marine laws, had dropped to 37,000 tons in 1794 (a reduction of 61 per cent) and was down to 19,670 tons in 1796 (a reduction of 79 per cent in seven years).

Jefferson, in his advocacy of some measure of protection to save United States shipping from being driven from the seas, said:

The loss of seamen unnoticed would be followed by other losses in a long train. If we have no seamen, our ships will be useless, consequently our ship timber, iron and hemp; our shipbuilding will be at an end; ship carpenters will go to other nations; our young men will have no call to the sea; our

products, carried in foreign bottoms, be saddled with war—freight and insurance in time of war—and the history of the last hundred years shows that the nation which is our carrier has three years of war for every four years of peace.

Jefferson, who was secretary of state in 1791, made some elaborate estimates in an attempt to set forth how much the United States had been losing by its dependence on foreign (British) shipowners. He figured that Britain, carrying 40 per cent of the \$25,000,000 in exports of the United States, received in freight and insurance \$2,250,000 in a year of peace (22½ per cent on \$10,000,000 worth of business) and that in times of war the British charges on our commerce, because of higher carrier costs, insurance and war hazards, would be increased to \$5,500,000 (55 per cent on the same volume of business). Therefore, Jefferson argued, the difference of \$3,250,000 per year between British peace- and war-time charges for freight and insurance represented the tax on American agriculture occasioned by the frequent British wars and the United States dependence on British ships. He further computed that England was at war during three out of every seven years and that, therefore, the United States was paying Britain \$1,392,857 (three times \$3,250,000 divided by seven) more per year than if the commerce of America—a peaceful nation—were being handled by its own ships.

Washington expressed the following sentiments when Congress was considering, in 1794, the strengthening of import duties and protection of the merchant marine:

To force shipbuilding is to establish shipyards; is to form magazines; to multiply useful hands; to produce artists and workmen of every kind who may be found at once for the peaceful speculations of commerce and for the terrible wants of war. . . . For a navigating people to purchase its marine afloat would be a strange speculation, as the marine

would always be dependent on the merchants furnishing them. Placing, as a reserve with a foreign nation or in a foreign shipyard, the carpenters, blacksmiths, caulkers, sail-makers, and the vessels of a nation, would be a singular commercial combination. We must therefore build them for ourselves.

In the last decade of the eighteenth century, Philadelphia and the Delaware led in the production of sizable quality American ships; in the last three decades of the nineteenth century and to the end of American (wood and steel) sail, Bath, Maine, and the Kennebec River led by a big margin. The center of activity and influence during the century of United States wood shipbuilding gradually moved north and east from the Delaware (and Chesapeake) to New York, thence to Boston, and after mid-nineteenth century it rested in Maine, waging its great fight for survival on the river front from which the first ship ever built on the American continent had been launched in the first decade of the seventeenth century.

Historical records reveal that on December 31, 1789, the United States had 123,893 tons of shipping in deep-water commerce carrying about 18 per cent of the country's imports and 30 per cent of its exports. The first real legislation of the First Congress of the United States was to encourage shipping. From the very beginning, the Federal Government adopted a policy of fostering and protecting American shipping. The action of the First United States Congress, by its differentiation in favor of American carriers in the levying of import duties, operated greatly to encourage the importation of goods in American rather than foreign bottoms and, therefore, to stimulate shipbuilding and shipownership in the young republic. During the ten-year period 1789-1799, the proportion of the combined imports and exports carried in American vessels to the total shipments increased from 23½ per cent to 88½ per cent. Moreover, during this period, American vessels could evidently be built and operated much more cheaply than similar British ships, and these advantages naturally were of great aid to American merchants in combating foreign competition.

By December 31, 1794, the United States merchant fleet registered for foreign trade had increased to 438,863 tons and was carrying 91 per cent of the imports and 86 per cent of the exports. Two years later, this deep-sea marine tonnage had increased to 576,733, and American bottoms were transporting 94 per cent of the imports and 90 per cent of the exports. The total merchant fleet of the United States increased from some 201,562 tons in 1789 to 747,965 tons in 1795, or 3¾ times in six years. The growth of the American merchant marine during this period and up to the Long Embargo is unprecedented in the history of commerce. The Napoleonic wars caused a great demand for American products, threw much of the carrying trade of Europe into American hands, and for a time left the United States no real competition in the China trade.

During the decade prior to the Revolution, the available official figures for the construction of vessels in British America (including Bermuda and the Bahamas) are meager and admittedly inaccurate. In 1769 the tonnage stated was 21,370 gross tons, of which, according to the Journal of the House of Commons, 20,081 tons were built in the thirteen colonies. In 1770 and 1771, the corresponding figures for ship construction in the colonies were given as 20,920 tons and 24,492 tons, respectively—an average of 21,831 tons for the three-year period 1769-1771 inclusive. Lord Sheffield, in "Review of American Commerce," gave somewhat different but generally similar figures of the volume of American shipbuilding and reported the total construction of wood sail in the twelve colonies for each of the four years 1769-1772 inclusive as follows:

Year	Tonnage	Ratio to 1769 Output	Year	Tonnage	Ratio to 1769 Output
1769	20,001	100	1771	24,068	120
1770	20,610	103	1772	26,544	133

Thomas Irving, the British inspector-general of customs, stated that these reported figures did not cover all new construction, because of the slackness in effect in making returns, and that he felt the actual tonnage built was one-half more than the official figures showed. It can, therefore, be estimated that the marine tonnage built in the colonies was about 37,000

tons in 1771, and historians tell us that the shipbuilding industry underwent a great expansion following the successful outcome of the Revolution.

The reports of the United States commissioner of navigation give the registered tonnage of the American merchant marine engaged in foreign trade for certain early years following 1789 (the first year of jurisdiction of the Federal Government) as follows:

As of Dec. 31	Foreign Trade Registered Tonnage	As of Dec. 31	Foreign Trade Registered Tonnage	As of Dec. 31	Foreign Trade Registered Tonnage
1789	123,893	1793	367,734	1797	597,777
1790	346,254	1794	438,863	1798	603,376
1791	361,110	1795	529,471	1799	657,142
1792	411,438	1796	576,733	1800	667,107

The above figures exclude registered vessels engaged in the whale fisheries, which during the period 1794-1800 inclusive are reported as averaging 2,948 tons for each of seven years (maximum for the period, 5,647 tons in 1799; minimum, 763 tons in 1798).

The United States official tonnage records were known by contemporaries to be incorrect; nevertheless, they reflect the trend of increase in shipping. All government figures prior to about 1821 are unreliable, as in the early years the methods of collecting and reporting tonnage data were pitifully primitive and not only encouraged but also inevitably led to error. A special official check report made in 1792 gave the tonnage of the United States merchant marine engaged in foreign trade as 289,394 tons (not 411,438 tons), and this variation or error of 122,044 tons, or about 30 per cent, is astounding. The drop in the official figures of 1793 was due to two facts or conditions: (1) It was the first year of the Franco-British war and of extensive spoliation on the high seas; (2) it immediately followed the exposure of errors in the 1792 reports. By 1800 the foreign trade fleet of the United States, according to government statistics, had practically doubled in size in ten years. The following figures give—for the early years—conservative and probably fairly accurate estimates of the registered foreign trade fleet of the United States: 1789, about 100,000 tons; 1792, about 289,000 tons; 1800, about 512,000 tons. The tonnage engaged in coastwise trade was estimated at 120,000 tons in 1793, 240,000 tons in 1800, and about 400,000 tons in 1808; this makes a probable total United States mercantile marine tonnage of 470,000 tons in 1793, 750,000 tons in 1800, and over 1,200,000 tons in 1807 before the embargo of 1808 cut down the foreign trade tonnage.

Early United States marine tonnage records, as copied and arranged by later officials and as compiled by later "authorities" and used by historians, show frequent, rather persistent, and at times annoying variations and errors in figures and descriptions. The reports of tonnage registered as engaged in foreign trade and of American shipping tonnage entered are much confused in the early years. The total tonnage of registered vessels, including whale fisheries (but excluding all enrolled vessels for coastwise trade and the fisheries—whale, cod and mackerel—and all small "licensed" vessels), as reported by the U. S. commissioner of navigation from figures prepared by the Register of the Treasury for each of the eighteen years 1794-1811 inclusive (immediately preceding the War of 1812), is set forth herewith:

As of Dec. 31	Tonnage of Registered Vessels	As of Dec. 31	Tonnage of Registered Vessels	As of Dec. 31	Tonnage of Registered Vessels
1799	662,789	1804	672,530	1809	910,059
1800	670,573	1805	749,341	1810	984,269
1801	632,907	1806	808,285	1811	768,852
1802	560,381	1807	848,307	1812	760,624
1803	597,157	1808	769,054	1813	674,853

During the eight years following the adoption of the Constitution (or from 1789 to 1797), the registered marine tonnage of the United States as officially reported increased 384 per cent; this gain was exceptional, and much of it was due to the almost universal state of war in Europe, which threw a large part of the carrying trade of the world to American neutral ships. Between 1797 and 1810, the increase was 64 per cent (notwithstanding a setback due to Jefferson's Embargo of 1807); but the War of 1812 and post-war conditions caused a slump in foreign trade tonnage, and it was not until 1847 that the tonnage of United States registered vessels exceeded the official recorded figures of 1810.

The following are the official U. S. Government figures for marine tonnage of (1) foreign registered, (2) coastwise (enrolled and licensed), (3) whale fisheries (registered and enrolled), (4) cod and mackerel fisheries (enrolled and licensed), with the annual increase or decrease of the aggregate recorded tonnage—expressed as a percentage—for each of the years 1789-1815 (from the adoption of the Federal Constitution to and including the year in which the war with Britain ended):

Year Ending Dec. 31	Foreign Trade Registered Vessels	Coasting Trade Enrolled and Licensed Vessels	Whale Fisheries Registered and Enrolled Vessels	Cod and Mackerel Fisheries Enrolled and Licensed Vessels	Total Merchant Marine	Total Annual Increase or Decrease in Tonnage
	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
1789	123,893	68,607		9,062	201,562	
1790	346,254	103,775		28,348	478,377	137.33
1791	363,110	106,494		32,542	502,146	4.96
1792	411,438	120,957		32,062	564,457	12.40
1793	367,734	122,071		30,959	520,764	— 7.74
1794	438,863	162,578	4,129	23,048	628,618	20.71
1795	529,471	184,398	3,163	30,933	747,965	19.00
1796	576,733	217,841	2,364	34,962	831,900	11.22
1797	597,777	237,403	1,104	40,628	876,912	5.41
1798	603,376	251,443	763	42,746	898,328	2.44
1799	657,142	246,640	5,647	29,979	939,408	4.57
1800	667,107	272,492	3,466	29,427	972,492	3.52
1801	630,558	274,551	3,085	39,382	947,576	— 2.56
1802	557,760	289,623	3,201	41,522	892,106	— 5.85
1803	585,910	299,060	12,390	51,812	949,172	6.39
1804	660,514	317,537	12,339	52,014	1,042,404	9.82
1805	744,224	332,663	6,015	57,465	1,140,367	9.40
1806	798,507	340,540	10,507	59,183	1,208,737	5.99
1807	840,163	349,028	9,051	70,306	1,268,548	4.95
1808	765,252	420,819	4,526	51,998	1,242,595	— 2.04
1809	906,855	405,163	3,777	34,487	1,350,282	8.66
1810	981,019	405,347	3,589	34,828	1,424,783	5.51
1811	763,607	420,362	5,299	43,234	1,232,502	— 13.49
1812	758,636	477,972	2,930	30,459	1,269,997	2.95
1813	672,700	471,109	2,942	19,877	1,166,628	— 8.14
1814	674,633	466,159	562	17,855	1,159,209	— 0.63
1815	854,295	475,666	1,230	36,937	1,368,128	18.02

The figures given for the years 1789-1792 inclusive are not truly comparative, for Joseph Nourse, register of the treasury, wrote on February 1, 1812: "As there were not any accounts kept at the treasury of the district tonnage of the United States prior to the operation of the acts of 31st December 1792 and 18th February 1793, the statement in which is exhibited the tonnage for the years 1789, 1790, 1791 and 1792 has been formed from the accounts of ton-

nage on which duties were collected for those years." The figures given for the tonnage of registered vessels in foreign trade during the years of the War of 1812 (i.e., 1812-1815 inclusive) and for the following years 1816 and 1817 are obviously inaccurate, as it was not until 1818 that any serious attempt was made to have the records reflect the losses of tonnage sustained during the war. In 1817 the official U. S. Treasury records show the registered foreign trade tonnage at 804,851 tons and in 1818 at only 589,954 tons—a drop of 214,897 tons, or 26.7 per cent. Joseph Nourse says in *AMERICAN STATE PAPERS* (Vol. II, p. 648): "The decrease of tonnage in this year [1818] arises principally from the registered tonnage having been corrected by striking off all vessels the registers of which were granted prior to 1815, which were supposed by the collectors to have been lost at sea, captured, etc."

The following is a record—evidently as nearly accurate as any that is available—of United States foreign commerce from the early years of the Federal Constitutional Government up to and including 1815, which reflects the resumption of trade following the termination of the War of 1812. (In 1816, the first full year of peace, the value of foreign commerce reached the record high of \$229,023,052—which held until 1835—with U. S. vessels carrying 70½ per cent of combined imports and exports.)

Year	Arrivals at U.S. Ports		Value of Foreign Commerce in Dollars	Percentage of Total Foreign Commerce Carried in American Ships		
	Tonnage	Percentage U.S. Vessels to Total		Exports	Imports	Combined Exports and Imports
1789				30	18	24
1790				40	41	40
1791			48,212,041	52	58	56
1792	658,000	63	52,253,098	61	67	64
1793	611,000	73	57,209,572	77	82	80
1794	608,000	84	67,643,725	86	91	89
1795	637,000	91	117,746,140	88	92	90
1796	721,000	93	140,010,789	90	94	92
1797	680,000	89	126,674,116	88	92	90
1798	610,000	85	129,879,111	87	91	89
1799	734,000	85	157,734,670	87	90	88
1800	806,000	84	162,224,548	87	91	89
1801	1,007,000	84	204,384,024	87	91	89
1802	930,000	84	148,290,477	85	88	86
1803	951,000	82	120,466,699	83	86	85
1804	944,000	87	162,699,074	86	91	88
1805	1,010,000	91	216,166,021	89	93	91
1806	1,134,000	93	230,946,963	89	93	91
1807	1,176,000	92	246,843,150	90	94	92
1808	572,000	91	79,420,960	88	93	90
1809	684,000	88	111,603,233	84	88	86
1810	986,000	92	152,157,970	90	93	91
1811	981,000	96	114,716,832	86	90	88
1812	715,000	93	115,357,236	80	85	82
1813	351,000	52	49,861,017	65	71	68
1814	107,000	55	19,892,441	51	58	54
1815	917,000	76	165,599,027	71	77	74

The only available U. S. Government statistics show that 56,679 gross tons of shipping were built in the young republic during 1797, and during each of the next three years (1798-1800 inclusive) the following records of the number of the various types and total tonnage of the vessels built and documented in the United States have been reported:

MERCHANT SAIL

Year Ending Dec. 31	Number of Vessels					Total	Total Gross Tons
	Ships and Barks	Brigs	Schooners	Sloops, Canal Boats, and Barges	Total		
1798	34	53	401	147	635	49,435	
1799	87	131	382	167	767	77,921	
1800	128	176	487	204	995	106,261	

The total tonnage built and documented in 1801 was reported as 124,755 tons, with no details as to type and number of vessels available; no statistics of any kind are recorded for 1802. The fluctuating periods of boom and depression in the shipbuilding industry of the United States prior to the conclusion of the War of 1812 with Britain and during the period of embargo, etc., are set forth in the reported new construction tonnage figures for each of the years 1803-1814 inclusive as follows:

Year	Tonnage	Year	Tonnage	Year	Tonnage	Year	Tonnage
1803	88,448	1806	126,093	1809	91,397	1812	85,148
1804	103,753	1807	99,783	1810	127,575	1813	32,583
1805	128,507	1808	31,755	1811	146,691	1814	29,751

In 1812 steam vessels are reported for the first time in the U. S. records of vessels built and documented. In that year, out of a total tonnage reported as 85,148 tons, there were four steam vessels aggregating 457 tons, and the tonnage for sailing vessels—including canal boats and barges—was given as 84,691 tons. The available records of U. S. shipbuilding for the war and early post-war years (the period of 1813-1817 inclusive) are as follows. (No details of the number and type of sailing vessels built have been preserved for the years 1801-1812 inclusive.)

Year Ending Dec. 31	Sailing Vessels, etc.						Steam Vessels		All Vessels	
	Ships and Barks	Brigs	Schooners	Sloops, Canal Boats, and Barges	Total		Number	Gross Tons	Number	Gross Tons
					Number	Gross Tons				
1813	3	21	212	128	364	31,153	7	1,430	371	32,583
1814	3	11	312	162	488	29,040	2	711	490	29,751
1815	136	224	680	284	1,324	154,624	5	955	1,329	155,579
1816	76	133	781	424	1,414	131,667	17	3,519	1,431	135,186
1817	34	90	559	394	1,077	86,393	10	1,233	1,087	87,626

The peak year for the period prior to 1815 was 1811 (after the embargo was raised and before the war with Britain commenced), when 146,691 tons were reported built. During the three boom years of 1804-1806, an average annual tonnage of 119,451 tons was built, and following the embargo the average annual construction for the two years 1810-1811 immediately preceding the war was stated as 137,133 tons. The offsetting depression years, with a minimum of new tonnage built, were the war years of 1813 and 1814 (only 32,583 tons and 29,751 tons, respectively) and 1808, the embargo year (31,755 tons).

The year 1815 was an artificial boom year as far as shipbuilding was concerned, and a new record of 155,579 tons built was reported. Some of this tonnage represented final completion and measurement of vessels that had been on the ways in an unfinished state during the War of 1812; some represented unusual sales to the Netherlands brought about by the suspension of the Dutch registry laws during the years 1815-1819 inclusive; and some, of course, represented new construction for shipowners who, with demands for tonnage in excess of normal, again entered the market upon conclusion of the war and after three years of pronounced marine inactivity. The Dutch, in an effort to replenish their mercantile tonnage, sadly depleted in the wars, bought some 75,000 tons of shipping from the United States during the five-year period of suspension of their registry laws.

*The New Nation Looks to the Far East—the EMPRESS OF
CHINA and the Opening of the China Trade*

During colonial days, American ships made no voyages to the East Indies because of the monopoly of the British East India Company and the fact that all available American ships and trading capital could profitably be employed in the various established trades nearer home. New England merchants, however, knew something about the trade of the English, Dutch, and Portuguese in the Far East, and they had learned that ginseng root, a plant growing wild in American forests, was highly valued medicinally by the Chinese. Sailing from Boston in December 1783, the little 55-ton sloop *Harriet* of Hingham, Mass., under command of Captain Hallet, was the first American vessel to clear a United States port and commence the long voyage to China. The sloop was loaded with ginseng, which it was planned to use in trade with the Chinese for tea or silk. Putting into Cape Town, South Africa, for water, Captain Hallet met some British East Indies traders who, evidently alarmed at the "Yankee threat" to their monopoly, offered him much more tea for his ginseng than he had hoped to obtain by barter in Canton (or two pounds for one); so Hallet traded with alacrity, saved the time of a long return voyage over the Indian Ocean and China Seas, and sailed the *Harriet* home.

By this change of plan, Captain Hallet made a good economic bargain, but lost the honor of taking the first American vessel into a Chinese port, which went a few months later to "the thoroughly American ship" *Empress of China*. Much of the young republic was interested in her, as she was built in Baltimore, financed in Philadelphia, managed in (and hailing from) New York, and all commercial affairs on the voyage were handled by a supercargo from Boston; she was, moreover, under the command of a naval officer—practically on furlough. Capt. John Green of the American Navy had been released from active service on January 15, 1784, so he could choose a ship, equip her and command her on this pioneer voyage, and arrange for a friendly convoy through the last and most dangerous portion of the run. Robert Morris, who had borne most of the burden of financing the War of the Revolution and who was referred to at times as the superintendent, dictator, or administrator in raising funds for the army and to prosecute the War of Independence, was the first leader in the enterprise, as in the "venturesome pursuit of commerce" he raised the \$120,000 needed and influenced Daniel Parker and Company, of Philadelphia, to share equally with him in the investment; Morris, furthermore, wrote the government's letter of authority for the proper officials to sign and arranged to obtain the services of Captain Green of the navy to select an available ship and command her on the contemplated voyage. Major Samuel Shaw, of Boston, appointed supercargo, had served as an officer in the Continental Army throughout the Revolution. He was General Knox's aide-de-camp, a good organizer and keen businessman of character, who had the faculty of getting along with everybody and the reputation of keeping excellent records of events and transactions. Major Shaw (who, in his domain as supercargo and businessman, was not subordinate to Captain Green) appointed Thomas Randall as assistant supercargo, and in A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK we read: "Five men—Morris and Parker at home, Shaw, Green and Randall aboard ship—handled all the important details of this pioneering venture."

In the Journals of Congress for 1784, there is an item referring to a letter of December 23, 1783, from Daniel Parker, which states that the ship *Empress of China* would shortly sail from New York for Canton, China, under the command of Capt. John Green, and requests sea letters. The letter referred to, which was finally given to Captain Green, having been signed by the president and by the secretary of Congress, reads as follows:

Most serene, most puissant, puissant, high illustrious, noble, honorable, venerable, wise and prudent emperors, kings, republics, princes, dukes, earls, barons, lords, burgomasters, councillors, as also judges, officers, justiciaries, and regents of all the good cities and places, whether ecclesiastical or secular, who shall see these patents or hear them read:

We the United States in Congress assembled, make known, that John Green, captain of the ship called the *Empress of China*, is a citizen of the United States of America, and that the ship which he commands belongs to citizens of the said United

States, and as we wish to see the said John Green prosper in his lawful affairs, our prayer to all the before mentioned and to each of them separately, where the said John Green shall arrive with his vessel and cargo, that they may please to receive him with goodness, and treat him in a becoming manner, permitting him upon the usual tolls and expenses in passing and repassing, to pass, navigate and frequent the ports, passes and territories, to the end, to transact his business where and in what manner he shall judge proper, whereof we shall be willingly indebted.

The INDEPENDENT JOURNAL of London, in its issue of July 29, 1785, reiterated the opinions expressed by marine authorities of Britain since the peace treaty of Ghent: that American ships would have no markets to trade with and, therefore, the American merchant marine was doomed to extermination through inactivity. It reported that it had become apparent that, notwithstanding the talk of American shipowners and merchants, "the Americans have given up all thought of a China trade, which can never be carried on to advantage without some settlement in the East Indies"; or, in other words, Americans without overseas territorial possessions—with their ports and trading centers—could never hope to become a real factor in foreign trade in the Orient, the East Indies, or elsewhere. The British were misinformed, for on February 22, 1784 (Washington's birthday), the "large and modern, fine copper-sheathed American ship" *Empress of China* sailed from New York for Whampoa (Canton), China. The British warships had vacated New York Harbor only eleven weeks before "this handsome, commodious and elegant ship" of 360 tons exchanged salutes with harbor batteries and commenced the historic and pioneer voyage from an American port to the Cape of Good Hope, Indian Ocean, East Indies, and the Orient, or "Far East." The *Empress of China* had forty-six men aboard her (ten officers of all ranks, thirty-four men before the mast, and two supercargoes), and not counting the private merchandise of Captain Green and personal "adventures," the ship is reported to have had on board "more than 30 tons of ginseng, about the same amount of pig lead, a ton of pepper, 1,270 woolen garments (camlets), and 2,600 fur skins." Shaw presumably carried the remainder of the capital in the form of specie for trading and the inevitable bribing of officials, etc.

Captain Green contacted the French man-of-war *Triton* (Captain d'Ordelin) in the East Indies and completed his voyage to China under friendly French convoy and pilotage. Major Shaw's journal gives the mileage of the *Empress of China* outbound as 18,248 miles, New York to Whampoa. She was reported to have reached Macao on August 23, 1784, after an outward passage (including delays and slow time in the East Indies under convoy) of 183 days. It was also reported that "the *Empress* arrived at Canton on the 26th of August." The length of the ship's stay in Chinese waters is unknown, but one record says she was "at anchorage at Whampoa for one month." On the return passage, the "*Empress*" crossed the South Atlantic and ran up the east coasts of the Americas, and Shaw gives the distance covered as 14,210 miles. She reached home on May 11, 1785, after a round voyage of 444 days (or 14 months 18 days) including all detentions—port or otherwise. (Most historians give the time as 15 months or as 14 months 27 days, both of which are evidently incorrect.)

That the voyage was profitable is unquestioned, but some contemporaries, who had hoped to make far more, seemed disappointed that the profits were only about 25 per cent of the entire capital risked on the enterprise. Some historians say that the profit on the voyage amounted to \$30,000, and one writer reports that the "*Empress*" showed "such a huge profit that the China trade was established firmly by this single voyage." We read that Major Samuel Shaw was so sure of his inventories and markets that he actually paid off the owners of the invested capital, based on his estimates, before waiting for complete returns. The profit that Shaw "modestly called twenty per cent" (or \$24,000 on an investment of \$120,000), we are told, was \$30,727, "but as other China traders bought ginseng more avidly and bid against

each other for the Hyson and Bohea teas of the Canton security merchants, the margin on which Shaw's 25.605 per cent was based began to disappear." It would be interesting to know what this competition was that certain historians refer to, for no other American vessel took ginseng direct to China to compete with that carried there by the *Empress of China* for a long period of time, and the next arrival in the United States with China teas was the little sloop *Experiment*, which did not reach New York until April 22, 1787, or only nineteen days short of two full years after the return home of the *Empress of China*. The ginseng carried by the little sloop *Harriet*, sold at the Cape of Good Hope, possibly reached the Orient in the autumn of 1784, but the quantity was small and the price (if based on the cost to the South African merchants) very high—and this was the only shipment of American ginseng known to have moved to the Far East, other than the "*Empress's*" cargo, for a period of about two years. If the tea brought home by the *Empress of China* had to compete in price with other newly arrived shipments, such teas could have been carried to the United States only in British or other foreign bottoms. It has been said that "despite Shaw's inexperience," the *Empress of China* brought home a cargo "that proved America need pay no further tribute for teas or silks to the Dutch or British"; also, "Major Shaw's report to the government . . . stimulated others to repeat the experiment," and Shaw "freely gave of his experience to all who asked."

Major Samuel Shaw, because of his initiative and success in trading with China, was officially given the purely honorary title of American consul at Canton. He sailed from New York to take up his residence in the Orient on the ship *Hope* of New York. He was very successful in winning the friendship of the Chinese and was largely responsible for the feeling among oriental merchants and government officials that the Yankees were "superior to all other white nationalities" and, therefore, entitled to favored treatment—a condition which greatly exasperated the English. Shaw also was connected with the development of the U. S.-East India trade, but unfortunately was resident in China and the East only about eight years. On his way home in 1794, when only forty years of age, he died at sea from an illness contracted in Bombay. Samuel Shaw was a resourceful and able man as well as an outstanding character. Capt. Amasa Delano, of Duxbury, said of him: "He was a man of fine talents and considerable cultivation; he placed so high a value upon sentiments of honor that some of his friends thought it was carried to excess. He was candid, just and generous, faithful in his friendships, an agreeable companion, and manly in all his intercourse."

American ginseng, which gave the young republic an entree to the market of China, was closely related to the highly valued Chinese ginseng and was described as an "alterative tonic, stimulant, carminative and diuretic." In early days, it grew rather plentifully on the forest floors that furnished the shipbuilders of the maritime provinces with their timbers for shipbuilding. Being merely "a dried material to make a medicinal, aromatic and stimulating hot drink," the demand for ginseng was necessarily not great, and soon American exports proved too large for the market to absorb and yield a good price to the merchant-carrier. The demand for China tea and silk in the United States, with its relatively small consuming population, was also quite limited, and these were facts that naturally restricted the volume of America-China trade during the critical years of America's fight for life on the ocean and the new nation's great struggle for world trade between the end of the War of the Revolution in 1783 and the adoption of the Federal Constitution, with the passing of the first national measure to encourage and protect United States shipping, in 1789. During these decisive years, the China trade was never worth more than 15 per cent of the total of America's ocean commerce, but it gained the United States immediate recognition as a world marine power and served notice on other nations, and particularly on the British, that the Americans were a people to be reckoned with on all trade routes open to them and that American merchants and mariners were resourceful, courageous, and able.

Although the United States soon outstripped every other nation in the China trade, save Britain, it could not long compete with Britain without a suitable trading medium; hence the

British declaration of 1785 that America, without settlements in the East, could not survive in the China trade. Ginseng could be procured and sold only in limited quantities, and the Canton market accepted little but specie and eastern products, which gave British merchants a great advantage; for they marketed the spoil of India, the products of the Moluccas, etc., and had abundant wealth, so that the major part of the teas, silks, and china acquired by the British ships in China was paid for in silver. Elias H. Derby, from the first, approached the China market from an angle different from the direct voyage out and back and met with a great measure of success through the force of fortuitous circumstances, the initiative of his captains, and his own vision in trading with the Isle of France in the Indian Ocean. Later, Boston merchants, following the pioneer voyages of the *Columbia* and *Lady Washington* around Cape Horn, developed the Boston-Northwest Coast-Canton-Boston trade, having commenced the venture in 1787. They felt that the solution to the problem of an acceptable and profitable cargo for China lay in the furs of the Northwest Coast. This decision was reached by the Boston merchants (1) after having conversations with Major Samuel Shaw, who had heard of a few small British traders' having sold Alaskan sea otter at Canton; (2) after having knowledge of Captain Cook's third voyage, an account of which was published in 1784; and (3) after giving consideration to John Ledyard's report of Captain Cook's exploratory voyage and of the Russian fur trade in the Bering Sea. By the time that the *Columbia* and *Lady Washington* sailed from Boston for the Pacific Northwest, it was known that China was an inviting and profitable market for furs and that such an acceptable trading commodity could be obtained in quantity on the Northwest Coast of the American continent.

*The Amazing Adventure of the Sloop EXPERIMENT—the
Second America-China Voyage*

Around the middle of the 1780's, a famous voyage was made from New York to the Far East and return by the 76-ton sloop *Experiment*, a diminutive vessel, with one mast (and two yards), that had been built at Albany for the Hudson River trade and passenger service. Under command of Capt. Stewart Dean, who had served in privateers during the Revolution, and carrying six cannon, a liberal supply of small arms (muskets, boarding pikes, and cutlasses), and a crew of fifteen men and boys, this little New York sloop, with audacious and resourceful officers (John Whitten was the experienced and competent mate), journeyed to "the other side of the world," braved the warships of marine powers, the treacherous pirates whose swift proas swarmed in the waters of the Malay Archipelago and the typhoons of the China Seas, and made an eminently successful and profitable round voyage. A good deal of erroneous material has been written by historians in regard to the voyage of the little *Experiment*. It is said that "she carried ginseng to China worth five dollars a pound," which is ridiculous, but different writers say that her profits were "great," "modest," or nonexistent; there is a great difference expressed in regard to the size of her crew, some writers stating a very large number. The W.P.A. compilers of A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK mention "a crew of eight, two of whom were boys," but most authorities agree that the sloop carried a crew of fifteen all told.

Coggeshall, in HISTORICAL SKETCH OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, gives the *Experiment* the honor of being the pioneer vessel to engage in the America-China trade and claims that she anticipated the *Empress of China*. This statement is evidently overenthusiastic and incorrect, for the *Experiment* embarked on her hazardous and historic voyage about the time that

the *Harriet* of Boston and *Grand Turk* of Salem started on their first voyages to the Orient. Historians, however, generally credit the *Experiment* with being the second American vessel to sail in the China trade and with an amazingly fast return passage "of four months and twelve days from Canton Roads to New York." It is further said that Captain Dean "brought back all of the fifteen men and boys who composed his crew, having had no sickness whatever during his absence from the United States." An eye witness wrote of the little vessel's return to New York that the sloop hauled into the wharf in regular frigate fashion, with ceremony and discipline like a vessel of war ten times her size, and that "martial music and the boatswain's whistle were heard on board, with all the pomp and circumstance of war."

The *Experiment* was no larger nor more seaworthy than any ordinary Hudson River sloop of over a century later that was used for freighting bricks from Haverstraw to Manhattan, and Marvin, in *THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, wrote in 1902: "Nowadays a seaman would be adjudged mad who took an eighty-ton sloop off soundings. Not a few of the other first ventures in the East India trade were conducted in vessels scarcely larger or more seaworthy than the *Experiment*."

There was a sloop *Experiment* that reached New York on November 10, 1785, from Bermuda, and this was probably the same vessel which was put in the China trade by a company formed for that purpose. The *Experiment*, after loading "dollar-a-pound ginseng, Madeira wine, silver dollars and other merchandise," evidently sailed from New York on or shortly after December 18, 1785, which was somewhat more than two weeks after Elias H. Derby dispatched his 300-ton ship *Grand Turk* to the Indian Ocean. This ship, after a long stop at the Isle of France, continued on to Whampoa (Canton), and soon after her arrival in September 1786, the *Experiment* entered the river. Being very small, the New York sloop loaded much more quickly than the bigger ships. She was reported as "getting away" on November 28, 1786, but other records say that she actually sailed on December 10 and arrived at New York April 22, 1787, which would make a fast run home of 133 days (4 months 12 days). This may have been about as fast as the homeward passage of the *Grand Turk*, which claimed to have left Whampoa thirty-four days after the *Experiment* weighed anchor and arrived at Salem May 22, 1787, just thirty days after the little New York sloop reached home.

The COLUMBIA'S Celebrated Voyage from Boston to the Northwest American Coast—"Furs for China and Tea for Home"

A young American seaman, John Ledyard, who sailed with Captain Cook, the British explorer, to the North Pacific and published a journal and chart of the voyage in 1783, is generally credited with urging the importance of the northwest fur trade. Robert Morris, who planned and financed the pioneer voyage of an American ship to China (the *Empress of China*, 1784-1785), was convinced of the practicability of the venture, but no merchants on either side of the Atlantic could be influenced to act in the matter until a group of Boston men, Joseph Barrell, Samuel Brown, and Capt. Crowell Hatch, merchants, and Charles Bullfinch, architect, with the co-operation of Capt. John Derby, of Salem (of revolutionary fame and brother of Elias Hasket Derby), and John Marden Pintard of the firm of Pintard & Company, New York, subscribed for fourteen shares of \$3,500 each and thereby raised \$49,000 to finance a pioneer trading voyage and equip and dispatch a ship to the Northwest Coast and open an American trade in furs with the Indians. America had been so impressed with the value of Captain Cook's explorations to all maritime peoples and the world in general that in 1779,

during the War of the Revolution, Benjamin Franklin, the American minister to France and marine superintendent abroad, had issued a special order to Continental cruisers requiring that "in whatsoever part of the sea they might meet the great discoverer, Captain Cook, they were to forget the temporary quarrel in which they were fighting, and not merely suffer him to pass unmolested but offer him every aid and service in their power, since it would ill beseem Americans to lift their hands against one who had earned the reverence and gratitude of all mankind."

Capt. James Cook (1728-1779), the British navigator (born in Yorkshire, England), had made three great exploratory voyages: (1) South Pacific (1768-1771), (2) Southern Hemisphere (1772-1775), (3) North Pacific (1776-1779). The latter was terminated by his violent death at the Hawaiian Islands. However, his own journal of this third voyage, published in 1784, tells of the warm and beautiful skins of the sea otter, which were purchased from Indians on the American Northwest Coast for beads and other trinkets and which were sold by the Russians to the Chinese for from \$75 to \$100 each.

It was to benefit by this trade and, by barter, to get cargoes of oriental products (tea, silks, chinaware) for the homeward passage that the Boston-Salem-New York syndicate of merchants decided to undertake an exploratory commercial voyage around Cape Horn to the fur-trading territory of the American Northwest. The expedition was placed under the command of Capt. John Kendrick, of Wareham, Mass., and two vessels were sent out. The larger, of which Kendrick was master, was the ship *Columbia* of 212 tons (83 ft. long). She had been built on the North River, Scituate, Mass., in 1773 and was, therefore, fourteen years old when she sailed for the Northwest "mounting 10 cannon," loaded with trading trinkets and other materials, stores, etc., and carrying an expert furrier, an "astronomer," a surgeon, a clerk, and an artist (Third Officer Robert Haswell). The second vessel was the sloop *Lady Washington* of 90 tons, which was intended to be used as a tender for coastwise navigation, and she was commanded by Capt. Robert Gray, of Tiverton, R. I., a former officer in the Continental Navy.

These two vessels, the first American craft to round Cape Horn, left Boston on September 30, 1787, and made long passages, going south via the Cape Verde Islands and stopping again at the Falklands. They encountered heavy westerly gales off the Horn, and on April 1, 1788, in Lat. 57° 57' S., they parted company and proceeded up the Pacific separately. The *Lady Washington* reached the coast of "New Albion" on August 16, when about ten and a half months out, and about a week later was joined by the *Columbia* at Nootka Sound, the fur-trading center on Vancouver Island. The vessels were anchored in sheltered coves, log huts were built ashore, and a small boat constructed. In the spring, trading commenced, but the furs came in slowly, the sloop being used for making cruises alongshore, penetrating the inlets, and visiting accessible Indian villages. When the *Columbia* had a "respectable cargo of fine furs" aboard, the skippers changed vessels, and on July 30, 1789, Captain Gray took command of the ship and set sail westward across the Pacific for Canton via Hawaii, where he stopped for "rest and provisions." Upon reaching the Chinese port, the furs did not sell for as much as anticipated, but there was a market for them, and the proceeds were used to purchase a cargo of tea for Boston. It is evident that the commissions, duties, presents, and graft that had to be paid by the "foreign devils" to Chinese officials, security merchants, and interpreters ate up much of the paper profits of American traders, particularly at first and until experience and a system to cope with the evil developed a more economic procedure. The *Columbia's* first cargo, consisting of 1,050 sea otter skins, sold for \$21,404.71, but after fees, expenses, etc., were deducted, only \$11,241.51 remained to invest in a cargo for the homeward voyage. It is said that "even after the ropes were learned, it was a clever captain who expended less than \$6,000 at Canton" for expenses, services, fees, and graft.

The *Columbia* sailed for home on February 12, 1790, calling at St. Helena and Ascension en route, and on August 10, after a passage of 179 days, reached Boston. She was "welcomed by artillery salutes and a great crowd of rejoicing citizens." The *Columbia* had completed a

trading voyage on which she had circumnavigated the globe and traveled 41,899 nautical miles. Apparently, some of the tea landed by Gray had been damaged by sea water, and this famous voyage "was more fruitful in fame than in gain." We are told that it brought "so little profit to the owners" that Capt. John Derby, of Salem, and John M. Pintard, of New York, sold out to the four Boston partners, who—not by any means disheartened—immediately set to work to prepare the *Columbia* for a second venture. Under command of Captain Gray, the old ship sailed from Boston on September 28, 1790, and on June 4, 1791, after a Cape Horn passage of 249 days (8 months 6 days), anchored at Clayoquet, a fur traders' harbor on the Northwest Coast. Captain Kendrick with the *Lady Washington*, having made a round transpacific voyage, was on hand, and the two American ships had a very turbulent summer with the belligerent, avaricious, and deceitful Indians. Three of the crew of the *Columbia* were murdered, and the sloop barely escaped capture, Captain Kendrick's son being killed and scalped. The *Lady Washington* later was changed into a brigantine at Macao and was the first vessel to fly the American flag in Japanese waters, although she was ordered away and "sternly refused the right to trade there." It is said that Captain Kendrick had hopes of interesting the wealthiest of the Japanese in bartering for the skins of sea otters, but that the people evidently were backward and disinterested as well as exclusive and combative and "knew not the use of fur." This vessel was later lost in the Straits of Malacca after making several transpacific passages. Captain Kendrick, after opening up a valuable trade in sandalwood, was killed with two boys on his own quarter-deck by an unfortunate accident in the Hawaiian Islands.

It was said that the Indians of the Northwest, when peacefully inclined, were hard to please in trade, and Captain Gray's clerk wrote: "They do not seem to covet useful things but anything that looks pleasing to the eye or what they call riches." On the first voyage, the *Columbia* carried out for barter large numbers of snuff-bottles, rat-traps, and Jew's harps, which proved a dead loss, but the supply of pocket mirrors in the same shipment moved well. Profiting by experience, the ship, on her second voyage to the Northwest Coast, carried goods for barter bought from certain merchants as follows:

- | | |
|---|---|
| From Herman Brimmer, "143 sheets of copper," many pieces of blue, red and green "duffills" and scarlet coating. | From Benjamin Greene, Jr., "blue duffle trousers at 92 cents, pea jackets, Flushing great coats, watch-coats and 'fear-noughts.'" |
| From Solomon Cotton, "4,261 quarter-pound chis-sells." | From Baker & Brewer, "striped duffle blanketing." |
| From Asa Hammond, "150 pairs shoes at 75 cents." | From Samuel Fales, "14M 20d nails." |
| From Samuel Parkman, "6 gross gimblets and 12 gross buttons." | From the U.S. Government, "100 old muskets and blunderbusses." |

It would seem that the Indians of the Northwest had advanced by 1789 far beyond the stage of bartering sea otter furs for beads and trinkets. They were, moreover, increasingly treacherous and hostile as they came in greater contact with the white men. Captain Kendrick was a man of high principles and, on parting with Captain Gray during their pioneer voyage, wrote him: "Treet the natives with Respect where Ever you go. Cultivate friendship with them as much as possibel and take Nothing from them But what you pay them for according to a fair agreement, and not suffer your peopel to affront them or treet them Ill." Captain Kendrick refused to retaliate upon the assassin when his own son was killed by an Indian, but turned the murderer over to the chief of the Indian tribe for punishment, "believing this would best serve the ends of justice and assure the safety of white men on the coast." Captain Gray and Boston men generally, from both personal interest and humanity, endeavored by just and tactful dealings to win the natives' confidence, but their work of peaceful trading was seriously hampered by foreign traders "who would pirate a cargo of skins and never return," and Captain Gray believed and affirmed that much of the Indians' treachery and aggression was the result of English outrages. New Englanders in the Northwest were seriously handicapped in their efforts to effect peaceful trading by the inability of the Indians to differentiate between the various nationalities of white men, and it was naturally extremely difficult for them to distinguish Americans from Britishers.

Capt. Robert Gray was the pioneer shipbuilder in the American Northwest, for he built at Clayoquet the 40-ton sloop *Adventure* to operate as a tender and consort to the *Columbia*. On his second expedition to the Northwest, Gray did much exploring, and on May 7, 1792, discovered the harbor in Lat. 46° 58' now known as Gray's Harbor, which was followed up by the discovery and navigation for some twenty-five miles inland of the great river that, after landing on May 19, 1792, he formally named for his ship, the *Columbia*. He wrote that he "doubted not it was navigable upwards of a hundred miles." A British naval exploring fleet of three vessels had passed the mouth of this magnificent river of the Northwest, the long-sought great river of the "Oregon country," and Capt. George Vancouver had written in his journal: "Not considering this opening worthy of more attention, I continued our pursuit to the Northwest." By this lack of perception, Vancouver missed the golden opportunity to claim northwestern America for the British by right of discovery.

John Boit, Jr., the junior mate on the *Columbia*, wrote that it was on May 12, 1792, that Captain Gray crossed the bars at the entrance to the big river and anchored in "10 fm water, quite fresh." He continued:

The river extended to the NE as far as eye cou'd reach, and water fit to drink. . . . We directed our course up this noble river in search of a village. The beach was lin'd with natives, who ran along shore following the ship. Soon after, above 20 canoes came off, and brought a good lot of furs and salmon, which last they sold two for a board nail. The furs we likewise bought cheap, for copper and cloth. They appear'd to view the ship with the

greatest astonishment and no doubt we was the first civilized people that they ever saw. At length we arriv'd opposite to a large village, situate on the north side of the river about 5 leagues from the entrance. Capt. Gray named this river *Columbia's* and the north entrance Cape Hancock and the south point, Adams. This river in my opinion, wou'd be a fine place for to set up a FACTORY. . . . The river abounds with excellent SALMON.

Morison has said that the *Columbia* "had solved the riddle of the Chinese trade" on her first voyage to the northwest fur-trading region, but that on her second voyage, which was also completed as a trading venture, "empire followed in the wake."

When Gray had secured a cargo of furs, he sold his tender *Adventure* to the Spaniards at Nootka and sailed in September 1792 for China and home. The *Columbia* reached Macao leaking, so her cargo of furs was unloaded and sent to Canton, where it was sold. Loaded with teas, sugar, chinaware, and curios, the ship cleared on February 3, 1793, for the United States and, after stopping at St. Helena, reached Boston on July 29 after a passage, port to port, of 176 days. She completed her second voyage of circumnavigation when twenty years of age. Marvin has said:

The owners of the *Columbia* never realized their dream of golden profits. As so often happens, other and later comers reaped what the pioneers had sown. But those sagacious Boston merchants did render a

great and noble service to their country, and the fame of their courage and foresight and the name of their ship will live as long as history endures.

It was twelve years after Capt. Robert Gray had discovered and named the Columbia River that Lewis and Clark's band of overland explorers reached the upper Columbia and floated down to the sea, and it was in 1811, or nineteen years after Gray's exploration and discovery, that Astoria, the oldest white settlement in the Northwest, was founded by John Jacob Astor, of New York, as a fur-trading post.

John Jacob Astor, the New York fur merchant, became interested in the trade with China around the end of the eighteenth century, as he saw in that great country a market for furs. In 1800, Astor dispatched to Canton his first ship loaded with pelts, which his trading connections had gathered and sent overland to New York. Henry Eckford, of New York, built the famous and long-lived *Beaver* for John Jacob Astor in 1805, and during the days of Jefferson's "absolute embargo," this vessel is said to have "paid for herself several times over" by "one of the resourceful Astor's many tricks." Albion, in *THE RISE OF NEW YORK PORT*, tells of the incident as follows:

At the time when the embargo was prohibiting all American ships from making foreign voyages, New

York was amazed to see the *Beaver* clear and sail for Canton. Astor had received permission from

President Jefferson, in the interest of "international comity," to carry home a distinguished "mandarin" stranded in this country. Amazement gave way to indignation when it developed that the "mandarin" was a very ordinary Chinaman dressed up for the

purpose and envy was well mixed with admiration when the *Beaver* returned with a profit of \$200,000 from a voyage in which all American competition had been legally debarred.

In June 1817, this same ship *Beaver*, still owned by Astor, cleared New York for "Canton and the Northwest Coast." Apparently, this was merely a ruse, as the vessel had loaded and was destined for Chile, then in the throes of civil war, with the coast blockaded. Putting into Talcahuano in southern Chile for water and fuel, the *Beaver* fell into the hands of Spanish royalists, who found among her cargo munitions to a substantial amount valued at \$140,000, which had quite evidently been selected with the Chilean rebels and not the Chinese or the Northwest Coast Indians in mind. The *Beaver* had her cargo condemned and was used for voyages up and down the South American west coast for some two years, and when she returned to New York in 1820, she carried a good quantity of Ecuador cocoa and opened up a new trading area.

When John Jacob Astor decided to invade the northwest fur field, where the Bostonians had become quite prominent, he planned to develop a permanent coast settlement and trading stations and work along the lines pursued generally in the northeast fur business. Astoria, founded near the mouth of the Columbia River, was to be not only the headquarters of Astor's fur-gathering organization and storage warehouses for furs and exchange goods but also, for protection of the investment, the nucleus of a great American colonization on the Pacific. But Astoria was unfortunate from the start. The *Beaver* carried out men and supplies in 1811, picked up a load of furs on the coast and took them to China, but the war with the British caused her to remain idle in the Whamboa for years, and she did not get back to New York with her cargo of teas, silks, china, and cassia until March 1816. Meanwhile, Indians massacred the crew of the *Tonquin*, which Astor had sent out from New York with supplies, and the War of 1812 killed Astor's ambitious project of founding a trading settlement and an American colony on Puget Sound. It is said that "at the threatened approach of a British frigate, Astor's representatives sold out [Astor's Astoria investment] to their Scottish rivals."

On returning to Boston in 1790, Thomas H. Perkins, who had made a voyage to China as supercargo on Derby's ship *Astrea*, bought the little 70-ton brigantine *Hope* and sent her to the Northwest American Coast under the command of Joseph Ingraham, who had served as mate under Capt. Robert Gray. In a single summer, the *Hope*, bartering with the Indians, collected 1,400 sea otter skins. In November 1790 (two months after the *Columbia* had started on her second voyage), the 157-ton brigantine *Hancock* left Boston under the command of Capt. Samuel Crowell for the Northwest Coast and furs for the China market. Captain Magee, who had commanded the *Astrea* in the China trade in 1791, interested James Lamb, and his brother, Lieut. Thomas Lamb, to join him in the building of the 150-ton *Margaret* for the fur and China tea trade, and this vessel sailed from Boston under Captain Magee's command on December 24, 1791, "bound on a voyage of observation and enterprise to the North-western Coast of this continent." Salem ships continued to trade with the East Indies and China via the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean, but by 1792 Boston had become more interested in furs to barter for China tea, silks, and chinaware, and the trade route Boston-Northwest Coast-Canton-Boston was fairly well established. A contemporary wrote: "The habits and ordinary pursuits of the New Englanders qualified them in a peculiar manner for carrying on this [fur] trade, and the embarrassed state of Europe gave them . . . almost a monopoly of the most lucrative part of it." In Boston, the northwestern part of the country was referred to as "The Coast," and in 1801, out of sixteen ships engaged in the fur trade there, picking up sea otter skins for the Chinese market, fourteen of them were owned in Boston. Morison says:

The most successful vessels in the northwest fur trade were small, well-built brigs and ships of 100 to 250 tons burthen (say 65 to 90 feet long) con-

structed in the shipyards from the Kennebec to Scituate. Larger vessels were too difficult to work through the intricacies of the Northwest Coast. They

were heavily manned, in case of an Indian attack; and copper-bottomed by Paul Revere's newly invented process, to prevent accumulating barnacles and weeds in tropic waters. The Winships' *Albatross* which neglected this precaution, took almost

six months to round Cape Horn, and found her speed reduced to two knots an hour. Clearing from Boston in the autumn in order to pass the high latitudes during the Antarctic summer, they generally arrived on the coast by spring.

It was a difficult and hazardous trade, which required, in addition to meeting navigation risks, unceasing vigilance in dealing with the Indians. In 1803 the ship *Boston* (Capt. John Salter) was attacked by the Indians, and all but two of the ship's company were slaughtered. The Northwest Coast fur ships were armed with "from six to twenty cannon" besides swivel guns, which were mounted on the bulwarks. High boarding nets were generally kept in position, and when Indian canoes swarmed alongside, men with blunderbusses manned the tops, the dugouts were kept at a respectable distance from the ship, and only a few Indians allowed aboard at a time. The cargoes of twelve vessels that cleared from Boston for the American Northwest Coast during the period 1797-1800 were invoiced between \$7,500 and \$19,700. The *Caroline*, we are told, asked in 1803 for \$14,000 insurance and obtained only \$13,000 for "ship, cargo and outfit" and had to pay a rate of 17 per cent for coverage of risk "against the natives and as well on shore as on board."

The skin of the sea otter was the principal fur sought by American merchant seamen, and it is said that the Chinese mandarins had never been able to get enough of them from Russian traders. Capt. William Sturgis, who had left Boston in 1798 for "The Coast" as a "16-year-old foremast hand" and returned in 1803 "as master of the Lambs' ship *Caroline* and of the fur trade," always asserted that a prime otter skin five feet by two feet was the finest natural commercial article in the world. Observing that the Indians on the coast used ermine furs for currency, Captain Sturgis bought five thousand of them at the Leipzig fair for 30 cents apiece. On his next voyage to the Northwest, he purchased one morning 560 sea otter skins at the rate of five ermine for one sea otter; therefore, these fine furs, which he sold in Canton for \$50.00 each, cost him only \$1.50 apiece. The Sturgis ermine venture, however, reduced the value of ermine to the Indians, as the increase in supply naturally depreciated their worth as currency. Captain Sturgis, lecturing at Boston on January 21, 1846, said that, in the early days of this fur trade, an outfit not exceeding \$50,000 gave a gross return of \$284,000.

One of the most outstanding voyages in the history of sail was in the northwest fur trade. It was made by the little sloop *Union* of Boston, which sailed from Newport on August 1, 1794, under the command of Capt. John Boit, Jr., who was then only nineteen years of age, but had been a junior mate on the historic *Columbia* under Capt. Robert Gray. The *Union* was armed with 10 carriage guns and 8 swivels and carried a crew of twenty-two men. On this voyage, she was the first—and possibly the only—sloop-rigged vessel, or single-sticker, to round Cape Horn westbound and complete the circumnavigation of the globe. The sloop, after making certain "anti-scurvy" stops, rounded the Horn and was at Lat. 57° 42' S. on February 4, 1795. On May 17, she dropped anchor in "Columbia's Cove," Vancouver Island, and went as far north as 54° 15' in her quest for furs, finding the trade brisk and that sea otter skins had doubled in price in three years' time. On June 20, the *Union* was attacked while at anchor in Puget Sound by several hundred Indians, but they were beaten off and the chief and forty warriors killed, with no casualties among the *Union's* crew. Leaving the Northwest Coast (Queen Charlotte's Island) on September 12, 1795, the *Union* sailed for the Sandwich Islands, thence to Canton, and anchored December 5, 1795, at Whampoa, where she found seven American vessels, all much larger than herself. After Captain Boit had exchanged his sea otter skins for "silk and nankeens" and taken aboard some freight and passengers for the Isle of France (Mauritius), he sailed on January 12, 1796, and with some coffee and pepper put aboard at the French Indian Ocean island port he commenced the last leg of his voyage in late March.

South of Madagascar, the *Union* experienced terrific weather, which sprung the mast; later, westerly gales for four days stove in part of the bulwarks and swept the deck as she

was hove to. In early May, the Cape of Good Hope was rounded, and in the Atlantic the *Union* was stopped by a French sloop of war, but was allowed to pass. Approaching the New England coast, Captain Boit ran up against the British, and H.M. frigate *Reason* first fired a shot through the *Union's* staysail and then ordered the young Yankee skipper to come aboard with his papers for examination. Captain Boit wrote that the commander of the French warship *Scipio* had treated him with "the utmost politeness," but not so the British, who, "finding they could not make a prize of the sloop, suffer'd me to pass, after treating me in a rough and ungentlemanlike manner." The *Union* reached Boston with a profitable cargo on July 8, 1796, after a round voyage that, with detentions, had occupied 23 months and 7 days and, it is said, "beat most of the fleet home." Young Captain Boit (nineteen years old when he sailed and twenty-one when he returned home) had fought the elements and the Indians with success, had run up against the sea power of Britain and France, had traded keenly in the Northwest, at Canton, and at the Isle of France, and, moreover, in a small single-sticker, had made a record deep-sea voyage that has never been equaled.

Capt. Richard Cleveland, of Salem, in 1797, when twenty-three years old, was master of the bark *Enterprise* bound from Salem to Mocha for coffee. The voyage was abandoned at Havre and the vessel ordered home. Cleveland, preferring "to remain abroad and gamble for himself with the chances of the sea," sent the bark back to Salem in charge of the mate, and he bought in France the "cutter-sloop" *Caroline* of 43 tons—a craft no larger than many later-day yachts "whose owners think it venturesome to take them off soundings in summer cruises." With a patched-up crew of little or no experience consisting of three men (one of whom was a Negro cook) and two young boys, Cleveland put to sea. The little craft was driven ashore on the coast of France, but—nothing daunted—Cleveland got her off, worked her back to Havre, and not only made repairs but also strained his credit and put \$1,000 more into his cargo. He wrote that it would "amount to \$7,000," although his vessel was "of only forty tons." The voyage to the Cape of Good Hope was of three months' duration and of such a nature that the London LITERARY EXAMINER later said that "few things in De Foe, Dana, or any other truth teller" compared with it and added, "Surely never before was there such an Indiaman and with such a cargo and such a crew."

Upon arrival at the South African cape, Captain Cleveland sold his cutter and her cargo, took passage to Batavia, and thence on to Canton, where he "was attracted by the prospect of a voyage to the northwest coast of America to buy furs from the Indians." In a small vessel, but little if any bigger than the *Caroline*, Cleveland risked his entire resources of cash and credit, stocked her with \$20,000 worth of assorted goods to be used for barter, and put out across the Pacific with a picked-up crew and crowd aboard of twenty-one "as accomplished villains as ever disgraced any country" (Englishmen, Irishmen, Swedes, Frenchmen, and two Americans). After a month of bad weather off the China coast, this crew of "beach-combing ruffians" and cutthroats mutinied, but with a handful of loyal men and possession of the guns aboard, Cleveland made for the shore, where he dumped the mutineers. With a crew big enough to handle the vessel at sea but so small that he ran imminent danger of Indians' taking her by boarding, he traded for two months on "the Wilderness Coast of Oregon" and loaded his vessel's holds with "prime sea-otter skins." Captain Cleveland sailed for China via the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands, and it is said that, with a cargo worth \$60,000, he had risked \$11,000 and made a profit of \$40,000.

Returning to Europe by way of Calcutta and the Isle of France and buying and selling cargoes on the way, Cleveland, in Hamburg (in partnership with Nathaniel Shaler, of Connecticut, and a young adventurous Pole, Count de Rousillon), purchased a fast Virginia-built brig, the *Lelia Byrd*, and sailed for the west coast of South America. They experienced trouble with the Spaniards, had to get out of Valparaiso by strategy, and silenced the fort at San Diego with their guns. The *Lelia Byrd* traded for furs and on August 29, 1803, arrived off Canton from the Sandwich Islands and sold a cargo of sea otter skins at a good profit. Rousillon had remained in Mexico to trade, and at Canton Cleveland and Shaler parted com-

pany, Cleveland taking passage via the Cape of Good Hope for Boston, while Shaler loaded the *Lelia Byrd* and took the brig back to the American coast for another cargo of furs. We are told that Capt. Richard Cleveland returned to Salem in 1804, when thirty years of age, having made "three most extraordinary voyages in tiny craft" and been twice around the world. He arrived home with his capital increased from \$2,000 to \$70,000, or 35 times, after paying all his debts and interest on loans.

Some of the Boston-Northwest Coast-Canton merchant seamen resorted to contraband fur trading on the Spanish California coast. All trade and intercourse between Bostonians and Californians were forbidden, but it appears that "both seized every opportunity to flout the laws of the Indies." The first United States vessel to anchor in Californian waters was evidently the 168-ton ship *Otter* of Boston (Capt. Ebenezer Dorr, Jr.), which put into Monterey for provisions in 1796. Apparently, Boston vessels in the Northwest Coast trade usually carried a *Carta de Amistad* signed by the Spanish consul resident at Boston, which gave permission to enter one of His Catholic Majesty's ports if in distress caused by the elements or lack of food and water. It has been said that such an exigency "was pretty sure to occur when the land breeze smelt sea-otterish." It was not on the far Northwest Coast that Cleveland and Shaler traded for furs but on the California coast, and the bloodless "Battle of San Diego" on March 21, 1803, was said to have been caused by the *Lelia Byrd's* trying "to make off with some pelts under the very nose" of Rodriguez, the Spanish commandant. We also read that farther north, at San Quintin, the Americans "got on beautifully with a group of mission fathers who came down to trade." Referring to the friendly relationship between the Puritan New Englanders and the Spanish Catholic padres, Morison says, "Nothing like a common interest in smuggling to smooth religious differences."

Capt. Joseph O'Cain, of Boston, in a 280-ton ship named after himself, inaugurated a new system of collecting sea otter skins in 1804. Calling at the Russian settlement on the California coast, he made a deal with the Russian factor for the loan of 150 Aleut Indians "on shares." Morison says:

These expert otter-hunters, putting out from the ship in their skin canoes, like Gloucester fishermen in dories, obtained 1,100 sea-otter pelts for Capt. O'Cain in his first California cruise. Kills were made under the very walls of the San Francisco presidio. Three years later, O'Cain chartered his ship *Eclipse* of Boston to the Russian-American

Company, traded their furs at Canton, . . . lost the vessel on the Aleutian Islands, built another out of the wreck and returned to the trade once more. California sea-otter and fur-seal hunting, combined with contraband mission trade, was pursued with much success for about ten years, when the Russians declined further aid to their competitors.

Americans were guilty of many shady transactions on the Northwest Coast in their quest for furs, but none was worse than their dealings in slaves in order to obtain the skins of sea otters. Finding that war-captives were a recognized form of wealth among the Indians, some Boston traders bought these slaves from tribes that were overstocked, with the price correspondingly low, and sold them very profitably to other tribes that were short on slaves and, therefore, put a high price on them.

The value of imports into Canton brought by American vessels, we are told by Morison, "rose to over five million dollars in 1805-1806." He adds: "Of this, over one million was accounted for by 17,445 sea-otter, 140,297 seal and 34,460 beaver skins and 1,600 piculs of sandalwood. Most of the remainder was specie brought directly from Boston, New York and Philadelphia. The same year American vessels exported ten million pounds of tea from Canton."

We read much of the isolation of Japan and the closing of its ports to trade and intercourse with the occidental barbarians, but it is well to note that for centuries China was but little more liberal. Its ports were closed to the "foreign devils," and whereas during the era of the northwest fur trade China was the only market for sea otter, Canton, up the Whampoa, was the only Chinese port where foreigners were allowed to exchange it. China, like Japan, was exclusive and was actuated by a sense of superiority.

Capt. John Suter, born at Norfolk, Va., in 1781 and a Bostonian from 1789 on, was a famous Nor'westman. In 1804 he was mate and assistant trader on the Boston ship *Pearl*, and after the successful completion of a Boston-Northwest Coast-Canton-Boston voyage, he was promoted to master and supercargo of the vessel. The records show that notwithstanding trouble with the Indians, Captain Suter collected enough furs in the Northwest and sandalwood at the Sandwich Islands to pay all expenses at Canton and have \$156,743.21 to lay out in goods for the homeward passage. The captain's memorandum of the makeup of this cargo and the prices realized when sold at auction in Boston in 1810 has been preserved:

50 blue and white dining sets, 172 pieces each.....	\$ 2,290.00
480 tea sets, 49 pieces each.....	2,704.80
30 boxes enameled cups and saucers, 50 dozen each.....	1,360.00
100 boxes superior Souchong tea.....	795.87
100 chests Souchong	3,834.66
235 " hyson	13,290.65
160 " hyson skin	5,577.40
400 " other teas	13,668.48
200 chests cassia of 2,208 "matts" each.....	8,585.52
170,000 pieces "nankins"	118,850.00
14,000 " (280 bales) blue do.....	24,195.00
5,000 " (50 bales) yellow do.....	6,800.00
2,000 " (50 bales) white do.....	2,580.00
24 bottles oil of cassia.....	466.65
92 cases silks	56,344.61
and sundries, bring the total to.....	261,343.18
Expenses of sale, including auctioneers' commission, wharfage, trucking, advertising, . . . etc.....	2,129.06
Captain Suter's "primage" 5% on balance.....	12,960.70
	<hr/>
	246,253.42
On this were paid customs duties, within 12 months.....	39,602.95
	<hr/>
Net profit on voyage	\$206,650.47

Captain Suter next commanded Captain Sturgis' old ship, the *Atahualpa*, with a "primage" of 10 per cent and "a sixteenth share" in both ship and cargo. Again he had trouble with hostile Indians on the Northwest Coast, but once more by bravery and quick thinking he saved his ship and took a cargo of furs to the Sandwich Islands. Because of the war with Britain and the presence of British warships, Captain Suter sold his ship, but he got enough furs so that after peace was concluded a cargo was sent home that, we are told, "netted the owners almost \$120,000 on their original adventure of not over \$40,000."

The northwest fur trade, with its around-the-world route from Boston (generally) around Cape Horn to the Northwest American Coast, thence via the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands to Canton and back home rounding the Cape of Good Hope, was suspended during the War of 1812, but it was resumed in 1815 following peace between Britain and the United States. Capt. William Sturgis, then head of the Boston firm of Bryant & Sturgis, again became very active in the trade (as did others, such as Josiah Marshall), but the business had become very competitive and showed a pronounced decline in profits. The Russians and British were very active, and sea otter had become too scarce and too high in price to continue as an important medium for trade in China. In the 1820's, the number of vessels annually engaged in the northwest fur trade lessened from some fourteen to two. For some years, certain shipping merchants found it profitable to send supplies out to "The Coast," but when, in 1831, Josiah Marshall's brig *Owhybee* brought back "pickled Columbia River salmon" and a new promising trade seemed to be in the making, the U. S. Treasury Department killed the business by levying import duty and ruling that the Columbia River was foreign territory and not part of the United States. By 1837 the northwest fur trade, which, it has been said, was "Boston's high school of commerce for forty years," had petered out and become a thing of the past.

The sea otter, an amphibious mammal called Amikuk by the Eskimos, is now one of the

rarest animals in the world. All trading in its fur is unlawful; but in 1911, when it still sold legally, a single pelt brought \$1,990. From 1741, when the crew of Vitus Bering's ship (after being wrecked on Bering Island) brought back to Kamchatka 700 sea otter furs, the slaughter was so ruthless that by 1840 sea otters were nearly extinct. In the early 1930's, the Alaska Game Commission found a few sea otters surviving in an Aleutian Bay, and now, under government protection, they are slowly increasing in number.

The Northwest Coast sea otter fur business should not be confused with that of the sealskin fur. Both were developed by Americans during the latter part of the eighteenth century, following the War of the Revolution, and carried into the nineteenth century. Both originated through Boston enterprise, but whereas Boston dominated the Northwest Coast sea otter fur trade until its end, it was the whalers of Connecticut and Nantucket primarily who carried on the "seal-skinners" trade. Soon after the peace on the Seven Seas became an assured fact in 1783, a Boston woman, Madam Haley (later married to Patrick Jeffery, a Boston merchant), who owned the ship *States*, had her fitted out for a voyage to the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic "in search of fur-seal and sea-elephant oil." It is said that some of the sealskins obtained on this pioneer venture were carried to China, where there was a market for them. Later, Canton was described as being "the golden lodestone for every otter-skin, sealskin, or sandalwood log collected on the Northwest Coast, California or Pacific Islands." Sealskins worth "a dollar or two" in the mart at Canton could be obtained in tremendous quantities by merely stepping ashore and clubbing the helpless animals to death when their haunts were discovered. We are told that before 1810 islands off the Pacific Coast of the American continent from Northern California to Chile as well as islands in or near the Antarctic Zone and in the Indian Ocean had been visited by seal skimmers. Mas a fuero in the Juan Fernandez group of islands off the Chilean coast was for many years the center for seal killing. American ships first visited this island in 1797, and Capt. Amasa Delano, of Duxbury, Mass., who was in the trade, estimated that during the following seven years three million skins were taken to China from this island alone. Delano says that he found as many as fourteen vessels at Mas a fuero at one time and that he himself carried away one hundred thousand skins. Historian Ralph D. Paine writes that this sealskin business "was a gold mine for profit while it lasted."

Capt. Amasa Delano was a private in the American Army at fourteen, a privateersman at sixteen, and a master shipbuilder at twenty-one. He sailed to the East Indies as second mate on Boston's mammoth Indiaman, the *Massachusetts*, in March 1790. Amasa Delano and his brother Samuel built the sealers *Perseverance* (200 tons) and the smaller *Pilgrim*, and Amasa wrote of their voyage:

Almost the whole of our connections who were left behind had need of our assistance, and to look forward it was no more than a reasonable calculation to make that our absence would not be less than three years . . . together with the extraordinary uncertainty of the issue of the voyage, as we had nothing but our hands to depend upon to obtain a cargo which was only to be done through storms,

dangers and breakers, and taken from barren rocks in distant regions. But after a voyage of four years for one vessel and five for the other, we were all permitted to return safe home to our friends and not quite empty-handed. We had built both of the vessels we were in and navigated them two and three times around the globe.

In the quest for cargoes that would be acceptable in China and replace specie in the acquiring of teas, chinaware, silks, etc., for which there was a demand and good market in America, Boston was the leader in developing trade with the skins of sea otters, and New York for a time seemed to participate only to the extent of supplying "trinkets" used for barter with the Indians on the Northwest Coast. This "trinkets and general merchandise" business, which was of materials to be used for trade purposes, or barter, with backward peoples, developed so that such goods were sold and stocked at international trade centers in the East Indies (and Indian Ocean island ports), and Northwest Coast fur traders were able

to pick up barter goods at a reasonable price without having to journey back all the way to New England for them. In *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK*, we read:

The export of "trinkets and general merchandise" [as the eighteenth century ended] was becoming more and more to mean the export of miscellaneous goods from the warehouses of South and Pearl streets. So long as New York goods moved into the Indian Ocean and passed by open bidding into the

hands of a Pacific trader like Kendrick and so to the Indians of North America, it mattered less that Kendrick and Gray were Bostonians than that the routing and management of most of the great body of such trade was passing into New York control.

New York claims credit for its early maritime adventures in the waters around Cape Horn, but it would seem that eastern Connecticut mariners, even though often backed by New York money, are entitled to the credit. There were many seafaring Fannings hailing from Stonington, Conn., but one of them named Edmund stands forth conspicuously for his courage, initiative, and achievements. Born in 1769, he made an "unusually successful voyage" in 1797 (when twenty-eight years old), and in command of the little 97-ton *Betsey* he sailed for the Pacific "with a few trinkets aboard as his only cargo." Rounding Cape Horn, Fanning decided to "try his luck" with seal rather than with otter, so he made for the barren island of Juan Fernandez, slaughtered thousands of seals that cost him nothing, and when well laden headed for Canton. North of the equator between the Marquesas and the Sandwich Islands, Fanning discovered the island which now bears his name, also Washington and Palmyra Islands, and proceeded to Canton, where he arrived before sealskins depreciated in price because of the ease in obtaining them and the quantity thrust on the market. He traded his skins profitably and loaded a cargo that sold upon his return to New York for \$120,000, although his "net profit for the voyage" was reported as \$53,000, which seems low considering the nature and cost of his outbound cargo and the price realized from the sale of the return lading. It is said that Capt. Edmund Fanning made "eighty expeditions." In 1816 he sailed from New York in the *Volunteer* for seals in the South Pacific and got into trouble with Spanish officials in Chile, but in 1819 he led the historic expedition to the south Shetland Islands, during which Capt. Nathaniel B. Palmer in the sloop *Hero* discovered Palmer Land.

The adventuring of Yankee ships around Cape Horn bound as fur traders for the Northwest Coast or as whalers in their quest for oil and bone made Americans acquainted with ports on the west coast of South America, and during the Napoleonic wars, United States ships were trading with the east coast. Capt. Robert Gray, of *Columbia* fame, commanded the brig *Alert* of Salem, owned by Dudley L. Pickman, et al., which is credited with being the first North American merchantman to enter the River Plate. This vessel was captured by a French privateer and taken into Montevideo late in 1798, but Captain Gray was released and in 1801 was again at La Plata in command of the topsail schooner *James*, having called at Rio de Janeiro en route. We are told that between February and July 1802, forty-four American vessels (of which eighteen hailed from Massachusetts) entered the River Plate with mixed cargoes and took away hides and specie; this trade was the forerunner of the great hide and lumber traffic of later years between New England and Argentina and Uruguay. In 1810, William Gray was re-exporting "Buenos Ayres Hydes" and Peruvian bark from Boston to Tunis.

It was Capt. James Shields, of Nantucket, in command of Samuel Enderby's ship *Amelia* of London on a voyage to the whaling grounds off the coast of Brazil, who found that the whales had migrated and showed that "he was a Yankee all through" by sailing in the winter of 1788-1789 to the south. Rounding Cape Horn, Captain Shields commenced to look for whales in the Pacific, as Captain Cook had reported seeing many off the west coast of South America during his explorations. In 1743-1744, Admiral Lord Anson, with a squadron of "six good British ships," had endeavored to round the Horn to destroy Spanish forces then at Chile and Peru, but only one of his fleet had succeeded in reaching the Pacific. This fact was well known to Captain Shields, but it did not deter the dauntless Yankee skipper or the Nantucket whalers aboard, who felt that they could do what the Massachusetts-owned *Columbia* and

Lady Washington had shortly before set out to do. The *Amelia* found good whaling waters in the South Pacific off the west coast of the American continent, and First Mate Hammond was the first white man to drive a harpoon into a whale in the Pacific Ocean. The *Amelia* was back at London loaded with oil in the autumn of 1790, and in 1791 seven American whalers sailed from New England to try their luck on the new grounds. Gradually, the whales frequenting this territory were either killed or driven off. Capt. George Swain, Jr., of Nantucket, who sailed thither in 1817, declared on his return that although he had saved 1,388 barrels of sperm oil and 568 of whale oil, no ship would ever again fill with sperm on that coast.

But Yankee initiative and courage continued to be in evidence, for Capt. George W. Gardner, sailing from Nantucket in 1818 in the whaling ship *Globe* and finding Captain Swain's gloomy forebodings substantially correct, refused to return and try to hunt whale on known grounds that "were pretty well fished out." He pointed his ship to the west and boldly sailed as a pioneer and exploratory voyager into unknown seas. On this venture, Captain Gardner discovered the "offshore grounds," and twenty-six months after leaving port the *Globe* was back at Nantucket loaded with 2,090 barrels of sperm oil worth \$61,555.73. She was the first vessel ever to carry more than two thousand barrels of sperm oil into that world-famous whaling port.

While Captain Gardner in the *Globe* was discovering and working the "offshore grounds," Capt. Joseph Allen sailed from Nantucket on October 26, 1819, in the ship *Maro* "to hunt whale in the Pacific." Continuing north from the "fished-out west coast grounds," he went to the Sandwich Islands, where he found four whalers, all commanded by Yankees, and three of them American owned. These vessels were the *Rambler* (Captain Worth) of Nantucket, the *Cyrus* (Captain Folger) and the *Balaena* (Capt. Edmund Gardner), both of New Bedford, and the *Syren*, commanded by Capt. Benjamin Coffin, of Nantucket, but owned by Enderby and Sons, of London. While the five whalers were in port, the Massachusetts merchant ship *O'Cain* (Captain Winship) arrived from Canton, China, and reported having seen great numbers of whales off the mysterious and forbidden Japanese islands. The whalers immediately started a race to the west to seek and work these hoped-for new whaling grounds, and the *Maro* and *Syren* beat the rest of the fleet. Captain Coffin of the *Syren* reported getting his first whale on May 10, and Captain Allen's log shows that the *Maro* "saved her first whale" on June 1. It is said that "both ships were full to the hatches within three months after reaching the grounds" and that the *Maro* returned to Nantucket, after a voyage of twenty-nine months, with 2,425 barrels of sperm oil—the first to be received in any port from the Japanese islands whaling grounds.

It has been authoritatively said that more than four hundred islands in the Pacific alone were discovered by American whalers. The day of the explorers was "the Golden Era of the whalers and of American seamen." We read, "Often adventures which Vancouver dedicates three chapters to, these men accounted unworthy of being set down in the ship's common log." Yankee skippers were brave adventurers, but they were also realists and practical businessmen; their quest was not for glory but for money and "the wherewithal to make the wheels go round" and trade profitable.

The first passage of an American ship through the Straits of Magellan—an unpopular route with the skippers of sailing vessels to the end of the era of sail—was made in 1824 from the Atlantic to the Pacific by the Massachusetts ship *Endeavor* under the command of Capt. David Elwell. Braving the westerly gales and heavy seas in rounding Cape Horn was generally considered less hazardous to the wind-propelled vessel than attempting to sail through the "protected waters" of the straits.

*Elias H. Derby, of Salem, Ventures in the East with the
GRAND TURK I and Other Vessels in the 1780's*

Following the peace with Britain and the return of Elias Hasket Derby's ship *Grand Turk I* of Salem from her last privateering voyage, this 300-ton vessel had her 28 guns removed and her holds and 'tween decks refitted to carry cargo instead of ammunition, stores, prisoners, and crew. The "*Turk*" was about three times as large as the schooners and sloops heretofore used in the West Indian trade, but Derby decided to accumulate and buy himself a cargo suitable for the Martinique and Guadeloupe markets. While the British, on the signing of peace, had closed their markets (including those of the West Indies) to American ships, the Caribbean Sea island possessions of the French were still open to American trade. On September 24, 1783, the *Grand Turk* (built at Hanover, Mass., in 1781) weighed anchor and stood out of Salem Harbor bound to the French West Indian islands on her first voyage as a merchantman. Capt. Samuel Williams was in command, and instead of a complement of 120 men, which had manned the "*Turk*" when she was a privateer, she now sailed with only 14 men aboard—consisting of the captain, 2 mates, 9 sailors, a cook, and a boy (a seemingly small and decidedly "economic" crew for a full-rigged three-masted ship). The manifest of the cargo of the *Grand Turk* "shipt by Elias Hasket Derby on his own account and risk," consigned to Captain Williams "for Sales and Returns," reads as follows:

128 HHDS COD	55 MS BOARDS	5500 BUNCHES ONYONS
2 HHDS SCALE	299 SHAKEN HOGHD	11 BARRELS APPLES
160 BARRELS FLOUR	12 CASKS BRANDY	82 MS SHINGLES
70 BARRELS MACKEREL	114 CHEESES	2880 BDL HOPES
120 BARRELS ONYONS	3000 DOLLARS CASH	8 B B BEEF
53 BARRELS POTATO	60 BARL OYL	50 HATS

The following are extracts from Elias Hasket Derby's letter of instructions to Captain Williams:

I do advise and Order you to come to sail & make the best of your way for Martinique & there if you cannot find better Market sell the most of your Cargo for Cash & there or at Guardalope load the Ship with Sugar, Molass^s, Cocoa & Cotton for Salem—unless you can do anything to more advantage

with the ship. Provided you conclude to come Home with the Ship you might make the greatest dispech as I suppose it likely to meet a good market for Cotton at Home two months from this date. . . . Bring me a Barrel of Oranges, a Barrel of yams, a Pot of ginger & a Pot of Sweetmeets.

The *Grand Turk* arrived back at Salem April 7, 1784, and her cargo was unloaded into the Derby warehouses and gradually sold by the merchant-shipowner. Although the voyage had occupied about six and a half months, it was evidently quite profitable, for the ship was sent on a second similar voyage in 1784 under command of Captain Silsbee, and she was back at Salem in the fall. In the meantime, Derby had been considering more distant markets than the West Indies for his three big ships. In June 1784, he cleared the *Light Horse* from Salem for St. Petersburg, Russia, with a cargo composed largely of West India sugar, and this ship was the first to fly the Stars and Stripes in the Baltic Sea.

Upon the return of the *Grand Turk* from her second trading voyage to the West Indies, Derby decided to send her on a commercial exploratory voyage to the Cape of Good Hope. He thought that he could purchase consignments of tea at the Dutch settlement there (as he knew that it was a regular port of call for the ships of the Dutch East India Company trading between the East Indies and Holland) and thus obtain a commodity for which there was a great demand in America without having to go all the way to the Orient for it. Therefore, on November 27, 1784, Derby sent the *Grand Turk* out of Salem on her third voyage as a merchantman to the southern tip of the African continent. Capt. Jonathan Ingersoll was in command, and the ship was loaded with rum, tobacco, sugar, oil, tar, pork, beef, flour, cheese,

chocolate, butter, ginseng, etc. (all valued at £5,390), which goods it was hoped would meet with a ready market at the Cape of Good Hope. Derby also placed aboard the "*Turk*" a strong box containing 10,000 Spanish dollars to be used as needed to supplement the proceeds from the sale of the outward cargo in purchasing a return lading. Captain Ingersoll anchored his ship in Table Bay in February 1785. He was able to dispose of most of his provisions at fairly good prices and his ginseng "for two-thirds of a Spanish dollar a pound, which is twenty per cent better than the silver money of the Cape," but was disappointed in his quest for tea, as "the ships bound to Europe are not allowed to break bulk on the way." Captain Ingersoll interviewed the masters of all ships that called at the port homeward bound from the Indies in an endeavor "to purchase fine teas in the private trade allowed the officers on board India ships," but met with no success in bartering until the East Indiaman *Calcutta* (Captain Thomson) arrived in port. On April 8, 1785, Captain Ingersoll wrote to E. H. Derby that "this port is Calculated only to supply Ships bound Too and from India and not purchases of Cargos as the port receives all supplies by the Company from Europe and Batave and exports nothing but bad wines, not fit for any markit but this." Ingersoll, having sold most of his cargo except the rum, was about to sail for "the coast of Africa to make sale of the rum" and put the proceeds into ivory and gold dust (but no slaves) and then go to the West Indies for a cargo of sugar and cotton when the *Calcutta* arrived at Table Bay from the East. Her master, Ingersoll wrote, "propos'd to barter sum of his Property for all my Rum," and after due deliberations the following "Turms" were agreed upon: Captain Thomson (of the *Calcutta*) offered to purchase from Captain Ingersoll all of the rum on board the *Grand Turk* for £3,097, which showed a fair profit over the cost in Salem, and in return Thomson agreed to give Captain Ingersoll, out of his private venture in the *Calcutta's* cargo, "200 chests of the best Hyson tea at £3,000 together with a consignment of nankeens and sateens valued at £940." However, the *Grand Turk* had to make delivery of the rum for Captain Thomson at the island of St. Helena in the middle of the South Atlantic, which was a port of call for British East India Company ships, a garrison town, and a good market for rum.

The *Grand Turk* sailed from Table Bay April 13, 1785, and was at St. Helena on April 30. After discharging the rum, she sailed on May 5 to Dominica (June 2) and thence to Grenada and the Dutch free port of "Statia" (island of St. Eustatia), where 164 chests of the tea bought for about £15 per chest were sold "at £34 apiece" and the funds used for the purchase of rum and sugar. By mid-July, the *Grand Turk* had on board all the cargo she could carry, and her manifest showed the unsold portion of the tea taken aboard at Table Bay at £593 and West Indian sugar and rum, £6,206. But Captain Ingersoll had contracted for a bigger cargo, so he sent the *Grand Turk* home on July 16, leased the British brig *Lark*, and loaded her with £1,503 worth of rum and sugar at Grenada, where she cleared for Statia and from there sailed for Salem. The balance of his purchases of rum and sugar (£1,564), Captain Ingersoll loaded on board the Derby ship *Atlantic*, which called at Statia looking for a cargo, and as Ingersoll feared overstocking the Salem market, he took passage north in the *Atlantic* and lay a course for New York, where the cargo was sold at a good profit. The *Grand Turk* arrived at Salem on July 26, 1785, after a passage of only 10 days from the West Indies (also reported as 11 days) and after an absence from Salem of one day less than eight months. Robert E. Peabody says:

Capt. Ingersoll had sailed for home with goods and cash to the amount of £8,400; and after he had sold his outward cargo at the Cape of Good Hope, his rum at Saint Helena, and his teas at Grenada,

he had increased his capital sufficiently to purchase homeward cargoes for the *Grand Turk*, the *Atlantic* and the *Lark* costing £13,000.

Elias Hasket Derby was a shrewd merchant as well as a capable shipowner. He preferred to buy and sell cargoes rather than sail his ships to make profits merely by freight money, and he operated a warehouse system and would sell according to market, holding nonperishable goods in storage for months or even for years. Derby would buy or sell any approved commodity in any part of the world and use his own ships to transport the goods both ways. Ralph

D. Paine, in *THE OLD MERCHANT MARINE*, says of Elias H. Derby's operations at the close of the century:

To carry on such a business as this enlisted many men and industries. While the larger ships were making their distant voyages, the brigs and schooners were gathering cargoes for them, crossing to Gothenburg and St. Petersburg for iron, duck and hemp, to the French West Indies for molasses to

be turned into rum, to New York, Philadelphia and Richmond for flour, provisions and tobacco. These shipments were assembled in the warehouses on Derby Wharf and paid for the teas, coffees, pepper, muslin, silks and ivory which the ships from the Far East were fetching home.

It was said that the voyage of the *Grand Turk* to the South African coast was particularly profitable and that Derby made "more than one hundred per cent clear on the original outlay." It would seem, however, that Derby was unusually fortunate in his choice of a commander for this very uncertain and experimental sort of voyage. Capt. Jonathan Ingersoll showed splendid ability as a trader and resourceful planner in his business deals. Moreover, it is well to note that in addition to showing a steady display of initiative, the Yankee skipper sailed the strange waters of the South Atlantic with very scanty navigating equipment, which consisted of "a few erroneous maps and charts, a sextant and a GUTHRIE'S GRAMMAR." (This was before the 1800 corrected and enlarged New Edition of this Geographical, Historical and Commercial Grammar was published in London containing "the Most Recent Observations and Draughts of Geographical Travellers.") In those days, the captain of a ship engaged in foreign trade was surely "on his own," and he had to be far more than a navigator and a disciplinarian. As Paine says:

There was no sending orders by mail or cable. It was this continual sense of facing unknown hazards, of gambling with the sea and hostile, undiscovered shores that prompted those old shipmasters to inscribe on the title pages of their log books:

A Journal of an Intended Voyage by God's Assistance.
 . . . From . . . I take my departure. So God send the good ship to her Desired Port in Safety. Amen.

While at the Cape of Good Hope, Captain Ingersoll had heard of the possibilities of trade at the Isle of France (Mauritius) in the Indian Ocean about midway between the Cape of Good Hope and Java. By a decree of November 30, 1784, the French granted permission to American vessels to land American produce at the Isle of France and to load the products of that island or the East Indies on the return voyage. E. H. Derby, hearing of it early in 1785, decided to dispatch the *Grand Turk* on her second long "over-seas" voyage via the Cape of Good Hope to the Isle of France with a cargo (generally of New England products) "there to be exchanged for a homeward lading of East India goods." The contemplated voyage, with Capt. Ebenezer West in command, was the longest yet undertaken by a Derby vessel, so the owner made inquiries through his London agents of the underwriters at Lloyd's in regard to insurance coverage, but was "turned down cold." The agents, Lane and Frazier, a responsible British firm, wrote E. H. Derby:

We could not effect the Insurance you order'd on the ship *Grand Turk* & Cargo Eben^r West Master from Salem to the Isle of France & back. Our Underwriters are not fond of the risque, it being a

new Trade to the Americans. Most of the ships in this kind of business are very particularly described, and the Masters and Seamen well acquainted with Navigation.

This was a "rap" at both the construction and the manning of American vessels and at the audacity of Americans in considering entering "a new Trade." The reference to British ships as being "very particularly described" means that they had been built in accordance with particular specifications and that the best materials were used throughout. It is said that "the members at Lloyd's looked askance at taking a risk on a mere colonial-built ship commanded by a captain of whom they had never heard and owned by an obscure American merchant." However, Derby obtained the desired insurance in New York, with a coverage for £4,000 at the rate of 9 per cent for the round voyage. To assist Captain West in the intricate business of sales and purchases of the cargoes and the necessary checking-up and bookkeeping (for Captain West, a fine mariner, was no scholar), Derby appointed William Vans, Jr., as supercargo. When the *Grand Turk* weighed anchor and sailed from Salem on December 3, 1785,

she had on board the following merchandise "consigned to William Vans & Ebenezer West for sales and returns":

10 Bbls Pitch	£ 12- 0- 0	20 Boxes Chocolate	£ 30- 0- 0	579 Boxes Cheese	£514-11-2
10 Bbls Tar	8-10- 0	22 Boxes Prunes	9- 8-6	25 Baskets Aniseed	15- 0-0
75 Bbls Flour	180- 0- 0	20 Crates Earthenware	166- 2-0	14 Hhds N.E. Rum	152- 3-8
6 Tierces Rice	38- 1- 4	26 Casks Brandy	206-14-0	20, ½ Hhds N.E. Rum	132- 2-1
35 Hhds Tobacco	686-10- 9	163, ½ Bbls Beef	293- 8-0	20 Hhds Fish	184-15-0
527 Furkins Butter	1,297- 8-11	9 Casks Ginsang	194- 2-0	42 Bbls Beer	126- 0-0
20 Casks Claret	90- 0- 0	30 Puncheons Granada Rum	464- 2-0	4 Tierces Bottled Beer	22-10-0
483 Bars Iron	300- 0- 0	42 Casks Coniac Brandy	823-10-0	4 Tierces Porter	23-13-0
12 Hhds Sugar	88-17- 3	7 Casks Bacon & Hams	93- 5-0	9 Kegs Pork	9- 9-0
123, ½ Bbls Pork	252- 3- 0	184 Boxes Candles	511- 2-1	6 Casks Cheese	37-17-1
38 Kegs Beef	36- 2- 0	32 Boxes Soap	93-15-9		
50 Cases Oil	90- 0- 0				

The merchandise was invoiced at £7,183-5-7; the "ship *Turk* with stores, wages & outfits for voyage" was valued at £2,000-0-0; and "light cash" was set down at £16-14-5, making a total recorded value of £9,200-0-0.

The *Grand Turk*, although a very fast sailer, was 82 days in reaching the Cape of Good Hope. After being severely buffeted by heavy winter gales in the North Atlantic, she suffered "tedious calms in the doldrums" as she worked south, "so that her passage was unduly prolonged" and it was February 23, 1786, when she dropped anchor in Table Bay. After the experience in the North Atlantic, Captain West decided the "*Turk*" was too heavily laden to proceed around the Cape. She was lightened somewhat at Table Bay as reported in a letter from Vans and West dated "Cape of Good Hope 12 March, 1786," reading in part as follows:

We have made our greatest efforts to dispose of some part our cargo but have not succeeded to our wishes. We have Sold 15,000 lbs. of Butter at about 4¼ lbs. the Spanish Dollar pd. us on delivering the Butter, 10 hhd. Tobacco Containing 9,448 nett pound for 945 Hides salted and in good order

for shipping to be delr'd to us or our order in four Months (to people you may depend upon). We have left with a M^r Carman a man of Property, 1 Hhd Loaf Sugar, 4 Tons Iron, 4 Crates ware & 6 Casks Rice for your Acct.

Sailing from Table Bay on March 17, the *Grand Turk* rounded the Cape and laid her course northeastward up the Indian Ocean to the Isle of France, dropping anchor off port on April 22 after a run of 36 days. Captain West found the Isle of France in the throes of a severe business depression. The people wanted the cargo in his ship's hold, but had no money to buy it, and as the British had been seizing the French possessions in India and had ruined the French trade with the East, the people had no desirable goods to barter. Vans and West wrote Derby on April 27, 1786, that they were "miserably disappointed in the demand for our cargo." With money scarce on the island and buying power low, the Americans, nevertheless, felt it necessary to dispose of the greater part of the "*Turk's*" cargo in small lots from time to time, and the prices realized "were not what had been hoped for." With no prospect of picking up any return cargo before November, when some coffee and cotton grown on the island would be available, Captain West considered taking his lightened ship to Batavia in search of a profitable lading. About this time, a French merchant of the island, Sebler de la Chataignerais, offered to charter two-thirds of the space in the *Grand Turk* on a passage from Isle of France to Canton, China, and from there to Boston with tea. West and Vans accepted the proposition made, as they saw in it a good chance to turn what looked like a losing venture into a profitable voyage. Elias Hasket Derby, when he dispatched the *Grand Turk* on this voyage, intended that she would go no farther east than the Isle of France, with Batavia in an emergency the extreme eastern port of call; but contrary to Derby's instructions, because of the conditions existing at Isle of France, Captain West decided to make the passage to Canton. On June 20, 1786 (about two months after the "*Turk's*" arrival at the island), West and Vans chartered two-thirds of the space of their ship to Sebler for \$1,200 per month, and the Frenchman loaded "1,768 pieces of ebony wood, 15 cases of ginseng, 17 bales of gold thread, a few cases of cloth and some bags of betel nuts" on board the "*Turk*" for the passage to Can-

ton. The French merchant sailed on the ship as a passenger to watch out for his interests. In September the *Grand Turk* anchored at Whampoa, and here among a fleet of British East India Company ships and vessels flying the flags of Holland, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden, Captain West discovered two ships flying the Stars and Stripes, the *Empress of China* and the *Hope*, both from New York. The latter vessel had brought out Samuel Shaw, of Boston, to take up his duties as United States consul at Canton. The *Grand Turk* of Salem was the first Salem vessel to round the Cape of Good Hope and the third American ship to reach China.

The French merchant, Sebier, was apparently operating "on a shoestring" and was financially unable to go through with the provisions of his charter and obtain tea to carry to Boston. On payment to the *Grand Turk* of \$3,800 for the use of space from Isle of France to Canton and \$500 for passage money (together with the repayment of a loan), the charter was annulled by mutual consent. West and Vans thereupon contracted for a cargo of teas "at the price paid by the Danish and Dutch companies this season" to be delivered on board the *Grand Turk* "in sixty days, or about December 1, 1786." While the Derby ship was lying at anchor off Whampoa, two more American vessels arrived in the river—the small sloop *Experiment* from New York and the ship *Canton* from Philadelphia. With the *Empress of China* (the pioneer U. S. vessel in the trade, then on her second voyage), the *Hope*, and the *Grand Turk*, this made five American vessels at Canton (Whampoa) at the same time, three of them (*Hope*, *Canton*, and *Experiment*) having undertaken the voyage because of the enthusiastic report of the *Empress of China*, the pioneer American ship in the trade, following the completion of her first voyage to the Orient. All the vessels flying the Stars and Stripes other than the *Grand Turk* had brought cargoes of American products out to Canton, where they were sold at a good profit and the proceeds utilized in the purchase of teas. The *Grand Turk* did not load as fast as expected and did not sail until around the first of January 1787. (The little *Experiment* got away on November 28—also reported as leaving the river on December 10—and the *Empress of China* on December 20, both with letters to Derby.) A Chinese certificate declared that the American ship *Grand Turk*, upon leaving Canton, carried and was given official clearance for "Sailors 18. Great Guns 4. Shot 100. Swords 10. Muskets 10. Fire-physic [powder] 200 catties." The vessel stopped at Table Bay to pick up the hides already purchased, left South Africa March 17, 1787, and sixty-six days later, on May 22, was back at Salem after an absence of 1 year 5 months 19 days.

The manifest of the cargo on board the *Grand Turk* upon her arrival from Canton (showing the prices paid) can be briefly stated as follows:

240 Chests Bohea Tea	}	\$17,510	75 Boxes China	\$1,923
175, ½ Chests Bohea Tea			945 Ox Hides	1,050
226 Chests Miscellaneous Teas (Hyson, Souchong, Bohea Congo, Cassia, and Cassia Bud)		1,939	100 Shammy and 50 Buck Skins and 130 Ordinary Hides	184
			10 Casks Wine	568
			1 Box Paper	44

The total value (i.e., cost) stipulated in the manifest is \$23,218. A list of "adventures" is attached consisting of five items: "13 Chests Bohea Tea \$650. 6 Chests Canzo \$300. 6 Boxes China \$135. 24 pkgs. Bandanna Hdkfs \$72. 24 Chests of Muslins [value not stated]."

There is nothing in these days comparable with the community of interests that bound such a seaport as Salem with the sea and its affairs or with one specific ship and her fortunes. The "adventures" referred to were the small speculations of individuals entrusted to the captain or supercargo (goods to sell or money to buy goods), all with the idea of making a personal trading profit as a result of the voyage. Limiting the price to be paid, some ladies of the port commissioned the officers of a ship to buy for them as an "adventure" such articles as "Canton crape shawls," "a china tureen," and "net bead with draperies." Some men supplied materials such as boxes of candles, casks of ginseng, pipes of Madeira wine, etc., to be sold for their account; whereas others put up a little money to be used in buying and selling goods on the voyage. One Salem man wrote the captain of a ship: "I hand you \$100 for my adventure. Please use as you think best and do for me as you do for your own."

The second long voyage of the *Grand Turk*, which was decidedly unprofitable as far as the outward passage and Derby's planning were concerned, ended in being highly successful. Felt, in his *ANNALS OF SALEM*, says that the voyage "was very profitable, yielding twice more capital than she carried out." It would seem that on the complete outward passage via Table Bay and Isle of France to Canton, the cargo cost 31,000 Spanish dollars and realized together with charter and passage money \$29,300, showing a loss excluding the expense of running the ship. The homeward lading of teas and chinaware was evidently sold at prices that averaged more than twice their cost in China. The arrival of five American vessels at Canton in 1786 firmly established America-China trade, which proved so profitable and satisfactory that in 1789 no less than fifteen American ships were in Canton Roads, of which four were owned by Derby, of Salem. The visit of the *Grand Turk* to the Isle of France proved to be premature, and trading conditions in 1786 changed rapidly because of governmental decrees, shipping orders, an immigration of merchants, and a commercial boom that followed. In August 1786, Derby had dispatched his brig *Three Sisters* to the Cape of Good Hope and Isle of France, and in January 1787 the ship *Light Horse* had been sent over the same course. Both vessels had cargoes of provisions generally similar to what had been sent out on the *Grand Turk*, and they sold quickly at a "great profit." It is said that the population of the French island was "in dire need" of such staples as the "New England beef, pork, potatoes, cheese, fish, and flour" that the Derby ships carried, and the vessels returned to Salem loaded with East India goods that sold at a good profit in the United States and West Indies.

This trade with the Isle of France looked so promising that Derby decided to send his son Elias Hasket Derby, Jr. (who had graduated from Harvard in 1786), to the Isle of France to act as his buying and selling agent. Young Derby had been a passenger in the ship *Astrea* to the Baltic in 1786 and had traveled extensively in Europe. Returning home in October 1787, he spent a few weeks in his father's countinghouse, and surprising as it may seem, when the *Grand Turk* cleared Salem on December 7, 1787, on her third voyage to the Cape of Good Hope and her second to the Indian Ocean, Elias H. Derby, Jr., although only twenty-one years of age and with a decidedly limited experience at sea (for he had not served the usual apprenticeship or been put through the customary quarter-deck routine), sailed on her as captain and in full command. Captain West quite naturally declined to be demoted and robbed of his title and refused to be placed in the position of sailing master under a young and inexperienced mariner. John Williamson, the first mate of the *Grand Turk*, was promoted to be sailing master of the vessel, but the actual management of the ship and all matters pertaining to business, buying and selling of cargoes, passages, money matters, and bookkeeping were put entirely in the hands of young Derby.

The "Manifest of the cargo on Board the ship *Grand Turk* Elias H. Derby Jr. Mast^r from Salem to the Isle France & Elsewhere, 6 Dec. 1787" can be briefly stated as follows:

28 Pipes Madeira Wine	15 Hhd. Tobacco wt. 17,266-1/2 lbs.	38 Barrels Mackerell
58 Casks Bordeaux Wine	163 Cases Geneva	93 Kegg Sound
6 Casks Loaf Sugar	1 Bag Coffee 108	31 Hhd Cod Fish
53 Cases West India Rum	50 Boxes Cheese	3 Barrels Sewett
1 Barrel Brandy 31-1/2 gals	610 Firkins Butter	2 Casks Ginsang
25 Tierces Beer	300 Half Barrels Beef	180 Barrels Flour (part shipped in half barrels)
75 Barrels Beer	100 Half Barrels Pork	33 Casks Whale Oyle
12 Casks Bottled Beer	31 Barrels Salmon	50 Barrels Tarr
40 Tierces N. Eng. Rum	20 Half Barrels Salmon	99 Boxes Sper. Candles
2482-1/2 gals	84 Keggs Salmon	30 Tubbs Steel
49 Boxes Chocolate		

In addition, under the category of "adventures," the *Grand Turk* carried 2,151 lbs. of tobacco, 143 1/2 gals. N. E. rum, 3 pipes and 2 half pipes of Madeira wine. Her cargo as stowed leaving Salem was said to be "worth \$28,000," and the vessel was reported as reaching Port Louis in the Isle of France in February 1788 after a good passage. The French island was enjoying a period of great and unprecedented prosperity, as it had become a prominent Indian Ocean trading center, a sort of marine crossroads. Young Derby disposed of his ship's cargo

promptly at good prices and soon obtained ample funds and credits with which to purchase a return lading. Elias H. Derby valued the *Grand Turk* when she left Salem in December 1787 at \$7,500 (the vessel being over six and a half years old), and as Captain Derby was offered \$13,000 for the ship by a French merchant, he decided to sell her. He used the proceeds to purchase the ship *Peggy* for \$6,700 and the brig *Sultana* for \$7,750—a total of \$14,450 for the two, which combined carried “about three-quarters as much again cargo as the *Grand Turk*.” Captain Derby loaded his two new vessels with goods procurable at the Isle of France and took them to Bombay, where he sold the cargoes at a profit. The ship *Peggy* was laden with Indian cotton and dispatched to Salem. However, young Derby returned to the Isle of France in the brig *Sultana*, where he loaded for Madras, and after selling the cargo there at “a nice profit,” he proceeded to Calcutta. Two other Derby ships, the *Astrea* and the *Light Horse*, reaching India via Isle of France, were loaded with cargoes at Calcutta and Rangoon and dispatched to Salem. Another Derby vessel, the brig *Henry*, after discharging at Isle of France, had loaded for Calcutta. With the *Sultana* and *Henry* in port, the former brig was sold. After lading the ship *Henry* with a full cargo of Indian goods, young Derby took passage in her for Salem and arrived home in December 1790 after an absence of three years, during which time, we are told, “he had built up an extensive business with India and had established the Derby house as the leading American firm trading with the Isle of France.” Ralph D. Paine says that when the profits of these several transactions were reckoned, it was found that more than \$100,000 above all outlay had been earned by this little fleet.

The Salem shipowner-merchant's trading ventures to the Isle of France in the Indian Ocean were quickly followed by voyages of Boston merchants, and according to the press on November 20, 1788, two ships, the *Hercules* and the *Omphale*, were being loaded at Boston for the Isle of France and India. We read: “Anybody wishing to adventure in that part of the world may have an opportunity of sending goods on freight.” At this time, Boston and New York newspapers were advertising for sale teas direct from beyond the Cape of Good Hope and the Far East, so “by the indomitable force of Yankee enterprise” the long monopoly of the British East India Company in the American tea trade had been broken for all time.

In early 1789, Elias H. Derby dispatched his ship *Astrea* to Batavia and Canton. Extracts from the Salem shipowner's letter of instructions to Capt. James Magee, Jr., and Super-cargo Thomas H. Perkins (written in February) are of interest:

The ship *Astrea*, . . . being ready for sea, I do advise and order you to come to sail, and make the best of your way for Batavia, and on your arrival there you will dispose of such part of your cargo as you think may be the most for my interest.

I think you had best sell a few casks of the most ordinary ginseng if you can get one dollar a pound for it. If the price of sugar be low, you will then take into the ship as much of the best white kind that will floor her, and fifty thousand weight of coffee, if it is as low as we have heard—part of which you will be able to stow between the beams and the quintlings and fifteen thousand of saltpeter, if very low; some nutmegs and fifty thousand weight of pepper. This you will stow in the fore peak, for fear of injuring the teas. The sugar will save the expense of any stone ballast and it will make a floor for the teas etc. at Canton. At Batavia you must if possible, get as much freight for Canton as will pay half or more of your charges. . . . You must endeavor to be the first ship with ginseng, for be assured you will do better alone than you will if there are three or four ships at Canton at the same time with you. . . . The Philadelphia beer is put

up so strong that it will not be approved until it is made weaker; you had best try some of it. . . . The iron is English weight—there is four per cent you will gain if sold Dutch weight. . . .

Capt. Magee and Mr. Perkins are to have 5 per cent commission for the sale of the present cargo and 2½ per cent on the cargo home and, also, 5 per cent on the profit made on goods that may be purchased at Batavia and sold at Canton or on any other similar case that may arise on the voyage. They are to have one-half the passage money—the other half belongs to the ship. The privileges of Capt. Magee is 5 per cent of what the ship carries as cargo exclusive of adventures. The property of Mr. Perkins, it is understood, is to be on freight, which is to be paid for like other freighters. It is ordered that the ship's books shall be open to the inspection of the mates and doctor of the ship, so they may know the whole business, as in case of death or sickness it may be of good service in the the voyage.

It is likewise my order that in case of your [Captain Magee's] sickness that you write a clause at the foot of these orders putting the command of

the ship into the person's hands that you think the most equal to it, not having any regard to the station he at present has in the ship.

You are not to pay any moneys to the crew while absent from home, unless in a case of real necessity, and then they must allow an advance for the money.

You will be careful not to break any Acts of Trade while you are out on the voyage, to lay the ship and cargo liable to seizure for my insurance will not make it good. Be very careful of the expenses attending the voyage, and remember that a one dollar laid out while absent is two dollars out of the voyage. Pay particular attention to the quality of your goods, as your voyage very much depends on your attention to this. . . .

Annexed to these orders you have a list of such cargo for my own account as I at present think may do best for me, but you will add or diminish any article as the price may be. . . . Lay out for my account fifteen or twenty pound sterling in curiosities.

Although I have been a little particular in these orders, I do not mean them as positive; and you have leave to break them in any part where you by calculation think it for my interest, excepting your breaking Acts of Trade which I absolutely forbid. . . . I commit you to the Almighty's protection and remain your friend and employer

Elias Hasket Derby

Leaving Salem, the *Astrea* was laden with a general cargo, the most conspicuous items being rum, wines, beer, fish, flour, spermaceti candles, and "598 Firkins butter, 32,055 lbs." The ship sailed with more than the usual amount of "adventures," for the records show the following carried on private account:

Tenney & Brown, Newbury

9 kegs snuff— $\frac{1}{3}$ the net proceeds you are to credit E.H.D.'s account for freight, the other $\frac{2}{3}$ to lay out on account of T & B in light goods.

Folger Pope

1 phaeton and harness complete, with saddles and bridles, etc., cased up—the net proceeds is to be credited to E.H.D.'s account as friend Derby is to have the use of the money for freight.

David Seas

Boxes containing \$15,000, 16 casks ginseng 5,570 lbs. This at one-fifth for freight.

William Cabot

Box containing 21 pieces plate, weight 255 oz. 16 dwts. 12 gr.

The supercargo of the *Astrea* was Captain Magee's young brother-in-law, Thomas H. Perkins, whose grandfather, Thomas Peck, had been the leading fur exporter of the province and whose mother, Elizabeth Perkins, described as "a remarkable New England woman of the Revolutionary period," carried on her husband's business with phenomenal skill following his death. Young Perkins, who is said to have become "the first of Boston merchants, both in fortune and in public spirit," is credited with assisting many Bostonians in the accumulation of wealth by suggesting their investment in "China voyages." The BOSTON HERALD OF FREEDOM, on January 6, 1789, announced that all persons "wishing to adventure" aboard the *Astrea* "may be assured of Mr. Perkins' assertions for their interest."

The year that the *Astrea* made this voyage (1789) was that in which the United States Government was organized under the Constitution. At this time, there were so many American ships in the China trade that the eastern market was flooded with ginseng and the business became unprofitable; moreover, with the annual tea consumption of the United States at about a million pounds, American ships imported 2,601,852 pounds in that one year alone, and ships arriving after the tariff was placed on tea by Congress had to pay a heavy import duty, which, in conjunction with a glutted market and associated low prices, made most of the 1789 China trade voyages decidedly unprofitable to American shipowners. Fortunately, Derby had been sufficiently farsighted so that his ships carried much more than ginseng for the outbound cargo.

That America was a leading shipbuilding country is well attested by the fact that the ships of such great shipowners and merchants as Elias H. Derby and William Gray, of Salem, Mass., were generally for sale to foreign owners—at a price. In Derby's letter of instructions to the command of the *Astrea* are written orders to be transmitted to the captain of another Derby ship (which the *Astrea* was scheduled to encounter at Batavia) in regard to the loading or possible sale of that vessel according to circumstances, but special stress is laid upon "the necessity of making careful calculations before selling the vessel, in order to be sure that

that course would pay better than bringing her home full of cargo." Derby's letter of instructions to Captain Magee and Supercargo Perkins definitely forbids the sale of the *Astrea* on this voyage, but adds, "If at Batavia or Canton you can agree to deliver her the next voyage for \$20,000 or \$25,000, you may do it."

In 1788, the *Atlantic* of Salem flew the first American flag ever seen in the harbors of Bombay and Calcutta, India, and challenged the monopoly of the powerful East India Company. Preceding the *Astrea's* voyage, Elias H. Derby had dispatched the barks *Light Horse* and *Atlantic* to the Isle of France, where they exchanged provisions for bills which at Bombay, Calcutta, and Surat brought a good assortment of trading goods for Canton. He also sent out the brig *Three Sisters* with a mixed cargo to Batavia. After it was disposed of, this vessel was chartered by a Dutch merchant to carry Java products to Canton. Two of these Derby vessels, the *Atlantic* and *Three Sisters*, were sold in China, and the entire proceeds from the sale of two ships and the cargo of four were invested in "silks, chinaware and three-quarters of a million pounds of tea," which were loaded for the voyage home on the *Astrea* and *Light Horse* (the two larger vessels of the Derby quartet). On June 1, 1790, the *Astrea* reached Salem Bay, but the *Light Horse* gave Elias H. Derby a great measure of concern before she safely reached port. Due to lack of wind, this vessel anchored June 15 off Marblehead. Morison, in *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS*, tells us what followed:

In the night an easterly gale sprang up. The vessel was too close inshore to make sail and claw off. Early in the morning her crew felt that sickening sensation of dragging anchors. Astern, nearer, nearer came the granite rocks of Marblehead, where the ragged population perched like buzzards, not displeased at the prospect of rich wreckage at

Salem's expense. "King Darby" hurried over in his post-chaise to watch half his fortune inching toward disaster at his very doorstep. Finally, with but a few yards to spare between rudder and rocks, the anchors bit, and saved the *Light Horse* until a shift of wind brought her to the haven where she would be.

The *Grand Turk I*, sold by Derby at the Isle of France in 1788, had her name changed by her French owner, and there is no record available of her subsequent career. The ship had meant much to Elias Hasket Derby, and in the winter of 1789-1790 the Salem shipowner-merchant laid his plans for building a new and larger *Grand Turk* at Salem. Robert E. Peabody has said: "The *Grand Turk*[I] in seven short years had seen the Derby house grow from a small concern trading with the West Indies, to one of the leading mercantile establishments in America, with its ships familiar sights in such far-away places as Whampoa, Rangoon, l'Isle de France, Batavia, Madras and Mocha."

The MASSACHUSETTS of Boston—an American Version of an Impressive British East Indiaman That Was a Failure

New York, Philadelphia, Salem, and Boston were all important ports in the development of the China trade, which was the major long-voyage commercial enterprise of the United States in the first part of the nineteenth century. It is said that in the year 1806 American ships imported more than five million dollars worth of goods into China "and took home, among the many items of chinaware, textiles and the like, nearly ten million pounds of tea." American medium- and small-sized ships fared well in this deep-sea trade, but in the winter of 1788-1789 some Boston merchants, headed by Captain Randall and Major Samuel Shaw, essayed to vie with the British East India Company and put a big frigate type of ship in the service. The result was so unfortunate that it is worthy of record. William Hackett,

of Amesbury, Mass., on the Merrimac, designer of the very successful American frigate *Alliance*, was deputized to build the pioneer ship of what was hoped by the promoters would be a large East Indian fleet of big American vessels. The *Massachusetts*, launched by Daniel Briggs at Quincy, Mass., in September 1789, was the result. Evidently, Hackett designed a good-looking, impressive vessel, for we are told that "French and British naval officers visited her to measure her lines and to study her construction" and that Captain Linzee of the British frigate *Penelope* pronounced her "as perfect a model as the state of the art will permit." We also read that "social Boston was so thrilled" with the big new ship "that fashionable teas and balls were held on her decks."

The *Massachusetts* of 600 tons (116 ft. long on the keel and 36 ft. beam), fitted with two complete planked decks, was the largest merchant vessel built up to that time in America. However, it would seem that she was more of a frigate in design than a merchant ship. She mounted "a battery of cannon" and must have been unusually heavily armed, for it is said that her crew consisted of a captain, four mates, eight minor officers, and sixty-seven men—or eighty men all told. Paine says that the *Massachusetts*, emulating the vessels of the British East India Company, "sailed in all the old-fashioned state and dignity of a master, four mates, a purser, surgeon, carpenter, gunner, four quartermasters, three midshipmen, a cooper, two cooks and fifty seamen," which makes a complement of 69 all told; whereas Marvin writes that "the vessel was grotesquely over-officered and over-manned," and he mentions besides the captain, supercargo, and four mates, "a purser, surgeon, several midshipmen, carpenter, boatswain, gunner and sixty-seven men before the mast." The master appointed to the command of the notable vessel was Capt. Job Prince, described as "a merchant as well as a seaman." It was said that hundreds of applications were received by the owners for stations on board her from "persons of the best character." We know much of what happened to the *Massachusetts* from the writings of Amasa Delano, who regarded himself as fortunate in securing his berth as second officer.

From the start, the ship was unfortunate. The rival port of Salem set rumors afloat that bad luck would follow the *Massachusetts*, and two crews deserted her before she finally sailed—after much delay—on March 31, 1790. It later developed that (1) the ship had inexperienced officers and was poorly manned, (2) her management knew practically nothing about the China trade or maritime economics, and (3) the builders were incompetent and used green and unsuitable timber in her construction. The model of the *Massachusetts* was said to be "faultless," and the handiwork of the skilled mechanics who built her was praised by competent authorities. However, through either undue haste or colossal ignorance, the master builder used only newly cut and wholly unseasoned white oak timber in her construction, and Delano tells us that before she had finished her first voyage "this noble fabric was rotten." It would seem that the stevedores who loaded the ship and the officers who directed stowage and were supposed to watch the cargo at sea were also grossly incompetent and negligent. We read that in addition to the wrong selection and foolish stowing of cargo, "much of it consisted of 'green' masts and spars, taken on board in winter covered with ice and mud and stowed in the lower hold. Several hundred barrels of beef were also placed in this hold, and then the lower deck hatches were caulked down, hermetically sealing the whole body of the ship below them. . . . When the lower hold was opened [at Canton] it was found that the close air and the fiery tropics had completely destroyed that Yankee beef, and the whole interior of the ship was in a woeful state of decay."

With no officer aboard who could work a lunar observation, with no chronometer, and "ill-provided with the instruments of navigation," the *Massachusetts* crossed the Atlantic and crept down the coast of Africa. Captain Prince endeavored to sight the Cape Verde Islands to correct his ship's "reckoning," but failed and later nearly piled the vessel up "on the inhospitable sands of South Africa." But the navigators of the *Massachusetts* blundered still more badly in missing Java Head, the "great landmark of East India voyagers," and this miscalculation compelled the ship to make "at least fifteen extra degrees of 'eastings,'" which

required "about three weeks' time." Handicapped by the shortcomings of the command and inadequate instruments as equipment, the *Massachusetts*—which was, in fact, a good sailer—reached Macao on September 30, 1790, after a passage of six months, or 183 days, and was at Whampoa (Canton) a few days later.

Major Samuel Shaw (bearing a commission as American consul for India and China), who is referred to as "one of the principal owners of the *Massachusetts*," was on board the vessel as a passenger; this gave the ship a semi-public status, but when she stopped at Batavia (the first port entered) to exchange most of her cargo for goods suitable for the Canton market, the Dutch authorities, notwithstanding Shaw's earnest pleas, refused to grant the vessel a permit to unload and trade at any East Indian Dutch possession. Continuing on to the Portuguese Chinese port of Macao with an "unsalable cargo," the *Massachusetts* was badly pounded and stressed during a severe typhoon, which caused leaks. We are told that upon arrival at her destination, she found that the cargo aboard "would not sell for anything." The voyage was a disastrous one as far as Major Shaw and his fellow Boston investors in the vessel and her cargo were concerned, and the only streak of luck associated with the venture was the fact that, as the Danish East India Company had just lost a ship in the typhoon that so seriously buffeted the Boston ship and wanted one to replace her, the owners were able to sell the *Massachusetts* to the Danes. This they did with alacrity for \$65,000, paying off the members of the crew and leaving them in the Far East to shift for themselves.

The *Massachusetts*, notwithstanding her "green timbers," unfortunate lading, and bad management in general, was "keenly admired," we are told, by the British, Dutch, and other European shipmasters in the East Indies and Far East and was acknowledged to be "the handsomest vessel in the two ports" of Batavia and Canton. Although the voyage of the big Boston ship was a commercial failure, yet other conservatively planned and less spectacular voyages of American vessels of more moderate size and of a decidedly American type continued to prove successful. When the *Massachusetts* reached Macao the end of September 1790, she found there the trading ship *Washington* (Capt. Jonathan Donnison) from Providence, R. I., and other American craft both preceded and followed the big Boston vessel in the United States-East Indies and China trade; but the experience with the *Massachusetts* prejudiced American shipowners against vessels larger than "four or five hundred tons" and against over-manned, spectacular, and impressive semi-naval ships of the British East Indian and the "Honorable Company" type and suggested to the merchants of Boston that their adventures in the northwest fur trade would prove more profitable. Salem, however, continued to prefer and operate over the Cape of Good Hope route to India and China, and these voyages, well and conservatively planned and executed with economy and farsightedness, were generally successful.

Tradition refers to the *Massachusetts* as a hoodooed ship, cursed by witches when building, and it is said that "ill luck pursued to his grave every man who sailed in her." This sweeping statement certainly did not apply to the brilliant and versatile Capt. Amasa Delano, who served on her as second mate, but Major Shaw died while returning to the United States and was buried at sea off the Cape of Good Hope. Later, however, Captain Delano jotted down the names of twelve members of the crew who within a few years' time came to their end, mostly by violence, and it was said that "no more than a handful of this stalwart crew survived the *Massachusetts* by a dozen years."

The "melancholy voyage" of the *Massachusetts* taught Bostonians one lesson that they profited by: Merchants, shipbuilders, and ship's officers must be experts in their line, and family connections and social standing were of no importance in the building and operation of ships. On a ship engaged in foreign commerce, only experience with good training and demonstrated ability counted. Although some very young men were at that time put in command of ships, they, as boys and youths, had received excellent training for their jobs and had proved their worth as navigators and practical handlers of ships at sea and as traders, businessmen, and diplomats in foreign ports.

*Elias Hasket Derby Errs in Building a Ship Too Big for
His Trade and the Times—the GRAND TURK II*

It is surprising that a hardheaded businessman like Elias Hasket Derby, of Salem, should in the winter of 1789-1790 be so influenced by the building of the big "Yankee Indiaman" *Massachusetts* at Quincy, Mass., for a syndicate of Boston owners and by the large and impressive "great ships of the British, Dutch, and French East India Companies" as to decide to build "a new and bigger *Grand Turk*" that would compare favorably in size, capacity, speed, and quality with any merchant vessel afloat. At this time, Derby had "half a dozen vessels plying regularly between Salem and the Isle of France, Indian or eastern ports," and he was much encouraged by the growth of his business during the young republic's critical years (1783-1789) and quite optimistic of the future now that the Federal Constitution had been adopted and the thirteen states, united at last, were taking steps to encourage and protect American shipping. On March 27, 1790, or three days before the *Massachusetts* of 600 tons (116 ft. long) sailed from Boston for the Orient, the keel of Derby's new big ship was laid by Enos Briggs, of Pembroke, "at the head of Derby's wharf," Salem, Mass. This vessel, a three-decker of 564 tons (124 ft. long, 32 ft. beam, and 16 ft. depth of hold) was not only the largest ship built in Salem up to that time but also almost twice the tonnage of any vessel hitherto owned by any of the Derbys. The "big Salem ship" took a long time to build, and an attempt to launch her on May 19, 1791 (13 months and 23 days after the keel was laid), was unsuccessful. The vessel "did not move her length to the great mortification of a numerous crowd of spectators," and we are told by a contemporary that "the persons present at the first view exceeded 9,000." It is evident that the launching ways did not have sufficient declivity. She was not urged, pulled, and shaken (with 200 men aboard) into the water until May 22. More delays followed, and it was not until February 2, 1792, that a master (Capt. Benjamin Hodges) was appointed to command her. She did not sail until March 11, 1792 (almost two years after her keel was laid), when she left Salem on her maiden voyage bound for Calcutta.

The complement of this vessel, christened *Grand Truk (II)*, consisted of a captain, four mates, a doctor (who was also the clerk), a boatswain, a cooper (also caulker), a steward, two cooks, and eighteen men before the mast—a total of twenty-nine men. The wages specified in the ship's articles are of interest, for the officers received low pay, but were given the privilege of carrying cargo for their personal account with which to speculate. The wages and privileges were as follows:

Officer	Monthly Pay	Cargo Privilege	Officer	Monthly Pay	Cargo Privilege	Officer	Monthly Pay	Cargo Privilege
	£	Tons		£	Tons		£	Tons
Captain	3	5	Second mate	2-14-0	1½	Doctor-clerk	2-14-0	½ (10 cwt.)
First mate	3	3½	Third and fourth mates	2-14-0	½ (10 cwt.)	Boatswain	2-11-0	½ (10 cwt.)

The remainder of the complement received no cargo privileges, but the straight monthly wages of these men were set as follows: cooper, £2-10-0; steward, £2-8-0; sailors, £2-8-0 each; cooks £2-5-0 each.

Owing to the size of the ship, Derby did not try to fill the entire cargo space himself (the risk was deemed too much for one bottom), so the *Grand Turk (II)* carried an unusually large number of outside merchant consignments for an Elias H. Derby ship. However, the owner was required to venture the sum of "forty thousand Spanish milled dollars," which he placed on board in strong ironbound boxes to be used in purchasing a return cargo in India, as Derby well knew that the proceeds from the outward-bound cargo would not fill

the ship on her return voyage and a full hold would be necessary if the desired and estimated profits were to be forthcoming. It was Derby's custom to place insurance on his ships and cargo "for only about half the value of his ventures, and risk the balance himself, thus minimizing his premiums." Derby arranged with New York underwriters to cover the *Grand Turk (II)* and her cargo for £6,000 at 9 per cent "from Salem to all and every port and places where and whatsoever in the East Indies, China and Persia in port and at sea and at all times untill her arrival at her discharging port in the United States." The amount of this outside insurance was admitted by Derby to be much less than half the value of ship and cargo. On March 7, 1792 (four days before the vessel sailed), Elias H. Derby penned the following "Orders for B. Hodges Master & Jos. Moseley Mate of ship *Grand Turk*" and handed them with supplemental verbal instructions to Captain Hodges:

In such a Voyage as you are now going upon there are many things that you must ever bare in mind—a few that respects the safety of the Ship I will mention. Never suffer any SPIRIT to be drawn after night—nor at any time under Deck—but at the Store Room—nor allow of any Powder to be kept in any place except in the Magazine on Deck—make it a constant practice every Saturday to have the Chimney of the Galley swept down least by this neglect it might set the Ship on Fire—and I believe it will be safer for the Ship without the Funnel—keep a constant watch on Deck while in Port & the more so on acct. of the danger of fire in the Galley—you must make the Ship leak so much as to give two good spells a Day at least. Keep the Hatches open so as to keep the ship cool & have a wind sail if there is occasion, as heat in the hold will damage

the Ship—Have the hold & Decks examined every Day, as perhaps after some Gale you may find some defect & may prevent the damage of considerable of the Cargo—Be very careful in the Dunnage of the Ship to take in her cargo—there need be no ballast left in provided there is very particular care taken in making Stowage of the sugar in Bags & Hogsh^{ds}., the ship will I suppose load without much on the Gun Deck—let the ginger, pepper & every light article be on that Deck—When the ship is unloaded in Calcutta I wish you to make 2 or 3 hogshds of very strong pickle & let some of your hands take a cloth & wash the Ship in the hold & in the lower Deck in every part, the same as you would scower of a Floor & if you have any Salt left put it on the Knees.

Elias H. Derby has been described as a "fussy schoolmaster" in his relations with his men. He was very much of an autocrat, but was generally sound in his ideas, a great man for detail, a hard worker, and a courageous adventurer.

The *Grand Turk (II)* ran into heavy gales immediately upon leaving Salem on Sunday, March 11, 1792. The log shows a course southeast as if she were heading straight for the southern tip of Africa. Then, when opposite the south part of the bulge of the continent, she changed to a southwesterly course, ran over to the South American coast (Brazil), and proceeded southeast to the island of Tristan da Cunha in the mid-South Atlantic, which she sighted on the morning of May 31. The course then lay almost due east past the Cape of Good Hope (which she passed June 22) in the Roaring Forties to a point in the Indian Ocean about midway between Africa and Australia. From there she headed north, sighted Ceylon on August 7, spoke a pilot vessel, and anchored ten days later. After experiencing very heavy weather and riding out gales, the "*Turk*" proceeded up the Hooghly River on August 22 and anchored off Champall Gant, Calcutta, on the 24th, 166 days out from Salem, after making a nonstop passage.

Captain Hodges' records show that the outward cargo of the *Grand Turk (II)* sold for 45,000 sicca rupees. Derby's 40,000 Spanish dollars were converted into 81,000 rupees, and of these available funds (which aggregated 126,000 rupees), Hodges paid the expenses of the ship in port and laid out 115,000 rupees, or approximately \$57,000, on a cargo for the homeward passage. While the "*Turk*" lay at Calcutta, the Derby ship *Astrea* (Captain Gibaut) reached Madras via Isle of France and was booked to pick up a cargo at both Calcutta and Madras to carry back to Salem. While at Madras, Captain Gibaut received an advantageous offer to charter the *Astrea* to carry a cargo of rice from Madras to Rangoon, which he was anxious to accept, so it was arranged that the "*Turk*" would load the cargo reserved for the *Astrea* at Calcutta and call at Madras on her way home and pick up the goods being held for the *Astrea* at that port, which were destined for the United States.

Robert E. Peabody tells us that Captain Gibaut had a most unpleasant and expensive experience with the *Astrea* when he accepted the charter to carry a cargo of rice from Madras to Rangoon, with the prime thought in mind of possibly finding unusual merchandise and favorable trading conditions in Burma that would be of interest and value to his employer, Elias H. Derby, of Salem. Upon Gibaut's arrival at Rangoon, affairs took a most unexpected turn:

The sultan of Pegu, then ruler of those regions, happened at the moment to be at war with the king of Siam and needing a vessel to transport troops and supplies to the Gulf of Siam, he was pleased to observe the arrival in his waters of a vessel which suited his needs exactly. As she carried a flag entirely unknown to him, without more ado he seized upon Captain Gibaut in the streets of Rangoon and confined him in his palace as a hostage. He then sent a detachment of armed men out to the

Astrea with instructions to take possession of her. This being accomplished, a body of troops, together with their supplies, was put on board the Derby ship, and her first mate was compelled to navigate her around to the Gulf of Siam, where the troops and supplies were discharged. Captain Gibaut was held in the meantime at Rangoon until the vessel returned, when both ship and master were released by the imperious sultan, the whole affair costing Mr. Derby some \$10,000.

This incident, with the height of effrontery on the part of the eastern potentate and its "unprecedented insult" to the flag of the young republic, caused Captain Gibaut deep humiliation; but he might at the time (early in 1793) have been comforted somewhat to know that seven years later (1800) Capt. William Bainbridge was to be compelled by the dey of Algiers—a Barbary pirate—to take the U. S. man-of-war *George Washington* loaded with Algerian emissaries and tribute to the Sublime Porte under the flag of a pirate state.

On January 1, 1793 (after lying 4 months and 8 days at Calcutta—Culpee), the *Grand Turk (II)* commenced her voyage home, but she did not get clear of "Saugor Roads" until January 7. She was at Madras about three weeks (January 17-February 6), and when she left India for Salem the vessel's holds and 'tween decks were completely filled with cargo. The course set for home was much more direct in both the Indian and the Atlantic oceans than on the outward passage, but the ship did not sail well and disappointed Captain Hodges. The South African cape was sighted April 2; St. Helena was passed April 18-19, and the Ascension Island on April 24. On June 12, 1793, the *Grand Turk (II)* was anchored off Salem, 126 days from Madras, having completed a voyage to Calcutta and back that had occupied 15 months and 1 day.

The cargo brought home by the "*Turk*" was "the largest and the second most valuable landed in Salem up to that time." This cargo had cost about \$87,000, and the duties assessed on it by the Salem customhouse totaled \$24,369.42. The voyage was evidently a profitable one, but it was a long time before the goods were moved out of the Derby warehouses, and Elias H. Derby was admittedly perplexed over the problem of planning another profitable voyage for his big ship. The "*Turk*" lay tied up at her owner's wharf throughout the summer, but in the fall Derby decided to try the ship in a different trade. On November 10, 1793, with Capt. Joseph Moseley in command, he sent her to Virginia, with some sugar and barreled beef aboard as ballast, to load tobacco for Europe. Captain Moseley and Gordon Bacchus (Derby's Virginia agent) had difficulty not only in selling the sugar and beef but also in purchasing the desired tobacco at what was considered a reasonable price. On January 3, 1794, about six weeks after arrival, Moseley wrote that but little tobacco had been acquired and only 158 hogsheads loaded up to that time. As war had broken out between Britain and France (Derby's contemplated markets for this tobacco) and as British warships would take any merchant vessel trading with France and French naval vessels and privateers would take any vessel caught en route to a British port, Derby wrote Captain Moseley on February 22, telling him of conditions and saying in conclusion: "I therefore order you to come with the ship to Salem as soon as you can—even if the ship is not quite loaded. I do not think there is immediate danger on this coast, but it is best to keep from any Vessels you see on the passage home."

On March 20, 1794, after lying at Petersburg, Va., for four months, the *Grand Turk (II)* sailed back home with a partial cargo of 721 hogsheads of tobacco aboard, which had cost £7,706. She arrived at Salem during the first week of April without sighting any British or French vessel on her run up the coast. Elias H. Derby's views at this time are expressed in a letter written to Edward Gould, his New York agent, on March 22, 1794:

You say in your last there is but little danger of a war—when Great Britain will give instructions to their ships to take our Vessels—& not publish those instructions till two Months after they are given out & some time after they have been put in Execution

—I do not see that we have anything to expect but War from such a piraticall Nation—I have two valuable Vessels I believe among the number Captured.

Derby was correct in his surmise. His ship *Light Horse* was captured by the British as she was on her way to France, and his brigantine *Rose* was also taken on her way home from the French West Indies. Incensed by the belligerent and arrogant actions of the British, undertaken without warning, Derby wrote to Congressman Benjamin Goodhue, representing his district:

I trust my government will never submit to such treatment, while we have it in our power to make them due us Justice. We have spirit & ability to stand in our own defence. I am sure there is a

disposition to do everything Congress may think for the best & I hope you will not suffer us to be further insulted by those Pirats.

While Jay was negotiating his treaty with Britain in London, Derby on June 8, 1794, dispatched the *Grand Turk (II)* across the Atlantic to Hamburg in response to suggestions made to him by his resident German agent, Casper Voght. The ship, in addition to the tobacco aboard, carried "bags of Indian coffee and aloes from the warehouses on Derby Wharf," the total cargo being valued at £9,000, or about \$43,000. Captain Moseley was instructed, after disposing of his vessel's cargo at Hamburg and receiving drafts on London to cover the sales, "to proceed in ballast up the Baltic to Saint Petersburg and there buy a cargo of iron, hemp, and canvas for Salem." Attached to Moseley's sailing orders was the following memorandum penned by Elias H. Derby under the caption, "Calculation for Russia":

You are to receive at Hamburg. . . .	£11,000 Stlg.
To be laid out in a cargo at Russia for Salem—	
250 tons old gable iron at £9.	2,250
300 tons clean hemp £15.	4,500
40 tons Russia clean Tallow @ 3 ^d stg	1,100
200 ps Russia sheathg @ 44/.	440
1172 ps Russia duck @ 36/.	2,109
Charges & found dues.	601
Stlg.	<u>11,000</u>

In Russia buy for me

- 2 pair large geese
- 2 pair do ducks

I have been informed they are much larger in that country than we have any here.

Captain Moseley

Bring me the best of Sable to make me four Muffs & Tippetts—bring me four pieces of fine Bedticks, that is Clouded. The whole is for my Family's use; you will take the Mercht's judgment of the Quality.

The *Grand Turk (II)* made a transatlantic passage of 38 days and was at Hamburg on July 17. The coffee and aloes sold fast and fetched good prices, but the tobacco market was overstocked, so that part of the cargo was put temporarily in warehouse for Voght to dispose of advantageously. Moseley sailed for St. Petersburg with drafts of £8,000 on London as advance payment for the tobacco, the balance to be remitted as soon as the leaf was sold. The Derby ship arrived at St. Petersburg on September 10, 1794. Drafts on Barings of London were received from Voght aggregating £10,381 "as proceeds of the tobacco and other cargo at Hamburg, less expenses," and with this money Captain Moseley and Derby's St. Petersburg agents (Brothers Blandon) purchased "230 tons of iron, 253 bales of hemp, 78 casks of green candle tallow, a consignment of candles, and 42 sable skins." The *Grand Turk* was given prompt dispatch and on October 16 sailed for New York, as it was feared that so many Massachusetts vessels were in the Baltic trade that the markets of Salem and Boston would be overstocked with Russian goods. Head winds delayed the ship, with heavy westerly winter gales in the North Atlantic, and she did not reach New York until February 17, 1795,

after a passage of 124 days, forty-three days of which were spent in the Baltic between St. Petersburg and Elsinore. In the meanwhile, Jay's Treaty with Britain had so improved Anglo-American maritime conditions in the North Atlantic that Derby, hearing from Voght of the sale of the outbound cargo at Hamburg, had insured the vessel and cargo for the westward, or homeward, passage through Gould in New York for \$30,000 at 6 per cent (the rate paid on the outward leg of the voyage was 9 per cent).

According to Edward Gould's accounting, the proceeds from the sale of the Russian cargo in New York came to \$59,225.64, giving the owner "a paper profit" of about \$16,000 on the cargo itself for the round voyage. However, from the time that the ship was preparing to go to Virginia for tobacco (about October 15, 1793) to the time that she was unloaded at New York (about March 1, 1795) sixteen and a half months had elapsed, and Derby said that the voyage in gross time occupied one and a half years. The cost of manning her for the period was about \$6,000; insurance premiums were said to total \$4,000 for the voyage (outside of Derby's assuming half the risk); and "port charges, pilotage, tonnage taxes and incidentals at the ports of call" were reported as at least \$3,000. Therefore, the net profit on a \$30,000 investment in a hazardous business was about \$3,000 in eighteen months, which figures $6\frac{2}{3}$ per cent per annum.

At the completion of the second voyage of the *Grand Turk (II)*, Elias H. Derby came to the very definite conclusion that the ship was too big to be practicable for his business and "much too large for our port [Salem] & the method of our trade." Salem Harbor was so shallow that vessels drawing more than 12 ft. of water had to load and unload by lighters. Whereas "King" Derby's fleet of some fourteen vessels averaged a scant 200 tons and only ten of William Gray's fleet of 113 vessels were over 300 tons burthen, with the largest of 425 tons (before Gray had moved from Salem to Boston for the better accommodation of his ships), Derby had built his "great ship" of 564 tons, which it was universally felt was "much too big for Salem." Morison says: "The average dimensions of six famous East Indiamen of Salem, built between 1794 and 1805 are, length 99 feet, breadth 28 feet, burthen 336 tons." The *Grand Turk (II)* was 25 ft. longer, 4 ft. beamier, and 228 tons (or $67\frac{1}{2}$ per cent) larger than this average of big and successful ships. It is not surprising that in February 1795, about five years after Derby had approved of the "*Turk's*" dimensions, model, and plans, he substantially admitted that he had had an over-ambitious desire to own a vessel like the great ships of the European East India companies; but there was a great difference between conditions of ownership for "a single merchant" located at Salem and a group of owners with great resources such as the "United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies," which had a choice of British ports with governmental support and advantages that he could never hope to possess.

Again, Derby had become convinced that it was a great mistake for him "to risk so much money in one bottom." Sir Thomas More, years before, had written: "A wise merchant never adventures all his goodes in one ship." Derby concurred in this economic philosophy and admitted that even if he could afford a large ship, it was preferable to distribute the tonnage over two bottoms. Writing to Gould, his New York agent, in February 1795, Derby said that he had decided to sell the *Grand Turk (II)* and asked him to try to dispose of her in the New York market. Derby added: "It is the very best ship that I ever built, but it is too large for me to manage with ease to myself. I do not know so good a ship on the continent for an Indiaman. This ship cost me when I built her Thirty Thous^d Doll^s." Gould replied that he would do his best to sell the vessel, but affirmed, "The ship is rather too large for any trade almost except the India. . . . There is nothing against it but her size." A notice of sale was placed in the New York DAILY ADVERTISER, which read:

The very fine ship *Grand Turk* Capt. Moseley just arrived from Russia, a stout staunch vessel, burthen about 700 tons, a little more than 3 years old, built under the particular inspection of the

owner, is well found and fitted and sails fast. For further particulars enquire of the captain on board at Murray's Wharf, or to

Edward Gould

On March 12, 1795, only twenty-three days following the arrival of the *Grand Turk (II)* at New York, the ship was sold for \$22,000, and unfortunately there is no record of her owner or of the subsequent history of the vessel. Whereas the *Grand Turk (II)* was advertised as being a fast vessel, she must have been a great disappointment to her original owner, for on no part of either of her two voyages did she show any speed. In this respect, she was not a worthy successor to the "first *Grand Turk*" of 300 tons, named after the sultan of Turkey (who had the reputation of being "the most ferocious of all monarchs"), which in 1781-1788, as privateer and merchantman, gained an admirable reputation as "one of the fastest and handiest vessels in the world."

Because of New England's experience with the Boston-owned *Massachusetts* of 600 tons and the Salem-owned *Grand Turk (II)* of 564 tons during the years 1790-1795, the feeling developed that a ship of 500 tons was the limit of size. We are told that aside from the definite ideas of shipowners in regard to economic operation and profits, the boldest Yankee shipmaster of 1800, if given the choice, would have preferred to round the Horn in a small ship of 100 to 200 tons rather than take the command over such a trade route of a ship of 500 or more tons.

*Capt. Jonathan Carnes in the Schooner RAJAH Makes a Fortune and
Salem the World's Greatest Market for Pepper*

Seamen and merchants of the young republic and particularly those of Salem, Mass., as did the Portuguese before them, tracked eastern spices to their source and thereby accumulated commercial and maritime power and wealth. An outstanding instance of a courageous and successful venture in this field is that of Capt. Jonathan Carnes, who, while at Benkulen (Bencoolen) in 1793, heard a rumor that wild pepper was growing and procurable to the northwestward along the coast of Sumatra. Carnes was alert and gifted with imagination—far more so than the officials and masters of the Dutch East India Company, whose ships had roamed for years along these strange and hostile shores. Carnes was close-mouthed and a schemer; he kept his knowledge to himself, completed his voyage, and returned to Salem. Needing money and support to further his plans, he selected a Salem merchant, Jonathan Peele, who saw a chance for big profits if the discovery could be kept quiet. He built and fitted out the schooner *Rajah* of 130 tons and in 1795, with 4 guns and a crew of only ten men, sent her under the command of Jonathan Carnes on "a trading voyage to the East." There was no fanfare or publicity in regard to this voyage; no one in Salem except "the two Jonathans" knew of the schooner's destination, mission, and hopes. In November 1795, she cleared for Sumatra with a cargo of brandy, gin, iron, tobacco, and dried fish, and many Salemites thought that the adventure was "not promising."

J. H. Reynolds wrote of Carnes and the *Rajah*: "Without chart or guide of any kind, he made his way amidst numerous coral reefs, of which navigators have so much dread, . . . as far as the port of Analaboo." Not a word was heard from Captain Carnes and the *Rajah* for eighteen months. Sailors, talking of her "damn fool voyage" and somewhat mysterious quest, began to imagine the schooner wrecked on uncharted coasts or her captain and crew slain by hostile natives. However, Jonathan Peele, a typical and courageous Salem merchant-adventurer (having risked his stake as Salem merchants were wont to do), was evidently unconcerned. He "busied himself with other affairs and pinned his faith in the proven sagacity and pluck of Jonathan Carnes," and Peele was not disappointed in his Yankee skipper or staunch little schooner, for they both came home triumphantly in due time. When the vessel let go her anchor in Salem Harbor, Captain Carnes brought word ashore that he

had secured a cargo of wild pepper in bulk—the first ever imported into America. This unique cargo, costing some \$18,000 with expenses, sold for 700 per cent profit at Salem. Ralph D. Paine, the Salem historian, says that the return was "at least seven hundred per cent of the total cost of the vessel and voyage; in other words this one 'adventure' of the *Rajah* realized what amounted to a comfortable fortune in that generation.

Carnes and Peele tried to capitalize to the full on their amazingly profitable discovery of a market, and secrecy was the order of the day, as many excited rival Salem merchants made vessels ready for sea and sought to benefit from the newly found trade. Salem went pepper mad. The port of Bencoolen as a destination of the *Rajah* leaked out, and many Salem vessels piled on canvas and hurried there, but were unsuccessful in finding Carnes's source of supply and had to proceed to India, where they filled their holds with whatever cargoes came to hand. In the meantime, the *Rajah* was conditioned for a second voyage, and other Salem vessels were ordered to follow her, locate the source of the supply of pepper, and duplicate the success of Captain Carnes. The *Rajah* slipped out of port at night, eluded her pursuers, and returned from her second Sumatra voyage with 150,000 pounds of the precious condiment. With a crew of ten men, however, and the lure of Salem taverns, there was no hiding the mystery of the pepper market, and by the time the *Rajah* had made three pepper voyages, rival vessels were "at her heels bartering with native chieftains and stowing their holds with the wild pepper, which long continued to be one of the most profitable articles of the Salem commerce with the Orient." In half a century, a large part of all the pepper used in the various countries of the world was reshipped from the port of Salem, and we are told that this trade flourished until 1850. According to customhouse records, some two hundred "pepper vessels" entered Salem between 1795 and 1845. Morison, in *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS*, says:

A dozen vessels cleared for Benkulen [following the return of Captain Carnes from his successful pioneer pepper voyage]; but few of them got so much as a sneeze for their trouble. Gradually, however, the secret leaked out; and by 1800, years before there was a published chart of the Malay archipelago, the harbors of Analabu, Sasu, Tally-Pow, Mingin, Labuan-Haji and Muckie and all those treacherous waters . . . were as familiar to Salem shipmasters as Danvers River. Twenty-one American vessels, ten from Salem and eight from Boston, visited this coast between March 1 and May 14, 1803, bargaining with local datus for the wild

pepper as the natives brought it in. Between the two northwest coasts there was little choice, in point of danger. Many a Salem man's bones lie in Sumatran waters, a Malay kreesse between the ribs. By way of reward, Salem became the American and for a time the world emporium for pepper. In 1791 the United States exported 492 pounds of pepper; in 1805, it exported 7,559,224 pounds—over seven-eighths of the entire Northwest Sumatran crop; and a very large proportion of this was landed in Salem. Captain James Cook imported over one million pounds of pepper in one lading of his five-hundred-ton ship *Eliza*.

While giving an historical sketch of the founding and early days of the Sumatra pepper business, it is of interest to note that the last vessel in this trade was the *Australia* of Salem, which loaded pepper there in 1860. It is also significant that authentic charts of the "most hazardous coast," so dangerous for ocean traffic, were made by the Salem merchant-skippers Capt. Charles M. Endicott and Capt. James D. Gillis. Many years later, when the U.S. frigate *Potomac* was sent by the U.S. Government to chart the Sumatra coast to aid American mariners, the experienced American scientists reported that "this duty has been much more ably performed than it could have been with our limited materials" and that "for this important service our country is indebted" to the two ship captains of Salem before mentioned.

Capt. Charles M. Endicott, one of these talented and patriotic men, was master of the unfortunate Joseph Peabody ship *Friendship*, which sailed from Salem to the west coast of Sumatra on May 26, 1830, with a total complement of seventeen men aboard. On September 22, the ship reached the port of Qualah (or Qualla) Battoo (Rocky River) in Lat. 3° 48' N., obtained all the pepper available from the old crop, then visited other ports, and finally returned to Pulo Kio (Wood Island), about two miles from Qualah Battoo, during the latter part of January 1831 to await the coming of the new crop. Captain Endicott had been engaged in the Salem-Sumatra pepper trade for more than fifteen years, and it was during these "wait-

ing periods" that he had surveyed and charted the coast most thoroughly and accurately. Being advised that the new crop of pepper was coming into Qualah Battoo and invited to come and get shipments estimated as from "one to two hundred bags a day," Endicott moved the *Friendship* to that harbor. Although the ship took every reasonable precaution for "security and protection," considering the attitude of First Officer Knight, who thought that Captain Endicott's orders were "childish and dam'd foolishness," a Malay Mussulman pepper vessel secured herself alongside, small boats from the shore came out, and at a given signal on February 7, 1831, the Malaysians boarded and rushed the *Friendship*. They secured "every musket, cutlass and boarding pike" and the ship's "entire stock of powder" and plundered the vessel, taking "every movable article on board, . . . every dollar of specie, every pound of opium, . . . all her spare sails and rigging (not a needle or ball of twine, palm, marling spike, or piece of rope were left); all our charts, chronometers and other instruments—all our clothing and bedding, were also gone, as well as our cabin furniture and small stores of every description." All Americans who resisted or were in the way of the Malaysians were taken prisoners, incapacitated, or killed. Captain Endicott, Second Officer Barry, and four seamen who had been ashore at the time of the piratical attack eluded the hostile natives. They had planned to murder all the Americans and had put a price of \$1,000 "upon the life" of Captain Endicott, \$500 on that of the second mate, and \$100 on each of the seamen. In the boat that escaped from Qualah Battoo was a friendly native, Po Adams, who had warned Captain Endicott of the contemplated attack and of the fact that "Mr. Knight [the chief officer] no look sharp, no understand Malay-man." Po Adams saved the lives of Endicott and his five fellow Americans and would have saved the ship and the lives of all if his advice had been heeded. Because of his pro-American friendship, he was ruined and made destitute by his countrymen. It is deplorable that the U.S. Congress, actuated by cheap politics, refused years later to show any interest in remunerating Po Adams for loyalty to his American friends and for saving six American lives and the ship *Friendship* from destruction and, at the risk to his own life, for boarding the Salem ship and warning her master of the contemplated murderous raid that resulted in the killing of First Mate Knight and several petty officers and seamen and the seizing and plundering of the vessel.

Captain Endicott's small boat made her way to Muckie with difficulty and there found the ship *James Monroe* (Captain Porter) of New York, the brig *Governor Endicott* (Captain Jenks) of Salem, and the brig *Palmer* (Captain Powers) of Boston. Following a council of war (and Po Adams' advice), the crew of the *James Monroe*, the largest of the three vessels, was fortified. The American flotilla sailed for Qualah Battoo, planning to lay the "*Monroe*" alongside the *Friendship* and to board and recapture her by force of arms, but this, because of existing conditions, could not be put into effect. The Malaysians had guns and ammunition in their forts and had supplied the *Friendship* with powder. In response to an offer that if they would give up the ship peaceably the Americans would not molest them, the Malaysians replied, "We will not give her up and you cannot take her from us." The three American ships thereupon opened fire upon Qualah Battoo (the town and its forts), and as the guns of the *Friendship* fired upon the Americans, "she also had to receive attention." One of the forts, mounting six 6-pounders and several brass cannon, was soon silenced by accurate fire. The Malaysians, finding the battle going against them, planned to destroy the American ship that they had captured. As the "*Monroe*" was unable to work alongside the *Friendship*, it was decided by the Americans to man three small boats with sailors "armed to the teeth" and storm her. Upon the approach of these boats, the piratical natives set fire to the ship and deserted the vessel after making vain attempts to get her ashore. After the Americans reduced Qualah Battoo and regained possession of the pillaged *Friendship*, they went ashore and were taunted by the natives in the bazaars, who followed them "in great crowds, exulting and hooting," with exclamations such as, "Who great man now, Malay or American?" "How many American dead; How many Malay man dead?" Through the assistance of Po Adams, Captain Endicott was able to "buy back" his sextant and one chronometer so that he could navigate his ship home, and he returned to Salem on July 16, 1831.

In something less than a year after this outrage, the U.S. frigate *Potomac* (Commander Downes) appeared off Qualah Battoo disguised as a merchantman. She was on a mission of retaliation and revenge, and she quickly extinguished the feeling of presumptuous exultation and proud defiance that had been exhibited by the natives since the *Friendship* affair. Three hundred men, under the guidance of Assistant Sailing Master Barry (formerly second officer of the *Friendship*), were put ashore quietly at night. They captured the forts by storm after some hard fighting and set fire to the town, which burned to ashes. The next day, the frigate, with her disguise removed, bombarded all places of note in the locality to wipe them off the map and impress the natives "with the power and ability of the United States to avenge any act of piracy or other indignity offered by them to her flag." It was said that, in the reduction of Qualah Battoo, "a hundred Malay warriors were killed and two hundred more wounded" in retaliation for the attack on the peaceful Salem merchantman *Friendship*. Marvin, writing of the incident, says: "Thus vigorously the United States, in the years when our merchant flag [on wood sail] flew on every sea, protected the humblest of its sailor-citizens."

Capt. Charles M. Endicott visited the west coast of Sumatra and Qualah Battoo some five months after the punishment inflicted on the Malaysians, and he wrote:

I found the deportment of the natives materially changed. There was now no longer exhibited either arrogance or proud defiance. All appeared impressed with the irresistible power of a nation that could send such tremendous engines of war as the *Potomac* frigate upon their shores to avenge any

wrongs committed upon its vessels, and that it would be better policy for them to attend to their pepper plantations and cultivate the arts of peace, than subject themselves to such severe retribution as had followed this act of piracy upon the *Friendship*.

In the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century, Joseph Peabody, of Salem, not only competed in the China trade, but also continued the famous pepper voyages between Salem and Sumatra. The unfortunate and dramatic *Friendship* affair did not discourage him or his sea captains, for Captain Endicott promptly returned to the trade after his miraculous escape from capture and death, and there is a record of a voyage of the brig *Smyrna* from Salem to Sumatra for pepper in 1833. The cost of vessel, cargo, and outfit was stated as \$28,218.09; expenses of the fourteen-month voyage \$5,050.82, which included \$854.00 "wages to the captain and \$1,404.76 to the crew." The voyage was very profitable, for we are told that "net sales amounted to almost one hundred per cent on the investment." As late as 1833, the leading merchants of Qualah Battoo, Sumatra, "believed Salem to be a country by itself and one of the richest and most important sections of the globe."

Captain Ropes in the RECOVERY of Salem Opens up the Coffee Trade by Adventuring to Mocha

It was not only in early voyages to China and the northwestern American coast that American shipowners and sailors showed courage, resourcefulness, and initiative. Capt. Joseph Ropes in the ship *Recovery* of Salem, sailing in April 1798, went far from the beaten path and adventured to Mocha to open up the coffee trade. We are told that the arrival of the *Recovery* at Mocha caused a sensation analogous to that of Columbus' first visit to the West Indies. The ship, which was the first American vessel to enter the Red Sea, was "an object of acute Moslem interest," the Stars and Stripes attracted much attention, and "the dignitaries wished to know where lay the strange country America" and "how many moons" were required to make the voyage. In 1801 the first full cargo of the fragrant coffee berry, which gave Mocha

its great fame, was brought to Salem by the *Recovery*, and in 1805 two million pounds of Mocha coffee were landed at Salem. The Indian Ocean and eastern trade via the Cape of Good Hope had a particular appeal for Salem shipowner-merchants, and we are told that in 1805 "forty-eight Salem vessels rounded the South African cape" on their mercantile voyages to the East Indies; that "from 1801 to 1810, the duties collected on the transactions of Salem merchants amounted to \$7,272,000."

The ship *America*, which distinguished herself as a privateer during the War of 1812, was the pride of the merchant fleet of the great Crowninshield shipping firm of Salem. Built by Retire Becket at his Salem yard, the *America*, with 10 guns and a crew of thirty-five men, sailed on her maiden voyage on July 2, 1804, under the command of Capt. Benjamin Crowninshield, Jr. (a nephew of George, Sr.), with positive orders to proceed to Sumatra "and nowhere else" and pick up a cargo of pepper after discharging her cargo at Indian Ocean island ports. Captain Crowninshield had evidently gained a reputation for using his own judgment and "tramping" in an endeavor to find appealing and profitable return cargoes, so before sailing Captain Benjamin was enjoined to go after a pepper cargo for his return passage and told: "Now you've broken orders so often, see for once if you can't mind them." While at the Isles of France and Bourbon in the Indian Ocean, Captain Crowninshield heard of the many pepper ships carrying cargoes from Sumatra to Salem, and being advised that coffee and other good merchantable commodities were available at Mocha, he sailed for that Arabian Red Sea port, where he arrived November 30, 1804, and there and at Aden took on board a good load of coffee with some goat skins, hides, gum arabic, and senna. When the *America* arrived off Salem Harbor, the bottom had temporarily dropped out of the pepper market through oversupply in relation to the demand, and the owners were "feeling pretty blue" as they put off from shore in a small boat to welcome and visit their returning ship. But as their boat approached the *America*, they became aware of an unmistakable strong aroma of coffee. As soon as they were within hailing distance, the principal owner shouted through a speaking trumpet, "What's your cargo?" Captain Crowninshield, putting on a woe-begone expression, dolefully replied, "Why pepper, of course"; but back came a roar from the head of the firm with "an exultant ring" in it, "You're a liar, blast your eye, I smell coffee." We are told that Captain Benjamin enjoyed his joke and was effusively forgiven for disobeying orders, for he "had brought back a cargo that harvested a clean profit of one hundred thousand dollars when sold in Holland."

The reason that the *America* had been sent to sea with 10 guns and thirty-five men is apparent when we read that Pringle, a British consul who traveled as a passenger on the Salem ship from Mocha to Aden and then transferred, was on the *Alert* when that ship was captured by Arabs, the captain and fifteen men murdered, and the vessel "carried off to India." The year after the *America* was at Mocha, the Salem ship *Essex*, with Capt. Joseph Orne in command, "adventured up the Red Sea" to Hodeida with \$60,000 in specie to purchase coffee. Captain Orne was influenced by Mahomet Ikle to augment his crew with some Arabs, who turned out to be members of a gang of a notorious pirate. The *Essex* was taken at night, her captain, officers, and crew murdered (only a young Dutch boy was spared to be enslaved), and the ship plundered and burned. It is said that when the sad news of this disaster reached Salem, the owner of the *Essex* (who was Captain Orne's uncle) found consolation in the fact that the ship was insured and, without hesitation, so expressed himself.

Piracy evidently followed in the wake of the opening up of ocean trade routes and was not by any means limited to the sphere of operations of the Barbary, Caribbean Sea, and Madagascar buccaneers or of the French and British freebooting privateers. Piracy in the China and Java seas developed rapidly to formidable proportions following the opening of trade with the occidentals. It was in evidence on the Sumatra coast soon after Captain Carnes in the *Rajah* inaugurated the pepper trade. In 1806 the ship *Marquis de Somereulas* (Capt. William Story) was attacked off that Dutch island by two Malaysian proas with fourteen pirates aboard, and after a desperate battle with some loss of life, many wounded and two

"missing" (later recovered), the Americans were extremely fortunate in saving their ship from capture and themselves from death. Moslem pirates operated in the Red Sea and off the Arabian and northeast African coast shortly after Captain Ropes had surprised the Arabs of Mocha by the appearance of the Yankee ship *Recovery* in the quest for trade.

Smyrna, the mart of Asia Minor, became the residence of a member of the Perkins family of Boston, with whom J. & T. H. Perkins, we are told, "opened profitable relations before the end of the eighteenth century, obtaining Turkish opium for shipment to Canton." What Morison refers to as "a convincing contrast of Yankee enterprise with Eastern lethargy" was evidenced when Capt. Ebenezer Parsons, of Boston, sent ships to Mocha in the Red Sea for several years, which loaded coffee and then circumnavigated the African continent to sell it at Smyrna "for three and four hundred per cent profit."

Coffee became an important item of American foreign trade; for the attitude of the British in regard to taxing tea had for years prejudiced patriotic colonists against its use, and coffee proved to be a palatable and most pleasing substitute for tea. Gradually, New York became the great coffee port of the United States. We read that the tea merchants N. & D. Talcott had ships in the sugar trade that brought coffee as well as sugar from the Caribbean, and such shipments became so common that "the price of coffee fell to compete with the price of tea." For a while, it was said that merchant trading in New York was distinguished as "East River versus North River; tea versus coffee; auction versus normal billing" (and later "steam versus sail").

*American Vessels under the Dutch Flag Trade at
Nagasaki in 1798-1801—Long before Commodore
Perry Put an End to Japanese Isolation*

The Dutch East India Company for many long years enjoyed a peculiar exclusive right of sending one ship a year from Batavia to trade at Nagasaki, Japan. The vessels of all other nations were barred from entering any Japanese ports, and the Dutch permit was restricted to one vessel per year and that at the port and time as specified, under thorough supervision, with full conformity to detailed formalities and regulations. In 1795, French arms and propaganda created the Batavian republic as an ally and vassal to France, and the Dutch East India Company, fearing capture of its vessels by British warships, for four successive years chartered neutral American vessels to make the usual annual Batavia-Nagasaki voyage. In 1798 the ship *Eliza* of New York made the passage, and Japan saw an American vessel for the first time since the pioneer would-be trader *Lady Washington* of Boston had been unsuccessful in an effort to trade in the early 1790's and was ordered to leave Japanese waters with dispatch. In 1799 the Boston ship *Franklin* of 200 tons, under the command of Capt. James Devereux, of Salem, was chartered by the Dutch. It was reported that the Boston ship *Massachusetts* received the annual charter in 1800 and that her owners obtained "the colossal sum of \$100,000" for her services—which is doubted, as the Dutch were notoriously thrifty, keen bargainers and "hard-headed traders." In 1801 the ship *Margaret* of Salem, built by Becket the previous year for Col. Benj. Pickman, John Derby, and Capt. Samuel G. Derby (who commanded her), was the Dutch-chartered trader between Batavia and Nagasaki.

Several documents of historic interest have been preserved dealing with the voyages of the American ships from Batavia to Japan and return, and those referring to the *Franklin* in 1799 and the *Margaret* in 1801 are outstanding. The ship *Franklin's* "charter party" for a

voyage dated June 16, 1799, signed by Johannes Siberg, the Dutch commissary general at Batavia, stipulated that the *Franklin* should carry to Nagasaki a cargo of cloves in sacks, cotton yarns, pieces of chintz, sugar, tin, black pepper, sapan-wood, elephants' teeth, and mummie; also supplies for the Dutch East India Company's agents in Nagasaki. The vessel was to bring back to Batavia a cargo of copper, camphor, boxes and boards. The charter price for the use of the vessel was to be paid in coffee, sugar, black pepper, cloves, indigo, tin, cinnamon, and nutmegs. Numerous minute instructions were given Captain Devereux, and those dealing with the ceremonies that had to be observed when approaching and while at Nagasaki are most voluminous, particularly with respect to the multitudinous salutes of a specified number of guns at stipulated places. All arms and ammunition had to be sent ashore, where they were stored in bond by the Japanese authorities during the *Franklin's* stay of four months in the harbor while she was unloaded and reloaded and the necessary formalities complied with.

We know much of the charter voyage of the *Margaret* in 1801 through the journal of George Cleveland, of Salem, Capt. Samuel G. Derby's clerk. The ship carried 6 guns and twenty men. On November 25, 1800, she left Salem Harbor bound for the East Indies, "and probably a finer, a better-fitted or better-manned ship never left this port before." The *Margaret* soon proved that she was a fast sailer, for when 11 days out she passed the Salem bark *Two Brothers*, which had left port "some days before us," and shortly thereafter the *Margaret* out-sailed a fleet of merchantmen and a British frigate that "set sail in chase." At Batavia, Captain Derby bargained with the Dutch "to take the annual freights to and from Japan." The cargo taken to Nagasaki was composed of "sugar, spices, sapan-wood, sandal wood, rattans, glassware, cloths, medicines, and various other articles," and it was required, "as was the custom from time immemorial, that the Japan ship should sail on a certain day."

On June 20, the *Margaret* sailed from Batavia. On July 16, "we made the islands of Casique and St. Clara which are near the harbor of Nangasacka [Nagasaki] our destined port" and on Sunday, July 19, entered the harbor of "Nangasacca" and "had much ceremony to go through in entering this port, which is considered indispensable, among other things to fire several salutes." The ship's log records firing five salutes of 9 guns each and one of 13 guns between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m. on the ship day of July 20—the latter as the *Margaret* "came to anchor in the roads of Nangasacky." Cleveland writes of Decima as "a little island connected with the city of Nangasacca by a bridge." He continues: "It is walled all round and here the Dutch residents are obliged to pass their lives. Provisions are very dear and everything had to be passed through the hands of a compradore and he, no doubt, put upon them a large profit." Merchandise carried in by ships' officers for personal account could be sold only through the Japanese Government, and it outlined a most involved and dilatory procedure. After a sale by auction under the direction of some of the upper banyoses (magistrates), a day was set for the delivery of the goods to the buyers, who had purchased after an examination of samples. Cleveland says:

Delivering these adventures [personal trading ventures] was a great affair, and it was a number of days before the whole was taken away. No person in this country (who has not traded with people who have so little intercourse with the world) can have an idea of the trouble we had in delivering

this little invoice which would not have been an hour's work in Salem. We finally, after a great trial of our patience, finished delivering goods, and articles that did not come up to the pattern were taken at diminished prices.

The Americans bartered their return from sales for "beautiful lacquered ware, such as waiters, writing desks, tea-caddies, knife boxes, tables, etc., . . . a great variety of porcelain and house brooms of superior quality." The Dutch East India Company cargo having been unloaded and the return cargo put aboard, the *Margaret* was required to depart from the anchorage opposite Nagasaki and drop down to the lower roads "on a certain day, . . . no matter whether it blew high or low, fair or foul, even if a gale and a thousand boats should be required to tow the vessel down." In early November, the *Margaret* changed her anchorage,

remained a few days in the outer roads, and then sailed for Batavia, where she arrived around mid-December 1801 "after a passage of one month."

The officers and crew of the Salem-built and owned *Margaret* were the last Americans to trade peaceably with Japan (and that under the Dutch flag) until the islands of that empire were opened to United States commerce—under prescribed restrictions—following the treaty negotiated by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, U.S.N. (1794-1858), in the spring of 1854, or nearly fifty-three years after the *Margaret* lay in Nagasaki Harbor as a Dutch-chartered trader. No other American vessel was amicably received in a Japanese harbor until Commodore Perry broke the isolation of Nippon on March 31, 1854, at Yokohama in a "friendly" manner (i.e., without bloodshed) under the silent, yet eloquent, guns of an American naval squadron consisting of the steamers *Susquehanna*, *Mississippi*, and *Powhatan* (which terrified the Japs) and the sailing vessels *Macedonian*, *Southampton*, *Lexington*, *Vandalia*, *Plymouth*, and *Saratoga* (also referred to by contemporaries as "a formidable force of ten ships and two thousand men"). A smaller squadron under Perry (reported as "four ships and five hundred and sixty men," which included the steamers *Mississippi* and *Susquehanna*) had visited Japan early in July 1853, and the commodore had succeeded in officially and impressively presenting on July 14 a letter from the president of the United States (Fillmore), which had unwillingly been received by high officials for transmittal to the emperor of Japan. On July 17, Perry left Tokio Bay for China with the understanding that he would return for his answer "with many more" American ships of war the following spring. Hearing at Macao in November of the activities of French and Russian squadrons, Perry returned to Yokohama with an augmented fleet earlier than anticipated and as before stated, on the last day of March 1854, reached an agreement as to terms on the first treaty between the United States and Japan. During the winter of 1853-1854, the Japanese had reached the conclusion that resistance to occidental demands would be futile, and their policy in the face of superior military might was decided; Japan would sign the treaty with the Americans (and similar treaties with other strong foreign military powers) and as soon as possible diligently and thoroughly learn the arts and skills, the ships and weapons of the barbarians, and then—.

Commodore Perry is credited with "one of the greatest diplomatic triumphs of the age," but it was gained not so much by "diplomacy" as by a display of military might consisting of nine warships bristling with guns and heavily manned, and three of the vessels were "fire ships that puffed smoke and could go anywhere without wind or against the wind." It was an impressive exhibition of armed force presented by superb showmanship that gave Perry his "diplomatic triumph." Washington Irving eulogized him by saying that he had gained for himself a lasting name and had won it "without shedding a drop of blood or inflicting misery on a human being." Irving added, "What naval commander ever won laurels at such a rate?" The United States has the distinction of having broken the long-established Japanese policy of national isolation and of compelling Nippon, through intimidation and against its will, to open its ports, trade with and come in contact with Americans, and join the family of nations in reciprocal world trade and exploitation of the weaker by the stronger. The Japan of today was born at Yokohama (about ten miles from Tokio) when Commodore Matthew C. Perry, U.S.N., by a display of American naval power, influenced the unwilling and ardently isolationistic Nipponese to let down their barriers and discard their old traditional policy of exclusiveness and self-sufficiency. From the time that Marco Polo brought news to Europe in 1295 of the existence of a large island off the coast of China named Zipangu (Cipango, or Jipangu), this land had inspired the adventures of explorers. When Christopher Columbus started on his great voyage of discovery in 1492, his quest was not to find a new continent but, by sailing west, to reach Cathay (China) and Cipango (Japan), and on sighting Cuba he felt for a while that he had actually reached Marco Polo's famous and elusive island. Maclay says: "Japan was destined to be brought within the pale of civilized nations not by Columbus, but by an officer of the United States Navy, a nation whose existence was a result of Columbus' great discovery."

Japanese isolationism, as far as occidentals and "Christian civilized nations" were concerned, was based not on any traditional characteristic of the race but, it is well to note, on experience. In 1542 a Portuguese ship bound for Macao was driven to a Japanese island, and the Europeans were so well received by the natives that during the next few years seven Portuguese expeditions visited the port of Kyushu for trading. In 1549 the first Christian missionary, the Jesuit Xavier, landed in Japan and was favorably received by the authorities, who saw a prospect of opening a lucrative trade with foreign markets. Three centuries before Commodore Perry's historic visit to Tokio Bay, the Japanese were an hospitable people not only willing but also anxious to trade with the European foreigners. The annual letter of the Jesuits to Rome written in 1582 boasts of 150,000 Japanese converts. The Jesuits, with their aggression, both irritated and antagonized the Buddhist clergy, and some anti-Christian edicts were issued by the emperor, but the country was divided. Some prominent Japanese, because of their hatred of the Buddhist priesthood, favored the Christians. In 1593 a group of Franciscans arrived in Japan from Manila and were well received. However, the Franciscans quarreled with the Jesuits as a rival religious order of the Christian faith and made accusations to the Japanese authorities. About this time, a Spanish ship was stranded on the Japanese coast, and the captain, boasting of the power and glory of Spain, is credited with saying during conversations regarding the means adopted to cause such a phenomenal growth of the Spanish Empire: "The Catholic king first sent ministers of the gospel [of Christ] to convert the natives, who afterwards, uniting with the captains of his majesty, made their work of conquest easier."

Hideyoshi, who has been called the Napoleon of Japan, became both the military and civil master of the country. He was tolerant in religious matters and friendly with the Jesuits in the sections where he was assured that they confined their activities to religious matters. That he was not prejudiced in favor of the old national religion of Buddhism is proven by his destruction of the Monastery of Negoro, which he burned to the ground in 1584. In military operations in Kyushu, Hideyoshi was brought into contact with Christianity as a political power, which caused him to issue restrictive edicts. In 1587 foreign priests were ordered to leave Japan "within 20 days"; however, Christian merchants were allowed to remain. Some churches were destroyed, but the ordinance was not enforced. Hideyoshi, being "clement by nature and desirous to reap the advantages of foreign trade," paid little or no attention to his edict if he felt that the Jesuits confined their interests to religious matters, although he was opposed to (1) ardent emotional drives to get Japanese to embrace the Christian faith, (2) Jesuits' inciting followers to destroy the so-called "heathen" temples, (3) the Jesuit and Christian persecution of Buddhist priests, (4) the practice of the Portuguese Christians in carrying off Japanese and making slaves of them in the Indies. Notwithstanding that when priests aspired to become a political power, Hideyoshi saw the menace of Christianity to the unity of his country and took steps to curb their activities in that field, we are told that in 1595 there were 137 Portuguese Jesuits in Japan and 300,000 converts. The arrival of the Spanish Franciscans, their fight with and charges against the Jesuits, and the talk of the Spanish captain caused Hideyoshi in 1597 to become, for national reasons, uncompromisingly severe against all Christian priests. All Jesuits were ordered out of the country, twenty-six native and foreign Christians were executed "for cause," many churches were destroyed, and feudal chiefs were forbidden to become Christians.

In 1600 the Dutch *Liefde* was towed into the harbor of Funai in Bungo after a terrible voyage. Will Adams, an Englishman from Kent who was "pilot major" of the expedition, was taken to Osaka, where he won the confidence of Iyeyasu. He was made master shipbuilder to the Yedo Government and adviser and diplomatic agent in dealing with foreigners. Adams, a Protestant, was treated well by the Japanese and was given a considerable estate. Although free to go where he pleased, he preferred to remain in Japan, where he died and was buried with honors in 1620. Because of Adams' influence, the Protestant Dutch in 1605 were given a license to trade with Japan, and in 1609 a factory was established by the Dutch

East India Company at Hirado. Upon the death of Iyeyasu in 1616, his son and successor, Hidetada, issued a severe edict against Christianity. In 1638 the Shimabara armed revolt occurred, and Dutch ships assisted the shogun's troops in the destruction of the Castle of Hara, the last stronghold of Christian Catholics. From this time, Christianity was the "wicked sect" and was practically suppressed in Japan because of (1) its interference in the political realm, (2) its aggressiveness, and (3) the continual turmoil between branches of the European religion. Henceforth Japan became isolationist, being apparently forced into this position to defend itself as a nation from the destructive, belittling, and enslaving tactics of European Christians. Many attempts were made by Europeans to trade with Japan, but following 1638—after the loss of thousands of lives and the driving of Christianity from the empire—all overtures looking toward reciprocal trade were met with the same reply: "So long as the sun shall warm the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan; and let all know that the King of Spain himself or the Christians' God, or the great God of all, if he violate this command, shall pay for it with his head."

Hidetada, the son of Iyeyasu, refused to receive a Philippine embassy in 1624 and published an edict ordering all Spaniards to be deported. In 1638 an edict was issued saying that since the Portuguese were continuing to bring missionaries into Japan in defiance of orders previously published and since they had instigated the Shimabara rebellion, henceforth every Portuguese ship coming to Japan would be burned with all her cargo and that every person aboard her would be executed. Two years before this (in 1636), it was enacted that no Japanese vessel should voyage abroad and any Japanese subject doing so would lose his life; also that no vessels would be permitted to be built in Japan large enough to cross the ocean to lands owned or controlled by Christians. The Portuguese were persistent in their efforts to re-establish trade relations with the Japanese. Four envoys were sent from Macao to Nagasaki on a special goodwill voyage, with the ship's carrying presents but no cargo. The envoys and fifty-seven members of their party were beheaded by order of the shogun, and the lives of thirteen others aboard were spared so that they could navigate the ship back to Macao with a report of their reception and a message that bade the Portuguese to "think no more of us just as if we were no longer in the world."

The Dutch had fought with the Japanese to subdue the Catholic Christians in the Shimabara rebellion, and they lost no opportunity of explaining to the orientals that the Dutch religion was different from that of the Spaniards and Portuguese and showed their animosity toward Jesuits, Franciscans, and all Roman Catholics. Nevertheless, the Dutch factory at Hirado was suspended for four years, and when it was reopened, the restrictions on trade were "irksome, vexatious and humiliating." The governor of Batavia sent an envoy to Japan to protest the regulations being enforced and to appeal for conformity with the charter granted the Dutch by Iyeyasu. The mission failed, for the Japanese asserted that they were no longer interested in foreign trade and the Dutch would not be permitted henceforth to live in any part of the empire save on a small artificial island (Deshima; also referred to as Dezima, Decima, or Disma) connected with a bridge to the Nagasaki shore in Kyushu (the southern island of the main Japanese group). The Dutch factory existed for more than two centuries at Deshima, where "communication with the shore and even domestic life on the island was subject to rigorous police surveillance." The Dutch merchants maintained their singular commercial monopoly at a price "which was measured in the deepest degradation of national and individual dignity and self-respect." The foreigners were virtual prisoners, restricted to an islet "not more than 300 paces in any direction," and only the leaders were permitted to leave it when as envoys they journeyed annually to Yedo to offer gifts and obeisance to the shogun and his court.

Kaempfer, a Westphalian in the service of the Dutch East India Company, was in Japan during the years 1690-1692, and he has written of the procedure witnessed and personally participated in on a Dutch mission to Yedo bearing the usual and expected presents. The senior Dutch resident of Deshima was required to creep forward, "crawling exactly like a crab"

to a curtain, behind which sat hidden the imperious shogun; he then was required to prostrate himself as before a god and then retire, crawling backwards in absolute silence. After this exhibition of humble subservience, the Dutch envoys were led further into the palace and ordered to amuse the court. "We had to rise and walk to and fro, now to exchange compliments with each other, then to dance, jump, represent a drunken man, speak broken Japanese, paint, read Dutch, German, sing, put on our cloaks and throw them off again, etc.," and perform other antics supposed to be illustrative of European life. Of the closely guarded and confined life in the little Dutch colony on Deshima, Kaempfer wrote:

In this service we have to put up with many insulting regulations at the hands of these proud heathens. We may not keep Sundays or fast days, or allow our spiritual hymns or prayers to be heard; never mention the name of Christ, nor carry with us any representation of the cross or any external

sign of Christianity. Besides these things we have to submit to many other insulting imputations which are always painful to a noble heart. The reason which impels the Dutch to bear all these sufferings so patiently is simply the love of gain.

In return for these humiliations, the Dutch East India Company was permitted to send one ship a year from Batavia to Japan and to export a cargo consisting of such articles as "copper, silk, gold, camphor, porcelain, and bronze," which returned immense profits.

In 1647 the Portuguese, having recovered their independence from Spain, sent Gonzalo di Siqueira with two vessels to Japan to explain that Portugal was actually at war with Spain; that the Portuguese had no connection with the Shimabara rebellion, and they urged the re-opening of trade relations for the mutual benefit of the two nations. The Portuguese were treated roughly and with scorn; there was no bloodshed, but they were glad to escape with their lives.

The English factory in Hirado, founded due to the good offices of Will Adams, of Kent (a sort of protege of the powerful Iyeyasu), was not a financial success and was closed by the British in 1623 (three years after Adams' death). However, when the English East India Company attempted to reopen trade, sent the ship *Return* to Nagasaki in 1673, and asked for a renewal of the old privileges granted, men on the ship were not permitted to land, the ship was ordered to depart promptly, and the only reply given as reported by the head of the British expedition was "that since our king was married with the daughter of Portugal, their enemy, they could not admit us to have any trade." The seclusion and isolation of Japan were henceforth complete for 180 years. No Japanese was permitted to go abroad, and no foreigner was allowed to come to Japan except a limited number of Dutch, who could visit Nagasaki and live on the islet of Deshima under arbitrary and humiliating conditions subscribed.

In 1808, when Britain and Holland were at war, the British sloop-of-war H.M.S. *Phaeton* put into Nagasaki looking for enemy vessels, and the Japanese deemed the visit a sign of European aggression; while the Dutch, wishing to preserve a monopoly of foreign trade, encouraged these fears. Troops were called out to repel the "invaders," and the British warship, after taking fresh water aboard, departed. As a tragic result of this incident, the governor of Nagasaki and five Japanese military commanders committed suicide according to a ritual that considered such actions the only way of recovering their self-respect.

The Russians for long years endeavored to trade furs with the Japanese, but all Russian attempts to find some basis of commercial intercourse failed. In 1811 the Russian sloop-of-war *Diana* lay off the Bay of Kunashiri to fill her water casks. The Japanese resented the visit, fired on the ship, and massed troops on the shore. When the Russian commander and five of his men landed, presumably to attend a conference, they were made prisoners and taken in chains to Hakodate, but were later released, placed on board their ship, and ordered to depart and never to return.

Whalers in the 1820's began to operate in Japanese waters and send boats ashore to obtain supplies. In 1824 the men from an English vessel slaughtered cattle and were guilty of other violence, which aroused such bitterness that the Japanese Government published a

decree ordering the local authorities to drive away all foreign vessels and boats attempting to put into port and to arrest or execute any foreigners who might land. The American ship *Lady Adams* disappeared near the Japanese coast in 1826, and it was said that the vessel had struck a reef and that her crew, after reaching shore, had been killed. Later, the ship *Lawrence* was wrecked, and the second mate and seven men, after landing, were treated "with great cruelty, one of the number being tortured to death." At about this same time, the *Lagoda* of New Bedford was stranded on the coast, and the crew was arrested and tortured, one of the men killing himself to escape further torment. The whaler *Plymouth* of Sag Harbor, when off the island, had one of her crew, Ronald MacDonald, well knowing the fate that probably awaited him, deliberately go ashore. He was seized, stripped of his possessions, and imprisoned; but as he was alone and seemed harmless, he was not tortured. In 1837 the *Morrison* was fired on by the Japanese.

In 1843, Japan, becoming somewhat impressed with the growing power of Europeans in the Far East, the opening of various Chinese ports, and the cession of Hong Kong to the British, modified somewhat its attitude toward foreign ships. Mizuno Tadakuni, while insisting that on no account should the barbarians (Europeans) be permitted to land on "the sacred soil of Japan," yet decreed that their ships need not be driven away by guns and military forces but would be allowed to purchase provisions, water, and fuel. At the same time, requests were made of the Dutch at Deshima to supply the shogun with pictures and models of European machines and copies of illustrated foreign books and papers. Following this awakening of interest by the rulers of Japan in occidental mechanical progress, the king of Holland sent an envoy to Yedo urging the abandonment of the Japanese policy of isolation, but the envoy was not permitted to proceed beyond Nagasaki. In 1845, when a formal reply was received to the Dutch letter, it simply stated that the law of Japan would remain unchanged and added, "Henceforth pray cease correspondence."

In 1831, Andrew Jackson, president of the United States, appointed Edmund Roberts as agent to open up trade in the Far East, but Roberts died at Macao in 1836 before he had worked north to Japan.

In 1845 the United States Congress resolved that it was advisable to open Japan and Korea for trade, and many months later Capt. James Biddle anchored at Uraga with the warships *Columbus* and *Vincennes*, but the Japanese authorities refused to negotiate with him. He had instructions "not to do anything to excite a hostile feeling or a distrust of the United States," and after nine futile days, during which he received "rough handling," Biddle sailed away without accomplishing anything. The Japanese evidently boasted of what they considered a "victory" over Captain Biddle's squadron, but on April 17, 1846, Commander James Glynn in the U.S.S. *Preble* arrived at Nagasaki for the avowed purpose of obtaining the release of eighteen seamen from American whalers who were imprisoned by the Japanese. Glynn would have no nonsense, but scattering a cordon of guard-boats that surrounded the *Preble*, he brought his broadside to bear on the city and delivered an ultimatum that unless the Americans were quickly brought out to his ship, he would open fire. On April 26, nine days after his arrival, the American sailors were brought aboard and the incident considered closed. The visit of Commander Glynn in the *Preble* to Nagasaki in 1846 prepared the way for the mission of Commodore Perry to Yokohama in 1853 and the making of a treaty with Japan in 1854, which broke down Japanese isolation by the visible effect of military might and a great deal of impressive stage work coupled with tact and an understanding of Japanese psychology. Perry took his ships as near as he could to Yedo (Tokio); he refused to go to distant Nagasaki, where the Dutch trading station was located, and he insisted on delivering his letter from the president of the United States (addressed to the emperor of Japan or his secretary of foreign affairs) to a high-ranking government official authorized to receive it. Moreover, he declined to receive a reply through the Dutch or Chinese, but would accept it only directly and that at Yokohama (the nearest port to Tokio). The treaty of March 31, 1854, officially signed at a later date and broadened by Townsend Harris, the first consul

general of the United States to Japan, opened up the two Japanese ports of Shimoda and Hakodate (and Nagasaki shortly thereafter and Yokohama in 1859), which the Americans were permitted to frequent within definite limits; American consuls or agents were granted the privilege of residence at Shimoda; shipwrecked American sailors landing on Japanese soil would henceforth be relieved, and American ships would be permitted to obtain provisions, water, and fuel in Japanese territory. After signing a treaty with the United States, Japan was required to sign similar treaties with Britain, Russia, Holland, and France, and on February 13, 1860, the Japanese dispatched their first foreign envoys on board the U.S.S. *Powhatan* for Washington.

Derby's Last Bold Venture—the MOUNT VERNON *a Fighting Merchantman*

The Undeclared War between the United States and France was under way, and Elias Hasket Derby, of Salem, "with a revival of his bold Revolutionary spirit," decided to risk a new ship that he had built, the *Mount Vernon*, to carry a cargo of sugar and coffee to the Mediterranean and take chances to evade or fight French privateers or naval vessels and Barbary Coast pirates. The *Mount Vernon* was "King" Derby's last ship, and her voyage his last business venture. The vessel was built in harmony with Derby's specifications, approved model and drawings to be "a very fast carrier," half merchantman and half privateer, or an ideal heavily armed and manned "letter of marque"—designed not to take prizes but to beat off any ordinary foe and sail away from powerful war vessels. The *Mount Vernon* was of 355 tons, was 100 ft. long, mounted 20 guns, and carried fifty men. She proved to be "a notable combination of commercial and naval fitness" and demonstrated her fighting ability as well as her speed and a most satisfactory paying cargo capacity on her maiden voyage.

Under the command of the owner's son, Capt. Elias H. Derby, Jr., the *Mount Vernon* sailed from Salem on July 14, 1799. In 8 days and 7 hours, she was up with Corvo in the Azores (which was clipper ship speed), in 16 days made Cape St. Vincent, and was anchored at Gibraltar after a passage of 17½ days. Captain Derby wrote his full report of the crossing on August 1, 1799. Frenchmen, we read, were "constantly in sight for the last four days" of the passage. After outsailing one of them, Captain Derby found himself on July 28 in the midst of a half-moon "fleet of upwards of fifty sail," which, while pretending to be English, were French; "an 18-gun ship from their center and two frigates, one from their van and another from the rear," were ordered to intercept the impudent Yankee that was boldly sailing through them flying the Stars and Stripes. One French warship got in several broadsides, but the *Mount Vernon* was brilliantly maneuvered, and being handy and fast, she kept herself as a minimum of target to the warships nearest to her, gave one ship a broadside "in such a style that apparently sickened him," and, firing her stern chasers, soon distanced her would-be captors. The next day, the Yankee ship was chased by two large and fast French frigates, but succeeded in evading and outsailing them. Then followed a fight off Cape St. Vincent with a "French lateen-rigged vessel apparently of 10 or 12 guns, one of them an 18-pounder." This French ship had an advantageous position to windward, and "his metal was too heavy for ours," so Derby says that he "bore away and saluted him with our long nines" as the *Mount Vernon* drove the aggressive Frenchman's consort, a large armed lugger, out of her path. The American ship made Cadiz at midnight and lay to until daylight, but did not see British warships as expected, so sailed for Gibraltar, "popping at Frenchmen

all the forenoon." At 10:00 a.m., off Algeciras Point, the *Mount Vernon* was "seriously attacked by a large latineer who had on board more than 100 men." A fight with broadsides ensued, and the Yankee "bore away and gave him our stern guns, . . . doing apparently great execution." Derby, in his report, continues:

Our bars having cut his sails considerably he was thrown into confusion, struck both his ensign and his pennant. I was then puzzled to know what to do with so many men; our ship was running large with all her steering sails out, so that we could not immediately bring her to the wind and we were directly off Algeciras Point from whence I had reason to fear she might receive assistance, and my port (Gibraltar) in full view. These were circumstances that induced me to give up the gratification of bringing him in. It was, however, a satisfaction to flog the rascal in full view of the English fleet who were to leeward. The risk of sending here is great, indeed, for any ship short of our force in

men and guns—but particularly heavy guns . . . I have, now while writing to you, two of our countrymen in full view who are prizes to these villains. Lord St. Vincent in a 50-gun ship bound for England, is just at this moment in the act of retaking one of them. The other goes into Algeciras without molestation. You need have but little apprehension for my safety, as my crew are remarkably well trained and are perfectly well disposed to defend themselves; and I think after having cleared ourselves from the French in such a handsome manner, you may well conclude that we can effect almost anything.

The *Mount Vernon*, in her encounters with the French vessels, had conclusively proven that she could outsail and outmaneuver any of them, but her broadsides of 6-pounders were too light for close-in fighting, and even her 9-pounder chasers were only half the weight of the metal carried by the small French ships that she had been compelled to fight. Moreover, no commercial vessel with a letter-of-marque commission and corresponding crew was in any position to handle a prize that had over a hundred fighting men aboard. The *Mount Vernon* was neither a well-manned warship nor a privateer, both of which carried men enough to make up many prize crews and vacant space aboard to accommodate prisoners. Notwithstanding her handicaps, the vessel was described by contemporary authorities as "a smart fast ship and a powerful one well suited for trading in times such as these."

Captain Derby found Gibraltar to be overstocked with produce such as his ship carried, so he decided to dispose of his cargo at Mediterranean ports. As sugar and kindred "colonial produce" were selling low, he joined with John William, of Baltimore, in chartering and loading a brig, and on August 10 the two vessels sailed in company. Touching at Palermo and finding no satisfactory market there, Captain Derby continued on to Naples, where the *Mount Vernon's* cargo, valued at \$43,275, was sold for \$120,000. "My sales have been handsome," reported the merchant-skipper, "though not as great as I could have wished." We are told that exchange on London being disadvantageous, "Capt. Derby made an investment of his gains, typical of this troubled period." He laid aside \$50,000 for wines and silks and then purchased two new polacca-rigged vessels for \$16,000. In the *Mount Vernon*, he convoyed them up the Adriatic to Manfredonia to load wheat. The guns and fighting crew on the Salem ship were needed on this expedition, as two attacking Moslem pirate craft with carriage guns and loaded with men "armed to the teeth" had to be beaten off. Returning, Captain Derby sold the grain at Leghorn. We are told that the profits on this venture "paid for the two polaccas with \$30,000 to boot, only two and a half months after their purchase"; that "in less than eleven months' time Capt. Derby had made a net profit of over a hundred thousand dollars on an investment of forty-three thousand."

The *Mount Vernon* did not get back home before the death of her captain's father, as the great Salem merchant, after whom the son was named, died in 1799. Ralph D. Paine, the marine historian, refers to Elias Hasket Derby as "the first American millionaire" and adds:

He was a shipping merchant with a vision and with the hard-headed sagacity to make his dreams come true. . . . Derby ships were first to go to Mauritius, . . . first at Calcutta and among the earliest to swing at anchor off Canton. . . . In

fourteen years the Derby ships made one hundred and twenty-five voyages to Europe and far eastern ports and out of the thirty-five vessels engaged only one was lost at sea.

*The ASTREA Opens the America-Philippine Islands Trade in 1796, and
the LYDIA Carries the American Flag to Guam in January 1802*

The Salem ship *Astrea* (Capt. Henry Prince), with the famous Nathaniel Bowditch aboard as supercargo, was sent by Elias H. Derby in 1796 to Manila in the Philippines "in search of sugar, hemp and indigo," and we are told that "she fetched home a large and valuable cargo." The *Astrea*, which anchored in Manila Bay on October 3, 1796, was the first vessel to fly the American flag in the Philippines and to open a trade with Salem merchants that continued as long as Salem was a commercial shipping port and as long as Salem men owned and operated deep-sea merchant sail.

It was a Salem bark, the *Lydia* (Capt. Moses Barnard), that in 1801 first displayed the American flag to the natives of Guam, the largest of the islands known as the Marianas group (or the Marianne, or Ladrone, Isles). The *Lydia* was at Manila on a trading voyage when she was chartered by the Spanish Government to convey to Guam a new governor of the Marianas, with "Lady, three children and two servant girls and 12 men servants, A Fryar & his servant, A Judge and two servants." The Massachusetts bark sailed from Manila on October 20, 1801, and her first mate, William Haswell, wrote an entertaining journal of the voyage. The complement of the *Lydia* consisted of only eleven men all told (captain, two mates, cook, steward, and six fore-castle hands), and great danger was anticipated from pirates whose proas infested the waters. Boarding nettings were rigged, and evidently no help was to be expected from the eighteen male passengers aboard. Haswell writes, "To my certain knowledge they would not have fought had we been attacked." After calling at Sambongue, "a pleasant place and protected by fifty pieces of cannon, the greatest part of them so concealed by the trees that they cannot be seen by shipping," the islands of Guam and Rota were sighted on January 4, 1802, and on January 7 the Spanish governor and his family and suite disembarked at Aguana (Agana), the capital, or chief town, of Guam. Captain Barnard obtained \$8,000 charter money for carrying the new governor and party from Manila to Guam and asked \$4,000 to carry the old governor back; but the Spaniard offered only \$2,000, which was declined, and then he waxed indignant and was chagrined to see the American bark sail away and leave him, for he had been sure that the Yankee skipper was only bluffing and at the last moment would accept his terms.

The Spanish governors of Guam and the Marianas had in operation an economic system that attracted the attention of Mate Haswell. The natives wore few clothes, as the governor was the only shopkeeper, and he priced goods to give himself a profit of "eight hundred per cent." There was a native militia regiment of one thousand men, who were paid "ten dollars a year." We read:

The payment of this militia is the only cash in circulation on the Island. . . . When pay day comes it causes a kind of market. The Governor's secretary pays them and they carry the money to the dry goods store and lay it out in Bengal goods, cottons and in Chinese pans, pots, knives and hoes, which soon takes all their pay away so that the cash never leaves the Governor's hands. It is left

here by galleons in passing and when the Governor is relieved he carries it with him to Manila often to the amount of eighty or ninety thousand dollars. The population is estimated at 11,000 inhabitants of which twelve only are white and about fifty or sixty mixed. The Governor and four Friars are the only Spaniards from old Spain, the others are from Peru, Manila, etc.

Samuel Eliot Morison has said that commerce with the Far East was a primary factor in restoring the young republic—once the thirteen American colonies—to prosperity and power, in giving "her maritime genius a new object and a new training," and in developing a natural marine supremacy "that ended in a burst of glory with the clipper ship." He adds:

By 1800 Massachusetts had proved the power of her merchants and seamen, when unrestrained by a colonial system; had given the lie to tory pessimists who predicted her speedy decay when detached

from the British Empire. A Tea Party in Boston Harbor, at the expense of the British East India Company, brought on the American Revolution. Twenty years later, tea and spices earned through

trafficking with savage tribes, carried in Massachusetts vessels and handled by her merchants, were underselling the imports of that mighty monopoly in the markets of Europe.

It is said that the first vessels of the British East India Company to touch at the Fiji Islands called there in 1807, and less than four years after the island natives' first contact with the white man, Capt. William Richardson, in the bark *Active* of Salem, was trading at the Fijis, and he continued his voyage from there on to Canton in 1811. For about a half century, we are told, the untutored natives of the islands pictured America "as consisting mostly of a place called Salem, whose ships and sailors were seldom absent from their palm-fringed beaches."

Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee and His Career Youths in Command of Yankee Ships

At the end of the eighteenth century, it has been said, "schoolboys commanded Yankee ships," and the records show that many a skipper was less than twenty-one years of age and had risen to a command the "hard way" and proved extremely competent in his responsible position. The Derby ship *Benjamin* of Salem (161 tons), dispatched in 1792 to the Indian Ocean, was in charge of the capable Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee, who was only nineteen years of age; the first mate, Charles Derby, was only twenty; and the clerical and supercargo work was handled by Richard Cleveland, who was eighteen (and five years later was master of the bark *Enterprise*, which commenced a voyage bound from Salem to Mocha, in the Red Sea, for coffee). The *Benjamin*, owned by Elias H. Derby, left Salem with a miscellaneous cargo, "including hops, saddlery, window glass, mahogany boards, tobacco and Madeira wine," for the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France (Mauritius), and India, but—as Captain Silsbee wrote—"with such instructions as left the management of the voyage very much to my own discretion." The *Benjamin* was not the first command of her nineteen-year-old skipper. Going to sea when fourteen, he was second mate on a brig voyaging to Madeira at seventeen and "when he returned to Salem was offered the command of her, considerably in advance of his eighteenth birthday," but, we read, "the death of his mother deferred his promotion." Soon afterwards, young Silsbee was captain of a sloop in West Indian trade, where he proved his mettle, courage, and seamanship. He then commanded a brig on a West Indian voyage, and when he became master of the ship *Benjamin* at nineteen, Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee was an experienced commander and "a veteran mariner."

Soon after leaving port, Captain Silsbee proved his versatility by amputating (without any suitable instruments) all the toes of both feet of the cook, whose feet were so badly frozen as to cause gangrene, and an operation was necessary to save the man's life. Silsbee called at the Cape Verde Islands to put the man ashore, but the surgeon of an English frigate at anchor examined the patient, pronounced the operation "well performed," and advised against moving the man, who, we read, "in a few weeks' time was able to resume his duties, recovered his usual health," and, although an elderly person, "made several subsequent voyages."

While on the passage from the Cape of Good Hope to the Mauritius, Captain Silsbee heard of war between Britain and France from a French frigate. When he arrived at the French island, prices were soaring, and "the cargo of the *Benjamin* was promptly sold at a

profit that dazzled her commander." But young Silsbee now proved himself to be a financier. As quickly as payments were made for the goods sold, he turned the paper currency into Spanish dollars, and when his ship was detained for six months due to an embargo being laid on all foreign vessels in port, Captain Silsbee saw his hard money increase to three times the value of the paper currency, while the market price of goods on the island did not advance in cost because of there being no outlet for the products. Therefore, Silsbee abandoned his plan of going to India, and as soon as French regulations permitted, he loaded the *Benjamin* with coffee and spices, after selling his Spanish dollars, and sailed for home. Upon arrival at the Cape of Good Hope, however, the young captain scented another opportunity to make money and availed himself of it. He wrote:

I found the prospect of a profitable voyage from thence [South Africa] back to the Isle of France [Mauritius] to be such that I could not consistently . . . (although attended with considerable risk) resist the temptation to undertake it. . . . There being two other Salem vessels in port by which I could send home a part of my cargo, I put on board

those vessels such portion . . . as I knew would considerably more than pay for the whole cost of my ship and cargo at Salem, sold the residue of the merchandise, and invested the proceeds in a full cargo of wine and other articles which I knew to be in great demand in those islands.

At this time, the Cape of Good Hope was held by the Dutch, who had joined the British in the war against France. Strange as it may seem, the *Benjamin* was the only foreign vessel lying in the South African port "of whom a bond had not been required not to proceed from thence to a French port." Leaving the Cape, however, Captain Silsbee had to slip his cables after dark in a gale of wind to escape from the clutches of a British frigate. At Mauritius, he sold his cargo for "three times its cost" and again loaded for home. When he was about ready to sail, it was reported that another embargo was about to be laid on foreign shipping, so the *Benjamin* was hastily put to sea. Calling at the nearby French island of Bourbon for provisions, Silsbee met a friendly governor who advised him to load quickly, sail that night, and keep the tip-off "a secret." The young skipper wrote:

There was a war-brig at anchor in a harbor a little to windward of my own vessel; toward midnight I had the anchor hove up without noise, and let the ship adrift without making any sail until by the darkness of the night we had lost sight of

the war-brig, when we made all sail directly from the land. At daylight the war-brig was sent in pursuit of us under a spread of sail but fortunately could not overtake us, and toward night gave up the chase.

The *Benjamin* arrived at Salem after an absence of nineteen months, and Elias H. Derby gained a net profit "of more than one hundred per cent" upon the entire cost of the gross investment in ship, cargo, and expenses. Captain Silsbee received \$4,000 as "his perquisites," bought a house, and, as he was taking the *Benjamin* out again, risked \$2,000 of it in an "adventure" on his own account. He crossed the Atlantic to Amsterdam and then sailed to the Mauritius, where he sold his cargo for "enormously high prices." Reloading the *Benjamin*, Silsbee sent her back to Salem in command of the first mate and then bought for \$10,000 (out of his employer's funds) a good new ship of 400 tons that had been brought in by a French privateer and condemned. Loading his new acquisition with coffee and cotton, the young Yankee skipper shipped a new crew and, with "6 guns and 25 men," set sail for home "in the wake of the *Benjamin*." Approaching the New England shore, Silsbee needed his guns, for he had to fight off a privateer, which he succeeded in doing by placing all his 6 guns on the one broadside.

In 1795, Captain Silsbee (then twenty-two years of age) purchased a quarter of a new ship, the *Betsy*, and commanded her on a seventeen-month voyage to Madras, Malaysia, and Calcutta and return. At Madras, he locked horns with British naval officers over the lawless impressment of a member of his crew. His next ship was the *Portland*, of which he owned a third. Sailing from Boston in the fall of 1797, he ran into the French, who had decreed that every vessel of any nation "on which might be found any articles of the production or manufacture of Great Britain or any of its territories" was liable to condemnation. When five days from Cadiz and bound for Genoa or Leghorn, the *Portland* was captured by a

French privateer brig from Marseilles and taken as a prize into Malaga, whose harbor "was filled with American and other foreign vessels all flying the French flag." Captain Silsbee was subjected to indignities and humiliation, but his bulldog persistence, courage, resourcefulness, and resolute bearing finally won out during this grave crisis of his fortunes. Soon after reaching Genoa, a French army entered that port and declared an embargo on shipping, as it was decreed that one of the fleets to carry Napoleon's legions to Egypt would be fitted out there. Learning that the French army was in great need of salted meat, Silsbee, in the dead of night, conveyed the forty barrels of salt beef and pork that he had aboard to "a secure hiding place several miles beyond the outskirts of the city." After withstanding all the arbitrary demands for the use of his ship and confiscation of all needed provisions, he was finally successful in bartering and agreed to provide the French authorities with forty barrels of salted meat, not on his ship or in the harbor of Genoa, in return for the release and free official clearance of the *Portland*. Silsbee, under the circumstances, was fully justified in writing: "I could not but consider that a more beneficial disposal of forty barrels of beef and pork had probably never been made than in this instance."

Returning home, Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee stayed ashore a while "in order to promote his rapidly growing commercial ventures," but he soon became "tired of the inactivity of life on land," bought the Maine-built ship *Herald* of 328 tons in co-operation with Samuel Parkman and Ebenezer Preble, and, with himself in command, sailed in January 1800 from Boston for India armed with 10 guns and carrying a crew of thirty men. The cargo consisted of butter, beef, tobacco, codfish, rum, nankeen (from China), and 236 pipes (double hogsheads holding 110 to 125 gallons) of French brandy that had run the British blockade; in addition, the vessel carried specie and bills of exchange. Silsbee wrote that the *Herald* sailed "with a stock of \$63,000 in specie and merchandise and with credits authorizing drafts on England or the United States for about \$40,000, making altogether over \$100,000, which at that time was considered a very large stock. Of this, as in my previous voyages to India, I furnished, besides my interest as owner of one-fourth part of the vessel and cargo, five per cent of the cost of the outward cargo, for which I was to take ten per cent of the return cargo at the close of the voyage as my compensation for transacting the business thereof."

On the return passage from India, the *Herald* left Calcutta and the Hooghly River in company with four other American ships (three from Philadelphia and one from Baltimore). As the Undeclared War with France was on and it was known that French privateers were cruising in the Bay of Bengal looking for British or American merchantmen, the masters of the four American ships entered into a pact to sail together as a squadron until they had passed the southern part of Ceylon. Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee, then an "elderly" man of twenty-seven, was designated commodore of the squadron that collectively mounted some 45 guns and carried about 125 men. On November 3, this flotilla of American merchantmen sighted the East India Company's packet ship *Cornwallis* of 18 guns, which was being attacked by the French privateer *La Gloire*, armed with a heavy battery of twenty-two 9-pounders and carrying "a crew of about 400 men." The five American ships cleared for action and were joined by the *Cornwallis*, whose captain asked permission to keep company with the American squadron until the danger was past. The French privateer "steered directly" for the *Herald*, "which was the center of the fleet," and met with a warm reception, the other vessels opening fire also as soon as their guns could be brought to bear on the enemy. The master of the American vessel nearest the *Herald*, feeling that his speed was sufficient to outsail the privateer, expressed "a keen desire to leave" and elude the Frenchman, but in response to his expressed intention Captain Silsbee roared through his speaking trumpet, "If you do, I'll sink you," and the argument ended with the retort, "Damn you Silsbee, I know you would." The privateer *La Gloire* annoyed the fleet of six merchantmen for two days and tried to "pick off" one or two of the ships, but as the squadron had a unity of command and purpose, she finally abandoned the chase and set sail to search for easier game.

Captain Silsbee made one more voyage and then, with a fortune before he was twenty-nine years old, retired from the sea for "his own home and fireside." He had married the daughter of George Crowninshield, of Salem, and was prepared to take a prominent position as a successful shipping merchant. From 1826 to 1835, Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee was a United States senator from Massachusetts (representing his state in company with Daniel Webster). Writing of the seafaring life of himself and his two brothers, he said that he, the eldest, went to sea at fourteen, his brother William at fifteen, and the youngest of the trio of brothers, Zachariah, at about sixteen and a half. He continues:

Each and all of us obtained the command of vessels and the consignment of their cargoes before attaining the age of twenty years, viz., myself at the age of eighteen and a half, my brother William at nineteen and a half, and my brother Zachariah

before he was twenty years old. Each and all of us left off going to sea before reaching the age of twenty-nine years, viz., myself at twenty-eight and a half; William at twenty-eight and Zachariah at twenty-eight and a half years.

All of the three Silsbee brothers of Salem had made their fortunes by the time that they were twenty-nine years old and "were ready to stay ashore as merchants and shipowners backed by their own capital."

Capt. John Boit, Jr., of the *Union* was only nineteen years old when, in 1794, he commenced an historic voyage around the world. James Howland, of New Bedford, was given the command of a ship on his eighteenth birthday and soon afterwards "went on a honeymoon voyage to the Baltic with his still younger bride." The Crowninshield family of Salem had six brothers, and all went to sea as young boys. One died of fever at Guadaloupe when fourteen years old, but of the surviving five, historian Paine says that all were "in command of ships before they were old enough to vote, and at one time all five were away from Salem each in his own vessel and three of them in the East India trade." Benjamin W. Crowninshield, in his memoirs, wrote of these brothers:

When little boys they were all sent to a common school and about their eleventh year began their first particular study which should develop them as sailors and ship captains. These boys studied their navigation as little chaps of twelve years old and were required to thoroughly master the subject

before being sent to sea. . . . As soon as the theory of navigation was mastered the youngsters were sent to sea, sometimes as common sailors, but commonly as ship's clerks, in which position they were enabled to learn everything about the management of a ship.

Capt. George Crowninshield, the eldest of the five Crowninshield brothers, served his years at sea "from forecabin to cabin" and, while young, "retired ashore to become a shipping merchant." George was the first American yacht owner, building the sloop *Jefferson* in 1801 for his personal use and converting her into a privateer in the War of 1812. In 1817, Capt. George Crowninshield built his famous second yacht, the brigantine *Cleopatra's Barge*, which, following his death, was sold and later became the royal yacht of King Kamehameha of the Sandwich Islands. Another brother, Benjamin W., became Secretary of the Navy under Madison and United States Congressman; another, Jacob, was a Congressman from 1803 to 1805 "and had the honor of declining a seat in Jefferson's cabinet." Jacob Crowninshield earned notoriety in 1796 by bringing on his ship from India the first live elephant ever seen in America.

Robert Bennet Forbes, of Boston, of a generation later, was born in 1804 of good family, and although a nephew of the great T. H. Perkins, he carved his own fortune and went to sea when thirteen years old, shipping before the mast on the *Canton Packet*. Writing of his career, Forbes says:

Beginning in 1817 with a capital consisting of a Testament, a "Bowditch," quadrant, chest of sea clothes and a mother's blessing, I left the paternal mansion full of hope and good resolution, and the promise of support from my uncles. At the age of sixteen I filled a man's place as third mate;

at the age of twenty I was promoted to a command; at the age of twenty-six I commanded my own ship; at twenty-eight I abandoned the sea as a profession and at thirty-six was at the head of the largest American house in China.

Robert Bennet Forbes, who, according to his own writings, "had become gray" in 1834 (at the age of thirty) "and imagined myself approaching old age" and as having "attained the summit of my ambition" and "comfortably off in worldly goods," became a merchant-shipowner in Boston in 1840 and has been authoritatively described as a practical, farsighted pioneer in the building and operation of ships. Morison writes that Forbes "had the most original brain and the most attractive personality of any Boston merchant of his generation."

Philadelphia Dispatches the CANTON to China in 1786

Two years after the departure of the *Empress of China* from New York to Canton to open up American trade with the Far East, Philadelphia is credited with dispatching its first vessel to participate in this trade. The pioneer Delaware ship in the East Indian and oriental trade—and the third American vessel to traverse this route—was the *Canton*, commanded by Capt. Thomas Truxton. Congress, on January 2, 1786, granted a sea-letter to the good ship *Canton* and her commander, Captain Truxton, identical as to substance and verbosity with that given Captain Green of the *Empress of China* in late December 1783. Few particulars are known of this voyage. The *Canton* sailed "early in 1786" and was "the first adventure after peace from the port to the East Indies"; she "returned to Philadelphia in May 1787, after a successful voyage." In those days, ships had many joint owners, and cargoes were joint-stock affairs, but it is said that "dividends on the profits of the voyage were made to each stockholder," although, because of the nature of things, they were evidently smaller than anticipated.

*Stephen Girard of Philadelphia—Mariner, Shipowner,
Financier, and Philanthropist*

Stephen Girard was born in Bordeaux, France, on May 20, 1750, the son of a sea captain, and when fourteen years of age he sailed with his father as boy apprentice on his first West Indian voyage. With no schooling and barely able to read and write when he first went to sea, young Girard became self-taught and in 1773 was first mate of a French merchant vessel. Three years later, at the age of twenty-six, Girard entered the port of Philadelphia in command of a sloop that had narrowly escaped capture by British warships. He immediately identified himself with the American revolutionary movement and in May 1776 definitely decided to make Philadelphia his home, becoming a citizen of Pennsylvania in 1778. Girard married the daughter of Lum, a shipbuilder, who built the *Water Witch* for him in 1779—the first of a fleet trading with New Orleans and the West Indies.

In 1791, Stephen Girard, who had become one of Philadelphia's leading merchants, began to build "a fleet of beautiful ships" for the European, China, India, and African trades, and the names of his most popular ships—the *Rousseau*, *Voltaire*, *Helvetius*, and *Montesquieu*—reveal his preference for authors and his ideas of liberty and religion. In 1793, Girard did splendid, courageous, and unselfish work in scientifically fighting the plague in Philadelphia, and during the dreadful yellow fever epidemic of 1797-1798, he took the lead in combating

the scourge along practical lines, caring for the sick and relieving the poor. Girard's wealth was earned in ships, and his career was one of the great maritime romances of the United States, but he used his means entirely for the good of his fellow Americans. In 1810, Girard used about a million dollars, deposited by him with the Barings of London, for the purchase of shares in the much-depreciated stock of the Bank of the United States, a deal admittedly "of great assistance to the United States Government." In May 1812, he established the Bank of Stephen Girard, and so successfully did he combine banking and shipping that during the War of 1812 he was referred to as "the wealthiest merchant in the United States." In 1813, one of Girard's ships from China was captured by a British privateer off the Capes of the Delaware. Her cargo of teas, silks, and nankeens was said to be "worth half a million dollars to Girard," so he proceeded to negotiate with the captain of the privateer for his ship's ransom "intact, and as she was in all respects when taken." When the British captain saw "one hundred and eighty thousand Spanish milled dollars," he could not resist the temptation. Girard got back his ship and, moreover, it was proven, made a good bargain by acting "quickly and generously in the matter."

Stephen Girard, the "mariner and merchant," was a most remarkable man, an individualist and a humanitarian, but he was sound in economics, liberal in his views. Although different from other men, he was social in his objectives and not an eccentric as has been claimed by selfish relatives and religious bigots. (He had no children, and his wife, who was ill for twenty-five years, died sixteen years before him.) Philadelphia's greatest merchant and financier died on December 26, 1831. His estate, valued at his death at about \$7,500,000, was bequeathed by the great philanthropist almost entirely to the well-being of his fellows in promoting education for the underprivileged, providing for a better police system, making municipal improvements, and lessening taxation.

*William Gray, of Massachusetts, America's Greatest
Shipowner-Merchant of His Day*

William Gray (1750-1825), America's greatest individual shipowner and deep-sea merchant around the turn of the century and to his death in 1825, seems to have been subjected to "a conspiracy of silence" by Salem's historians, and it is unfortunate that, with the exception of one letter-book, all his personal papers and records of his commercial transactions were destroyed in the Boston fire of 1872. William Gray was born in Lynn, Mass., on June 27, 1750, and was named after his grandfather, who initiated the manufacture of shoes by operations at Lynn. When young William was ten years old, his father, Abraham Gray, moved his family to Salem, and at an early age William was apprenticed to Samuel Gardner and later entered the countinghouse of Richard Derby—both of Salem. In 1778, Gray was engaged in business for his own account. In 1775, as a militiaman, the young Salem shipping merchant, following a forced march, arrived in time to contact the British on their retreat from Lexington and exchange shots with them. When the province of Massachusetts Bay decided to send a report of the Lexington and Concord affair to England to arrive there before the official report had a chance to influence the British popular mind with a biased account of the event and the disaster to British arms, the only contributions made by individual citizens toward the expense of sending Richard Derby's fast-sailing vessel *Quero* across the Atlantic with the news were a patriotic donation of William Gray in cash and the services of Capt. John Derby (also of Salem), who as captain of the expedition refused to charge for his personal services.

William Gray was commissioned as second lieutenant of the First Essex Regiment in the early days of the War of the Revolution, and during the latter part of the fight for inde-

pendence, he was either owner or part-owner of many privately armed vessels that captured British property. Records are available showing that William Gray, of Salem, was the principal and managing owner of the following letter-of-marque vessels, which were employed as merchantmen in deep-sea trade, but were armed, manned, and commissioned to take prizes and defend themselves against the enemy and as privately owned ships of war were under heavy bond to the government to obey the rules of warfare:

Name of Vessel	Commissioned	Rig	Ton-nage	Number of Guns	Men	Name of Vessel	Commissioned	Rig	Ton-nage	Number of Guns	Men
DEFENCE	Nov. 18, 1781	Brigantine	100	10	16	HECTOR	Nov. 5, 1782	Brigantine	100	6	15
HIND	July 3, 1782	Brigantine	120	8	16	HYNDE	Nov. 19, 1782	Brigantine	90	8	16
VENUS	July 3, 1782	Ship	140	10	20	IRIS	Dec. 23, 1782	Ship	100	9	18
DEFENCE	Oct. 26, 1782	Brigantine	100	10	16	UNION	Dec. 31, 1782	Brig	100	6	17

When a letter of marque changed masters (or owners), a new commission was issued and bond required. The two commissions granted the *Defence* were evidently given to the same vessel, but in 1781 Capt. Robert Rentoul was in command and in 1782 Capt. John Barr. Each of the above-stated vessels was bonded for \$20,000. These seven different armed merchantmen (consisting of two ships, one brig, and four brigantines) totaled 750 tons and carried 57 guns and 118 men; they were all commissioned during the period of thirteen months and thirteen days from November 18, 1781, to December 31, 1782. But little is known of William Gray's ownership of vessels prior to 1789, but there are incomplete records of vessels being built for him and of his extensive shipping interests throughout the 1780's, one of his better-known vessels being the brig *Volant*, built in 1785. By 1792, Gray's interest in foreign trade "had reached large proportions," and in that year the Essex Bank was organized by Salem merchants, with William Gray its first president. He had his ships engaged in long-voyage foreign trade at an early date and, it is recorded, "was one of the first Salem merchants to embark in the trade with India and China." There is a record of the arrival at Canton in 1790 of his brig *William and Henry* (named after Gray's two eldest sons); this was presumably the brigantine of 166 tons bearing that name, which was built at Kingston in 1784 and registered at the Salem customhouse on July 15, 1790: "William Gray Jr. Owner; Thomas West Master." In August 1792, Gray dispatched his new 164-ton brig *Enterprise*, built at Haverhill, for the East under the command of Capt. William Ward, who was a brother-in-law of William Gray (having married a Miss Chipman, of Marblehead, a sister of Mrs. Gray). The following letter of instructions to Captain Ward penned by the owner of the brig on August 9, 1792, shows the thorough understanding that Gray had not only of trade possibilities in the different ports mentioned but also of the profits that could be made if one were fortunate and willing to take the risks, which were great in those days:

Salem Aug. 9, 1792.

Capt. William Ward,—

The Brig *Enterprise* under your command being ready for sea, you will embrace the first opportunity and proceed for the Cape of Good Hope—upon your arrival sell such part of the cargo as you can to advantage which I suppose will be the Russia duck, coles and such other part of your cargo as you think proper. I then advise you, if you can, to purchase about twenty hogsheads of brandy and from 60 to 80 hogsheads wine, such as is best calculated for the Isle of France market, some raisins and almonds, and then proceed for the Isle of France, then sell your cargo or such part as you think for my interest to sell, which I expect will be the whole, when you have sold if you can find any sugar, coffee, tea, Indigo, or cotton that will pay one hundred per cent profit reckoning them to sell at the price you have at foot then I advise you to

come back with such of those articles as you find will do best if you cannot find goods to answer to come home from the Isle of France, then I advise you to proceed for Calcutta in the Bay of Bengal, and there take sugar, saltpeters, Bandanno silk Handkerchiefs, or such other goods as you suppose will answer best in this market. If you have advise that nothing can be done to advantage at Calcutta then you may go to Canton if you can get a cargo of Black wood, cheep, provided you can make out a stock of \$20,000. exclusive of the Black wood. When you arrive at Canton after selling your wood take on board as much Bohea tea, as the Brig will carry with some China ware, nankeens, some black sattins, and such other silks as you suppose will best answer. When you have compleated your business in the East Indies proceed directly to this port by such rout as you think safest, if you should come home in the winter it may be well to touch

at St. Eustatia and then lay till the spring approaches, so that you may come in safer. I think it may be well to send your boat on shore of Trinita in Martinico where perhaps you will find letters from me. It will be best to sett your cooper at work as soon as you possibly can, and to agree for your wines and Brandies as soon as you can after you arrive, your cargo will sell for 10 to 20 per cent more to take wines and brandies than cash.

Notwithstanding what I have wrote I would have you sell your whole cargo at Good Hope if you can obtain 20 per cent advance and purchase sugars or any other goods that will pay fifty per cent profit home, then proceed directly for this port. If you have opportunity to sell the Brig *Enterprise* and appurtanance at a price that you think will answer and can lay out the money to advantage, do it. She cost five thousand dollars and will be worth that surely when she returns, you will take into your calculations what freight she will make home what you must pay freight and what you can make profit upon the proceeds of the Brig.

I expect your cargo will sell at the Isle of France at one hundred per cent profit provided you get there before Cathart who will sail from Boston in ten or twenty days after you. You can buy the Brandy and wine by the legar and then return them their casks by starting them into your own casks, which will save near one half the expense upon the whole. I leave this voyage to your prudent management resting assured that every exertion will be made by you (to promote my interest) that can be done. In case any accident should happen to Capt. Ward during the voyage then I appoint Mr. Benjamin Davison his present mate to persue the plan of the voyage and do and conduct as Capt. Ward would or should have done had no such accident have happened and in case any accident should happen to both Capt. Ward and Mr. Davison, then

I appoint Mr. Jere Putnam the second mate to do and conduct the business as either of them would or could have done and follow these orders.

Write me by all opportunities either to America or Europe. If to England, direct to the care of Messrs. Harrison Ansly & Co in London, if to Spain to Gardoqui & Co in Bilboa. If to France then to the care of Messrs. Lanchon & Co at L'Orient. If to Denmark to the care Messrs. Ryberg & Co. at Copenhagen. If to Sweden then to the care of Mr. Thomas Erstein at Gottenburg. The port charges at Canton I suppose about three thousand dollars, at Calcutta the port charges are small. If there is any obstruction to your trading at Calcutta you can do business at some other port a little above to as much advantage. I think the favourable monsoons to go to Calcutta begin in May, I would not have you run any great risk as I shall have little or no insurance. Capt. Ward having paid five per cent upon the amount of the cargo here, including the cash, at the return of the Effects, he is to receive ten per cent of the whole neat stock but not to charge any commission during the voyage excepting such as he pays to some other person. But to charge the voyage all necessary charges. The five per cent addition to the five he puts in is to pay him in lieu of commission.

I further agree Captain Ward shall receive of the profits that shall be made upon one hundred pound averaging my whole stock in this voyage at his return.—as a further consideration for his services. In case you can obtain a credit to advantage and lay out the amount so as to pay me profit you may take to the amount of six thousand dollars and draw upon me—payable either here or in London—and your bills shall meet due honour.

Wishing you Almighty protection and a prosperous voyage

I am your Friend

William Gray Jr.

This letter also shows how much the success of a voyage depended upon the judgment of the captain, who had to be a merchant as well as a ship navigator and master. On this voyage, Captain Ward apparently did not find prices attractive enough to meet his owner's expectations of profits, so "he took freight from India to Ostend, and there filled his hold with European merchandise"; however, the voyage proved "most satisfactory and profitable." There is some confusion in Salem records, for we read that in August 1794 the "brig *Enterprise*, William Ward, Master, consigned to William Gray," entered "from India," and yet in the advertising columns of the Salem GAZETTE is the following notice to the public dated May 26, 1794:

Imported in Brig *Enterprise*, Captain Hathorne, just arrived from Cadiz and for sale at the store of
William Gray, Jun.,
Sherry and Malaga wines, of the first quality in

quarter casks; A few boxes of lemons—casks of raisins and casks of Brandy.

May also be had as above
Bar and sheet lead, if applied for soon.

Another letter written by William Gray to Captain Ward dated Salem, January 1797, has been preserved and is given herewith, which shows that Gray still continued to use New York as a port for foreign trade. The ship *John* referred to (one of at least six different vessels owned by Gray during his career that bore this name) was evidently of 175 tons and

built at Salisbury in 1794; such a ship was registered at Salem with William Gray the owner on March 31, 1795.

Captain William Ward Salem Jan. 1797.

You will embrace the first opportunity and proceed for New York, on your arrival, take command of my ship *John*, on board which you will ship such goods as you suppose will answer at Calcutta, when you have got your ship in good order, proceed for Calcutta in the Bay of Bengal there purchase about one hundred and twenty tons of good sugar, and then fill the ship with such other goods as you suppose will answer best in this market, such an assortment as you brought the last voyage was good except the bandanno handkerchiefs. I would not have you purchase any of them at more than one hundred and ten rupees per cwge. Instead of the pepper brought last voyage, I recommend your bringing ginger, this article will always answer. You will get what information you can at New York. Upon your arrival at Calcutta, if you find it will be for our interest you have liberty to draw bills on Bainbridge, Ansley & Co. of London for my acct or take up money in Bengal. You have liberty to take what sum you think proper, not to exceed one hundred thousand rupees. the whole stock on board for the owners acct. When you have completed your business in the East Indies proceed directly to this port, unless it should winter when you come on this coast, in that case, and peace between France and England should have taken place, you may stop at the Wind W. India

In the latter part of the 1790's, William Gray's shipping had reached such large proportions that George Cabot referred to Gray as the greatest merchant in Massachusetts. When during the end of Washington's administration the French Directory broke off all relations with the United States Government and French naval vessels and privateersmen began an attack on American commerce, Congress, in 1798, suspended intercourse with France and declared that the treaties with that country were terminated. American ships were authorized to arm in order to defend themselves if attacked by the French, and the vessels of the United States Navy were ordered to capture any French vessels guilty of depredations on American commerce. Under these turbulent conditions, Gray armed one of his merchantmen at Havana, and several American vessels were convoyed home by this "well-gunned and manned Gray ship," arriving at Salem (according to Bentley's diary) on September 11, 1798. At this time, the United States was too poor to create a navy adequate for its defense, and Congress, while feeling the great need of warships, did not consider that it could go beyond ordering the construction of three frigates. On October 26, 1798, the Salem GAZETTE tells of a meeting held in the courthouse, when "it was voted unanimously to build a Frigate of 32 guns, and loan the same to the Government." A committee of five responsible and respected citizens was elected "to carry the vote into immediate effect," and William Gray was later chosen chairman of this committee. The leading subscribers to the fund to build the Salem frigate, which was launched on September 30, 1799, were William Gray and Elias Hasket Derby, the largest shipowners and merchants of Salem, who each furnished \$10,000, although at the time Derby was said to be "worth well over a million dollars" and Gray "nine-tenths as much as Derby." Gray, however, was less than fifty years old and was steadily gaining in wealth and importance; whereas Elias H. Derby was near his end, as he died August 8, 1799. Hon. Timothy Pickering wrote on November 29, 1799:

William Gray of Salem is a man of unspotted character and for mercantile talents and extent of business, the first merchant in the United States. . . . Mr. Gray is a cool, discerning man who does

islands and sell such part of your cargo as you can to advantage, and wait for good weather to come on. But if you come on this coast in the winter and peace has not taken place, then proceed directly to New York, on your arrival write me a letter. Break no acts of Trade or laws of any nation during this voyage. In case any accident should happen to Capt. Ward to prevent his doing the business of this voyage, then I appoint Mr. _____ the present mate of the *John*, to do the business of this voyage and follow the foregoing orders as Capt. Ward would or could have done had no such accident have happened, with this exception that I would not have any moneys drawn or borrowed by any other person than Capt. Ward.

Wishing you a successful voyage and Almighty protection I am your friend and employer

Wm. Gray Jr.

It is agreed that Capt. Ward shall be allowed five per cent commission for selling what merchandise he carries out, in the *John*, or sells during the voyage for the owners, and two and a half per cent for what he purchases, as well the amt of what he takes up aboard for the owners, as on the proceeds of the cargo. He is to have five per cent privilage of what the ship will or doth carry for his adventure, and twenty-five dollars per month for his wages.

Wm. Gray Jr.

not form his opinions hastily, and is too strongly attached to the government to express dissatisfaction with its measures or the officers who execute them, unless he conceives there is very good cause for it.

Later, Gray proved the latter part of Pickering's opinion of him to be correct, for he supported the government in a measure that was strongly against his personal financial and social interests. At that time, Pickering, being on the other side of the political fence, denounced Gray for his courage and called him a "shuffler" and "trimmer."

In the late 1780's, William Gray was engaged in the Baltic and Russian trade, and in the 1790's his vessels were trading around the Cape of Good Hope to Indian Ocean ports, India, the East Indies, and China; also to South America. The Mediterranean and general European trade was strong around the turn of the century, and among the entries of Gray's ships at Salem about this time are:

- | | |
|--|--|
| June 1799, brig <i>Salem</i> with gin and hemp from Hamburg. | gin from Amsterdam. |
| July 1800, ship <i>Lucia</i> with brandy, soap, etc., from Leghorn (on which a duty of \$20,301 was paid). | May 1802, brig <i>Minerva</i> with brandy and salt from Alicante, Spain. |
| September 1800, ship <i>Essex</i> with 42,871 lbs. of cheese, 5,000 lbs. of nails, and 8,000 gals. of | August 1804, ship <i>Ulysses</i> with prunes, almonds, 18,199 lbs. of soap, 48,233 gals. of wine, and 1,571 gals. of brandy from Marseilles. |

In July 1800, the Gray ship *Pallas* of 331 tons was reported at Salem from Canton with a cargo of tea and sugar, on which she paid a duty of \$66,927.65. In July 1801, the "big Gray ship" *Laurel* of 425 tons (Capt. Daniel Sage) entered from Manila with 115,133 lbs. of indigo and 124,683 lbs. of sugar, on which a duty of \$32,382.26 was paid. In August 1804, the ship *Lucia* of 310 tons (Capt. Solomon Towne) entered from Calcutta with a cargo of "sugar, indigo and cheroots."

In 1803, William Gray bought a wharf in Charlestown and sent his eldest son William Rufus to Boston as his agent. In 1801 the population of Salem was some 9,500, and from 1800 to the enforcement of the Embargo Act in 1807, Salem was at the height of its enterprise and prosperity. Felt, in ANNALS OF SALEM, says that in November 1806, Salem had 73 ships, 11 barques, and 48 brigs engaged in foreign commerce, and of these 132 vessels, about one-fourth (36) were owned by William Gray.

A letter of instructions written at Salem on September 7, 1804, by William Gray to Capt. John R. Dalling, master of his ship *Ulysses* of 340 tons (built at Haverhill in 1798), has been preserved and is quoted herewith, as it refers to the Indian trade of the period with interesting side lights:

Salem, Sept. 7th, 1804.

Capt. John R. Dalling

The ship *Ulysses* under your command being ready for sea you will embrace the first opportunity and proceed for Bombay in the East Indies. Upon your arrival sell the cargo now on board for the most it will fetch or such part of it as you suppose most for my interest in case you can sell the whole and suppose it will promote the interest of the voyage you will proceed for Muscat upon the coast of Arabia, there purchase coffee, drugs, and medicines and saltpetre and when you have completed your business there, proceed for Boston in this State, in case you cannot sell the whole of your cargo at Bombay and suppose it will be for my interest to go on with the residue to Pondicherry, Madrass and Calcutta you have liberty to go to one or all those places and there complete your business.

In case you can only sell the part of your cargo at Bombay and it shall then appear to you to be for my interest to have you go on to Canton with

a cargo of cotton, you will do that taking on with you such articles as you cannot sell and if you think proper touch at Malaca in the Streights of Malaca to sell such part of your cargo as remains upon hand then proceed for Canton in China. There invest the whole proceeds in Nankeens, fine teas, and such other goods as you suppose will produce most profit, when you have completed your business in India or China proceed to this place or Boston in this state. As it is impossible to give instructions in all cases I must leave you to conduct this voyage as you think will best promote my interest, but by no means break any acts of trade or laws of any nation. You have herewith several price currants of merchandize in this country as well as Europe, by which you can calculate what price it will answer to pay for them in India. In case you sell part of your Cargo at Bombay and do not think it for my interest to purchase there, and you find you can obtain undoubted bills for what you do sell upon Calcutta, take them and remit them to Damchunder Benarjea of Calcutta for my

account. In case you come home from Muscat, if you can obtain one or two handsome fleet Arabian Stone horses for breeders take them on board provided the price doth not exceed two hundred dollars cost, you can bring them on deck placing them near the centre of the vessel. Provided you find it impossible to make sales of your cargo at Bombay and suppose it will be for my interest to go from there to Calcutta you may proceed. That amt or upon the whole, conduct as you think will most promote my interest. In case any accident should happen to you during the voyage then I appoint Mr. Thomas W. Ward your present mate to conduct the business as you would or could have done had no such accident happened.

In case any accident should happen to both Capt.

Dalling and Mr. Ward then the second mate Mr. James Dunn is to conduct the voyage agreeable to the foregoing instructions. Capt. Dalling is to have a privilege of carrying an adventure in the *Ulysses* not exceeding five tons he is to have two and half per cent. commission for what merchandize he sells and two and half per cent commissions for what he purchases but is not to have any commissions for selling money or specie. In case he should negotiate any bills he is not to have any commissions for that but two and half per cent for investing the proceeds of said bills.

Committing you to Almighty protection and wishing you a successful voyage

Am yr sincere friend

Wm. Gray Jr.

Memorandum and price currant for Capt. John R. Dalling of the Ship ULYSSES

Good refined salt petre may be had at Muscat but the common unrefined is often mixed with common salt. By puting the real salt petre upon a coal of fire it will melt and burn, but if mixed with salt it will sparkle when put on fire, you may calculate Salt Petre to be worth sixteen cents per pound in this Country.

<i>Prices articles in America</i>		<i>in Europe</i>
Mocha coffee	25 cents	28 to 30 cents
Salt Petre	20 cents	16 to 20 cents
Opium	3 to 3½ doll p. lb.	
Asafatida	40 cents	
Gum arabic	20 to 25 cents	33 cents
Gum Tragaconth	50 cents	
Columba Root	40 to 50 cents	
Sago	10 cents	
Mace	6 dollars	
Cloves	80 cents	
Bengal indigo	175 cents	

I presume cotton generally can be purchased at about 10 cents per pound perhaps it may be lower now or it may be very dull so that they will give a great price for your goods payable in cotton in which case perhaps you may think it for our interest to purchase cotton and carry it to Canton where I expect you will generally obtain about 18 to 20 cents the pound. But in case anyone should want you to take freight, it will not answer for you to take freight for the subject of any power at war as in that case you will be liable to be stoped and detained.

You must not attempt to cover any property but if you find it for my interest to draw bills you have liberty to value upon me here or upon Messrs. Bainbridge Ansley & Co. London not to exceed twenty two thousand dollars or five thousand pounds sterling.

Wm. Gray Jr.

The cost of vessels during the period 1792-1804 is reflected by William Gray's statement that the 164-ton brig *Enterprise*, built at Haverhill in 1792, cost \$5,000, or somewhat over \$30 per ton. In the fall of 1804, Gray put a price of \$7,000 on his 205-ton ship *Wells*, built in early 1801 (and then some three and a half years old), which figures a little over \$34 per ton. Gray usually valued his vessels at from \$28 to \$37 per ton based on age, size, condition, and "appurtenances," but it was said that he usually estimated on a price of "about \$30 per ton to buy and \$35 to sell."

The only records of William Gray (in the form of a letter-book) not destroyed in the Boston fire of 1872 cover a period from 1809 to 1812. From January 1810 to January 1813, Gray registered in the Boston customhouse eighteen vessels that he had acquired (four ships, eight brigs, and six schooners). Of this number, it would seem that the only vessels built for him or purchased when "brand new" were his sixth *John*, a brig of 212 tons, built at Fal-mouth in 1811, and the "big" brig *Porcupine* of 330 tons, launched at Charlestown in 1812. That Gray owned a large number of vessels (more than generally supposed, for some were not registered in either Salem or Boston) is evidenced by the fact that, in the one letter-book salvaged from the Boston fire, mention is made of his ownership and operation of ten vessels of which there is no record in the Salem or Boston registers.

At this time, whereas Gray's trade continued to be primarily with foreign countries, he did some coasting business, using schooners and small brigs as feeders and distributors of

cargoés. Among the articles that he dealt in were cotton, sugar, rice, lumber, staves, fish, brandy, wines, salt, ginger, indigo, hemp, iron, duck, linens, silks, fabrics, etc., coffee, cocoa, logwood, copper, "West India produce," Buenos Aires hides, Peruvian bark, etc., but it was said that "Gray handled any article for which there was a demand and that could be dealt in profitably." His captains were given a commission on sales and purchases and allowed an "adventure" on the voyage, and generally the final decisions on buying and selling were left to their judgment; consequently, much of the success of a voyage depended on the shrewdness, resourcefulness, trading ability, and mercantile knowledge and good sense of a captain when he operated under the general suggestions and limits set forth by the owner. Sometimes, when one of the ships had a valuable and important or "tricky" cargo, Gray sent along a supercargo, and on the ship *Trent*, dispatched to Naples, Supercargo Megit received one per cent on both the sales and the returns. Gray also had correspondents, or agents, at certain ports, and at times cargoés were left in their hands for sale on a commission basis. Sometimes, but not often, his ships traveled in ballast one way, and at times he sent substantial amounts of specie abroad to purchase a valuable return cargo. On June 16, 1810, Gray wrote his agent, Ramdollolday, at Benaja, that he was sending on the brig *Caravan* "ten casks" containing \$20,319, "which I request you will invest in indigo under the inspection of Captain Gilchrist provided you can procure that article, and of the best quality at a price not exceeding one dollar per pound. If the indigo cannot be had at the foregoing terms then please to put the money at interest until the price comes down to the above price."

When Massachusetts merchants were examined before a committee of the legislature in 1813, the figures given by William Gray of the average number of seamen that he had employed annually for "the last fifteen or twenty years" were 50 per cent more than the number of men employed by Israel Thorndike, of Boston, during the boom years before the war; twice as many as those employed by any of the three firms of the Perkins', of Boston, Eben Parsons, of Boston, and the Peabodys, of Salem; and three times the number reported by the next largest shipowner, Theodore Lyman, of Boston. Gray paid his men well, but wages were low in those days. Shore labor (common) in New England in the first decade of the nineteenth century received from 80 cents to \$1.00 per day, and out of this, men had to feed and house themselves. An army private's pay was only \$3.00 per month. The frigate *Essex* paid boys and ordinary seamen from \$5.00 to \$14.00 and able seamen \$17.00 per month. In 1811, William Gray was paying seamen from \$16.00 to \$21.00 according to their experience and ability, cooks \$19.00 to \$21.00, boys \$11.00, second mates \$23.00, first mates and captains \$25.00 per month. The officers enjoyed privileges that materially boosted their incomes, and the captain, by a system of commissions in effect, was really a partner in the business venture associated with a voyage.

William Gray was active in the Baltic trade as early as the 1780's and at the time of the War of 1812 was very well and favorably known in St. Petersburg as an American shipowner-merchant. Among the Salem records of entries are the following Gray vessels:

October 1789, brig *Ceres* (173 tons), Thomas Simmons, master, entered from Russia with 1,546 pieces of sail-cloth and sheeting, 180 bundles of hemp, 948 bars of iron, and 359 cwt. of cordage.

November 1792, brig *Francis* (174 tons), J. Wallace, master, entered from Copenhagen with iron and glass.

February 1804, ship *Rising States* (291 tons), Benjamin Beckford, Jr., master, entered from Gotenburg with hemp.

We also read among the departures that the Gray brig *Hind* (165 tons), John Bickford, master, "cleared for the Baltic June 17, 1790, with 600 barrels of tar, 10 barrels of turpentine, 4 hogsheads of tobacco, 27 casks of rice, 21 hogsheads of New England rum and 73 chests of hyson tea, and entered from St. Petersburg on her return in November 1790." It is said that "the early trade with Copenhagen seems to have been carried on largely by Mr. Gray," and Felt, in *ANNALS OF SALEM*, mentions Elias H. Derby and William Gray as importing

from Copenhagen several horses of a superior grade in 1796. Morison, in *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS*, says:

The Baltimore brig *Calumet* penetrated the Black Sea to Odessa in 1810; shortly followed by a vessel commanded by a Ropes of Salem. Profits in this Russian trade were immense. The ship *Catherine* of Boston, 281 tons [built at Haverhill in 1799 and registered at Boston July 14, 1806, as William Gray, owner], worth possibly \$7,000, cleared \$115,000 net in one voyage in 1809. President Madison's policy, at first favorable to commerce, won away from the Federalists a part of their previous gains. In 1810 William Gray was elected Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts. His friend John Quincy Adams [president of U.S.A., 1825-1829] . . . was appointed minister to Russia, went out in one of Gray's ships and proved a useful friend at Court. William Gray was the principal Russian trader in the United States. He distributed Russian duck, sheetings, cordage and iron (which sold for \$115 a ton in Boston) to Philadelphia, Charleston

and New Orleans, there loading tobacco, sugar, and "cotton wool" for the Baltic market. Other vessels of his fleet took lumber and coffee to Algiers and proceeded to Gallipolis to load olive oil for Russia. In addition he was conducting a Mediterranean-Calcutta trade. . . . Napoleon, to complete his continental blockade, required the exclusion of neutral shipping from Russia, whose emperor was his nominal ally; and from Sweden, whose ruler was his former marshal. In the summer of 1810 he made the demand. Alexander and Bernadotte equivocated, and then refused. They had no intention of shutting off their subjects' supplies of West- and East-India goods. Then began Napoleon's preparations to invade Russia. Thus the Baltic trade of Massachusetts played an important if unconscious part in the chain of events that led Napoleon to Moscow and to St. Helena.

The following extract taken from a memorandum written by William Gray at Boston on October 3, 1810, shows the prices that the shipowner-merchant was willing to pay at that time for Russian goods:

Invoice of goods which Wm. Gray desires Mr. Joseph S. Farley to have purchased at St. Petersburg next winter

1,000 tons of old Sable iron if it can be purchased at a price not exceeding ten pounds sterling per ton.

1,000 tons clean hemp, if it can be purchased at a price not exceeding thirty pounds sterling per ton.

5,000 ps of the best Russia sailcloth if it can be had not exceeding fifty shillings sterling per pd.

5,000 ps Russia sheeting called Flems if it can be had not exceeding forty-five shillings sterling per pd.

William Gray was scrupulous in his desire to conform with the various acts of trade of European nations and ordered his captains to adhere strictly to all regulations. He took chances with his ships and did not insure them, and he endeavored to evade seizure by complying with the letter of the laws affecting navigation, embargoes, etc. It is said that William Gray's ship *Wells* of 205 tons cleared Salem eighteen days before the Jefferson embargo was laid and that as long as it was in effect "she remained abroad making money for her owner." During the War of the Revolution, Gray did no privateering, but he armed his ships and sent them on their voyages as letters of marque, and he did the same thing to a relatively lesser degree in the War of 1812. The British seized some of his ships, but the French caused him much greater losses. Upon his death in 1825, his estate listed as "assets" claims against European governments amounting to \$645,821.29 for spoliation of vessels and their cargoes owned and insured by him between 1796 and 1811, which included the period of the Undeclared War with France, but terminated before the War of 1812 with Britain. Of this amount, claims of \$422,500.00, or about two-thirds, were against France. On January 21, 1811, William Gray wrote his agent at London, "By no means break any acts of trade, or laws of any nation." Yet if he could operate his ships in conformity with regulations, he says in the same letter, "I am content to hazard the vessel and fifty or sixty thousand dollars anywhere, where the prospect is good." On April 6, 1811, John Quincy Adams wrote William Gray from St. Petersburg:

Commercial speculation of all kinds is at this time exposed to such great and extraordinary hazards that the advice I should be tempted to give a friend whose fortune is made, would be rather to lay his ships up in port, and wait for a less tem-

pestuous time than to risk the chances of the seas, when universal robbery has become the only Law of Nations. But I know that you have a more adventurous spirit, and that principles of benevolence to others far more than your own personal interest

prompt you to keep so large a portion of your capital still afloat in the midst of the commercial shipwrecks which are spreading ruin upon the face of every sea and bestrewing every shore.

That William Gray was beginning in the summer of 1811 to feel that war with Britain was inevitable is indicated by extracts from a letter written to his agents, Bainbridge & Brown, London, from Boston on August 10, 1811:

We have just heard the unpleasant information of the condemnation of the *Fox* [brigantine of 116 tons owned by Gray] and others bound to France. . . . I think this nation never will submit to the principles set up by your Government, dreadful as the conflict will be, it must come with all its horrors, which I pray God to avert, if the Orders in Council are not repealed, and the property restored condemned under them, there never will or can be an accommodation between the two nations.

Historian L. Vernon Briggs refers to many ships—"fine merchantmen"—built on North River, which were owned by William Gray, the largest shipowner in the country, who at one time "is said to have owned sixty square-rigged vessels." After the embargo, when Gray moved from Salem to Boston, he was the reported owner of thirty-six vessels, twenty-two of which were three-masted square-riggers; thirty-five were three- and two-masted square-riggers, and only one was a schooner. Before the war, we are told, Gray "employed more than forty sail of vessels." (Col. Samuel Swett said forty-four, "many of them the largest ships then constructed," and Gray's grandson and namesake said thirty-eight.)

When the United States Government, in view of possible war, opened subscriptions for a loan in April 1812, William Gray promptly subscribed \$100,000 (according to the COLUMBIAN SENTINEL of May 2, 1812). Congress declared war against Britain on June 18 and on June 24, 1812, sent out a letter to the commanders of vessels to proceed to some safe port. We read that Gray "was said to have lost more money by the war than any man in the Union." He subscribed liberally to government loans, and records show that he furnished \$500,000 of his private fortune to assist the United States in the prosecution of the war. Yet the "War Congress" adjourned without providing any increase to a very weak navy and even without making proper appropriation to condition the vessels in commission or in shape to be got ready for sea. After the U.S. frigate *Constitution* ("Boston's pride and joy") escaped the British fleet of five vessels off the New Jersey coast in July 1812 and reached Boston, the government was so impoverished that there was no money on hand to condition and supply the vessel. As historian Morison says, "Had not William Gray dug into his own pocket, for her supplies, she would not have met and defeated the *Guerrière*" in one of the most brilliant single-ship engagements of the war. It would seem that William Gray during the War of 1812, as in the years of the fight for independence, did not send out privateers, but he did arm some of his ships and had them commissioned as letters of marque to engage in trade and defend themselves against the enemy. However, some historians state that the two following ships, which are known to have been armed and commissioned as letters of marque during the Quasi-War with France, were "commissioned as privateers in the War of 1812":

Name of Vessel	Rig	Tonnage	Built		Registered by William Gray	Guns Mounted
			Town	Year		
AMERICAN HERO	Ship	251	Kennebunk, Maine	1796	May 1, 1797	11
FANNY	Ship	150	Freeport, Maine	1796	Dec. 19, 1797	10

The ship *American Hero* was at India when the war was declared and was at sea homeward bound when she first heard of it; whereupon her skipper, avoiding large ports and British cruisers, put into Barnstable in the center of the north shore of the neck of Cape Cod late in 1812. The INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE of August 17, 1812, said:

Letter of marque ship *Catherine* [of 281 tons] belonging to William Gray Esq., of Boston was captured and sent into Halifax, by the British brig of war *Colibri*, after a running fight of several hours. The *Catherine* was very much shattered, but lost none of her men. The *Colibri* had one man killed and seven or eight wounded.

We read that during the War of 1812 many of William Gray's vessels—in their attempts to trade and prevent the isolation of the United States and the distress associated therewith—

were captured by the enemy. "Loss succeeded to loss, but his constant reply was, when taunted by the opponents of the war, 'Never more prosperous.'" Edward Gray has written:

That was the heart of the patriot rising superior to all sordid considerations; so long as the rights of his country were defended, he forgot his own interests. It was the case of the embargo over again; the general feeling in Massachusetts was strongly against the war and Mr. Gray stood out conspicu-

ously as one of the few great merchants in New England who were willing to support the General Government. The general feeling in Massachusetts seems to have been a determination to do nothing by way of active support of the war, but solely to defend ourselves against foreign aggression.

There is no complete record of William Gray's losses during the War of 1812, but the following vessels owned by Gray were officially reported as captured by the British:

Name of Vessel	Rig	Tonnage	Built		Registered by William Gray
			Town	Year	
CATHERINE	Ship	281	Haverhill, Mass.	1799	July 14, 1806
JOHN	Brig	212	Falmouth, Maine	1811	Dec. 16, 1811
SPITFIRE	Brig	269	Portland, Maine	1811	Jan. 21, 1813
ESSEX	Brig	293	Newbury, Mass.	1812	Mar. 3, 1813

In 1814, William Gray turned over his 222-ton ship *Aurora* (built at Haverhill, Mass., in 1791) to the United States Government to be used as a prison ship at Salem. He was one of the very few American shipowner-merchants who registered merchant vessels at the customhouse in the normal manner through every year of the war with Britain (1812-1815) and of the Undeclared War with France. With the one exception of Jefferson's absolute embargo year of 1808, William Gray registered from one to sixteen merchant vessels at the customhouses of Salem and Boston for each of the thirty-seven years 1789-1825 inclusive, and it is known that he owned a large number of vessels during 1780-1788 and many that evidently were never recorded in the registers at either Salem or Boston.

The total number of vessels owned by William Gray during his career as a shipowning merchant is unknown. In the one letter-book saved from the Boston fire covering the period 1809-1811, mention is made of ten vessels managed and evidently owned by Gray. These vessels are:

Name	Rig	Captain	Name	Rig	Captain
OLIVE BRANCH		Daniel Nason	CARAVAN	Brig	Gilchrist
LOUISIANA	Schooner	Timothy Newhall	AUGUSTA		Curtis
SEWALL	Brig	Swett	ONTARIO	Ship	Hector Coffin
BIRD	Schooner	John D. Dennis	COMET	Brig	Philip Besome
VENUS	Brig	Michael Bowden	RADIUS	Brig	Benjamin Lander

None of these vessels are in either the Salem or Boston registers, and during these three years immediately following the embargo William Gray registered fourteen vessels at Boston (four ships, six brigs, and four schooners). Notwithstanding the loss of records, mention is made in documents of over one hundred ninety vessels, and it is probable that the total number of ships that Gray owned or had an interest in during his lifetime was nearer two hundred thirty. William Gray also chartered vessels both in the United States and abroad, and his maritime activities and interests much exceeded the operation of the vessels recorded in his name at Salem and Boston. His most active years in registering at Boston were 1815, 1823 (two years before he died), 1820, and 1822, where the customhouse shows the following vessels registered by William Gray:

Year	Number of Vessels					Tonnage		
	Ships	Barks	Brigs	Schooners	Total	Largest	Smallest	Average
1815	7	1	6	2	16	619	82	283
1823	—	3	6	6	15	233	65	154
1820	2	—	6	3	11	341	80	183
1822	1	—	6	2	9	320	114	178

In a list of 200 William Gray vessels, 51 were ships, 7 barks, 1 snow, 58 brigs, 28 brigantines, 52 schooners, 2 sloops, and 1 galiot. Another list of 174 vessels (totaling 31,307 tons) owned by William Gray during the period 1789-1825 gives the following data regarding rig and tonnage:

Rig	Number	Tonnage		Rig	Number	Tonnage	
		Total	Average			Total	Average
Ships	41	12,242	299	Brigantines	24	3,744	156
Barks	4	708	177	Schooners	50	4,664	93
Brigs	52	9,753	188	Sloops, etc.	3	196	65

The largest vessels registered by William Gray at either the Boston or Salem customhouse were the ships *Union* of 619 tons (1815), *Saco* of 528 tons (1815), *Fawn* of 436 tons (1816), *Laurel* of 425 tons (1800), and *Rubicon* of 407 tons (1815). In addition to these five ships of over 400 tons, Gray registered at Boston or Salem fifteen ships of from 309 to 395 tons and eight ships of from 281 to 299 tons.

Of the vessels registered by William Gray at the Salem and Boston customhouses during the years 1789-1825 inclusive, only seven were built at Salem and four at Boston (Charlestown). Out of a list of 178 vessels owned by Gray and registered at Salem or Boston, 97 (54.5 per cent) were built in various parts of Massachusetts, 69 (39.0 per cent) in Maine, 6 in New Hampshire, 3 in Connecticut, and 1 each in New York, Maryland, and North Carolina. William Gray gave but few orders to shipyards to build craft for his account, but generally bought vessels that pleased him—either new or that had seen a little service—if he could acquire them at what he considered an attractive or reasonable price. In 1815, he registered at Boston three British vessels that had been “captured in war by citizens of the United States and lawfully condemned as prize.” It is said that William Gray never insured his own vessels, but that he insured the risks of others. The records show that six of his vessels were wrecked or lost at sea, besides those that were seized by the French and British. It was estimated that Gray was worth “about three million dollars at the time Jefferson’s embargo of 1807 became effective,” or about twice as much as the estates of Elias Hasket Derby, of Salem, and Israel Thorndike, of Beverly and Boston; however, Gray’s fortune diminished from that time to his death in 1825 because of war losses, spoliation by the French, his public-spirited policy, his gifts to members of his family, and loans to friends that he well knew would never be repaid. He gave \$100,000 to each of five sons to start them in business, his charitable contributions were great, and at his death he had reduced his estate to about \$900,000, exclusive of claims against foreign governments for spoliation of property. William Gray continued in business until his death in 1825, and only a little over three months before the end, he registered the schooner *Hope* of 125 tons at the Boston customhouse and a year before that the ship *Congress* of 339 tons. In 1822 and 1823, he was particularly active and in these two years registered at Boston twenty-four vessels ranging in size from the ship *Albion* of 320 tons to the coasting schooner *Commerce* of 65 tons.

Whereas most of William Gray’s Salem colleagues interested in commerce were peeved with him for his removal from the town in 1809 and were quite articulate in their denunciation, the middle-class people of Salem were frank to admit that his enterprise and courage had done much to promote the town’s prosperity, which waned after Gray’s departure to Boston. We are told that among a host of solid Salemites his name was held in such high repute that they later claimed him as a native son and envied Lynn, Mass., the honor of being his birthplace. The COLUMBIAN SENTINEL of Boston, on November 9, 1825 (six days after the great merchant’s death), said:

Mr. Gray was unostentatious, plain and affable in his manners. In his pursuits, he was judiciously enterprising, indefatigably industrious. In all seasons he rose at three or four o’clock and in the quiet of the morning read his letters, examined his accounts, formed his plans and made his arrange-

ments. In his long commercial course, many of his vessels were wrecked—but he heard of such losses without the least visible emotion if human life were spared. He had sustained several elevated offices in the state, and those who differed from him in politics had the fullest confidence in his patriotism.

William Gray has been described not only as America's greatest shipowner-merchant of his day but also as a liberal individualist, a humanitarian, and a patriot. His word was always as good as his bond, and in all commercial transactions he was so scrupulously honest that "he seemed to lean backwards at times." He often expressed the opinion that "no bargain is a good bargain that is not equally good for both sides."

The following is an incomplete list of William Gray's vessels compiled from the SHIP REGISTERS OF THE DISTRICT OF SALEM AND BEVERLY—1789-1900, published in the Essex Institute Historical Collections, and from the available records in the Boston customhouse. The first register record that appears in the Salem customhouse is dated October 6, 1789, at which time William Gray was in his fortieth year, and it is known that he had then been a substantial shipowner for ten years, having commissioned seven armed merchantmen in 1782. In the following list, all second or third registries of the same vessel have been ignored, even though the vessel may have been reconstructed and changed in rig. No vessels registered except at the customhouses of Salem and Boston, with William Gray as owner, are included in this list.

Year	Name	Rig	Tonnage	Where Built	Year Built	Registered William Gray, Owner
1789	ESSEX	Schooner	98	Scarborough	1782	Oct. 17, 1789
	FANNY	Brigantine	156	Pittston	1784	Nov. 14, 1789
	CERES	Brigantine	173	Saco	1788	Nov. 14, 1789
	SWALLOW	Schooner	70	Bradford	1786	Dec. 3, 1789
	NEPTUNE	Schooner	70	Bradford	1786	Dec. 3, 1789
	ACTIVE	Schooner	67	Haverhill	1786	Dec. 8, 1789
	BEE	Schooner	68	Salem	1786	Dec. 10, 1789
	ROBIN	Schooner	68	Bradford	1786	Dec. 11, 1789
	HAWK	Schooner	69	Lynn	1786	Dec. 11, 1789
	FREEDOM	Schooner	91	Kennebunk	1784	Dec. 17, 1789
	CERES	Ship	154	Amesbury	1784	Dec. 19, 1789
1790	SWALLOW	Schooner	73	Lynn	1776	Jan. 20, 1790
	MOLLY	Schooner	62	Newburyport	1778	Jan. 29, 1790
	IRIS	Brigantine	126	Salisbury	1790	Mar. 2, 1790
	JOHN	Schooner	73	Haverhill	1786	Mar. 24, 1790
	LEOPARD	Brigantine	156	Dover, N. H.	1784	May 31, 1790
	WILLIAM AND HENRY	Brigantine	166	Kingston	1784	July 15, 1790
	NANCY	Schooner	89	Newbury	1783	Dec. 8, 1790
1791	HIND	Brigantine	165	Falmouth	1783	Jan. 6, 1791
	BETSEY	Schooner	70	Salisbury	1784	Mar. 24, 1791
	HOPE	Schooner	68	Hanover	1789	Oct. 21, 1791
	AURORA	Ship	222	Haverhill	1791	Dec. 17, 1791
1792	SALEM	Schooner	88	Salisbury	1792	May 26, 1792
	WILLIAM	Brigantine	182	Salem	1784	July 21, 1792
	ENTERPRISE	Brig	164	Haverhill	1792	Aug. 9, 1792
	UNION	Brigantine	140	Salisbury	1792	Sept. 15, 1792
	COMMERCE	Ship	247	Durham, N. H.	1790	Nov. 17, 1792
1793	LUCIA	Brigantine	183	Haverhill	1792	Jan. 25, 1793
	ELIZA	Brigantine	144	Kingston	1785	May 6, 1793
	ESSEX	Schooner	129	Scarborough	1782	May 24, 1793
1794	PHENIX	Snow	150	Amesbury	1793	Mar. 15, 1794
	FRANCIS	Brigantine	174	Newbury	1791	June 18, 1794
	ENTERPRISE	Brigantine	176	Kennebunk	1788	June 20, 1794
	LYDIA	Brigantine	152	Salisbury	1790	June 26, 1794
	JOHN	Schooner	111	Falmouth	1794	Dec. 4, 1794
1795	DISPATCH	Sloop	70	Kennebunk	1794	Jan. 28, 1795
	JOHN	Ship	175	Salisbury	1794	Mar. 31, 1795
	VOLANT	Brig	138	Kennebunk	1795	May 4, 1795
	BETSEY	Ship	218	Wells	1795	June 18, 1795
	LUCIA	Ship	310	Salisbury	1795	Oct. 26, 1795
	INDUSTRY	Schooner	59	Amesbury	1787	Dec. 9, 1795
	1796	WILLIAM AND HENRY	Ship	256	Newbury	1796
ACTIVE		Schooner	82	Haverhill	1786	May 16, 1796
ELIZABETH		Ship	333	Danvers	1796	Sept. 21, 1796

Year	Name	Rig	Tonnage	Where Built	Year Built	Registered William Gray, Owner
1797	NANCY	Brigantine	157	Newburyport	1787	Apr. 21, 1797
	AMERICAN HERO	Ship	251	Kennebunk	1796	May 1, 1797
	CONCORD	Ship	171	Salisbury	1795	June 28, 1797
	PATTY	Schooner	70	Newbury	1789	Dec. 9, 1797
	FANNY	Ship	150	Freeport	1796	Dec. 19, 1797
1798	MINERVA	Brigantine	114	Newburyport	1795	Jan. 24, 1798
	FAME	Schooner	62	Ipswich	1795	May 11, 1798
	ULYSSES	Ship	340	Haverhill	1798	June 26, 1798
	RISING STATES	Ship	291	Falmouth	1794	Oct. 12, 1798
	HERO	Galliot	74	Duxbury	1794	Oct. 31, 1798
1799	TRYALL	Brigantine	119	Salem	1790	Mar. 8, 1799
	IRIS	Ship	227	Kennebunk	1797	June 19, 1799
1800	FOX	Sloop	52	Westport	1797	Mar. 24, 1800
	JOHN	Barque	96	Duxbury	1792	Apr. 18, 1800
	LAUREL	Ship	425	Danvers	1800	June 30, 1800
	PALLAS	Ship	331	Durham, N. H.	1798	Aug. 13, 1800
	ROBOREUS	Schooner	128	Scarborough	1800	Nov. 22, 1800
1801	WELLS	Ship	205	Wells	1801	June 6, 1801
	MINERVA	Brigantine	100	York	1801	Oct. 27, 1801
	ELIZABETH	Schooner	80	Salisbury	1801	Dec. 6, 1801
1802	FREEDOM	Brigantine	155	Frankfort	1802	Mar. 11, 1802
	MINERVA	Ship	231	Portland	1800	Apr. 26, 1802
	TRENT	Ship	191	Freeport	1801	May 5, 1802
	HORACE	Ship	382	Durham, N. H.	1800	July 17, 1802
	JOHN	Schooner	124	Georgetown	1797	Nov. 24, 1802
	ROVER	Brigantine	204	Kennebunk	1802	Dec. 23, 1802
1803	VENGEANCE	Brigantine	181	Kennebunk	1800	Apr. 2, 1803
	UNICORN	Brigantine	172	Freeport	1799	May 16, 1803
	MENTOR	Brigantine	183	Falmouth	1801	June 15, 1803
	COMMERCE	Brig	167	Kennebunk	1795	July 12, 1803
	ENTERPRISE	Brig	182	Kittery	1800	Sept. 26, 1803
	HARPER	Barque	141	Arundel	1801	Oct. 20, 1803
	POWDER POINT	Schooner	82	Duxbury	1798	Dec. 30, 1803
1804	FOX	Brigantine	116	Salisbury	1795	May 11, 1804
	HOWARD	Ship	290	Kittery	1801	June 22, 1804
	ATTEMPT	Schooner	105	Union River	1802	July 21, 1804
	WILLIAM	Brig	178	Pepperellboro	1804	Aug. 9, 1804
	THOMAS	Schooner	103	Kennebunk	1801	Sept. 21, 1804
	PACKET	Ship	229	Portland	1803	Nov. 26, 1804
1806	CATHERINE	Ship	281	Haverhill	1799	July 14, 1806
	PACTOLUS	Ship	288	Salem	1806	Dec. 25, 1806
1807	LEOPARD	Barque	207	Danvers	1807	Oct. 13, 1807
1809	PHENIX	Brig	208	Saco	1807	Sept. 12, 1809
	ST. PETER	Schooner	67	Amesbury	1789	Dec. 6, 1809
1810	PALAFX	Brig	181	Bath	1807	Jan. 6, 1810
	WILLIAM	Brig	162	Kennebunk	1806	Jan. 10, 1810
	INDUSTRY	Schooner	62	Danvers	1787	May 23, 1810
	HANNAH	Ship	144	Scituate	1800	Dec. 15, 1810
1811	FREDERICK	Brig	153	Hanover	1801	Apr. 8, 1811
	NANCY	Schooner	117	Pasquotank River, N. C.	1807	Sept. 9, 1811
	RECOVERY	Ship	284	Salem	1794	Dec. 5, 1811
1812	JOHN	Brig	212	Falmouth	1811	Dec. 16, 1811
	RACHEL	Schooner	71	Newbury	1769	Jan. 14, 1812
	PALAFX	Brig	226	Bath	1807	Jan. 18, 1812
	FEDERAL JACK	Schooner	85	Cape Porpoise		Feb. 10, 1812
1813	PORCUPINE	Brig	330	Charlestown	1812	Dec. 19, 1812
	SPITFIRE	Brig	269	Portland	1811	Jan. 21, 1813
	POLLY	Schooner	114	Marshfield	1800	Jan. 22, 1813
	ESSEX	Brig	293	Newbury	1812	Mar. 3, 1813

MERCHANT SAIL

Year	Name	Rig	Tonnage	Where Built	Year Built	Registered William Gray, Owner
1814	BRUTUS	Schooner	231	Dorchester Co., Md.	1812	Sept. 27, 1814
1815	CHANCE	Schooner	104	Manchester	1814	Mar. 28, 1815
	LUDLOW	Brig	207	Kennebunk	1814	May 15, 1815
	UNION	Ship	619	Charlestown	1815	May 26, 1815
	GRAND TURK	Brig	309	Wiscasset	1812	June 8, 1815
	LEGAL TENDER	Brig	112	(captured in war)		June 10, 1815
	PATRIOT	Brig	223	(captured in war)		June 15, 1815
	RUBICON	Ship	407	Kennebunk	1810	June 20, 1815
	ROMP	Brig	161	Vassalborough	1812	July 27, 1815
	CLARISSA	Ship	321	(captured in war)		Sept. 30, 1815
	SACO	Ship	528	Saco	1815	Nov. 4, 1815
	BEE	Schooner	82	Kennebunk	1812	Nov. 11, 1815
	ELIZABETH	Ship	352	Bangor	1815	Dec. 2, 1815
	LAWRENCE	Brig	181	Kennebunk	1814	Dec. 13, 1815
1816	FAWN	Ship	436	Charlestown	1812	Jan. 4, 1816
	CONCORD	Brig	230	Kennebunk	1806	Mar. 15, 1816
	HOPE	Brig	153	Kennebunk	1812	Mar. 25, 1816
	HANNIBAL	Ship	272	Salisbury	1810	Apr. 22, 1816
	SWIFT	Brig	161	Amesbury	1805	May 17, 1816
	RUTHY	Brig	148	Salem	1790	Sept. 2, 1816
1817	CHANCE	Brig	235	Saco	1816	Apr. 2, 1817
	RAMBLER	Brig	147	Kennebunk	1816	Aug. 6, 1817
1818	ACASTUS	Ship	343	Pembroke	1811	Feb. 7, 1818
	AMERICA	Brig	157	Newbury	1801	Apr. 7, 1818
	COLUMBUS	Ship	395	Plymouth	1810	Oct. 21, 1818
	WASHINGTON	Brig	166	Salisbury	1804	Oct. 28, 1818
	CLAY	Ship	299	Hanover	1818	Dec. 30, 1818
1819	AURELIA	Barque	264	Hingham	1811	Feb. 27, 1819
	FAME	Schooner	77	Freetown	1812	June 29, 1819
	JOSEPH	Brig	161	Newcastle	1807	Dec. 7, 1819
1820	LIBERTY	Schooner	86	Amesbury	1804	Jan. 20, 1820
	ULTIMA	Brig	168	Newbury	1816	Apr. 5, 1820
	ADVANCE	Brig	193	Kennebunk	1807	Apr. 25, 1820
	TRAVELLER	Brig	150	Eden	1815	May 29, 1820
	DIAMOND	Ship	341	Haverhill	1819	June 20, 1820
	MAINE	Ship	294	Kennebunk	1819	June 20, 1820
	SEAMAN	Brig	181	Catskill, N. Y.	1810	Aug. 11, 1820
	BLAKELY	Brig	233	Salem	1816	Aug. 17, 1820
	MERMAID	Schooner	109	Duxbury	1805	Sept. 18, 1820
	PATRICK HENRY	Brig	179	Newcastle	1820	Oct. 21, 1820
1821	ESSEX	Brig	200	Amesbury	1820	Sept. 29, 1821
1822	VICTORY	Schooner	151	Saybrook, Conn.	1818	June 19, 1822
	FOUR SISTERS	Brig	114	Newburyport	1816	June 26, 1822
	ALERT	Schooner	118	Killingworth, Conn.	1816	Aug. 12, 1822
	DISPATCH	Brig	198	Charlestown	1800	Sept. 24, 1822
	CORINNA	Brig	121	Haverhill	1815	Oct. 4, 1822
	PLANT	Brig	208	Amesbury	1818	Dec. 10, 1822
	ALBION	Ship	320	Haverhill	1815	Dec. 10, 1822
1823	COMMERCE	Schooner	65	Harpwell, Me.	1816	Mar. 5, 1823
	POTOMAC	Schooner	157	Bath, Me.	1810	Apr. 7, 1823
	PACKET	Schooner	148	Yarmouth	1811	Apr. 9, 1823
	JAMES	Schooner	74	Haverhill	1798	Apr. 9, 1823
	HENRICO	Brig	224	Barnstable	1811	May 1, 1823
	CHARLES AND ELLEN	Brig	182	Castine, Me.	1816	May 22, 1823
	THOMAS	Brig	174	Duxbury	1805	May 23, 1823
	AUGUSTUS	Brig	143	Kennebunk	1820	June 17, 1823
	HUNTER	Schooner	98	Haverhill	1815	June 17, 1823
	HAYTI	Schooner	74	Kingston	1823	June 25, 1823
	HOPE	Brig	186	Kennebunk	1823	Oct. 21, 1823
1824	CONGRESS	Ship	339	Rochester	1823	May 3, 1824
1825	HOPE	Schooner	125	Brunswick, Me.	1825	July 25, 1825

Massachusetts Shipping in the Early Nineteenth Century—the Rival Ports of Boston and Salem

Salem was never a great shipbuilding center, even when it was the home of probably the most progressive shipping merchants in America. Boston and Charlestown were also slow in getting started in a big way in ship construction, and for many years during and following the Federalist period the Merrimac and the North rivers were the cradles of shipbuilding and shipbuilders in Massachusetts and New England. The lower Merrimac River from Haverhill to Newburyport was reported to be "the greatest shipbuilding center of New England" subsequent to the War of the Revolution and up to the close of the War of 1812. Currier says that 1,115 vessels were built and registered in this area during the twenty-three-year period 1793-1815 inclusive, and we are told that "a number constructed for outside parties are not to be found on this list." The banner year for Merrimac ship construction was evidently 1810, when "twelve thousand tons of shipping were launched." The North River, Massachusetts, region was a great shipbuilding section around the turn of the century, and we are told that 138 vessels were built here during the six-year period 1799-1804 inclusive, with 30 being completed in 1801. We read, "Looking downstream from the Hanover bridge eleven shipyards were in view, filled with vessels in various stages of construction." Medford, where Massachusetts' first vessel, the *Blessing of the Bay*, was launched in 1631, again became the scene of shipbuilding activities in 1802; but prior to the end of the War of 1812, only a few ships were constructed per year. As early as 1795, the 200-ton ship *Merry Quaker* was built at Dighton on the Taunton River.

For many years following the close of the War of 1812, "Boston built only a third of her marine tonnage." As the years advanced, Boston constructed more and more of its sizable vessels locally, but the small craft were generally built out of town, "where they could be produced better and cheaper." Figures compiled from the official registers and enrollments for the years 1815, 1820, and 1824 show the following interesting comparison between new Boston-built and "out-of-town-built" vessels documented at the Boston customhouse. (The first year [1815] following the Peace of Ghent was a highly artificial boom year in marine construction.)

Type of Rig of Vessels Documented	1824				1820				1815			
	Boston-built	Built Elsewhere	Total	Percentage Boston-built of Total	Boston-built	Built Elsewhere	Total	Percentage Boston-built of Total	Boston-built	Built Elsewhere	Total	Percentage Boston-built of Total
	Tons	Tons	Tons		Tons	Tons	Tons		Tons	Tons	Tons	
Three-masted ships and barks	1,471	1,626	3,097	47	665	918	1,583	42	5,076	4,095	9,171	55
Brigs	1,817	2,322	4,139	44	931	865	1,796	52	2,863	6,545	9,408	30
Total square-riggers	3,288	3,948	7,236	46	1,596	1,783	3,379	47	7,939	10,640	18,579	43
Fore-and-afters—schooners and sloops	344	2,405	2,749	13	99	1,714	1,813	6	671	3,208	3,879	17
Total sailing vessels—all rigs	3,632	6,353	9,985	36	1,695	3,497	5,192	33	8,610	13,848	22,458	38

Morison, in *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1783-1860*, says:

Boston throughout the federalist period was a commercial center of about three times the importance of Salem, whether one takes population, tonnage, or customs duties as the standard of comparison. The commercial activity of Boston Harbor was prodigious. . . . In 1793 there entered and

cleared eleven vessels from England, one hundred and nineteen from the West Indies, and one hundred and sixty-three from other foreign ports. . . . The population increased from 18,320 in 1790 to 33,787 in 1810.

The *COLUMBIAN SENTINEL*, on Wednesday, October 26, 1791, said: "Upwards of seventy sail of vessels sailed from this port [Boston] on Monday last for various parts of the world." In November 1794, Thomas Pemberton wrote: "The harbour of Boston is of this date crowded with vessels. Eighty-four sail have been counted lying at two of the wharves only. It is reckoned that not less than four hundred and fifty sail of ships, brigs, schooners, sloops and small craft are now in this port." Under the stimulating influence of federal bounties (first granted by the act of February 9, 1792), the tonnage of the Massachusetts fishing fleet increased from some 10,000 tons in 1790 to 62,214 tons in 1807 (88 per cent of the national total), when Jefferson's embargo severely checked its growth and put the greater part of the fleet out of commission because of the loss of all foreign markets.

It is of interest to note the official reported marine tonnage owned in the State of Massachusetts—and the various sections therein—compared with that of New York during various periods from 1798 to 1820. These figures show a definite and pronounced trend of growth up to the end of 1810 and a recession thereafter.

District	December 31				
	1798	1800	1807	1810	1820
	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons
Boston (including Charlestown, Medford, all Boston Bay, and Cohasset)	80,471	96,312	119,510	149,121	126,323
Salem (including Beverly, Marblehead, Danvers, Swampscott, Nahant, Ipswich, and Essex)	44,475	45,786	64,086	63,662	47,374
Newburyport (including Merrimac River)	19,673	20,615	34,630	39,100	20,441
New Bedford (including Fairhaven, West Buzzards Bay, and Westport)	14,532	16,355	25,222	26,378	32,245
Barnstable (including whole of Cape Cod)	16,100	13,707	18,454	16,175	20,810
Nantucket (entire island)	13,709	11,760	17,540	16,777	28,513
Gloucester (including Rockport and Manchester)	10,279	9,375	13,052	11,394	11,440
Plymouth (including Scituate, Duxbury, and Kingston)	9,798	10,707	20,761	23,028	21,070
Fall River (including Dighton and all Taunton River)	5,468	5,996	6,780	7,126	6,353
Edgartown (including Martha's Vineyard and Elizabeth Islands)	402	645	1,000	1,392	1,500
Total—Massachusetts	215,177	231,258	321,035	354,153	316,069
New York	155,435	146,442	217,381	268,548	231,215

The port of New York's registered tonnage was recorded as 37,712 tons in 1790 and 71,693 tons in 1794 (a gain of 90 per cent in four years); by 1812 it was reported as 265,548 tons (a gain of 604 per cent in twenty-two years). During this period, New York City was firmly started on its way to become the leading port in the United States. New York registered tonnage showed a gain from 1798 to 1820 of 49 per cent, and to 1810 (before the war) it was 73 per cent; corresponding figures for Massachusetts were 47 and 65 per cent, respectively, but the registered marine tonnage of Massachusetts increased 100,892 tons from 1798 to 1820 and 138,976 tons from 1798 to 1810, whereas the corresponding gain in New York was only 75,780 tons and 113,113 tons, respectively.

Salem, considering its natural limitations and handicaps, was a great seaport during the latter part of the eighteenth century and up to the time of the Jefferson embargo. It had eclipsed for many years its rivals in the Cape of Good Hope, Indian Ocean, and East Indian trade, but it was prostrated by the War of 1812 following the embargo. Its overseas trading fleet declined from 182 sail in 1807 to 57 in 1815, and never again did Salem attain the ton-

nage or the entries of pre-embargo days. Elias H. Derby, the shipping magnate, had died in 1799, leaving, it is said, "a fortune of \$1,500,000," and Morison says, "William Gray's departure [from Salem] to Boston in 1808 began a process [of passing glory] that did not stop." In Felt's ANNALS OF SALEM we read that when William Gray left Salem, he was the owner of 15 ships, 7 barks, 13 brigs, and 1 schooner (36 seagoing vessels), and Bentley, a contemporary Salem diarist, wrote on February 19, 1809, that "his estate was reckoned at three millions of dollars." Historian Paine, of Salem, describes Gray as a man "of surpassing sagacity and success" who "left a princely fortune as the product of his farsighted industry."

"Loyal Salemites" during the period of Salem's greatness have been eulogized with a fervid enthusiasm by prejudiced local historians; whereas Salem's greatest individual shipowner of the period and the leading merchant shipowner of the United States, the unassuming and rather self-effacing William Gray, has been willfully disregarded by these bigoted, prolific writers of "America's greatest witch town." Gray differed with his fellow citizens on a matter of politics and, although a Federalist, supported the republican embargo measure in spite of the fact that it cost him money. The Salem GAZETTE of September 2, 1808, wrote of Gray and his views: "Though he tells us he thinks it a wise measure, [he] is yet candid enough to acknowledge it a ruinous one." Joseph Story wrote that Gray was "one of the most truly honorable patriots in the country" and that "his conduct has gained him the highest respect in every part of the Union." As early as 1804, William Gray had commenced registering some of his vessels in the Boston customhouse, and from 1804 to the time of his removal to Boston, he had registered as many of his vessels there as at Salem. Since the War of the Revolution, he had been fully conscious of the natural limitations of Salem as a port and its weakness as an economical shipbuilding locality, and after years spent in building his vast fleet of eminently successful merchant ships elsewhere (in yards favored geographically with a good supply of ship timber and skilled shipwrights to work it), he decided in 1809 to move both his residence and business—offices, wharves, and warehouses—to Boston. To favor Boston over Salem and to perceive through sound business sense and vision that Boston was better located than Salem, with a much better and bigger harbor and deeper water, was William Gray's unpardonable crime against Salem—its Derbys, Crowninshields, Peabodys, and their satellites; so Salem, with its subsidized writers and historians, proceeded to ignore Gray and sought to belittle him (which they conspicuously failed to do), and evidently they would have crucified him if to do so had been in their power.

It is generally said that Gray was driven out of Salem by ostracism because of his political views, but this is only a small part of the truth. Salemites made life rather unpleasant for Gray in 1808 because of their unfriendliness; however, they did not drive him out of town, and he was not the type of man to be "driven." During the embargo, when the Salem sailors were unemployed and many others thrown out of work, Gray supplied flour to feed the needy and subscribed to the running of a soup house and other movements to relieve the wants of the poor and unfortunate. At the same time, he employed all the men he could to condition and care for his big laid-up fleet, which, being entirely inactive, cost him "a terribly large sum of money." Political differences gave him a welcome excuse and made it easy for him to abandon Salem as the hailing port of his ships and move to Boston to take advantage of a vastly superior harbor, facilities, and shore as well as water transport. William Gray had been a state senator in 1807 and 1808, but declined to be a candidate in 1808. It is significant, however, that in 1810 he was elected lieutenant governor of the commonwealth of Massachusetts (and re-elected the following year) notwithstanding "all the virulence of invective" heaped upon him by his former Salem friends.

For fifteen or more years before the War of 1812, William Gray owned more sizable ships and employed more seamen than any other Massachusetts shipowner. His last registry was the *Hope* in 1825, and he died at Boston that year, when seventy-five years of age.

William Gray's shipping was not all done from Salem or from Massachusetts. Some of

his vessels loaded at New York, and Bentley, the Salem diarist and historian, wrote on October 9, 1794, that William Gray thought very seriously of moving to that city in 1794. He fully appreciated the limitations and handicaps of Salem as a foreign trade port from the time that he sensed the demand for larger and deeper-draft ships and bigger cargoes that had to be collected and distributed, and in the fall of 1794 he journeyed to New York for the express purpose of studying conditions there. However, both Gray and his wife were Yankees, with their roots deep in Massachusetts soil, and they had five living children from one to eleven years old at the time. It is said that family reasons, with personal inclinations, caused William Gray to decide to remain in Salem for the time being and in Massachusetts indefinitely. He continued to load or discharge several of his vessels in New York, and this was often due to proximity of market in both receiving and distributing freight. When in January 1797 he loaded his ship *John* at New York, it is obvious that it was not due to depth of water at Salem, for the vessel was not large, being of 175 tons. Elias Hasket Derby, a patriotic Salemite, when he built his big ship *Grand Turk (II)*, found her far too large for both (1) Salem Harbor and its shallow water and (2) Salem freight (collecting and distributing) facilities. Captain Moseley, returning home from St. Petersburg, found it advisable to take his ship and cargo to New York, where she arrived in February 1795 and was sold by "King" Derby, as she was admittedly far too large for the port and trade of Salem.

Excluding coasters and fishermen, the following vessels engaged in foreign trade officially entered the port of Salem during the period May 31-June 18, 1790. At least one vessel from China and three from Europe were owned by William Gray.

Date of Entry 1790	Name of Vessel	Rig	From	Cargo	Import Duty Paid
May 31	WILLIAM AND HENRY	Brig	Canton	Tea, coffee, silks, spices, and nankeens	\$ 9,783.81
June 2	BETSY	Schooner	Cadiz	Lemons, feathers, raisins, olive oil, and salt	114.30
June 3	ACTIVE	Schooner	Lisbon	Wine, salt, lemons, and feathers	171.47
June 5	LARK	Schooner	Cadiz	Salt, lemons, figs, etc.	35.40
June 5	BEE	Schooner	Lisbon	Wine, salt, and feathers	166.92
June 5	ASTREA	Ship	Canton	Tea, silks, chinaware, nankeens, and other merchandise	27,109.18
June 11	EXPERIMENT	Schooner	St. Eustatia	Sugar, rum, gin, and salt	123.64
June 11	THREE BROTHERS	Brig	West Indies	Sugar, rum, iron, and salt	207.82
June 12	NANCY	Schooner	Cape Verde Islands	Salt	96.12
June 14	HANNAH	Schooner	Lisbon	Salt, wine, and lemons	55.23
June 15	LIGHT HORSE	Ship	Canton	Tea, silks, and chinaware	16,312.98
June 17	DOLPHIN	Schooner	Port au Prince	Salt, sugar, and coffee	56.97
June 17	SALLY	Schooner	Port au Prince	Sugar and molasses	323.93
June 18	LYDIA	Schooner	Aux Cayes	Molasses	70.43
June 18	SUKEY & BETSEY	Schooner	Martinoco	Molasses, raisins, and limes	101.97
June 18	JOHN	Schooner	St. Lucia	Sugar, coffee, cocoa, and molasses	297.42
June 18	FAVORITE	Brig	Lisbon	Salt, wine, and lemons	113.13

The above represents seventeen arrivals at Salem from foreign ports in nineteen days (an average of practically one per day), two ships, three brigs, and twelve schooners. Three were large vessels from China; seven were vessels from Europe and seven from the West Indies.

Joseph Peabody is of importance historically because of his fight to keep Salem on the map as a prime American port when it was well known that the town was doomed to pass into oblivion in the march of time as ships grew larger and drew more water and as transportation expenses and facilities to and from ships, from centers of production to areas of consumption, were considered. Following William Gray's withdrawal from Salem, Peabody became "the wealthiest merchant-shipowner of the town." After the War of 1812 and as the years advanced to the forties, Joseph Peabody, it has been said, was "almost alone in continuing to ship out of Salem, all other merchants having transferred their fortunes to the high

noon of Boston or the vigorous dawn of New York." Historians say that Peabody's ship *George* of 328 tons, from 1815 to 1837, made twenty-one voyages between Salem and Calcutta, with such regularity that she was called the "Salem Frigate" and the "Salem Packet," and that his brig *Leander* of 223 tons, from 1821 to 1843, made twenty-six voyages to Europe, Asia Minor, Africa, and the Far East. The ship *Friendship*, which in 1830 was attacked and captured by natives of Qualah Battoo when engaged in the Sumatra pepper trade, was owned by Joseph Peabody. The Peabodys, whose memory has been perpetuated by the Peabody Museum of Salem, are generally referred to as "successful Salem merchants"; but the Peabody who, dying wealthy and a bachelor, left his vast fortune to libraries, institutes, and museums named in his honor was George, born in Danvers, Essex County, in 1795. George Peabody became a merchant in Baltimore in 1815 and was very successful. In 1837 he founded a bank in London (as a competitor of Baring Brothers) for the benefit of Americans who were dependent upon England for banking facilities.

Whereas New York gets the honor of opening up the China trade with a ship from the Chesapeake, money from Philadelphia, a captain from the navy, and a supercargo and businessman from Boston, it was Massachusetts that developed the United States-China trade: (1) Salem via the Cape of Good Hope and (2) Boston via the Cape Horn-West Coast of America route, with voyages around the world. Massachusetts ships were the first to trade with South Africa, Mauritius (Isle of France), and India, and Salem led in the East Indies trade. Salem ships first traded with the Philippines, Guam, and the Fiji Islands and inaugurated the pepper trade with Sumatra and the coffee trade with Mocha on the Red Sea. Boston has the honor of initiating trade to east coast ports of South America and around the Horn to west (or Pacific) coast ports of North and South America; however, New York and Connecticut enterprise led in many adventures around the southern tip of the American continent. It was a Boston ship that first tried to trade with Japan, but ships hailing from New York, Boston, and Salem finally succeeded—only, however, when chartered for one voyage each by the Dutch, who enjoyed a humiliating monopoly there. Morison, in *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS*, says:

Boston was the Spain, Salem the Portugal, in the race for oriental opulence. Boston followed Magellan and the *Columbia* westward, around the Horn; Salem sent her vessels eastward after the *Astrea* around Africa, along the path blazed by Vasco da Gama. Trace a rough curve from the Chinese coast along 20° north latitude, pull it south before reaching Hawaii, to join 120° west longitude at the equator, and you have a rough line of demarcation between the two. Everything north and east was preëmpted by Boston. . . . To the southward and

westward of this line, in the Dutch East Indies, Manila, Mauritius, both coasts of Africa and the smaller islands of the Pacific, Salem had the same connotation as Boston on the northwest coast; . . . Boston vessels competed at Calcutta; Salem vessels sometimes attained Canton; the fleet met off Java Head and returned home together; but for the most part each respected the other's territory, and left little to divide between Providence, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore.

George Cabot, of Beverly (Salem), opened United States trading with Russia in May 1784, when he sent his ships *Bucanier* and *Commerce* to the Baltic and St. Petersburg. In 1788, Derby's *Astrea* was at Gothenburg, Sweden, disposing of tea, coffee, rum, flour, and tobacco and bringing back to Salem a cargo of canvas, duck, hemp, iron, and household linen. Salem ships were importing candles and soap from Archangel in 1798.

During the first half of the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars, American vessels did a lot of "neutral trading" between European ports. James Perkins, of Boston, wrote to his brother at Bordeaux in February 1795: "I find several vessels have been advantageously employed in plying between Hamburg, Rotterdam and France"; so he sent out the ship *Betsy* with a cargo of rice, which was to serve as capital for continuing the carrying trade between northern and French ports. These vessels did not transport cargoes for freight charges, but they bought and sold goods on their owners' account and, it is said, "made immense sums, which no statistics record, by the repeated turnovers." At Hamburg, there were 35 United States ship entries in 1791 and 192 in 1799, and Amsterdam reported 160 American entries

in 1801. On a "sound list" of 81 vessels engaged in Baltic commerce, reported as passing Elsinore during the open season of 1802 and bringing cargoes generally to Copenhagen and St. Petersburg from various European ports, the West Indies, etc., were 21 vessels hailing from Salem, 14 from Boston, 8 from each of Newburyport and New York, 7 from Providence, 5 from Marblehead, 4 from Gloucester, 2 from Charleston, and one from each of Philadelphia, Norfolk, New Bedford, and Salisbury. It is significant that of this detailed list giving the hailing ports of 73 American vessels, 54 were owned in Massachusetts, 8 in New York, 7 in Rhode Island, and only 4 in the territory covered by the Delaware, Chesapeake, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. These vessels, it is said, brought "nankeens, pepper, sugar, fruit, coffee, tea, rum, wine, cotton, indigo, tobacco and mahogany" to the Baltic ports and cleared laden with "iron, hemp, flax, cordage and sailcloth" for all parts of the world. They were not all ships or sizable craft, and Morison says that several were schooners and brigantines under 80 tons burden.

A letter written by Thomas H. Perkins and James Perkins, of Boston, on January 1, 1814, to their agents at Canton (Perkins & Co.) is of interest, as it gives an insight into the operations of the captains of industry in the days of such men as William Gray, of Boston and Salem:

You say a cargo laid at Canton would bring three for one in South America, and your copper would give two prices back. Thus \$30,000 laid out in China would give you \$90,000 in South America, one-half of which laid out in copper would give one hundred per cent or \$90,000, making \$135,000 for \$30,000. 60,000 pounds of indigo even at 80 cents, \$48,000; 120 tons of sugar at \$60 or \$7,200,

and cotton or some other light freight, say skin tea, \$20,000, in all \$75,000, would be worth \$400,000 here, and not employ the profits of the voyage to South America. Manila sugar is worth \$400 to \$500 per ton here, clear of duty. The ship should be flying light, her bottom in good order, the greatest vigilance used on the voyage and make any port north of New York.

This letter was written during the War of 1812 and at about the time that the British were extending the blockade of the southern ports to the New England coast. Massachusetts ships were laid up in large numbers by the activities of British cruisers on the Seven Seas as well as by the blockade. Early in April 1813, the ship *Sally*, approaching Boston from Canton, first learned of the war from a fishing boat off Cape Cod and also of the presence of two British frigates off Boston Light; so she made for Plymouth Bay and greatly pleased and surprised the customs agent at that inactive port by unloading a cargo that paid \$133,731.47 in duties—"more than that customs district had taken in since Jefferson's embargo." The *Sally's* cargo was carried to Boston in "a fleet of wagons," and this method of land transportation was to become very common as the war advanced, particularly after Madison's embargo of December 1813, which put a stop to coastwise as well as foreign trade. We are told that the embargo and the blockade stimulated wagon traffic between coastwise ports and large towns reaching from the deep South to eastern Massachusetts.

In 1814, the Boston-China merchants dispatched three letters of marque to Canton with letters of instruction to the commanders of their ships anchored and blockaded by the British at Whampoa. These privately owned armed merchant vessels were the ship *Jacob Jones*, the brig *Rambler* (16 guns; fifty men), and the schooner *Tamaamaab*. J. & T. H. Perkins, of Boston, writing to their agent (Perkins & Co.) at Canton on November 17, 1814, refer to their ship *Jacob Jones* as "a war-built vessel." Because of this fact and the reputation she had of being "a swift sailer," they had obtained some insurance on her at the rate of 50 per cent; whereas "vessels built before the war cannot be insured at 75 per cent." All three armed dispatch vessels arrived safely at Canton and "took a few prizes off Lintin." After arranging with the skippers of the very lightly armed Boston merchantmen to remain in the safe neutral waters at Whampoa until word reached them through authoritative channels that peace had been declared, the commanders of the three well-armed and manned Yankee letters of marque, after loading, dropped down-river on the night of January 18, 1815, passing quietly by two British warships and about a score of armed British East Indiamen, many of which opened fire upon the "impudent Americans" and signaled with lights to the men-of-war to no avail.

The three Yankee ships were soon under full sail and headed for home; they kept in company most of the way, learned in the North Atlantic that the war was over, and hurried to Boston, where they arrived on May 3 and 4, 1815, after fast runs of 105 and 106 days from Whampoa (also reported as 108 and 109 days). They were in good time to get the benefit, for their adventurous owners, of the high prices that prevailed for a period after the war due to a temporary shortage of goods in the market.

From the War of the Revolution to well after the close of the War of 1812, Americans were engrossed with the struggle for existence and survival. Ralph Waldo Emerson, the sage of Concord, wrote that "from 1790 to 1820, there was not a book, a speech, a conversation or a thought in the state"; but notwithstanding this apparent neglect in Massachusetts and New England of things defined as spiritual and intellectual, the Yankee mind was active. While the French Revolution had made the New Englander suspicious of social theories, Yankee thought was very evident in practical, productive channels, in fostering new enterprises, and in opening up new avenues of trade. The period from the peace of 1783, and particularly from the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, to the years following the War of 1812 was an era of adventure and of enlarged horizons, of expressed courage, of struggle against tremendous odds, and of ultimate victory. Brissot de Warville, visiting New England in 1788, wrote of the people: "Commerce occupies all their thought, turns all their heads and absorbs all their speculations. Thus you find few estimable works and few authors. . . . They think of the useful before procuring themselves the agreeable. They have no brilliant monuments; but they have neat and commodious houses, superb bridges and excellent ships." America, impoverished by the War of the Revolution and not a united nation prior to 1789, had cause to concentrate upon practical things in order to live. Other writers speak of the "lively imagination" and the "bold enterprise" of the Yankees, which were reflected in the building, manning, and operation of ships, the opening of new trade routes, and an indomitable spirit that fought successfully against heavy odds. For many long years, it was the young American republic against the world, and such conditions developed self-reliance and initiative, courage and fortitude.

Capt. "Bill" Sturgis gave the following advice to Robert Bennet Forbes, a boy of thirteen, as he went to sea to carve out his fortune. (Born in 1782, Sturgis was captain of the *Caroline* in the northwest fur trade when he reached his majority, and shortly thereafter, when in command of the ship *Atahualpa*, with \$300,000 in specie aboard, he beat off an attack of sixteen pirate junks in Macao Roads.) "Always go straight forward, and if you meet the devil cut him in two and go between the pieces; if any one imposes on you, tell him to whistle against a northwester and to bottle up moonshine." This, it has been said, was the practical philosophy of the intrepid Yankee maritime adventurers who not only put the United States on the map as a first-class marine mercantile power but also led the nation to world leadership in the building and operation of ships and in sailing and commercial procedure. By the middle of the nineteenth century, New England ships, sailors, and merchants had decisively beaten the much-vaunted Mistress of the Seas in merchant sail and was supreme both in the North Atlantic packet service, where America enjoyed a monopoly, and in deep-sea clipper ship trade wherever United States ships were permitted to compete.

J. H. Thomason, Jr., has written:

The years immediately after the Revolution were also critical years; England, having conceded independence grudgingly, set out by every means she found to scupper the American sea-borne trade, and the last decade of the century was as perilous for Yankee ships in European waters as the war-time had been. One result of the English search-and-seizure tactics was that American seamen, trying for free waters, opened the China trade, and for two generations afterwards dominated it. Their neces-

sities, also, drove them to daring innovations in design; their ships had to outrun the British cruisers and still carry payloads, and the New England ship-builders rose magnificently to the occasion. The period between 1800 and 1860 was the American Merchant Marine's era of glory; the years of the China clippers, of the whaling saga, of the North Atlantic packet-boats; of the old Triangular Trade—rum, negroes, and molasses—whereon certain eminently respectable modern fortunes are based.

*Frederic Tudor, of Boston, Inaugurates the Shipping of Ice by
Vessel and Becomes the World's "Ice King"*

Frederic Tudor (1783-1864), of Boston, initiated in 1805 the New England export ice trade, which grew to tremendous proportions until refrigerating and ice-making machinery was invented and perfected so that natural ice, plus the cost of cutting, handling, storage, insulation, and freight, could no longer compete with artificial ice in the consumer markets of the world. Ice was an undreamed-of luxury south of the frost line, and the story of how Yankee genius brought ice to the tropics is a commercial epic. Born in the year that the peace treaty was signed with Britain to end the War of the Revolution and the thirteen American colonies' fight for independence, Frederic Tudor was a son of Colonel William Tudor (an officer on the staff of General Washington) and is generally credited with being one of the outstanding Yankees whose initiative in the days of the young republic brought honor, glory, and prosperity to his native land at a critical time in its history and contributed much to the leadership, volume of business, and prestige of the American mercantile marine.

When Tudor proposed to send a cargo of natural ice, cut in the winter, from Massachusetts to the West Indies, his friends remarked that they had "always thought Frederic a little mad." The twenty-two-year-old boy had difficulty in persuading shipowners and seafaring men to co-operate in his experiment, as they feared that the ice would melt when the vessel was in a warm climate and probably cause her loss by swamping and capsizing. Tudor persisted, however, and sent out his first ice in a brig to Martinique, which left Boston with 130 tons of ice aboard. This initial venture proved to be a failure due to faulty insulation and protective precautions, but when Tudor received the bad news of his loss of cargo in transit, nothing daunted, he wrote in his journal: "He who gives back at the first repulse and without striking the second blow despairs of success, has never been, is not and never will be a hero in love, war or business."

By 1812, Tudor had gone a long way toward solving the problem of transporting New England natural ice, or "frozen water," to the tropics, and he was enjoying and gradually building up a profitable ice trade between Boston and the West Indies when the war wiped him out. After the Peace of Ghent, Tudor obtained government permission to build ice-houses at Kingston and Havana, with monopolistic privileges, and by 1820 he had extended his ice business to Charleston, S. C., Savannah, Ga., and New Orleans, La. The world's pioneer ice merchant not only had to solve the problem of insulating his ships and properly handling and caring for the cargo aboard under all conditions of weather and climate but also had to create markets, store ice ashore, and instruct consumers in the art of preserving it. Tudor proved himself to be a resourceful businessman and a good salesman as well as a courageous pioneer. Morison writes:

Frederic Tudor's letter-books (preserved in an old Boston office, under ship pictures and photographs of Tudor ice-houses in the Far East) reveal something of the pains, ingenuity, and persistence required to build up the ice-exporting business. Vessels had to be double-sheathed, to protect the ice from melting, and the captains had to be cautioned, with wearisome repetition, never to let

the hatches be removed. Tudor experimented with all sorts of filling; with rice and wheat chaff, hay, tan-bark, and even coal dust, before he settled upon pine sawdust as the best insulator. Instead of filling a long-felt want, he had to create a market at every new port; and to make the market pay, he had to educate not only the well-to-do, but the working people.

We are told by an agent of Tudor's that in shipping ice to the West Indies, which he said was "a voyage of ten or fifteen days," the bottom and sides of the vessel's hold were lined with tanbark four inches thick, and the spaces between the tops of the blocks of ice (cut true and placed very close together so that they formed a mass of almost solid ice) were filled compactly with hay. The hatches were then closed, battened down tight, and not allowed to be opened till the ice was ready to be discharged. Records show that it was usually

measured for shipping and "each cord reckoned at 3 tons," whereas "a cubic foot weighed 58½ lbs."

There are records of Frederic Tudor's sending the first shipment of ice to Rio de Janeiro in the "barque *Madagascar*," with Osgood Carney as supercargo. He was instructed by the "Ice King" not only in the care of ice in transit and in port but also in salesmanship and the creating of a demand for the product among all classes of people—rich and poor.

In 1833, Tudor made his first venture in shipping ice to India, which required two equatorial crossings. The ice was loaded on the ship *Tuscany*, the last of the cargo being put aboard May 7; the passage occupied 4 months 7 days, and the ice was unloaded into prepared warehouses on September 13-16. The *Tuscany* sailed with 180 tons of ice, and Tudor, in his instructions to Captain Littlefield, said:

As soon as you have arrived in latitude 12° north, you will have carried ice as far south as it has ever been carried before, and your Ship becomes a discovery ship and as such I feel confident you will do

everything for the eventual success of the undertaking; as being in charge of the first ship that has ever carried ice to the East Indies.

We are told that on this voyage to India the icehold of the *Tuscany* was an insulated space extending from the after part of the forward hatch to the forward part of the after hatch, about 50 ft. in length. It was constructed as follows: A floor of one-inch deal planks was first laid down upon the dunnage at the bottom of the vessel, and over this was strewed a layer of one foot thick of tan; that is, the refuse bark from the tanners' pits, thoroughly dried, which was found to be a cheap and good nonconductor. Over this was laid another deal planking, and the four sides of the icehold were built up in exactly the same manner, insulated from the sides of the vessel. The pump well and mainmast were boxed round and similarly insulated. The cubes of ice were then packed, or built, together so close as to leave no space between them and to make the whole one solid mass; thus the cargo of about 180 tons was stowed. On the top was pressed down closely a foot of hay, and the whole was shut up from access of air with a deal planking of one inch nailed upon the lower surface of the lower deck timbers, the space between the planks and deck being stuffed with tan.

Tudor's agent at Calcutta, J. J. Dixwell, reported that on the passage the ice melted between the blocks and not from the exterior only as anticipated. He estimated "the loss at Diamond Harbour to be 55 tons and 6 or 8 tons more in the delay and passage up the river." It is said that about 100 tons out of the original shipment of 180 tons were finally deposited in the insulated icehouse on the shore and sold therefrom. Morison says:

After sailing twice through the torrid zone, the *Tuscany* landed almost two-thirds of her chilly cargo in good order at Calcutta. Many are the yarns told of its reception. A Parsee asked the captain, "How this ice make grow in your country? Him grow on tree? Him grow on shrub?" Indignant

natives demanded their money back, after leaving a purchase in the sun. The poverty of the people made it difficult to establish a wide market; but the Anglo-Indian community quickly took to iced drinks, and paid large sums for the Baldwin apples, which were buried in the chilly cargoes.

Historians tell us that Tudor soon learned that the most effective and economic way of shipping ice by vessel and of storing it in icehouses was by packing well-made blocks of ice close together in "thick blankets of white pine sawdust." It is also said that Tudor and his remarkable ice business came just in time to preserve Boston's East India commerce from ruin, for America's carrying trade between Calcutta and Europe had declined almost to extinction because of British regulatory and protective restrictions.

A precarious foothold in Bengal was retained by Boston and Salem houses only by importing specie, eked out with "notions" such as spiced Penobscot salmon, cods' tongues and sounds, coarse glassware, sperm candles and Cape Cod Glauber salts. Our importing business from Calcutta had been "cut up by the roots" by the tariff of 1816, as Daniel Webster said; and within a few years the Massachusetts mills were making cotton cloth in sufficient

variety to kill all demand for Allabad Emerties, Beerboom Gurrachs, and the like, so extensively imported in Federalist days. But the ice business increased to such an extent that by 1841, although pushed by fifteen competitors, and forced to lower the retail price to one cent a pound, Frederic Tudor was able to pay off a debt of a quarter-million contracted by his early experiments.

Ice was easy to cut and, once the proper way to handle it became known, was cheap to load and ship. Before 1850 the Boston ice trade was extended to practically every large port in South America and the Far East. It has been said: "Not Boston alone, but every New England village with a pond near tidewater, was able to turn this Yankee liability into an asset, through the genius of Frederic Tudor."

In 1877, long after Tudor's death, the Tudor Ice Company, of Boston, launched at East Boston a trio of big ships for the East India trade to carry ice and some general cargo out and to return with oriental produce. These ships were the *Iceberg* of 1,135 net tons (177 ft. long, 37 ft. beam, and 24 ft. deep); a sister vessel, the *Ice King*, which had a full-size image of Frederic Tudor for a figurehead; and the *Iceland* of 1,179 tons.

To the end of the century, long after natural ice had ceased to be an article of deep-sea commerce, ice cut in Maine and stored in icehouses on great rivers like the Kennebec was shipped by sailing schooners or towing barges not only to the South but also to cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. In the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century, C. W. Morse, of Bath, Maine, was popularly known as the "Ice King," a designation that for all time rightfully belongs to Frederic Tudor. As a mere boy, he conceived the idea of shipping ice, took risks in transporting a highly perishable, or vanishing, commodity, overcame all difficulties, and developed shipping procedure so that ice could be months at sea and pass through or be delivered in the tropics—and that with satisfaction to the purchaser and profit to the shipper and carrier. Tudor established a major industry at a time when it was greatly needed and, luckily, made a fortune out of it and brought prosperity to many thousands of New Englanders—farmers, merchants, and shipowners.

The Anglo-French War of 1793 Stimulates United States Neutral Shipping and Profits

In early 1793, war developed between Britain and France that was destined to last for over twenty-two years, with but two short breathing spells. The news of the commencement of hostilities reaching the United States in April was received with satisfaction by the struggling young republic, which in foreign trade was finding it "pretty hard sledding" and looked with pleasurable anticipation to the favorable position it would occupy as a neutral, with the world's two greatest maritime powers at war with each other. Commercial conditions in the United States during the first decade of its existence had been depressed and at times desperate. Before the Constitution was adopted in 1789, the new nation was too loosely joined to function as a whole and deal with other countries, and the separation from the British Empire had lost for American shippers the old "sugar triangle," which was "the very foundation of the commerce of the northern and middle colonies." A major cause of the plight in which the American merchants found themselves was, as Albion says in *SEA LANES IN WARTIME*, "the loss of the old remunerative transatlantic 'long haul' which had, as part of the colonial 'triangle,' made it possible to get enough sugar, beyond their own domestic needs, in the West Indies [in exchange for American fish, lumber, and flour] to permit shipping the surplus to Europe with profitable freight earnings for themselves as well as that wider market for their own produce in the Caribbean." During the years 1783-1793, not only Britain but also France, Holland, Spain, and Denmark had reserved this much-to-be-desired "long haul" for their own vessels, and it was hoped in the United States that war between the great powers would reopen trade (then closed) to American ships sailing under the flag of the neutral nation, which was the largest noncombatant maritime carrier.

When the war commenced in 1793, the sympathies of the United States were with France

simply because Americans disliked the French much less than they did the English and, during the War of the Revolution, France had been allied with the colonists. This early partisanship soon cooled off, with cause, into real neutrality, and as time went on, as Albion well says, "our neutrality actually was reminiscent of the alleged inquiry of the Irish Free State official, 'Whom are we neutral against.'" Both Britain and France used and abused the United States during the period of hostility between them. Each thought of and cared for only its own national power and well-being, and as the conflict developed into a fight to the death, no consideration was given any neutral beyond that which it could demand by force of armaments. Soon after the beginning of the war that was expected to make the United States rich with "neutral profits," both Britain and France, the world's leading maritime powers (naval and mercantile), commenced issuing the first of a long series of trading regulations, which grew increasingly complex, opportunistic, and arbitrary with the years. Neither belligerent cared anything about the repercussions of these restricting commercial measures upon neutral countries except in so far as such would affect the fortunes of itself, and the United States was tolerated to a degree by both sides because of its use to them. Albion has written:

We were the heaviest purchaser of England's manufactures, and with the Continental market now restricted, we were too valuable a customer to lose. Also our neutral bottoms were convenient for trading with hostile Continental ports. France had even more urgent need of our neutral flag to bring home its Caribbean sugar and coffee and to carry on its coasting trade, for the tricolor became exceedingly risky to fly at sea. We were thus very useful, but not, as we thought, indispensable. The Embargo would prove that to our sorrow. . . . We found our neutral role an extremely profitable one, with "freedom of the seas" a decidedly practical policy. The records of seizures by the British and French are voluminous and sometimes exciting, but they tend

to obscure the financial gains from our freighting and trading throughout those [two] decades. For every voyage interrupted by seizure, many others terminated in high profits. Part of the gains came from selling a cargo for much more than it cost. . . . Still more common were the generous freight payments for a vessel's carrying services. . . . In those days, too, the same man or men usually owned both vessel and cargo and reaped both profits. Even the national treasury was richer by some \$100,000,000 between 1793 and 1812 from customs duties above the annual amount received from peacetime trade in 1792; and in that day, customs duties paid most of the costs of government.

We read of the sale of American flour abroad or in the West Indies at two to three times the market price in New York, and we are told of a 78-ton sloop worth \$1,500 that was earning \$2,500 on a voyage from Boston to Surinam (Dutch Guiana, South America) when she was captured; but to offset these stated figures of excessive profits are multitudinous records of losses and confiscation. With a bad harvest in 1792 and the turmoil of the Terror, France greatly needed American cargoes of flour to avert a famine, and Britain, at war with France in 1793, with a chance to strike at its enemy through hunger, in June declared breadstuffs as contraband of war. A decree of the national convention of the French republic had granted neutral vessels the same rights as those which flew the tricolor; this privilege reopened a rushing American trade with the French West Indies, and hundreds of United States vessels hastened to Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Lucia. In November 1793, Britain struck at neutral shipping carrying cargoes to and from the French West Indian islands, and British warships and privateers raided in particular American vessels, carrying them into British ports, where large numbers were promptly condemned. Some records say that the United States lost at least 150 ships in these early thunderbolt raids on neutral shipping in the West Indies, and all British-born or men who had at any time been subjects of the British king (and, speaking English, could not prove that they were born in the United States after 1783) were impressed into the British Navy. Paine says that the British orders to cruisers were "enforced with such barbarous severity that it seemed as if the War for Independence had been fought in vain." He continues:

Without warning, unable to save themselves, great fleets of Yankee merchantmen were literally swept from the waters of the West Indies. At St. Eustatius one hundred and thirty of them were condemned. The judges at Bermuda condemned eleven

more. Crews and passengers were flung ashore without food or clothing, were abused, insulted or perhaps impressed in British privateers. The ships were lost to their owners. There was no appeal and no redress.

The officers of the ships of the Royal Navy obeyed their orders, but acted with some propriety, something which cannot be said for the privateersmen of Bermuda and the West Indies, who did not wait for the formality of condemnation proceedings in the vice-admiralty court before looting and destroying property. Small boats, many of them carrying mulattoes and Negroes, were commissioned at the various British islands "to take Americans," and the result was a horrible, avaricious lawlessness. The Spanish, then allied with Britain, joined in the hunt for American vessels found trading with France, and the right of a neutral meant nothing to most of the armed aggressors, who were more pirate than commissioned privateer. At Martinique, a British fleet and army captured St. Pierre in February 1794 and seized some forty American vessels then in or around the harbor. Boarding parties "tore down the colors," impressed into the British naval service the members of the crews that appealed to them, and flung two hundred and fifty other seamen into the foul hold of a prison hulk, where they were kept half dead with thirst and hunger while most of their vessels, uncared for, stranded or sank at their moorings. Charleston, S. C., alone reported that thirty-eight of its vessels, with cargoes worth \$315,000, had been seized, twenty-five already condemned, while another thirty-three were abroad in the West Indies "fate not known."

But the attacks on American shipping, which started with the British and quieted down when the Jay Treaty between the United States and Britain was negotiated, was carried forward intermittently by the French when and as such was deemed to serve their purpose. At times, American shipping was much harassed in certain trades by French detentions and seizures, and about the time of the British raids it was reported that large numbers of American ships "were under seizure in France." In the upheaval which followed the Reign of Terror, the French forgot all about their protestations of everlasting friendship for the young republic and began to outdo Britain in depredations upon unprotected American commerce. United States vessels were made subject to seizure on suspicion of trading with British ports and, in fact, "were seized on no pretext whatsoever by French picaroons miscalled privateers, which hovered thickly in West Indian waters, especially in the neighborhood of Guadeloupe." Marvin says, "French greed, French jealousy of our active marine and French hatred of England combined to bring our West Indies trade to ruin"—and all this while Britain refused to permit United States vessels to trade with any of its West Indian possessions. In 1794, a list was published of thirty-eight American vessels that it was known had been captured on the high seas and carried into French ports by French naval vessels and privateers for confiscation, even though the United States was then at peace with France and all the world.

An alarmed Congress passed laws in 1794 to create a navy and to fortify the most important harbors; talk of war was in the air. President Washington recommended an embargo for thirty days, which Congress readily voted and then extended for thirty days more. These measures were popular with the shipowners and mariners themselves at that time, for trading was extremely hazardous. Shipmasters would not sail south, Marblehead fishermen laid up their vessels, and after the sixty days of embargo, we are told, "the mates and captains of the brigs and snows in the Delaware River met and resolved not to go to sea for another ten days, swearing to lie idle sooner than feed the British robbers in the West Indies." In the meantime, the island ports were crowded with destitute American seamen—captains, officers, and men; cargoes were ruined, crews sickened, and it was impossible to communicate with owners or hire lawyers to defend the cases in the vice-admiralty courts. At Antigua, an epidemic ran through the fleet of American vessels forcibly detained there pending condemnation proceedings. In May 1794, when the French admiral, Van Stabel, was convoying 116 merchantmen from the Chesapeake to Brest, with cargoes needed by the people of France (one item being 24,000,000 lbs. of flour), John Jay, the chief justice of the United States, sailed from New York to endeavor to negotiate a treaty with Britain and put a stop to the outrages being perpetrated in the West Indies and, to a lesser degree, elsewhere. The American argument was: "Stop England; then France will behave and we will have peace and enjoy prosperity."

John Jay had a tough assignment when he sought to bargain at the Court of St. James.

The United States was considered pro-French by the British, who were at war with the French and determined to crush them at sea. Jay undoubtedly did the best he could and possibly as well as any American could have done; however, the treaty that he negotiated not only greatly disappointed the American people in general, who had hoped for more concessions from Britain, but also caused an outburst of popular indignation in the United States. Jay was even "damned as a traitor," while the sailors of Portsmouth, N. H., burned him in effigy. A mob of seafaring people in Boston gave vent to their spleen when they heard the terms of the treaty by seizing and burning the British vessel *Speedwell*, which had put into that port as a merchantman, but was, in fact, a commissioned privateer, having her guns and ammunition carefully hidden beneath a cargo of West Indian produce.

By the terms of the Jay Treaty, American vessels of less than 70 tons were not allowed to trade with the British West Indian sugar islands, since they were too small to continue across the Atlantic. Direct trade with the British East Indies was opened up to American ships, but at the price of complete freedom of trade for British shipping in United States ports. As Paine says: "It must be said, too, that although the [Jay] treaty failed to clear away the gravest cause of hostility—the right of search and impressment—yet it served to postpone the actual clash, and during the years it was in force American shipping splendidly prospered, freed of its most irksome handicaps."

The Jay-British treaty of commerce, negotiated in 1794, was not given full effect until 1797. Ostensibly, it provided that "there shall be between all the dominions of His Majesty in Europe and the territories of the United States a reciprocal and perfect liberty of commerce and navigation." This sounds good, but in fact there was no such reciprocity and no such liberty. American ships actually gained "a scarcely improved footing in British waters," and the regulations covering the West Indian trade, so highly important to Americans, were most disappointing and "positively unacceptable" to the mercantile and shipping fraternity. Marvin says:

The real advantage of the treaty was that any commercial treaty whatsoever with Great Britain at that time served to allay fears of a commercial war. . . . It satisfied the commercial interests of both countries that the feud between the young republic and the mother land was not implacable and everlasting, and that they would continue to trade as they had traded before the violent separation. This assurance was very important, because Great Britain

. . . was not only the chief market for our products, but the indispensable source of all kinds of manufactured goods, and the traffic between our own and British ports was by all odds the largest and most active branch of our ocean-carrying. Imperfect though it was, the Jay treaty continued to regulate commerce and navigation between the United States and British ports until 1807.

The Jay Treaty provided that "a mixed commission should determine claims for damages resulting from unneutral acts." This commission of two appointed Americans and two Britishers decided on the fifth member by flipping a coin, and the Americans were fortunate to win the toss, thereby giving the United States a majority representation of 3 to 2 on the commission. Meetings were held at intervals for a period of some ten years; hundreds of claims were considered and settled based on the commission's technical interpretation of international law. It appears that this commission (a "direct and immediate progenitor" of the later Civil War Geneva Commission) awarded United States claimants nearly \$12,000,000 for losses sustained in the taking by the British of their transatlantic grain ships and their vessels engaged in West Indian trade. British shipowners and merchants were granted damages of \$143,000 resulting from the depredations of French privateers that had been fitted out in United States ports.

When the war broke out between Britain and France in early 1793, the French expected "lively co-operation" from the United States in accord with the old treaty of 1778, made by France with the American colonies then in revolt against Britain. However, the Jay-British treaty of 1794 abrogated the provisions of the American-French treaty of 1778 and gave the French a chance not only to express their anger at the United States but also to reaffirm what they had been halfheartedly suggesting for years: that in blood the British and Americans were

of the same race and to defend themselves against their arch-enemy they would be required to attack United States shipping. The terms and provisions of the Jay Treaty of 1794 did not become generally known until 1796, at which time France, incensed at being double-crossed by the United States, adopted a policy of retaliation intended to punish America for abandoning its expressed policy of friendship for France and, it was claimed, "even its neutrality." It was said in early 1797: "It now appears that the United States by its Jay Treaty became not only the vassal of England but also the enemy of France."

For almost three years after the Jay Treaty was made, United States commerce was not seriously molested and fared quite well, although both Britain and France made some seizures of American vessels during this relatively prosperous period. Shipbuilding boomed "from the Chesapeake to Maine," and Albion says that "most of our foreign trade was now in American bottoms, which a few years back had had little more than half of it." In 1793, there were 367,000 tons registered for foreign trade, and this total had increased to about 598,000 tons in 1797—the actual recorded gain being 230,000 tons, or 63 per cent, in four years. During this period, foreign trade (i.e., imports plus exports) increased from \$57,000,000 to \$131,000,000, a gain of \$74,000,000, or 130 per cent. (Re-exports amounted to \$27,000,000.)

In the late 1780's, many an American merchant had been wishing for an Anglo-French conflict, and when in April 1793 news reached the United States that such a war had been on for two months, great prosperity to American shipping through "neutral profits" was expected; but the first year of the war (1793) proved to be one of harassment, uncertainty, and anxiety rather than profit. The volume of United States shipping dropped about 8 per cent and that registered for foreign trade 12 per cent from the corresponding tonnage of the preceding year. Insurance rates in trading to Great Britain advanced from 2 per cent in 1792 to from 3 to 10 per cent in 1793 and on Mediterranean voyages from 3 per cent in 1792 to 25 per cent (or over eight times as much) in 1793. However, notwithstanding the attitude of the belligerents, the war between Britain and France and the position of the United States as a neutral maritime country definitely operated to encourage American shipping and deep-sea commerce. From 1793 to the end of 1800, the tonnage of United States shipping, both the total and that registered for foreign trade, showed a steady and pronounced increase each year—the gain in total tonnage being about 90 per cent and in registered tonnage about 80 per cent during a period of seven consecutive years. Whereas 63 per cent of the tonnage arriving at United States ports in 1792 was American owned, the percentage of trade in American bottoms had advanced to 85 per cent at the end of the century; exports from 1792 to 1800 increased three and a half times and imports about threefold, and during the years 1798-1800 inclusive, re-exports reached a volume representing in money value 56 per cent of the national export business.

*"Rule of 1756"—the "Breaking-the-Voyage" Admiralty Court
Decision of 1800 and Its Repudiation in the
ESSEX Case of 1805*

The years around the end of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth centuries—which closely followed a protracted struggle on sea and land between the American colonies and Britain and about two centuries of wars between the great European powers—have been well described as "a period of almost barbaric lawlessness upon the ocean," with the risk

to an American shipowner, master, and crew coming "not from the fury of the elements but from the arrogance, greed, or treachery of mankind." Marvin says:

International obligations, maritime rules and customs were trampled under foot in the long, fierce death grapple of Napoleon Bonaparte and the British Government. The United States held aloof from this combat, which was probably wise, but it

won the contempt as well as the hatred of both combatants by its obvious unreadiness to assert its neutral rights and especially to protect its sailor-citizens.

England, which during this last struggle for marine domination and world trade had been at war almost incessantly with France since 1793, adopted the most strenuous measures to weaken and harass the French when Napoleon rose to power and to build up British trade at the expense of all other powers—hostile, friendly, or neutral. Again England resurrected the British Admiralty Court's old decision in regard to neutral shipping, which had become known as the "Rule of 1756" and which decreed: "A neutral has no right to deliver a belligerent from the pressure of his enemies' hostilities by trading with his colonies in time of war in a manner not allowed in time of peace." In the eighteenth century, "it was customary to treat the trade of a colony as the absolute monopoly of the motherland." In doing so, England affirmed that it was merely following the established practice of Spain, France, Holland, etc. All of these countries "forbade the carrying of merchandise to their colonies under any flag other than their own or the carrying of foreign merchandise to their colonies even under their own flag." Furthermore, the products of colonies "could not be exported to foreign countries unless they were first brought to the mother country." Prior to the middle of the eighteenth century, the colony-holding nations had both merchant and naval fleets to maintain in practical fashion this exclusive trade policy to the degree they desired or considered expedient. By 1756, France, however, was so weakened in the tonnage of its merchant fleet that it was required to let down the bars of trading with its colonies to the fleets of neutrals in order to save itself and colonies from commercial paralysis. England, seeing the weakness of France, an enemy, and having a great measure of commerce on the seas, ordered British frigates and sloops of war to put a stop to such neutral powers' trading with French colonies and to seize the ships so engaged. This was done, and the Rule of 1756 was the result, the British Admiralty Court, in true national and opportunist fashion, justifying the seizures by using the farfetched argument that neutral vessels in trading with the French colonies had of their own volition become French "by adoption." The British Government found no occasion for many years thereafter to invoke the Rule of 1756 against its enemies and neutral nations—not even during the time of the American Revolution; but in 1793, when France and England again went to war, Britain agreed in a treaty entered into with Russia to prevent all neutral powers from trading with France or its colonies. France promptly retaliated by forbidding neutral countries to engage in commerce with Britain or its overseas possessions.

At this time, the young American republic was not only an important mercantile marine power but also by far the foremost and largest neutral carrier; moreover, the islands of the West Indies were America's best market. In that trade and all other, American merchant ships found themselves between two arbitrary forces—England and France. The United States Government fought for freedom of the seas and international law—on paper; but the fight was to no avail in a world where only shot was weighted and heard. Both the English and the French seized American ships engaged in peaceful trade in harmony with United States law and United States interpretation of international law. Protestations were futile. Each of the great powers was grimly determined to exterminate the other, and the United States, which persisted in doing some trading, became the target of the venom and hatred of both nations. The tension between the United States as a neutral and Britain as a belligerent was eased for a period by the signing in 1794 of the Jay Treaty; but this agreement of the United States with Britain angered the French, as it was deemed to abrogate the American-French treaty of 1778, and matters moved quickly forward to the historic Undeclared (or Quasi-) War between the United States and France. Great Britain was much more powerful on the high seas

and much more consistent in its dictatorial, domineering policy than France—more predictable and less inflammable—but in every way a tougher proposition for the United States to cope with and a “harder nut to crack.”

The United States Congress imposed its first embargo in 1794, which ran for thirty days and was extended for a similar period. Chief Justice Jay was sent as a special envoy to England to seek to negotiate a commercial treaty between the United States and Britain and to avoid war and the extermination of the United States as an ocean-trading power. The Jay Treaty resulted. This widely heralded commercial agreement, while it softened somewhat England's hostile policy toward United States shipping and trade, did not make radical changes affecting fundamentals. Britain's navy, under admiralty orders, became increasingly arbitrary as Napoleon's power grew on the continent of Europe.

Much of the big increase in United States import and export business in the last decade of the eighteenth century, following the commencement of the war between Britain and France, was due to the new “indirect trade” between belligerent ports and to United States “re-exports.” With trade between the French West Indian sugar islands and France forbidden by Britain, American vessels tried the expedient of making such voyages via a United States port, and as the war advanced and Britain became increasingly critical of such procedure, they evolved the plan of going through the formality of unloading the French cargo at a United States port and, after paying customs duties thereon, of reloading it and carrying it to the desired destination, with the refunding of the import duties paid. At times, small American vessels would handle the West Indian islands-United States business, with larger vessels making the transatlantic run. When this method of handling the West Indian trade was used, some queer cargoes, consisting of a mixture of foreign and domestic goods, developed. We are told that the brig *Eliza*, sailing from Philadelphia for Haiti, carried in her hold “flour, oil, gin, brandy, salmon, candles, soap, tea, lard, hams, sausages, almonds, marble mortars, herring, claret, looking glasses, playing cards, traveling cases, glassware, cheese, fruits, perfumes, sweetmeats and hairpowder.” Such practices, which were merely a ramification and development of an old established Massachusetts custom (whereby the shipowner-merchant collected in his warehouses goods from various parts of the world and made up mixed cargoes for markets where they would sell well), may have inspired the American “breaking-the-voyage” plan of handling trade indirectly between the French West Indian islands and France, and the Anglo-French war greatly increased the volume of American re-export business. Albion says that in 1792 the New York customhouse refunded in “re-export drawbacks” less than 4 per cent of the duties collected; in 1795 the percentage had increased to more than a quarter and by 1798 represented more than a third of the total, and “during most of the years down to 1807 [the embargo year], those re-exports overshadowed the exports of our own domestic produce.”

Whereas United States statistics on foreign trade give “an illusory inflation,” they do not show the very important business handled by the American merchant marine in “tramping” between foreign ports. Much carrying of this nature was done by American vessels without returning to the United States, and the extent of such business was stimulated by the war and by France's removal of the peace-time restrictions on its coasting trade. As Albion says, “Right up to the War of 1812, hundreds of American merchantmen were playing around the continental ports or even going as far afield as the East Indies and back, without seeing their home ports for years on end.”

In 1799 it was decreed that the British Rule of 1756 should be made applicable to Spain and Holland (then dominated by France), and all American ships and those of other neutral powers were forbidden to trade with Spanish and Dutch colonies and the mother countries in Europe. As British orders sanctioned the carrying of goods from the colonies of Spain and Holland to the United States and the trading between the United States and Spain and Holland, it was not long before America was busily engaged in violating the spirit of the new British restrictions—aimed at destroying the commerce of Britain's enemies—by the practice

of importing Spanish and Dutch West Indian goods into the United States for re-exportation to Europe. When such products were actually landed at an American port, put through customs, and then, duty having been paid, reshipped, the British tolerated the procedure as per the High Court of Admiralty decision of 1800 in the case of the *Polly* of Marblehead, Mass., and reaffirmed the following year.

The American ship *Polly* was seized by a British cruiser when bound from Marblehead to Bilboa carrying a cargo of Havana sugar and Caracas cocoa that had come from the West Indies. The owners of the *Polly* proved to the British court that the vessel's cargo had been landed and entered at the customhouse at Marblehead; that the duties had been paid, the ship repaired, a new insurance policy issued, a clearance secured, and a new voyage begun. The British Admiralty Court was required to rule that this procedure, being within the law, was entirely legal and proper, and the *Polly* and her cargo were released. Shortly thereafter, another American vessel, the *Mercury*, not content to follow the practice approved by the British court, attempted a shortcut and "lost out." The *Mercury* sailed from Havana to Charleston with her cargo and did not discharge, but merely stayed in port long enough to get clearance papers for Hamburg. A British privateer that had been watching her seized the *Mercury* off the Carolina coast, took her in, and the lords commissioners who heard the case condemned her on the ground that the stop at Charleston was a mere pretense, that the voyage was in fact a direct one from Havana to Hamburg and, therefore, under the ban of the order in council. In a third case tried in 1801, the British Admiralty Court reaffirmed the early *Polly* decision and definitely held that the actual landing of goods and paying duty thereon in a foreign country broke the continuity of a voyage and legalized the trade.

The Franco-British war, which began in 1803, was the serious continental conflict that led to the land battle of Austerlitz and the naval battle of Trafalgar in 1805; Napoleon, victorious on land, was overwhelmingly defeated at sea by the British. France lost both its navy and most of the sizable units of its merchant marine; but privateering (smuggling, illegitimate trading, and certain forms of piracy) had always appealed to the French temperament, and as the war progressed and went from 1803 into 1804 and 1805, privateers were commissioned in increasing numbers, gained in power and audacity, and being fast, handy, and well armed, played havoc with British merchantmen. Most of the North Atlantic shipping was transferred to the flags of neutrals, and as the United States was practically the only important neutral nation, the greater part of this frightened merchant tonnage was registered under the Stars and Stripes. McMaster, referring to this period of great demand for American vessels, says:

In two years almost the whole carrying trade of Europe was in their hands. The merchant flag of every belligerent save England disappeared from the sea. France and Holland absolutely ceased to trade under their flags. Spain for a while continued to transport specie and bullion in her own ships, protected by her men-of-war. But this, too, she soon gave up, and by 1806 the dollars of Mexico and the ingots of Peru were brought to her shores in American bottoms. It was under our flag that the sugar trade was carried on with Cuba; that coffee was exported from Caracas and hides and indigo from South America. From Vera Cruz, from Car-

thagena, from La Plata, from the French colonies in the Antilles, from Cayenne, from Dutch Guiana, from the Isles of France and Reunion, from Batavia and Manila, great fleets of American merchantmen sailed for the United States, there to neutralize the voyage and thence go on to Europe. They filled the warehouses at Cadiz and Antwerp to overflowing. They glutted the markets of Embden and Lisbon, Hamburg and Copenhagen, with the produce of the West Indies and the fabrics of the East, and bringing back the products of the looms and forges of Germany to the New World, drove out the manufactures of Yorkshire, Manchester, and Birmingham.

By 1804 the great maritime trade of the United States gave grave concern to Britain, the Mistress of the Seas in warships and military power afloat. The American merchant marine, augmented during the war, threatened British pre-eminence on the ocean, and the operation of these ships of a neutral power was saving from ruin the colonies of Britain's foes. A most important source of profit to United States shipping—secondary only to its own exports—was the extensive traffic (principally sugar) from the French West Indies to the home country, and American bottoms had enjoyed most of this business since the outset of the Franco-British war. Handled by the plan of "breaking the voyage," which the British courts had held legal

and as not violating the Rule of 1756, such commodities as sugar were taken to a United States port, discharged and reloaded there for Europe, a new clearance secured, and a "drawback" on duties paid. The re-export trade from French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies, handled almost entirely by American vessels, was very large, amounting by 1806 to about sixty million dollars a year. This the British Government decided to check notwithstanding the law, as it was not only operating in the interest of its enemies but also building up too strongly a rival for the world's ocean-carrying trade.

The highest British courts had ruled and later reaffirmed that the American procedure of evading the drastic Rule of 1756 was legal, but matters had come to such a state that it was said in England, "To save Britain, strong influences were put to work to make the court change its mind." Americans presumed that the British law of 1800-1801 was fixed, and "they had the formal judgment of the king, the advocate general, and the High Court of Admiralty, that landing goods in a neutral country and paying the duty broke the continuity of a voyage and made it legitimate." But the British Ministry decided that American marine commerce had to be crushed in the interest of the British Empire and of its merchants and shipowners. Marvin says: "Britain hated our swarming ships with a double hatred—first, because they threatened her pre-eminence on the seas, and, second, because their activity saved the colonies of her foes from ruin and starvation." A British minister, in alarm at the rapid strides being made by the American merchant marine, declared: "Such growth imperils our navy. Let America build up a large mercantile fleet and before long she will have a powerful navy to protect it. American commerce is a menace to our domination of the seas, both mercantile and naval."

In January 1804, the British proclaimed a blockade of the French West Indian colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe. This was followed by the blockade of the Dutch islands of Curacao, and in August 1804 American ships were shut out of Central European ports by a proclamation covering the English Channel. However, this was not deemed enough by the British Ministry to attain its double objective, and it was decreed that established British law should not be permitted to stand in the way of "Britain's march to glory" and, when considered necessary, must be definitely reversed "to suit the wishes and interests of the government." An appeal to patriotism, while capitalizing the intensifying pressure of the Napoleonic wars, caused the British Admiralty Court deliberately to reverse its 1800 decision: that actually landing goods and paying duty in a foreign country broke the continuity of a voyage and legalized the trade. In May 1804, the ship *Essex* of Salem, Mass., was seized by the British, and the case came before the lords commissioners of Admiralty Appeal and was tried not only in the same court but also before the same judge as had heard and rendered judgment on the exactly parallel case of the *Polly* in 1800. The *Essex* had sailed from Barcelona to Salem, had landed her cargo and given bond for the payment of duty, had undergone repairs and been conditioned, and then had commenced a new voyage and cleared for Havana with the same cargo aboard. The conditions were identical with those of the *Polly* case, and naturally American merchants in general and the owners of the *Essex* in particular expected the same favorable judgment from the court. They were shocked to find that the judge, ignoring his former decisions and responding to government pressure, condemned the *Essex* by laying emphasis on the intent of the owners and decreed that the voyage was in fact not broken but continuous and, as such, was in defiance of the order in council. Whereas it is a fact that such cargoes as those carried by the *Polly* and *Essex* were entered in the United States not for American consumption but actually for re-export abroad, yet the *Essex* was condemned when following in all details the procedure that the British Admiralty Court had declared legal in each decision previously rendered.

The British Navy and privateers quickly capitalized on the surprising outcome of the *Essex* case, and consternation ran along the United States seaboard. Several American vessels caught unawares met the fate of the *Essex*, and many more would have been liable to seizure and confiscation if they had fallen into British hands. We are told: "To many American mer-

chants and shipowners, this extraordinary decision in the case of the *Essex* meant instant ruin. Projected voyages were abandoned, cargoes sold at a loss, and ships laid up or diverted to less profitable service." Some adventurous shipowners, bold and contemptuous of British control of the seas, took a gamble and sent their ships on voyages as in the past; many sailed safely to their destinations, but some were not so lucky. Monroe wrote in September 1805 that fifty-six American ships condemned by the *Essex* decision were known to have been carried into the ports of England and as many more into the British West Indies.

This *Essex* ruling opened the flood gates of wrath in the maritime states, and memorials of protest poured in upon Congress from the angry people of seaport towns; the criticisms were much more general than against the principle involved in the seizure of the *Essex*. It was evident that Americans interested in shipping and deep-sea commerce were "fed up" with the arrogant British, the opportunist and unpredictable French, and the pacifistic, everlastingly appeasing and weak-kneed administration at Washington. They were weary of "fraudulent blockades" and "the insolent treatment of neutral flags," the practices followed by the British and French in their maritime warfare, and the impressment by the British of American seamen. The *Essex* episode brought to a head for a time the smoldering indignation of a people regarding policies that had become too savage and oppressive to be borne, and coupled with this was a feeling of contempt for the feeble and impractical administration, which suffered persistent humiliations without apparent resentment. As Marvin says: "It was significant that many of these protests suggested war as a final remedy [of the foreign situation], although they came from seaboard communities which would have to bear most of the burden and suffer most of the loss of such a conflict." Nevertheless, indirect trade continued, with the routine modified, following the adverse *Essex* decision of 1805. An old drawback book in the Plymouth customhouse records shows how this trade was being handled in 1806 and 1807, and Morison, referring to it in MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS, says:

The brig *Eliza Hardy* of Plymouth enters her home port from Bordeaux on May 20, 1806, with a cargo of claret wine. Part of it is immediately re-exported to Martinique in the schooner *Pilgrim* which also carries a consignment of brandy that came from Alicante in the brig *Commerce*, and another of gin that came from Rotterdam in the barque *Hannah* of Plymouth. The rest of the *Eliza Hardy's* claret is taken to Philadelphia by coasters and thence re-exported in seven different vessels to Havana, Santiago de Cuba, St. Thomas and Batavia. The brig *Rufus King*, about the same time, brought into Plymouth a cargo of coffee from St.

Thomas. It is transferred to Boston and thence re-exported to Rotterdam and Amsterdam in four different vessels. The barque *Hannah* also brought wine and brandy from Tarragona, which is re-exported from Boston to Havana and Madeira. The schooner *Honest Tom* left Plymouth for Bordeaux on December 21, 1806, with sugar and coffee that another vessel had brought from the West Indies. She returned to Plymouth on May 18, 1807, with wine and brandy which flowed from Boston to Demerara in the ship *Jason*, to the East Indies in the ship *Jenny* and to San Domingo in the brig *Eunice*.

Changing bottoms and splitting up cargoes as well as interposing coastal voyages between the two ends of what was essentially "unneutral" traffic evidently confused the British Admiralty, for such trade seemingly continued without further interference and confiscation as long as it was deemed profitable by American merchants.

Albion and Pope, in SEA LANES IN WARTIME, give figures for the value of United States imports, exports, and re-exports for several years prior to 1815, from which the following table has been compiled. (For the years 1796 and 1797, the figures stated for total value of foreign commerce, i.e., imports plus exports in dollars, are slightly different from those given elsewhere.)

Year	Im-ports	Ex-ports	Re-ex-ports	Year	Im-ports	Ex-ports	Re-ex-ports	Year	Im-ports	Ex-ports	Re-ex-ports	Year	Im-ports	Ex-ports	Re-ex-ports
In Millions				In Millions				In Millions				In Millions			
1796	\$81	\$67	\$26	1801	\$111	\$94	\$46	1806	\$129	\$101	\$60	1811	\$53	\$61	\$16
1797	75	56	27	1802	76	72	35	1807	138	108	59	1812	77	38	8
1798	68	61	33	1803	64	55	13	1808	56	22	12	1813	22	27	2
1799	79	78	45	1804	85	77	36	1809	59	52	20	1814	12	6	..
1800	91	70	39	1805	120	95	53	1810	85	66	24	1815	113	52	6

The relation of value of re-exports for the three years 1798-1800 inclusive was 56 per cent, and the average annual value of re-exports for this period was \$39,000,000; similar figures for the three years 1805-1807 inclusive were 56.6 per cent and \$57,300,000, respectively. In 1808, with the embargo in effect, the value of re-exports was down to only one-fifth of the average for the two preceding years 1806 and 1807, but the re-exports held up to 54.5 per cent of the value of exports. In 1796 re-exports were 38.8 per cent of exports; in 1810, 36.4 per cent; in 1812, 21.1 per cent; and in 1815, only 11.5 per cent.

Insurance rates (including marine and war risks) on American shipping and commerce from the time of the commencement of the war between Britain and France in 1793 to the end of the war between Britain and the United States in 1815 ranged from 2½ to 15 per cent in the North Atlantic, from 3 to 25 per cent in the Mediterranean, from 2½ to 33 per cent in the West Indian, and from 4 to 75 per cent in the Far East trades.

The Undeclared War with France—1798-1801

During the French Revolution, Great Britain, being alarmed "lest republican ideas gain headway among the common people," joined a coalition of royalist nations against France. The result was that the United States—a young republic—was made to suffer; for Britain claimed that France and the United States were sister republics and, therefore, "a democratic menace," while France accused the United States Government of being pro-British and claimed that the two English-speaking peoples were in accord, that United States neutrality was flexible and not real, and that "most American sailors were subjects of the British king." In early 1793, French privateers captured several American ships, and on May 9, 1793, France repudiated its treaty made with the United States in 1778 by ordering the seizure of "all neutral vessels which shall be laden wholly or in part with food products and destined for an enemy's port."

In 1793, Edmond C. E. Genet appeared in the United States as an official agent of France and claimed the assistance of the American republic for "her sister, the French Republic." Genet went so far in commissioning privateers and endeavoring to secure recruits for France that President George Washington felt required to issue a proclamation of neutrality—the first act of its kind in American history. Washington wanted no entangling foreign alliances of any kind; he was incensed at Britain but equally so at France; moreover, he did not like the turn the French Revolution was taking. Genet, however, demanded conformity to the spirit of the Franco-American treaty of 1778, which, he said, made France and the United States allies against Britain, and he made such "outrageous demands upon the United States Government" that Washington insisted on his recall and secured it in 1794. Washington's proclamation of neutrality and his insistence on the recall of Genet brought about a split in national political thought, and an extreme French party was born to which, as a term of contempt, was applied by the Federalists the name Democrat (later it became "Democratic-Republican").

The British Government, for over ten years after the Peace Treaty of 1783 and the admitted independence of the thirteen American colonies, had not truly and officially recognized the United States as a separate nation. It had accredited no minister to the young republic and had refused to make any commercial treaty or give up the forts that it occupied in the western territory of the United States, through which British agents continued to exercise a commanding influence over the Indians. With Britain at war with France, neutral American vessels fared badly at the hands of both (1) the disappointed French, who tried to force the

United States to become their ally and an active belligerent and (2) the bullying, arrogant British. Matters came to such a pass that after suppressing Genet's pro-French activities in the United States, President Washington sent Chief Justice John Jay to London to seek to negotiate a treaty with the British, on honorable terms, that would promote peace between the nations, recognize the United States as a neutral nation without ties to any belligerent, and operate to stimulate commerce. In 1794 the Jay Treaty was made with Britain under duress, and the pressure of Britain upon the United States was relieved or at least much eased for a term of years. By the terms of this treaty, the United States was pledged against any intervention in the war on behalf of France, but nothing was said in regard to the British right of search and impressment, and the United States agreed to irksome limitations affecting its commerce. The Jay Treaty was generally criticized and unpopular in America and was branded "a surprising treaty for a supposedly honorable nation to make." By it, the British were given rights over American shipping that the French (by treaty an American ally), at war with Britain, did not enjoy; to make matters worse, the treaty terms did not come out in the open until May 1796. France rightly accused the United States of dishonorable trickiness and, in resentment, decreed that "the flag of the French Republic will treat neutral vessels either as to confiscation, as to searches or capture in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them." The British had been highhanded and arbitrary in their treatment of United States shipping; henceforth America, with no navy, had the two great naval powers of the world to harass its shipping, and this without regard to justice, rhyme or reason.

On March 2, 1797, France went still further and decreed that "every American vessel shall be a good prize which has not on board a list of the crew in proper form such as is presented by the model annexed to the treaty of the 6th February, 1778." This was devilishly subtle persecution, for no American vessel had carried such a list (*rôle d'équipage*) or had had any occasion to do so since the Revolutionary War. As Spears says, the French intent was to drive all United States ships from the sea. He continues: "Then, as a final thrust at America, it was decreed on October 29, 1799, that American sailors found serving on the ships of enemies should be treated as pirates and that they should not be allowed to plead in extenuation that they had been impressed." It is difficult to say what damage the French actually inflicted upon the American merchant marine, but Spears reports: "Documents written under oath show that more than 600 ships were despoiled before the year 1800 and that losses—ships and cargoes only—amounting to more than \$20,000,000 were sustained." However, the French and English were not the only European powers that emulated the Barbary pirates in their depredations upon a defenseless American merchant marine. Spain captured scores of American ships, and it is said: "When the French privateers carried an American ship into a Spanish port, the Spanish officials invariably assisted in the robbery." Records show that fifty-one United States ships were taken captive into Danish and Swedish ports, that the small as well as the large nations showed a piratical aptitude, and that "all robbed in proportion to their power and opportunity."

France, the ally of America in its struggle for independence, proved a formidable enemy and contemptible foe of the merchant marine of the young republic during the later days of the French Revolution, the upheaval that followed the Reign of Terror, and the period of domination of most of the continent of Europe by the imperialist, arbitrary upstart Napoleon. From France, the United States expected at least some measure of friendship, but in many respects France, with which the United States was at peace (a signed treaty supposedly being in effect), was worse than England in the harassment of American ships at certain periods; France was unpredictable, erratic, excitable, and "quick to ignite," whereas England was steadily and uniformly anti-American and "just British" in enmity, obstinacy, and temperament. After France had passed through its Reign of Terror, a strange inconsistency developed, and although royalist France had supported democratic America, democratic France quickly showed signs of antagonism toward what was supposedly its only sister republic. France not only quickly forgot its "friendship" for the United States but also began to outdo England

in depredations on apparently unprotected American commerce. There were two Frances with which the American merchant marine had to contend. One was the official France, at war with Britain and mistrustful of all ships manned by English-speaking sailors, which seized American ships on suspicion of trading with British ports and of being useful to the British; the other France was a sort of French reproduction of the Algerian corsair. Whereas French privateers, who frequented certain waters, operated in general harmony with established international custom, the French picaroons, who infested such waters as those of the West Indies (where the United States did much trading), were no privateers at all but out-and-out pirates.

France, determined to win and hold the French West Indian trade that American ships had enjoyed for many years, began unwarrantedly to attack United States merchantmen in the Caribbean with French armed vessels (privateers or picaroons). France well knew the feeling of bitterness and resentment held by the shipping interests of America toward England because of its ruthlessness on the seas, its domination of commerce and impressment of American sailors, and France had fought side by side with Americans against Britain only a few years before; yet volatile France justified its attacks on United States ships with the excuse that they were rendering aid to the English and that, "as a matter of fact, the English and Americans are one people and are enemies of France."

The United States protested vigorously through diplomatic channels at French depredations upon United States commerce, but the hands of the government were tied for years by a peace party—very strong in the South—which held quite erroneous ideas of France (its former royalist policies and its "democratic revolution") and, actually feeling gratitude toward France and a sense of obligation, was opposed to any belligerent act, even in self-defense. This condition existed, but gradually grew weaker as the acts of France became increasingly hostile, more imperial, and less democratic. The Democratic-Republicans, or the pro-French party, grew in power during the administration of Washington and under the Federalist John Adams, who succeeded him as president early in 1797; Thomas Jefferson—backed by the new anti-Federalist party—was chosen as vice-president (and was later president, 1801-1809). The policy of the Federalists to keep the country out of entangling alliances with any of the European belligerents was construed by the Democratic-Republicans and the French to mean only one thing: a refusal to co-operate with France and practically a refusal to support a revolution said to have as its prime aim "the rights of man." At the end of Washington's administration, the French Directory broke off relations with the United States, demanding the abrogation of the Jay Treaty and a definitely expressed sympathy with France more in line with the American-French treaty of 1778.

In the 1790's and prior to the War of 1812, hundreds of American ships engaged in "the tramping trade," carrying cargoes between continental ports wherever they could get them and at times making long voyages as far as the Orient and back without visiting a United States port for years. Albion and Pope, in *SEA LANES IN WARTIME*, record the experience of the American ship *Confederacy* of 495 tons, which was a very large vessel for her day and engaged in this class of trade. With the Jay Treaty with Britain in effect, the *Confederacy* left New York in April 1795, with "provisions and sugar," bound for Havre, but she had barely cleared the American coast when she was seized by two British frigates and sent into Halifax on the charge of carrying contraband to the enemy. The ship was released by the vice-admiralty court, but as she continued on her passage, she was captured again by a British man-of-war, which sent her into Plymouth. Once more the American ship was released, and for some unstated reason her captain abandoned the original plan of taking his cargo to Havre (just across the Channel) and instead carried it around to London. Possibly the release of the ship at Plymouth or even at Halifax and Plymouth had been "informally conditional." Upon arrival at London, the *Confederacy* was sold, and her new owners were said to be "another New York firm." The vessel then partly loaded for the East Indies, sailed from London December 25, 1795 (about eight and a half months after she had sailed from New York), called at Madeira to take wine aboard, discharged most of her cargo at the French

colonies of Ile de France (Mauritius) and Bourbon (Réunion) in the Indian Ocean, and in June 1796 loaded cotton at Bombay. After a stop at Penang, the *Confederacy* reached Canton, where she disposed profitably of her cargo, emptied her holds, and took aboard a full load of "tea, cinnamon, sugar and chinaware." In January 1797, the ship cleared for Hamburg, and her skipper, surprisingly, took the Cape Horn route, sailing east and circumnavigating the globe. The *Confederacy* stopped at Charleston, S. C., but in June 1797, when nearing the English Channel, although an American ship bound for a German port, she was seized by a French privateer and taken to Nantes, where she was condemned. The confiscation was based, it is said, on the ridiculous and "trivial charge of lacking a notarized crew list," and the piratical French privateersmen shared "the \$298,349.68 which ship and cargo fetched at forced sales."

It was such incidents as this that led to America's "Undeclared War" with France. In July, the French decreed that neutral vessels would be treated "exactly as they allowed themselves to be treated by England." The U. S. secretary of state, Timothy Pickering, wrote: "By this monstrous abuse of judicial proceedings, frauds and falsehoods, as well as flimsy and shameless pretexts, pass unexamined and uncontradicted, and are made the foundation of sentences of condemnation." Pickering collected a large list of French seizures of American vessels with sworn statements, details of operations, etc., which clearly reveal the piratical actions of the French with their "petty plundering, shameless irregularity and occasional brutality." On June 21, 1797, the secretary of state sent to President Adams "a report respecting the depredations committed on the commerce of the United States since October 1, 1796, as far conformable to the resolve of the House of Representatives of the 10th instant as the materials in my possession would permit." The report summarized "more than 316 individual cases" of French depredations upon American ships, and Pickering wrote: "The number of captures will give a tolerably correct idea of the extent of our losses, and the documents will show the nature of the depredations, and the causes or pretences for which they have been committed."

The United States endeavored to arrive at some peaceful solution of the maritime situation with France, and President Adams, soon after he became president, sent C. C. Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry as duly authorized envoys and commissioners to France to negotiate with the French as John Jay had done with the British following their disgraceful 1793-1794 raids on American shipping. The American commissioners were instructed to do all within their power to re-establish friendly relations between the United States and France on a sound and honorable basis, but they were met with demands for money and were informed by the French that "a great deal of money" was "the first prerequisite to peace." Talleyrand made a shameless demand for a heavy bribe through confidential emissaries, and when word of this infamous "X.Y.Z. affair" and news that the French had begun to seize United States vessels on the American coast were made public, a wave of indignation swept over the United States and with it an "intense popular desire for war with France." The "unscrupulous, grafting and highbinder" revolutionary French leaders were condemned, and in 1797-1798 the American people in general as well as the maritime interests in the country "were clamoring against the French more loudly than they had protested the British seizures of 1794."

By 1798, the year that the United States was sending tribute of "dollar-laden ships" to the Barbary corsairs, even the "peace-at-any-price" Congress began to feel that a continuance of exchange of diplomatic notes, official protests, and negotiations with France got the nation nowhere; that there was no price in treasure and appeasement that could ensure peace and permit of even a mediocre existence free from molestation. Reluctantly, orders were given to pursue a sterner course. On May 28, 1798, the vessels of the United States Navy cruising along the American shore were ordered (by a president who appreciated both the need and proper use of a navy) to attempt the capture of any French vessels molesting American ships or interfering in any way with American commerce. On July 7, 1798, the United States sus-

pended intercourse and abrogated its treaties with France. The navy was directed to attack and seize armed French vessels, and on July 16 the building of three more frigates was authorized to augment the relatively small naval force under commission or available. The president was empowered to issue letters of marque and reprisal to privately owned American merchantmen; however, these privately owned armed United States vessels were not commissioned as privateers but were authorized to carry guns and use them if necessary to beat off armed French vessels and to make prizes of any such ships, and French merchantmen that were unarmed and peaceful traders were not to be molested. It was further stipulated that these protective emergency measures would at once cease whenever France should "cause the commanders of all French vessels to refrain from the lawless depredations and outrages hitherto encouraged." A United States army was also formed and Gen. George Washington called from his retirement at Mount Vernon to command it; but war was not declared by Congress (as it was against Britain some fourteen years later), and after a period of open hostilities at sea and a few fights in which the little American Navy performed most creditably and "did itself proud," Napoleon seized power in France and shortly thereafter renewed the peace with the United States that should never have been broken.

American history books dwell at great length upon the War of 1812, during which the United States was at war with the British about two and a half years—June 18, 1812, to December 24, 1814 (actually, it carried well into 1815, as the Americans, under Andrew Jackson, decisively defeated the British in Louisiana on January 8, 1815, before the news of the Peace Treaty of Ghent was received). Practically nothing is said in American histories of the war with France, which lasted from July 7, 1798, or earlier, to February 3, 1801, or over two and a half years, and was a real if an undeclared and technically unacknowledged war.

The story of the American Navy from the end of the War of the Revolution to the period of the Undeclared War with France is a pathetic one. Washington saw the necessity and ultimate economy of a permanent naval establishment of sufficient size and power to command respect and protect American commerce, and he declared in a speech before both houses of Congress: "To an active, external commerce the protection of a navy is indispensable." He also maintained that for a neutral flag to secure respect "requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression." Washington further urged the gradual building of a navy "without delay," as "our resources shall render it practicable," so "that a future war with Europe may not find our commerce in the same unprotected state" it was during the Franco-British war and the belligerency of the Barbary pirates in the early years of the republic. If it had not been for the Barbary pirates, the act of March 27, 1794, establishing a navy and ordering six frigates to be built (eleven years after the signing of the Peace Treaty of 1783, which gave the colonies their independence) would not have been passed by a peace-loving, nonaggressive, and economy-minded Congress. But the nation was shortsighted. It purchased a peace and agreed to pay tribute to Algiers and thereupon stopped work on three of the frigates, feeling that this humiliating procedure was more economical than maintaining its honor by force of arms; whereas six frigates supported by a few sloops of war in the Mediterranean would have obviated the purchasing of peace treaties and the paying of tribute to any of the Barbary corsair states and would have not only protected American ships and commerce at a lower cost but also formed the nucleus of a navy available for use in any waters.

When trouble with France developed, Congress belatedly, on April 27, 1798, passed a law authorizing the purchase or construction of twelve vessels for the navy and appropriated \$950,000 for the purpose. This occurred less than three years after the United States had paid a greater sum to purchase a peace with a semi-barbarous power, and this money invested in ships of war would have produced a navy sufficiently strong to have annihilated the entire corsair fleet of Algiers. Great activity was displayed by Congress and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert in the spring and early summer of 1798. Twenty acts were passed between March 27 and July 16 for strengthening national defense. In addition to authorizing the pur-

chase or construction of twelve moderate-sized armed vessels, Congress made provision for equipping the three new frigates then completed and for obtaining ten armed galleys. Mac-lay, in HISTORY OF THE NAVY, says:

The population of the United States at this time numbered nearly five million, while the exports from October 1, 1797, to September 30, 1798, were valued at \$61,527,097, and the imports at \$63,000,000. The total tonnage of the merchant marine was nearly nine hundred thousand tons, valued at \$29,397,963.11. The entire cost of the navy from 1794 to 1798, including building, arming, equipping and keeping the ships in commission, was \$2,510,730.69; and at a moderate calculation the gain to American merchants in the lowering of insurance, caused by the existence of this naval force, for the year 1798 alone, was \$8,655,566.06; so that

the economists in Congress, who had been so loudly boasting that they had saved the United States Treasury two or three million dollars by not establishing a navy, had in fact been extorting from the people many times that amount in the form of high insurance, which the absence of a naval force had made necessary, besides paying several millions in tribute to the piratical states of Barbary. View it in whatever light we may, the expense of maintaining a respectable and progressive navy is nothing more than a safe, economical and necessary insurance on the prosperity of the nation.

A report of the secretary of the navy made on December 24, 1798, shows a total of twenty-two vessels, mounting 456 guns and having a complement of 3,484 men; but eight of these vessels were merchantmen and poorly adapted for war purposes, and in the list were revenue vessels. The only real sizable ships of war were the 44-gun frigates *Constitution* and *United States* and the 36-gun frigate *Constellation*. In the fall of 1798, it was reported that all the vessels of the United States Navy, other than one frigate, one sloop of war, and a few revenue cutters that were deputized for the protection of the American coast, had been ordered to the West Indies in the interest of United States commerce and with instructions "to keep up incessant attacks upon the French cruisers on their own ground." Records show that during the winter of 1798-1799 the United States had four squadrons of naval vessels, consisting all told of thirteen ships of war and eight cutters, "cruising in definitely assigned sections in the West Indies."

Secretary of the Navy Stoddert, in his first annual report, recommended the building of twelve ships of the line, rating 74 guns each, twelve frigates, and some twenty to thirty smaller vessels. He asserted (December 29, 1798) that conditions demanded that the naval force of the United States be strengthened "to make the most powerful nations desire our friendship—the most unprincipled, respect our neutrality," and he added: "We shall not be easily provoked to carry the war into the country of an enemy; and it well becomes the wisdom of America, to provide a cheap defence, to keep it from our own." Six 74-gun ships of the line were laid down under the spur of hostilities with France, but work on them was discontinued early, and one of Jefferson's first acts as president in March 1801 was to wreck the young American Navy. If Stoddert's advice had been followed, there would have been no war with Tripoli, and the war with Britain in 1812-1815 would have been averted; also most of the trouble experienced by the American merchant marine emanating from both the British and Napoleon.

Before hostilities officially commenced against France, the American 20-gun ship *Delaware*, under the command of Capt. Stephen Decatur, Sr., captured the French privateer *Le Croyable* (pierced for 14 guns), which was preying upon American commerce, and carried her into Philadelphia, where she was refitted and taken into the U. S. Navy as the *Retaliation*. This vessel, the first armed French vessel taken by the United States Navy in the Quasi-War with France, proved to be also the first vessel flying the U. S. naval flag that was captured by the French. On November 20, the *Retaliation*, under the command of Lieut. William Bainbridge (who was later to lose the U. S. frigate *Philadelphia* off Tripoli on October 31, 1803), cruising in the vicinity of Guadeloupe in company with the U. S. 20-gun ship *Montezuma* (Capt. Alex. Murray) and the U. S. 18-gun brig *Norfolk* (Capt. Thos. Williams), got in too close to two fast and powerful French frigates, the *Insurgent* of 36 or 40 guns (Captain Barreaut) and the flagship *Volontaire* of 44 guns (Captain St. Laurent). The *Retaliation* was captured by the *Insurgent*, although by means of a ruse the *Montezuma* and *Norfolk* escaped.

In mid-July the American 44-gun frigate *United States* (Capt. John Barry), while sailing toward Cape Cod, came very close to engaging the British 50-gun ship *Thetis*, which was flying French colors. As Britain was at war with France, the belligerency of the United States toward French power at sea was of much benefit to Britain and made America and Britain allies on the Seven Seas. But even under these conditions, Britain still continued its arrogant, superior, and dominating policies, and its naval vessels perpetrated outrages on American seamen and on the American flag. On November 16, 1798, while convoying merchant ships from Charleston to Havana to protect them from the French (several of whose cruisers and privateers were known to be in Cuban waters), the 20-gun U. S. ship *Baltimore* (Captain Phillips) was stopped by a squadron of five British warships, rating 310 guns. The British promptly proceeded to impress men from the *U. S. S. Baltimore* (a ship of an ally at war against a common enemy). This humiliating episode caused such indignation in the United States that Captain Phillips was dismissed from the naval service because he submitted to the British demands, and his course of nonresistance was pronounced most culpable.

The following year, the British, in an attempt to carry out similar tactics against the complement of the 24-gun U. S. ship *Ganges* (Capt. Thomas Tingey), met with a different reception. While cruising off Cape Nicolas Mole on the lookout for French privateers between Cuba and Haiti, the *Ganges* was boarded by a boat from the "friendly" British cruiser *Surprise*, whose commander calmly informed Captain Tingey that the object of the visit was to impress all seamen serving on the *Ganges* who happened to be without American "protection papers" (or certificates identifying them as citizens of the United States). Captain Tingey, under the guns of a much more powerful vessel (but not facing odds of over 15 to 1 as had Captain Phillips of the *Baltimore*), refused to have his ship searched and replied to the demand by saying, "A public ship carries no protection for her men but her flag. I do not expect to succeed in the action with you, but I will die at my quarters before a man shall be taken from the ship." The members of the crew of the *Ganges* were then ordered to their battle quarters and the guns manned, shotted and trained at the "friendly enemy." As the British commander perceived that he could not impress men from the *Ganges* without fighting an engagement and shedding blood, he reluctantly sailed away without making any further attempt to seize any of the crew of the American warship. The *Baltimore* and *Ganges* incidents of 1798 and 1799, however, did not in any way change the attitude and policy of the British and were a mere foretaste of the scandalous *Chesapeake-Leopard* affair of 1807, when a British frigate, catching a new American frigate fully manned but with no guns in a condition to be used against her, impressed members of a United States warship's crew into the British naval service by firing broadsides into the defenseless vessel and achieving her object by violence and bloodshed (three killed; eighteen wounded).

As the U. S. 44-gun frigate *Constitution* was later to prove the outstanding naval vessel of the War of 1812 so did her smaller sister, the U. S. 36-gun frigate *Constellation*, gain the honors of having the most brilliant record of any vessel of either side during the Undeclared War between France and the United States. Capt. Thomas Truxton was in command of the *Constellation* when on February 9, 1799, while cruising off St. Kitts, he encountered *L' Insurgente*, a French frigate of similar type and gun power and captured her after an hour and a quarter of fighting. *L' Insurgente* was commanded by Captain Barreaut of the French Navy, who fought well and bravely, but he was outmaneuvered by Captain Truxton in the *Constellation*, and his vessel was severely dealt with in a rather one-sided action. Although the *Constellation* was rated as a 36-gun frigate, during this engagement she actually mounted 28 long 24-pounders on the main deck and 20 long 12-pounders on the quarter-deck and fore-castle. *L' Insurgente* (according to official French records) carried 26 long 18-pounders on the main deck, 10 long 12-pounders and 4 short 32-pounders on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, and the French pound was 8 per cent heavier than the English pound. The total weight of metal of the batteries of the two frigates was: *Constellation*, 848 pounds; *L' Insurgente*, 791 pounds. The French vessel carried a much larger crew than the American, having a

complement of 409 men as against only 309 men on the *Constellation*, and when, later, the merchants of London presented Captain Truxton with a handsome piece of plate to commemorate his victory, it was engraved stating that he had "captured a French frigate of superior force." Captain Truxton, in his official report of the engagement, said:

I must not omit to do justice to Monsieur Barreaut, for he defended his ship manfully, and from my raking him several times fore and aft, and being athwart his stern, ready with every gun to fire when he struck his colors. We may impute the conflict not being more bloody on our side; for had not these advantages been taken the engagement would not have ended so soon.

The loss of the main-topmast of *L' Insurgente* at a critical time undoubtedly handicapped Captain Barreaut seriously, for he went into the fight confident of victory, feeling not only that he had a slight advantage in armament and a big advantage in the number of fighting men but also that *L' Insurgente* had the reputation of being "the fastest ship in the French Navy" and "the handiest frigate afloat." The casualties on *L' Insurgente* were twenty-nine killed and forty-one wounded—a total of seventy men. Those on the *Constellation* are given by Maclay as two killed and three wounded—a total of five men, but other records state that the *Constellation* came through the fight "with casualties of only three wounded, one mortally." Alden and Westcott, in *THE UNITED STATES NAVY*, say: "The only man killed in the American frigate [*Constellation*] was one summarily dealt with by the third lieutenant, when at the beginning of the action he deserted his post."

Notwithstanding the fact that France had been at war with the United States at sea intermittently for years and openly, aggressively, and consistently for approaching a year, and that Captain Barreaut in *L' Insurgente* had captured the *U. S. S. Retaliation* (Lieut. William Bainbridge) on November 20, 1798, and had been incensed when he was prevented by an American ruse from capturing two other relatively weak U. S. Navy ships (the *Montezuma* and the *Norfolk*), yet we are told that when "citizen Barreaut, frigate Captain" was taken aboard the *U. S. S. Constellation* as a prisoner of war and treated not only civilly but also with respect, he ranted with typically French revolutionary perverseness, "By this act you have caused a war between our countries that were at peace," to which Captain Truxton replied with vigor, "If so, I am heartily glad of it. I detest doing things by halves." For the French "democratic" revolutionists to use force, crucify justice, and defy international law was not considered war by them, but if any foreigner defended himself against their aggressive violence, that was deemed an act of war.

Captain Barreaut, in his official report of the engagement with the *Constellation* to the "Citizen General" at Paris, emphasized the following points: (1) that he thought at first that his adversary was a British frigate; (2) that he was not guilty of commencing hostilities and that the *Constellation* was the aggressor; (3) that when overtaken, he was sailing under the American flag to deceive the enemies of France; and (4) that he understood that "the instructions of captains of American frigates did not permit them to fire on the Republic's vessels." Barreaut further wrote:

Judge of my surprise on finding myself fought by an American frigate, after all the friendship and protection accorded to the United States! My indignation was at its height. As soon as my first broadside was fired I cried, and with all the men on the quarter deck and fore-castle "Stand by to board." . . . *L' Insurgente* obeyed the first impulse, but . . . as we were not able to move . . . quick enough, the American frigate had time to run ahead of us. . . . This frigate did not remain abeam of us but sought by every means to take advantageous positions and completely to dismantle us. . . . Finally, as my position was hopeless, it soon be-

came necessary to surrender to very superior forces. . . . Rather than strike to two [imaginary] English ships in my disabled condition, I prefer to surrender to the American frigate which I believe has not the right to take me being persuaded that war did not exist between the two nations. . . . I make bold to assure you that if I had been able, during the two hours that the American frigate [which he thought was British] was in our wake, within range of our long 18-pound stern chasers, to fire on her, I should have made it impossible for her to overtake me. My honor, existence, all are compromised by the duplicity of this infamous government.

All this was written by a French captain who, eighty-one days earlier, had captured one weak U. S. naval vessel and had almost wept with rage when "a clever trick of a Yankee liar"

prevented him from capturing two others armed only with 6-pounder guns as against his formidable armament of long 18- and 12-pounders and short 36-pounders.

The *Constellation's* rigging and sails were much cut up in the fighting, but her hull was unharmed. After the surrender of *L'Insurgente*, First Lieut. John Rodgers, Midshipman David Porter, and eleven men were sent to take possession of the prize and to superintend the transfer of prisoners to the American frigate. A heavy storm blew up during the night before the work was completed and before more men could be sent from the *Constellation* to perform necessary repairs to make the French vessel seaworthy and get a jury rig upon her. The two frigates became separated and at dawn were out of sight of each other. To Lieutenant Rodgers and his pitifully small force of a dozen men fell the task of making the severely damaged prize seaworthy, of guarding 173 French prisoners still aboard, of putting up a jury rig, and of navigating the ship into port. It was a most trying situation, but after three days and nights of anxiety, vigilance, and hard work, the thirteen Americans succeeded in taking their prize with all the prisoners aboard into St. Kitts, where the *Constellation* was awaiting them. The *Insurgent* was refitted and taken into the U. S. Navy as a 36-gun frigate. On July 14, 1800, she left the Chesapeake under command of Capt. Patrick Fletcher on her second cruise under the American flag, and it is generally believed that both she and the 14-gun brig *Pickering* (Mast. Com. Benjamin Hillar) were lost at sea in the great hurricane of September 1800.

The capture of the French frigate *L' Insurgente* and the check given French privateering by armed American vessels in the West Indies made the Directory of France "better disposed to negotiate a treaty of peace," and as assurance was given the United States that its representatives "would be received with more respect than had been accorded them in the past," the 44-gun American frigate *United States* (Capt. John Barry) sailed from Newport for France on November 3, 1799, carrying Messrs. Ellsworth and Davie as envoys. However, the French at this period were so erratic, suspicious, belligerently revolutionary, and lacking in organization that, it would seem, the *United States* would have done more in the interest of peace if this fast and powerful frigate had been ordered to seek and destroy French naval vessels. Three American commissioners reached Paris in March 1800 to negotiate peace terms, but it was not until the end of September that the "Convention of 1800" was completed, following which both Napoleon and the United States Senate wrangled over details. It was not until February 1801 that a firm agreement was reached, and peace did not come to the West Indies until early March. Meanwhile, Congress continued its efforts to build a respectable United States Navy and during 1800 voted \$2,482,953.90 for the service. Following Secretary of the Navy Stoddert's report on the number of vessels in the navy given in late December 1798, the additions to the list (excluding the 36-gun frigate *Insurgent*) consisted of:

Name	Type	Number of Guns	Name	Type	Number of Guns
PRESIDENT	Frigate	44	JOHN ADAMS	Corvette	28
CHESAPEAKE	Frigate	36	CONNECTICUT	Sloop of war	24
CONGRESS	Frigate	36	TRUMBULL	Sloop of war	24
NEW YORK	Frigate	36	MARYLAND	Sloop of war	20
PHILADELPHIA	Frigate	36	PATAPSCO	Sloop of war	20
ESSEX	Frigate	32	WARREN	Brig	18
ADAMS	Corvette	28	AUGUSTA	Brig	14
BOSTON	Corvette	28	ENTERPRISE	Schooner	12
GENERAL GREENE	Corvette	28	EXPERIMENT	Schooner	12

The Salem-built frigate *Essex* (Capt. Edward Preble), in 1799-1800, convoyed a fleet of merchantmen to Batavia and was the first United States naval vessel to carry the American flag eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.

About a year after the U. S. frigate *Constellation's* brilliant victory over the fast and powerful French frigate *L' Insurgente*, the *Constellation*, still under the command of Capt. Thomas Truxton, fought the second frigate action of the war and triumphed, silencing the

guns of a much more heavily armed enemy vessel but being deprived by bad luck of the honor of capturing her. On February 2, 1800, the *Constellation* came into action with the large French frigate *Vengeance* west of Guadeloupe. The French warship is generally reported to have carried 54 guns and 480 men, but Maclay says that she was rated as a 40-gun frigate and at the time of the engagement carried 52 guns, a crew of 330 men, and with passengers had 350 fighting men on board. The armament of the *Vengeance* (Capt. A. M. Pitot) consisted of not less than 28 long 18-pounders on the main deck, 16 long 12-pounders on the quarter-deck and forecastle, and 8 short 42-pound carronades—a total of 52 guns, with 1,115 pounds English weight of metal. The U. S. 36-gun frigate *Constellation* at the time of this action had some 24-pound carronades aboard (the first used on an American naval vessel), having exchanged 10 of her long 12-pounders for these carronades and substituted long 18-pounders for her old 24-pounders. Her armament, therefore, consisted of 28 long 18-pounders on the main deck and 12 long 12-pounders and 10 short 24-pounders on the quarter-deck and forecastle—a total of 50 guns, with 826 pounds of metal.

Captain Pitot evidently tried to evade the *Constellation*, for he crowded all possible sail on the *Vengeance*, but the American frigate was the faster vessel and gained steadily on the Frenchman, which opened fire on her pursuer at 8:00 p.m. from her stern chasers and quarter-deck guns. Captain Truxton withheld his fire until he was close enough to inflict a great deal of damage, and there were a good many casualties on the *Constellation* before she reached a favorable position off the weather quarter of the *Vengeance* and brought her guns into play with deadly accuracy. Captain Pitot attempted to disable the American frigate by wrecking her spars and rigging, but Captain Truxton's orders were to hull the *Vengeance* and work in close for a yard-arm action. At half an hour after midnight, the French frigate's guns were silenced, but the *Constellation's* spars and rigging were seriously cut up, although her hull was comparatively unhurt. Captain Truxton regarded the *Vengeance* as his prize and was trimming his sails to come alongside of her when, in the hour of victory, the mainmast went overboard, despite every effort to save it, carrying the topmen and Midshipman Jarvis with it. Fully an hour was required to clear the wreck, and during this time the *Vengeance*—badly injured in hull, making water fast, and with her guns wrecked and useless, but having sustained little damage to her spars and rigging—limped away under the protection of the dead of night. Captain Truxton was robbed of his prize, for at dawn not a trace of his defeated adversary was to be seen. Sail was, therefore, put on the *Constellation*, and she made for Jamaica to repair damages. The *Vengeance* reached Curacao on February 18, 1800, in a most serious condition, and it was reported that she had been hulled by 186 round shot and that "the slaughter was horrible." At the time of the engagement, the French frigate had 36 American prisoners aboard, and the casualties among the French were stated as "50 killed; 110 wounded; a total of 160 men," or practically half of the crew of 330 men. The *Constellation* reported casualties of 39 all told (14 killed and 25 wounded), but it is said that 11 of the wounded afterwards died of their injuries.

The naval action between the *Constellation* and the *Vengeance* was one of the bloodiest single-ship engagements in all history, and the American frigate handled the larger and heavier *Vengeance* so roughly in this night fight that Captain Pitot reported that he had been attacked by a frigate of the United States mounting 60 guns (24- and 18-pounders) and manned by 500 men. Captain Truxton, in recognition of his victory, was honored by Congress' voting him a gold medal, and he was given the command of the new and larger frigate *President*, rated at 44 guns as against the *Constellation's* 36 guns. In a very indefinite and inaccurate report to "Citizen Minister" of the French Marine and Colonies, Captain Pitot claimed that he was attacked by a United States frigate that "fought at first under the English flag and then the American." That his ship was badly injured and "the will to fight taken out of his crew" are suggested by the easy capture of the *Vengeance* by the British frigate *Seine* (Captain Milne) on August 20, 1800, about six months after the badly battered French frigate had reached Curacao in distress.

In May 1800, Lieut. Isaac Hull, in the armed sloop *Sally*, manned by ninety volunteers, sailed into Puerto Plata at midday and captured the valuable French letter-of-marque *Sandwich*, while men from the sloop landed and spiked the guns of the battery on shore. The well-armed and manned French vessel was taken completely by surprise, was quickly boarded, and after a few minutes of brisk hand-to-hand fighting was taken by the American without the loss of a single man killed or wounded.

The little schooners *Enterprise* and *Experiment* had been especially constructed with a view of dealing with the small fore-and-aft-rigged French privateers, which swarmed in the West Indies and ran to cover in waters where the heavier and deeper-draft American square-riggers could not go. The *Enterprise* (Lieut. John Shaw), mounting 12 old-fashioned 6-pounders and carrying from sixty to eighty-three men and boys, made a brilliant record against the French privateers, buccaneers, or picaroons, and particularly so during a six-month cruise in 1800. In early April, this "impudent Yankee schooner" had a spirited engagement with a Spanish brig that mounted 18 guns of heavier caliber than those of the *Enterprise*, and by the time that the identity of the two vessels was established and they separated by mutual consent, the advantage lay with the little American. Among the eight armed French vessels captured by the *Enterprise* during this one cruise (in addition to "a small privateer" and a belligerent "heavy French lugger that carried as many guns as the American schooner") were the following:

Name	Type	Number of		
		Guns	Crew	French Casualties
LA CYGNE	Privateer schooner	4 (or 6)	57	24 (11 killed)
LA CITOYENNE	Privateer	6	57	15 (4 killed)
L'AGILE	Privateer brig (or schooner)	10	78	12 (3 killed)
LE FLAMBEAU	Privateer brig (or schooner)	12 (9 pds.)	100 (90 to 110)	40 (7 killed)
LA PAULINA	Privateer schooner	6 (or 4)	38 (or 40)	
GUADALOUPEAN	Letter-of-marque lugger	7	35 (or 45)	

The *Enterprise* also recaptured several American merchantmen (stated at four, but also at eleven) and on this cruise is said to have taken "eight French privateers mounting forty-seven guns and carrying three hundred and eighty-four men." However, Lieut. John Shaw, her commander, writing to a friend on December 12, 1800, said: "I have on my last cruise taken 13 sail of vessels, made 300 French prisoners, killed and wounded 61, taken 42 pieces of artillery and 180 stacks of musquetry."

The *Experiment* (Lieut. William Maley), a sister of the *Enterprise*, while convoying several merchantmen, was attacked on January 1, 1800, when becalmed in the middle of the channel between the island of Gonaib and Trou Corvet (in the Bight of Leogane), by eleven armed barges, or galleys, which Edward Stevens, U. S. consul general of St. Domingo (who was aboard the *Experiment*), reported were "manned with negroes and mulattoes and armed with muskets, sabres and boarding pikes." Stevens said that "several of these barges carried cannon of 4 pounds and swivels in the bow," and he estimated that there were 400 to 500 men in these boats, "the large ones carrying 60 or 70 and the small ones 40 or 50 each." This attacking force carried the tricolor flag of France, but as the engagement (which lasted about seven hours all told) continued, red pendants were displayed at the mastheads of some of the largest barges. Another report says that the "picaroon barges" each contained not less than 40 men "pulling twenty-six oars" and, in addition to a good supply of small arms, had "swivels in the bow and quarters." The vessels officially mentioned as being in the convoy and attacked with the *Experiment* were the brig *Daniel and Mary* (3 guns; eight men), the schooner *Sea*

Flower (3 guns; eight men), the 76-ton schooner *Mary* of Boston (Captain Chapman), and the schooner *Washington*.

The merchant vessels were somewhat spread out, and there may have been more in the convoy, but in the dead calm they could not get together to resist attack or to move under the protecting guns of the armed naval schooner. A concentrated effort was made by the pirates (operating with the protection and encouragement of the French) to take the *Experiment* by boarding, but they were driven off with great loss after "a smart action of nearly three hours." The pirates, following each repulse, returned to shore to remove their dead and wounded and reman their boats with sound well-armed men. There were three attacks made on the *Experiment*, and during the fight the *Mary* was boarded and pillaged and her captain brutally murdered. The officers, crew, and passengers on the *Daniel and Mary* and the *Washington* transferred from their vessels to the *Experiment*, and as the U. S. war vessel could not get in position to protect them with her guns, the pirates ultimately captured these two vessels; but they were driven off the *Mary* by the well-aimed guns of the *Experiment* after the schooner had been taken, and the *Sea Flower* was saved. Captain Maley sent his small boats after the pirates as they towed their two captures away, and while the guns of these boats inflicted "considerable damage" to the enemy, he could not recapture the American vessels. Early in the fight, the *Daniel and Mary*, armed with 3 guns, expended all the ammunition she had aboard, and after the second spirited attack on the *Experiment*, that vessel suffered from a shortage of musket cartridges and grapeshot. The Americans lost two vessels of the convoy because of the dead calm, but the casualties were limited to the murdered captain of the schooner *Mary* and Lieut. David Porter of the *Experiment*, "who received a slight contusion on his arm." The pirates lost two of their barges, and we read that "the loss of the picaroons in killed or wounded must have been heavy." Consul Stevens reported at the time of this attack: "The number of barges that now actually infest the coast from L'Archaye to St. Marc's is not less than 37 and the number of pirates they carry exceeds 1,500."

Soon after Lieut. Charles Stewart took command of the U. S. schooner *Experiment* (having been transferred from her sister, the *Enterprise*), he had a busy and eventful day. After capturing the French privateer schooner *Deux Amis* (8 guns; 50 men) and putting 5 men aboard her temporarily, the *Experiment* was chased by a French brig (18 guns; 120 men) and a three-masted schooner, *La Diane* (14 guns; 60 men). Lieutenant Stewart, having the fastest vessel but being no match for the combined force of the brig and the schooner, which mounted 32 guns to his 12, resorted to strategy. Having separated his two attackers, he closed in quickly on the schooner about midnight and surprised her with a broadside which, followed up by good maneuvering and a destructive fire, soon caused her to strike her colors. Putting a prize crew aboard *La Diane*, Lieutenant Stewart set sail to find and attempt to take the French brig, but that vessel, alarmed by the unexpected attack by the American on the schooner, crowded on sail and shaped her course so that she succeeded in escaping under cover of the night—and this from a "Yankee schooner" of less than two-thirds her power. Both the *Deux Amis* and *La Diane* were taken safely into port with their small prize crews. Among the prisoners were General Rigaud, thirty invalid French soldiers, and the first lieutenant of *L' Insurgente*, who had been the prize officer of the *Retaliation*.

During heavy weather on the night of November 16, 1800, the *Experiment* fought an action with and captured a privateer that proved to be the *Louisa Bridger*, a British vessel armed with eight 9-pounders and carrying forty-five men. The weight of metal of the two vessels was the same (72 pounds), but the lighter guns of the *Experiment* did far greater damage, due to better marksmanship and more spirited manipulation, than the heavier guns of the British privateer. When taken, the *Louisa Bridger* was badly injured, had four feet of water in her hold, and had many casualties, including her commander. When the nationality of the vessels became known, the American rendered assistance to her adversary of the night and made every possible reparation.

On March 11, 1800, the U. S. corvette *Boston* (Capt. George Little), with a merchant brig in tow and with her guns housed in an effort to decoy the picaroons, was attacked by nine barges from the island of Gonave at about the same place where the *Experiment* had had an adventure with the pirates. Three of the barges, with their crews, were destroyed, and Captain Little reported: "The rest were so fortunate as to reach the island, but in a most shattered condition, by this time it had become dark; had daylight continued three hours longer, I am apt to think I should have destroyed the whole fleet."

The *Boston*, on October 12, 1800, in Lat. 22° 52' N. and Long. 52° 56' W., fought the last single-ship naval engagement of the Undeclared War with France and captured the French national corvette *Le Berceau* (Citizen Louis Andre Senes, Commander) after what Captain Little of the *Boston* reported as "an action of two hours." One of the officers of the French warship wrote that it commenced at 3:30 p.m. on October 12 and did not end until after dawn the next day, when *Le Berceau* was dismasted, her guns encumbered, and, making seven inches of water per hour, was in a dangerous condition and no longer able to defend herself. The battle was a spirited one, and although the casualties reported were not relatively large considering the severity of the engagement, it would seem that the French losses were much heavier than reported. Whereas the French corvette was badly mauled, Captain Little reported that "the *Boston* was much injured in her masts, spars, rigging and sails, considering the force of the corvette." It is evident that the gunnery displayed by *Le Berceau* was much superior to that shown by either *L'Insurgente* or the *Vengeance* in their actions with the American frigate *Constellation*. The corvettes *Boston* and *Le Berceau* carried about the same complement and were of the same general type of warship, but the American vessel, as was usual in comparison with European naval vessels, carried a heavier armament. The *Boston* mounted 24 long 12-pounders and 12 long 9-pounders, or 36 guns in all; while the battery of *Le Berceau* is given as "22 9-pounders and 2 12-pounders on deck." Each vessel had a crew of 230 men, and Captain Little states his casualties as 15 (4 killed; 3 mortally wounded; and 8 wounded but "on the recovery"). The records in Paris give the casualties on *Le Berceau* as only 21 (4 killed; 17 wounded), but when the French corvette was taken, Captain Little had 52 actual and known casualties counted, consisting of 34 men killed and 18 wounded. The *Boston* took her prize safely into the port of Boston after *Le Berceau* had been made seaworthy by her captors, although it was reported that the French corvette was "in a deplorable condition and leaking dangerously."

A change came in the French Government at Paris in 1800, the Directory being replaced by Napoleon. A treaty of peace was negotiated between the United States and France late in the year and on February 3, 1801, was ratified by the U. S. Senate, but the old French alliance, which had proved so embarrassing, was not renewed. During the struggle of some two and a half years' duration, the United States had sent out a force of more than fifty naval vessels against French warships, privateers, and pirates, and the organization and morale of the American Navy under Secretary Stoddert had been as remarkable as its record in fighting was magnificent. Under the terms of the treaty, all government vessels of war captured by either side were to be restored. The provision was one-sided, for no American-built vessel of the United States Navy was at any time captured by the French, and the only vessel flying the American naval ensign taken by them was the *Retaliation*; this was formerly the French privateer *Le Croyable*, which had been captured by U.S.S. *Delaware* when lawlessly preying upon unprotected American commerce before the Quasi-War with France really commenced. The corvette *Le Berceau* and a small cruiser *Vengeance*, taken by U.S.S. *Trumbull*, were released to the French, but the frigate *L'Insurgente* had in the meanwhile been lost at sea. A United States list shows that during the war American vessels had captured 84 armed French ships, mounting well over 500 guns. In addition to the two national ships surrendered under the treaty, one was sunk and eight were acquitted by condemnation courts as not being legal prizes. Other records show that in less than three years the "infant navy" of the United

States "captured 111 privateers and sunk four more, recaptured more than 70 American merchantmen," and drastically reduced the number of seizures by the French.

The French admitted that they were disagreeably surprised at the power, number, and achievements of the American naval vessels and of the armed merchantmen which the United States sent to sea to combat armed vessels flying the tricolor of the French republic and particularly at the "aggressive activity" of armed American vessels in the West Indies. The American Navy was so "young and small" during the Quasi-War with France that Secretary of the Navy Stoddert rightly concentrated on its use to protect the American coast and commerce in the West Indies. Following the capture of the privateer *Le Croyable* in July 1798 off New Jersey, the French realized that the American coast was "too risky for comfort and fell back on the West Indies nearer their bases." Albion and Pope, in *SEA LANES IN WARTIME*, writing of the period of the Undeclared War with France and the U. S. naval concentration in West Indian waters, have said:

The important result of this naval activity was that the [French] privateers grew less bold in their former richest hunting grounds, and though Yankee vessels were still seized as prizes, it rarely happened on the more frequented runs. The armed letters of marque were particularly valuable on routes distant from the strong arm of the navy. Altogether more than a thousand of these armed merchantmen were commissioned, ranging from the *Providence* with thirty-four guns, down to the *Reindeer* which carried nineteen wooden [Quaker] guns and one real one. Early in 1799, the ship *Mary* of Boston, with

Captain Gamaliel Bradford in command, fought off several French privateers near Malaga with her ten guns without losing a man. That summer the *Mount Vernon* of Salem with twenty guns had a four-day running fight off Gibraltar, in which she beat off a small French warship, escaped from two pursuing frigates and then pounded a privateer into submission. . . . Even in the West Indies, the letters of marque often had to fend for themselves, as the embryo navy could not be everywhere at once; their own guns saved more than one of them from what would have been inevitable prize courts.

The gallant action of the *Mount Vernon* as she approached Gibraltar and ran into French privateers, which operated during the French Revolution very much as did the Barbary pirates but made their base at Algeciras, was re-enacted in a measure by the armed merchantman *Louisa* of Philadelphia. This vessel was attacked by several French privateers of the buccaneer type out from Algeciras, and the *Louisa* beat them off; but when her commander was shot through the shoulder and was taken below, the crew all at once deserted the guns, being "sick of fighting." A large lateen-rigged French pirate, noticing the confusion on the American's deck, seized the opportunity to work in close and board her. The mate, however, was equal to the emergency. He rallied the men, and they turned a destructive fire on the enemy as he crowded on his forecastle and bowsprit ready to board. The rapid change on board the American caused the Frenchmen to think that they had been the victims of a stratagem to decoy them to work in close and mass for boarding so that they could be effectively dealt with and wiped out at short range. The privateer-corsair thereupon promptly hauled off, badly injured and with a tremendous number of casualties, to join her discomfited consorts, which were licking their wounds out of range of the American guns. We are told, "The *Louisa* sailed into Gibraltar in triumph, and was greeted with enthusiasm by the thousands of people who had witnessed the action from the Rock."

The defeat and capture of the French naval corvette *Le Berceau* was evidently "the last straw" and caused the government of France to reach the decision that its Undeclared War with the United States was not working out very well and that French prestige was suffering greatly. It was France and not the United States that "cried quits" and took the initiative in negotiating a "treaty of peace" with the United States to end a war that technically had not existed. The ratification of peace in February 1801, with the dispatch of cruisers to recall American naval vessels cruising in the West Indies, brought to a close an undeclared (or quasi-) war and a long drawn-out period of hostilities, which put an end to French oppression of the American merchant marine until Napoleon, the Corsican parvenu, later ran wild toward the close of the first decade of the nineteenth century. It is evident that there is nothing new about the undeclared wars of the twentieth century; they have a prototype dating back to 1798 in American history.

In 1797, when the United States had no navy and not a single cruiser in regular service, the exports of the country were about \$57,000,000 and the revenue on imports approximately \$6,000,000. Government figures for the value of exports from the United States and of the revenue derived from imposts on merchandise and tonnage for each of the years when at war with France and for the first year of peace are stated herewith:

Year	Value of U. S. Exports	Revenue from U. S. Imposts on Goods and Tonnage	Year	Value of U. S. Exports	Revenue from U. S. Imposts on Goods and Tonnage
1798	\$61,327,411	\$7,106,061	1800	\$70,971,780	\$ 9,080,932
1799	78,665,522	6,610,449	1801	93,000,000	10,750,000

According to government statistics, the entire cost of the United States Navy from its beginning up to the end of 1800, including the building, equipping, and operation of all vessels, all expenses incurred under the act of February 25, 1799, for building six ships of the line, and the purchase and improvement of property for navy yards, etc., was \$8,818,155.58. We read:

If we extend the period of these expenses, so as to embrace the return of our ships, after the conclusion of peace with the French republic, they may be estimated to have amounted to ten millions of dollars; but if we deduct from this gross amount the expenditures for the purchase and improvement of navy-yards, the purchase of the islands and of

timber and other materials required for the construction of the six 74-gun ships, we should find that the whole expenses were short of \$8,500,000. Of this sum, \$3,583,777.58 had been expended in the building, purchasing, arming, repairing and equipping the different ships belonging to the navy.

With the rise to power of the Democratic-Republican party and the election of Thomas Jefferson as president, the navy was doomed. The Federalist party, and particularly its secretary of the navy, Benjamin Stoddert, had done a magnificent job in building quickly the nucleus of a real navy to protect American commerce and had succeeded in bringing volatile, supremely selfish, and belligerently revolutionary France to terms; but the first act of Jefferson, the pro-French, shortsighted, purse-tight Democrat, was to "junk the navy," and only the activities of the Barbary pirates prevented him from completing his plan of the demolition of a seagoing "imperialistic and anti-democratic" navy. Under the act of March 3, 1801, all the vessels belonging in the U. S. Navy except thirteen frigates and corvettes and one schooner (the *Enterprise*) were ordered to be divested of their armament and military stores and sold. The revenue brought into the treasury from the sale was \$309,330.59, or \$522,750.70 less than their cost. The original cost of building and equipping the fourteen vessels retained was \$2,464,250.67, and allowing for depreciation, their value in 1801 was at least \$2,120,000. It has been officially said that the actual cost to the nation of the protection afforded to its commerce during the years 1798, 1799, 1800, and part of 1801 was "six millions of dollars," and this stated amount includes the loss in the forced sale of vessels and the loss at sea of the *Insurgent* and the *Pickering*. Continuing, we are told that the United States commerce (protected at an expense of \$6,000,000) consisted of "surplus products of our country to an amount exceeding \$200,000,000" and imports from other countries yielding "to the government a revenue exceeding \$23,000,000."

In negotiating a peace treaty with France, the United States commissioners failed to obtain an agreement by which the French became obligated to pay compensation for private damage caused by seizures and condemnations—an amount estimated at some \$20,000,000. This had been covered by the Jay Treaty of 1794 with the British, but the French balked at such a provision and the American commissioners weakly agreed to final peace terms that did not include this very important feature. In 1803 the United States Government agreed to pay compensation for private damage as part of the Louisiana Purchase deal, but it was not until the end of 1915 that the Court of Claims cleaned up its docket, in which 6,479 cases had been handled involving 2,309 vessels.

*Despoiling the American Merchant Marine by
International Brigandage*

During the Undeclared War with France, the foreign trade of the United States and the national revenue from customs increased approximately fifty per cent, and coupled with this splendid commercial and economic record—which augmented a fine naval showing—was the knowledge that France had grown to realize that the United States was “a useful friend and a dangerous enemy.” Henceforth, for a period of some eight years (until the unscrupulous and rapacious Napoleon grew desperate), France was less aggressive and unjust toward American merchant ships and sailors than was England.

France, under Napoleon, was an ambitious imperialistic power and adopted any means, no matter how immoral, to aggrandize itself and its ruler. The caution and appeasement policies of the administration in Washington, culminating in Jefferson’s notorious Embargo Act of December 1807, bred contempt for the United States in the Corsican’s militaristic mind, although—exhibiting opportunism on one occasion for the benefit of certain enemies—he called it “a great and courageous sacrifice.” The American Nonintercourse Act of 1809, following the repeal of the Embargo Act and Macon’s Bill, operated to increase the hostility of both France and England toward the United States; with the Napoleonic wars waging bitterly, neither of the two great marine powers cared anything for or paid much attention to the “paper manifestoes” of a young nation that had “a puny navy and no line-of-battle ships.” Napoleon set a deliberate and diabolical trap to encourage American ships to sail, cargo laden, to European ports after the United States Embargo Act had been repealed by Congress in March 1809, and hundreds of unsuspecting American ships became the spoil of international brigandage. Winthrop L. Marvin has written:

When it seemed as if the diplomatic struggle for free trade and sailors’ rights might win a peaceful triumph, a great and noble fleet of American merchantmen, long pent up in harbor, loosened sail and sped over the Atlantic. These ships were freighted with a full lading of American produce and followed by the fervent hopes and prayers of a multitude of people, merchants, tradesmen, mariners,

who saw a chance to recruit the fortunes almost ruined by hateful embargo and nonintercourse. It is one of the bitter memories of the old sea towns from New England southward that very few of these gallant vessels ever returned. The snare was spread, though neither the waiting ones at home nor the brave ones who trod the stout decks knew it.

These American ships sailed confidently for the Mediterranean, west European Atlantic, North Sea, and Baltic ports, and they generally made harbor. The attitude of Napoleon, in continuing his ruse of encouragement to the trading of American ships, whose cargoes he coveted, is evidenced by his personal letter to the servile and obsequious Prussian Government, which reads, in part: “Let the American ships enter your ports. Seize them afterwards. You shall deliver the cargoes to me, and I will take them in part payment of the Prussian War debt.” Presumably, similar orders were sent to the governments of other subjugated countries and to the port officials, and privateers were used along some sections of the coast to make sure that the American ships and their cargoes reached ports dominated by the French.

John Quincy Adams, arriving at Christiansand, Norway, September 20, 1809, on his way to Russia (where he had been appointed to serve as United States minister), found “thirty masters of American vessels, who had been robbed of ship and cargo” by order of Davoust, acting under instructions of Napoleon. Adams declared that fifty American vessels valued at from four to five million dollars had been confiscated in Norway and Denmark alone and many others in Holland and Prussia. Napoleon ordered that American vessels in the ports of France, Spain, and Italy be “sequestered and sold” in retaliation for the Nonintercourse Act, which had done no harm to French shipping whatsoever. Napoleon estimated at \$6,000,000 the booty he obtained from his unscrupulous coup in Holland, Antwerp, and Spain alone; but,

as Marvin says, in this figure he did not include another \$6,000,000 which represented the value of American ships seized in Denmark, Hamburg, France, and Italy. The American consul in Paris stated that, in the year ending April 1810, "fifty-one American ships had been seized in the ports of France, forty-four in Spain, twenty-eight in Naples, and eleven in the ports of Holland." It was authoritatively said that "more than two hundred American vessels were lost to their owners" when Napoleon, like a brigand, lured them into a trap and closed it. On the ten to twelve million dollars (or more) that Napoleon plundered from Americans, France reluctantly paid, two decades later, five million dollars indemnity; but such claimed or attempted reparations—aside from being inadequate in an economic sense—could not possibly be anything approaching restitution. Napoleon's devilish trick had operated to despoil the American merchant marine at a time when it needed its fine, fast ships—the cream of the fleet. There are sections of the New England seacoast where there is a most positive dislike for the British, originally founded with good cause, that has been handed down through many generations; but there also lingers today in many an American coastwise town an inherited dislike for France. Paine says: "It is a legacy of that far-off catastrophe ['Napoleon's trap'] which beggared many a household and filled the streets with haggard broken shipmasters."

Napoleon's greed and treachery were promptly reflected in the tonnage of the deep-sea fleet of the United States. The tonnage of vessels registered for foreign trade—increased by the optimistic hopes of the shipowners and merchants in 1809—reached a record high of 984,269 tons in 1810, which incidentally is an all-time record for the country, measured in relation to population (or expressed as a ratio of United States foreign trade marine registered tonnage per capita), and a tonnage total that, even in a rapidly growing and expanding country, was not again equaled until the forties. By 1811, the tonnage had dropped to 768,852—a decline of 215,417 tons, or 22 per cent. A part of the drop can be attributed to the reluctance of American shipowners to build new vessels to replace those lost because of increasingly strained relations with Britain (which led to the War of 1812), but the bulk of the 215,417-ton loss in deep-sea tonnage can be attributed to artful and premeditated, unscrupulous plunderings by the French. It is interesting to note that Napoleon's great ruse, which resulted in the spoliation of a large part of the United States deep-sea trading fleet, contributed to his undoing. Marvin says: "It is one of the delicious ironies of history that the helpless and despised American merchant ships which Napoleon and his pro-consuls plundered proved to be one of the potent agencies which at last drew him to his doom."

When, under orders of Napoleon, ships of the United States were arbitrarily seized and condemned in north European ports, several other American vessels sought refuge at Kronstadt in the eastern Baltic and even in Archangel (far north in the Arctic), both of which were "free ports of the White Czar." Napoleon demanded of Emperor Alexander that the Russians exclude all such American craft and discontinue giving them asylum, for, he asserted, they were "British smugglers in disguise and unworthy of Russian hospitality." Alexander, however, was feeling too much economic as well as military pressure and liked the idea of developing trade between Russia and America, for he needed many goods that American ships could bring him and had suitable products for exchange, sale, or barter. Moreover, Alexander was gaining in spirit and was developing mental resistance to Napoleon's requests, which were intended as demands. The U. S. minister, Adams, reported that Czar Alexander would not exclude American ships from Russian ports or trade and that he had said, "Our attachment to the United States is obstinate—more obstinate than you are aware of." But Alexander went still further; he not only sanctioned Russian trade with America but also encouraged it in substantial fashion, even to the extent of granting the United States more favorable terms than those given to France. Napoleon, in a rage at Russian discrimination against French products, recalled his minister and planned vengeance, while American ships embraced the very welcome opportunity to trade with Russia. Henry Adams, in *HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES*, says that the foreign trade merchant fleet of the United States was "the rock on which Napoleon's destiny split; for the quarrels which in the summer of 1811 became violent between France and the two independent Baltic powers—Russia and Sweden—were

chiefly due to those omnipresent American ships which throve under pillage and challenged confiscation." Following the French Revolution, Russia not only resisted the continental system, or "new order," of Napoleon and against his vigorously expressed wishes gave support to the American merchant marine but also, during the Civil War in the United States, when European governments (led by Britain) favored intervention in the hope of making American disunity permanent, sent two fleets into United States waters—one to New York and one to San Francisco—as a warning to other nations to keep out of the domestic quarrel.

Right up to the time that the American republic was seemingly forced by a long chain of events into war with England, Napoleon played false with the United States. In August 1810, he seemingly revoked his obnoxious Berlin and Milan decrees. As usual, the young nation, after making inquiries and receiving assurances through diplomatic channels in regard to the future favorable attitude and behavior of France concerning American shipping, took the statements of Napoleon and his ministers in good faith, and President Madison went so far as to issue a proclamation with respect thereto. Once more, Americans proved gullible to the wily French, and the United States, as Marvin says, "was shamefully tricked by the desperate gamblers of Europe; before the Madison proclamation was six weeks old, news came that American vessels were being sequestered at Bordeaux."

A student of history, after covering the attitude of the French nation toward the young republic of the United States during the period from 1789 and the organization of the first real Federal Government, through the French Revolution, to the end of the Napoleonic Era, could not be expected to appreciate the attitude of the French people or feel much affection for them. Any debt due them for their aid in the American Revolution had been paid in full long before Napoleon rose to power. Moreover, the mercenary French (who as a people may sell, but never give) rendered assistance to the American colonial rebels for one reason only—to weaken their great enemy Britain; in furnishing some aid to the American revolutionists, the French were effectively fighting the English and causing harm where it would hurt the most and do the greatest lasting damage to the British Empire. There never has been anything altruistic about the French, and America, from the early nineteenth century, has positively never been in the debt of France; hence the absurdity of French propaganda soliciting America's help during European wars. The slogan used by the American Expeditionary Force in 1917-1918 was, "Lafayette, we are here"—with men and money. The United States lost both, and neither America nor the world gained anything whatsoever by the sacrifice. For centuries, the French have referred to England as "perfidious Albion," and the term was used freely and quite generally during the days of Napoleon. The appellation did not originate without cause. Although the characteristics of the British and French peoples are entirely different, the two nations were similar in their common enmity toward the United States during its early years of struggle and growth. In dealings with the government and the people of the United States, and particularly with regard to its maritime interests, the French and British majorities or parties (interests or classes) in power have, from the early days of the republic, been equally perfidious, unscrupulous, hostile, avaricious, and jealous. For a century and a half, America has not owed any European country anything. The debt, in more ways than one, is on the other side; moreover, it will be increased but never repaid even in part.

England, from the War of the Revolution, sought "an early check or restraint upon all American progress and especially upon the prosperity of American shipping." As the years advanced and France in a spirit of indignation and pique attacked American shipping, England consistently had one thought in mind—to protect and maintain maritime supremacy. Other nations were animated by no higher motive than that of the Algerine pirates, but the first consideration of England during its wars with the French was commerce and its domination. After England declared war on Napoleon, on April 29, 1803, there was much grandiose posing and four-flushing oratory permeated with propaganda about "England's death struggle with tyranny," but this was all sham. Britain was primarily interested in trade; all its moves of pretended "retaliation" and aggression against a despot were made and all its orders were issued for the benefit of British trade. If an English ship was not permitted to enjoy a certain

trade, then the British Navy was ordered to see that ships of no other nations—belligerent or neutral—benefited by it. Spencer Perceval, in the British Parliament on March 3, 1812, frankly stated, "The object of the Orders in Council was not to destroy the trade of the Continent but to force the Continent to trade with us." Lord Hawkesbury said, "I am of the opinion that some decisive measure in support of our own commerce . . . has become indispensable, not merely as a measure of commercial policy but in order to put the contest in which we are engaged upon its true grounds." England "monkeyed" with the United States in the early years of the republic and, during the Napoleonic wars, operated as if America were once more a dependent colony. England undoubtedly made a vassal of the United States, and America was even more powerless to withstand Britain's imperialistic domination of the seas than to withstand Napoleon's avaricious, highwayman tactics.

*Shipping and Commerce during the Critical but Prosperous Years
Immediately Preceding the Embargo of 1807*

The early years of the nineteenth century, before the Jefferson embargo of 1807, were turbulent and uncertain ones for the American shipowner and mariner. During the years 1799-1801, United States shipping registered for foreign trade, according to official figures, varied from about 631,000 tons in 1801 to 667,000 tons in 1800; but the total foreign commerce, which was approximately \$158,000,000 in 1799, was about \$162,000,000 in 1800 and had risen to over \$204,000,000 in 1801—the increase since 1797 (a period of four years) being some \$77,700,000, or 61 per cent. During this time, American ships carried approximately 91 per cent of the imports of the United States and 87 per cent of its exports. In the spring of 1801, conditions looked bright for American shipping, and freights were so high that, it was said, the revenue from one eastbound Atlantic crossing of a ship would practically pay for her cost of construction. The American merchant marine consisted of about nine thousand vessels, and about two-thirds of the tonnage was registered for foreign trade. The marine prosperity of the United States had been due largely to its position as the leading maritime neutral power, and when Britain and France patched up a peace in 1801, the "good news" was "bad news" to the American shipowner, merchant, and mariner and "instantly operated like the hand of death upon all business" in the United States. The year of the definitive European peace of Amiens (1802) saw deep gloom among the merchants and seafaring fraternity in America. Registered floating tonnage dropped from 667,107 tons in 1800 to 557,700 tons in 1802, and total foreign commerce, which was \$204,384,000 in 1800, was only \$120,466,000 in 1803—a decline of \$83,918,000, or 41 per cent, in two years; American ships handled only 84.5 per cent of combined imports and exports in 1803 as against 89 per cent in 1801 and 92 per cent in 1796. It has been said that "the sharp fluctuations of [United States marine registered] tonnage faithfully reflect the blows which foreign greed and domestic weakness and folly aimed at the merchant marine," but the depression of 1802-1803 was due primarily to a period of temporary peace in Europe and was affected to some extent by the actions of the Barbary pirate states.

The peace proved to be of short duration, a mere breathing spell, and the second round of the Franco-British conflict, which commenced in 1803, with Napoleon in command in France, was a much more serious matter for both belligerents and neutrals than the first round of the war. Napoleon was an executive and an ambitious imperialist. He made France a united, aggressive nation, increased its naval strength, sent victorious armies into almost every country of Continental Europe, and became an unscrupulous dictator. Britain, threatened

with invasion and the loss of its European markets, used sea power—its only potent weapon—most vigorously, and the result was a ruthless battle between belligerents on the seas, where the rights of neutrals received but scant consideration and they were used by both sides with only selfish opportunism in mind—never justice or honor.

Britain and France, by a series of orders in council and Napoleonic imperial decrees, began in 1806 to attempt to drive all neutral shipping from each other's ports. When British sea power tightened and Napoleon extended his control over Continental Europe, as Morison says, "it became no longer easy for American shipping to play both sides." Napoleon won the Battle of Jena on October 14, 1806, and a few days later made his triumphal entry into Berlin (the capital of his conquered foe), from where on November 21 he issued his famous Berlin Decree, which, while only a "paper blockade," was his retort to the British order in council issued six months earlier. This was followed by Napoleon's Milan Decree, and throughout 1806 and 1807, foreign trading got so increasingly difficult, complex, and risky that it paved the way for Jefferson's famous embargo. Yet in the face of all these handicaps and risks, of the constant threat of seizure of ships, cargoes, and men, the American marine thrived from the peace low of 1803 to the end of the turbulent and uncertain year of 1807, when the government, following Jefferson's recommendation, took American shipping from the seas.

The following comparative figures of 1803 and 1807 are significant and prove that American foreign commerce made its most remarkable gain of 105 per cent in four years of unprecedented handicaps, resistance, uncertainty, and hazards (and 92 per cent in the three-year period 1803-1806):

Year	Registered Foreign Trade Shipping Tons	Total Foreign Commerce	Percentage of Foreign Commerce Carried in American Vessels		
			Exports	Imports	Exports and Imports Combined
1803	585,910	\$120,466,699	83.0	86.0	84.5
1807	810,163	246,843,150	90.0	94.0	92.0

In 1806 the tonnage of shipping was 798,507 tons and the foreign commerce \$230,946,963. In 1811, the year before the war with Britain, the tonnage was down to 763,607 tons, and foreign commerce was only \$114,716,832.

To gain a somewhat intimate realization of the spirit of the critical and hazardous years of 1806 and 1807, which were, on the whole, so prosperous to American shipping, it is interesting to recall the incidents which during that period befell that gallant Yankee mariner, Capt. Richard Cleveland, of Salem. (Following his death in 1860, he was described as "an American sailor of the olden-time, a brave and knightly man of an heroic age in his country's history.") Captain Cleveland, born in 1773, started his experience with ships in the countinghouse of Elias Hasket Derby at Salem in 1786, and historian Paine speaks of Cleveland as "perhaps the finest type of the Salem shipmaster of the age when her seamen were the vikings of American commerce." In 1804, Captain Cleveland, having made a fortune of \$70,000 at sea during amazing historic voyages, felt the call to stay ashore and enjoy "the tranquil life of a New England village"; but in 1806 he was once more at sea in command of the ship *Telemaco*, "in which he had staked all his cash and credit" together with an investment of his friend and partner Nathaniel Shaler. Sailing from Rio de Janeiro to Havana, Cleveland wrote his wife of his confidence in escaping the pirates in the West Indies, but continued: "I expect to meet the British ships of war, but do not fear them, as my business is regular, and such as will bear the nicest scrutiny by those who act uprightly." He was not so confident in regard to well-armed and manned privateers, for such were mere buccaneers in spirit and action and respected the property of no one. Cleveland wrote that the time was a precarious one for neutrals, "when the two belligerents [Britain and France] agreed in nothing else than plundering them," and he added: "On the presumption, however, that such neutral commerce

as did not, even in a remote degree, prejudice the interests of the belligerents would be unmolested, I felt that I had little else than sea-risk to guard against, and was therefore free from anxiety on the subject of insurance."

Near the equator, the *Telemaco* was brought to by a British frigate and later by a sloop of war, and the commanders of both of these vessels, after satisfying themselves as to "the legality" of the voyage, treated Captain Cleveland with civility and permitted him to continue on his way. At the entrance to the Caribbean, the *Telemaco* came in contact with a British fleet under command of Admiral Cochrane, R.N., who was on H.M.S. *Ramillies* (74 guns). The Yankee skipper was summoned on board the flagship, his papers examined carefully, and as no cause could be found for his detention, he was permitted to proceed. However, the *Telemaco* had barely got under way bound for Havana when Admiral Cochrane either changed his mind or overruled his captain (and the commanders of two other vessels of the Royal Navy); for he arbitrarily signaled Captain Cleveland to heave to again and then, without further questioning or examination, ordered the American vessel to be seized and taken to Tortola in the Virgin Islands for condemnation proceedings. The formalities at the British vice-admiralty court were a farce; no fair hearing could be obtained by Captain Cleveland, and his vessel, with her valuable cargo, was arbitrarily confiscated. Following his fruitless attempts to get justice and fair play at the hands of the avaricious and unprincipled British agents and "judges," the Yankee skipper wrote: "I am now on the point of embarking for home, after being completely stripped of the fruits of many years hard toil." After a succession of difficulties had been overcome (including being dismasted in heavy gales of hurricane force and making Rio de Janeiro after "a voyage of 43 days in that crippled condition"), to see his entire wealth swept away "by the irresistible means of brute force" and himself and his family "reduced in a moment from affluence to poverty" was, as Captain Cleveland said, "a calamity of no ordinary magnitude." He continued: "After the villainy I have seen practised at Tortola, by men whose power and riches not only give them a currency among the most respectable, but make their society even courted, I blush for the baseness of mankind and almost lament that I am one of the same species."

During the wars between Britain and France, the United States merchant marine, through the benefits of being neutral, had grown too strong for the British to tolerate without expressing anxiety and displeasure and taking steps to counteract it. Orders were given to capitalize America solely for the benefit of Britain and not only to punish any attempt made by a United States vessel to trade with the enemy but also, in order to discourage American ships and commerce, to condemn every questionable case. It was said that "it were better to condemn nine innocent ships and American trading enterprises, rather than let one damned guilty rascal escape." The years 1806 and 1807 were eventful in Europe, but they were also the years when Britain practically waged war with the United States at the doors of its own harbors. The *Richard-Leander* affair occurred off Sandy Hook on April 25, 1806, and the unparalleled *Chesapeake-Leopard* humiliation off Hampton Roads on June 22, 1807. Either incident was a just cause for war, and it is possible that a war declared against Britain then would have had a much greater national backing than that declared in 1812. With Napoleon powerful and greatly annoying Britain, the arrogant Mistress of the Seas might have been rather quickly brought to terms as far as impressment and the arbitrary, unprincipled confiscation of United States ships and property were concerned. Adam Seybert estimated that the American merchant marine in 1801 was earning at least fifty dollars per ton annually. In 1806-1807, the profits were higher, and a total of about 800,000 tons of foreign shipping was probably earning over \$40,000,000 a year—an amount far greater than the capital invested in the fleet itself. These vessels, in case of war in 1806 or 1807, would have been used to a great extent in trading, as letters of marque, or as privateers, and in addition to being somewhat active and making some return on the investment, they would have given employment to every seaman who wanted a chance to work. The Jefferson pacifistic policy and the absolute embargo of December 22, 1807 (which was in effect until March 15, 1809, or 14½ months), cost the country dearly, and it has been authoritatively said that "war would have been cheaper and

more successful." In any event, when war was declared by Congress in June 1812, the United States was no better—if as well—prepared for it, and in the meanwhile Jefferson's weak appeasement policies had impoverished the country for a long period of time.

That Britain was deeply concerned over United States competition in shipbuilding and ship operations both prior to and during the War of 1812 is known from the statements of British shipbuilders, shipowners, and politicians, from the articles in the public press, and from the remarks of statesmen. In the "Report of the Committee of Correspondence on Trade with the East Indies and China, British Parliamentary Papers, 1815," there was given an estimated comparison of the cost of operation in 1805 of an American and an English vessel, each of 250 tons, on a round voyage between England and the United States. The cost of the English ship's passage was stated at £4,000 and that of the American vessel's at only £2,000, or one-half that of the British-built craft. Each ship, it was said, would carry 3,000 barrels of flour at nine shillings, or £1,350, and the average freight "from England back" would be £600—a total of £1,950. The estimate of operation officially presented, as prepared by an English merchant, was as follows:

AMERICAN CHARGES				ENGLISH CHARGES			
	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
Insurance out and home on £2500				Insurance out and home on £4000			
@ 4½%	95			@ 6%	360		
8 men, 5 months @ £5.....	200			12 men, 5 months @ £5.....	300		
Captain and mate @ £10 each...	100			Captain and mate @ £10 each...	100		
2400 lbs. bread @ 16s.....	19	4		360 lbs. bread for 14 people for			
Beef 10 bbls. @ 32s.....	16			5 months @ 32s.....	57	12	
Pork 10 bbls. @ 50s.....	25			15 bbls. of beef @ £4.....	60		
150 gallons rum.....	16	17		15 bbls. pork @ 90s.....	67	10	
Interest on £2000 5 months.....	41	13	4	220 gallons rum @ £5.....	55		
				Interest on £4000 5 months.....	83	6	8
	513	14	4		1083	8	8

It is difficult in these days to understand the details of the estimate, but they were seriously prepared, presented, and defended in Parliament along with other generally similar data in an attempt to prove that American ships in the first decade of the nineteenth century and prior to the War of 1812 could be both built and operated at one-half the cost of similar English-built vessels operated by Englishmen under the British flag.

The amazing interest in shipbuilding and in marine adventures during the years preceding the second war with Britain, by which the United States sought to obtain complete independence, is manifested by the placing of shipyards in naturally unfavorable geographic locations and by the courage and ingenuity displayed by marine enthusiasts in building vessels "locally," no matter what the handicaps might be in getting them to sea. John R. Spears, in *THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE*, gives the following illustration of the remarkable and irrepressible enterprise of Americans in the marine field during the first decade of the nineteenth century:

When a colony of New Englanders settled at Marietta, Ohio (Capt. Abraham Whipple was one of the number), they began to build ships there for the deep-water trade. The brig *St. Clair* of 110 tons was launched in 1800. In 1801 a ship of 230 tons and a brig of 126 were built. Three ships of 300 or more tons were completed in 1806 besides a number of smaller ones. A similar record was made

the next year. The largest ship built there was the *Francis* of 350 tons, built by Whitney for B. J. Gilman. She was of the largest size of her day. In all, seven ships, eleven brigs, six schooners, and two gunboats (for the navy) were built at Marietta before the War of 1812. Imagine a full-rigged ship, with all sails set, plunging over the Falls of the Ohio!

*The Effects of Jefferson's Appeasement Policy upon the
Country and Its Merchant Marine*

Following formal declaration of war on Napoleon by England on April 29, 1803, it was well known that, under the pacifist and appeasement policy of the Jefferson administration, the United States would not build vessels or even use the few ships in commission in its navy to protect American ships; therefore, the British decided to hamper aggressively, in every possible way, all American ships that acted as carriers of French goods. As belligerents, the British held the right to stop and examine neutral vessels on the high seas, and having once boarded an American ship, they promptly proceeded to assert their right to impress into the British naval service all the capable and healthy looking seamen who were or had been British subjects. In 1805 and afterwards, American merchant ships were stopped in American waters and robbed of members of their crews by British warships.

Two British frigates, the *Leander* and the *Cambrian*, virtually blockaded the port of New York for the avowed purpose of intercepting French commerce and searching all ships for property belonging to the French. However, this was only one of three real reasons; others were the occupation of American waters for the purpose of hampering American trade and the detention and search of all United States ships for the impressment of sailors whose taking would strengthen the British Navy and correspondingly weaken the American merchant marine. Boarding parties from the *Leander* and *Cambrian* searched all vessels entering and leaving New York. Not only the ships' papers but also private letters were scrutinized, sailors were impressed, and on any slight pretense ships would be seized and sent to Halifax for condemnation. The presence in New York waters of these British frigates—to say nothing of their arbitrary and persistently vexatious acts of humiliation—was a gross insult to the United States, and it is both amazing and disgraceful that it was tolerated even by a feeble and conciliatory government, which sought to lean backwards in an effort to avoid international unpleasantness that might lead to hostilities. On April 17, 1806, a memorial of the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York, signed by De Witt Clinton, was forwarded to President Jefferson, which said:

Our port is blockaded, our vessels intercepted, our seamen impressed, our commerce interrupted and our jurisdictional rights most grossly violated. A British squadron is now before our harbor, evincing a disposition to renew its outrages and to

perpetuate additional enormities. We therefore respectfully request that a naval force may be immediately stationed at this port, and that three or more American frigates may without delay be sent for our protection.

The extent and nature of the blockade established off the port of New York by the bullying British frigates are set forth in the writings of Basil Hall, a midshipman on H.M.S. *Leander*:

Every morning at daybreak we set about arresting the progress of all the vessels we saw, firing off guns to the right and left to make every ship that was running in heave to or wait until we had leisure to send a boat on board to see, in our lingo, what she was made of. I have frequently known a

dozen and sometimes a couple of dozen ships lying a league or two off the port, losing their fair wind, their tide, and worse than all, their market for many hours, sometimes the whole day, before our search was completed.

The evening of April 25, 1806, was of historic importance, as the events occurring at the entrance of New York Harbor at that time did much to shock the American people and make them realize that, notwithstanding the extreme and unprecedented pacific attitude of the administration and its persistent concessions to countries at war, an American merchant ship was part of America and that an attack on such a vessel was an attack upon the integrity and honor of the nation. The sloop *Richard*, engaged in coastwise trade and bound for New York, was fired on without warning when about to enter the outer harbor by the British 50-

gun frigate *Leander* (Captain Whitby). A shot across the bow caused the little vessel to heave to, much against the captain's will, as he wanted to "make the tide," and almost immediately thereafter two reckless and unwarranted shots came from the *Leander*. One shot went over the sloop, but the last one decapitated the helmsman, John Pierce, the captain's brother. The only excuse made by the *Leander* for this indiscriminate shooting, which resulted in the death of an American sailor, was that "it was all a joke"—that the gunner meant to aim high and scare the Americans but not injure them. The *Richard* reached New York the next day, and Captain Pierce placed the mangled body of his murdered brother on public view in City Hall so that the people could see what had happened. The arrogant British were vigorously denounced by the marine fraternity, John Pierce's funeral became a great public demonstration, and a flame was kindled in the minds of the New York populace "like that which blazed up out of the red snow of the Boston massacre." New York was aroused, the ships' boats of the British fleet were chased out of the harbor when they attempted to land for supplies, British naval officers on shore were driven into hiding, and a grand jury indicted Captain Whitby of the *Leander* for murder. As the news of the calamitous incident spread, the rage of New York was repeated in every town and community of the country. The affair quickly became of national importance; the infuriated people cried out for revenge; and on May 3 President Jefferson, against his will, was compelled to do something. The spirit of war was surging through the colonies, so "the great appeaser" issued a proclamation ordering the arrest of the commander of the *Leander*—if found within United States jurisdiction—and closing all ports and harbors of the country to British warships and their commanders. Jefferson apologetically informed the British that he was compelled to do this to prevent threatened "incidents" of reprisal that would inevitably lead to war.

Shortly after the Jefferson proclamation restricting the activities of British war vessels in the United States, Britain, incensed and partly in retaliation for the "insult," dealt another severe blow to American deep-sea shipping by proclaiming a limited blockade of the European coast from the River Elbe to Brest and a strict blockade from the Seine to Ostend—forbidding all neutral ships to enter this prescribed area under any condition. The restrictions developed from this British order in council of 1806 naturally provoked Napoleon to resort to counteroffensive measures aimed at Britain. In October 1806, he crushed Prussia, won the Battle of Jena, entered Berlin, and on November 21 issued the famous Berlin Decree declaring a blockade of the entire coast of the British Isles. This retaliatory measure forbade all neutral vessels to trade with Britain and made all goods of British origin (whatever their subsequent ownership) liable to confiscation; by later decrees, the vessels carrying British goods were also made liable to seizure. Napoleon also declared that any neutral vessel violating his order could not enter any port of France or its colonies or possessions and, when apprehended in a violation, would be condemned to confiscation. As the United States was the only maritime nation that had not been drawn into the maelstrom of the Napoleonic war during this blockade fight between the English and the French, both the British order in council of May 1806 and the retaliatory French Berlin Decree of November 1806 were aimed directly and almost solely at United States ships and fell with demoralizing and devastating effect upon American commerce. The United States, with no navy and, therefore, helpless in the defense of its rights as a neutral, was placed between the relentless grindstones of the world's two greatest powers, Britain and France.

At this early period in our country's history, the North and the South were divided politically. Jefferson's party, which predominated in the South and was in power as the "Republican" party, was known as the "French" party. The political party in opposition to Jefferson "Republicans" was known as the "Federalist" party. The northern states, with their great shipping interests, were anti-French—fierce haters of Napoleon—and were driven to the moral support of England and its allies in the wars against Napoleon and the French. Jefferson and the southern Republicans in power had few ships and sailors, and they legislated "to protect" American shipping to the extent of commercial nonintercourse. New England and the maritime states demanded freedom of the seas and the right to operate their ships and take

chances in regard to embargo, impressment, and confiscation. Jefferson's party was for appeasement; it was French in sympathy but essentially pacific. It would take no action in any way that might lead to hostilities, but was content to preach, proclaim, and legislate. The Federalists, on the other hand, were in a dilemma. They were in opposition to the English on the seas, but, although inclined to fight for freedom of the seas, free trade, and sailors' rights, did not want to wage war against Britain while it was engaged in fighting the Corsican upstart who had crucified democracy in Europe.

Jefferson's nonimportation bill aimed at England was passed in 1806 after turbulent debates, but it was decreed that this bill should not take effect for a year pending negotiations in London. Britain, unimpressed by the legislative and administrative acts of the United States, promulgated an order in council on January 7, 1807, which stated, "No vessels shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both of which ports shall belong to or be in the possession of France or her allies." As all of the continent of Europe, with the exception of Sweden, was at this time under the domination of the French, this proclamation really meant that henceforth American ships could not engage in European commerce.

Throughout 1807, England hoped that its policy in regard to ocean commerce and Napoleon's Berlin Decree would drive the United States—the only important neutral maritime power—to declare war on France. The United States failed to do this, and Britain, weary of negotiations with Jefferson's pro-French government, issued an order in council on November 11, 1807, which declared all ports from which "the British flag is excluded" in a state of blockade. This was followed on November 25 by a proclamation reopening the ports to neutral ships provided that the trade be carried on by way of England and such ships' cargoes be landed at the English port of call. This order in council practically made the United States a vassal of England and re-established the law in effect in colonial days whereby goods purchased by Americans in Europe had to be carried to an English port, landed, and checked, and whereby tribute in the form of import duties on the cargo had to be paid before such cargo could be reloaded and taken to America. England, convinced that it could not, as hoped, wipe the American merchant marine off the ocean, was determined to make American ships serve British interests as far as possible, carry British goods to the ports from which British ships were excluded, and pay heavy toll by being required to land these cargoes in English ports.

The prime reason for all the British orders in council affecting shipping was the desire for supremacy of the British merchant marine—as well as the British Navy—and British foreign commerce. The avowed purpose of the November 1807 proclamation was to support and encourage the growth of the king's mercantile marine, "which the exertions and valor of his people have under the blessing of Providence enabled him to establish and maintain." Napoleon, as was to be expected, promptly retaliated to Britain's aggressive declarations of policy and in his Milan Decree of December 17, 1807, directed the confiscation, by France and all its allies and subjugated states, of all neutral ships that accepted British protection and paid British duties.

John R. Spears, referring to the British practice of taking American sailors from American ships and compelling them to serve in British warships, says: "The practice was maintained as one method of depressing our navigation. Many American merchantmen were left short-handed upon the high seas, and there is no doubt that some of them were, for this reason, lost with all hands." The inexcusable attack on April 25, 1806, by the British frigate *Leander* upon the harmless American sloop *Richard* (while she was entering New York Harbor engaged in coastwise trade), with the murder of John Pierce, the helmsman, without any provocation whatsoever, was an act of war, but our pacifist president, Jefferson, took the insult quietly in harmony with his appeasement policy and, to the chagrin, mortification, and despair of the seafaring interests and communities of the country, merely "turned the other cheek." The official reaction (because of the woefully weak, humble, and cowardly policy of the administration) to Britain's striking of this second cheek is—considering the nature and intensity of the blow—an infamous blot upon the escutcheon of the United States.

In the spring of 1807, while the U. S. 36-gun frigate *Chesapeake* was being outfitted and commissioned at the Washington navy yard to relieve the U.S.S. *Constitution* in the Mediterranean (the U. S. treaties with the bashaw of Tripoli and the bey of Tunis having been signed some eighteen months before), the British minister informed the U. S. Government that three sailors who had deserted from H.B.M. frigate *Melampus* were enrolled among the crew of the *Chesapeake*. It is surprising that the British Secret Service was functioning to an extent that permitted it to delve into such picayune matters. The statement of the British minister was taken seriously, and an investigation of the claim in regard to the men was ordered and undertaken by Master Commandant Charles Gordon, who was in command of the ship. One of the deserters declared that he was a native of the eastern shore, and cross-examination by Gordon, who had lived in the region himself and was, therefore, well acquainted with it, convinced the American naval officer of the man's veracity. A second deserter was a Negro, and "no question was entertained on the part of the *Chesapeake's* officers as to his right of American protection." In regard to the third man, it would seem that there was no conclusive evidence on either side, but the sailor stoutly maintained that he was a citizen of the United States. All the three "deserters" emphatically asserted that they had been impressed into the British Navy against their wills, and this the British officers working on the case could not deny; therefore, as two of the men were deemed to be "unquestionably entitled to American protection" and the third one reasonably so, the British minister was informed that the demand for the three men would not be honored and that they would not be given up. This seemed to end the matter as far as diplomatic channels were concerned, and the incident was considered closed.

On June 22, 1807, the *Chesapeake*, flying the broad pennant of Capt. James Barron, dropped down the bay to Hampton Roads and made sail for the Mediterranean. She was in no shape either to go to sea or fight and was "in a disgraceful chaotic condition," with equipment and stores (including furniture, personal effects, provisions, chicken coops, etc.) cluttering the decks. Not a single gun was in a condition to be fired, as in the confusion aboard the rammers, wads, matches, gunlocks, and powder horns could not be produced. The spars, rigging, and sails of the *Chesapeake* were being given attention before the encumbered decks were made shipshape and the armament usable, when the British 50-gun frigate *Leopard* (Captain Humphreys), which had been lying in Lynnhaven for some days and had preceded the *Chesapeake* to sea by an hour or so, allowed the American frigate to come up with her. About forty-five miles from port, the *Leopard*, being to windward, bore up and ran close abeam of the badly disorganized American, which was struggling while under canvas to bring order out of chaos—something that any competent commander would have done while the ship was at anchor in protected waters. The *Leopard* hailed, and Captain Humphreys signaled, saying that he had dispatches which he desired to have taken to Europe, so he would lower a boat and send aboard the *Chesapeake*—a procedure of exchange of courtesies quite common in those days. When the British lieutenant reached Captain Barron's cabin, however, he handed over not dispatches for Europe but an order signed by Vice Admiral Berkeley of the Royal Navy dated June 1, 1807, directing all commanders of vessels in his squadron to board the *Chesapeake* wherever found on the high seas and to search her for deserters. The powerful *Leopard* had evidently been specifically detailed to watch for the sailing of the smaller *Chesapeake* and, when clear of land, carry out the orders of search, using such force as might become necessary. Maclay, in HISTORY OF THE NAVY, says: "In this arrogant assumption of authority Vice-Admiral Berkeley, without the sanction of his government, not only presumed to institute a radical innovation in that most delicate of all legal subjects, international law, but proceeded in an arbitrary way to carry out his views in this case without so much as informing the American authorities of his dissatisfaction."

Captain Humphreys of H.B.M. frigate *Leopard* demanded the right to send a boarding party over to examine all the crew of the U.S.S. *Chesapeake*, with the object of impressing into the British naval service those members on whom it would arbitrarily assert Britain had

a claim. This unprecedented request of a warship of one nation demanding the right to board and search a warship of another nation and impress members of her crew was naturally indignantly refused; whereupon, as Edward Ellsberg says, the heavily armed *Leopard* "treacherously loosened her flaming broadsides upon our unsuspecting frigate *Chesapeake* to slaughter in cold blood our fellow citizens and then impudently pressed from her crew part of her seamen to fight the king's battles for him." He continues: "The depths of our national degradation has been plumbed. . . . The *Chesapeake*, taken unawares and unprepared in times of peace for the *Leopard's* murderous attack, was unable to fire a shot in return and had to haul down her flag when her decks were littered with dying sailors." (The latter statement is somewhat exaggerated, as the *Chesapeake's* decks were "littered" with materials that should never have been there, and to these cases and bales of supplies, turned into debris by enemy fire, were added many wounded and a few dead or dying sailors.) For some fifteen minutes, it is said, the *Leopard*, at short range and in smooth water, fired broadside after broadside into the unresisting and helpless *Chesapeake*. Historians generally tell us that "not one shot was fired in return," but it appears that just as the Stars and Stripes was being hauled down, Lieut. William H. Allen "seized a live coal from the galley fire with his fingers and discharged a gun," which hulled the *Leopard*. Out of a crew of 375 men, the *Chesapeake*, in this British naval murder, had suffered 21 casualties (3 killed and 18 wounded). All her masts were badly injured, the rigging greatly damaged, the sails riddled with grape and canister, and twenty-one large round shot had hulled her, the entire cruel engagement being fine—and safe—target practice for the gunners of the *Leopard*.

After the *Chesapeake* had struck her colors, she was boarded by British naval officers. They mustered all the crew and took the three men who had been on the *Melampus* (William Ware, David Martin, and John Strachan) and a fourth who, they claimed, had left the British cruiser *Halifax*. All these men protested to the last that they were American citizens and had been impressed into the British Navy against their wills notwithstanding their citizenship and sworn allegiance to the United States. Captain Barron informed the commander of the *Leopard* that he had taken the *Chesapeake* by force of arms and the American frigate was his prize captured by an act of war, but Captain Humphreys refused to view the matter in that light. His work had been merely "punitive," and having obtained his objective, he sailed the *Leopard* away with her four prisoners, and Captain Barron took the humiliated and unlucky *Chesapeake* back to Hampton Roads.

The news of the *Leopard* outrage caused great indignation and excitement throughout the length and breadth of the United States; the insult to the United States flag and to the young American nation could not be exaggerated. Because the United States had for years permitted the British to board American merchantmen and impress members of the crew into the British Navy without avenging the insolence and defending the nation's sovereignty and honor, the British were encouraged to inflict the maximum possible indignity and humiliation upon the Stars and Stripes and the American people by robbing a national frigate of members of its crew. It was said, "To the mass of the people, it looked like a deliberate British attempt to break the national spirit utterly by an aggravated case of the hateful spirit of impressment."

The national outrage brought about by the *Chesapeake-Leopard* incident recalled to the minds of the American people the *Baltimore* affront of 1798, which occurred when the United States and Britain were attacking a common enemy. On November 16, while convoying American merchant vessels from Charleston to Havana, the U. S. sloop-of-war *Baltimore* (Capt. Isaac Phillips) fell in with a powerful British squadron, under the command of Commodore Loring, consisting of three ships of the line, *Carnatie* of 74 guns (the flagship), the *Queen* of 98 guns, and the *Thunderer* of 74 guns, and two 32-gun frigates, the *Maidstone* and the *Greyhound*. The British commodore informed Captain Phillips that it was his purpose to impress into British naval service every man in the *Baltimore* who did not personally have an American "protection certificate." Phillips protested at the insult to the United States flag from such a procedure and remonstrated that it would leave his sloop in a defenseless

state, as it would deprive him of many men. Few Americans felt it necessary to carry "protection" affidavits with them, as they naturally thought that service on board a government vessel under the national flag was all the protection needed. Arguments proved in vain. The *Baltimore* was boarded by British officers, and 55 of her complement were selected and taken aboard the *Carnatie* under the eyes of a fleet of five big warships mounting 310 guns, supposedly allied with the United States against the French. Later, Commodore Loring, thinking better of his action, returned 50 of the men, permanently retaining 5, among whom was the *Baltimore's* boatswain. Having in the meantime raided the American convoy of merchant ships and seized three of the vessels, Commodore Loring sailed for Havana after acknowledging that he had a number of impressed Americans in his own crews. The three merchantmen, after a vexatious and unwarranted delay, were finally released by the British and permitted to proceed on their voyage. As a result of this "unprecedented situation," which proved, according to an official letter from the secretary of the navy, "so degrading" to the flag, the helpless Captain Phillips was dismissed from the naval service on January 10, 1799, while the American public fumed and denounced the effrontery and arrogance of the British.

Jefferson supinely protested to the British regarding the *Chesapeake-Leopard* incident and futilely sought to negotiate an amicable solution of difficulties that could be solved only by a complete change of the arbitrary British "divine right" policy or the withdrawal by the United States from deep-sea commerce. The British cabinet at Westminster disavowed the act of Captain Humphreys and the orders of his superior officer and recalled Vice Admiral Berkeley from the station, with the object of pacifying the exasperated "American rabble," who were "crying for revenge and war," but the admiralty, soon after the British Ministry had insisted that Berkeley be relieved of his post, proved how it felt in the matter by assigning him to a more important post. While the American Nonimportation Act (postponed for a year before it was to become effective) was being discussed in London looking to a harmonious settlement, a British royal proclamation was made on October 17, 1807, requiring all British naval officers to enforce the claimed right of impressment to its full extent against neutral merchant ships. This was Britain's answer to America's protests of years, including those concerning the *Richard* and the *Chesapeake* episodes, and it was made at about the time that Jefferson's Nonimportation Act was to become effective. It is evident that all American acts and protests and the diplomacy of the Jefferson administration gave Britain, the Mistress of the Seas, little if any concern; for the United States had no navy, and it was well known abroad that the administration was pacific and would not fight for its rights, even if it had the ships and armed forces to do so.

Captain Barron was tried by court-martial and was found guilty of one of four charges; viz., "For neglecting, on the probability of an engagement to clear his ship for action." His treatment by "fellow members of the navy club" was extremely temperate as far as condemnation of his laxity and absolute unpreparedness to defend himself was concerned, but he was suspended from the service without pay for five years. It is well to know that later Barron's application for active duty was opposed by most of his colleagues, and this led to the Decatur-Barron duel at Blandensburg, Md., on March 22, 1820, in which Capt. Stephen Decatur, a popular naval hero, was fatally wounded. (Barron, at the time of his death in 1841, was commandant of the Philadelphia navy yard.) Master Commandant Charles Gordon and Captain Hall of the Marines (who—particularly the former—were certainly not blameless for the existing chaotic condition) escaped with "a private reprimand" while the chief gunner was cashiered.

Of the four men taken by the British from the *Chesapeake*, the three who had been on the *Melampus* were each sentenced to receive five hundred lashes (a cruel punishment little short of the death penalty), but the carrying-out of the sentence was delayed pending approval of the home government. The fourth man was accused of insulting and humiliating Lord James Townsend of H.B.M.S. *Halifax* on the streets of Norfolk, Va., and we read that "the puerile spite of the noble Lord James . . . could not be appeased until he saw Jenkin Ratford [also

known as John Wilson] hanged at the fore-yardarm of the *Halifax* before instructions from England could arrive" in regard to the disposition and punishment of the men. Although this "flagrant offense" against a presumably sovereign and friendly nation was disavowed by the British Government, it was only after a lapse of several years that the two survivors were returned; in the meanwhile, in addition to the man who had been summarily hanged, the fourth had died. The persistent insults to the Stars and Stripes and the apparently studied and deliberately planned humiliations to which the United States was being steadily subjected by Britain taught the American people, in general, that the dignity of a nation could be maintained only by a respectable showing of force. As Maclay says:

When they were thus rudely awakened to the fact that even their largest frigates were incapable of resenting insults, they became apprehensive of their defenseless ships, representing a tonnage of two millions, which spread their sails on every sea. The condition of the *Chesapeake* on the 22nd of

June, 1807, unprepared to vindicate its honor by immediate action, illustrates the humiliation and danger that ever await a nation when its coast defenses and navy are permitted to deteriorate and decay.

On December 18, 1807, Congress authorized the construction of 188 additional gunboats designed for harbor, river, and coast defense (in smooth waters), making a total of 257 vessels of this class on the Navy List. These were vessels of Jefferson's "nonaggression" navy and not only wasted money but also operated to deceive many Americans, particularly those who lived outside of the maritime provinces, in regard to the strength of the U. S. Navy for purposes of defense. The War of 1812 positively proved the Jefferson gunboats to be useless, but competent marine men—from the Delaware to Maine—were fully convinced of their futility from the start and branded them correctly as "senseless two-penny boats that will do us more harm than they ever will the enemy."

The persistent patrolling of the entrance to United States harbors by British war vessels, with the forming of a virtual blockade, which occurred in the early years of the nineteenth century and led to the War of 1812, was admittedly for the purpose of preventing America from trading with Britain's enemies and for the impressment into the British Navy of American sailors. Whereas there was a concentration of effort where shipping routes, deep-sea and coastal, converged outside a port, the British naval practice of search and impressment was universal, and as a result of the stopping of American ships on the open sea by British cruisers looking for alleged British seamen, many sailors were forcibly carried off United States merchant ships in mid-ocean, leaving the vessels bereft of their best seamen and with their crews so dangerously weakened that all were severely handicapped in making port, and some were lost, having insufficient competent hands aboard to take care of the ship in bad weather. But British naval activity against United States shipping went much further than impressment of seamen. Any American vessel loaded with a cargo that a British naval commander suspected of possibly being ultimately intended to reach an enemy of Britain was ordered out of her course and into some British port, where she was in due time unloaded and searched. This frequently resulted in the confiscation of American cargoes for the benefit of the British exchequer and always entailed a serious loss of time to the merchant. Before the War of 1812 put a stop to these arbitrary actions (but, even then, not by any honest and aboveboard treaty stipulation), there were fair-minded British officials who not only questioned the wisdom of the policy but also denounced the practice in effect as unjust. Lord Dundonald, a brilliant naval commander who, as a Parliamentarian, made himself felt in seeking to correct naval abuses, wrote in his private journal:

On our arrival at Halifax we found many American vessels which had been detained, laden with corn [grain] and provisions. These had been seized by our predecessors on the station, the act by no means tending to increase our popularity on subsequent visits along the United States coasts. Another practice which was pursued here always ap-

peared to me a questionable stretch of authority toward a neutral nation, viz., the forcible detention of English seamen whenever found navigating American ships. Of this the government of the United States justly complained, as inflicting severe losses on its citizens, whose vessels were thus delayed or imperiled for want of hands.

The British orders in council and the Napoleonic decrees in effect at the end of 1807 put the American shipowner in an untenable position. If he ignored the British proclamation, his ship was subject to capture and condemnation by the British; if he complied with the order, he made himself liable to seizure by the French. Jefferson thereupon took the position that American ships and sailors, since he could not protect them on the high seas, should be required by law to remain in port or in home waters; hence the notorious and famous embargo which caused America "to slink shamefacedly from the seas." On December 18, 1807, Jefferson sent to Congress his embargo message, which said in part:

The British regulations had before reduced us to a direct voyage to a single port of their enemies, and it is now believed they will interdict all commerce whatever with them. A proclamation, too, of that government . . . seems to have shut the door on all negotiations with us, except as to the single aggression on the *Chesapeake*. The sum of these mutual enterprises on our national rights is that France and her allies, reserving for future consideration the prohibiting our carrying anything to the British territories, have virtually done it by re-

straining our bringing a return cargo from them; and Great Britain, after prohibiting a great proportion of our commerce with France and her allies, is now believed to have prohibited the whole. The whole world is thus laid under interdict by these two nations, and our own vessels, their cargoes, and crews are to be taken by the one or the other for whatever place they may be destined out of our limits. If, therefore, on leaving our harbors, we are certainly to lose them, is it not better as to vessels, cargo, and seamen to keep them at home?

Jefferson's idea of protecting American honor and of saving American ships and sailors was to order them to stay at home, "the ships to rot at their moorings, and the sailors to starve to death." New England and the coast-line cities and settlements fought the idea of an embargo and the abandonment of the seas, but with a rallying cry of "We must save our sailors," the embargo bill passed both houses on December 22, 1807, and became law. Immediately thereafter, all U. S. war vessels were recalled from the Mediterranean, and the few warships in commission were ordered to remain in American waters. Actually, the embargo bill was declared by the administration to be a measure to keep the nation out of war. Josiah Quincy had previously begged the House to remember that the ocean would never be abandoned by Americans, that the sea was in their blood, that the past history and destiny of the people were allied to the deep, and that Americans "would rather see a boathook than all the sheep crooks in the world." He paid an apt tribute to the indomitable seafarers of New England when he said, "Concerning the land of which the gentleman from Virginia and the one from North Carolina think so much, they think very little. It is, in fact, to them only a shelter from the storm, a perch on which they build their eyrie and hide their mate and their young, while they skim the surface or hunt in the deep."

After the *Chesapeake* episode of June 1807 and national humiliation at the hands of a contemptuous and ruthless Britain, the country both north and south cried out to avenge the insults, and Jefferson, if he had called on Congress to declare war, would have had a united nation behind him. But Jefferson wanted peace, not strife, and used his political influence and persuasive arguments so well that his Embargo Act, when it became law, was really popular with a large majority of Congress. From the first, the embargo was denounced by New Englanders and the marine interests of the country, who, even if they had no government and no armed forces to protect them in peaceful commerce, demanded the right to trade on the ocean at their own risk as free men. Edward Ellsberg well expresses the views of New Englanders when he says:

By Jefferson's fiat, free Americans, who fought for liberty and won independence, were required to bear at King George III of Britain's hands, the tyrannies which as his subjects they could not stomach. . . . To what nether depths of hell had we as a nation sunk when we could find no answer to foreign arrogance in looting our ships and murder-

ing (or impressing) our seamen save by Jefferson's act of embargo, which proclaimed ourselves before the world as craven poltroons, unwilling to defend ourselves, abandoning the seas which are our right and our heritage lest the presence of our ships there offend some petty tyrant flouting every law of man and God.

From the start, the important shipping communities of the country showed a tendency to defy the government and flout the embargo, and gunboats and troops were required to en-

force its provisions. The embargo, being a pro-French measure, naturally pleased Napoleon, and he so expressed himself and praised it; but he was not called upon "to pay the piper" as were the merchants, shipowners, and seamen of the maritime states and the nation's seaports. Britain officially treated the matter with indifference, but was, nevertheless, delighted to note the paralysis of the foreign trade of its greatest rival in the realm of ocean commerce. The Embargo Act was crudely drawn, and it was quickly followed by supplementary legislation to plug the loopholes and make evasions increasingly difficult. A hundred towns in Massachusetts adopted resolutions against the embargo, and the state legislature denounced it as unconstitutional. Sailors in Boston and Philadelphia marched and presented their grievances to the authorities, demanding work or bread, and in New York idle sailors were fed by the city. Government officials in New England, unwilling to enforce the obnoxious law, resigned from office, and the administration removed many for "lack of zeal." The coast had to be patrolled by armed vessels, but ships loaded with cargo sailed from the Kennebec, the Merrimac, and other northern ports literally fighting their way to sea. In 1807 exports totaled \$108,000,000 and imports \$138,000,000; the following year, they had dropped to \$22,000,000 and \$56,000,000, respectively. (The value of both exports and re-exports in 1808 was only one-fifth of that reported for 1807.) In 1808 American foreign commerce was dead, and the effect upon the nation's ports was devastating. In New York, "by February five hundred ships were decommissioned in the port." There were ninety-three transatlantic crossings from New York or Boston to Liverpool in 1807, but not a single one in 1808. A European traveler visiting in New York in 1808 described the city as one "stricken by pestilence," and he further wrote:

The port, indeed, was full of ships but they were dismantled and laid up, . . . and scarcely a sailor was to be found on board. Not a box, bale, cask, barrel, or package was to be seen upon the wharves. Many of the counting-houses were shut up or advertised to let. . . . The coffee-houses were almost empty; the streets near the waterside were almost deserted; the grass had begun to grow upon the wharves.

An army of unemployed trod the water front of the country's largest ports, as all business connected with marine shipping or dependent upon it to freight its goods to market either suspended operations or ran only part time. Seamen became increasingly restive as the weeks and months passed. New York supplied soup kitchens to keep seafaring men alive, and many of them, strongly against their wills, were driven to seek employment on British ships. By September 1808, every port in the United States felt most seriously the paralyzing effects of Jefferson's embargo. Discipline generally averted threatening riots, but could not prevent the flood of bankruptcies and the prevailing economic distress, which, being in evidence first in coast towns, gradually extended inland.

The enforcement of the embargo law and the passage of such supporting legislation as the Force Act, by which "every lad who went out for a day's fishing might have his boat stopped and his lunchbag searched," steadily intensified popular wrath, and the embargo was defied with ever-increasing shrewdness and determination. Moreover, the measure was not enforced with uniform thoroughness and ardor by the Federal Government. Certain traders for the Orient sailed unmolested from the Delaware, whereas similar vessels endeavoring to leave the Kennebec would be fired on by land forts and gunboats stationed in the river. An evasion practiced in the South would not be tolerated by the government forces stationed in New England. Smuggling and illicit trade were encouraged, and the harbors of Canadian provinces (over the line from Maine and Vermont) and Florida (over the southern boundary of Georgia) became active camouflaged shipping ports for United States goods.

Jefferson's efforts at "peaceful coercion" by means of the embargo (1807-1809) and the nonintercourse acts, which put a stop to legal trade, led to wholesale violations and developed a spirit of lawlessness and disunity that was most unfortunate and had a pronounced ill effect when the inevitable war (of 1812) finally came about. Jefferson, though pro-French and anti-British in sympathies, generally has been described as "a long-range nationalist," but his actions during his two terms as president (1801-1809) clearly substantiate the statement made of him that "the farmer, not the merchant, was his man; the interior, not the coast, was his first con-

cern." As the embargo continued, it became apparent that it was operating seriously to damage and tending to ruin America's economic position without materially affecting Britain and certainly without bringing it to terms on a single fundamental issue.

The tide was beginning definitely to turn in the United States when in January 1809, the president was empowered (i.e., virtually ordered by the Congress) to put into commission the frigates *United States*, *President*, and *Essex* and the corvette *John Adams* and to increase the naval complement from 1,425 to 5,025 men and boys. Jefferson's "little navy" idea no longer received popular support. The Embargo Act had to be repealed in the spring of 1809 because of the temper of the people, the poverty, lawlessness, and injustice associated with it, and because of its general condemnation as an unsound economic and protective measure. But the Jeffersonians, defeated in Congress by the Federalists, were reluctant to see the embargo withdrawn and were strong enough as a political party to pass a nonintercourse act. The people of the seaboard rejoiced when the embargo bill was withdrawn on March 15, 1809, as Jefferson's executive career was closing, but Congress, with its Nonintercourse Act, substituted one evil measure for another and tied President Madison's hands.

There was no relaxation in the fierce hostility of Britain and of the Napoleon French Empire toward the merchant marine of the United States. Napoleon regretted the repeal of the American Embargo Act and diabolically plotted to take full advantage of certain conditions resulting therefrom. Erskine, the British minister at Washington, entered into an agreement with President Madison whereby certain British orders in council would be recalled on June 10, 1809, if the United States would renew its trade with England and its dominions. Madison thereupon issued a proclamation that after that date American ships would be free to trade with Britain and its colonies. In conformity with this understanding entered into and the pledge given by the accredited representative of a foreign power, American ships loaded cargo, and many of them had sailed when another bombshell burst. England disavowed and repudiated the acts and promises made by its minister and recalled him. It canceled some of its orders in council only to issue others that were "up to date" and blockaded the coasts of France, Holland, and northern Italy.

The United States Congress, before it adjourned, in an effort to cope with international trade conditions, avoid hostilities, and influence the belligerent powers to be more reasonable and friendly toward United States shipping, substituted for the Nonintercourse Act a measure known as Macon's Bill No. 2. This law allowed American ships to trade for the time being with any port in the world, but empowered President Madison, in case "either Great Britain or France shall, before the third day of March next, so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," to cut off all intercourse with the persistently hostile power. This was playing one belligerent against the other and bidding for the trade of one while hoping to obtain the trade of both. It was a foolish hope and merely another weak move. France pretended "to bite" at the proffered bait, and United States shipping suffered greatly because of Napoleon's treachery and brigandage. Britain, as usual, scorned the legislative acts and "paper manifestoes" of a young pacifistic nation that was powerless in a world where the might of armed forces ruled and the measure of the freedom of the seas obtainable by either a neutral or a belligerent nation was what it could win and hold by line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops of war, armed and fighting merchantmen, and privateers.

As the British Government contemptuously ignored the "overture or the warning" of the Macon legislation, the United States Government in November 1810 gave three months' notice that commercial intercourse with Britain would cease as required by this act of Congress. The British acknowledgment of this notice was not in words, but consisted of an audacious act further to humiliate a young and defenseless nation and treat the United States more like an unruly colonial vassal. Ignoring the American reaction to the blockade of New York Harbor by the British frigates *Leander* and *Cambrian* in 1805, the British Government sent the frigates *Guerrière* and *Melampus* to Sandy Hook in early 1811 to resume the exasperating work per-

formed by the earlier blockade, and these warships stopped and energetically searched American merchant vessels, maltreated and impressed their seamen, and seized all ships believed to be carrying goods destined for the French and their allies or ports dominated by Napoleon. The British frigate *Guerrière* (44 guns; rated as a 38), under command of Capt. Samuel J. Pechell, proved particularly obnoxious to American shipping interests when cruising off New York Harbor in the early spring of 1811. As an expression of his arrogance, Captain Pechell painted his ship's name in large letters extending across the entire width of the fore-topsail and stated that he would cause the "damned Yankees to well remember and dread that name." On May 1, 1811, the *Guerrière* stopped, boarded, and searched the American brig *Spitfire*, bound from Portland, Maine, for New York, and impressed a man named John Deguyo, who was a passenger and a native citizen of the United States. Thomas Jefferson, the meek pacifist and appeaser, was no longer president of the United States, and James Madison, his successor, sent to sea the 44-gun U. S. frigate *President* (Capt. John Rodgers), which was lying at anchor off Fort Severn, Annapolis, "to watch this insulting blockade of the chief port of a neutral nation" and to protect American interests and honor. Rodgers set sail with glee to locate, watch over, and "cramp the style" of the *Guerrière*, and, before leaving the Chesapeake, "went Pechell one better" by painting the name of his ship on each of her three topsails, so that the Britisher, should she meet her, would have no cause to be uncertain of her identity.

At noon of May 16, when the *President* was about forty miles northeast of Cape Henry, a vessel was sighted on the eastern horizon which was known to be a man-of-war from her squareness of yards and symmetry of sails. Rodgers wrote that from the appearance of the vessel in the distance, he thought she was the *Guerrière*. Signals were later exchanged, but they were unintelligible and the breeze had been dying away, so it was dark when the *President*, which had been chasing the stranger, drew near to her. At 8:30 p.m., Rodgers was close enough to hail, "What ship is that?"; the only response was a similar inquiry. Rodgers repeated his inquiry and for reply received a round shot in the *President's* mainmast. Rodgers ordered a single shot fired as a return; whereupon the stranger fired three guns in rapid succession and quickly followed up with a complete broadside. The *President* then responded and commenced firing in earnest. It was soon found that the *President's* antagonist was of inferior power to the American frigate, and when she ceased firing, the *President* promptly stopped. The stranger again opened fire and brought upon herself more American broadsides. When it was apparent that the enemy was smaller and weaker than the *President* and had become entirely unmanageable, Rodgers drew to windward and remained in the vicinity of the belligerent for the night to learn her identity and to be available for assistance if such should be needed. At dawn it was found that the stranger, which had been soundly chastised by the *President* for her combativeness and impudence, was the 22-gun British ship *Little Belt* (Capt. Arthur B. Bingham, R.N.). She had suffered severely in the action, which she had instigated, with the heavier American frigate and had thirty-two casualties (eleven killed; twenty-one wounded), whereas the *President* had emerged unscathed. Lieut. John O. Creighton of the *President* boarded the British man-of-war with proffers of services, which Captain Bingham declined, and after the *Little Belt* had made necessary repairs, she limped back to her station "licking her wounds." The *President* never met the *Guerrière*, but in the first frigate action of the War of 1812, a sister ship, the U.S.S. *Constitution*, had the satisfaction of sinking her.

The *President-Little Belt* encounter, following the *Guerrière-Spitfire* incident, added to the feeling of intense bitterness in the United States toward the British and the attitude of the commanders of ships of the Royal Navy. Many Britishers by this time were convinced that the officers on the king's ships were "going too far," and James admits in his HISTORY OF THE BRITISH NAVY:

The act of the *Guerrière* in pressing a native American citizen out of an American coaster, in the very mouth of an American port, was unjustifiable, unnecessary and impolitic; and that this wanton encroachment upon neutral rights, coupled with

many others which have been practiced along the same coast, was a sufficient ground for the government of the United States to take every measure, short of actual war, for protecting its commerce and citizens from the repetition of such acts of violence.

The fight between the *President* and the *Little Belt*, whereas apparently due to a misunderstanding, was unquestionably caused—as far as fundamentals were concerned—by the arrogant mental attitude of Captain Bingham, R.N. The American public (as well as Captain Rodgers and his crew) fully sensed this fact, and “it warmed the Yankee blood.” This naval action, though one-sided, was considered as disciplinary and punitive by the American people and was accepted by them “as honest vengeance for the *Chesapeake*.”

In the winter of 1811-1812, a plot for the dismemberment of the United States, instigated by emissaries of the British Government, was discovered and made known to the president and Congress. In April 1812, the United States Congress laid a ninety-day embargo on American shipping. This third embargo was enacted as a preparation for war. Britain was actually at war with the United States, for during the month preceding the passing of the 1812 embargo, Britain had seized at least eighteen American vessels valued at one and a half million dollars and presumptuously refused to temper or modify its policy in regard to the seizure of American ship cargoes and sailors or to respect the rights of the United States as a neutral power. During the ninety-day embargo, American vessels were generally kept in the home ports, but fast ships were dispatched abroad to warn merchantmen that war was near at hand and that they should sail home immediately or seek sanctuary in some safe and reliable neutral port.

The Jefferson embargo of 1807 had proved worse than useless. It had inflicted great damage on the marine interests of the United States and done incalculable harm to American sailors, seaboard communities, and foreign trade while causing little injury to England and France. Indeed, the embargo proved to be a great boon to England and the British merchant marine, and British commerce increased as American shipping declined. Whereas Jefferson believed that he was “thwarting and angering his country’s enemies,” he was really “playing their own game.” McMaster, in *A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES*, estimates that the embargo cost 55,000 sailors their wages of \$20,000,000 in fifteen months and 100,000 mechanics and laborers, \$36,000,000 in a single year; i.e., a reduced pay roll at the rate of \$52,000,000 per year—and this while the ships lost \$12,000,000 in net earnings and the national customs revenues shrank some \$16,000,000 per year. It is said that eighty thousand New England families were impoverished because the goods they produced could find no foreign market. The town of Portland, Maine, set its loss due to the Jefferson appeasement “stay-at-home and abandon-all-foreign-trade” embargo at \$700,000, and history tells us that thirteen hundred men were imprisoned in New York in 1809 for no crime other than being ruined by the embargo. Whereas the Jefferson embargo was enacted into law with the professed object of protecting American ships, sailors, and shipowners, it actually operated to ruin many merchants and producers as well as shipowners and shipping firms; even though it undoubtedly saved some American sailors from press gangs, it drove them to poverty and sent them to American poorhouses and jails instead of to British warships.

President Madison’s 1812 embargo message to Congress, which was frankly not another of the many pacifistic paper manifestoes of the Jefferson and Federalist party variety but a prelude and call to war, laid stress upon British violations of the United States flag on the high seas, the robbery of American ships and seamen, the humiliating presence and insolent actions of British warships in American waters, the exasperating “paper blockades,” and persistent British orders in council, which served increasingly to restrict the operation of American ships, prevent fair foreign trade, and destroyed the freedom of the seas. The enactment of the Madison short embargo early in April 1812 was not without its scandal. Congressman Emott of New York “tipped off” his constituents and released the details of the proposed law, three days before its passage, in such a way that the leading merchants of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston became “the secret beneficiaries of this action.” In *A MARITIME HISTORY OF NEW YORK*, we read that the news of the intended embargo reached a favored few in the city on April 2 and that “in a few hours flour went up a dollar a barrel and freight had a rise of 20 per cent.” Ships were frantically loaded by working night and day, and forty-eight well-laden

vessels were cleared from the port of New York "before the dead line of April 4." Britain welcomed the goods shipped, which were foodstuffs and supplies badly needed, and although Britain "extended special considerations" to the American carriers, it retained its haughtiness coupled with an old and well-developed contempt for the United States, its pitiable naval and military forces, and its weak, vacillating policies.

Rear Admiral Mahan, referring to the pre-Madison embargo leakage of Congressional intent, has called the occurrence "a conspicuous instance of mercantile avidity wholly disregarding of patriotic considerations such as is found in all times and all countries; strictly analogous to the constant smuggling between France and Great Britain at this very time." He continues: "Its significance in the present case, however, is as marking the widespread lack of a national patriotism, as distinct from purely local advantage and personal interests, which unhappily characterized Americans at this period." The United States minister to Britain reported on May 9, 1812, that the British "will endeavor to avoid the calamity of war with the United States by every means which can save their pride and their consistency," and he added: "The scarcity of bread in this country [England], the distress of the manufacturing towns, and the absolute dependence of the allied troops in the peninsula on our supplies, form a check on their conduct which they can scarcely have the hardihood to disregard."

The British public was evidently tiring of the orders in council and agitating for their revocation, but the people acted too late. The American public was tiring also of diplomacy and compromise, of embargoes and appeasement, of impressment of its seamen and seizure of its vessels and cargoes, and it was America and not Britain that acted formally to declare a condition of hostilities, which had in fact never really ended since the fight for independence in 1775-1783. President Madison sent Congress a war-or-peace message on June 1, 1812, and with a majority of 62 to 38 per cent in the House and 60 to 40 per cent in the Senate, the United States declared war on Britain on June 18, 1812, just one day before Britain's revocation of certain hateful orders in council. This belligerent act of the United States was "delayed too long for the honor of the nation and the welfare of the merchant shipping, for which the war was chiefly fought." A proud people with a courageous executive would have acted after the humiliating episode of the *Richard* in April 1806 or after the unprecedented insult of the British attack on the defenseless United States Government vessel *Chesapeake* and the impressment of members of its crew in June 1807.

The news of the war naturally aroused much interest on the continent of Europe, primarily because of Napoleon Bonaparte and the effect that the war might have upon his campaigns. The JOURNAL DE PARIS, on July 29, 1812, made the following most interesting declaration:

The United States, wearied of the commercial tyranny of England, draws from its scabbard the sword of Washington, which has once already humbled British pride. The efforts of the Americans excite an interest in those who recall with what insulting hauteur they have been treated by the English Government, which always considers them as revolted colonies. The probable consequence of this new war will be a mortal blow to that system of commercial monopoly which England for two centuries has so obstinately pursued, and which becomes weaker in proportion as it becomes more extended, because it is contrary to the natural rights of other nations.

Although "Mr. Madison's war" was publicized as being undertaken primarily for the benefit of the maritime interests of the United States, it was not popular in New England or the shipping ports of the country. Merchants and shipowners generally opposed it as they had the embargo; the country was ill-prepared to wage war and had no navy to protect its shipping. At the time of the declaration, the shipowners had a splendid chance to recoup their losses by engaging in a profitable trade carrying supplies to British armies on the Continent, which were waging war against Napoleon, the arch-enemy of popular government. Whereas much of the opposition to the war in New England and the northern maritime states was because of a deep felt antagonism toward the motives, plans, and actions of Napoleon, nevertheless, a large part of it was founded on a less idealistic desire for profits when such seemed to be readily obtainable. The United States embarked on the War of 1812 not as a united and

patriotic 100 per cent American nation fighting for its rights against an oppressive enemy but with sympathies part British and part French in the struggle being waged in Europe. As stated in a contemporary New York weekly:

It was insinuated that every "republican" was a friend to Napoleon and influenced by him and that every "federalist" was attached in an equal degree to England; thus dividing the citizens of the United States into French and English, and leaving no portion of the people to be distinguished as Americans, whereby could be established the monstrous and inconsistent doctrine that the democratic re-

publicans must rank themselves under the banners of a monarch [Napoleon] whose interest is to destroy all popular government, and that federal republicans should rally round the standard of a king [George III of Britain] who feels himself conscientiously bound to deny to a large portion of his subjects the most obvious rights of freedom.

Under conditions that had been prevailing at sea, American shipowners could insure their ships and property, and with high freight rates prevailing and high prices obtainable on their goods abroad, they stood to make big profits. Even if they lost an occasional ship, they could afford it. The merchants and shipowners were never in personal jeopardy, a condition quite different from that of their employees, the merchant seamen, for impressment by the arrogant British Navy was an occupational hazard to cover which there was no insurance. We read:

Pay was not increased to compensate for the risks of violating the [British] orders and running Napoleon's blockade. It is not surprising, therefore, to find [New York's] South Street seamen pleased with the declaration [of war against the British], eager to get even with the jailers of six thousand of their fellows, happy at the discomfiture of their

employers, and at the prospect of early privateering dividends. . . . On New York's waterfront [and that of other seaports] the economic extremes met for the purpose of engaging in privateering, that opportune combination of vengeance, warfare and quick enrichment which disappeared with sail.

Following the declaration of war by Congress (presumably for "free trade and sailors' rights"), the British quickly blockaded the southern "French sympathizers'" ports of the United States, but the New England ports and New York—believed to be more friendly and more useful in commerce to the British cause—were treated far more leniently. It was not until British troops entered Paris in 1813 and "opened the continent of Europe as a source of supply" that the British Government, feeling independent of American merchant commerce, ordered its admiralty, after the war had run a year, to make effective the blockade of New York. In November 1813, the blockade was extended to the New England coast. Britain then started to fight the war in earnest and send troops as well as ships to America in an effort to bring the war of a giant against a "pestiferous pygmy" to a quick ending favorable to British arms, dignity, and prestige.

No matter what the causes were that led to the War of 1812, the spirit in which it was fought, or the text of the Peace Treaty of Ghent that brought it to a close on Christmas Eve of 1814 (not effective in the various parts of the globe until varying times in 1815), the fact remains that the war gave a real independence to the United States that the War of the Revolution and the Peace of 1783 had not secured, and the young republic succeeded in wrenching itself completely loose from British domination. But the war proved to be of prime world-wide importance, as it divided two great eras of commerce. Prior to the war, the Seven Seas were infested by pirates and privateers, and trade routes were dominated by "whatever power could show the most guns afloat." After the war, the day of the buccaneer at sea was over, and trade on the high seas became open to the merchant ships of any nation. The War of 1812 was fundamentally a battle waged by the United States for freedom of the seas, and in this respect the young republic—with practically no navy and the privateer its only real fighting arm—was victorious, when the after-effects of the negotiated peace are properly evaluated.

Ralph D. Paine, in *THE OLD MERCHANT MARINE*, says:

The War of 1812 was the dividing line between two eras of salt water history. On the farther side lay the turbulent centuries of hazard and bloodshed and piracy, of little ships and indomitable seamen

who pursued their voyages in the reek of gunpowder and of legalized pillage by the stronger. . . . On the hitherside of 1812 were seas unvexed by the privateer and the freebooter. The lateen-

rigged corsairs had been banished from their lairs in the harbors of Algiers and ships needed to show no broadsides of cannon in the Atlantic trade. For a time they carried the old armament among the lawless islands of the Orient and off Spanish-

American coasts where the vocation of piracy made its last stand, but the great trade routes of the globe were peaceful highways for the white-winged fleets of all nations.

Impressment of American Sailors—the British Navy Afloat Beyond the Law

The impressment of American sailors taken by force from American ships at sea by the British Navy was merely an extension of the vicious English system of obtaining men for the ships of the Royal Navy by the use of press gangs. Much has been written of the rugged fighting quality of the British tar at the time in the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century when Britain took undisputed command of the seas in a military sense. The British Navy grew to be both formidable and unbeatable, and its record is brilliant from the day of the defeat of the Spanish Armada to Trafalgar (and the all-important annihilation of Napoleon's naval forces) and to the end of sail. A popular old British song glorifies the "hearts of oak" of English ships of war and of the "free" Britishers who manned them—men who gloried in their inheritance of freedom and could never be enslaved. Yet it was the press gangs of England that were looked to by the naval authorities to supply the British fleet with men. Voluntary enlistment was responsible for only a small part of the manning of the redoubtable Royal Navy; many of the crew members were no more "free" men than were the galley slaves of old.

Nelson's message to the British fleet before the Battle of Trafalgar—"England expects that every man will this day do his duty"—is historic. This sounds like a message to free men fighting for their country as patriots. Actually, Nelson's ships at the Battle of the Nile and in subsequent naval victories were "filled with men of all nations, wherever the press gangs could find them." Marvin, quoting a tradition that was generally referred to by contemporary and later-day authorities, says that Nelson's own barge crew on the *Victory*, made up of men selected for their skill and strength, "was composed chiefly of Yankee tars pressed out of merchant vessels" and that there were then "thousands of American seamen in the British Navy rendering the king a most involuntary service." He adds:

The habit of stealing men from under the flag of their country and compelling them to risk their lives for a flag they loathed is in large degree responsible for the strangely persistent hatred of Great Britain which is to be found to this day in the coast villages of Long Island and New England

among people of the purest Anglo-American stock. Theirs is not a race antipathy; it must be traced back to a deep sense of personal wrong. This hate is not discoverable, or at any rate is not so intense, in inland communities.

Ships of the British Navy had a bad reputation for treatment of sailors, and it became impossible to supply these war vessels by enlistment with sufficient men to work the ships and handle the cannon. A large proportion of the crews on British warships was made up of most unwilling members, who were given no opportunity to escape and who were held in subjection by fear of cruel physical and mental punishment. They were brutally flogged for trifling offenses, fed dreadful food, at times were given no pay for years, and often were forbidden to set foot ashore for fear that they would desert; if they did escape and were caught, their punishment was very severe. At the time of the Nore Mutiny in 1797, it developed that there were ships in the British fleet whose men had not been paid off for from eight to fifteen years. We read:

These wooden walls of England were floating hells and a seaman was far better off in jail. He was flogged if he sulked and again if he smiled—flogged until the blood ran for a hundred offenses as trivial as these. His food was unspeakably bad

and often years passed before he was allowed to set foot ashore. Decent men refused to volunteer and the ships were filled with the human scum and refuse caught in the nets of the press-gangs of Liverpool, London and Bristol.

The press-gang system of recruiting was as intolerable and as fiercely resented in England as it was in America. Ralph D. Paine has said:

Oppressive and unjust, it was nevertheless endured [in Britain] as the bulwark of England's defense against her foes. It ground under its heel the very people it protected and made them serfs in order to keep them free. No man of the common people who lived near the coast of England was safe from the ruffianly press-gangs nor any merchant ship that entered her ports. It was the most cruel form of conscription ever devised. Mob

violence opposed it again and again, and British East Indiamen fought the king's tenders sooner than be stripped of their crews and left helpless. Feeling in America against impressment was never more highly inflamed, even on the brink of the War of 1812, than it had been in England itself, although the latter country was unable to rise and throw it off.

Many a Britisher preferred jail or deportation to a convict colony to service in the Royal Navy, and when jails became full a quota was turned over to the fleet. Landsmen and merchant sailors alike shunned service in the Royal Navy and hated the press-gang system that was used to sweep up able-bodied men ashore and carry them to sea (often leaving their families penniless) and to raid merchant ships (robbing them of their best men and frequently leaving them dangerously undermanned). An English historian had this to say of the impressment and press-gang system:

To the people, the impress was an axe laid at the foot of the tree. There was here no question, as with trade, of the mere loss of hands who could be replaced. Attacking the family in the person of its natural supporter and protector, the octopus

system, of which the gangs were the tentacles, struck at the very foundations of domestic life and brought to thousands of households a poverty as bitter and a grief as poignant as death.

The operations of English press gangs not only in the British Isles but also in the ports throughout the world, augmented by the navy's impressment of sailors from ships sailing under any flag, resulted in the manning of British naval vessels by motley crews, which, however, generally consisted of strong, rugged men. The press gangs ashore or afloat were selective; they used discrimination and did not pick up weaklings. But the Royal Navy "of a thousand ships" had to be supplied with men, and even the British merchant marine did not escape from paying a toll in men to a vicious system that permitted and supported gangs, or boarders, in arbitrarily selecting men for duty "in the service of the king" just as the king's agents in New England forests claimed the finest white pine trees and put the king's brand thereon. The British impressment system, operating solely in the interest of the navy, sought out active, competent men. As impressing men for the navy was fought with steadily increasing vigor by embittered Englishmen both ashore and afloat, the officers of the British fleet were commanded to find crews at sea and abroad, and the admiralty gave orders to naval vessels to stop foreign merchant vessels at sea and rob the ships of all likely looking seamen that they could concoct some excuse or other for taking. As American sailors were the best in the world, spoke English, and possibly at one time had been subjects of the king, the crews of American ships were singled out for impressment. After the War of the Revolution, citizenship in the United States proved no protection, and when the War of 1812 broke out, the fact that a sailor had been born in America under the Stars and Stripes did not save him from British press gangs if the English officer looking for men either took a fancy to him or was badly in need of sailors. The impressment of Americans from American merchant ships was not only planned by the British to improve the fighting personnel of their navy, both in numbers and quality of men, but also carried out in a way that seemed to indicate a devilish intent to injure the United States merchant marine and cripple many of its units. It was said that many an American ship, after a visitation by an armed, selective recruiting British force, was left without sufficient men

to operate her, that a large number of American ships were placed in "deadly peril," and that many "went missing" and were undoubtedly lost because they did not have enough men aboard to work them.

American sailors were not impressed and forced to serve against their wills in the British Navy for a limited period—for a cruise, a return voyage, or a year—but were treated as convicts undergoing a long sentence. They were not permitted to go ashore in any place where they might have a chance to escape from servitude. Even though their ships might go out of commission upon arrival at an English dockyard, they, after a long and weary service, would be transferred under an armed guard to some other outbound vessel and forced to sail on another long voyage without a chance to set foot ashore. For long years, families in America not only would be deprived of the support of these men but also would have no knowledge of their whereabouts or even of their continued existence.

It was truly said by Americans, "Both England and France steal our ships, but England steals our sailors also." At first, the British stopped United States ships and impressed all men who were British subjects and then, all who were or had been British subjects, which, literally interpreted, meant all who had been born in America prior to 1783. The United States sought to protect its citizens from the outrage of forcible impressment into the navy of a foreign power (with which it might some day be at war) by furnishing them with certificates testifying in authoritative legal fashion as to birth and citizenship, but such papers failed to protect the holders. These documents (or cards) were generally jeered at by British naval officers, and lieutenants, with their boarding gangs, kidnaped from the forecastles of American ships "such stalwart tars as pleased their fancy." It was claimed by the British that American protection certificates could be "readily forged" and were "too easily negotiable" and, therefore, could not be honored. But a seaman on an American ship without a protection and identification certificate was evidently "out of luck." As a U. S. senator said: If an American seaman carried a certificate of citizenship for purposes of identification and protection, the British refused to honor it and branded it a forgery; but if a sailor had no certificate, they considered the lack of such a document (or card) as proof of noncitizenship. (There were also periods when the French detained and searched American ships and took off English-speaking sailors as British prisoners if they could not show a United States certificate of citizenship.)

The British arbitrarily refused to permit the subject of impressment to be brought up and negotiated. According to them, there was nothing to negotiate, for the stopping of foreign ships and the impressing of the most promising members of their crews to serve in the British Navy was England's God-given right and no subject for discussion. The British Navy afloat was beyond the law. Britain claimed the right "to recover" its seagoing subjects wherever it might find them—on shore or at sea. In 1796, H.M.S. *Regulus* removed by force five men from the crew of an American merchantman on the high seas, and the practice quickly spread. The United States Congress contended that an American ship was merely an extension of American territory, but the British refused to see the matter that way. When Capt. Silas Talbot, as an American agent, took out writs of *habeas corpus* in Jamaica in 1797 to rescue Americans from enforced service in the British fleet and presented these writs to Sir Hyde Parker, the vice admiral in command, the answer was that this time-honored expedient of British law was inoperative on the ships of the Royal Navy.

The cruel discipline of the British Navy "wreaked vengeance" upon American seamen who endeavored to communicate with their government, families, or friends. McMaster states: "The detection of an attempt to notify an American consul of the presence of Americans on board an English ship was sure to be followed by a brutal flogging." According to Marvin, the files of the State Department show that in 1806 and 1807 there were six thousand seamen who were declared American citizens serving against their wills in the British fleet, and it is said, "How many more who could not or who dared not make their identity known can only be conjectured."

American sailors aboard British men-of-war were as much prisoners and slaves as if they had been captured by the Barbary pirates. The following letter from Capt. Nathaniel Silsbee of the American ship *Betsy* refers to an incident which occurred at Madras in 1795 and shows the arrogant as well as brutal way in which the British carried out their policy of impressment:

I received a note . . . from my chief mate that one of my sailors, Edward Hulen, a fellow townsman whom I had known from boyhood, had been impressed and taken on board of a British frigate then lying in port. . . I immediately . . . proceeded to the frigate where I found Hulen and . . . was informed by the first lieutenant . . . that he had taken Hulen from my ship under a peremptory order from his commander to visit every American ship in port and take from each of them one or more of their seamen. . . I then called upon Cap-

tain Cook who commanded the frigate and sought first by all persuasive means that I was capable of using and ultimately by threats to appeal to the government of the place to obtain Hulen's release, but in vain. It remained for me only to recommend Hulen to that protection of the lieutenant which a good seaman deserves and to submit to the high-handed insult thus offered to the flag of my country which I had no means either of preventing or resisting.

After several years' forced detention in the British Navy, Edward Hulen, of Salem, got away, returned home, and served on privateers in the War of 1812. Detention for long years on board vessels of the British Navy was a common condition experienced by hosts of Britishers as well as Americans and some foreigners.

Before the War of 1812, the United States Government had a docket of over sixty-five hundred alleged cases of American sailors who were forcibly impressed into the British Navy, although the English claimed that many of these men went into the service of their own accord during the depression caused by the Jefferson embargo. In a speech before Parliament on February 18, 1811, Lord Castlereagh declared that "out of 145,000 seamen employed in the British service in January 1811, the whole number claiming to be American subjects amounted to no more than 3,300." This was a sizable number of men "enslaved by force" and against their will, but evidently it grossly understated the facts, for the Americans in the fleet were subjected to cruel intimidation and only a part dared to declare themselves. Moreover, the British idea of an "American subject" seemed to be "born in the United States after the colonies (in 1783) attained their independence," and the British frequently advanced the dictum, "Once an Englishman, always an Englishman." To the average Britisher, citizenship by free choice and naturalization meant nothing; neither did any individual's oath of allegiance to the United States flag, with an associated and concomitant voluntary repudiation of fidelity as a subject of the British Crown. It has been said that one-tenth of real sailors in the British Navy were Americans and that "fully as many more wanted to be if they could escape the service." Undoubtedly, a free America was a Mecca which many British seamen sought to reach, and large numbers of them ultimately attained their objective notwithstanding rigorous British Navy discipline and punishment for desertion.

In colonial days, many Americans, protected by an act of Queen Anne's time, had violently opposed impressment, and John Adams, of Boston, in 1769 had secured in the courts a verdict of "justifiable homicide" for a Marblehead sailor who had killed a lieutenant of a British frigate while forcefully and vigorously resisting impressment. During the temporary peace between Britain and France, the United States, in early 1803, sought to compromise the irritating condition existing between America and Britain by agreeing not to ship any British seamen on United States vessels if Britain would discontinue its policy of detention and search and the impressment of sailors from American vessels. However, approval of the plan by Lord St. Vincent, in charge of the British Admiralty, was not obtainable. Later, a bill was introduced in the United States Congress which declared impressment to be piracy and subject to the death penalty. The bill stipulated a bounty of \$200 to be paid to any American seaman for killing any person who tried to impress him, but legislative action on this bill, which evidently had real teeth in it, was "postponed"; in the meanwhile, the seizure of men on American vessels by powerfully armed men from British warships proceeded unabated. The arbitrary enslavement of sailors (or of likely material out of which seamen could be molded) continued

with increasing severity as the ordinary available supply of English naval sailors became smaller and smaller due to the terrible drain as well as demands of the Napoleonic wars. Although the practice is diametrically opposed to the much-vaunted and highly publicized idea of the inherent freedom of the Anglo-Saxon, it is significant that, to the end and as long as the impressment policy could be worked and the English Navy receive benefit by it, Britain never repudiated the system and never would condescend to consider it a fitting subject for discussion or negotiation with any foreign power. Even after the War of 1812, the British refused to agree in the peace treaty to stop impressment, but public opinion in Britain as well as in America forced the evil practice to be discontinued.

Testifying before a committee of the legislature of Massachusetts in 1813, William Gray said that, in his opinion, one-fifth of the seamen in the American merchant marine were foreigners, and in 1807 Adam Seybert, the statistician, had estimated one-sixth. It is said that in 1808 Salem shipping merchants informed a British agent that they "no longer employed British seamen, in order to avoid trouble from impressment." Massachusetts refused to accept Monroe's report of 1812 giving over six thousand cases of American seamen impressed into the British Navy, and the seaboard communities of New England—which furnished most of the men for the United States merchant marine—"showed repeatedly by vote and deed their opposition to a war waged ostensibly in their behalf." Morison says that, appearing before a committee of the General Court of Massachusetts, "fifty-one of the leading shipowners of Massachusetts, who had employed annually over fifteen hundred seamen for the last twelve years, could remember but twelve cases of Americans being impressed from their vessels. Nor were all these witnesses Federalists. William Gray gave witness against his party, when he was able to recall but two cases of impressment from his great fleet in the last decade." Morison expresses the opinion that for the country as a whole the truth of the extent of American impressment into the British Navy probably lies somewhere between the statements of the administration and those of the Massachusetts shipowners, and he adds:

A large number of impressed Massachusetts seamen spent the period of hostilities in Dartmoor Prison [England] rather than fight against their country. Contemporary newspapers, sailors' narratives and depositions, contain numerous and out-

rageous cases. . . . Impressment gave sufficient cause for war, by modern standards. But war [of itself] was no remedy, as the Peace of Ghent proved. A powerful navy was the only language England understood.

Massachusetts Leads the Maritime States in Opposing War with England

The maritime states well knew in 1812 and at all times during the administrations of Jefferson (1801-1809) and Madison, up to the declaration of war, that the United States, without a navy (or an army), was in no condition to fight any foreign foe and was particularly incompetent to wage war on Britain, the Mistress of the Seas, with part of her empire on our northern border, in full control of the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, Nova Scotia, etc., and with strong naval bases in the Caribbean and the western Atlantic. Senator Lloyd of Massachusetts expressed the views of many of his fellow New Englanders when he said: "If we are going to war with Great Britain, let it be a real, effectual, vigorous war. Give us a naval force, . . . give us thirty swift-sailing, well-appointed frigates . . . and in a few weeks, perhaps days, I would engage completely to officer your whole fleet from New England alone." The shipping fraternity of the maritime states, of the seaboard towns, and generally of New England declared that the war, presumably to be waged for "free trade and sailors' rights" and to put a

stop for all time to the devilish British policy of impressment, had been engineered by partisan politicians who knew nothing of the sea and of foreign commerce and by "men who rarely ever saw a ship or sailor." Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: "The declaration of war has appeared to me to be one of those portentous acts which ought to concentrate on itself the efforts of all those who can take an active part in rescuing their country from the ruin it threatens."

After the national Congress had declared war, the Massachusetts House of Representatives resolved to organize a peace party throughout New England and said to the people: "Let the sound of your disapprobation of this war be loud and deep. . . . Let there be no volunteers except for defensive war." Seaboard county peace conventions declared the war to have "originated in hatred to New England and to commerce; in subservience to the mandate of the tyrant of France." As Morison says, "To sabotage the war, in the interest of an early peace, became the declared policy of maritime Massachusetts." As a general proposition, the South and the administration in power were pro-French and anti-British, while New England and the maritime North were anti-Napoleon and inclined to favor Britain over France not only because of Napoleon's political and military philosophy, which threatened all human liberty, but also because of the chance to do profitable business with Britain by supplying its armies on the Continent (fighting the "French upstart" and "the foe of democracy") with needed provisions and stores. The fight against impressment and for "free trade and sailors' rights" had been too long delayed, and before the pro-French elements in the country declared war on Britain, the French had commenced to impress into their navy sailors from American ships. On one occasion, twenty-two American seamen were seized by Napoleon's men at Danzig, marched to Antwerp, and impressed into the French Navy. Morison, in *MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS*, well describes the New England seaboard antagonism toward "Mr. Madison's war," which had been "put over" in Congress by a political coalition of Southerners and Westerners, "who were burning for a fight and anxious to conquer Canada," but had no knowledge of or interest in ocean commerce.

To this War of 1812 maritime Massachusetts was flatly opposed. Her pocket and her heart were equally affected. She deemed the war immoral, because waged against [Britain] the "world's last hope"; unjust because Napoleon had done her commerce greater injury than had England; and hypocritical, because declared in the name of "free trade and sailors' rights" by a sectional combination that had neither commerce nor shipping. In Congress, a majority of the representatives from New England voted against the declaration of war. . . . Reviewing the diplomatic ineptitude of Madison's administration [following and continuing that of Jefferson], the opposition of Massachusetts [and of maritime communities] is not surprising. Napoleon's pretended revocation of his decrees had been

exposed by Adams at St. Petersburg as "a trap to catch us into a war with England." Every shipmaster knew that the French confiscations and sequestrations had continued. Secretary Monroe admitted as much in 1812, after war had been declared. By his own figures, the Napoleonic system had done more damage to American commerce than had British navalism. Yet the administration, on the ground that "the national faith was pledged to France," adopted successively non-intercourse, embargo, and war against Great Britain. When the administration heard that England had repealed her orders in council, two days after our declaration of war, it decided to continue the war on the ground of impressment alone.

V.

THE BARBARY PIRATES

*Moslem Depredations against Christian Commerce and the
Attitude of the Leading Maritime Nations toward
the North African Corsair States*

PIRACY FLOURISHED in the Mediterranean from early days, but with the rise of Islam, buccaneers were more and more of the Mohammedan faith until in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and the early years of the nineteenth century, the corsairs of the North African coast were Moslems, directing their attacks against Christian nations. Five centuries after the military expeditions undertaken as crusades by European Christians to recover the "Holy Land" from the Mohammedans, the Moslems of the Barbary States of North Africa were conducting, under the militaristic domination of a small group of avaricious, unscrupulous, and adventurous Turks, organized attacks on the shipping and commerce of Christian nations. For about two centuries, the northern shores of the Mediterranean were raided by these lawless Moslem pests. Christian communities were destroyed by surprise attacks and all portable goods of value confiscated; the captured men were carried off to horrible servitude (from which they might be ransomed) and the women taken to the slave marts of the East. Some of the greatest fortifications along the African Mediterranean coast were built by Christian slaves in Moslem bondage, and it is said that "the Mole at Algiers represents the work of thirty thousand Christians." Piracy appears to have been established at Algiers by Aruch Barbarossa in 1516 as an important institution of the subjugating Turks, and history tells us that Dragut, a famous Moslem pirate, was made the first governor of the province of Tripoli by Sultan Suleyman II toward the close of the seventeenth century. Piracy, acknowledged from the first by the Mediterranean Moslems as a highly esteemed channel for war against the hated "Christian dogs," grew to be a state institution in the Turkish garrisoned outposts on the North African coast. The militaristic masters of the Moors soon learned that raids on Christian commerce—with the seizure of ships and cargoes and the enslavement of their crews—were much more profitable than even the most extreme oppression of the relatively weak and nonproductive natives of the territories that they ruled by force of arms.

The Barbary pirates occupy a unique place in history and a shameful one as far as the record of Christian nations is concerned. Indeed, the relations that were developed between the so-called civilized powers of Europe and the nests of sea robbers in Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli (who became generally known as the Algerine Barbary pirates) seem absolutely incredible. These inhuman Mohammedan corsairs were protected in their devilish depredations and the cruel enslavement of their victims by the great Christian nations of Europe and encouraged (and even definitely used at times) to prey upon the ships and sailors and destroy the trade of their enemies and of neutrals whose marine activities were believed to be benefiting these foes. Louis XIV (Le Grand), king of France from 1643 to 1715, said that if there were no Algiers, he would build one, as it would be the cheapest way of

depriving the Italian states of their natural right of navigating their own seas. This contemptible policy, later said "to be worthy only of a king," was, nevertheless, the one adopted by Britain in relation to the commerce of competitive maritime nations and particularly the shipping and trade of the United States. Benjamin Franklin, writing from Europe on the attitude of the English Tories and leaders in the realm of overseas trade toward the newly formed republic, declared cynically that the London merchants were in hearty concord with Louis XIV's policy and motive and that they were of the mind that "if there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while to build one." England not only stirred up Indian savages to war against American colonists during the Revolution (and after the peace treaty had been signed) but also was willing to encourage—aid and abet—lawless pirates to attack and seek to embarrass and exterminate the merchant marine of the United States once "peace" was declared between the mother country and "the American rebels."

For about six years (1783-1789), the one-time thirteen American colonies—presumably a new nation—were in no position to take any consistent or decisive retaliatory measures in their own defense against the British; there was actually no "United" States of America, as no strong central government had yet been established, and no effective steps could possibly be taken by the "feeble and inharmonious" Continental Congress to protect the shipping and commerce of the young republic. As a matter of fact, Britain refused to acknowledge the existence of any "United States," insisted on dealing separately with the representatives of the various states, and in communications, written and oral, consistently referred to the "American states." Britain capitalized the situation of sectional selfishness and non-co-operation prevailing in the American states (which had won their independence during the years 1775-1783) to its own advantage in the greatest possible measure and did all it could by hatred and unscrupulous tactics to bankrupt, make impotent, and dishearten the new nation. The War of the Revolution was officially ended and peace proclaimed in the American states on April 11, 1783, but the country did not become a united whole—and a national unity in foreign matters—until the Federal Constitution was adopted and became effective on April 30, 1789, with George Washington as the nation's first president. During the period from the suspension of hostilities to the spring of 1789, a condition of chaos and incohesion existed that can be described as senseless and discouraging, humiliating, frightening, and suicidal. It was not until 1789 that the United States of America was born in fact as well as in name.

Britain, with its great navy and as Mistress of the Seas, was quite able to exterminate quickly all the Barbary corsairs and eliminate piracy in the Mediterranean and on the high seas, but did not deem it to be to its selfish interest to use its naval power to promote lawful trading and freedom of the seas. Instead of using its marine might to wipe out piracy, Britain, the world's greatest naval and commercial nation, actually stooped so low as to purchase from weak Moslem powers "immunity" for its ships from the depredations of the corsair states, while England urged them with these money payments to attack the ships of its commercial (ocean-carrying) rivals. Britain was technically at peace with the United States, but in spirit and the essentials that count—such as trade and the pocketbook—it was at war.

Lord Sheffield, addressing the British Parliament in 1784, said in his "Observations on the Commerce of the American States":

It is not probable that the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be to the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them from the Barbary States [pirates]. If they know their interests, they will not encourage the Americans to be carriers. That the Barbary States are advantageous to maritime

powers is certain. If they are suppressed, the little states . . . would have much of the carrying trade. . . . The armed neutrality would be as hurtful to the great maritime powers as the Barbary States are useful. The Americans can not protect themselves from the latter; they can not pretend to a navy.

An interpretation of these "diplomatic words" is given by Smollett in his history when he says: "The existence of Algiers and other predatory states which entirely subsist upon

piracy and rapine, petty states of barbarous ruffians, maintained, as it were, in the midst of powerful nations, which they insult with impunity, and of which they exact an annual contribution, is a flagrant reproach upon Christendom; a reproach the greater, as it is founded upon a low, selfish, illiberal maxim of policy." However, Britain, by means of this contemptible policy, with its support and encouragement of cruel Moslem piracy aimed at Christian nations, we are told, "secured a monopoly of the Mediterranean carrying trade, at that time the most important in the world."

*The Barbary Corsairs Attack the Shipping of
the Young American Republic*

The secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, reporting to Congress on December 28, 1790, "relative to the Mediterranean trade," said that the loss of customhouse records in several of the states during the War of the Revolution made it impossible to present reliable data of the extent of "our commerce and navigation in the Mediterranean Sea," but he affirmed according to the best information obtainable:

It may be concluded that about one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the United States, and about one-fourth in value of their dried and pickled fish, and some rice, found their best markets in the Mediterranean ports; that these articles constituted the principal part of what we sent into that sea; that, that commerce loaded outwards, from

eighty to one hundred ships, annually, of twenty thousand tons, navigated by about twelve hundred seamen. It was abandoned early in the war. And after the peace which ensued, it was obvious to our merchants, that their adventures into that sea would be exposed to the depredations of the piratical States on the coast of Barbary.

Congress, by a commission of May 12, 1784, authorized certain persons, named ministers plenipotentiary, to conclude treaties of peace and amity with the Barbary powers and on March 11, 1785, empowered these ministers to appoint agents to negotiate such treaties at the proper place of abode of the ruling powers within the several Barbary States. The whole expenses were limited to \$80,000, and agents were sent to Morocco and Algiers. While these negotiations were taking place at Tangier (Morocco) and Algiers, an ambassador from Tripoli arrived in London and sought an interview with the minister plenipotentiary of the United States. During the meeting that followed, the Moroccan "demanded for the peace of that state thirty thousand guineas; and undertook to engage that of Tunis for a like sum." The secretary of state wrote: "These demands were beyond the limits of Congress and of reason and nothing was done. Nor was it of importance, as, Algiers remaining hostile, the peace of Tunis and Tripoli was of no value; and when that of the former should be obtained, theirs would soon follow." The prevailing opinion in the United States was that the negotiation of peace treaties with Morocco and Algiers was of prime importance and that satisfactory treaties would be readily made with Tunis and Tripoli following the consummation of an amicable understanding with Morocco and Algiers. The friendship of Morocco was deemed important to the United States "because our Atlantic as well as Mediterranean trade is open to his [the emperor of Morocco's] annoyance, and because we carry on a useful commerce with his nation." All the four Barbary States—Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli—were Moslem; but whereas the Moroccans were Moors, the governing powers of the other three Barbary corsair states to the eastward fronting on the Mediterranean were Turks and under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. Morocco, however, had a peculiar friendly relationship with Tripoli, and the dey of Algiers boasted of his influence over the bashaw of Tunis. At the end of 1790, the secretary of state, in reporting to the U. S. Congress, further said:

Our navigation, then, into the Mediterranean, has not been resumed at all since the peace [with Britain in 1783]. The sole obstacle has been the unprovoked war of Algiers; and the sole remedy must be to bring that war to an end, or to palliate its effects. Its effects may, perhaps, be palliated by ensuring our ships and cargoes destined for that sea, and by forming a convention with the regency, for the ransom of our seamen, according to a fixed tariff. That tariff will, probably, be high, and the rate of ensurance so settled, in the long run, as to pay for the vessels and cargoes captured, and something more. What proportion will be captured, nothing but experience can determine. Our commerce differs from that of most of the nations with whom the predatory States are in habits of war. Theirs is spread all over the face of the Mediterranean, and therefore must be sought for all over its face. Ours must all enter at a strait only five leagues wide; so that their cruisers, taking a safe and commanding position near the strait's mouth, may very effectually inspect whatever enters it. So safe a station, with a certainty of receiving for their prisoners a good and stated price, may tempt their cupidity to seek our vessels particularly. Nor is it certain that our seamen could be induced to engage in that navigation, though with the security of Algerine faith that they would be liberated on the payment of a fixed sum. The temporary deprivation of liberty, perhaps chains, the danger of the pest, the perils of the engagement preceding their surrender, and possible delays of the ransom, might turn elsewhere the choice of men, to whom all the rest of the world is open. In every case, these would be embarrassments which would enter into the merchant's estimate, and endanger his preference of foreign bottoms not exposed to them. And upon the whole, this expedient does not fulfil our wish of a complete re-establishment of our commerce in that sea.

A second plan might be, to obtain peace by purchasing it. For this we have the example of rich and powerful nations, in this instance counting their interest more than their honor. If, conforming to their example, we determine to purchase a peace, it is proper to inquire what that peace may cost. . . . And when that [the original payment] is paid, all is not done. On the death of a Dey (and the present one is between seventy and eighty years of age) respectable presents must be made to the successor, that he may recognise the treaty; and very often he takes the liberty of altering it. When a consul is sent or changed, new presents must be made. If these events leave a considerable interval, occasion

must be made of renewing presents. And with all this they must see that we are in condition to chastise an infraction of the treaty; consequently, some marine force must be exhibited in their harbor from time to time. . . . Nor must we omit finally to recollect, that the Algerines, attentive to reserve always a sufficient aliment for their piracies, will never extend their peace beyond certain limits, and consequently that we may find ourselves in the case of those nations to whom they refuse peace at any price.

The third expedient is to repel force by force. . . . They [the Algerines] have usually had about nine chebecks of from ten to thirty-six guns, and four galleys, which have been reduced by losses to six chebecks and four galleys. They have a forty gun frigate on the stocks, and expect two cruisers from the Grand Seignior. The character of their vessels is, that they are sharp built and swift, but so light as not to stand the broadside of a good frigate. . . . The vessels illy manoeuvred, but crowded with men—one third Turks, the rest Moors, of determined bravery, and resting their sole hopes on boarding. But two of these vessels belong to the government, the rest being private property. If they come out of harbor together, they separate immediately in quest of prey; and it is said they were never known to act together in any instance. . . . Should the United States propose to vindicate their commerce by arms, they would, perhaps, think it prudent to possess a force equal to the whole of that which may be opposed to them.

* * * *

Portugal has singly, for several years past, kept up . . . a cruise before the Straits of Gibraltar, and by that means has confined the Algerines closely within [the Mediterranean]. But two of their vessels have been out of the straits in the last five years. Should Portugal effect a peace with them [the Algerines], as has been apprehended for some time [and urged by the British], the Atlantic will immediately become the principal scene of their piracies; their peace with Spain having reduced the profits of their Mediterranean cruises below the expenses of equipment.

Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce. If war, they will consider how far our own resources shall be called forth. . . . If tribute or ransom, it will rest with them to limit and provide the amount. . . .

The secretary of state transmitted to Congress estimates—made by persons who were supposed to be competent to judge—of the initial cost to the United States of buying a peace with Algiers, and the amounts varied from "sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling" for a peace and the redemption of the survivors of the originally captured and enslaved twenty-one Americans to a figure of "not less than a million dollars." The Tripoline ambassador who went to London had "thought that peace could be made with the three smaller powers [Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli] for ninety thousand pounds sterling, to which were to be added

the expenses of the mission and other incidental expenses." But Algiers, he affirmed, would demand more—probably as much as the other three powers together, and it was felt by ministers who talked to the Tripoline that, according to his views, peace could not be bought at the time of the discussions by the United States from the four Barbary corsair states for less than an initial payment of between \$460,000 and \$575,000. President George Washington referred to Congress on December 30, 1790, all the information that his administration had secured in regard to the Mediterranean trade and the redemption of captives enslaved by Algiers and requested its decision in regard to the policy to be pursued by the United States. A committee of the Senate, to which the matter was referred, reported to that body on January 6, 1791, that "the committee . . . are of opinion that the trade of the United States to the Mediterranean, cannot be protected but by a naval force; and that it will be proper to resort to the same as soon as the state of the public finances will admit."

Prior to the gaining of independence by the thirteen colonies and the forming of the young republic, American shipping had been considered British by foreign powers and by the Barbary States, which, with certain subtle encouragement from competitive Christian maritime nations, had developed piracy into what was probably the most persistent and profitable racket in history. Britain paid graft to the Barbary States, and this fact coupled with the powerful navy of the Mistress of the Seas brought security to her commerce, while an unscrupulous British Government encouraged the Barbary pirates in their depredations against the shipping of rival states. Soon after the close of the Revolution, the dey of Algiers was advised by British ministers that a new nation, with an ocean commerce, had come into being; therefore, he proceeded by piracy to capture American ships and imprison their crews, so as to extort from the United States a tribute for protection (or for the nonharassment of the nation's vessels) such as he had succeeded, by recourse to unscrupulous methods and dealings with equally unprincipled statesmen of competitive and jealous Christian countries, in wresting from the various maritime powers of Europe. Albion and Pope, in *SEA LANES IN WARTIME*, have said:

The loss of this protection [British-Barbary pirate] was one of the prices America paid for its independence. In fact, it was openly suggested that that severance from the British Empire involved an even more positive liability to American shipping. England seemed to be buying more than protection; the pirates were almost perpetually at "war" with the small states of Italy and the Adriatic, and apparently could be "persuaded" to attack the Scan-

dinavians, the Spaniards—and the Americans. It proved an exceedingly effective way to reduce potential rivalry in the Mediterranean carrying trade. This was one reason why the North African "scourge of Christendom" was allowed free run of the seas for such a long period; certain powers found the pirates too useful to wish to co-operate in their destruction.

The Barbary pirates did not spring into existence during the latter part of the eighteenth century; the states of Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli had been practicing and developing the racket of piracy, with its plundering, ransoms, and blackmail, since the end of the fifteenth century. It became the policy of these states to sell "protection" or a "treaty of peace" for a cash sum plus the payment of an annual tribute; at times desired goods would be preferred in part payment, and of course "presents," generally made under compulsion, were expected by the Moslem leaders.

It would seem that the British interest fitted in quite well with the policy of the Barbary States, which apparently did not want to be at "peace" with all nations or peoples engaged in ocean commerce but only with those which paid well for protection, and the thought of the pirates at all times seems to have been to follow a procedure that would bring to them the greatest amount of revenue in cash or its equivalent in desired goods and at the same time keep their corsairs employed. Every little nation evidently could not buy "peace" and its associated protection if the entering into such a treaty would weaken the understanding with a greater marine power and lessen the aggregate tribute flowing to and benefit received by the state. The dey of Algiers clearly expressed the thought that he had to be careful and not enter into too many "peace" treaties, effective at the same time, when he said: "If I were to

make peace with everybody what should I do with my corsairs? What should I do with my soldiers? They would take off my head for want of other prizes, not being able to live upon their miserable allowance."

Capt. Richard O'Brien (of the *Dauphin*) wrote in October 1794 after having been a captive at Algiers since mid-1785:

It is bad news to the Consuls in Algiers when the Algerine Corsairs returns to port without taking a prize. The Dey like the hungry Lion. says what must I do I cannot starve I must Eat my friends as I cannot Catch my Enemies—and allso Discontent is all the officers & crews. of the Marine the[y] take no prize the[y] say the[y] are at peace with too many nations

Captain O'Brien, writing from Algiers to Thomas Jefferson, the U. S. minister at Paris, on June 8, 1786, reported on the strength of the Algerian corsair fleet, or navy, and said that it consisted of "nine sail of xebecs" (a Mediterranean vessel with long overhanging bow and stern—usually three-masted); one mounted 32 guns, another 30, three carried 24 guns each, three had 18 guns each, and one mounted 12 guns—a total of 200 guns and an average of 22 gun per corsair. O'Brien reported that these vessels were small in relation to their gun power, or "the metal they carry"; that one-third of their crews were Turks, with the remainder Algerine Moors, and that the corsairs usually cruised from April to around the end of November and laid up for the winter. Some seven and a half years later (on November 12, 1793), O'Brien reported that the Algerian fleet then consisted of four frigates of from 44 to 24 guns each; one brig in service and one "on the stocks," each of 20 guns; one polacre of 18 guns; and four xebecs of from 12 to 20 guns each. The total battery of the fleet of eleven vessels was 244 guns—an average of 22 guns per corsair. (In addition to this fleet of deep-sea vessels, the Algerians owned sixty "gunboats" for harbor and coastwise service.) Other reports add another armed corsair, a brig of 22 guns, making a total of twelve seagoing vessels carrying 266 guns. It was said that they carried "at the rate of ten men to each cannon," which would mean 2,660 men on board the large corsairs and an average of about 220 men per vessel. Of the twelve corsairs, one was built in England and one in France; one was reported of Genovese and another of Levant construction; four were said to have been built in Algiers by a Spanish contractor; and three were recorded as "built on the coast."

It would seem that the first Barbary attack on the flag of the young American republic occurred in October 1784, when the brig *Betsey*, bound for Teneriffe, was captured in the eastern Atlantic by the Moroccans and carried into Tangier. It is said that the crew was not enslaved, and "as a result of Spanish intervention," the brig and crew were released after being held for six months, but with the understanding that an arrangement looking toward peace would be negotiated between the United States and Morocco. A representative was established at Tangier "at the moderate cost of some ten thousand dollars." This first clash between one of the Barbary States and the United States of America was mild, but it was soon followed by harsh measures when Algiers, the most powerful and aggressive of the four Barbary States (consisting, west to east, of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli), decided to act. Spain, following an unsuccessful joint naval attack with Portugal and Italy on Algiers, withdrew its patrol from the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Algerian corsairs cruised into the Atlantic looking primarily for rich prizes in the form of vessels engaged in the Brazilian-Portuguese trade. Not finding what they wanted, the Algerians evidently seized everything afloat of value that they encountered (other than British and French vessels), and among the victims of the raid were two American vessels captured by different corsairs.

On July 25, 1785, the schooner *Maria* (or *Mary*), owned by a Mr. Foster, of Boston, under the command of Capt. Isaac Stevens, was seized off Cape St. Vincent (the southwesterly tip of Portugal), and five days later (on July 30) the ship *Dauphin* (or *Dolphin*), owned by Messrs. Irvins, of Philadelphia, and commanded by Capt. Richard O'Brien, was taken about fifty leagues westward of Lisbon. (O'Brien reported that his ship was captured by "an Algerian cruiser of 34 guns and 450 men.") In these two seizures by "ferocious Algerine corsairs," twenty-one Americans were thrown into slavery and two American deep-sea trading

vessels confiscated. It appears that the *Maria*, the smaller of the two, had a crew of six (probably seven, including the captain); whereas the *Dauphin* was said to have "fourteen aboard," although records show that she carried a Frenchman as a passenger. Official communications refer to twenty-one American captives as of June 1786, but six years later (June 1, 1792), the secretary of state wrote that the prisoners had been "reduced by death and ransom to fourteen," evidently with only one, Charles Colvil, having been ransomed—and that by his relatives and friends. In a petition of the surviving captives to Congress on March 29, 1792, signed by the thirteen living and rational prisoners, these men, enslaved in Algiers after "nearly seven years captivity, twice surrounded with the Pest, and other Contagious distempers, which has numbered six of our brother sufferers in the talls of Mortality, and we remain in the Most laborious work, . . . destitute of almost all the necessities of life, . . . reduced to the Utmost distress . . . and Compelled in a great Measure to depend on the Charity of Transient people," humbly prayed and entreated "that some attention will be paid to our situation . . . before the whole of us perish." In addition to the reported six deaths, James Hormet, a seaman on the *Maria*, had become insane and was "confined in a dungeon." Only twelve of the twenty-one men captured on the two American vessels in July 1785 ever returned to the United States; of the nine who died in Algerine slavery, seven perished by the plague, one succumbed to consumption, and another was the victim of the madhouse.

There is an official record of 1786 in the form of a letter to Thomas Jefferson, then U. S. minister at Paris, which states that a Mr. Lamb interviewed the dey at Algiers and expected to redeem twenty-one American captives for the sum of \$5,000 to \$6,000 (an average of some \$240 to \$290 per head). Lamb endeavored to barter and raised his bid to \$10,000 (an average of about \$480 per head), but the dey was adamant. His price was \$50,000 for the lot—take it or leave it—an average of \$2,381 per head. This was deemed too high by the American Government, and the men continued in slavery for a period of years until a "peace treaty" was negotiated and tribute paid to the dey and regency of Algiers in 1795, ten years after the men on the *Maria* and *Dauphin* had been captured and enslaved.

Of the sixty-five American captives released by Algiers who arrived in Philadelphia, Pa., following the conclusion of the peace negotiations in the fall of 1795, only Capt. Isaac Stevens, Mate Alex. Forsyth, and one seaman, Thos. Billings, returned of the men on the *Maria* when that schooner—the first American vessel to be seized by the Algerine corsairs—was captured on July 25, 1785. However, one other member of the crew was alive—James Leander Cathcart (a foremast hand), described in a list of prisoners prepared at Algiers on July 9, 1790, as "seaman (keeps a tavern)" and, therefore, worthy of a bigger ransom than an ordinary seaman. This man, as a boy, had been a midshipman in the Continental Navy, had escaped from the notorious British prison ship *Jersey* at New York in 1782 when fifteen years old, and was only eighteen when captured by the Algerine pirates. Apparently, young Cathcart had learned the language on a previous Mediterranean voyage, for he was given clerical work to do and rose to be the "chief Christian secretary to the Dey." Later, he became the United States consul at Tripoli, and Capt. Richard O'Brien of the *Dauphin*, a most versatile and capable man, became the consul general at Algiers.

When the *Maria* was seized, the corsairs stripped the Americans of shoes and clothing deemed of value and cast the men into the "filthy stuffy hold" of the pirate vessel, which already contained thirty-seven captives—all Portuguese men except one, who was a Spanish woman. Albion and Pope write:

At Algiers, the unfortunate group were given dirty clothing, swarming with vermin, and marched through the streets to the delight of a mob, avid for a glimpse of the first Americans. Three miserable days later, they were put up for sale in the slave market; most of them were bought by the government, including the woman—for the dey's harem.

. . . The fourteen aboard the *Dauphin* . . . likewise went into slavery. Only the captains received preferred treatment—if it could be called that. They were taken to the British consul's house to work in the garden and otherwise "to serve as domestics, . . . suffering every indignity that inhumanity could devise to render their situation

humiliating in the extreme." Eventually our charge d'affaires at Madrid was able to arrange for them and the mates to live in fair comfort in a small house by themselves, but the sailors were left at hard grueling labor in the Algerian heat or in special jobs around the palace.

The reports of these captures and the imprisonment and enslaving of American seafaring men reached the United States in due course (September 1785). Historians tell us, "Such was the opposition to a standing army or a permanent naval force that no decisive action was taken"; but more than that—because of a weak and penurious government, American merchant ships and seamen received no protection abroad other than that which they were able to furnish themselves, and the Stars and Stripes was subjected to great humiliation and the men serving under the flag to enslavement. President George Washington, on December 30, 1790, sent a special message to Congress making known a report of Thomas Jefferson, the secretary of state, in relation to the American prisoners at Algiers. In this communication, Jefferson tells of an offer of \$200 per man ransom having been made and of the dey's demand of \$59,496 for the twenty-one captives, and he adds: "The agent, therefore, returned in 1786, without having effected either peace or ransom." In a report to Congress by the secretary of state on the Mediterranean trade (sent to the House December 30, 1790, and the Senate January 3, 1791), it was said that the Algerines "are in peace at present with France, Spain, England, Venice, the United Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark; and at war with Russia, Austria, Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, Genoa and Malta." In this report, we also read that "the late peace of Spain with Algiers is said to have cost from three to five millions of dollars"; that France has paid a cash sum and given presents for a treaty renewal and pays a tribute of \$100,000 annually. "It is supposed that the peace of the Barbary states costs Great Britain about sixty thousand guineas, or \$280,000, a year," and according to Captain O'Brien, "the Dutch, Danes, Swedes and Venetians pay to Algiers from \$24,000 to \$30,000 a year each."

The Algerines also obtained presents from the powers in addition to the regular money payments. The Barbary States evidently worked one European country against another and grafted from all. The great marine powers, including France (the former ally of the American colonies in revolt), would not lift a hand in the defense of American merchant ships against "lawless, avaricious, and bloodthirsty heathen pirates," but some—besides England—encouraged pirates to attack United States vessels, which were practically helpless and had no navy to protect them. Little Portugal alone of the European maritime powers used its navy to keep the Barbary corsairs out of the Atlantic and bottled up in the Mediterranean and to protect its trade and occasionally to convoy through the danger zone the merchant ships of friendly nations.

On June 2, 1792, President Washington appointed Admiral John Paul Jones as U. S. consul at Algiers, with specific instructions and powers for (1) establishing peace, (2) ransoming captives, and (3) representing the United States generally, but the admiral died in Paris before notification of this appointment reached him.

The British-inspired Raids by Algerine Corsairs on American Commerce in 1793

Britain proved, in the middle of the seventeenth century, that it could easily crush the Algerine pirates. However, between 1672 and 1816, Britain not only let them alone but also actually operated to build them up and help them in their fiendish raids on the shipping of its

enemies and of the nations that it was jealous of or did not like, but with which it was at peace. For years, the Algerine pirates had been "egged on" by the British and encouraged with money and armaments to restrict the operations, discourage the commerce, and attack the shipping of "the new maritime nation of the West, a nation with many merchant ships but no navy." How the British worked with the pirates of Algiers is covered in letters written in October 1793 by Edward Church, the United States consul at Lisbon. Portugal had been protecting its trade with warships and incidentally affording convoy to such American ships as were in the pirate-infested waters and needed it. The Portuguese evidently ceased their vigil without any warning, and a number of Algerine corsairs promptly sailed through the straits and into the Atlantic looking for booty. Consul Church, upon inquiry at the office of the Portuguese minister of foreign affairs, learned that Charles Logie, the British consul general and agent (economic and diplomatic) at Algiers, acting under orders from the British Government but without either the knowledge or sanction of the Portuguese Government, had concluded a peace treaty in the nature of a twelve months' truce between the dey of Algiers and Portugal and that Britain had guaranteed the execution of the treaty and made payment to the Algerines of the tribute that it stipulated. The agreement between Portugal and the dey of Algiers, as written, concluded, and financed by the British "in the interest of Portugal," contained a clause to the effect that the Portuguese Government should not afford protection to any nation against Algerian cruisers. The blow was undoubtedly aimed primarily and directly at the United States. Through powerful domination of a little ally, the British removed all possible naval protection for United States vessels by virtually employing lawless pirates to attack the American merchant marine. At Lisbon, Consul Church, being a realist, rightly termed the arrangement a "hellish conspiracy" against American shipping. The pirates, with the British behind them, had sailed unmolested into the Atlantic to prey upon the commerce of the United States and such nations as the British might from time to time suggest.

In a letter written to the secretary of state from Lisbon on October 12, 1793, U. S. Consul Church said:

Early this Morning I waited on his Excellency Luiz Pinto de Sousa, Minister & Secretary of State for foreign Affairs, on the subject of this unexpected Event, and the unfortunate situation in which it had placed not only the American Captns. now here, but our Nation at large, whose injury seems to have been particularly meditated in this negotiation:—

The Minister received me with great politeness, and anticipating the cause of my visit, informed me that he was at the moment of my arrival occupied in writing to me on the subject, but was better pleased to see me, as he could more fully and particularly explain the nature of this business to me viva voce, than by letter, and assured me that he

would candidly communicate to me how far the Court of Portugal were concerned, or chargeable for the Mischief resulting from this Truce, to all other Powers not at peace with Algiers, he declared that it was as unexpected to the Court of Portugal as it could be to us, and if it was not quite so unwelcome, yet it was by no means agreeable to their Court, who never intended to conclude either a Peace or Truce with the Dey without giving timely notice to all their friends that they might avoid the dangers, to which they might otherwise be exposed by trusting to the Protection of the Portuguese Ships of War stationed in the Mediterranean.

The Portuguese minister acknowledged that, six months before, the court had held conversations with "the Courts of England and Spain" in regard to the possibility of Portugal's establishing peace with Algiers, but that "the Court had appointed no Person directly or indirectly to negotiate in behalf of her Majesty."

But the British Court . . . very officiously authorized Charles Logie, the british Consul-General and Agent at Algiers, not only to treat, but to conclude, for and in behalf of this Court, not only without any Authority, but without even consulting it;— A Truce was accordingly concluded between the Dey and the british Agent (for twelve Months)

in behalf of her most faithful Majesty, for the performance of which on the part of her Majesty, the British Court is Guarantee—the Condition is, that this Court shall pay to the Dey one third as much as he receives, annually from the Court of Spain,— When this Court received information of this proposed Condition from Mr. Walpole the british En-

voy to this Court; They informed him, that however desirous they might be of a Peace with Algiers, they were so far from being disposed to submit to such a condition, that it was the determination of her most faithful Majesty not to pay one farthing, but in the interval the Truce was signed by the self constituted Agent Mr. Logie. . . . The Conduct of the british in this business leaves no room to doubt, or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at

Us, and proves that their envy, jealousy, and hatred, will never be appeased, and that they will leave nothing unattempted to effect our ruin—as a further confirmation it is worthy of remark, that the same british Agent obtained a Truce at the same time between the States of Holland and the Dey, for Six Months, whereby We and the Hanse towns are now left the only prey to those Barbarians.

In the same letter, Consul Church says that on October 5, 1793, an Algerine fleet consisting of eight vessels had been seen "sailing out of the Mediterranean" by a Portuguese fleet that had just arrived in port. These corsairs consisted of "4 ships carrying 44, 36, 30 and 28 guns—3 Xebecs 20, 24 & 26 guns and one brig of 22 guns." We read: "One of the frigates now Cruising under Algerine colours was a present from the king of Spain, but not very lately—and one is certainly a very late present from the British king"; also, "It is currently reported here, that 3 or 4, some say 2 & some but 1, of the Algerine frigates now cruising against Us, were a late present from the British king." As soon as the treaty binding Portugal was negotiated by the British agent, British merchants were evidently warned not to ship their goods in American bottoms, for we read under date of October 14, 1793: "We are informed that the American vessels now in England are returning in ballast, the English not chusing to risk their property in American bottoms, but no reason has been assigned this mysterious conduct"—probably "mysterious" to some American masters (at the time) but well understood by the Portuguese, Algerines, and United States officials at Gibraltar and Lisbon. On October 22, 1793, Consul Church, at Lisbon, in a letter to the secretary of state, said: "One of the Articles of the Truce with Algiers which was communicated to me on the 12th instt. by Luiz Pinto, the Minister for foreign Affairs, expressly restricted the Portuguese from affording protection (without exception) to any one Nation." We also read:

I had strong reasons to believe that this Government [Portugal] were by no means pleased with the conditions of the truce, or the manner in which it had been negotiated *for* and not *by* this Nation. . . . I was also convinced that a great Majority, if not the whole Nation, were extremely offended for various reasons, they conceived it intended not

only to throw on them the odium of the manifest treachery in the business, but that it was also aimed at their Navy, which was now an object of their particular attention, and which for want of some employment, wou'd again sink into neglect, which they suppose to have been one object of the English in so eagerly precipitating this Truce.

The withdrawal of Portuguese naval protection and convoy service, as diabolically planned by the British, was abrupt, and since it was made without warning, the results were disastrous to American shipping and, temporarily, to the morale of the North Atlantic foreign trade fleet. As soon as the agreement had been made with Britain and its apparent vassal Portugal, a large and powerful Algerine corsair fleet dashed out into the Atlantic to seize American ships and, in short order, captured several unprepared merchantmen, confiscated the vessels and their valuable cargoes, and enslaved the American sailors at hard labor, awaiting ransom. James Simpson, U. S. consul at Gibraltar, wrote the secretary of state on November 25, 1793, advising him that Capt. Richard O'Brien, a prisoner at Algiers (since the middle of 1785), had written on November 5, 1793, that "in consequence of the Portuguese and Dutch obtaining a Truce with this Regency, the Algerine Cruisers has captured in the latter end of October ten American Vessels, the Masters & Crews to the number of 110 men is brought to Algiers and is made Slaves to this Regency, these and all the other American Captives is in a distressed and naked situation." O'Brien, in a footnote, tabulates the seized vessels as four ships, four brigs, and two schooners; at the end, he adds, "also ship *Hope* of N York," which evidently reached Algiers after he wrote but before he sealed his letter. A list of the American vessels captured by the Algerine corsairs in their raid of October 1793 is set forth herewith:

Name of Vessel	Rig	Master	Hailing Port	Bound		Cargo
				From	To	
HOPE (400 tons)	Ship	John Burnham (Hartford, Conn.)	New York	Rotterdam	Malaga	In ballast. Crew of 18 men; 2 British passengers. Captured Oct. 6, 1793, by 40-gun corsair.
MINERVA	Ship	John McShane	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Barcelona	Captured Oct. 17, 1793, by corsair.
PRUDENT	Ship	William Penrose	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Cadiz	Grain, flour, etc.
THOMAS	Ship	Timothy Newman	Newbury Port, Mass.	Cadiz	Amsterdam	Sugar, wool, and sundries.
GEORGE	Brig	James Taylor	Rhode Island (Newport)	New York	Lisbon	Grain and Indian corn.
POLLY	Brig	Michael Smith	Newbury Port, Mass.	Baltimore	Cadiz	Flour.
OLIVE BRANCH	Brig	William Furness	Portsmouth, N. H.	Virginia	Lisbon	Grain.
JANE	Brig	Moses Morse	Haverhill, Mass.	Cadiz	Ostend	Hides, indigo, etc. Captured 4 days out by 24- gun corsair.
JAY	Schooner	Samuel Calder	Colchester, Mass.	Malaga	Boston	Raisins, wine, grapes, etc. Captured Oct. 11, 1793, by 26-gun corsair.
DISPATCH	Schooner	William Wallace	Petersburg	Cadiz	Hamburg	Sugar, indigo, sarsaparilla, etc.
MINERVA	Brig	Joseph Ingram	Portsmouth	Leghorn	New York	Sundries.

The story told by all the American seamen—masters, officers, and men—captured by the Barbary pirates is substantially the same. Capt. Samuel Calder of the schooner *Jay* said that he was captured by "an Algerine cruizer" and taken into Algiers October 30, 1793, where he found "ten sail of Americans," with their "unfortunate crews," all captured in October. On November 3, he wrote Dominick Terry and Company, Cadiz, Spain: "We was all stript of all our Cloaths some Came on shore without even a shirt, we was immediately put into Chains and put to hard Labour, with only the allowence of three small loaves of black bread pr. day & water." On December 4, 1793, Captain Calder, "a slave at Algiers," wrote further to David Pearce, Jr. (the son of the owner of the *Jay*), of his and his fellow Americans' plight and said that the captives "were all put into Chains without the least distinction and put to hard labor from daylight untill night." When the corsairs boarded the American schooner at sea, the pirates "took the clothes from our backs & brought us on board almost naked in this situation they put us into the Cable Tier without anything, not even a blanket to Cover us where we remained untill our arrival here without even a shirt to shift us. Death would be a great relief & more welcome than a continuance of our present situation. . . . We think ourselves happy if we escape through the day being beat by our drivers, who carries a stick big enough to Knock a man down, and the innocent often suffer with the guilty as they say we are all Christians." Captain Calder concluded his letter with the following:

Whether ever I shall get away from this is entirely uncertain, indeed if I may judge by the unfortunate Capts. O'Brien & Stevens who have been nine years here & most of their Crews are already Dead, & if our Country could not relieve so small a number, what will they do where there is nearly 140 men in the 13 Vessells that's already taken & we have no reason but to expect more—however we have no Reason but to expect but that the Plague will

in the course of a year take off many of us, as the last Plague took away 800 out of 2,000 Slaves—I hope your father had the *Jay* Insured as I make no doubt you had the cargo. I would if it was in my power forward you a regular Protest, but you know its impossible in this Country & I suppose one from a Slave would be of no importance. I am very sorry for your Misfortune but my Own is so much greater than yours that there is no Comparison

The seizure of American vessels by the Algerine corsairs greatly increased the insurance rates on American ships and on cargo shipped in American bottoms. Immediately, rates were jumped to 25 per cent and on one ship, from Philadelphia bound for Spain, to 50 per cent. The English virtually controlled marine insurance, and Lloyd's increased the rates on even north transatlantic crossings for American ships to a full 10 per cent. This condition played into the hands of British shipowners, as British merchants, because of these unwarrantedly

high insurance rates, would not ship their goods in United States bottoms; the result was that American vessels in British ports had to return home in ballast. Meanwhile, British merchants in Spain formed a pool to purchase from Algiers certain cargoes of captured American ships at bargain prices. Britain capitalized to the full the Portugal-Algiers peace and the associated foray of Algerine pirates into the Atlantic aimed at the capture and confiscation of United States ships and cargoes and the enslaving of American seamen.

The tonnage of United States ships engaged in foreign commerce at the end of 1793 showed a pronounced drop in volume from that of the preceding year, and the cause was officially attributed to the depredations upon and spoliation of American trading vessels by the Barbary corsairs of the Mediterranean.

*The Raids of Barbary Pirates on the American Merchant Marine
Cause the Establishment of the United States Navy*

It was the actions of the Algerine corsairs and, in fact, the menace to American lives, commerce, and property that caused the establishment of the United States Navy. For long years after peace was declared following the successful outcome of the War of the Revolution, the democratic sentiment in America was definitely anti-militaristic as well as anti-monarchical.

William Maclay, a senator from Pennsylvania in the first United States Congress, in arguing against the establishment of any national naval or military forces, said:

It is the design of the Court party to have a fleet and an army. This is but the entering wedge of a new monarchy in America, after all the bloodshed and sufferings of a seven years' war to establish a republic. The Indian War is forced forward to justify our having a standing army, and eleven unfortunate men now in slavery in Algiers is the pretext for fitting out a fleet. . . . This thing of a fleet . . . is another menace to our republican institutions.

The "Court party" mentioned by Maclay was a political reference to those men who were accused of desiring to create a new government that would not be republican or in essence democratic, but rather would follow the monarchical ideas of Britain and the Old World. For such a government, it was declared, an army and navy were necessary to keep a king and aristocrats in power, but a real democracy, with its rule of the people by themselves for their own good, required no armed forces; moreover, the United States had no territorial and imperialistic ambitions, and a navy was branded as an instrument of armed aggression and, therefore, peculiarly anti-democratic. Even when there was a large majority in Congress and throughout the country in general who favored the protection of the nation's foreign commerce and of its ships and men abroad, there were many who opposed the establishment of a navy because of their economic objections to the associated expenditures in the face of the young republic's deplorable financial position. However, the October 1793 raids on American shipping in the eastern Atlantic near the Strait of Gibraltar and the Portuguese and Spanish coasts by unscrupulous Algerine corsairs (backed by a hateful and destructive British policy) proved to be a little too much even for an American Congress that had consistently fought against the building of a navy, had maintained that a fleet to protect the commerce of a peaceful and nonimperialistic-minded nation was unnecessary, and, moreover, had argued that a navy would prove to be only "another menace to our republican institutions." Washington had consistently been out of sympathy with Congress in its "no navy" attitude. He had argued before both houses that "to secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized

and ready to vindicate it from insult and aggression"; that "to an active, external commerce, the protection of a naval force is indispensable." Washington further advocated the "gradual creation" of a navy and said:

Will it not be advisable to begin without delay to provide and lay up the materials for the building and equipping of ships of war, and to proceed in the work by degrees in proportion as our resources

shall render it practicable without inconvenience, so that a future war with Europe may not find our commerce in the same unprotected state in which it was found by the present.

Whereas the United States really came into being with the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, in the original scheme of federal government, the naval defense of the country's interests was deemed of such slight importance that the secretary of war was entrusted with the management of all marine forces, and it was not until March 27, 1794 (another five years later—or about eleven years after the declaration of peace), that a law was passed by Congress for the establishment of a navy. This enactment, which was passed by a pathetically slight majority and in the face of determined objection, created a Navy Department and authorized the construction of six frigates. Charles W. Goldsborough, who in early days was chief clerk of the Navy Department and secretary of the Naval Board, said:

The resolution of the House of Representatives that a naval force adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States ought to be provided, was passed by a majority of two voices only. Its adversaries, who were powerful in numbers and in talents, urged with force and eloquence that the force contemplated was inadequate; that the

finances of the nation did not justify expensive fleets; that it was a sacred duty as well as a sound policy to discharge the public debt; that older and more powerful nations bought the friendship of Algiers, and we might do the same, or that we might subsidize some of the European naval powers to protect our trade.

On January 20, 1794, a committee appointed "to report the naval force adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs, together with an estimate of the expenses," in a communication to the House of Representatives, placed the Algerine naval force as a fleet (exclusive of galleys) carrying 282 guns and stated that, in its opinion, "four ships, capable of carrying 44 guns each, and two ships carrying 24 guns each, will be sufficient to protect the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs." The cost of such a fleet (including six months' stores and provisions and three months' pay to officers and seamen) was estimated at \$600,000, and the annual expense of maintaining the fleet of six naval vessels in service was put at \$247,960. The Third Congress of the United States substantially followed the recommendations of its committee and on March 27, 1794, passed "An Act to provide a Naval Armament," of which the preamble and section 1 read as follows:

WHEREAS the depredations committed by the Algerine corsairs on the commerce of the United States render it necessary that a naval force should be provided for its protection:

SECTION 1. *Be it therefore enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United*

States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be authorized to provide, by purchase or otherwise, equip and employ four ships to carry forty-four guns each, and two ships to carry thirty-six guns each.

The legislation stipulated the two smaller vessels to be 36-gun ships, but in section 5 gave certain leeway, while requiring a total not exceeding 248 guns, and stated that "no ship thus provided shall carry less than 32 guns." The complement of the ships was set forth as 359 officers and men (including 50 marines) for the 44-gun vessels and 312 (including 40 marines) for the 36-gun ships. The pay and subsistence were set forth in the bill; also the rations for each day of the week. However, section 9, the concluding paragraph of the act, read: "*Provided always, and be it further enacted*, That if a peace shall take place between the United States and the Regency of Algiers, that no farther proceeding be had under this act." The last section of what would otherwise have been sound and meritorious legislation unfortunately savors of politics and attempted bluff, and the carrying forward of the construction of the six ships of war authorized was permeated with disappointment and disgust.

MERCHANT SAIL

In the planning and building of these ships, there was a deplorable lack of sound judgment, management, organization, and discipline and far too much politics and red tape. These regrettable factors and influences interfered with the work of the practical shipbuilders in the country, who, if given their heads and encouragement, were fully competent to build the ships authorized in a reasonable time, at a fair and moderate cost, and, moreover, construct good ships that would prove their quality by years of service, by performance at sea, and if called upon in war. From the start, the ships were built without any real government enthusiasm, and appropriations were erratic, far behind, and below construction needs; but much of this trouble was caused by "too many cooks spoiling the broth," by unreliable estimates, and by changes being made by politically appointed executive heads without the knowledge and sanction of Congress.

An element that can be described as "little navy," or "no navy," came back gradually and developed strength in a Congress that was notoriously parsimonious. Ultimately, this group influenced the legislators to be penurious enough to discourage the building of warships admittedly needed to defend the country's merchant marine against the depredations of pirates and also influenced them in their decision that, as "older and more powerful nations bought the friendship of Algiers, we might do the same or we might subsidize some of the European naval powers to protect our trade" and, in pursuing this course, save money—being freed of the cost of building a navy and the still greater (continual) cost of maintaining it. The sequel to the action by the British of handcuffing the Portuguese and making it possible for the Barbary corsairs to attack defenseless United States ships in the eastern Atlantic off the coast of Spain and Portugal is not pleasant reading, but it illustrates the state of civilization among the "most enlightened nations of the world" at the turn of the century.

On June 9, 1794, Congress appropriated \$688,888.82 "for the purpose of carrying on the building and equipping of the six frigates ordered"; as later stated, this sum, "at the time of passing the act, was thought [to be] sufficient to build and equip the said frigates." It was also believed that, if desired and if the money was on hand to pay the bills, the ships could "be built and equipped in one year." The secretary of war wrote the secretary of the treasury under date of April 21, 1794, setting forth the decision of the president as to where the six ships authorized should be built (but it was later decided that a 36-gun frigate intended to be built at Charleston, S. C., should be laid down at Portsmouth, N. H.), and in the report of the secretary of war to Congress dated December 27, 1794, concerning the construction of the frigates, we read:

The building of the ships has been directed in the several following ports of the Union, in order, as well to distribute the advantages arising from the operation, as to ascertain at what places they can be executed to the greatest advantage, to wit:

One thirty-six at Portsmouth, New Hampshire
(Congress)

One forty-four at Boston	(Constitution)
One forty-four at New York	(President)
One forty-four at Philadelphia	(United States)
One thirty-six at Baltimore	(Constellation)
One forty-four at Portsmouth, or Norfolk, Virginia	(Chesapeake)

It was understood by both the legislative and the administrative branches of government that the work of building these vessels of war would be spread among the colonies; therefore, the orders were placed with parties in six different states located between the Piscataqua in the North and the Charles or Chesapeake in the South. Originally, it was planned to build one of the vessels at Charleston, S. C., but this political idea had to be abandoned, and the 44-gun frigate assigned to Norfolk, Va., later became the 36-gun frigate *Chesapeake*, built at Baltimore, Md.

The captains of the six frigates were appointed and their relative rank set forth on June 5, 1794, and this was before the constructors and master builders were decided upon. Joshua Humphreys, of Philadelphia, who actually made the plans, models and molds for all six vessels, did not receive his appointment until June 28, 1794 (and then only as constructor and master builder of the 44-gun frigate to be built at Philadelphia). A year later, on

June 22, 1795, Joshua Humphreys addressed a letter to the secretary of war, in which he said, "Neither time nor expense should be spared in laying the keels of the frigates," so evidently actual work on the ships proceeded very slowly from the start. In mid-1795, the records show, the secretary of war had reached the conclusion that, as only southern live oak should be used for much of the work, the six vessels could not be built concurrently, for it was considered impossible to get out the needed timber to keep the yards operating.

Whereas the construction of six frigates was ordered by Congress on March 27, 1794 (in what was the greatest wood shipbuilding country in the world as far as available natural resources were concerned), difficulties in getting out the specified live oak and red cedar in Georgia and dilatory work due to lack of organization and of funds, with costs running some 66 per cent higher than anticipated, together with the fact that a peace treaty had been negotiated between the United States and Algiers caused the program for the building of the new ships—then far from completion—to be materially changed some two years later. On January 20, 1796, the secretary of war sent to a committee of the House of Representatives an estimate to show that the six frigates would cost \$1,142,160 instead of the \$688,888 formerly estimated and appropriated by Congress; thus \$453,272 more money than originally contemplated would be required to complete the vessels. On March 15, 1796, President Washington addressed Congress in regard to the ninth section of the act authorizing the construction of the six frigates and said: "The peace [with Algiers] which is here contemplated having taken place, it is incumbent upon the Executive to suspend all orders respecting the building of the frigates, procuring materials for them, or preparing materials already obtained, which may be done without intrenching upon contracts or agreements made and entered into before this event." Because of certain phases affecting the suspension of all work in harmony with the law, the president referred the matter to Congress for definite legislative action, and on April 20, 1796, an act was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives "to continue the construction and equipment (with all convenient expedition) of two frigates of forty-four [*United States* and *Constitution*], and one frigate of thirty-six guns [*Constellation*]" and to provide that the president "be, and he hereby is authorized, to cause to be sold, such part of the perishable materials as may not be wanted for completing the three frigates, and to cause the surplus of the other materials to be safely kept for the future use of the United States." In addition to the original appropriation of \$688,888.82 for the building and equipment of six frigates, the sum of \$80,000.00 (also appropriated on June 9, 1794, "for the building of galleys or other vessels" as the president might direct and which evidently had not been used) was diverted and earmarked to be used in the completion of three frigates, making the total appropriation for this purpose, therefore (as of April 20, 1796), the sum of \$768,888.82.

Work on the frigates *President* (44 guns) at New York, *Congress* (36 guns) at Portsmouth, N. H., and *Chesapeake* (36 guns) at Norfolk, Va., was suspended by order of the secretary of war during the period April 20-25, 1796. The signing of a degrading peace treaty with a semi-barbarous power, which required the payment of some million dollars to the dey, or corsair chieftain, of Algiers and an annual tribute of about twenty-two thousand dollars (with frequent expensive "presents"), was claimed by the administration and legislators to be in the interest of national economy, and the Algerine treaty made with but one of the Barbary pirate states, it was said, would obviate the necessity of building and maintaining a navy.

After the completion of three of the original six frigates was ordered by Congress to proceed "with all convenient expedition," the work continued to drag and to be unreasonably expensive. On January 12, 1797, the secretary of war reported that an additional sum over all appropriations of \$177,962.93 would be required to complete the three frigates and said that "from present appearances" and "provided the winter does not prove severe," the three ships would be launched during the period April-July 1797. The time necessary to construct the three frigates, on which work was presumably not at any time officially suspended (from authorizing the building to getting them far enough along to put in the water), is of interest:

Name of Frigate	Tonnage	Number of Guns	Where Built	Work Authorized	Date of Launching	
					Estimated on Jan. 12, 1797	Actual
UNITED STATES	1,576	44	Philadelphia, Pa.	March 27, 1794	April 1797	July 10, 1797
CONSTELLATION	1,265	36	Baltimore, Md. (Norfolk, Va., district)	March 27, 1794	May 1797	Sept. 7, 1797
CONSTITUTION*	1,576	44	Boston, Mass.	March 27, 1794	July 1797	Sept. 20, 1797

*The CONSTITUTION is still afloat after about a century and a half.

The time required to construct these ships up to the point of putting them in the water was well over three years—a wretched performance for a country that had the timber resources, with competent naval architects, constructors, and shipwrights. The cost of the three frigates has been given as *United States*, \$299,336; *Constitution*, \$302,710 (an average of about \$191 per ton and \$6,841 per gun for the two large 44-gun frigates); and \$314,212 for the smaller 36-gun *Constellation* (or \$248 per ton and \$8,728 per gun), which was built on the Chesapeake and had the advantage of being nearer the source of supply of southern live oak, etc. Construction on the other three frigates originally authorized to be built on March 27, 1794, with work suspended thereon by act of Congress on April 20, 1796, was evidently delayed for an additional period of about two years, as the *Congress* (36 guns) was launched at New Hampshire on August 15, 1799. Figures have been prepared to show that whereas the cost of the first three completed frigates (two 44- and one 36-gun ships) was \$916,258, the complete cost of the six vessels was \$1,555,092, which, however, was \$866,204, or 126 per cent, in excess of the original total estimated cost and the Congressional appropriation made to cover it.

The republic of independent American states needed a navy from the date of its birth, as it was essentially a maritime nation and its future lay in shipping and ocean commerce. The attitude of the maritime powers toward United States ships and foreign trade demanded that America build and operate a navy to protect its merchant vessels and gain the respect of foreign countries for the Stars and Stripes. Britain, from the first (and it was soon followed by France—America's one-time ally), did all within its power to weaken the United States as a maritime power and wreck its national economy, but it required the corsair dey and regency of Algiers to bring home to the American people their humiliating weakness on the high seas. When the United States felt compelled to purchase a peace with Barbary pirates, ransom captives taken in violation of international law, and pay a yearly tribute to the corsairs to stop the arbitrary seizure of American vessels and the enslaving of their crews, there was a great outcry of indignation throughout the country and a popular demand that became crystallized in expression through the historic slogan, "Millions for defense; not a penny for tribute." This was the reaction of the debt-ridden American nation to the Barbary pirates as well as to the British, and this spirit, with its demand for liberty and justice and freedom of the seas for peaceful trading, led to the building of an American Navy, to the War of 1812 with Britain, and shortly thereafter to the end of the reign of terror and blackmail of the Moslem Barbary pirates. The attitude of the British toward American commerce and seamen at the time of the British-inspired Algerine corsair raids on United States shipping is stated in a letter addressed to the secretary of state by the firm of Dominick Terry and Company, Cadiz, Spain, on September 20, 1794: "I have in a former Letter taken the liberty to mention the practice of English commander's pressing American sailor's in the Bay, which still Continues. We have Several American Vessel's now to our address which have been Strip't of their Men in this way, & are exposed to lose the Convoy for want of hands to Man them." This British policy of ignoring the United States flag and forcibly impressing American sailors was sheer piracy and should be ranked in unscrupulous lawlessness with the acts of the Barbary corsairs. Three other statements made in the letter of Dominick Terry and Company are of interest: that the firm has obtained permission from

the "Captain General" of the Marine to grant protection to certain American vessels if they join a convoy sailing under the care of a 74-gun ship of the line; that a list prepared by the Swedish consul shows that only ten of the first batch of (twenty-one) American captives taken in the summer of 1785 still survive; and that the Spanish firm "sent a thousand dollar's for the relief of the American's at Alger's early in November last."

*The Humiliating Treaty of Peace, with the Payment of
Tribute, Negotiated by the United States with
the Dey and Regency of Algiers*

On March 18, 1796, Joel Barlow, the United States agent at Algiers, wrote to the secretary of state an interesting report describing conditions at Algiers, from which the following extracts are taken:

The Regency of Algiers, which contains from two to three Millions of Inhabitants, is Governed, & has been for neare three centuries, by about 12,000 Turks, this number has never exceeded fifteen Thousand & is generally above ten. These Turks are natives of some part of the Levant, and are inlisted and brought here as Soldiers. They are generally ignorant & ferotious adventurers, & many

of them have been guilty of crimes for which they flee their Country. It is a common saying in the Levant that no honest man goes to Algiers. They all do duty and receive pay as Soldiers, their pay is very small at first, but it rises in proportion to the time they have been in service, & they are all eligible to any Office in the Government.

The laws discouraged marriage, Turkish women did not migrate to Algiers, and children of a Turk with a Moorish wife were not Turks and could not hold office, civil or military, nor enjoy any of the privileges of the "superior" race. Continuing, Barlow wrote:

The Moors have no arms of any kind and they are not suffer'd to learn the use of them. It is a high crime for a Merchant to sell any Arm or Amunition to a Moor, and the excessive rigor of this Military Government has accustomed them to

consider the Turks as a superior race of beings, not only as endowed with greater force arising from the use of Arms, but as the favourites of the prophet & the Lords of the Country.

The country, which was "extensive and fertile," broken with mountains and naturally defendable and peopled by a "strong, well-made, active race of men," had been governed for many ages "by a Handfull of Strangers." Barlow then stated:

The Algerine Turks are not Patriots, & they cannot be so from the Constitution of the corps. For it is not to be expected that a Man can have any Affection for a Country where neither he nor his friends can have any Posterity, or if they leave any, they must be sunk among the Miserable Vassals of the Country, who are despised & plunderd by thire proud rulers: & it is difficult to conceive with what contempt & injustice the Moors are treated by the Turks. This body then being held together by no other tie than that of self preservation, the proper object of each individual is to enrich himself by Plunder, the poor Soldiers by marauding among the Country People, & the Men in Office by committing Piracies upon all Nations who do not purchase their

peace by paying large sums of Money to every Officer in the State for their Private use, and Annual tributes, which go into the Public Treasury. . . . The Dey was supposed to be chosen by the whole body of the Turks, & every Soldier had an equal Vote. He was chief Magistrate and President of the Divan, which was a Council composed of 42 of the most ancient Officers in the Army & frequently assembled to deliberate upon Peace & War & other great matters of state. But the Government has now become a Simple Monarchy.

The Divan has not been assembled for some Years, & the Dey is subject to no other check than what arises from the Necessity he is under of distributing foreign presents, & sometimes his own

Money, among the principal Officers, to secure himself from Assassination and to prevent Mutinies. . . . It is necessary to observe that, as the peace-presents which every nation makes, & generally to a great amount, go principally into the hands of the Dey and other great Officers, and as the annual tributes only are destined wholly to the public treasury, it is the interest of these men to break friendships with every nation as often as possible. They are sure to be enriched by every Treaty, let the object of it be what it may. . . . Breaches of peace are often made upon the most frivolous & unjust pretences that can be imagined, & generally

speaking, every Nation has its turn. The only exceptions are France & England, whose great Naval strength Over Awees them in such a manner that their peace has been less interrupted. But even these powers, though they pretend not to pay tribute, expend a great deal of Money in Occasional presents.

If peace with America should now take place, it will not probably last without Interruption Seven Years. They are now going to War with Denmark. After that it is probable they will take Venice or Sweeden, or both, they will then try Holland again & perhaps Spain, and our turn will be next.

Barlow referred to the personal character of the dey of Algiers—a man “of a most ungovernable temper, passionate, changeable & Unjust, to such a degree that there is no calculating his policy from one moment to another.” During the reign of his predecessor (Mahomet Bashaw, who died in 1791), the present incumbent in office, Ali Hassan, had held great powers and had feathered his nest well. He “made himself vastly rich, particularly by the Spanish peace, which was the richest treaty they [the Algerines] had ever made.” The Spanish-Algerine treaty, made in 1786, was said to have cost the Spaniards about five million dollars to negotiate and maintain during the first ten years of its life. Of this amount, Ali Hassan was said to have personally received (or grabbed) one-fifth, or a cool million, “besides a great proportion of the presents” made by the Spaniards upon request or, rather, demand. Upon being raised to the position of dey, Ali Hassan Bashaw—a man along in years—assumed autocratic power, strangled a rival, arrested and banished or put to death the principal officers of state, and raised others to “power” who were his men and “mere cyphers in his council.” According to Barlow, it was well known that the Algerine policy was extremely capricious. “There is one point only in which it is fixed, which is that the regency must be at War somewhere, and their little perpetual hostilities with Malta, Genoa & such states as are constantly on their guard, will not satisfy them.” We are also told that the seagoing naval force of the Algerines in 1796 consisted of eleven vessels mounting 240 guns, which, Barlow said, had been built up during recent years; but this does not compare with the naval power of Algiers in 1724, when the records show that it owned twenty-four vessels carrying from 10 to 52 guns each and mounted on these corsairs a total of 680 guns.

The deys of the Turkish provinces known as the Barbary States were high dignitaries of the Moslem empire, void of both real dignity and honor and consistently rapacious, cunning, and unscrupulous. They were addressed in the most extravagant terms extolling their greatness and wonderful, unequalled attributes, power, and glory. Such men had to be humored or cajoled constantly by the consuls and agents of Christian nations, and dealing with them was a terrific problem because of their passionate changeableness, erratic decisions, stubbornness, avarice, lack of character, and non-acquaintance with truth. That they were not even impressive to look at is evidenced by the writings of a contemporary American, who described the dey of Algiers as “a huge, shaggy beast, sitting on his rump upon a low bench, with his hind legs gathered up like a tailor or a bear, who extended his fore paw as if to receive something to eat.” This same dey was as terrible as he was horrible and revolting when he burst forth into an ungovernable rage and threatened a Christian then in his presence with torture and a dungeon, and he had a little army of some fifty fully armed janizaries within earshot fully prepared and looking with joyous anticipation to the prompt and cruel execution of any order that their diabolical bashaw might give them aimed at the humiliation, persecution, torture, or death of a “Christian dog.”

Capt. Richard O'Brien, a captive at Algiers, wrote David Humphreys, U. S. minister to Portugal at Lisbon, in October 1794 of “the dey of Algiers' exorbitant demands for a

peace with the United States of America" and gave the following recapitulation of the terms that he understood would be demanded by the dey and regency of Algiers for a peace treaty and the ransom of a hundred American captives:

	<i>Dollars</i>
2 frigates of 36 Guns Each Coppered at the lowest Calculation Equal to.....	248,000
For the Casna or Treasury the Sum of.....	1,080,000
For the Deys private Emolument.....	540,000
For the 2 ^d Class of officers of the Regency.....	98,000
For the Redemption of one hundred American Captives.....	354,000
For the Principal officers of the Regency.....	115,000
First Cost for the Peace and Ransom in Mexico Dollars.....	2,435,000

O'Brien seemingly had obtained authentic information with respect to the demands to be made by the dey of Algiers of the American "ambassador" who was being sent to negotiate a peace treaty, but the captain urged that the United States representative "should not hesitate to Reject the whole and observe that his Country or no nation could ever conceive or Imagine that the Dey and Regency would ever expect such an exorbitant Sum, to be asked from the U.S. which is one thousand Leagues distant Over a Vast Ocean from Algiers, and from a new nation that wished to be friends with all Mankind, and that never armed a Corsair against Algiers—& never gave any Just or offensive motives for war, that we were a nation much in debt." O'Brien rightly felt that, if the United States was going to buy a peace with Algiers, it should not be required to pay more than such countries as Sweden and Holland, and he recommended that the American ambassador propose to the dey and regency not more than the following terms, affirming that such sums were as large "as was in the power of the U.S. to perform, or pay":

	<i>Dollars</i>
For the peace for 60 years the sum of.....	200,000
For the Dey for his Particular friendship.....	100,000
For the one hundred American Captives the Sum of.....	200,000
This offer to include the whole expences in. Mexico dollars.....	500,000
For a free gift annually in Maratime & Military Stores & Money, &c.....	30,000

Then there is a regala—as Customary on the peace, of Stores, &c. Allso Ambassadorial and Consolary presents, & Money to persons of Influence—which in my Opinion would amount to upwards of fifty thousand Dollars—Allso to be paid a duty of

16 per Ct. on the ransoming of Captives which with this Statement all expences included, by Establishing the peace ransom of Captives and setting the Consul in his post, would cost the United States upwards of 600,000 Dirs.

The very competent, observing, and patriotic American shipmaster O'Brien, after well over nine years in humiliating captivity in Algiers, further suggested that "if the Dey Gets in his usual Blustering Convulsions of Passion, and orders the Ambassador to be gone from his presence and depart Algiers," the order be obeyed instantly, but that, because of the "fluctuateing and Variable character of the Dey," someone should be deputized and granted powers to resume negotiations and conclude a treaty "on the terms you offered or proposed." O'Brien mentioned two resident agents of Christian foreign powers and a firm of "Jew merchants" who could be expected to work energetically and intelligently in the matter if it were made to their interest to do so by the payment of a commission.

In regard to the building of two frigates for the Algerines by the United States, O'Brien called attention to the possibility that the Turks might revolt at any time, kill the dey, elect a new dey, make war on the U.S., and use the two frigates given them "at the peace" in capturing Americans and dragging them into slavery. Hassan Bashaw, dey of the Algerines at the time, was an old man, and upon his death by either natural causes or violence, his successor, knowing what the present dey received as presents for "making a peace," could be expected to repudiate the existing treaty and refuse to honor a peace "made by a dead foolish man," in order to negotiate and personally benefit—as did his predecessor—in the making of a new one. Moreover, Algiers was but one of the Barbary corsair states, and the nature

and cost of any peace made by the United States with Algiers undoubtedly would have influenced the attitude of the beys or bashaws of Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco. In trying to understand the actuating thought and motive of the dey in making his demands of the United States, O'Brien was inclined to the belief that "there still remains some of Seeds or Dregs of the political influence of the british on his mind, which was imbibed into him when the[y] were all, and all, and of influence dureing many years past." Captain O'Brien, a captive slave in Algiers who greatly desired his liberation, nevertheless, wrote urging that the dey's demands of the United States be not accepted by Congress and added that the terms proposed "would certainly be the most dishonourablest that was ever brought before a Republican Government to Debate on."

Under the caption, "Presents exacted from the United States by the Dey of Algiers" is a document in Washington copied by James Lea. Cathcart, the dey's head Christian clerk and dated December 22, 1794. The preamble and first three clauses read as follows:

LAUS DEO.

The Terms exacted by the Dey & Divan of the Regency of Algiers to conclude a treaty of Peace with his Excellency the President & Citizen Subjects of the United States of America for the term of one Century to commence from the day said Peace is ratified, an account of said treaty being duly register'd in the Publick Register of this Regency.

The Dey demands on the part of this Regency, two Frigates sheath'd with copper to mount 36

Guns, 12 pounders on the Gun deck & every way compleately equipd &ca—

Mexican Dollars

The Dey demands the United States of America to pay to the Publick Treasury of this Regency in Six different payments the sum of Six hundred thousand Algerine Sequins, Value in Mex^a. Doll^a. 1,080,000

The Dey expects for his own private emolument three hundred thousand Algerine Sequins, eq^l to 540,000

The fourth demand covers "sums to be paid to the Dey to be distributed by him at his own discretion" aggregating 158,000 Mexican dollars; the amounts are set forth under thirteen divisions and include 60,000 "for the Deys Wife & Daughter," 5,000 for the dey's chamberlain, 10,000 for his two head cooks, 23,000 for nine members of the dey's staff, and 60,000 for "Moorish Chauxes," "Officers of Justice," "Officers of the antient Divan," and "Cappa negroes or Officers of the pay Table."

Division No. 5 is stipulated as follows under the heading, "The Sum Exacted for the Ransom of one hundred American Captives is as Viz":

			<i>Mexican Dollars</i>
For 11 Masters & one Super cargo @	6000	Dolls. each 72,000	} 354,000
For 14 Mates	4000	Dolls. each 56,000	
For the Deys Christian Clerk	4000	Do. 4,000	
For His three American pages or Servts. @	4000	Do. 12,000	
For the Redemption of 70 Mariners @	3000	Do. 210,000	

The sixth and last general division of demanded payments is under the heading, "The following sums are to be sent privately to the following Grandees Houses Viz":

			<i>Mexican Dollars</i>
To the Hasnagi or prime Minister	15,000		} 115,000
To the Aga or Generallissimo of the Turks	15,000		
To the Hodge of Cavallos or Farmer General	15,000		
To the Beitalmel or receiver de les droits d'Aubain	15,000		
To the Vikilhadg or Intendant of the Marine	15,000		
To the four Hodges or Turkish Secretary's—10,000 Dolls. each	40,000		

The recapitulation of the amounts to be paid at once as "presents," excluding the cost of two frigates, is stated as "The whole sum exacted for the Peace & Redemption of 100 American Captives is 2,247,000 Ds."

In addition to the demands for the purchase of a peace and the liberation of a hundred enslaved Americans, "the terms exacted" further stipulate:

. . . that the United States of America shall pay annually unto this Regency the sum of twelve thousand Algerine Sequins in Warlike Stores timber &c. The Dey & Divan on their parts farther declare that in Consequence of the United States complying with the above demands on the Arrival of an Ambassador Plenipotentiary from said United States, That they will insure the United States an advantageous Peace with the Regency of Tunis, even below their most sanguine expectations, and will grant the United States every Commercial

privilege equal to the most favour'd Nation, & will likewise comply with any reasonable request said Ambassador may make on the part of the United States of America — — —

DONE BY OUR ORDER IN THE DEYS
PALLACE ALGIERS Decr. the 22d 1794

AUTHENTICATED & SEAL'D WITH THE
PUBLICK STAMP OF THIS REGENCY

HASSAN BASHAW
Dey of the City & Regency of Algiers

A treaty of peace was concluded between the United States and the dey and regency of Algiers on September 5, 1795, at which time "peace presents" aggregating 21,215½ sequins (\$38,188) were made. Joseph Donaldson, with proper credentials, was the agent of the United States during the negotiations, but on January 4, 1796, after four months had elapsed "without the least ratification [according to Algiers] on the part of the United States of America," Hassan Bashaw, dey of the city and regency of Algiers, wrote David Humphreys, "Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of North America at the Court of Portugal and Chargé des Affaires de Barbaria," and said that such a delay in complying with the provisions of the treaty "makes me doubt the authenticity of the said Donaldson's commission, notwithstanding my Christian clerk [James Leander Cathcart] has absolutely informed me that he was authorized by the Sign Manual of His Excellency George Washington, President of the United States of North America and confirmed by the Great Seal of the said States." The dey, after expressing doubt as to the "veracity" of Donaldson's credentials and a desire to hear from Humphreys personally "either to object to his [Donaldson's] proceedings or confirm them," said:

I therefore desire that you may immediately dispatch a Courier on receipt of this to inform me of the cause of such detention, as the Divan in general are, very impatient, and by discontenting them, it is out of my power to remedy the fatal con-

sequences that might ensue—even to risque the ruin of your cause in this Regency during my Reign and for a number of years afterwards. I therefore recommend Dispatch.

On February 6, 1796, James L. Cathcart wrote David Humphreys at Lisbon of the dey's impatience and anger at the United States and reported that unless something definite was done within a month, the dey would become convinced that "the agents of the U. S. were trifling with him;" that he would "consider everything we had allready done to be void and would treat us as a set of imposters." On February 10, 1796, because of Donaldson's ill health, Joel Barlow was appointed by Humphreys U.S. agent at Algiers to act separately or jointly with Donaldson as conditions might suggest, and on April 3 Barlow and Donaldson reported from Algiers:

The Dey has this moment given us to understand that he has come to the following decision relative to our affair:—that in 8 days we shall be sent away from this place [Algiers], that he will then allow thirty days & no more, before his cruisers shall have orders to bring in American ships, that

if within that time the money should come to pay the sums stipulated by Mr. Donaldson, he will receive it & conclude the peace, otherwise it is war; and as he shall consider the treaty as violated on our part he will be under no obligation to renew it.

The United States agents rightly complained (seven months after the negotiation of the treaty) of "the ignorance in which we have been kept relative to the state of the funds & to your intentions as to fulfilling the conditions of the treaty."

Presumably, about this time, the dey of Algiers received a letter from David Humphreys written at Lisbon, February 16, 1796, in reply to the one addressed him by the dey on January 4, in which the Algerine bashaw was assured that Joseph Donaldson, Jr., who negotiated the "provisional Treaty of Peace and Amity" on behalf of the United States, had full powers "emanating from the Executive of the United States of America" to do so; that it "hath received my recognition (so far as I was able to recognize it) and has been forwarded to the Executive of the said States." Humphreys explained further:

It is necessary (according to our Constitution) that it should be ratified by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, before it can become the Supreme law of the Land; that the delay which hath occurred originated from inevitable circumstances beyond the foresight or controul of human precaution; . . . that all possible measures are now taking for accomplishing the Arrangements as soon as the circumstances will ad-

mit, in a manner which it is hoped will be satisfactory to your Excellency—but still it is impossible to say whether a considerable time must not elapse before the money can possibly be collected—as neither gold or Silver, to the amount in question, can be exported from the Place where all has every assurance & reason to expect it would have been in readiness for us.

This letter of the "Commissioner Plenipotentiary from the United States" to the chief of the unscrupulous band of Turkish pirates dominating the affairs and destiny of the unfortunate Algerines ends with the words: "I pray God to have your Excellency in his holy keeping; and to crown your life with length of days, felicity & glory."

On the very day (February 16, 1796) that Humphreys wrote to the dey of Algiers from Lisbon, Capt. Richard O'Brien, who evidently had been sent to England "in the State Brig *Sophia*, John Cranson Master," to obtain "in London, the funds of the U.S. which was to be appropriated to the Algerine business," wrote the American secretary of state:

I am sorrow to inform you that in London Gold or Silver cannot be procured. I therefore return to Lisbon in the States Brig, with a credit from Sir Francis Baring, for the requisite sum on Cadiz Our

only hopes is that Col. Humphreys by some means will be able to have permission granted by the Spanish Court for said sum to be shipt on board the States Brig—

There is a record dated April 10, 1796, that U.S. consular presents costing \$27,561.96 were "given to the Dey and his relations and officers," and in a letter from the U.S. agents at Algiers of April 5, 1796, we read that "Baccry, the Jew, who has as much art in this sort of management as any man we ever knew" and "who has more influence with the Dey than all the Regency put together," was instructed by the American representatives that:

. . . he might offer him [the dey] a new American built ship of 20 guns, which should sail very fast, to be presented to his daughter, on condition that he would wait six months longer for our money. The Jew observed that we had better say a ship of 24 guns, to which we agreed. . . . The novelty of the proposition gained the Dey's attention for a moment & he consented to see us on the subject. But he told the Jew to tell us it must be a ship of 36 guns or he would not listen to the proposition. We were convinced that we ought not to hesitate a moment. We accordingly went and consented to his demand, & he has agreed to let every thing remain as it is for the term of three months from this day, but desired us to remember that not a single day beyond that will be allowed

on any account. We consider the business now as settled on this footing. And it is the best ground we could possibly place it upon. You still have it in your power to say peace or no peace. . . . She [the gift ship] ought to be built long in proportion & formed for sailing fast, a circumstance particularly pleasing here. We think such a vessel fitted for sea may be delivered in America for 45,000 dollars. . . . In order to save the treaty thus far, . . . we found it necessary some time ago to make an offer to the Jew of 10,000 sequines (18,000 dollars) to be paid eventually if he succeeded & to be distributed by him at his discretion among such great officers of State as he thought necessary, and to keep as much for himself as he could keep consistent with success.

Thus was born, in Algiers, the idea that resulted in the construction of Portsmouth, N. H., of the Barbary corsair 36-gun frigate *Crescent*, which Americans were to build as a fast and powerful ship of war to be used by the Moslem pirates in raiding the merchant shipping of Christian nations. At the very time that this deal was made, Algiers was concentrating its corsair attacks on Danish vessels, and we read in a letter dated Algiers, April 17, 1796, that "thirteen Danish vessels are already sent in by the cruisers." This attack on the Danes could easily have been avoided, as Denmark was willing to pay tribute, "but the Dey would not consent to any accommodation that would not give activity to his cruisers."

A month after the deal had been made between Donaldson and Barlow representing the United States and the dey of Algiers, with "Baccry the Jew" as intermediary and partial beneficiary, by means of which the dey's daughter was to be given the present of a fine, new, fast-sailing American-built 36-gun frigate, Vizir Hassan Bashaw, dey of the city and regency of Algiers, wrote George Washington, president of the United States of America:

Health Peace and Prosperity

Whereas Peace and Harmony has been settled between our two Nations, through the Medium of the two Agents of the United States Joseph Donaldson, and Joel Barlow, and as eight Months has alaps'd without one article of their agreement being complied with we have thought it expedient to

dispatch James Lea[n]der Cathcart formerly our Christian Secretary with a note of such articles as is required in this Regency, likewise with a form of a Mediterranean Passport in order that you may furnish your Consul here with such as fast as possible. [Dated at Algiers, May 5, 1796]

A letter of Joseph Donaldson from Leghorn dated June 20, 1796, refers to 360,000 Mexican dollars available to be sent by the United States to Algiers, and liberated American captives were evidently sent from Algiers to Leghorn according to a letter of July 12, 1796, from Joel Barlow, U. S. agent at Algiers, to M. Felichi, U. S. consul at Leghorn. Also, a letter of Barlow to Donaldson of the same date refers to a \$400,000 credit at Leghorn and \$200,000 more at Lisbon, "for which you can draw" for the purpose of making payments to Algiers for maintaining the peace and "to liberate our people." Another plague broke out in Algiers at the end of May, and before the liberated American captives sailed from Algiers on July 13 for Leghorn, six more of them succumbed to the pestilential scourge. After writing a letter to the secretary of state mentioning "the extremely capricious and savage character of the Dey" and the difficulty in getting real cash or acceptable credit to Algiers in order that the American captives could be freed, Joel Barlow sent a letter on July 12, 1796, with the liberated slaves, which reads in part:

This will be presented to you by the remnant of our captive citizens who have survived the pains and humiliation of slavery in this place. . . . When we reflect on the extravagant sums of money that this redemption will cost the United States, it affords at least some consolation to know that it is not expended on worthless & disorderly persons, as is the case with some other nations who are driven, like us, to this humiliation to the Barbary States. Our people have conducted themselves in general with a degree of patience and decorum which would become a better condition than that of slaves. . . . I

hope they will receive . . . from their fellow citizens in general that respect which is due to the sufferings of honest men. Several of them are probably rendered incapable of gaining their living. One is in a state of total blindness; another is reduced nearly to the same condition; two or three carry the marks of unmerciful treatment, in ruptures produced by hard labour; and others have had their constitutions injured by the plague. Some of these are doubtless objects of the charity of their countrymen.

From a letter written by President Washington from Mount Vernon on July 13, 1796, to the secretary of war, it is apparent that the executive was displeased with the slow progress being made in the building of the "gift ship" and critical of governmental red tape. In this private communication, Washington said:

Disagreeable as this requisition was found in its reception, and more so in the compliance with it; yet, as there appeared no other alternative but to comply, or submit to the depredations of the Barbary corsairs on our citizens and commerce, the former was preferred; & I had no doubt (after pressing as often and as earnestly as I did before I left Philadelphia . . .) that every thing relative to this Frigate was in a perfect train of execution, agreeably to whatever assurances had been given by

Captain O'Brian. . . . Before I conclude, let me, in a friendly way, impress the following Maxims upon the Executive Officers.—In all important matters, to deliberate materially, but to execute promptly & vigorously,—and not to put off until the morrow which can be done, and require to be done, to day.—Without an adherence to these rules, business never will be *well* done, or done in an easy manner; but will always be in arrears with one thing treading upon the heels of another—

Apparently, Washington's admonitions bore some fruit with the army and navy organization, for the 36-gun frigate referred to was completed and ready to sail about eighteen months later, and probably at least six months could have been cut from this time, together with much expense, if the building of the ship had been left entirely to the private local constructors and taken out of the hands of dominating and prejudiced federal naval architects. (The 36-gun frigate *Constellation*, launched in September 1797, had been authorized in March 1794.) However, the record of the United States in this entire affair of dealing with the Algerine pirates is an unfortunate one and is permeated with indecision, procrastination, and the very qualities which Washington denounced. An apparent indifference to

the lives and suffering of American citizens is evidenced by the fact that the surviving members of the crews of the *Maria* and *Dauphin*, captured by the Algerine pirates on July 20 and July 25, 1785, were not liberated and permitted to sail from Algiers until sometime after the middle of September 1795 and July 13, 1796—or after a period of enslavement, humiliation, and inhuman abuse of about ten to eleven years. Capt. Richard O'Brien of the *Dauphin* (afterwards consul general at Algiers) affirmed that he was "10 years and 40 days in captivity," although apparently given preferential treatment because of his importance and leadership, and another record states that O'Brien "remained in captivity until the 11th of September 1795," when he was "Redeemed in consequence of the Peace made by the United States with Algiers." It required almost nine years dating from the *Maria* and *Dauphin* incidents for the United States to decide to establish a navy, and then four more years passed before America had its first three frigates (totaling 124 guns) ready for service—a fleet woefully inadequate to cope with the naval forces and organization of the Moslem Barbary pirates.

After the "peace" with Algiers (and, it was believed, with all the Barbary corsair states), United States consuls were stationed at Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, and American merchants and shipmasters were optimistic for a time and ventured in increasing numbers into the dangerous waters of the Mediterranean. In defense of the treaty with Algiers, Joel Barlow, U.S. agent at Algiers, on April 20, 1796, estimated that American vessels in that trade were receiving \$1,200,000 a year in freight, "of which one-half [was] clear profit," and he calculated as probable "augmentation of our commerce arising from the circumstances of our being our own carriers, per an. 3,000,000 dol. on which 15 per cent. profit." Barlow's estimate of profit of American Mediterranean commerce, therefore, was set at \$1,050,000 per annum; whereas the annual cost of maintaining the peace was set at \$40,000 per year for Algiers, \$16,000 for Tunis, and \$4,000 for Tripoli—amounts which were supposed to cover tribute payments, presents, and all the expenses of the consul's office. The worthy American agent, in presenting this estimate to the secretary of state, boldly showed a "clear advantage" to the United States resulting from "maintaining a peace with Barbary" of \$990,000 a year. Against this, Barlow estimated that an average American vessel captured by the corsairs would cost the United States about \$60,000, or the entire cost of maintaining the peace with the three Mediterranean Moslem states for a whole year. (Morocco was not considered by Barlow in these calculations, for that state was primarily an Atlantic province, and he said: "We must be at peace there [Morocco] if we would use the Atlantic, whether we use the Mediterranean or not.") Barlow's detailed figures of the cost of an average American ship captured by the Barbary corsairs, with the price of redemption (or ransom) to be paid for the crew and the loss of ship and cargo, together with expenses of negotiation, are set forth as follows:

Cost of Ransom of Crew		Value of the ship.....	\$ 8,000
Captain	\$ 4,000	Value of the cargo.....	24,000
Mate	3,000	15½ per cent customary duties.....	3,565
Eight men @ \$2,000.....	16,000	Expenses of negotiating the redemption.....	1,435
Total for crew.....	\$23,000	Total loss and cost of redemption.....	\$60,000

Barlow also referred to the effect of war with the Barbary States in the cost of marine insurance and the driving of American commerce to the use of foreign bottoms for protection, i.e., safety and resultant economy. Such estimates seem to reveal why the United States was willing to pay for peace with the Barbary States—at least during the time that its navy was building; unfortunately, the figures are not only deceiving but also decidedly erroneous, and in the end the United States paid a very stiff price for the peace bought from the various Barbary corsair states. In addition to causing unspeakable humiliation, degradation of spirit, and the crucifixion of honor, the paying of money as tribute and as good-will presents to the Turkish pirates was like "pouring money down a rat-hole." As in all black-

mail cases, the amounts demanded rapidly and steadily increased; the recipient became less appreciative, more demanding, more conscious of power, and more determined to use this power unscrupulously toward shortsighted, selfish ends.

The treaty of peace and amity signed at Algiers on September 5, 1795, which was submitted to the U.S. Senate February 15, 1796, and ratified by the United States March 7, 1796, is a lengthy document of twenty-two articles. Apparently, nothing in this treaty covers the terms agreed upon for "buying" the peace with cash presents to the "Publick Treasury" of the regency and personally to the dey and the members of his family, household, and government, but following the last article we read: "Joseph Donaldson Jun^r. on the Part of the United States of North America agreed with Hassan Bashaw Dey of Algiers to Keep the Articles Contained in this Treaty Sacred and inviolable which we the Dey & Divan Promise to Observe on Consideration of the United States Paying annually the Value of twelve thousand Algerine Sequins [\$21,600] in Maritime Stores." By this treaty, the United States made reciprocal trade and naval agreements with the dey and regency of Algiers and bound itself that its warships (if it ever had any) should treat the armed cruisers, or corsairs, of the Algerines as if they were the legitimate warships of a friendly foreign power—and not the lawless pirates which they were.

In a statement written in Turkish setting forth the "Reason for the Drawing Up of the Peace Treaty with the American People," we read that the treaty of peace was "between the ruler and commander of the American people, living in the island called America among the isles of the ocean, and the frontier post of the holy war, the garrison of Algiers." This document states that the understanding was reached by the American ambassador "in the exalted presence of His Excellency the noble Vizier and powerful Marshal who sits on the throne of lordship, the destructor of tyranny and injustice and the protector of the country, Hassan Pasha [the Dey]—may God grant to him what he wishes; and in the presence of all the members of the Divan, of the chiefs of the victorious garrison, and of the victorious soldiers." Continuing, we read: "This peace treaty has been concluded, together with the contractual promise to give annually to the garrison of Algiers 12,000 Algerian gold pieces, provided that, in equivalence of these 12,000 gold pieces, being the price of peace, there may be ordered and imported for our garrison and our arsenal, powder, lead, iron, bullets, bombshells, bomb stones, gun stones, masts, poles, yards, anchor chains, cables, sailcloth, tar, pitch, boards, beams, laths, and other necessaries." The United States, therefore, pledged itself to pay its annual tribute to the corsairs in munitions of war or supplies needed for the armed vessels of the pirates if such should be desired by the dey to keep the Algerian fleet equipped to prey upon Christian shipping.

Figures giving the early cost to the United States of the "peace" negotiated with Algiers are to be found in the following report to the Senate dated January 16, 1797, dealing with necessary appropriations:

That the further sum of \$255,759.03, being a balance of \$992,463.25, not yet provided, will be necessary to carry into effect the treaty with Algiers, agreeably to primary stipulations, including the frigate of 36 guns, promised the Dey; that, for the balance of the annuity granted by the said treaty, calculated for two years, at \$144,246.63, the further sum of \$96,246.63; that for the 10,000 sequins

promised the Jew broker by Mr. Donaldson, the sum of \$18,000; and that, for the expenses of the captives performing quarantine at Marseilles, and transporting them to America, the sum of \$6,000 will also be necessary; making in the whole [at this time] \$376,805.66, which sum, in the opinion of your committee, ought to be appropriated out of some effective fund, for the purposes aforesaid.

The secretary of state, on August 31, 1797, writing to agents of the United States in Europe of the sailing of the ship *Newport* for Algiers, said:

The Ship *Newport* is laden with timber (including two large masts and four yards) planks and staves for the Dey, on account of the stipulations of the treaty of the United States with him. . . . This is the third Ship laden with naval and other Stores for the Dey pursuant to our agree-

ment; and we shall continue to forward the residue as fast as possible. The entire performance of our contract may absolutely be relied on.

The freight which will be due to Captain Tew on the delivery of the cargo of the Ship *Newport* at Algiers is \$8,932.88.

On January 26, 1799, Consul General O'Brien, at Algiers, stated that the United States "had bro^t. to Algiers 8 cargo's & 5 corsairs" as part of the "great sum" paid "for the peace and ransom." A statement as of February 22, 1799, giving the "accounts of sundry cargoes shipped by the United States for Algiers," shows that the brig *Independent* had such general and miscellaneous cargo aboard valued at \$40,268, the *Jupiter* \$22,853, the *Newport* \$9,455, and the five American-built corsairs, in addition to military and naval stores, \$32,017.

In trading and deals made by United States representatives with all the Barbary States, it is evident that the unscrupulous Moslems cheated on every hand and that Americans were unable, because of the conditions in effect, to get any degree of fair business treatment at the hands of men who at all times—notwithstanding their persistent and elaborate protestations—were lawless pirates. Another difficulty developed from the incompetency (due to lack of practical knowledge) of American agents in estimating costs. Joseph Donaldson, Jr., U. S. agent at Algiers, according to a letter of the secretary of state dated May 13, 1797, made a "most egregious error," as "the enormous masts estimated by Mr. Donaldson at only thirty dollars each, will cost probably five hundred, perhaps considerably more, delivered at Algiers." (In December 1798, the secretary of state gave the cost of these "thirty-dollar masts" as "six to eight hundred dollars.") Moreover, "the oak and pine planks six inches thick cost more than three times the price estimated by Mr. Donaldson." The Moslems were hard traders; furthermore, they capitalized to their advantage the difficulties of language and the ignorance of some well-intentioned but inexperienced Americans who tried to protect United States interests. Much material was confiscated because of noncompliance with technicalities, and it would seem that the Barbary State officials themselves arbitrarily set values and the prices on all products that they acquired from all the relatively weak Christian nations with which they had peace treaties.

Much more can be said of the humiliation, unquestioned weakness, and dishonor of the United States as well as of its national gullibility in even attempting to deal with corsairs and blackmailers. From the published work on the life of General William Eaton, American consul at Tunis (who has been described as "an energetic, aggressive Dartmouth graduate and ex-soldier"), we read that on December 22, 1798, the newly appointed consul went on board the "tribute-laden" brig *Sophia* (Capt. Henry Geddes) at Philadelphia bound for Algiers "in company with the *Hero*, a ship of 350 tons burden, loaded with naval stores for the dey of Algiers," and the United States-built armed vessels (corsairs) *Hassan Bashaw*, *Skjoldebrand*, and *Lelah Eisha*. Not only all the cargoes of these five vessels but also "all these vessels [themselves] excepting the *Sophia* [and she was destined to be given to Tripoli] were to be delivered to the Dey of Algiers for arrearages of stipulations and present dues." John R. Spears has written: "With these facts in mind, we shall be able to comprehend why American shipping was subjected to ruthless spoliation during the entire period between the end of the War of the Revolution and our second war for liberty, which we began in 1812. The sole criterion of right in international affairs was might."

After the Federal Government was organized in 1789, the United States oscillated in regard to its naval policy. It wanted a navy and did not want to spend the money to build one. The "little navy" people, of whom there were many, talked poverty and preached economy. The depredations of Barbary pirates resulted in the passing of bills by Congress for the construction of frigates needed to protect the honor and commerce of the United States, but a clause in the bill of authorization stipulated an automatic suspension of work on the warships if peace were secured. Evidently, the administration paid tribute, or in plain words graft, to the dey of Algiers to stop piratical attacks on American vessels. The United States paid in fighting craft and armaments that would increase the lawless might of the pirates; to offset the cost of this tribute, it stopped work on its warships and declared that during an "era of peace" it had no need of a navy. The tribute of a "dollar-laden warship," of armed cruisers and American-built corsairs, of armaments, munitions, naval stores, timber, valuable supplies, and money was—as ought to have been expected—wholly ineffective. Payments to black-

mailers acknowledge the power of the blackmailers and lead to increased demands. The presents and tribute paid by the United States to the deys of Algiers fed the vanity of those greedy potentates; such payments did not placate them, but operated to increase their appetites. Moreover, the United States should have known that there were four Barbary States—and all had found piracy profitable. The tribute paid the dey of Algiers by the United States in conformity to the provisions of the original "peace treaty" not only made the Algerines desire more "easy pickings" but also inspired all the other Barbary States to forage upon American commerce in order to create a substantial amount of nuisance value on which they could capitalize to their selfish advantage by generally similar treaties of peace.

The total number of United States vessels captured by the Barbary pirates was not large because of the timely warnings generally given shipmasters; the use of the warships of powerful friendly nations as convoys for protection through dangerous waters; the good sailing qualities and handiness of American ships; and the resourcefulness, scheming, and defensive tactics of able men in command and of brave fighting men in the crew. Nevertheless, the acts of the corsairs caused a sharp rise in insurance rates, which for a time checked the growth of the American merchant marine. As long as the unscrupulous, lawless, and relatively weak Barbary Moslem states were permitted by the maritime Christian powers to continue their depredations on peaceful merchant shipping, there was ever present not only the constant threat of the confiscation of both ships and cargoes but also the possibility of the capture of a trading vessel's officers and crew, and the sufferings of the Barbary pirates' victims, as slaves under inhuman Moslem taskmasters, were terrible beyond words.

*The Appeasement Policy of the United States toward the Barbary
Pirate States—Gift Ships and the Building of Corsairs
in America for the Use of Moslem Pirates against
the Commerce of Christian Nations*

The treaty negotiated in September 1795 by the United States with the dey and regency of Algiers (the most powerful and belligerent of the Barbary pirates, which also included the Moslem rulers of Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco) was ratified by the United States Congress six months later. It was generally considered as an agreement between two states whereby the weaker one (the United States), measured by available naval power, purchased a "peace" with the stronger and more aggressive and unscrupulous one (Algiers) by the payment of a substantial sum amounting to "some million dollars" in money and the equivalent in goods, including specified presents made and demanded under threats and duress. However, this treaty was in fact a covenanted agreement of a free and peaceful people, whose well-being required the continuance and growth of foreign maritime commerce and whose destiny was on the ocean, to pay tribute (by means of a large initial sum followed by annual payments for a century) to Moslem (Turkish) corsairs who had virtually no legitimate trade and were in control of a North African nation of Moors conquered and held in subjugation through force of arms. The entire marine fleet of the Algerines, except for a few small coasting traders, which measured only about 15 tons each, consisted of armed deep-sea corsairs and smaller gunboats. These corsairs did not engage in any legitimate commercial pursuits; but, while designated as vessels of the Algerine navy, were out-and-out pirates. Some of them were privately owned (the property of wealthy Turks), but all were under the personal control of the autocratic despot—the dey of Algiers. Because of impecuniosity and relative poverty, the young republic of the United States, which had no navy, paid much of its tribute to the blackmailing and lawless

Barbary pirates in materials of war (including ships) and, therefore, by such payments increased the marauding power of the corsairs. America evidently did not know that it is much cheaper in the end to pay pirates with shot and the sword than in gold. A weak Congress (and it must be admitted that it was badly advised by the administration) was guilty of putting a stain on the honor and flag of a young nation that even kindly time can never erase. The disgraceful tribute to the pirate chief at Algiers was somewhat delayed in payment, but it seems that the original contributions and presents in substantial amounts were made in 1797 and 1798.

When the American agents in Algiers promised a "gift ship" to the dey in an effort to pacify him pending the payment of hard money, they wrote on April 5, 1796, that they thought that a 36-gun frigate such as was in their mind could be produced in America, fitted ready for sea, for \$45,000. Naval Constructor Joshua Humphreys, U.S.N., estimated the cost (about June 8, 1796) as follows:

	Dollars
Completely built & rigged, fit for sea, the materials of the hull, live-oak and cedar, will cost.....	64,000
36 guns, nines and sixes, estimated at.....	3,000
Gun-carriages	450
100 barrels of powder.....	2,000
15 tons of cannon balls.....	700
Rammers, sponges, etc.	200
	70,350

Wages and provisions for thirty officers and men for a period of four months, in order to make delivery, were estimated to cost \$5,000.

On November 29, 1796, Naval Constructor Joshua Humphreys and Josiah Fox made an estimate of the cost of the vessel on the basis of \$100 per ton as follows:

Carpenters bill for building the Hull, launching & compleating the same together with a Compleat set of Masts & Yards.....	45.00
Joiners, Smiths, Plumbers, Boatbuilders, Carvers, Coopers, Blockmakers, Sailmakers, Riggers & Rigging, with Ship Chandlers bills.....	55.00
	Pr. ton..... \$100.00
Ship compleat of 538 Tons at \$100 pr. Ton.....	53,800.00
Copper Sheathing	4,118.40
Cannon	7,428.69
Copper Pintles and Braces.....	1,200.00
Powder, Shot, and other Military Stores.....	13,551.00
40 Men including officers, for 5 Months together with their provisions	8,589.00
	\$88,687.09
Contingencies	9,690.00
	\$98,377.09

The secretary of state wrote to Joel Barlow, U. S. agent at Algiers, on December 3, 1796: "The frigate [*Crescent*] is building at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, under the direction of an excellent naval architect; and I trust she will be ready to sail for Algiers (with masts and naval stores agreeable to your suggestion) early in the next summer. But instead of forty five thousand dollars, she will cost the United States, about ninety thousand, by a late estimate; and probably this will eventually rise to one hundred thousand." The 36-gun "gift frigate" was finally completed and sailed from Portsmouth, N. H., in January 1798. A little over a year later, Richard O'Brien, the U. S. consul general at Algiers, reported in an official letter: "I observed [in conversation with the dey] that the U. S. also gave the frigate [*Crescent*] to the Algerines [and] that said vessel cost the U. S. 150,000 dollars."

During the first week of June 1796, President Washington, with his advisers, decided to comply with the request made from Algiers and build a "gift ship" in the form of a 36-gun frigate for the dey of Algiers. On July 13, Washington criticized the secretary of war and other government officials for the delay evident in getting the work started, but was assured by the secretary of war on July 16 and 18 that "no unnecessary delay respecting the Algerine frigate has taken place." Yet we find that it was not until September 1, 1796, that

an order was given by the war office to have the vessel built under contract by James Hackett at Portsmouth, N. H., and the time to construct the frigate is stated as "ten months from the date of reception of this letter." This would have required completion by early July 1797.

The secretary of state, writing to Joel Barlow, U. S. agent at Algiers, from Philadelphia on May 13, 1797, said: "You say 'the dey requires the frigate [*Crescent*] as soon as possible.' She is to be launched on the 4th of July next. Captn. Newman (late a captive in Algiers) writes me under date of May 1 that he has been at Portsmouth to see her, and finds her as 'complete a piece of workmanship as he ever saw.'" On July 7, 1797, the secretary of war, writing Captain Thompson at Portsmouth, acknowledged his report of June 29 and said: "I congratulate you and Mr. Hackett on the safe Launching of the Frigate into her proper element." Surprisingly, after the vessel had been launched, the United States secretary of war wrote: "It being necessary to fix on a name for the frigate intended for the dey of Algiers before she sails from Portsmouth: I have therefore concluded to call her the *Crescent*." A letter from the secretary of war dated September 13, 1796, definitely makes requisition of the secretary of the treasury for all the guns needed for the "frigate destined for the Mediterranean" (24 9-pounders and 12 6-pounders); yet, almost a year later (September 5, 1797), a letter from the secretary of state to Francis Da Costa indicates that even the drawings for some of these guns had not been made, and at that time the ship was awaiting her armament. On December 4, 1797, Richard O'Brien wrote the dey of Algiers from Philadelphia: "The accident happening to the guns destined for the frigate [*Crescent*], which this government gives to Algiers, has retarded her sailing. Please God said frigate will sail for Algiers in december." This "accident" was evidently due to government departmental inefficiency, red tape, confusion, procrastination, and the lack of a competent and authorized directing head.

Capt. Thomas Thompson at Portsmouth, N. H., August 1, 1797, certified to the secretary of war that the construction work on the *Crescent* (hull, spars, rigging, and equipment, excluding armament) had been completed in accordance with the contract and specifications and that James Hackett, the constructor, was entitled to payment in full. "I can assure you," Thompson affirmed, "that nothing on his part has been neglected, but has done every thing to make the Ship complete as possible in doing of which, he will have but a very small sum left for his Services." Edmund H. Quincy, writing from Portsmouth, N. H., on November 5, 1797, referred to "the Frigate *Crescent*, riding at anchor the pride of our river and the boast of our seamen; indeed, she is a beautiful Ship & it is confidently asserted, the handsomest vessel, in the United States."

The *Crescent*, because of unnecessary delays in obtaining her armament due to an inexcusably weak federal executive organization, did not sail from the Piscataqua for Algiers until January 18, 1798. When she left the United States, she carried a cargo of naval goods, such articles as tea, sugar, pepper, cloves, spices, and fabrics, and also \$180,000 in cash. The Portsmouth, N. H., newspaper of January 20, 1798, said:

On Thursday morning, about sunrise, a gun was discharged from the frigate *Crescent* as a signal for getting under way, and at 10 A.M. she cleared the harbor with a fine leading breeze. Our best wishes follow Capt. Newman, his officers, and men; may they arrive in safety at the place of their destination and present to the Dey of Algiers one of the finest specimens of elegant naval architecture which was ever borne on the Piscataqua's waters. The *Crescent* is a present from the United States to the Dey as a compensation for delay in not fulfilling our treaty obligations in proper time. Richard O'Brien, Esq. [captain of the *Dauphin* of Phil-

adelphia, captured by the Algerian pirates July 30, 1785], who was ten years a prisoner at Algiers, took passage in the above frigate, and is to reside at Algiers as consul-general of the United States to all the Barbary states. The *Crescent* has many valuable presents for the Dey, and when she sailed was supposed to be worth at least three hundred thousand dollars. Twenty-six barrels of dollars constituted a part of her cargo. It is worthy of remark that the captain, chief of the officers, and many of the privates of the *Crescent* frigate have been prisoners at Algiers.

It was said that "a major gesture leading to more cordial relations" between the United States and Algiers was the presentation to the dey by the American Government of the 36-gun frigate *Crescent*, built at Portsmouth by Col. James Hackett. The dey had "demanded

sufficient inducement to observe his treaty with the United States and compliance was immediate." Construction work on the 36-gun American frigate *Congress*, greatly needed by the inadequate United States Navy, was purposely delayed in order to hurry forward the work on a "tribute ship" to be sent with the nation's compliments to the most powerful and unscrupulous of the Barbary pirates. Adams tells us in ANNALS OF PORTSMOUTH that the *Crescent* was considered "the finest specimen of naval architecture that ever floated on the waters of the Piscataqua." She reached Algiers after a 29-day passage from Portsmouth, N. H., and the dey was reported to be much pleased with this "proud product" of a New England shipyard. It is evident that the United States took a new frigate that it greatly needed, named her the *Crescent* to please and pamper Mohammedan pirates, and sent her to Algiers with barrels of good American money as tribute to lawless corsairs instead of sending her and others to deliver broadsides of iron into the hulls of pirate craft. Also, the United States sent a consul general "in the interests of trade and good will," knowing well that Barbary pirates did not buy but stole or obtained by blackmail all the foreign goods they acquired and that our ambassador to promote friendship "had languished for a full decade in an Algerine dungeon." Marvin writes of this episode that Americans will read with astonishment that their country could ever have been guilty of this base weakness and adds:

There was peculiar irony in the fact that this fine frigate [*Crescent*], launched at a time when we had only two or three frigates of our own [and not a single one ready for service], was sent to the Dey officered and manned in part by American sailors

whom he had already robbed and enslaved, and as the final touch of bitter humiliation, the *Crescent* sailed from the New England river whose free tides had borne a few years before the brave keels of John Paul Jones's *Ranger* and *America*.

Capt. Timothy Newman, a liberated Algerine captive, delivered the frigate *Crescent* to Algiers, and upon his return to Boston on the *Sarah* (Captain Hopkins), he wrote the secretary of state on June 7, 1798: "The *Crescent* was very joyfully received and a very fine ship." Richard O'Brien, another corsair-captured Algerine slave, ransomed after ten years and then the U. S. consul general at Algiers, sailed on the *Crescent* on her maiden (and delivery) voyage from the United States to Algiers, and in making his official report on March 1, 1798, he said:

I sailed from Portsmouth the 18th of January in the *Crescent* frigate destined for Algiers. On the 17th of February we arrived at Gibraltar . . . and sailed from said place on the 20th, arrived here on the 26th having with us the United States schooner *Hamdullah*. I immediately had a long conference with the Dey, and, from being something dissatisfied he got well pleased, and I fully explained

all our difficulties which retarded the Algerine business. We discharged those stipulated articles which were on board the *Crescent*, Captain Newman, and the schooner *Hamdullah*, Captain Montgomery, so that this day the frigate and schooner was delivered up to the Dey and Regency of Algiers. . . . Thank God we and the one hundred and eighty thousand dollars we had on board is arrived and all well.

The sum of \$180,000 is variously referred to as ransom money and amounts due in conformity with provisions of the peace treaty entered into with Algiers, but a letter from the secretary of state dated December 29, 1797, says that the sum of \$180,000 placed on board the frigate *Crescent* was for the following purposes:

For our peace treaty with Tunis.....	\$ 60,000
To repay the sum lent by the Dey of Algiers to purchase our peace with Tripoli.....	40,000
To be paid the Bey of Tripoli when our consul arrives there pursuant to treaty.....	12,000
To reimburse the house of Bacri for advances.....	50,000
Miscellaneous and contingencies.....	18,000
	<hr/>
Total amounting to.....	\$180,000

By the end of 1797, the Tunis and Tripoli corsairs, following the example of the dey of Algiers, were evidently beginning to blackmail the United States in substantial amounts; Morocco, to a much more moderate degree, pursued the same tactics.

The schooner *Hamdullah* (referred to by Captain O'Brien in his letter of March 1, 1798), which was handed over to the dey of Algiers concurrently with the *Crescent*, was also

a gift to the corsairs from the United States—or, more correctly, represented part of the tribute that America was obligated by treaty to pay to the pirate leaders of Algiers; for the U. S. Government officials deemed it more economical to send the dey and regency of Algiers another armed corsair that he could use to prey upon the shipping of Christian nations than to send him the equivalent value in the timber, spars, and naval stores that he had specified. In the case of both the *Crescent* and the schooners *Hamdullah* and *Lelah Eisha*, the idea of sending the Algerine corsairs armed vessels to be used by them solely as pirate craft originated in the minds of Americans and was not suggested by the dey or any official of the regency of Algiers. That the original thought was permeated with great possibilities of increasing evil (even if it did operate to relieve a pronounced tension and serious condition at the moment) is proven by the fact that the dey ordered two corsairs to be built in the United States for his account and that the government seemingly accepted the commission with alacrity. These two vessels, with the three U.S.A. "gift ships," can be briefly described comparatively as follows:

Name of Vessel	Tonnage	Type	Armament (as originally)	Place Built	Date	Stated Algerine Complement
CRESCENT	538	Frigate (ship)	24 9-pounders 12 6-pounders (total 36 guns)	Portsmouth, N. H. (by contract)	1796- 1797	306
HASSAN BASHAW	275	Brig	22 6-pounders	Philadelphia (by contract)	1798	196
SKJOLDEBRAND	250	Schooner	20 4-pounders	Philadelphia (by contract)	1798	150
LELAH EISHA	150	Schooner	18 4-pounders	Philadelphia (by contract)	1798	130
HAMDULLAH	125	Schooner	14 3-pounders	Baltimore (purchased)	1797	70

The secretary of state, on December 29, 1797, wrote to Consul O'Brien:

The Schooner *Hamdullah*, which has lately sailed with Stores for Algiers is also [in addition to the *Crescent*] to be delivered to the Dey. . . . This Schooner [evidently a newly built Baltimore privateer] has been purchased, and the Schooner *Lelah Eisha* is now building here, for the Dey, in the expectation that they will not only soothe him under the past delays & disappointments in the fulfilment of our stipulations, but serve as acceptable substitutes for the stipulated, Masts, Yards, and

heavy planks, which are so costly and difficult to procure, and so exceedingly expensive to transport—the former, when delivered at Algiers will cost the United States perhaps thirty times their estimated price in the stipulations. You will, therefore, exert all your talents to effect these objects. . . . The Schooner *Skjoldibrand*, & Brigantine *Has-san Bashaw* now building here on a special Commission from the Dey, will be completed as soon as possible.

Official correspondence not only mentions the armed vessels building in the United States for the dey of Algiers as being designed and constructed under the supervision of America's leading naval architects but also actually refers to them as the best corsairs ever built. However, it would seem that as the year 1797 ended, the executive heads of the U. S. Government were at last beginning to sense the evil associated with building armed vessels for the Algerine corsairs either as "gifts" or under contract for the dey's account, and they must have sensed the probability that whereas the dey might order ships to be built for his account, he would later demand that they be turned over to him gratis as gifts and tokens of friendship. In the letter of the secretary of state written December 29, 1797, to Consul O'Brien of Algiers, we read: "The building of armed vessels for the Dey and Regency of Algiers. the Government of the United States would willingly have avoided: altho' the European nations have long been in the practice: But the critical situation of our affairs left us no alternative. In time to come, however, we shall be well pleased if further engagements of the kind could be avoided." It is also of significance that in this same letter the secretary of state urged the following among the reasons for the consul to keep in mind when explaining to the Barbary States the difficulties in which the United States found itself:

The fact that altho' we contended with the force of Great Britain and successfully, in the establishment of our Independence, and had many vessels of war on the Ocean; yet these were chiefly the property of private Citizens, who with the conclusion of the war, laid aside all armed vessels, and the Government, loaded with heavy debts in the

war for their Independence have hitherto avoided the expensive establishment of arsenals and dock-yards: Hence the delays in procuring cannon and building vessels of war. The forming of these establishments being reserved for the urgent occasion commenced or apparently unavoidable.

The dey of Algiers (Hassan Bashaw) who made the treaty with the United States in September 1795, died May 15, 1798, and was succeeded by the prime minister, Baba Mustapha (raised from the ranks, favored and honored by Dey Hassan), on which occasion all the nations with which the Algerines were at peace had to give "graciously" presents of a certain predetermined value to the new ruler. U. S. Consul General O'Brien reported that "a regular succession of officers took place, all in tranquility," and that "we have on this occasion come off tolerably well," as the new dey renewed the treaty and "the guarantee of the treaty of the U. S. with Tripoli." As was to be expected, when payment for the U.S.-built corsairs came up for consideration, Dey Baba Mustapha stated that he would accept them only "as free gifts from the U. S., as tokens of the American friendship for the Dey and Regency"; that if they were not given to him gratis, notwithstanding his predecessor's order (given under the seal of the regency), he would not "admit them to be received as deductions from our annual stipulations."

Dey Baba Mohamet (in some records he is referred to as the "Saint of Algiers"), who ruled the Algerines and the corsair Moslems of that regency before the "reign of Dey Hassan Bashaw, declared: "I know my friends by the presents they bring." Mohamet's successor, Hassan, increased the autocratic power of the dey and demanded greater personal emoluments, while elaborating the policy of Mohamet and making it possible for the friendly and generous to obtain concessions and a measure of justice. The new dey, Mustapha, who followed Hassan Bashaw as the despotic leader of the Algerines, intended from the first to pursue the course set by his predecessors in office and, after he had established himself, increase the wealth and power of Algiers and of its dey—and this at the expense of Christian nations by means of his corsairs and the capitalizing of the rivalry and jealousy existing between the maritime powers and the weakness of certain Mediterranean states. Dey Mustapha planned and considered the present and immediate future, and what tribute the Christian nations had paid his predecessors interested him only as a gauge of the possible sums that he might extract from them in return for his friendship. The existence of a treaty for a term of years and the fact that money had been paid to former deys to buy a peace meant nothing to Mustapha; he had to have money and presents flow to him at intervals in an amount to satisfy him fully and meet the requirements of the regency and his personal avarice or the treaties' existence would be repudiated, and what could not be obtained from a certain Christian nation by diplomacy, demands, and threats would be gained by the depredations of his corsairs.

The three new American-built corsairs (of privateer type), with their estimated cost, date of arrival at Algiers, and length of Atlantic passage on their maiden (and delivery) voyages, are given in official documents as follows:

Name of Corsair	Rig	Arrived at Algiers	Length of Eastward Atlantic Crossing	Stated Philadelphia Price (presumably cost)
HASSAN BASHAW	Brig	Feb. 8, 1799	32 days from Philadelphia	\$39,848
SKJOLDEBRAND	Schooner	Feb. 4, 1799	29 days from Delaware	21,088
LELAH EISHA	Schooner	Jan. 23, 1799	38 days from Philadelphia	17,941

Capt. Richard O'Brien declared the brig *Hassan Bashaw* to be "the most beautiful & most compleat vessel ever seen," and he wrote to the secretary of state:

The whole maritime class of the Algerines were captivated with these vessels & observed generally that after they had traversed the boisterous ocean they had arrived in Algiers, without carrying away a rope yarn, these three corsairs arrived in perfect order & from their manoueuering in sight of all Algiers, the regularity & that all essential maritime

order, amazed the Algerines, & from this sample of American construction, Officers & Men, comprising the Crews of these vessels, the Algerines are convinced that we have abilities & resources in the United States to be a very active & stubborn enemy in case war was to be the result or reward of all our endeavors to cultivate peace.

Mustapha Bashaw, the new dey of Algiers, persisted in his attitude expressed by the interrogation: "Did not the U. S. give the frigate to Hassan Bashaw as a free gift from the government of the U. S. & under this consideration is not the present Dey to be as much noticed, respected & honor'd as the late Dey who had such large Sums of Money from the U. S. . . . Had not he [Mustapha] renewed the peace & kept it & only rec'd a few trifling presents." After a good deal of negotiating and refusals to comply with the demands, followed by the dey's open threats, the American consul general compromised the situation by making a present to Dey Mustapha Bashaw of the new brig, and all the American-built corsairs became Algerine property. The United States obtained a credit of 60,000 dollars and a certificate that "our annual stipulations were paid for 2 years & 9 mo^s." During the arguments with the dey, O'Brien had put a price of 49,000 dollars on the brig and 28,000 and 21,000 dollars, respectively, on the two schooners—a total of 98,000 dollars, or some 19,123 dollars more than the "Philadelphia prices." Furthermore, in his bargaining, O'Brien had stated "that the Portuguese ambassador in Philad^a had offered for these 3 corsairs the sum of 120,000 dollars if delivered in Lisbon, . . . that I could assure the Dey it was the policy of the Christian nations to do every possibility to reduce the marine of Algiers, that the U. S. found a pleasure particularly at present [February 1799] in increasing the strength of Algiers in order to crush the French, who had turned the robbers & persecutors of the Musselmen & of the neutral nations." O'Brien further continued in a note: "What are these 3 corsairs employed in, I say in these seas, to look out, take, sink, burn & destroy French corsairs that is robbing & pirating Americans, so that from this circumstance it will be the means of our commerce having less obstructions in this quarter."

The depredations of French cruisers and privateers on United States shipping had reached serious proportions in 1793, and on March 2, 1794, France was charged with capturing and taking thirty-eight American vessels into French ports in flagrant violation of the treaty in effect between the two nations. On April 27, 1798, Congress (some two years after ratifying the peace treaty with Algiers and deciding to spend a million dollars as tribute to Barbary pirates to save the necessity of building a navy) authorized the purchase or construction of twelve vessels, none of which would rate over 22 guns, at an expense of \$950,000. Additional galleys and small vessels were ordered soon after for coast defense. On May 28, 1798, the United States cruisers were authorized to capture any French vessel that might be found near the coast preying on American commerce; on July 7, 1798, all treaties with France were abrogated, and within a few days United States cruisers were given permission to attack French vessels wherever found. Commissions were available for privateers, and the construction of the three long delayed frigates was authorized as well as six ships of the line. It was the peace treaty with Algiers that stopped the construction of a United States Navy, but it was the "growing spoliations" by the French that in the spring of 1798 "rendered it imperative" to the administration and Congress "that some active defensive measures be taken afloat." (The so-called "Quasi-War with France" covered the period of 1798-1801.) During the time of this Undeclared War with France, there are records of the flight of American merchant ships to the ports of Barbary pirates for protection from the depredations of French (and Spanish) privateers.

A list of the corsairs owned by the Algerines on February 20, 1799, shows a total of fifteen vessels, each carrying from 14 to 36 guns and with an aggregate armament of 332 guns. Of this fleet, five vessels (one frigate, one brig, and three schooners) carrying 110 guns, or one-third of the total, were built in the United States—including the 36-gun *Crescent*, the

largest ship of the dey's marine force. Another statement dated February 28, 1799, adds a 20-small gun polacca to the list and mentions another 26-gun xebec building; the number of slaves is stated as 1,051, and the comment is made that the relatively small marine force "of this infernal regency" evidently "makes all Christian nations become tributary to them, oh! humiliating reflection J. L. C."

On March 17, 1800, Captain O'Brien, U. S. consul general at Algiers, wrote the secretary of state that the frigate *Crescent* (then less than three years in the water) "is beginning to have dry rot," and he significantly adds: "I am in hopes, that this year she will be run on shore or taken by the Portuguese if so it will be rendering the United States a service and saving Much difficulties." O'Brien may have been deceived, misinformed, or somewhat pessimistic and unwarrantedly fearful in regard to the physical condition of the *Crescent*, for there is a record four years later that the ship was in commission and giving general satisfaction. At no time does there seem to have been any criticism made by the Moslems of either the life or the quality of workmanship (and design) of U.S.-built ships; whereas it is well known that vessels built in North Africa had an unusually short life, and it is said that "many of the gunboats built didn't last much more than a year."

*The U.S. GEORGE WASHINGTON Operated under the Algerine
Corsair Flag to the Discredit and Humiliation of the United States*

On August 29, 1798, the secretary of the navy wrote Capt. Silas Talbot, New York, requesting that he make a survey of the ship *George Washington*, owned by John Brown, of Providence, R. I., which the government was planning to acquire by purchase if the vessel was as represented: "a ship built of cedar and live oak, coppered, two suits of sails, completely rigged, and fitted in all respects for a ship of war." It was said that she could be "sent on a cruise with very little expense, and without delay; capable of carrying 24 12-pdr. cannon or 32 guns, 9 & 6 pounders," and that she was "one of the best sailers in America." The ship was purchased September 18, 1798, for \$40,400 (\$10,400 in cash and \$30,000 in "6 per cent stock"), and the armament of 24 9-pounders and 8 6-pounders was ordered (from Brown). Capt. Patrick Fletcher was the first commander of the vessel, and the complement of the ship consisted of 120 hands (70 able seamen and 50 ordinary seamen and boys) and 30 marines together with officers. The ship was ready to be commissioned as a naval cruiser and to sail in December 1798.

In May 1800, the U. S. ship *George Washington* (Capt. William Bainbridge) was ordered "to convey the annual tribute to the Dey of Algiers." On September 17, U. S. Consul General O'Brien reported that the vessel had arrived, and he wrote the secretary of state:

We are upwards. of 110 thsd. dollars in debt. to the Bacris & Busnach. of Algiers. we are. nearly 2 years in Arrears in our annuities to the regency—I am sorrow to find that few articles is sent on the Annuities and. no Cash to pay our debts. we should be More punctual. if not we shall experience diffi-

culties. . . . The dey has. demanded that the Ship [*George*] *Washington* should carry the presents of the Regency to Constantinople. I have tryed all in My power to evade this. but. I am affraid I shall be obliged to give way to prevent extraordinary diffi-

Each of the Barbary Moslem corsair states was a conquered province under tribute to the sultan of Turkey, and the dey and regency of Algiers were required to send tribute to Constantinople of a stipulated amount, which they were expected to extort from the subjugated natives or obtain from their corsair depredations on Christian commerce as they saw fit. Mac-lay says:

Just before the arrival of the American frigate the dey [of Algiers] had seriously offended the Sublime Porte by making a treaty with France at a time when Turkey and her ally, Great Britain, were carrying on a war against Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt, and the dey was anxious to forward with all possible dispatch, presents to the value of five or six hundred thousand dollars, besides upwards of two hundred envoys to propitiate the wrath of the sultan.

Upon reaching Algiers, Captain Bainbridge had quite naturally anchored the *George Washington* in the safe and usual place, which, however, was under the guns of Algiers' shore batteries; therefore, the vessel was in the hands of the Algerines. When the American commander declined to have the vessel of the U. S. Navy used in the Moslem service for carrying tribute from an outlying North African conquered province to the capital of the Turkish domain, the dey of Algiers became "violently angry" and changed his original request to a demand, threatening "to blow the ship out of the water" and enslave the survivors of the officers and crew (or cast them into dungeons) if his orders were not complied with. It is significant that at this time a British 24-gun ship of war was at Algiers and should have been available to undertake the mission to Constantinople, as the Turks and the British were allies at war. The dey either was refused permission or declined to use the British naval vessel to carry his ambassadors and presents to the Sublime Porte, but insisted that his flag "be hoisted at the main masthead of the American ship" and that she obey orders and undertake his mission without delay. The log of the U.S.S. *George Washington* of Thursday, October 9, 1800, reads:

We receive a positive command from a Dispoctic Dey of Algiers that we must be the porters of savage Tygers & more Savage Algerines Ambassadors in Compliment to the Grand Seignior at Constantinople. At 2 P M the Capt. Consul & the Deys executive Juncto [Junta] came on board. the

pendant of the United States was struck and the Algerine Flag hoisted at the Main top Gallant royal mast head. 7 guns were fired in compliment. some tears fell at this Instance of national Humility the Compliment was answered from the Castle.

The following day (October 10), Capt. William Bainbridge, in a letter written from Algiers to Benjamin Stoddart, secretary of the navy, said in part:

The light that this Regency [of Algiers] looks on the United States is exactly this: you pay me tribute, by that you become my slaves, and then I have a right to order as I please. Did the United States know the easy access of this barbarous coast called Barbary, the weakness of their garrisons, and the effeminacy of their people, I am sure they would not be long tributary to so pitiful a race of infidels. . . . I have no choice in acting, but am governed by the tyrants here; . . . no arguments would avail, their despotic will must be complied with. . . . Had we 10 or 12 frigates and sloops in those seas, I am well convinced in my own mind that we should not experience those mortifying degradations that must be cutting to every American who possesses an independent spirit. This forced cruise compelled by the Dey, will cost 14 or 16 thousand dollars in expenses for pay and provisions, and after effected will have no tendency to promote the interest of the United States with this Regency; it is not in the

nature of those people to regard any favors done to them by a christian nation. . . . [There has been] no alternative but compliance or war,—the fears of slavery for myself and 131 under my command, was the least alarming to me; but a valuable commerce in those seas, that would fall a sacrifice to the pirates of this port on account of our not having cruisers adjacent to protect it. I sincerely hope on my return from the Levant that I shall see some of our frigates off Algiers; it is my candid opinion that in no part of the world there is more need to shew them than in the Mediterranean sea. It is the opinion of Consul O'Brien, should any accident happen to the *Washington*, against the interest of Algiers, by whatever cause it may be, the Algerine cruisers will immediately capture our vessels, unless they are prevented by our cruisers being in these seas. I candidly believe, on the safety of the embassy in the ship under my command, hangs the preservation of our peace with Barbary.

This episode, with the degradation of an American naval vessel and the humiliation of the United States and all its citizens, was a bitter pill to swallow for both Captain Bainbridge, U.S.N., and Captain O'Brien, the U. S. consul (a lieutenant of a privateer in the Revolutionary War and later a captain in the merchant marine), but as O'Brien wrote to Bainbridge on October 10:

The Consequence of a *positive refusal* would be war made immediately by This regency on the United States. the Ship under your Command would be detained. and detention & Slavery would be the

fate of yourself officers and crew The Vessels property and Citizens of The united States would be Captured & Condemned in this City of bondage. . . . by *acquiring* to the *forced demand*, . . . you will

by This Means Save the Peace of The United States. times . . . and is what Occasionally must be done by
 it is what all other nations at peace with this regency those that intends to keep their Peace.
 [including Britain, France, Spain, etc.]. has done at

The United States had no navy in the Mediterranean and, in fact, no sizable navy afloat that it could send there. To make matters worse, the nation was "badly circumstanced" in Algiers, for as O'Brien points out, "The United States is, at present, in Arrears [in making stipulated payments of tribute]. in debt no funds &c in fact no Credit."

An officer on the U.S.S. *George Washington*, writing on October 14, 1800, from Algiers, said:

We are to set sail from hence to-morrow, for Constantinople, which will of course detain us from our country at least nine months. . . . The Dey insisted on our going; and we had only to choose between compliance and slavery. They have hoisted the red flag at our maintop gallantmast head. It is said that our Consul had to enter into a security on the part of the United States of 800,000 dollars, for the safe delivery at Constantinople, of the cargo of the *George Washington*.

Consul O'Brien, writing to William Eaton, the U. S. consul at Tunis, on October 19, 1800, gave the number of people and an idea of the cargo aboard the U.S.S. *George Washington*:

Crew of the <i>Washington</i>	131	} 331
ambassador & suit.....	100	
negro men women & children.....	100	

4 horses 150 Sheep 25 horned Cattle. 4 lions 4 tygars.
 4 antilopes 12 Parrets. funds & Regalia Amt. nearly one million of dol^{rs}

An officer of the ship stated that there were "60 Turkish women" aboard and "20 gentlemen"; also "100 Negro Turks." He listed, besides jewels and money and the wild animals and horses, "200 sheep." Another list mentions "leopards" and "ostriches" also and says that all the presents aboard, including the 100 slaves, were "valued at several millions of dollars." We also read in a letter written by Consul O'Brien from Algiers on October 19:

On the 14th inst arrived the Ship *Brutus* capt Brown from Livorn in 10 dayes— The dey will insist said Ship will proceed to Rhodes to Bring him a Cargo of Turks— Observe said Ship has 1056 Cases of Oyle & Soap on board— The dey told me that if Said Ship did no go he would oblige her per force—no pay no Consideration for the Cargo— nothing to be Considered but the deys own Despotic will—

Later, the dey changed his mind, as a better opportunity presented itself for getting his "Cargo of Turks" from the island of Rhodes, and the *Brutus* was permitted to sail for Salem on October 26. Captain Brown, on his arrival home, gave a skeleton report of the spoliations of Algerine corsairs during "the last two years." The list includes: "27 Sail Neapolitans, Sicilians and Maltese . . . vessels and cargoes condemned; crews, 215 condemned to slavery. . . . 17 Sail of Greeks—vessels, cargoes and crews condemned—the Greeks employed as Slaves, and after a service of 15 months given up to the Grand Signior [at Constantinople]. 18 Sail of Imperialists, valued at one million of dollars—vessels and cargoes condemned—crews given up to the Grand Signior." We also read that a Danish frigate chased an Algerine corsair ashore, for which "mistake" the Danish Government paid the dey \$80,000 and his ministers \$20,000. The American-built corsair brig *Hassan Bashaw* (then named merely "*Bashaw*," as Dey Hassan was dead and his successor did not care to perpetuate his memory) was captured by a French and Spanish naval squadron and taken to Cadiz. Upon learning of this, the dey of Algiers put the Spanish consul in chains, and he was fettered for 33 or 35 days and until the Spaniards gave assurance and guarantees that they would promptly return the vessel and the captured crew and gave presents to compensate for the injury to an amount stated as from \$50,000 to \$60,000. During this same period, Captain Brown affirmed that the Tunis corsairs had captured eleven Danish vessels valued at \$600,000 and that the Tripoli pirates had seized "24 sail of Swedes." The statement of Captain Brown dated Salem, December 11, 1800, also includes the following:

Look out! United States of America! or you will share the fate of the Swedes at Tripoli—the Danes at Tunis—and of many other Nations at Algiers. The United States should immediately have six stout frigates in the Mediterranean, to keep Roguers in awe. Should any accident happen to the *George Washington*, in her passage to or from Constantinople the government of the U. States will be obliged to reimburse the Dey all damages he may sustain thereby, or his most Potent Majesty will

order his corsairs to capture American vessels. . . . The Algerines observed to capt. Bainbridge, that he ought to consider it a great mark of the dey's favour, to go upon his Majesty's special business to the Grand Seignior—adding, that it was an honour he would confer on very few others. There are about 2,300 European slaves in Algiers—some of them from the first families in Europe. The place appears very strong, but 6 or 8 Seventy-fours could batter it to pieces.

Writing the secretary of state from Algiers on October 22, 1800, O'Brien maintained that even though he had definitely declined to have the United States assume any responsibility for the safe passage of U.S.S. *George Washington* with her cargo to Constantinople, he knew, full well, that if the vessel was lost or suffered any injuries affecting the value of her cargo, the dey of Algiers would collect from the United States through the capture of American vessels; he would, furthermore, follow his established custom, and if the loss was \$600,000, he would take \$1,000,000 to balance it. To prevent or at least minimize the "threatened calamities," the American Government was urged to dispatch immediately "a fleet of six of our best and fastest sailing frigates. into this Sea. under the command of such an active man as Commodore Truxton," with orders to act to protect the country's commerce (ships, men, and cargoes) and interests in general.

The U. S. ship-of-war *George Washington*, which sailed from Algiers at 6:00 p. m. on October 20, 1800, arrived at Constantinople on November 11, coming to anchor off the lower end of the city at 10:00 p. m. after a passage of 22 days and 4 hours (reported as 23 days to destination). In Captain Bainbridge's report to the secretary of the navy dated November 17, 1800, we read: "Three officers successively, came from the Grand Signior, to know what Ship we were, & what Colours were them we had hoisted, Answered American frigate & Colours. They said they knew no such place as America, we then told them the new World, by that name they had some distant ideas of us." Bainbridge, still suffering from his humiliating position and the insult of the dey of Algiers to the flag, dignity, and honor of the United States, in this same letter wrote:

I shall endeavour as much as lies in my power, consistently to preserve the Peace, but should a demand be made by their Ambassador, of the Frigate's remaining 5 or 6 Months in this place [Constantinople], I shall consider myself justifiable in not complying to so long a time, a refusal may be attended with threatenings of War which I candidly believe will never be put in execution, would 6 of our Frigates appear before Algiers. A list of their whole Marine force [nine vessels carrying over 20 guns—three of them American built—and four

more with over 10 and under 20 guns, of which two were American built], I had the honor of enclosing, from that place, you there can see the pitiful force of the *All powerful Algiers*, to which is to be added, they have only two Ports on their whole Coast.

Believe me Sir, my information of that Country is so correct, that I do not hesitate in saying, that 6 or 8 frigates in the Mediterranean Sea, would give us more permanent security, than any Treaty that can be made with the States of Barbary.

The reaction of the United States Government to the "extremely mortifying *Washington* episode" is expressed by the secretary of state in a letter to the consul general at Algiers written May 20, 1801 (soon after Thomas Jefferson assumed his duties as the third U. S. president, following John Adams, 1797-1801, and before him, George Washington, 1789-1797). In this official communication, we read:

The sending to Constantinople the national ship of war the *George Washington*, by force, under the Algerine flag, and for such a purpose, has deeply affected the sensibility, not only of the President, but of the people of the United States. Whatever temporary effects it may have had favorable to our interests, the indignity is of so serious a nature, that

it is not impossible that it may be deemed necessary, on a fit occasion, to revive the subject. Viewing it in this light, the President wishes that nothing may be said or done by you that may unnecessarily preclude the competent authority from animadverting on that transaction in any way that a vindication of the national honor may be thought to prescribe.

The same letter admits that the United States is "three years in arrears [in tribute payments] to the Dey [of Algiers]" and says that the *George Washington* is booked to carry another load of "timber and other stores, for at least one annuity." However, the United States would rather send money than goods (naval stores and merchandise), and the government is evidently displeased with the *Fortune* confiscation incident and the loss with respect thereto (stated by O'Brien on March 20, 1799, as \$47,987), for we read:

The pretensions set up against the United States, in the case of the ship *Fortune*, for indemnification to the owners of the merchandise with which she was laden, show disadvantage of employing our vessels in the freight of Algerine property. You

will, therefore, as far as you can, discourage that branch of trade; and, as far as it cannot be done, will take care to repress all expectation or claim whatsoever, to throw on the United States the losses by capture under their flags.

The *Fortune*, it appears, was engaged by an American agent, at the time that a plague was raging in Algiers, to get certain American seamen captives out of Algiers and over to Leghorn as promptly as possible upon the conclusion of negotiations for the peace treaty. To facilitate matters and ensure a safe arrival of the Americans at Leghorn, the vessel (for the one passage) was placed under the flag of the United States. The real owners of the ship, Bacri & Busnah (a Jewish firm of Algiers), continued without authorization to operate the vessel under the American flag, and on February 5, 1797, she was seized by two British frigates (*H.M.S. Inconstant* and *Blanche*) in the Mediterranean in the vicinity of Marseilles, although her papers said she was bound for Genoa. The British condemned and confiscated the ship and her cargo; whereupon the Algerian firm that owned the vessel and was entirely responsible for her operations made claim for full compensation from the United States, as this firm had—in violation of specific instructions and for its own selfish advantage—continued to keep operating her under the Stars and Stripes with an American crew. The Jews, who were banker-brokers, or financial and diplomatic agents for the United States in Algiers, admitted full ownership of the *Fortune* and her cargo, but declared that "the rule universally established in the Barbary States is that the flag shall protect the ship and her cargo"; therefore, the United States and not the firm of Bacri & Busnah would have to stand the loss. Apparently, the United States, because of its position in Algiers and its dependence on the Jewish firm for financial accommodations and political influence with the dey and head officials of the regency, was compelled (as was so often the case) in the *Fortune* affair to see justice once more crucified and the United States again made "the goat"—a role that had become habitual and was expected by all the Barbary States.

The U.S.S. *George Washington* and her American officers were better received at the Sublime Porte than the ambassadors of the dey of Algiers notwithstanding the gifts they brought to the sultan. Maclay says that the Algerine representatives "were treated with harshness and were informed that the dey had just sixty days in which to declare war against France and to send a large sum of money to Constantinople." An English traveler, Edward Daniel Clarke, who reached the Turkish capital shortly before the arrival in the harbor of U.S.S. *George Washington*, wrote:

On the arrival of the American frigate . . . considerable sensation was excited not only among the Turks but also throughout the whole diplomatic corps stationed at Pera. The ship commanded by Captain Bainbridge came from Algiers. . . . The messenger from the dey was ordered on board the [Admiral] Capudan Pasha's ship, who receiving the letter [addressed to him personally] from the dey

with great rage, first spat and then stamped upon it, telling him to go back to his master and inform him that he would be treated after the same manner whenever the Turkish admiral met him. Captain Bainbridge, however, was received with every mark of attention. The order of the ship and the healthy state of the crew became topics of general conversation in Pera.

After landing the envoys, passengers, livestock, and the presents, the U.S.S. *George Washington* returned to Algiers, where she arrived on January 21, 1801, after an absence of three months (which was much less than anticipated), but this time Captain Bainbridge, profiting by his earlier experience, took the precaution to anchor beyond range of the guns of the forts. It was well that he did so, for the dey was determined to use the American

frigate on another mission and chastise the "Christian dogs" of the New World if they would not readily do his bidding. Maclay writes:

The dey's plan now was to inveigle her [the "*Washington*"] under his guns on any pretext, seize her, enslave all her officers and men, and then declare war against his unmannerly tributaries. Having brought them to a better frame of mind with threats of torturing or butchering his several hundred prisoners, he would grant peace only on promises of better behavior in the future, and on

payment of a heavy ransom, which would reimburse him for the fine the sultan had just imposed upon him, and leave a handsome balance besides. . . . All the subterfuge and craft known to oriental diplomacy were brought into play. Threats and persuasion, menace and flattery and an adroit manipulation of falsehood, spread out their network of deceit and trickery to entangle the victim.

Captain Bainbridge was not to be duped, and he could not be influenced to bring his ship within range of the shore batteries. Finally, a personal interview was arranged between the dey and the American commander, which started off badly, but the expressions of "ungovernable rage" and threats on the part of the furious dey changed quickly when Bainbridge presented the Turkish royal decree (firman) that the High Admiral Capudan had given to him. The dey of Algiers expressed even a measure of deference toward the American naval commander who had been honored by the sultan and Capudan Pasha, and the next day Algiers declared war on France. The dey threatened to put in irons every French man, woman, and child found in Algiers after forty-eight hours, and as there were no vessels to take such people away, slavery loomed as imminent to all. The United States was engaged in the Quasi- (or Undeclared) War with France, but Captain Bainbridge, about to sail, took aboard his ship all the French people then at Algiers to save them from the horrors of Mussulman captivity, and they were landed at Alicante, Spain, on May 8, 1801. Napoleon Bonaparte, first consul of France, acknowledged the humanity of Captain Bainbridge and his "unforgettable kind and generous treatment to fellow Christians" and ordered that "thanks be tendered to Captain Bainbridge for the important services he has rendered the Republic, with assurances that such kind offices would be always remembered and reciprocated with pleasure whenever an occasion offered."

No matter what the nature of the alliance between Britain and Turkey may have been and regardless of the enmity existing between the head officials at Constantinople and Algiers and the displeasure of the sultan (the Grand Seignor) and his High Admiral Capudan with Mustapha, dey of Algiers, in the winter of 1800-1801, the Turks and Mussulmen in general were a unit in their fundamental hatred of the Christians. On November 8, 1801, the U. S. consul general at Algiers, in an official report, said:

The Algerine General of Marine the Dey's Ambassador to the Grand Señor returned here the 12th Ult^o. This Government has purchased the influence and friendship of the Captain Bashaw, they have arranged their whole affairs, got their money and to this date there has arrived 750 Turk recruits— The Grand Señor gives to Algiers as presents 4000 recruits 40 Brass Guns 500 Barrels of powder 1000 Quintals of Sulphure 40000 Balls 500 Bales sail Cloth 100 Masts 6000 plank and 1000 Quintals

Ropeyarns, Pitch, Tar and Rosin 1000 Barrels besides Caftans and valuable presents to the Dey and Ministry. part of those articles are arrived here. This I suppose is Turkish Policy to strengthen the hands of this State, the principal political Redoubt of the Ottoman Empire—or to lull this Regency into security to plunder them—we shall see what the French and British will do to alter the System of Barbary.

Through British influence, exerted through the Sublime Porte, Algiers had declared war on France in the early spring. This was to the advantage of Britain, and that nation had evidently been liberal in supplying its ally, Turkey, with munitions of war and essential naval stores, which were utilized to a substantial degree to strengthen and equip the Moslem Barbary corsairs for depredations against Christian maritime nations and the shipping of weak Mediterranean Christian states.

Britain's war with France caused England to reshuffle the cards in the Mediterranean as they affected the three Barbary pirate states (Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli), which were dominated by and considered military outposts and possessions of the Ottoman Empire. Britain made an alliance with Turkey and brought influence to bear on the sultan, so that he made

anti-French and pro-British demands on the bashaws of the Turkish corsair North African states requiring that they (1) liberate all the slaves of states that were friendly to the cause of Britain; (2) declare war against France and either drive out of the Turkish North African domain all French subjects or enslave them; (3) respect the British and the interests of the British-Turkish alliance and grant the British such supplies, privileges, and assistance as might be needed and helpful in the war against France; (4) send substantial, increased amounts of tribute in cash and supplies and as presents to the sultan (as "the Grand Signior has not much money") and the Captain Bashaw, so that they could wage an aggressive war with Britain, their ally, upon the French. U. S. Consul O'Brien, writing from Algiers January 27, 1801, to the secretary of state following the return of the U.S.S. *George Washington* to that port, said:

The Grand Signior. has detained the Algerine Ambassador. Suit and presents [at Constantinople]. untill that the regency of Algiers complies with all his demands. and will have full submission to his orders— . . . These demands threw the dey and ministry. into the Greatest. confusion and The dey has given up 240 Neopolitans Sicillians &c maltese. all of which were captured with British recommendations. . . . The Sum demanded . . . is . . . Equal to. Three millions two hundred and forty thsd dollars. . . . Also. Algiers has liberated. 160. Imperials and Venitians. and has collected from the treasury one million of manbois [\$1,350,000]— which he intends. sending in a dean [Danish] ship to the Grand Signior Algiers has declared war against france. and ordered every french subject to depart from the regency. the dey intended. to put them all in chains. but has done right in sending them out of this Country. . . . On the 25th Inst when I and Captain Bainbridge were in a private audience with the dey. he had the meanness to ask us to write in his favour to Capt Bashaw and asked me what he should do. That he would do Justice. for the wrongs he did But that those done by Hasien Bashaw [the former dey]. he had nothing to do with. . . . The dey seemed much humbled. . . . The Grand Signior has taken the same determination relative to Tunis and Tripolia as he has with Algiers and I Make no doubt. but his orders will be particularly complied with. . . . Lord Keith with the British fleet and 21 thousd troopes is at the Island of Rhodes. The Captain Bashaw—and fleet with 30 thousand turks will shortly leave Constantinople to Join Lord Keith. 20—or 30 Thousand Turks is at Jaffa—or Joppa these united. will rondevouse at Rhodes. and all proceed and make an

attack on alexandria. to such great forces the french would be obliged to capitulate after this all would Visit Algiers and Tunis. rob and plunder and destroy those Governments. and leave tributary Bashaw^a in Each place subservant to the orders. and influence of the Grand Signior This consideration has struck this regency. with Terror. and obliged Them to acquise. . . . all treaties of the Christian powers should be first made with the Grand Signior. and under his gaurentee if not. we are at the mercy and caprice of every Petty Pirate of Barbary—and the Grand Signior will not admit. The 3 Eastern States of Barbary to be at peace with any nation but agreeable to his interest and orders— . . . under these considerations we have no time to loose in sending an ambassador to Constantinople . . . and we should with him send two of our largest frigates in Grand Order. it will give the Eastern world an Idea of what might be expected in a few years from the Western world. . . . The dey [of Algiers] will make a hawl to repay him. for his present losses—I hope we shall not be the Victim: we are nearly 2½ years in arrears no funds has a valuable and unguarded Commerce in this Sea—we are Threatened by all Barbary. Therefore we should act with Energie make good our stipulations and annuities have Consular funds. not to be depending on those Mercenary Jews—and shew force in this sea if not we will certainly experience difficulties. . . . The Levite directory is now at the mercy of British influence, a *British* influence firman [after rooting out all "French influence and agents from the 3 pirate states"] might also *Occasion Barbary to be at war with Spain no difficult affair.*

The *George Washington* continued in service for a short while, acting as a United States Navy tribute ship to the Barbary States. On April 14, 1801, the Navy Department ordered "a thorough survey taken of her" and the making of "a Correct report of her present state & condition . . . to ascertain whether she is fit to be employed further in the business of carrying tribute to the Barbary powers." Apparently, the shipment of goods as well as money across the Atlantic to appease the Moslem corsair states was of sufficient volume to consider having a U. S. Government vessel fitted out specifically for that purpose, and as the survey of the *George Washington* made by Captain Bainbridge and Naval Constructor Humphreys was favorable if the ship was allowed more internal space for cargo, the acting secretary of the navy (Samuel Smith) on May 4, 1801, issued the following order to Naval Constructor Joshua Humphreys, U.S.N.:

The *George Washington* being wanted to carry the Tribute to Algiers, she is immediately to be divested of her lower deck Guns, & with all possible expedition be put into a Situation to receive her Cargo. You will therefore direct the repairs necessary on the Hull & spars to repair her for that object, to enable her to carry the most in your power by removing the orlop Decks if you conceive it to be proper— The greatest dispatch is necessary—

In April 1802, because of economic conditions and the ascendancy to power under the administration of the "little navy" group (with the policy of a navy of small vessels for defense only), the *George Washington*, with other vessels, was ordered sold upon her return to port and the crews paid off and discharged. The order of the secretary of the navy dated April 13, 1802, to the navy agent at Philadelphia, Pa., reads:

The *George Washington* must be sold. I have instructed Captain Shaw to divest her of her military & other stores and deliver them to you, taking your receipt therefor: he will then deliver you a complete inventory of the Ship, her Sails, Tackle, Apparel & Furniture. . . . You will give one Month's notice in the public papers that this Ship is to be sold. The payments must all be made, within six months from the day of sale.

On June 1, 1802, the secretary of the navy congratulated the Philadelphia agent on having "made an excellent sale" of the ship, and the *George Washington*, retaining a few guns for protection from pirates, etc., returned to private ownership and probably resumed trading. Built as a vessel for commercial trade, the U.S.S. *George Washington*—as were many other naval cruisers of the period—was essentially a merchant ship and, when heavily armed for naval service, was merely an American privateer owned and operated by the U. S. Government.

*The Relations of the U. S. A. with Morocco, 1788-1804—the
Capture of the Brig CELIA at Sea and the Seizure
of the Brig HANNAH at Mogadore*

Before the appointment of a U. S. agent to negotiate a treaty of peace with Morocco as per the acts of Congress of May 12, 1784, and March 11, 1785, a corsair of that state had seized a U. S. vessel (the *Betsy*—Capt. James Erving). The emperor of Morocco, on the friendly interposition of the Court of Madrid, had finally liberated the crew after a delay of some six months and made restitution of the vessel and her cargo "as far as their condition admitted." "This," declared the U. S. secretary of state, "was a happy presage of the liberal treaty . . . afterwards concluded with our agent, still under the friendly mediation of Spain, and at an expense of between nine and ten thousand dollars only." The treaty, which, it was said, "shall continue in full Force with the Help of God for fifty years," was made by the United States with Morocco on June 23, 1786. On June 1, 1788, the various consuls resident at Tangier received the following letter dated May 9, 1788, from the foreign secretary of the emperor of Morocco:

His imperial majesty, whom God have in his holy keeping, has commanded me to make it known to you, that it may be made publicly known, that he is not at war with any nation whatsoever; and that if any nation declare war against him, he will send ten galliots and eight galleys into the streights—part of them to be stationed at Algeziras, and another part at Tangier and Tertuan, in order, by that means, to keep master of the streights; and the prizes they

shall make of them, shall be burned, together with their cargoes, and the crews put in chains. His imperial majesty will also send his frigates to America, provided with European pilots, and if they make any prizes, they shall be dealt with as above-mentioned, as his imperial majesty stands in no want of money, or any worldly effects; and he trusts that God will make him conqueror.

At about the same time, each of the consuls of the Christian nations at Tangier received a letter from the emperor of Morocco dated May 7, 1788, which stated that "we are in peace and friendship with all the Christian powers until the month of May 1789"; that if any of the "Christian nations desire to continue in peace and friendship with us or desire to go to war with us, they shall let us know it by the above-mentioned month of May." Although a treaty of peace was in effect with the United States that, according to its provisions, was to continue until June 1836, the emperor of Morocco demanded that it be reaffirmed before May 1789. He died on April 11, 1790, and civil war followed, as each of two sons claimed the throne. In 1796, Muley Soliman held the provinces of the north, with the harbors capable of containing armed vessels, while Muley Ishem possessed the territory of the south, with some small ports and a larger army. The treaty of the United States with Morocco became "a mere scrap of paper," and even if the succession had been regular and peaceful, the treaty—according to the customs of the Barbary States—would have become inoperative unless reaffirmed by the new ruler.

In 1795 the United States decided to acknowledge Muley Soliman as emperor of Morocco, and overtures were made looking toward the renewal with him of the treaty of peace "which was so happily established between the Empire of Morocco & the said United States in the reign of your late august father, of glorious memory." Muley Soliman's reply was a typical one, and he promptly desired to know "what sum it would be agreeable to the United States of America, to pay him annually" as tribute. As the U. S. agent, James Simpson, sought to obtain a reaffirmation of the old treaty without any modification, the emperor replied, "As the American will not agree to pay anything yearly, he must get ready to return from whence he came." At a further conference with the minister, Simpson was told that he would have to leave the country and that no more negotiations were possible unless the emperor was assured that the United States was prepared to "treat for a Peace, subject to payment of a subsidy." On July 25, 1795, James Simpson, U. S. consul at Gibraltar, reporting the unsuccessful outcome of his mission to Morocco, wrote from Rhabat to the secretary of state:

Permit me Sir on this occasion, with due respect and deference, to urge the grand necessity there is, for the Flag of the United States being seen in these Seas, in such force as to command Respect;—even part of the Frigates you have building, with some

Tenders, or smaller Vessels, would be found perfectly sufficient, under prudent Commanders for every purpose of that nation both within, & without the Straits:—here they need only be seen, there it may be necessary for them to act.

On August 18, 1795, "His Imperial Majesty Muley Soliman, Emperor of Morocco," affirmed the terms of the treaty made with the United States at Morocco in 1786, saying: "The Americans, I find, are the Christian nation my father, who is in glory, most esteemed. I am the same with them as my father was; and I trust they will be so with me." Notwithstanding this declaration, the secretary of state was advised by David Humphreys, who was in charge of negotiations with Barbary powers, in a letter of April 26, 1796, sent from Lisbon:

Having now an opportunity, . . . I would not lose that of offering one additional remark, on the expediency, policy & necessity of our hastening the equipment of a naval force, arising from the actual state of our affairs in the Empire of Morocco.—The remark is, that, in my opinion, we ought always

to have a small naval force in readiness for Sea, to prevent the evils which might otherwise result from any sudden Revolution, and particularly of naval circumstances, in the Empire of Morocco—even if we were to pay no regard to the other Barbary States.

Evidently, presents had to be sent at intervals by U. S. agents to Moorish officials in Morocco, and on June 8, 1798, James Simpson, appointed U. S. consul at Tangier, wrote the secretary of state that he had met the emperor and presented his commission. He added: "The articles I presented to His Majesty, were acceptable, some parts so much so, that the day I was about to leave Mequiniz, Sid Mohamet Ben Ottman, brought me a message to say so from His Majesty, & to request I would obtain some more."

About this time, the Portuguese renewed a peace treaty with the Moroccans, and the presents made to Emperor Muley Soliman were said to be "very considerable" and to include "160 mules and 50 camels."

In June 1802, the U. S. consul was expelled from Morocco and war declared against the United States because of the inability of the U. S. consul at Algiers to grant passports to vessels to carry Moroccan wheat to Tripoli through the blockade. On July 3, 1802, Consul Simpson wrote the secretary of state from Gibraltar:

At this moment it appears to me we have a very fair opening, for coming to an Explanation with the Emperor, and for doing away those pretensions I have for some time dreaded he was desirous of bringing forward, on subject of more frequent Presents being made him. . . . On this occasion it would be a happy circumstance if Commodore Morris

could shew himself in force off the Emperours Ports, for as I have often since Summer 1795 had the honour of stating in my dispatches, there is not any thing has such weight, as shewing the Moors that a Naval force is at hand, to act against them in case of need.

In a report of a meeting between James Simpson, U. S. consul, and the governor of Morocco held on August 1, 1802, Simpson said that the presence of a U. S. naval squadron off the Moroccan ports was "essentially necessary" if the Moroccan corsairs then fitting out were to be made to desist from hostile acts against United States merchant vessels. Everything, he declared, depended on a show of naval power, and "while the President's friendly messages [which he had transmitted to the emperor of Morocco] ought to have weight, . . . I assure you that the knowledge of a squadron being at hand has much more." In September 1802, the U. S. consul was back at Tangier and once more hoisted the Stars and Stripes over his residence "in testimony of the return of Peace," following which "the commanding officer of the American ships of war stationed in these seas" permitted the Moroccan armed vessels *Mirboha* (or *Mirboka*) and *Miribha* "to put to sea & navigate in safety." But amicable relations were evidently not established on a firm basis, for the consul received from the Moroccan secretary of state an "Order of His Imperial Majesty stating his expectations of Annual Embassys accompanied with Presents from the United States of America." On August 15, 1803, the U. S. consul at Tangier wrote to the U. S. secretary of state:

On Friday last Alcayde Hashash gave notice to the Consuls that His Imperial Majesty would very soon be at Tangier. . . . It will afford me an opportunity of renewing to His Majesty assurances of the steady disposition of the Government of the

United States to maintain Peace with this Country. . . . On this occasion I must as every other Consul not only make a handsome present to His Majesty, but to the Cheifs and others of his Court.

This visit of the emperor of Morocco to Tangier occurred at the time that it was known that two Moroccan armed ships, described as frigates, were at sea (the *Mirboha* of 20 guns and 100 men and the *Maimona* of 30 guns and 150 men); three galleys were being armed and equipped as was a sixth vessel described as "a two masted Boat lately seized here [Tangier] under Genoese colors."

Capt. William Bainbridge, in command of U. S. S. *Philadelphia* (then rated as a 36-gun frigate with a complement of 320 men), on August 26, 1803, reported that he fell in with "a vessel of Warr from Barbary" and discovered that she was "a cruiser belonging to the Empr. of Morrocco calld *Mesboha* [*Mirboha*] commanded by Ibrahim Lubarez Mounting 22 Guns and Mand by 100 Men." It was night at the time, but the corsair had a brig in company. Bainbridge continued:

By not making ourselves known to the officer [from the *Mirboha*, who came aboard the *Philadelphia* when hailed and requested to do so] he Confessed that the Brig [*Celia*] in Company was an American & had been with them 3 or 4 days, was bound to some Port in Spain, had been boarded by them, but not detaind, the low sail in wch the Brig was under induced me to suspect that they had Captured her notwithstanding their having your [the U.S. consul at Tangier's] Passport which must appear from the sequel was only obtained to protect them against the American ships of Warr—

I sent my first Lieut. on board to Examin if they had any American Prisoners, on his attempting to Execute my orders, he was prevented by the Capn. of the Cruiser, this increased my suspition and I sent a Boat with armed Men to inforce my Intentions, after they were on board they found Capn. Richard Bowen of the American Brig *Celia* Ound by Mr. Amasas Thayer of Boston and several of his Crew, who was taken the 17th Inst. from Barcelona—bound to Malaga, . . . the Capn. & the Crew they had Confined below Deck which they always did when speaking a Vessel, after Making this Dis-

covery I instantly ordered all the Moorish Officers on board the frigate, for I made no hesitation in Capturing her after such proceedings on their part and Violation of the faith of Passports which ought to be Sacred—Owing to the high Wind and Sea it took me the greatest part of the Night to get the Prisoners on board and Man the Prize which detention Occasiond loosing sight of the Brig, the following Morning discovering many Vessels in diver directions the Day was spent by the frigate & Prize in chasing to find the Captured Brig about 4 P.M. made her coming round Cape de Gatt from the Eastward, standing close in shore for Almeria Bay, . . . we recapturd her at 12 oClock at Night.—The Moors Confess that they came out aCruising for the sole purpose of Capturing Americans to be sent

to Tanger. I have recd. a paper from them written in Moorish wch. they say is their authority from the Govr. of Tanger for so doing. . . . I believe the Govenour of Tanger is much disposed for Hostilities with the U.S., the Moorish Prisoners accuse him as the sole cause of their present Situation. I sincerely hope that this Capture may be productive of good Effects to the U.S. with the Empr. who may be assured that if he unjustly goes to Warr with the U.S. he will loose every large Cruiser he has. . . . My Officers and self have made it a Markd point to treat the Prisoners not only with the lenity that is due from Humanity but with particular attention of Civility to impress on their mind a favorable Opinion of the American Character.

Capt. Richard Bowen of the American brig *Celia*, upon his arrival at Gibraltar, made under date of September 3, 1803, at the office of the consul of the United States of America, a deposition in regard to the capture of his vessel (with himself and crew), which reads in part as follows:

That he saild from the Port of Barcelona . . . on the Sixth day of August last, in and with the said Brig *Celia* destind for Malaga with about four thousand staves for Barrils & Ballast. That he Continued on said Voyage with light Airs untill the Seventeenth day of said Month, when the said Brig with every thing on board was taken & Capturd . . . by the Moorish Ship of Warr *Marboka*, . . .

belonging to the Emperour of Morrocco, who took him the Deponent and the Crew of the said Brig (the Mate Excepted) on board said ship, and put thirteen Moors on board the Capturd Brig. That the said Moorish Commander told him the Deponent that he was Capturd and intended to take him and the Brig to Tangier.

After the U. S. S. *Philadelphia* had captured the Moorish corsair and recaptured the brig *Celia*, the three vessels proceeded in company to Gibraltar; occasionally, the *Philadelphia* took one of the other two vessels in tow. After all were anchored in Gibraltar Bay on September 1, the *Celia* was delivered to Captain Bowen and was admitted to pratique.

As Thomas Jefferson, who held very strong views in regard to aggression, was president, the captains of American ships were compelled to be extremely careful of their acts at all times. Therefore, Captain Bainbridge of the U. S. frigate *Philadelphia*, in reporting the capture of a Moroccan corsair (caught red-handed in an act of piracy, with the crew of an American ship the victims of the outrage), felt it necessary when sending the facts to the secretary of the navy to close his remarks by saying: "I trust that the circumstances relating to the capture will appear in the opinion of the President of the United States, proper justification for my conduct in detaining the ship without a declaration of war. I hope Sir that you will do me justice in believing that no pecuniary motives influenced me but was solely actuated by the Honor & protection of the American Flag." It is gratifying to know that Captain Bainbridge did receive word later (March 1804) from the secretary of the navy (transmitted through Capt. Edward Preble of the U. S. S. *Constitution*) that "the President of the United States has approved of your conduct in capturing the *Mirboka* and re-capturing her prize" and that thanks were conveyed "for the vigilance and foresight exercised by you in the whole conduct of that business; and for the rapid movements which you subsequently made to arrest the mischief intended us."

Another Moroccan corsair, the *Meshouda* (28 guns), was captured by U.S.S. *John Adams* (Capt. John Rodgers) when attempting to run the U. S. blockade of the port of Tripoli and carry "naval and warlike stores" to enable the cruisers (corsairs) of the bashaw of Tripoli "to act more efficiently against our commerce." A third corsair owned by the emperor of Morocco, the *Maimona* (30 guns; 150 men), was also about this time roaming the seas and acting suspiciously, so much so that Captain Preble of the U.S.S. *Constitution*, who encountered her

at sea and let her proceed unmolested (as like the *Mirboka* and *Meshouda* she carried U. S. safe conduct passports), wrote from Gibraltar on September 13, 1803:

The Admiral [Hadji Tacher Aumed in command of the *Maimona*] told me the Emperor [of Morocco] was at peace with all nations; But from the number of Guns, and men, he had on board, and the length of time he had been out, I was doubtful; and had I not most sacredly regarded our treaty, with his Imperial Majesty I should have detained

the *Maimona*, until my doubts could have been satisfied: and I have now good reason to wish I had, as I have no doubt, but she has Orders to Capture American vessels, and may do much Mischief unless the wind favors my sailing to the westward, with the Squadron.

On September 4, 1803, the American brig *Hannah* of Salem (Capt. Joseph W. Williams) was seized by the Moroccans at Mogadore with her cargo, consisting of "75 bales of cotton, 10 chests tea, some iron & a few bales of piece goods." At this time, orders in effect to local officials were to seize any American ship within their domain, and James Simpson, U.S. consul at Tangier, was virtually a prisoner and incommunicado, having been enticed to the home of the governor of Morocco in the late evening of August 29 and there detained without seeing the governor. The consul was told that the orders were to hold him "until such time as the frigates [*Mirboka* and *Meshouda*] were released" by the U.S. ships that had captured them at sea. On September 3, Simpson wrote: "My release was obtained by a demand made to that effect by all my Brother Consuls, but he [the governor of Morocco] insisted on their becoming answerable that I should not leave the country without previously obtaining his Majestys permission. . . . The necessary representations and complaint on this violence has been laid before his Majesty by the Consuls collectively, as well as by myself." For about a month, the U.S. consul was under armed guard and was not free to communicate openly with the outside world.

The policy of the Moroccans was to hold the *Hannah*, seize all American ships and property, and imprison and hold captive all Americans that they could lay their hands on in retaliation and as reprisal for the U.S. capture of two Moroccan corsairs—and this notwithstanding that one of these corsairs (*Mirboka*) was caught red-handed with a seized American brig (*Celia*) in her company (and the captain and men imprisoned below decks) and that the other was captured while engaged in a deliberate act of war by attempting, through fraud and deception, to run the U.S. blockade of Tripoli and carry war materials to America's besieged enemy. The emperor of Morocco made demands that the captured Moroccan vessels, with their papers, officers, crews, and cargoes, be returned to Tangier, so that he as supreme judge could pass on what had occurred and rule thereon in the interest of maintenance of peace.

Captain Preble, writing to Consul Simpson at Tangier on September 13, 1803, said:

The Emperors late gross Violation of our treaty in issuing Orders to his Cruisers, to Capture American Vessels, and one of his ships the *Mirboka* . . . actually having taken one, will justify my giving Orders to the Captains of the Squadron under my command, to capture and bring into port all vessels belonging to his subjects, as I must consider them as acting under the Authority of the Emperor in

capturing our vessels, knowing that they dare not act without such Authority, and if I can ascertain that the *Maimona* or any other Moorish Cruiser has captured a single American vessel, & should meet with her; you may acquaint the Emperor from me, that it is my intention in future to sink every such vessel as a Pirate, as he denies having given Orders to justify their conduct.

It was well to bring the claim of piracy into the open, for the Barbary corsair states for long years had maintained that they attacked and seized the ships of only those nations with which they were at war—all in harmony with accepted international law—even though the Barbary States did at intervals make war without warning on certain nations that they felt had shipping unprotected from their raids. Preble had in his possession an order given to the captain of the *Mirboka* to capture American ships and also the property of Americans on board neutral vessels; but the emperor of Morocco had denied the authenticity of the order and had affirmed that it had not originated with him nor with his knowledge.

Captain Preble, on the U.S.S. *Constitution* and with the *Nautilus*, reached Tangier Bay on October 5, 1803, while the *New York* and *John Adams* joined company the next day. For two

or three weeks, American warships had been patrolling the Moroccan coast and showing themselves. Upon arrival at Tangier, the ships were constantly kept clear for action, and the men slept at their quarters. On October 7, the Moroccans sent out to the U.S. squadron a present of "ten bullocks, twenty sheep and four dozen of fowls as a token of friendship." The next day "the Emperor appeared on the beach with his court and army for the purpose of viewing the squadron"; the ships saluted him, and the Moroccans returned the salute. On October 9, the emperor gave an order, under his seal, for the release of the Salem brig *Hannah*, with her crew and cargo, which had been seized and was being held at Magadore. On the 10th, the prize ship *Mirboka* reached Tangier from Gibraltar on orders from Captain Preble and attached herself to the U.S. fleet pending developments, and on that same day Captain Preble, Consul Simpson, and the emperor of Morocco had a conference at the castle. Reporting this interview to the U.S. Government, Captain Preble wrote:

He [the emperor] expressed much regret that any differences had arisen between the two nations; disavowed having given any hostile orders, and declared he would punish those of his Governors who had. He said he was at present at peace with the United States, and wished to continue so. He promised to restore all American property, and release all our citizens that have been or may be detained in consequence of orders from any of his Governors. We assured him, on our part, that it was the wish of the President of the United States to be on terms of peace and friendship with his majesty; and I prom-

ised to deliver up to him the *Murboka*, and all other vessels of his nation that may have been detained by any of the vessels of my squadron, and to recall the orders I had given to capture Moorish vessels; and observed to him that I was authorized by Commodore Rodgers to say he would restore the *Meshouda*, but that we expected his majesty to ratify the treaty made by his father in 1786; this he promised most sacredly to do, and said his friendship for the Americans should last forever, and increase in strength in consequence of our disposition to oblige him.

The *Meshouda* was returned to the Moroccans at Tangier by Commodore Rodgers on October 25, 1803. A declaration of peace between the emperor of Morocco and the United States made at Tangier on October 10, 1803 (as the result of a display of naval force by the United States), as sent by the emperor of Morocco, with the imperial seal, to the governors and head officials of Morocco (translated from Arabic to Spanish and from Spanish to English) reads as follows:

Praise be given to God Alone

May God be propitious to our Master Mohamet and to his family—

(Imperial Seal)

Know all those who shall see this noble writing, all our Governors those encharged with our affairs, and Captains of our Vessels; that the American Nation are still as they were in peace and Friendship with our person exalted by God—their Vessels are safe both sea and in port, and so are their Merchants, & you are not to disturb the peace, between us and them —

What has happened with their and our Vessels, has been an affair among the Vessels but the said Nation continues respected, as they were with us, and under all security and equally so their Vessels— Wherefore we hereby Order that all those of our

Governors, those encharged with the Command of our ports, and Captains of our Vessels who shall see this writing, that they act in all respects for the fulfillment of this Order, and that they do not deviate therefrom

Those who shall contravene it, will be punished with a severe punishment.

* * * *

And at last we are in peace and Friendship, with the said American Nation as our Father (to whom God be Mercifull) was, according to the Treaty made the first day of Ramadan in the year 1200 —

The emperor of Morocco, under date of October 11, 1803, also sent a letter "To President Thomas Jefferson and to the Senate of the United States," which is a florid, bombastic, vainglorious Mohammedan document belittling by implied denials and excuses the treachery perpetrated and stating in part:

Know ye that between some of Our Vessels rendered victorious by God, and some of Yours — some enmity has happened at sea, and the affair

became so serious, as that some Vessels of each party were taken

So soon as we heard of this we felt concerned at

it, as we were still in peace and friendship; and we desired that all the Vessels might be brought to Tanger, which is under the protection of God. When we had seen what had happened between the

Nations, we found it was a matter of little consequence, and such as demanded no great attention, we sought to accomodate it, and we succeeded —

The logbook of the U.S.S. *Constitution* states (October 8, 1803) that the "body guard" of the emperor consisted of eight thousand light horsemen. Another written report by an eye-witness says that the emperor visited Tangier with fifteen thousand troops and that they were encamped over a region around the town as far as the eye could reach. Muley Soliman, who gloried in the enjoyment of the protection of God, gained the throne in opposition to the wishes of his father and brother—only through the medium of a civil war that lasted for long years—and, thirteen and a half years after the former emperor's death, felt it necessary to overawe his domestic rivals and enemies by a constant display of military power.

Although the Moroccan affair was amicably settled at Tangier on October 10, 1803, Captain Preble wrote from Gibraltar to the secretary of the navy on October 16 that it would be absolutely necessary to have at least one sizable vessel of the U. S. Navy in rendezvous at Gibraltar to show herself "in Tangier Bay and along the Moroccan coast occasionally," and he believed that the known proximity of U. S. naval power would be necessary to keep the emperor friendly toward America.

The U. S. Government made presents at times to the emperor, one of which was a hundred gun carriages delivered at Tangier by the schooner *Citizen* in February 1804. It later developed that the captured *Meshouda* was in fact owned by the Tripolines, with whom the U. S. was at war. The emperor of Morocco was not only a friend but also a blood relative of the bashaw of Tripoli and persisted in his attempts to get cargoes of wheat (also some copper and saltpeter) to Tripoli through the U. S. blockade of the port. After the *Meshouda* was laid up at Larache in harmony with the peace treaty, the emperor schemed to get one of his other vessels of war (the *Maimona*) into the hands of the Tripolines in lieu of the *Meshouda*. Commodore Barron, with the U. S. frigates *Essex* and *Congress*, was at Tangier in late August 1804 and gave a demonstration of naval power off the Moroccan coast at a time when the emperor was "highly displeased" at the refusal of the U. S. to grant safe conduct passports for his vessels through the blockade to Tripoli. We are told by Consul Simpson that "the very opportune arrival" of a U. S. naval squadron at Tangier prevented serious trouble with the Moroccans, and he adds, "Until Peace can be obtained there [Tripoli] we shall have no security here, but what they are awed into."

*United States Relations with Tunis and the Meritorious Work
of Gen. William Eaton as U. S. Consul, 1799-1803*

During the negotiations for a peace treaty between the United States and Algiers, the American agents were on several occasions informed by the dey and the leading ministers of the regency that once a peace and amity agreement was concluded between the United States and Algiers, the Barbary Moslem corsair state of Tunis would fall in line and enter into a similar understanding at a merely nominal expense, for it was declared that the bashaw of Tunis would do what the dey of Algiers demanded of him. On April 28, 1791, Capt. Richard O'Brien (late of the *Dauphin* and a captive in Algiers since early August 1785), writing to the Congress of the United States, said:

In my opinion, the United States may obtain a peace with this regency for fifty or sixty thousand pounds sterling, all expenses included; that is, if the affair is well managed; and with Tunis for fifteen thousand pounds sterling. In making a peace with Algiers, there should be a provisional article relative to Tunis, as Tunis is a tributary State to this regency, and under its influence.

When the dey (Hassan Bashaw) and the regency of Algiers made an official offer of the cost to the United States of a peace treaty with Algiers, the document in its last paragraph stated: "The Dey & Divan on their parts farther declare that in Consequence of the United States complying with the above demands . . . they will insure the United States an advantageous Peace with the Regency of Tunis, even below their most sanguine expectations." A few weeks after a peace treaty had been negotiated between the United States and Algiers, an agent from the bey of Tunis reached Algiers to discuss peace terms with the American representatives, and the dey of Algiers approved a memo of Tunisian demands and sent it to Joseph Donaldson, Jr., the accredited agent of the U. S. resident in Algiers. This memo reads:

For the Bey [of Tunis]—Dollars 30,000. Peace Presents
of Watches Clothes &c &c—and Annually—

200€	Lead	200 ps	Cannons	50 Bbs	Tar
3000.	Cannon ball	15	Yards	50 do	Pitch
10	Masts	50 Bls	Gun Powder		and three
5	Cables				thousand
10	Hausers				
100€	Cordage				Dollars for Hadge Ally. who is the
300	Pine Planks				Agent now here—
300	Oak do				

Donaldson reported November 2, 1795: "I have requested the Dey as well as Hadge Aly to Propose a truce for twelve month with Tunis & Tripoli. . . . the Dey has been told as he has got all the money. that he must dictate to the State of Tunis." On November 8, 1795, a truce was concluded between the U. S. and the regency of Tunis for a period of eight months. This document is virtually an order from Vizer Hassan Bashaw, dey of Algiers, to Hamada Bashaw, bey of Tunis, to "command all the raises commanding vessels under his command and jurisdiction not to damage plunder or impede in her voyage any american vessel until the time herein specified shall be completed and they receive our second orders." This truce was also signed by "Hadge Ally Vikel or Charge des affaires and agent for the Regency of Algiers and Tunis."

Captain Richard O'Brien, who was ten years and forty days in captivity at Algiers, wrote the secretary of state from London on February 5, 1796, that he was very apprehensive about the dilatoriness of the United States with respect to complying with the provisions and making the payments required by the terms of the peace treaty entered into with Algiers, and he added:

Even that we are at peace with Algiers we are at war with Tunis & Tripolie. the Corsairs. of Tunis is 12 Sail. and I am affraid that many Americans will be Captured by the Tunicians if so—depend it will be difficult for the U S. to make apeace with Tunis it. would make the Terms exorbitant. and it is in vain for the U S, to make apeace with Tunis untill all our agreements with Algiers is fulfilled. as Tunis is Tributary to Algiers & biased by its influence.

The American schooner *Eliza*, owned by Gorham Parsons and Edward Rand of Boston, under the command of Capt. Samuel Graves, with Edward Rand aboard as supercargo, was captured by a Tunisian corsair on June 16, 1796, when two days out from Cette, and taken with her cargo of brandy to Tunis, where she arrived several days before the truce negotiated by the dey of Algiers and Hadge Ally, agent for Tunis, would expire. The bey of Tunis evidently ignored the provisions of the Algerine-dictated truce and took the *Eliza* as a prize and the men aboard as slaves, but agreed through the French merchant, Joseph Etienne Famin, acting as agent, to grant a six-month truce to the United States provided "the

government will consent to pay an additional sum of ten thousand dollars." Such a truce was granted by the bey of Tunis, but for some unknown reason the date was set back to June 15, 1796. The document reads in part as follows:

The glory of the princes of the Christian nation, the selected chief among the community of Jesus, Washington, the present ruler of America—may his days end with blessings—being desirous and wishing to negotiate a treaty of peace in order to lay the foundations of friendship and to strengthen the sincere amity with the frontier post of the Holy War, the victorious garrison of Tunis the well-preserved, . . . has confided the negotiations of the treaty [through Joel Barlow, U.S. agent at Algiers] to the French merchant Joseph Famin, residing in Tunis the well-preserved.

The truce states that the period of six months has been set for the U. S. agents in Europe to communicate with and receive from the government of the United States the authority needed by them to negotiate and conclude a peace and amity with Tunis along lines demanded by the bey and that "until the answer comes and within a limit of six months [expiring December 15, 1796] . . . security has been given"; that if during this period of truce "war vessels [corsairs] of our well preserved garrison place meet at sea with ships of the said Americans they shall not hinder them or molest them in any way, but they shall be treated as friends, and immediately order has been given to our officers to let them go their way."

On August 2, 1796, Joel Barlow, U. S. agent at Algiers, wrote a peculiar letter to Edward Rand, Tunis, as owner of the captured schooner *Eliza*, evidently blaming the owners and command of a peaceful American trader for her capture by a Tunisian pirate during a period when, if the truce entered into on November 8, 1795, for eight months meant anything, United States shipping was immune from the raids of the Tunisian corsairs. In the Barlow letter, we read:

Your capture is a most disastrous circumstance to the United States as well as to you. It will make a difference of at least 30,000—Dollars in the price of the peace that I was concluding with that Regency. I have consented to the Agreement made by Mr. Famin for the Redemption, including the Schooner & the Brandy on board. I should not have included these, were it not for the sake of facilitating the negotiation with the Bey and to favour your return & that of the crew to America.

Nothing is said (in this or other U. S. official letters written about this time) of violation by the Tunisians of the provisions of a truce in effect at the time of the seizure, and it is evident that the capture was made under orders from the bey to hurry up the Americans, exhibit a practical threat, and give the dey something tangible to trade with. In an official statement dated October 6, 1796, we read that the bey claimed that he had never heard of the early eight-month truce "which was pretended to have been made by his agent at Algiers." The *Eliza* was turned back to her American owners and the officers and crew liberated from bondage, but the voyage proved a disastrous one to her owners. The schooner, when proceeding from Gibraltar to Cette, was driven by gales into Adge, a French port (near her destination), where "robbers" boarded the vessel at night and made off with \$10,000 with which the owners were to purchase a return cargo at Cette. After seizure by a Tunisian corsair, with the enslavement of the crew and the annoyances, hardships, and delays incidental thereto, Captain Graves got into further difficulties when freed; for U. S. Consul General O'Brien, writing from Algiers to the secretary of state on December 21, 1798, said that the schooner, "converted into a brig by Captain Graves, returned to Boston, where when sold with some trifling cargo, she scarcely defrayed the wages of the crew: The loss sustained in this case having arisen from the fraud or folly of the American master we must be content to bear."

On December 9, 1797, the owners of the schooner *Eliza* petitioned Congress for restoration of the vessel, which at that time was at Boston and deemed to be, with her cargo, the property of the United States. The owners rightly asserted:

Upon the restoration of the vessell and cargo, it would not be consistent with the national honour to detain the same from the original owners, that it cannot be supposed that the United States would

negotiate with the Bey for the purchase of a vessell and sixteen Pipes Brandy for their own benefit especially when the same had been taken from their own citizens and made prize of contrary to a truce stipulated between the two governments, . . . your petitioners have also understood that expences have been incurred in altering the said Schooner into a Brigantine since her restoration, and that wages are

due to the seamen for navigating her to Boston, and also that the said Brigantine has earned a freight about equal to those expences, wherefore your petitioners humbly pray that Congress wou'd take the premises into its wise consideration; and order the said Brigantine and Brandy to be restored to the original owners, as some alleviation of their misfortunes arising from this disastrous voyage.

Apparently, the schooner that later became the brigantine *Eliza* was formerly the schooner *Maria*, for on January 25, 1799, the secretary of state referred to her as such in writing to Timothy Williams, a merchant of Boston, Mass., who had been appointed "in charge of settling the affairs" of the vessel. In this letter we read:

I trouble you to obtain and communicate to me, information of Captain Graves—where he is, and whether he has any property. The United States have been obliged to pay eleven thousand dollars

for a cargo he took on board at Tunis, belonging to some Algerine and Tunisian merchants, but which he embezzled. He also caused a great expence by repairs at Cadiz, thro' the American Consul.

The *Eliza* was taken out of her owners' hands by Tunisian pirates, and when she was redeemed, agents of the U. S. Government took hold of her and Captain Graves henceforth was under their orders. David Humphreys, U. S. minister to Portugal, who had charge of all the negotiations with the Barbary powers, wrote from Lisbon on October 6, 1796: "This Schooner [*Eliza*] before mentioned, Mr. Barlow has put into the Service of the U. S. by having sent her to Leghorn for the purpose of carrying our ransomed People [from Algiers] to America, if necessary." Barlow, on August 2, 1796, also wrote of considering sending Captain Graves in the *Eliza* to "take a freight from Leghorn or from Malaga, or return to America as she is." It would seem that Captain Graves, after being captured by the Tunisian corsairs, did not know for whom he was working and that both the vessel and her command were more or less "thrown to the wolves." Under the conditions existing, with unscrupulous Algerine and Tunisian merchants and inexperienced American agents, the charges made against Captain Graves—which evidently were never proven—should not be taken too seriously.

In early January 1797, Joel Barlow, U. S. agent at Algiers, wrote of the "obstinacy & bad faith" of the bey of Tunis and added: "You may be assured that the present war which the Dey of Algiers has undertaken against Tunis is wholly on account of our Treaty." At this time, the dey of Algiers was expecting a promised personal present (tribute) of \$180,000 from the United States, and on the dey's insistence, \$110,000 of it was being minted into Algerine sequins; therefore, the Algerine-Tunisian war was more a gesture of friendship toward the United States than a real fact, and it was, of course, a bloodless conflict between two bashaws of the Ottoman Empire, both subordinate to the grand seignior, or sultan, at Constantinople. It goes without saying that the Moslems would not have engaged in serious civil war for the benefit or in the interest of any Christian nation.

The United States peace treaty with Tunis was negotiated by Joseph Stephen Famin, a Frenchman, who was appointed to represent the U. S. in this matter at Tunis by Joel Barlow, U. S. agent at Algiers. The "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" was signed at Tunis August 28, 1797, and the preamble (as translated from the original written in Turkish) is of interest:

God is infinite.

Under the auspices of the greatest, the most powerful of all the princes of the Ottoman nation who reign upon the earth, our most glorious and most august Emperor, who commands the two lands and the two seas, Selim Khan [Selim III, sultan of Turkey, 1789-1807] the victorious, son of the Sultan Moustafa, whose realm may God prosper until the end of ages, the support of kings, the seal of justice, the Emperor of emperors.

The most illustrious and most magnificent Prince Hamuda Pasha, Bey, who commands the Odgiak of Tunis, the abode of happiness; and the most honored Ibrahim Dey; and Suleiman, Agha of the Janizaries and chief of the Divan; and all the elders of the Odgiak; and the most distinguished and honored President of the Congress of the United States of America, the most distinguished among those who profess the religion of the Messiah, of whom may the end be happy.

We have concluded between us the present Treaty of Peace and Friendship, all the articles of which have been framed by the intervention of Joseph Stephen Famin, French merchant resident at Tunis, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America; which stipulations and conditions are comprised in twenty-three articles, written and expressed in such manner as to leave no doubt of their contents, and in such way as not to be contravened.

The text of the voluminous and unnecessarily long treaty contained three articles objectionable to the United States (Nos. 14, 12, and 11), and the U. S. Senate, while desiring a modification of two of the articles, positively refused to ratify the treaty unless Article 14 was eliminated. This objectionable article was incorporated into the agreement by Famin for his own selfish advantage as a merchant, and it was "subversive to our great revenue system" and "without reciprocity." It granted merchants of Tunis advantages far beyond those of any "most favored nations" and reduced from ten to three per cent the import duty on goods entering the U. S. shipped by a Tunisian merchant under any flag. A part of Article 12 was obviously objectionable, as it reads: "In case the [Tunisian] Government shall have need of an American merchant vessel, it shall cause it to be freighted, and then a suitable freight shall be paid to the captain, agreeably to the intention of the Government, and the captain shall not refuse it." This would have permitted any merchant of any nation resident in Tunis to obtain a government order for an American vessel and, as set forth by the secretary of state, "practice the most injurious and galling oppression."

Famin, a merchant of Tunis, evidently schemed for his own personal advantage and, besides being avaricious for himself, put notions into the head of the bey that were expensive to the United States. It is fortunate that the original plan to appoint Famin the U. S. consul at Tunis—strongly urged by the Tunisians—was not put into effect. One of the wisest selections of the United States Government to fill a diplomatic-commercial post in the Barbary States was the appointment of Capt. William Eaton (late of U. S. Army and a graduate of Dartmouth College), who reached Algiers on the U. S. brig *Sophia* on February 9, 1799, and proceeded to Tunis early in March, where he supplanted Famin in charge of American affairs and was installed as "Consul of the U. S. of America for the City and Kingdom of Tunis." Famin was a rapacious Frenchman who sought "to carry water on both shoulders." At the time that Famin was acting for the United States, it was avowed by the French "to be the interest of France and the duty of its agents to oppose the interests of the United States among the Barbary powers."

The peace negotiated with Tunis, according to a letter addressed to the secretary of state, was to cost the United States \$50,000, but \$10,000 was presumably paid the "Jacketaba or Chamberlain of Tunis," and \$10,000 was claimed as paid or necessary to be paid by Famin to various Tunisian officials. (On April 30, 1798, the U. S. consul general at Algiers wrote that "the 50 thousand Dollars for the Peace for Tunis which I sent by land, has arrived at Tunis, Monst Famin has drawn a Bill on me for 8000 Dollars which I have paid.") Consul O'Brien, at Algiers in January 1797, reported in detail seven items of jewelry that he had bought in Algiers for 493 sequins and eleven items in Paris at a cost of 11,472 livres as "presents . . . delivered by him to Mr. Famin to be employed at the conclusion of the peace." We read that Famin, later, "without any intimation to me [O'Brien], procured presents for Tunis to the amount of 18 or 20 thousand dollars, he had a bill paid in April as you will observe of 8,000 dollars this without any intimation or advice but informing me that he has done it." On April 30, 1799, the secretary of state, in a memo prepared before the bey increased his demands, put the cost of the peace with Tunis at \$107,000 if the regala—supposed to amount to \$35,000—did not exceed that sum (which it surely would have, as it included items that were either extremely expensive or impossible to deliver as ordered). The list of material agreed by Famin to be supplied Tunis by the United States included 40 cannon with carriages, 12,000 cannon balls, 300 quintals of powder, and 35 large cables and hawsers in addition to 200 quintals of cordage, 600 barrels of pitch, rosin, and tar, 600 quintals of wrought iron, 40 quintals of match rope, 60 masts, 300 ash oars each 34 feet long, and the following timber:

800 oak planks 4-1/2 inches thick, 32 feet long	300 oak timbers 14 inches square, 40 feet long
5,000 pine planks 4 inches thick, 18 feet long	500 knees of oak
20 oak keels 52 feet long	200 forked knees of oak

Of the total of \$107,000 mentioned by the secretary of state, \$50,000 is "Peace cost in money," \$16,000 represents "Peace presents," \$6,000 "Lack atappa or secret service," and \$35,000 is "Regala."

Upon the arrival of U. S. Consul Eaton at Tunis, he quickly ran up against "French intrigue" and the "infidelity" of those who had been handling money matters and buying good will. The Tunisian vultures, encouraged by Famin (whom Eaton refers to as "this French pirate"), swooped down upon him, and on April 10, 1799, he wrote in disgust that "the prime Minister—Mustapha Hogeia, returned his present to me, from a resentment he felt on account of its being less, than the Sapatapa's." This was followed by a demand "from the Admiral, for a gold headed cane, a gold watch and Chain, and twelve picks of cloth" and from "the Aga of the Goulette" for a present "on the occasion of the first Vessel of War coming to anchor in the Bay." Famin also had the nerve to demand, in addition to compensation for services (which had been augmented greatly by graft), the sum of \$1,918.21 "on account, of repairs, alterations, paper hangings, &c" for his house, "including nine months additional house-rent, and a few articles of furniture." This demand of Famin followed by four days "a final settlement" reached between Eaton (on behalf of the U. S.) and Famin, by which the latter was paid \$19,960.70 to cover salary and house rent for two full years and clean up a "current account." Eaton concluded his official letter with the following gem: "This afternoon is appointed for the Adjustment a Combination of beggars and thieves! I would as soon contract to satisfy the grave, the barren womb, and the devouring fire, as to Content these scoundrels with presents the revenue of our Country would be inadequate to it."

On May 6, 1799, Consul General O'Brien, in reporting to his superior officer, David Humphreys, U. S. minister at Madrid, wrote:

By the [Algerian] Dey's influence Eaton is in his post Famin is unshipped and remains a poignant enemy to the interests of the U.S. I perceive by Consul Eaton's statement to me that since he has been in Tunis he has paid 32 thousand dollars [practically all spent cleaning up only in part Famin's commitments and claims]. The presents he carried from here was upwards of 6000 Dollars and it seems the Bey demands presents of friendship of nearly 41,000 Dollars. The three articles which

prevented the Senate from ratifying the treaty with Tunis was so modified or agreed to by the Bey. A few days afterwards he retracted and that part of the business is unfinished. Consul Eaton made the Bey an offer in lieu of the maritime and military stores and all demands 50,000 Dollars. The Bey rejected it and added, as viz. "Consult your government I give them six months to give me an answer and to send the presents If they come in that time well if not take down your flag and go home."

No wonder a consul of the caliber of William Eaton, from the first, preached a show of force to intimidate the Barbary pirates! In an official communication of his dated Tunis, July 18, 1799, we read in part:

I have earnestly insisted on the necessity of showing a force in this sea. . . . The patience and submission with which we have suffered spoliation and robbery from Algiers have encouraged the insolence and avarice of Tunis [also Tripoli and Morocco]. The consequent demands of the Bey I consider as inadmissible as they are unjust. It would be degrading to the United States to yield to them. . . . We must at some period dare begin to resist demands. . . . Why should farther sacrifices be made before we try the experiment of resistance? Humility invites insult. The greater our concessions the

more accumulated will be the demands upon us. Nothing can be more absurd than to expect by presents to satisfy the demands of these marauding and beggarly courts, who have no sense of gratitude, no sentiments of honour, no respect for justice, . . . and whose avarice is as insatiable as death.— . . . But what is still more extraordinary and still worse, we have really been stupid enough to engage the friendly mediation of Algiers to obtain a peace with Tunis, and have solicited the guarantee of the former for the good faith of the latter! This is placing money in the hands of one highwayman to

keep it out of the hands of his companion, and taking one horsejockey to guarantee the word and honour of another. The consequence is we are plundered and disgraced without securing our object, while our agents have shared the booty. These arrangements were brought about by a brace of Frenchmen and their Hebrew co-adjutors who have been allied and sharers with the regency in the produce of their agency. . . .

I am more and more convinced that the mode of our negociation with these regencies must be so reformed as to remove the impressions that weakness and fear have dictated the measures to which we have hitherto yielded.

Already have the United States expended more than one hundred thousand dollars in their negociations with Tunis, without securing a peace.—The stipulated regalia and extraordinary demands of the Bey, if complied with, will amount to little short of two hundred thousand more. Without this compliance we are threatened with war.—I do not be-

A month earlier (June 15, 1799), Consul Eaton had written the secretary of state:

I have before said that there is no access to these courts without paving the way with gold or cannon balls. . . . I have also advanced my opinion that a respectable armed force in this sea would be among the best precautions against a predatory war. How often is the Maxim repeated in America, "To preserve peace be prepared for war?" But how should this preparation be productive of its object

lieve we are much more safe at Algiers. For the least delinquency the government of the United States will be arraigned at the tribunal of the potent Dey, and ammerged in damages a frigate or a 74.—One half of these expenses the United States may place to the account of French agency. My predecessor here is a slave, and a base one because a voluntary one, besides being a swindler and a Frenchman. . . .

America must shew a force in this sea. National interest, honour, safety demand it. The appearance of a few frigates would produce what the whole revenue of a country would not. They would produce impressions of terror and respect. Without force we are neither safe nor respectable here. Does not good policy dictate this caution against aggression before we shall be compelled to the measure to chastise outrage? . . . *Let the government of the United States at least send one ship of war to convoy out the regalia to Tunis that these people may be persuaded that defense grows in our country.*

if the world are ignorant of it? . . . Were I to dictate measures to the United States they would read thus.—"Send out the stipulated regalia; for being stipulated it is become a debt,—accompany it with a respectable force and under our guns make the tender on the legal principles of a tender, that if refused they should annul the obligation."

The conditions prevailing when William Eaton left Philadelphia for the Barbary States on the brig *Sophia* (Capt. Henry Geddes) in early January 1799 are suggested by the sea letter for the vessel given by John Adams, president of the United States of America, and signed, "By the President. Timothy Pickering Secretary of State," to which is attached a statement by a Philadelphia notary public sworn to and witnessed by Captain Geddes under date of December 11, 1798:

MOST Serene, Serene, most Puissant, Puissant, High, Illustrious, Noble, Honourable, Venerable, wise and prudent, Lords, Emperors, Kings, Republics, Princes, Dukes, Earls, Barons, Lords, Burgomasters, Schepens, Counsellors, as also Judges, Officers, Justiciaries and Regents of all the good cities and places, whether Ecclesiastical or Secular, who shall see these patents, or hear them read. We Clement Biddle Notary make known, that the master of Brig *Sophia* appearing before us has declared upon oath, that the vessel, called the *Sophia* of Philad^a of the burthen of about 118 6/95 tons, which he at present navigates, is of the United States of America, and that no subjects of the pres-

ent belligerent powers have any part or portion therein, directly nor indirectly, so may God Almighty help him. And, as we wish to see the said master prosper in his lawful affairs, our prayer is, to all the before-mentioned, and to each of them separately, where the said master shall arrive, with his vessel and cargo, that they may please to receive the said master, with goodness, and to treat him in a becoming manner, permitting him, upon the usual tolls and expences, in passing and repassing, to pass, navigate, and frequent the ports, passes and territories, to the end to transact his business, where, and in what manner he shall judge proper: Whereof we shall be willingly indebted.

In the spring of 1799, U. S. Consul Eaton, at Tunis, reported the number and strength of the corsairs at that port. Thirteen vessels were enumerated (four barques, four xebecs, three galleys, one corvet, and one tartana, mounting 190 carriage and 38 swivel guns and carrying 1,155 men. The guns were from 4- to 9-pounders. He reported the marine strength of Tunis much superior to that of Algiers and that there were 120 smaller cruisers (than those mentioned at Tunis) "in the [Tunisian] ports of Farena, Byzerte, Sfacs and Susa." Continuing, Eaton said:

MERCHANT SAIL

The [Tunisian] vessels are better preserved and managed [than those of Algiers], and the men are much more enterprising. . . . Their manner of attack is uniformly boarding. It is however owing more to the weakness and timidity of the enemy they engage than to their own superior valor or management that they make such progress in their mischief. I have seen nothing yet, neither in Algiers nor Tunis but what appears contemptible when contrasted with the force which a warlike European, or even American might oppose to it. The whole marine of both kingdoms would hardly . . . furnish a breakfast to such force as the United States could without much inconvenience fit out, provided we were at peace with France. . . . We have heard much of the irresistible intrepidity of the

turkish military here. It is all hyperbola. Here is nothing like an organized military. The camp . . . is an awkward squad of insolent turks, whose only feats of valor consist in swaggering once a year into the country among the wretched, defenseless [unarmed] moors to gather taxes. They have neither tactics nor discipline. There is not a bayonet in Barbary. Not much should be feared nor expected from a people whose principal ministers, principal merchants and principal generals consume day after day in the same company smoking tobacco and playin at chess—While the citizens and soldiers are sauntering in rags, sleeping under walls, or praying away their lives. . . . Such is the military, and such the industry of Barbary—Yet to the shame of humanity they dictate terms to powerful nations!

U. S. Consul Eaton, at Tunis, reported to the secretary of state on June 15, 1799, that there were possibilities of trading between America and Tunis, "but no adventures should be made hither by merchants of the United States until a full confidence in the integrity of our government shall be established and the twelfth article of the treaty, which admits merchantmen being pressed into the service of the Beylique, shall be altered or expunged." Among the articles enumerated by Eaton for which there was an import demand in Tunisia were dried fish, lumber, candles, sugar, pepper, and spices of all kinds, cochineal, iron, coffee, and fabrics, which commodities, he wrote, "command great prices in cash, at least three hundred per cent more than in America." Eaton, in this same letter, gave the number of cruisers (corsairs) of Tunis as between 120 and 130, "including half gallies mounting swivels and patereroes," and added: "None of their guns exceed 12 pounds." He prepared the following interesting table, which shows the activities of the Tunisian corsairs over a period of time:

Month	Number of Cruises Made by Tunisian Corsairs during Each Month of the Years 1790-1798 Inclusive									
	1790	1791	1792	1793	1794	1795	1796	1797	1798	
January	3	1	2	3	3	1	1	3	2	
February	—	1	—	—	—	1	2	—	2	
March	3	3	—	2	3	4	7	5	5	
April	8	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
May	7	4	2	7	3	7	4	2	2	
June	4	6	8	3	2	9	8	13	17	
July	7	3	5	10	4	15	13	11	9	
August	4	4	6	4	9	7	7	11	10	
September	2	5	3	17	5	8	10	16	6	
October	2	2	1	9	5	7	7	11	9	
November	5	3	8	6	5	8	4	5	14	
December	1	1	2	2	—	4	5	4	13	
Total for year	—	40	44	67	42	71	68	90	94	

Whereas the Algerine pirates, when after "big game," haunted the Strait of Gibraltar and sought an opportunity to get out into the Atlantic and raid vessels bound for Portuguese and Spanish ports, the cruising ground of the Tunisian corsairs was generally "in the vicinity of Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily, on the coast of Genoa, Tuscany, Naples, Calabria, and in the entrance of the Adriatic Sea"—although they had operated as far north as Venice. The European war had caused the belligerent powers to protect certain people and commerce that had been heretofore considered easy prey to the Tunisian pirates, and the corsairs were looking in the spring and summer of 1799 for new and safer profitable hunting grounds.

Eaton wrote:
 Their mode of attack is uniformly boarding. For this their vessels are peculiarly constructed. Their long latteen yards drop on board the enemy and afford a safe and easy conveyance for the men who man them for this purpose. But being always crowded with men, they throw them in from all

points of the rigging and from all quarters of the decks, having their sabres grasped between their teeth and their loaded pistols in their belts, that they may have the free use of their hands in scaling the gunnels or netting of their enemy. In this mode of attack they are very active and desperate. Taught by revelation that war with the Christians will guarantee the salvation of their souls, and finding so great secular advantages in the observance of this

religious duty their inducements to desperate fighting are very powerful. Proper defence against them are high nettings with chains sufficiently strong to prevent their being cut away—buckshot plentifully administered from musquets or blunderbusses—and lances. But it is always best to keep them at distance that advantage may be taken of their ignorance at manoeuvre.

The British consul at Tunis told of a typical Tunisian pirate attack on a Mediterranean Christian community. On September 8, 1798, five corsairs carrying 990 men landed "in the grey of the morning" upon the island of St. Peters (Sardinia) and captured 220 men and 700 women and children, subjecting the "unfortunate defenceless wretches" to "barbarous and brutal" treatment that "would shock a savage." All the prisoners, upon arrival at Tunis, were driven naked, "goaded with thongs," to "the common auction square, and consigned to slavery." The king of Sardinia sent Count Porcile as an emissary to negotiate for the liberation of his people, but the bey of Tunis demanded a ransom of \$640,000, which could not be paid. (Later, a ransom of \$270,000 for the survivors was discussed if terms of payment satisfactory to the bey of Tunis could be arranged and guaranteed.) In the meanwhile, "the old, the infirm, and the infants, who were unfit for slaves" had been obliged to "shift for themselves," with the result that the mortality was great in a land where, outside of the few European and American consuls' homes, Christian charity was evidently unknown, for it was never practiced.

We read in official communications that the Barbary pirates were handicapped, retarded, and disappointed in the execution of their planned enterprises by the delay of the United States in shipping armaments and munitions as promised and that "no sum of money would be considered as equivalent to that regalia" of military and naval stores. In mid-1799, Tunis admitted being unable to obtain from any other known source "munitions of war" or "maritime and military stores" such as America was obligated by a "Treaty of Peace and Amity" to supply it, and "the delinquency of the United States" in this matter (caused by procrastination and economic reasons and not by reason of morals or principles involved) intensified the seriousness of a crisis. The demand was made by the bey of U. S. Consul Eaton that if the big timbers ordered could not be procured immediately, then "the guns, ammunition, pitch, tar, rosin, cordage, and such other articles as are to be found in our magazines" should "be forwarded without delay." At the identical time that this specific demand was made, Eaton wrote, "a body of Turks came armed to the garden, and even into the court-yard" of the sapatapa of Tunis, when he was giving a dinner to the English, French, Portuguese, Sicilian, and United States consuls, "and demanded money, alledging that the government having made peace with everybody had reduced them to famine; but they were resolved not to starve!" Eaton, reporting the occurrence, added, "This circumstance confirms the opinion heretofore advanced that they must be let loose upon some body." He asserted that since Portugal and Sicily have concluded peace with the Tunisians and as "England is in a kind of alliance with them—and France will not oppose their outrage against Americans, . . . everything conspires to confirm my suspicion . . . that the commerce of the United States is marked out as the victim of Tunisian piracy."

On April 12, 1800, the American ship *Hero* (Captain Robinson) reached Tunis with a cargo of military and naval stores, which were part of the "regalia" as required by the peace treaty. The arrival of this ship, unarmed and without convoy, embarrassed Consul Eaton, for at the time a demonstration of U. S. naval power in the Mediterranean was essential if peace with the Barbary States was to prevail. Eaton reported that he had to lie to the Tunisians "to save face" and hold their respect for the United States:

I told the Bey this transport of the government sailed with convoy till she was out of danger. . . . I told him also that the stores, now shipping for

Tunis at New York, would Sail with a Squadron—One apology must fit both cases—Hope it will occur that all the beneficence of the Jehovah of the Jews

would never have rendered him respectable among that horde of Savages, if he had not thundered from Mount Sinai! And that the government of the United States will send the residue of the Regalia with *something Masculine*.

Of all the maritime powers, Britain alone, for long years, commanded the respect of the Barbary States, and it used the corsairs of these Moslem provinces for its own selfish ends, supporting and paying them well for their devilish depredations upon the commerce of its Christian rivals. In May 1799, however, a Scotchman, Donald Campbell, commodore of the *Alphonso* (64 guns) of the Portuguese Royal Navy, incensed at the interference of Tripoli with Portuguese commerce, appeared off that Barbary port, captured the Tripoline admiral with his flagship, burned another 18-gun corsair, and in two weeks' time so intimidated the bashaw of Tripoli that he concluded a peace with Portugal "as favorable in every respect as the existing treaty with Great Britain." Whereas the United States continued to buy humiliating and contemptible peace treaties and to pay tribute and ransom to Barbary States for a long term of years, the secretary of state, writing to U. S. Consul Eaton at Tunis on January 11, 1800, bemoaned the fact that other Christian maritime nations had not long ago combined to eradicate Moslem piracy in the Mediterranean and said: "Have they wanted spirit or conduct?—The late spirited example of Portugal, when a single ship of the line destroyed two Tripolitan Corsairs and reduced the Bey to the very novel condition of purchasing peace of a Christian Power is encouraging." The relationship of Britain to the Barbary pirate states is not only an indelible stain upon the pages of the history of a great nation but also a record diabolical beyond words. The actions of France and Spain in regard to the Moslem corsairs also "smell to heaven," and of the smaller and less potent maritime powers, Portugal alone has a creditable history, the only blots or relapses being British-made and both conceived and engineered by Britain for its own selfish ends while posing as Portugal's friend, patron, and protector. In the fall of 1793, Britain negotiated and signed—without authority—a peace treaty with Algiers in the name of Portugal and thereby let loose a fleet of corsairs upon United States shipping, which was banking on the protection of the Portuguese Navy and its blockade of the Strait of Gibraltar. However, Portugal rebelled against British domination, repudiated Britain's specific act with Algiers in behalf of Portugal, and on April 10, 1794, declared war against the regency of Algiers. An official consular letter to the secretary of state said: "Two sail of the Line & two frigates are already dispatched by the Court of Portugal to the Streights [of Gibraltar] in order to shut up the Hell hounds, that were lately let loose on our Unfortunate Countrymen."

The United States owes Portugal a great debt of gratitude for its actions in regard to the Barbary pirates. Two Americans should also be revered for their work about this time, when courage and farsightedness were needed to maintain the honor and dignity and develop the prestige of the young republic. These outstanding men were U. S. Consul William Eaton, stationed at Tunis, and Capt. (Commodore) Edward Preble, U.S.N.—both energetic, straight-shooting New Englanders and ardent, patriotic Americans. Captain Preble could quickly have cleaned up "the entire Barbary pirate mess" if he had been given the ships of war of suitable number and power and had not been handicapped by a pacifistic president (Jefferson) and an incompetent naval department bound with red tape, politics, and seniority rules. Consul Eaton was a soldier of proven ability and a well-educated man, and his courage and intelligence in regard to the Barbary States were of great value to his country during a critical period. It is to be regretted that an Eaton in conjunction with a Preble, supported by an adequate naval force, was not on hand in the late 1780's and early 1790's to handle the Barbary pirate situation. If they had been, the later atrociously humiliating and outrageously expensive developments in Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli would have been avoided. Extracts from a letter addressed the secretary of state by U. S. Consul Eaton, dated at Tunis, June 23, 1800, are of particular interest:

Yesterday I rec^d letters . . . intimating a demand . . . If further testimony be necessary to inforce a conviction of the correctness of the conclusion, so often reiterated, that no profusion of generosity made on the U States by the Pacha of Tripoli for a Regalia equivalent to that of the Bey of Tunis.

can satisfy these begging thieves we shall undoubtedly have that testimony—The Bey of Tunis holds to his claim for a cruiser—I refused to communicate his message—He gave me to understand that I would be ordered out of his kingdom—I intimated to him in return my sense of the *Honor* he would do me by such a measure—I will not yield to the claim. Let him send me away—He dare not make war upon us if the U States use their proper means to deter him. Without the use of these means we are considered tributaries—and shall be treated as such— Again, I say, our affairs in Barbary have been badly managed— Our negotiators have been *French Agents, Apostate Americans* and *Slaves!* . . .

Nothing but terror will check the insolence of these demands on our generosity! What has been done to effect it? What is *doing* to effect it? No-

Capt. William Eaton, late of the U. S. Army, in his criticism of the caliber of the men who had represented and were then representing the United States in the Barbary States, unquestionably referred as "slaves" to Capt. Richard O'Brien, the U. S. consul general resident at Algiers, and James Leander Cathcart, the U. S. consul at Tripoli. Pursuing this matter further, Eaton said:

I dont mean a criminal reflection by this last term [slaves]— I have seen a man who exhibited no extraordinary symptoms of fear in moving to a battle who trembled in passing a grave yard for fear of ghosts—& I have seen a man, who, I believe,

body here, acquainted with our concessions, could be persuaded that we are the same Americans who, twenty years ago, braved the resentment of Great Britain, if that fact were not recorded. There is, indeed, no nation so much humiliated in matters of tribute— And it is a burlesque upon every thing manly or political to see nations pouring into the ports of these kingdoms, which have not of their own produce a single article of naval material, stores and builders to construct navies to be employed as pirates against themselves— In this list of incontentents the U States at present have the honor [?] to stand at the head— Our whole system of *Negotiation* must be changed. . . . No *American* can be cool and suffer as I do— And say to the Govt of the U. States they must either send a *show* of force to the Tunis—or a *Slave!* The example of Portugal at Tripoli, is it not worthy of imitation!

would not shrink at the thunder of a Broadside of a man of war, tremble at the Nod of a Turban— In the first instance the impressions were made by the *Nurse*— In the latter by the *Bastinado* & chains.

Capt. Richard O'Brien, master of the American ship *Dauphin* when she was captured by Algerine pirates on July 30, 1785, and held as a prisoner and slave in Algiers for over ten years, was a very competent and intelligent seafaring man. However, living in captivity and under constant threats of terrorism for more than a decade inevitably takes virility and a true sense of relative values from a man. James L. Cathcart was a youth serving before the mast on the schooner *Maria* when that vessel was taken by an Algerine corsair on July 25, 1785. As Cathcart knew something of the Turkish language and was quick to learn, he was used as an interpreter and later as a slave clerk, rising in the favor of the dey until he became the dey's Christian secretary slave. Cathcart was sent by Vizer Hassan Bashaw, dey of Algiers, to the United States in May 1796 as his messenger to demand a quick compliance with his requests for the payment of tribute. Cathcart, according to Joel Barlow's letter of May 4, 1796, to the secretary of state, had "hopes of obtaining the consulate to this place" (Algiers), but the U. S. agent added, "He has neither the talents nor the dignity of character necessary for the purpose." Even if richly endowed mentally and morally, a man who had served almost eleven years as a subjugated slave of an arrogant ruler was positively not fitted to meet that despot on even terms to discuss affairs of vital importance to his country; the relationship of the past would but naturally prove to be too vivid and dominant.

President John Adams and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering showed a surprising lack of knowledge of fundamental human psychology when they appointed the recently liberated slave, Richard O'Brien, as U. S. consul general for the kingdom of Algiers (and senior, or ranking, consul for the Barbary States), and it is ironic to read in the official letter to the dey regarding this appointment that O'Brien "is charged to make it his constant care to maintain the subsisting peace and friendship." Ten years and forty days of slavery is not an expression of "peace," and such serfdom, under constant dread and even fear, is certainly not conducive to "friendship." Cathcart, who was officially deemed unqualified for the position of consul at Algiers, was nevertheless, after his experience of nearly eleven years as a slave of a Barbary State, appointed U. S. consul at Tripoli. Of the three consuls appointed to the Barbary

The ship *Anna Maria* reached Tunis December 1, 1800, with a cargo of tribute consisting of plank, oars and iron, but the Tunisians were displeased with the short length of the plank and oars and because the promised guns, shot and powder, and oak keels had not been shipped in this lightly laden vessel of 500 tons burden. Commenting on the criticism made of the *Anna Maria's* inadequate cargo, Eaton wrote on December 8: "The United States are the only nation which have at this moment a rich *unguarded* commerce in the Mediterranean . . . the Barbary regencies are *Pirates*. . . . We are yet deficient, and I am not without apprehension that this deficiency will be resorted as a pretext for surprizing our merchantmen—in which case they might do us incalculable mischief. These are considerations which, it is supposed, should compel exertions to fulfil our obligations with this regency." Later in the month, the Tunisians, hearing of the *George Washington's* having been sent from Algiers to Constantinople in the service of the dey and regency of Algiers, notified Eaton that "the Beylique had need of an American ship to go to Marseilles," and when the sapatapa was informed that there was no American ship available for charter, he referred to the *George Washington's* voyage and said that Tunis as well as Algiers could use force to attain its objectives. Eaton deliberately falsified the facts about the voyage of the *George Washington* to Constantinople by saying that the vessel calling at Algiers had been "originally destined to Constantinople . . . to open the door of negotiation with the Sublime Porte; and that it was considered a fortunate circumstance at that instant that the Dey of Algiers had an Embassy to the Porte." Had this been otherwise, Eaton declared, the American agent at Algiers would most probably "have asked it as a favor of the Dey to have assisted the project by sending some one of his distinguished officers of government to introduce the American messenger." Eaton was mentally resourceful, and his explanation of a humiliating occurrence was evidently convincing, even though it was untrue. At the end of the conference, the Tunisians offered \$4,000 and perquisites for one voyage of the *Anna Maria*, but Capt. George G. Coffin, her master, put his price at \$5,000, and nothing came of the matter.

The belligerent attitude and avaricious spirit of the bashaw of Tripoli (who was merely following the example of the dey of Algiers and the bey of Tunis) finally caused the pacifistic United States Government administration, under President Thomas Jefferson, to decide in May 1801 to send a squadron of three frigates and a schooner to the Mediterranean "for the protection of our commerce & the instruction of our young officers." The four naval vessels selected for this service, with their commanders, were as follows:

Name	Type	Number of Guns	Commander
PRESIDENT	Frigate	44	Commodore Richard Dale
PHILADELPHIA	Frigate	44	Capt. Samuel Barron
ESSEX	Frigate	32	Capt. William Bainbridge
ENTERPRISE	Sloop of war (schooner-rigged)	12	Lieut. Andrew Sterett

Immediately following Jefferson's inauguration as president in March 1801, the growing United States Navy received a severe setback; ships engaged in foreign service were ordered home, and an official list of the secretary of the navy as of March 23, 1801, shows seventeen vessels to be sold (including the *U.S.S. George Washington*, then on an Algiers voyage) and thirteen vessels (classed as frigates) to be retained, but the memo reads: "It will probably be some time before it may be determined where the six Frigates to be kept in constant service, shall be employed." Of the squadron of four vessels that were ordered to the Mediterranean and reached Gibraltar July 1, 1801, the *President* (44 guns), in March, was inactive at Norfolk, Va., but she had a crew aboard; the *Philadelphia* (44 guns) was at St. Kitts in the West Indies; the *Essex* (32 guns) was laid up in New York (out of commission); and the schooner *Enterprise* (12 guns), listed "in port—to be sold," was laid up at Baltimore. The little *Enterprise*, destined to make history for the U. S. Navy in the Mediterranean with her memorable fight of August 1, 1801, with the powerful corsair *Tripoli*, was one of the fleet of seventeen vessels of the U. S. Navy not considered necessary for the well-being of the



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As a postscript of this letter, the following was added under date of August 28, 1802: "Yesterday I was called to the palace. The Minister formally demanded of me a frigate of 36 guns. It need not be thought strange to see me in America this winter. I can neither yield to nor get rid of the demand." At this time, Tripoli was openly at war with the United States, and former U. S. Consul James L. Cathcart was at Leghorn, Italy. From his office there on August 25, 1802, he addressed a letter to the secretary of state, in which he said:

Captⁿ Alex^r Murray arrogated to himself the presumption to discard measures the motives of which whether *right* or *wrong* he must have been perfectly unacquainted with, nay totally ignorant of, & which . . . were by no means in his department, & that too in a stile of the most illiberal censure, without even observing the common respect due from public Officers in diff^t departments to each other especially in foreign ports: . . . my sole aim in making this report is to request that the President will be pleas'd to draw a line of distinction between the relative duties of the Consuls residing in Barbary & the Commanders of our vessels of War, for I cant suppose it conducive to the public interests to subject men (who have spent . . . years acquiring knowledge in the Country's where they reside) to the caprice of every gentleman who may command our vessels of War, for altho they may be excellent seamen & as good officers it must be

supposed that they must be very deficient in any superficial knowledge they may have acquired relative to Barbary where they have scarce ever been. . . . The situation of a Consul in Barbary provided he is determined to do his duty is of all others the most humiliating & perilous, . . . doom'd to breath an air contaminated by plague & slavery, . . . exposed to every species of insolence & degradation that a fertile brain'd Mohammedan can invent to render the life of a christian superlatively miserable, that dare oppose his will, one moment menaced with chains, the next with death & damnation, in a state of constant vigilance concern & perplexity; there is no occasion nor necessity in addition to all our suffering of subjecting our measures to the control of men, who from the routine of their duty can have as little ability to judge either of their propriety or utility as they have had modesty in censuring what they wanted the power to condemn.

It is surprising to read in official communications that Capt. Alexander Murray, a United States naval officer, favored the buying of "peace" and the paying of tribute to the Barbary pirate states. Yet on August 14, 1802, when in command of the *U.S.S. Constellation* and commodore of the Mediterranean squadron, he wrote the secretary of the navy in regard "to the obnoxious custom of paying tribute" to "all the Barbary States" and said that as other nations did it, "it will be more prudent for us, also, to submit to the Indignity, at the expence of our Pride." This same statement was made in a report from Naples dated September 18, 1802, and on October 8, James L. Cathcart, former U. S. consul at Tripoli, wrote the secretary of state: "The *Constellation* arrived here on the 3rd inst; . . . Captⁿ Murray differs from me in sentiment very much relative to our operations with the Barbary States, he says it is our interest at present to purchase peace at their discretion." With the record of the inactivity of the U. S. squadron during the past year in mind, U. S. Consul Eaton, writing from Tunis on August 9, 1802, to the secretary of state, feelingly said: "Government may as well send out *quaker meeting-houses* to float about this sea as frigates with Murrays in command. The *friendly* salutes he may receive and return at Gib^r produce nothing at Tripoli. Have we but one Truxton and one Sterret in the United States?" In a report of June 8, 1802, we read that the frigate *Philadelphia* had not been seen at Tunis since she called there October 2 and "has but once since shewn herself before Tripoli, and then remained on the station only six hours"; that this was "the only U States ship of war (Except the *Geo. Washington*, a transport.) which has appeared at all on this coast since October until the arrival of the *Boston*, Capⁿ McNiell, who has kept his post." Other interesting comments of Consul Eaton were:

The *extremity of winter* compelled the *Commander of the Philadelphia* to take home and lodgings at Saragosa, except thirty or forty days he has been on shore at Leghorn— The *Essex* has been stationed off Gibraltar to watch the hull of a dismantled ship: but that post she has left occasionally

ten, twelve or fifteen days at different periods. . . . This is a singularly economical mode of carrying on the war; and it is not extraordinary, if Gentlemen *feelingly* attached to it should take offence at a vigilance which should go to put an end to it.

On October 22, 1802, Consul Eaton wrote the secretary of state from Tunis:

The indignities I have suffered at this court latterly are insupportable— On the first appearance of our squadron this Bey behaved respectfully: he has grown insolent in proportion to the moderation of his movements and the success of the enemy [Tripoli]— I have in no instance yielded to his exactions— But, again permit me to repeat, without more energetic support I cannot maintain the position I have taken here: a position which has hitherto received the approbation of every distinguished officer of the General Government with whom I have had the honor to correspond. . . . If further concessions are to be made here I desire that I may

not be the medium through whom they shall be presented— The rich regalia I have already given this Bey in the name of the Chief Magistrate of the United States serve only to show him our wealth and our weakness, and to prompt his avarice to new demands— . . . Only one American frigate has been shown here since 29th January last [a period of nine months]— And, I confess, it embarrasses me to account for our squadron having lain ten days in Cagliari, only eighteen hours sail from this, without enquiring whether peace still subsisted here, or without giving me a word of information.

On the night of June 18, 1801, a fire broke out in the palace of the bey of Tunis and "consumed fifty thousand stands of arms." The mental attitude of the bey toward the "tributary nations" is indicated by his prompt demand of U. S. Consul Eaton for a present of "ten thousand stands of arms," with the statement: "I have proportioned my loss among my friends and this falls to you to furnish. Tell your government to send them without delay." Eaton declined to accede to the demand or to be intimidated by the threats made, although informed that "your peace depends on your compliance." Following a stormy interview on June 28, Captain Dale, in the *U.S.S. President* and in command of a squadron, fortunately arrived on the Barbary Coast to protect United States interests in Tripoli and pay his respects to the Moslem rulers of Algiers and Tunis. The presence of the fleet, the arrival of the American ship *Peace and Plenty* with tribute at Tunis, and gifts of jewelry apparently caused the bey, temporarily at least, to change his belligerent attitude. There is on file, under the caption, "Presents to Tunis," a bill of H. W. Mortimer, Son & T. Mortimer, No. 89 Fleet Street, London, dated March 15, 1802, made out to the agent of the U. S. Government for jeweled arms made of precious metals, studded with diamonds and emeralds, packed in mahogany cases lined with crimson velvet, the amount stated for "arms, jewels, cloths" being \$43,300.36.

When U. S. Consul Eaton refused to grant passports to Tunisian vessels to run the blockade and carry food and munitions to Tripoli, which was at war with the United States, the bey of Tunis again became truculent, stormed at Eaton, and demanded a new consul "more capable of cherishing peace." Further discussions led to this expressed view of the Tunisian court:

That though they [the Tunisians] could not pretend to the ability of fighting our ships of war, we [Americans] could not do them any hurt; they would lay up their large cruisers & send out their small ones to vex our commerce— And said the minister, though a fly in a mans throat cannot kill

him it will make him vomit! Yet they should always be willing to maintain the Peace with the Americans on the same footing as the other *small Christian Nations*: but they must have a Consul with less *fantasia* & more friendly to the Barbary interests.

During these days, the British were conspiring with the sultan at Constantinople, who expressed the hope that arrangements would be made to keep all United States frigates out of the Mediterranean. France was knifing American interests, and the selfish, subtle, two-faced British diplomats and naval commanders were giving the American consuls of the Barbary States much to worry over. On May 21, 1802, Consul Eaton wrote officially, "I dread the jealousy and base intrigues of the English more than the address of our actual enemy," and from an official communication dated Tunis, October 22, 1802, we read:

Far from receiving any succour from the *magnanimity* of the great nations of Europe, we have now demonstrations of their policy to use these instruments of piracy as impediments to the growth of our commerce. Why does Bonaparte, at this peculiar crisis [with Tripoli at war with the U.S.A.], give Tripoli a cruiser [described as "a beautiful new vessel mounting eighteen carriage

guns"]? Why has England assisted the escape of the Tripoline admiral and his soldiers? The object is so clear that the regencies themselves cannot but perceive it: and it encourages their insolence. They have formed an idea that the U States are too far off to coerce them—and the operations of our force have hitherto but confirmed them in this security.

On July 6, 1802, a Tripoline xebec entered Bizerte with the American brig *Franklin* (Capt. Andrew Morris), with nine men aboard, laden with wine, oil, soap, silks, perfumes, hats, etc., captured off Cape Pallos while on a passage from Marseilles to St. Thomas. The vessel and her cargo were promptly "put up at public auction" in Tunis. (The Tripoline corsair had been refused permission to bring her prize into Algiers.) Consul Eaton wrote on July 9, 1802:

I cannot obtain permission to speak with the Captain and consequently do not know what kind of treatment the people have suffered from their captors. They will be carried to Tripoli, where they also will be cried for sale at public auction, like so many cattle; or, perhaps, stationed on the batteries to slay & be slain by their Countrymen. . . . This mode of carrying on the war will not do: Let our fellow Citizens be persuaded, before it be too late, that except more energy be thrown into our operations, we risque to play a farce here, which in its progress will entrain the most disgraceful and the most inhuman sacrifices: our property captured and sold without the most distant prospect of indemnity—and our Citizens dragged to Slavery and goaded to a lingering death under the bastinado of merciless robbers. And, what is still more humiliating, after all this we shall be compelled to *purchase a peace* on the terms of an unprincipled, overbearing

Bashaw of a wretched dog-kennel, without at all remedying the evil— If America can yield to this, and look the world in the face without a blush, let her blot the stars from her escutcheon and veil with sack-cloth the sun of her former glory— But concessions will not end here: The moment we subscribe to the demands of Tripoli we shall have Tunis and Algiers, in a more imperious tone, demanding *more substantial proofs of the veritable friendship of the President of the United States!*— Does not all experience prove to us that these States, when under no restraint of fear, never want a pretext for war where they have a prospect of gratifying their avarice? . . . It is neither the magnanimity of great nations, nor yet the Millennium which will redress the aggressions we suffer and shall continue to suffer from these Regencies: we must seek it only in our own resources.

Consul Eaton urged that small armed United States vessels as well as frigates were necessary to blockade the Barbary Coast, for the larger war vessels could neither prevent the small corsairs from "stealing out" nor catch them in the dangerous waters of the coast line when they were out and looking for prey. The Tripoline pirate that captured the unarmed American brig *Franklin* (owned by Sumner and Brown of Philadelphia) was reported by her master, Captain Morris, to be "one of three Tripoline cruisers"; the corsair was small, mounting only "four carriage and four swivel guns," but apparently had a crew of thirty armed ruffians aboard. It is significant that when the pirate, with her nine captives heavily chained, reached Tripoli, a British agent claimed two officers and one seaman as Englishmen, with the result that they were promptly liberated; two more, who were Frenchmen, were also freed, so only Captain Morris and three seamen were considered "real Americans" (although two were Negroes) and as such were held by the Tripolines as "slaves." On September 1, 1801, Commodore Dale, U. S. N., had released to the bashaw of Tripoli a number of Turkish prisoners (one officer and twenty-one soldiers) "on the condition of the bashaw's promise to restore to us the first Americans which should be captured," the equivalent stated being "an American officer and three seamen." The bey of Tripoli repudiated his agreement with the U. S., but the dey of Algiers, "with an axe to grind," succeeded in getting the captives liberated, and they arrived at Algiers on October 6, 1802, with a peace envoy, or ambassador. The pasha of Tripoli and dey of Algiers jointly requested (with the return of four prisoners) \$120,000 to conclude a peace between Tripoli and the U. S. A., which amount was made up as follows:

Cash for Tripoli.....	\$60,000	Ministry	\$10,000	Extraordinaries	\$5,000
Dey of Algiers.....	30,000	Presents	10,000	Extra services	5,000

The brig *Monarca*, which brought the four American prisoners from Tripoli to Algiers, returned to that "blockaded" port with a cargo of wheat and with a passport issued by U. S. Consul General O'Brien, so it would seem that Tripoli, being greatly in need of food, profited by the "generosity" of the bey when he freed merely an officer and three men in harmony with his pledge of the preceding year. The ratio of prisoners—twenty-one Turkish soldiers for three American sailors, or 7 to 1—is of interest. However, the Turkish corsair chiefs were not interested in any exchange of prisoners, and on one occasion in 1801, before the

Franklin was captured, the bey of Tripoli declared that he had no American prisoners, but that if he had, he would not exchange one of them for forty Turks.

The dey of Algiers took the occasion of the liberation of the four American captives at Tripoli to write the United States Government to notify it officially and direct of what he had done in its interest, emphasize his influence over the other Turkish Barbary States and the obligation of the U. S. A. to him (which he would expect to be suitably paid in some pleasing, substantial form), and at the same time discredit James L. Cathcart, former U. S. consul at Tripoli, and lay the blame on him for the American-Tripoline war. In this connection, it is important to note that Cathcart was a slave at Algiers for nearly eleven years and was the Christian clerk, or secretary, to Ali Hassan (Hassan Bashaw), the former dey, and the present dey (Mustapha) wanted no man at Algiers as U. S. consul who had been in intimate contact with his predecessor. The dey of Algiers' denunciation of Cathcart should be considered more favorable to that man than otherwise, and Mustapha Dey, in putting the blame of the Tripoline war on his shoulders, was not only excusing Tripoli but also condemning all consuls who were not, in all matters, under the subjugation of the Turkish rulers of the Barbary States.

The first part of the letter of the dey and regency of Algiers, "with The Great Seal of Mustapha Pascha," dated on the Moslem calendar "Equal to October The 17th 1802," reads as follows:

To. our great friends The American Government—

We salute and pray for your health and happiness. your Consul OBrien in your name demanded. the favour of us to seek and Obtain. the release from Slavery of your Subjects in the Possession of

The Pascha of Tripoli. we wrote and Obtained The same and gave them to your Consul to Send to you as a present. and we pray you to receive The same and be assured of our friendship.

The bey of Tunis, finding that he could not get the presents and favors that he desired from the resident agent of the United States (he had unsuccessfully tried to get a passport to send a ship laden with wheat to Tripoli by offering Consul Eaton a present worth about \$10,000 as a bribe), decided to make his request for a frigate—repeatedly turned down by Eaton—direct to President Thomas Jefferson. Accordingly, he wrote the following letter dated Tunis, September 8, 1802:

Mr. President: With equal pleasure and satisfaction I have seen arrive, and have received successively, all the military and naval stores, as well as the superb jewels, which your Government has sent forward for my Regency and myself, in execution of our conditions for the confirming and consolidating the harmony and alliance which, thank God, have been established, and actually subsist between us.

While I am happy to give you this assurance, indeed sincere, of my full contentment, I ought not to dissemble that I do not, at the same time, see myself treated with the same distinction, and the same regard that you have had for your other friends; and since I am equally one, I avow to you, with frankness, as I have already declared to Mr. Eaton, your consul, that it would have been infinitely agreeable to me if you had also made me a present of a vessel of war.

Mr. Eaton, not finding it convenient to charge himself with the communication of this demand to you on my part, I am determined to testify to you directly, by the present, that it would be very agreeable to me that you should send me a good frigate of 36 guns, which would add to the high esteem I have for your nation, and would more and more cement the ties of our friendship, which on my part I shall maintain firm and inviolable.

Convinced as I am, beforehand, Mr. President, that this demand, taken into consideration, will obtain the full effect which I expect from it, I renew to you the assurance of my most distinguished esteem; and I pray Almighty God to have you in his holy keeping.

HAMUD BASHAW,

Bey, Prince of Princes of Tunis, the city well guarded, the abode of happiness.

This letter from an avaricious and unscrupulous, blackmailing pirate chieftain, addressed and forwarded to the president of the United States, shows how low the young republic had fallen through exercising its policy of appeasement with lawless corsairs, a policy undertaken at first for reasons of economy and continued under Jefferson because of his idealistic democracy, his hatred of aggression and military power, and his sublime faith in the inherent goodness of humanity—virtues unknown to the Moslem Barbary pirates.

As the United States naval squadron in the Mediterranean gave Tunis a wide berth, Consul Eaton's position representing U. S. interests became increasingly difficult. When on January 17, 1803, a vessel named the *Paulina* was captured by the U. S. schooner *Enterprise* while endeavoring to run the blockade and get a cargo into Tripoli, the bey abused and humiliated Eaton and made impossible and unreasonable demands of restitution and damages for interference with his commerce and for all delays and inconveniences resulting therefrom, a peremptory demand for an official abject apology, etc., with threats of immediate retaliation by depredations of Tunisian corsairs on American shipping. In the course of an interview, the bey declared: "We Barbary States, do not admit the laws of war, established among Christian nations, applicable to us. We have always enjoyed the exclusive privilege to assert our own customs." Consul Eaton wrote Capt. Richard V. Morris, who was then in command of the U. S. naval squadron, fully in regard to the situation on January 26, 1803, and closed his report with the following statement:

There is an absolute necessity that I should have an interview with you and Mr. Cathcart, and soon. Affairs of incalculable moment to the United States here, require the assistance of your counsel, perhaps your force. I have this evening had the assurance of the Bey's chief Commercial Agent, who is

friendly, but nothing except your appearance here will prevent the Bey from putting his menaces in execution, unless it be unconditional concessions to his demands. I am neither authorized nor inclined to yield to those concessions.

Commodore Morris, in the U.S.S. *Chesapeake*, with former U. S. Consul Cathcart of Tripoli aboard, accompanied by the frigates *New York* and *John Adams*, was at Tunis Bay on February 22, 1803, when Consul Eaton boarded the *Chesapeake*, talked with the commander, and explained the seriousness in regard to United States interests at Tunis. He evidently urged Captain Morris—who was reluctant—to go ashore for an interview with the bashaw (a customary procedure and necessary compliment to be paid the bey if peace was desired). Eaton went backward and forward, at will, between the shore and the *Chesapeake*—with legal permission—and on the 24th was accompanied by Cathcart (who had been previously told that he would not be permitted to land in Tunis under any condition). Cathcart wrote that he accompanied Eaton to Tunis "in order to induce the Commodore to visit the Bashaw, as I really supposed his presence would be of infinite service to our affairs here." On February 25, Eaton and Cathcart returned to the *Chesapeake* (which had been lying inactive in the bay with the other vessels of the U. S. squadron for three days) and officially informed Captain Morris that his writing letters to the bashaw from his ship was not enough; that the bey "demanded that the Commodore should come on Shore, that the validity of the Prize [the *Paulina*] should be verified at Tunis." Moreover, the bey "had signified in the most unequivocal terms, that if these propositions were not complied with, he would declare War against the United States of America." Captain Morris, in opposition to his wishes, was finally influenced to go ashore with Eaton and Cathcart on February 26, and he took with him Capt. John Rodgers and several officers from the squadron. On the 27th, the bashaw refused to grant an audience, but set the next day for an interview; in the meanwhile, Morris had a private conference with Hadgi Unis Ben Unis, the bashaw's commercial agent, of whom it was said that in matters of trade and finance he "could out-jew any Hebrew." During the "Public audience in the Ambassadors Hall" held on February 28, with Cathcart acting as interpreter, the bashaw stated what he would and would not do. As the papers bearing upon the *Paulina* case were on the *Chesapeake*, they were sent for, but were not received until March 2, and the party remained ashore. Eaton, in the meanwhile, told Cathcart and Morris, in the presence of Hadgi Unis (and his Christian secretary), of the deplorable condition he had been in at Tunis, particularly during the past year of controversy and increasing tension; that he had contracted debts to a considerable amount (during his virtual isolation) in the execution of the duties of his office; that he had informed the government and had been in "daily expectation of relief."

On March 2, Captain Morris and Hadgi Unis reached an agreement at the consular house, during an examination of the papers of the *Paulina*, with the master of that vessel and the

claimed Tunisian owner of part of the cargo present. We read that as a result of this session, the commodore promised restitution of the Tunis-owned part of the vessel's cargo. "And the Agent [Hadgi Unis] on the part of his Master promised that no farther claims should be made, and that he would not interfere, directly or indirectly in any thing relative to the part of the Cargo which appertained to the Subjects of Tripoli" (with which the U. S. A. was at war). Morris was elated, and it was felt that "the appearance of the Squadron in this Bay had tranquilized our affairs with this Regency for some time." However, Morris, the men on the ships, and all who had not lived in Tunis for some time did not know the unscrupulous avariciousness of the bashaw and his Turkish-Moorish-Jewish horde of associates. The day after the final agreement had been reached, Hadgi Unis made fresh demands involving more of the cargo of the *Paulina*, and Captain Morris weakly consented to further restitution. On the following day (March 4), when the party was planning to re-embark, "Hadgi Unis Made more demands for several articles not included in the Manifest, and solemnly swore by his Maker that they were mentioned yesterday, and that the Commodore had promised to deliver them up to the proprietor." Cathcart, who acted as interpreter, reported: "I lost all patience at so barefaced a falsehood, called him an impostor destitute of shame, he went away in a Pet, and the Commodore in order to prevent detention thought proper to accede to his demand, however unjust, and to prevent a repetition, determined to embark immediately, he having previously intended to take leave of the Bashaw, as is customary when a Public Officer leaves this Country."

After the denunciation of Hadgi Unis ("an open insult") by Cathcart—which was well merited—and the sneaking away of a commodore of the U. S. Navy with a fleet of three powerful frigates mounting 112 guns and lying at anchor in the roadstead, the following events, which happened rapidly, could have been forecast by anyone acquainted with the psychology of the Tunisian regency. As the party was about to embark, Hadgi Unis appeared and with a supporting force claimed that Eaton and the United States Government owed him \$34,000, which must be paid before the squadron (and the men) left Tunis. A stormy session followed at the palace on the 5th, when Eaton expressed himself vigorously. He denounced the "insolent Jew money counter" and the French rascal Famin, branded many of the officials as impostors, and accused the prime minister (who was present) of robbing him. In a frenzy, the bashaw finally stuttered, "You are mad. . . . I did not intend to injure you, but since You have yourself began, I will turn you out of my Kingdom"—after Eaton had settled his obligation and that of his country with the bashaw's henchman, the usurious, avaricious, and unscrupulous Hadgi Unis, who acted in shady transactions for his master.

Eaton, with a pitifully small salary, had been required to spend money in his country's interest and do many things that he did not want to do to maintain himself and his consulate office. In a spirit of humanity, he had helped the unfortunates of other Christian nations, and it was necessary to give "presents" to the vultures around him not only to get anything done but also even to survive. From the time of his arrival on the Barbary Coast in early February 1799 to his departure from Tunis in March 1803 (a period of about four years), Eaton had generally been "destitute of U. S. funds" as well as virtually abandoned and left to his fate by some of the U. S. Navy commanders. In July 1800, the Tunisian corsairs brought fourteen Danish vessels into port, and the masters of the captured vessels appealed to U. S. Consul Eaton in a body, urged that he "redeem" their property, and said that they would open a credit on Leghorn to cover the expense. Eaton obligingly acted as requested and became the personal owner of the vessels when the Danes reneged and left the American consul "holding the bag." Eaton acquired the *Gloria* for the U. S. Government and armed her as a much-needed dispatch vessel. She did some good work, and Capt. Daniel McNeill of the U. S. frigate *Boston*, on March 31, 1802, authorized her master, Captain Bounds, "to capture any cruisers belonging to the Bashaw of Tripoli, agreeable to the laws of the United States." Consul Eaton wrote in regard to this vessel: "The necessity of having

about me a Vessel of force to enable me to Communicate with our Commanders in this Sea, especially at this moment [March 1802], and peculiarly as our frigates seldom touch here has compelled me to put this Ship, the *Gloria*, into Government's Service."

The *Gloria* was sent to Gibraltar with important dispatches, but shortly after her arrival there, Capt. Alexander Murray of the U.S.S. *Constellation* wrote Consul Eaton at Tunis: "You were unauthorised in employing the Ship *Gloria* on Public account—As Commanding Officer, . . . to put an end to this needless expence, I have given orders to the Capt of the *Gloria* to employ his ship as he may otherwise judge proper & that she ought not to be considered as at the charge of the U. States." At this time, the United States had great need of small and able armed vessels in the Mediterranean, but Captain Murray declined to co-operate with a mere civilian in helping to keep in contact with the Barbary States and look out, with zeal, for the interests of his countrymen. Furthermore, the *Constellation* took off two of the *Gloria's* crew and left Captain Bounds to get back to Tunis, shorthanded, and deliver the ship to U. S. Consul Eaton as his personal property to use and pay all the expenses thereof. On June 8, 1802, Eaton wrote the secretary of state:

If I have surpassed the limits of that discretion which I suppose attached to my duty, I hold myself responsible alone to my government for my conduct; not amendable to an inferior Captain of a squadron. . . . Except more energy be thrown into our operations against Tripoli, we shall fail in our object; and, by a temporizing mode of warfare, encourage the other Barbary powers to become in-

solent. . . . All the frigates of the U States employed in cruising, or even in blockade, are inadequate to prevent the small galleys of the enemy from stealing out and doing us mischief. While the *Constellation* was at anchor in this bay, two of that species of cruisers passed along the coast, and entered Bizerte, about 40 miles from this—and, the next day departed in search of Americans.

Commodore Preble appreciated fully the need of small vessels in conjunction with frigates in operations on the Barbary Coast, and if Captain Bainbridge had followed Captain Preble's orders and used the smaller *Vixen* in co-operation with the *Philadelphia* (or had had a *Gloria* to do the inshore work), the United States would not have lost its fine frigate. Eaton's initiative and patriotism cost him a lot of money, and smaller men in charge of U. S. naval vessels acted to embarrass and humiliate as well as weaken him in his extremely difficult consular work in one of the most unscrupulous and subtly belligerent and scheming of all the Barbary States. In regard to the acquisition of vessels that Consul Eaton of Tunis was required to finance at this own expense, it is interesting to note that Consul O'Brien at Algiers, in November 1798, purchased a three-masted polacre, which he named the *O'Brien*, and placed her in United States service, evidently with no criticism or expense to himself.

The indebtedness of Eaton and the consulate to Hadgi Unis and the loan sharks was reduced from a claimed \$34,000 to \$22,000. Holek, the Danish consul, agreed to stand security for this sum, but the incensed commercial agent of the bey demanded hard money, and whereas Commodore Murray returned to his ship, Captain Rodgers and Cathcart remained ashore until the money was received. On March 9, a final interview bearing upon the episode took place at the palace between the bey of Tunis and an American contingent consisting of Captain Rodgers, James L. Cathcart, former U. S. consul of Tripoli, and Dr. George Davis, who had been appointed by Captain Morris to take charge temporarily of U. S. affairs in Tunis. At this interview, Cathcart reported, the bashaw and his minister declared that "they did not wish a war with the United States; that they only wanted a person more condescending [than Eaton, as U. S. consul] and who would act more congenial to the interests of Barbary." James L. Cathcart was appointed U. S. consul at Tunis by the secretary of state on July 16, 1803, but did not take up his duties there until September; it is significant that in the interim, in order to live respectably under the conditions existing at Tunis, Dr. Davis, as acting consul, had to practice in his profession and charge for his services as physician and surgeon.

Captain Morris, when he left Tunis on March 6 to board the *Chesapeake*, promised to return the following day, but lacked the moral courage to do so. On March 7, he sent the following letter ashore:

His Excellency the Bey of Tunis

Excellency, When I left your Regency yesterday, it was, with the intention, of returning this morning, with the money; exposed to bad, weather, has added indisposition to ill health, and unwillingly, oblig'd me, to relinquish my desire, of offering my respects, and wishes, that, our present good understanding, may be perpetuated.

* * * *

While, I assure your Excellency, that nothing, but indisposition, could have prevented my offering my respects in person; I beg you, to be sensible, of the high respect and personal esteem, With which, I have the honor to be—

RICHARD V MORRIS

Cathcart refers in his report to the bey as "this Tyrant," and in conjunction with the letter that he evidently translated and penned in Turkish for Captain Morris, we read this note:

On Board the U.S Frigate *Chesapeake*
Tunis Bay. 7 March 1803

Had I commanded the United States Squadron in place of sending this letter I would have sent him [the bey] a copy of my protest against him for

the insult my country suffer'd in my person for this overt act of violence [held ashore as hostage] & informed him that I should only wait the orders of my government to redress the grievance

CATHCART

In an official report to the secretary of the navy under date of March 30, 1803, Captain Morris had the effrontery to excuse his own acts of incompetency and ignoble timidity by attacking in an unwarranted and thoroughly biased and dishonorable manner the outstandingly courageous and patriotic William Eaton, and we read:

I cannot forbear (in justice to myself, and the insult offered to my country) to attribute the cause to the duplicity of Mr. Eaton. Had he intimated to me his embarrassments, previous to my going on shore, and particularly, that he had bound the United States, by placing their seal to the obligation given, I should not have put myself in the power of

the Bey of Tunis. Mr. Eaton's entreaties to prevail on me to go on shore . . . strengthens my belief in his being accessory to my detention. As a security for the money paid by me, I insisted on Mr. Eaton's assigning all his real and personal estate to the government.

For an American naval officer to accuse Consul Eaton of duplicity was an outrage, and to question the truth of his statements, as Morris had no hesitation in doing in his official communication to the U. S. Government, was damnable. A man who would take the word of a lying, unscrupulous, and rapacious opportunist Moslem pirate against that of a high-principled, free-born American Christian gentleman was certainly not morally fit to command a United States warship and certainly not a squadron. On June 21, 1803, Captain Morris was "suspended in the command of the squadron on the Mediterranean station and of the frigate *New York*," ordered to the *Adams*, and "that with her you return without delay to the United States." A board of enquiry (court-martial), consisting of three naval officers and a civilian judge advocate, tried Capt. Richard V. Morris, U.S.N., at Washington, April 3-13, 1804, for disobedience, neglect, etc. The members of the court "limited the expression of their opinion to such periods of his [Morris'] command and to such parts of his conduct, as they could, from the evidence fairly and clearly pass an opinion on" and agreed unanimously that "Captain Morris did not conduct himself . . . with the diligence or activity necessary to execute the important duties of his station." On May 16, 1804, the secretary of the navy advised Morris that the president had ruled "that it is not the public interest that you should be longer continued in command in the navy of the United States" and that "he has revoked your commission."

William Eaton, the former U. S. consul at Tunis, was appointed as naval agent for the several Barbary regencies on May 26, 1804. It is significant that, while retaining the full confidence of the officials of the State Department, it was the Navy Department of the United States (whose operations—and lack of them—in the Mediterranean he had severely criticized, with cause) that asked for and obtained his services to augment in an executive way a more aggressive and practical policy against the Barbary pirates. The special commission of Eaton reads:

To all who shall see these presents GREETINGS

Know ye that reposing special trust and confidence in the Zeal fidelity and Abilities of William

Eaton I do hereby appoint him agent of the Navy Department of the United States of America for the several Barbary regencies.

This commission is a complete vindication of the character, abilities, good judgment, courage, and real patriotism of William Eaton, which had been attacked, ignored, or slightly considered by such U. S. Navy commodores in the Mediterranean theater of commerce and war as Richard V. Morris and Alexander Murray. William Eaton was also appointed as acting judge advocate in the court of enquiry which convened on board the U.S.S. *President* on June 29, 1805, to inquire into the loss of the frigate *Philadelphia* off Tripoli on October 31, 1803, and the conduct of Capt. William Bainbridge with respect thereto.

*The U.S.A. Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tripoli—the
Barbary State's Unwarranted Repudiation of It and
Declaration of War in May 1801*

The treaty of peace and amity made by the United States with (or rather bought from) Algiers operated to excite the cupidity of the other Barbary corsair states and particularly that of the two Turkish-dominated provinces of Tunis and Tripoli lying to the east of Algiers, with frontage on the North African coast of the Mediterranean. The dey of Algiers, when negotiating his treaty with the agents of the United States, for selfish reasons minimized the importance and capacity for evil of Tunis and Tripoli and went so far as to imply their dependence upon and domination by Algiers. Consul Richard O'Brien, who had been a captive slave there for over ten years and was naturally deeply impressed by the unscrupulous power of the dey and regency of Algiers, affirmed that Tunis and Tripoli, while evidently separate outpost provinces of the Ottoman Empire, were in fact subsidiary to and dominated by the more powerful and aggressive Turkish government of Algiers. However, such was never the intention of the "Grand Seignior," or sultan, at Constantinople, nor was it known to the Moslem beys (or bashaws) and regencies of Tunis and Tripoli. Great mistakes were made by the United States in dealing with the Barbary pirate states through its gullibility in believing that an expensive peace bought from Algiers meant that a very cheap peace could be made at will with Tunis and Tripoli and that any agreement reached with these two other Turkish corsair regencies should be made through the dey of Algiers and negotiated at Algiers under the guidance of the "friendly" dey. By attempting to follow this procedure, trouble developed right away with both Tunis and Tripoli, and when it was decided to have resident consuls at Tunis and Tripoli, the United States made a mistake in making them subordinate to the consul general at Algiers. The regencies of Tunis and Tripoli naturally interpreted this procedure to mean that the United States considered Tunis and Tripoli not as independent Moslem provinces but as regencies subsidiary to and dominated by Algiers.

The first "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" between the United States and Tripoli was negotiated with Jussaw Mahomet Bey at Tripoli by Consul O'Brien of Algiers (with Joseph Ingraham, U. S. chargé d'affaires, resident at Tripoli) and was signed November 4, 1796, by the bey as well as by the treasurer, minister of marine, chamberlain, chief of the divan, kaya, genl of the troops, com^t of the city, and the secretary of the regency in the order named (nine signatories). The dey of Algiers subtly worked on O'Brien to have himself mentioned in the treaty as final arbitrator in case the United States and Tripoli disagreed at any time on any of the terms set forth, and he went further and obtained the consent of both parties to his occupying the role of guaranteeing that the United States and "the Bey and subjects of Tripoli of Barbary" would each live up to all the provisions of

the agreement set forth. After the peace treaty was signed at Tripoli, U. S. Consul O'Brien returned to Algiers with ambassadors of the bey of Tripoli, and as the dey of Algiers was mentioned in the first and last (12th) article of the treaty as guarantor and arbitrator, Hassan Bashaw Dey signed the treaty at Algiers on January 3, 1797, as did Joel Barlow as "agent plenipotentiary of the United States of America."

It is significant that in the text of this treaty (as in all similar treaties made by the U. S. A. with the Barbary corsair states), nothing definite is said about the purchase price to be paid for peace by the blackmailed, intimidated, and humiliated Christian state, but accompanying the treaty is a "receipt" and a memorandum. The "receipt" is an interesting document and reads:

Praise be to God &c—

The present writing [Treaty of Peace and Friendship] done by our hand and delivered to the American Captain OBrien makes known that he has delivered to us forty thousand Spanish dollars,—thirteen watches of gold, silver & pinsbach,—five rings, of which three of diamonds, one of saphire and one with a watch in it,—one hundred & forty piques

of cloth, and four caftans of brocade,—and these on account of the peace concluded with the Americans.

Given at Tripoli in Barbary the 20th day of Jumad 1211, corresponding with the 21st day of Nov^r 1796—

Jussuf Bashaw—Bey
whom God Exalt

The memorandum of the bey of Tripoli states that upon "the arrival of a consul of the United States in Tripoli he is to deliver to Jussuf Bashaw Bey" the following presents:

12,000 Spanish dollars	25 barrels pitch	10 ship's masts
5 hawsers, 8 inch	10 barrels rosin	12 ship's yards
3 cables, 10 inch	500 pine planks	50 bolts canvas
25 barrels tar	500 oak planks	4 anchors

This memo as well as the "receipt" was signed by the dey of Algiers and Joel Barlow (as U. S. agent) on January 3, 1797.

In the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" between the United States and Tripoli, definite mention is made in Article 10 of "the money and presents demanded by the Bey of Tripoli . . . for this treaty of perpetual peace and friendship." (Such references do not appear in the body of the treaties made with Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis, but Jussuf Bashaw Mahomet, bey of Tripoli, was not a trustful soul, and he believed in having everything down in "black and white.") Article No. 11 of the treaty made by the young Christian republic of the West with a Moslem pirate state contains a clause inserted to placate the Mohammedan corsairs that is as cowardly in the realm of religion as were the acts of the United States in the diplomatic, military, and economic spheres, for it reads, "as the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion." Whereas this statement may have been technically correct, it was deceiving and expressed moral weakness. No nation on earth in 1796-1797 was more of a Christian nation or founded and operated upon more Christian principles than the United States.

Joseph Ingraham, U. S. chargé d'affaires, wrote from Tripoli on October 4, 1797, an official letter which says in part:

Our government must not trust to the Algerines to hold their peace with either Tunis or Tripoli. . . . the consuls of Tripoli & Tunis must be empowered to sacrifice, perhaps 60 or 70,000 Dollars or even 100,000—sooner than have our shipping captured and our seamen made slaves. . . . The Bashaw told . . . me he never meant to make peace with one nation without making war with another, . . . he has already made war with two nations since I've been here—Danes and Swedes. . . . This re-gency, when I first arrived here, was in a poor state, but now it is on the rise, growing very powerful. They have frigates from 26 to 36 guns, besides a

number of galleys from 6 to 12 guns. . . . The Bashaw has received some great presents from the Grand Seigneur, 2 frigates, 1000 barrels of powder, cannon, mortars, shot, shells, cordage, canvas, spars, pine and oak plank, and a promise of as much more as the Bashaw stands in need of, to raise this re-gency to its former dignity which was the first state in Barbary. Our present for this place according to the treaties of peace, is much smaller than was expected, but I hope our government will take it into consideration and send something more than is put in the treaties of peace.

If a United States citizen of the caliber of William Eaton had been made the U. S. consul at Tripoli immediately upon the signing of the peace treaty on November 4, 1796, and

had been responsible only to the secretary of state and if men of similar courage, character, and ability had represented the United States in each of the four Barbary States—backed up by a naval squadron of suitable power—from the time that the young republic adopted its Federal Constitution and became a nation of united states, the history of its relations with the Barbary corsair states would have been very different. On November 4, 1797, Ingraham wrote from Tripoli:

These people has got so haughty that they pay little or no respect to either friend or foe. . . . Its fear that induces them to pay any respect. . . . How long they may be friends with the Americans after their presents is delivered, I cannot pretend to say

unless they keep a few frigates constant in these seas to keep them under subjection: if they do that, it is possible to hold our peace for some years, and not otherways. . . . Depend on it that these people is not to be bound under writings.

In July 1798, Ingraham wrote from Tripoli that "the United States are very backward in performing their engagements here" and said, "Mr. O'Brien . . . promised as making Peace here that our government would send to this Regency a small Cruizer besides the other Presents this was promised before the Bashaw the Spanish Consul and all the leading men of this Regency." This promise, claimed by the Tripolines, was stoutly denied by O'Brien. Continuing, Ingraham said:

If Mr. O'Brien thinks that he can secure our Peace through the influence of Algiers in Tripoli he is greatly deceived and if he has informed our Government that he can he has led them into an error that will cost Government some thousands of Dollars to extricate themselves out of it again You may depend on it that the Algerines have no influence over this Regency . . . they must hold the confidence of each Regency separte they must give greater presents to this Regency than what is ap-

pointed already if they wish to hold their peace good in this place and not depend on the Presents that's coming and Algiers to hold a perpetual peace in Tripoli be assured it never will be the case till such time as the United States keep a force in these seas to keep these people under subjection and less than three good frigates will not answer . . . we have not Christians to deal with but Turks If they are our friends it's by the force of money or the force of arms.

Hassan Bashaw, dey of Algiers, died May 15, 1798, and on September 7 an "ambassador" left Tripoli for Algiers with a letter to U. S. Consul O'Brien from "His Excellency the Bashaw of Tripoli" congratulating him on his appointment as "U. S. Consul General" and requesting some money "due to me after the conclusion of the Peace" and a gift of the controversial armed American brig. In February 1799, in the presence of Joseph Ingraham, U. S. chargé d'affaires, Dr. Bryan McDonogh, the British consul, and a man described as "the American broker," the bashaw of Tripoli declared, according to McDonogh, "that he thought himself not treated like a Sovereign, being so long neglected by the United States, that he was credibly informed from Algiers that his cruisers dare not presume to molest the Commerce of America without the consent of the Algerines, but now that he was determined to let them and all Europe know what the Bashaw of Tripoli could do, and that he was not to be intimidated by any power or state."

David Humphreys, U. S. minister to Madrid, Spain, was unfortunate in his choice of men to represent the United States in both Tunis (Joseph Famin, a Frenchman) and Tripoli (Capt. Joseph Ingraham—once a slave at Algiers). Famin, at Tunis, consistently worked against U. S. Consul Eaton and the best interests of the United States; so did Ingraham at Tripoli, where he proved a "thorn in the side" of U. S. Consul Cathcart and later plotted with British Consul McDonogh to influence the bashaw of Tripoli to "make war upon the Americans." Captain Ingraham left Tripoli under pressure from the Tripolines (and the British consul) early in February 1799 to go "by vessel of his own" to Spain to lay matters before David Humphreys, the ranking member of the U. S. diplomatic corps in the Mediterranean theater. James Leander Cathcart, for about eleven years a slave at Algiers (and the Christian clerk of the dey) and appointed U. S. consul at Tripoli by the secretary of state on December 20, 1798, reached Algiers on February 9, 1799, in the U. S. brig *Sophia* (12 guns and 2 swivels) en route to take up his duties at Tripoli. After Ingraham (who, we read, seemed "to be unworthy the confidence reposed in him by the executive") left Tripoli,

British Consul McDonogh took over U. S. affairs and was evidently to blame for the bashaw's refusal to receive Cathcart as U. S. consul upon his arrival at Tripoli on April 5, 1799, unless all the presents promised were paid in full and the U. S. brig *Sophia* was turned over to the bashaw at once. Cathcart reported the message from the bashaw, given through the Britisher McDonogh, as follows: Without the prompt delivery of the presents and the brig, "we might depart when we pleased [without going ashore], that he would allow forty days from our departure before he would order his cruisers to capture American vessels—that at the expiration of that period he would order the American flag to be haul'd down & would make known to the whole world that the Bashaw of Tripoli is an independent Prince and would be respected as such in spite of the Dey of Algiers Bey of Tunis or even the grand Signore." As a result of a great deal of correspondence, the exchange of messages by emissaries, and bickerings (after Cathcart was permitted to land), the United States bought a continuation of a peace and friendship with Tripoli by paying \$23,500 and giving the bashaw two of the brass guns that were mounted on the *Sophia*, etc.

The total naval power of Tripoli at the end of 1799 is stated by U. S. Consul Cathcart as eight sizable vessels mounting a total of 140 guns; also a galley of 22 oars and 4 guns and a gunboat with a 24-pounder in the bow. The largest vessels of the fleet were a 32-gun English-built frigate and the *Betsy*, an American prize, which had been armed with 28 guns and was commanded "by an infamous Scotch renegade formerly call'd Peter Lisle but now Morad Raiz." The third largest ship was English built and mounted 16 guns. None of these vessels were up-to-date and impressive warships, and the disreputable Britisher was the only officer of the Tripoline Navy who was a navigator or competent commander; the members of the crews were poor seamen and an ill-assorted mob of cutthroats who were not trained in naval engagements with cannon but whose idea of warfare at sea was boarding and overwhelming a foe by numbers literally "armed to the teeth" (with knives).

The reaffirmed peace of the U. S. with Tripoli negotiated by Cathcart in April 1799 did not satisfy the avaricious Tripolines long, and the bey soon commenced to show signs of discontent and belligerency. In May 1800, the U. S. consul wrote the secretary of state:

The only conclusion which can be drawn from the Bashaws proceedings is that he wants a present, & if he does not get one, he will forge pretences to commit depredations on the property of our fellow Citizens; His letter to the President will be the means of keeping him quiet untill he receives an answer *provided no unnecessary delay is made*, as he will expect to reap a benefit therefrom? should government think proper to make him a present, it

will have the desired effect probably for one year; but not longer, I therefore can see no alternative but to station some of our Frigates in the Mediterranean, otherwise we will be continually subject to the same insults which the Imperials Danes Sweeds & Ragusians have already suffer'd, & will still continue to suffer, if they do not keep a sufficient Naval force in this Sea to protect their trade.

At about the same time (May 1800), the secretary of state, in a letter to Cathcart, showed that the administration of President Adams appreciated the precariousness of the situation with the Barbary States and the need of a United States naval force in the Mediterranean, for he wrote:

The pretences on which, as you represent them, the Tripoline cruisers capture and condemn the vessels and cargoes of nations with which they are at peace, demonstrate the extreme precariousness of any existing treaty; and that nothing can give effectual and permanent security to our commerce, but a marine force adequate to the destruction of those cruisers: and from your description of their number and qualities, any two of our frigates, with two smaller vessels, would without, much difficulty, demolish their [Tripoli's] whole force. Should the pending negotiation with France produce peace between her and the United States, it will be in the power of the U. States to send into the Mediter-

anean a naval force sufficient to combat and destroy the marine of all the Barbary Powers: and should the necessity of the measure occur, it is to be hoped there will be no hesitation in doing it. The efficacy and even economy of such a measure have been incontrovertibly proved by Commodore [Donald] Campbell [of the Portuguese Navy], with his single ship of the line [the *Alphonso* of 64 guns], in reducing the Bey of Tripoli [in May 1799] to absolute submission; not only to make peace, but, what is perhaps without example, to [make the Barbary pirates] *purchase* it of a Christian Power—and that power possessing so small a marine as Portugal.

The episode of Portugal's showing its teeth at Tripoli in May 1799 is of special interest inasmuch as Portugal was an ally and under the protection of Britain. Britain dominated the Barbary corsair states and used them in its own commercial interest, and the British consul at Tripoli, Bryan W. McDonogh, was all powerful with the bey and regency of Tripoli. When the *Alphonso* of the Portuguese Navy appeared with her big threatening guns at Tripoli, she represented not only the naval power of Portugal but also of the British behind it. The Scots, moreover, were conspicuous in the picture. The commander of the Portuguese battleship was a Scot as was the British consul at Tripoli, and the admiral of the Tripolitan Navy, Morad Reis (Peter Lisle), was also a Scot; incidentally, he hated the Americans and from the first openly adopted a policy of insulting and humiliating the United States.

On October 15, 1800, the Tripoline corsair *Tripolino* (a "polacre ship" of 18 guns), commanded by Raiz Amor Shelli, arrived at Tripoli with the U. S. brig *Catherine* (Capt. James Carpenter) as a prize. The *Catherine*, owned by Minturn & Champlin, of New York, was on a voyage from New York to Leghorn laden with sugar, coffee, pimento, beef, logwood, and whalebone (the value of cargo was said to have been \$50,000). On September 25, when seven or eight leagues south of the island of Majorca, the vessel was brought to by the Tripoline pirate, which took possession of the brig, robbed the captain and crew, plundered some of the cargo and stores, imprisoned the Americans, manned the captured vessel, and brought her under convoy of the *Tripolino* into port. U. S. Consul Cathcart protested the capture of the *Catherine* to the bashaw and "demanded satisfaction for the insult our flag had suffer'd in having one of our vessels brought in here without any visible cause her papers & passports being in perfect order" and likewise "restitution of property plundered from the Brig." The reply of the bashaw was that he would return the *Catherine* to her American owners, but that the United States would have to pay him money at regular intervals if it wanted to enjoy peace with Tripoli and not be subjected to corsair raids. "Let your government give me a sum of money & I will be content—but paid I will be one way or other . . . I will wait Six months for an Answer to my letter to the President, . . . if it does not arrive in that period and if it is not satisfactory, . . . I will declare war in form against the United States." The signed treaty in effect between the United States and Tripoli was deemed by the bashaw as a mere scrap of paper and meaningless, as Moslems considered only the present and would never think of binding themselves in respect to future actions. The only way for the United States to have peace with Tripoli was to buy it through the paying of tribute and the giving of substantial presents in money, jewelry, arms, munitions, naval equipment and stores, etc., from time to time as such might be needed by the avaricious and unscrupulous bey and regency of Tripoli.

U. S. Consul Cathcart protested under date of October 29, 1800, "the conduct of Jusef Bashaw supreme Commandant of said City & Regency of Tripoli & his Ministers—towards the Government & Citizens of the said U. S. of America." The protest covers (1) actions of Admiral Morad Reis (the Scot) in refusing to receive the passports issued by the U. S. consul and claiming superiority and preference over the other Barbary States; (2) the "purchase" of U. S. commercial goods by the bashaw, which was in fact confiscation, as evidently the bashaw had no intention of paying for the goods that he had diverted through arbitrary power from the channels of trade; (3) the annulment of the whole of the treaty with the U. S. by the bashaw and particularly of Articles 10 and 12; (4) the seizure of the U. S. brig *Catherine*, with the plundering of certain effects, of which restitution had never been made notwithstanding the promise of the bashaw. A letter from Consul Cathcart to the secretary of state dated Tripoli, January 4, 1801, states that the Swedes have agreed with the bashaw to pay him \$250,000 for a peace and ransom of 131 captives (with an annual tribute) and that the United States seems to be the next on the list for aggression. At the same time, letters were sent to all U. S. consuls and agents in Europe warning merchants and masters of vessels, through them, of the threat of war by the bey and regency of Tripoli.

During conversations of February 9 and 16, 1801, Jussef Bashaw demanded of the United States, through its consul, the sum of \$225,000 as the price of a "separate peace" and "an annuity of twenty thousand to perpetuate the same." Cathcart fought for time to transmit such an ultimatum to the U. S. Government and obtain its reply and agreed to cancel a debt of the bashaw's of \$2,000 and pay him an additional \$20,000 if he would delay action pending receipt of some word from the U. S. Government. Later, Cathcart raised the purchase price for suspended action to \$30,000, but the bashaw declined to consider such propositions. On April 13, 1801, U. S. Consul General O'Brien wrote Cathcart from Algiers:

Should you draw on me to any amount. as intimated on this business—I have not in My power to Anst^r your bills. I have not money or Credit. . . . Our Barbary affairs is much neglected we shall have

war—experience losses & Captivity to many Citizens of the U States. We have no information these 10 Months from the departm^t of State we have neither funds or Credit.

On January 4, 1801, Consul Cathcart wrote the secretary of state from Tripoli:

I am under the necessity of observing that my situation is peculiarly disagreeable; I have not only the peace of my nation to maintain but the influence & intrigues of the whole Sanhedrim of Algiers & Tripoli also to counteract, unsupported by government, not having receiv'd but one letter from the Department of State in two years, neither have I heard from our minister at Lisbon [the ranking official of the State Department in the Mediterranean theater] since the 8th of last April [over nine months ago], add to this that my instructions are merely answers to some questions which I ask'd before my departure [letter from secretary of state of December 20, 1798] and are couch'd in such terms as will not authorize my taking one decisive measure unless first approved by a man who has done nothing (this two years past) but write non-

sense dictated by the perfidious Jews at Algiers, & who has not taken one step to enforce our treaty by that Regency since my arrival at Tripoli, the whole of his communications being a complicated chaos of contradiction misrepresentation ignorance & duplicity mixt together with rocks shoals anchors cables masts rigging & a thousand other absurdities which would puzzle Lawyer Lewis or any one else to understand; the only article in which he has been consistent is in demonstrating a desire of throwing the whole of our affairs both at Tunis & Tripoli into the hands of the pusillanimous jews as they are at Algiers & of writing unintelligible metaphors no more to the purpose than the proverbs of the inimitable Cervantes de Saavedras auxiliary Hero Sancho Panca were.

Capt. Richard O'Brien, U. S. consul general at Algiers, was very evidently not a good man to have been put in charge of U. S. affairs at either Tunis or Tripoli, and we read that on April 7, 1799, the bashaw of Tripoli, in the presence of several people, denounced him to the newly appointed U. S. consul at Tripoli (who was subordinate to O'Brien) and said:

That OBrien had reported that he [the bashaw of Tripoli] was dependent on the Algerines that he would now let the world see that he was not, that OBrien would not be always at Algiers that all his Cruisers had orders to bring him to Tripoli if ever

they found him onboard a neutral vessel & again swore that if ever he was found that he would have him hung like a dog onboard of the vessel that brought him in.

It is significant that Consul Eaton at Tunis, writing the secretary of state on April 10, 1801, should deplore the influence of perfidious Algerian Jews in the affairs of the United States in Barbary and urge the liberation of U. S. officials from the toils of the usurious and unscrupulous money lenders. Eaton wrote: "We must . . . rely alone on the strength of our own arm. Why should we be any longer amused by the sink of Jewish perfidy in Algiers? . . . This may serve as a caution against passing any thing through Algiers which may indicate coercion against the Bashaw of Tripoli."

The record of the United States on the Barbary Coast is not a happy one. The impetuosity of the United States Government is not a sufficient excuse for the deplorable conditions that developed; neither is the sectionalism of the country, with its warring political factions. Aside from the very apparent handicaps of a young country that was forced into negotiations with the Barbary corsair states in the interest of its commerce and merchant marine, there were pronounced and inexcusable evils evident, such as the weakness, procrastination, ignorance, and indifference of administrative officials and the incompetency of certain representatives, agents, consuls, and naval officers. O'Brien and Cathcart, both patriotic

Americans and excellent men if rightly placed as subordinate officials in consuls' offices of the Barbary States, should never have been appointed as U. S. consuls; O'Brien's elevation to U. S. consul general of the Barbary States was most unwise and proved to be unfortunate. But an admirable, competent, and courageous consul such as William Eaton at Tunis was rendered helpless by a lack of government support—diplomatic, economic, and naval. It is no wonder that Eaton prayed for a few ships and a thousand marines to clean up all the nests of the pirates on the Barbary Coast and destroy their ships and fortified harbors. When in May 1801 it was decided by the pacifistic President Thomas Jefferson to send a squadron of four naval vessels (two moderate- and one smaller-sized frigates and a small cruiser) to the Mediterranean, the instructions given the commodore, commanders, and officers of the ships well reflect the spirit of the administration. With U. S. vessels of war presumably being sent to the Mediterranean to uphold the honor of the country's flag, protect American commerce, and wage war against Barbary pirates if the Moslem corsair states molested United States ships and broke their treaties of peace and friendship that had been bought and were presumably in effect, the official instructions to the squadron do not say a single word in regard to waging war with the pirate states. When war with Tripoli was known to be almost inevitable and Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco were also threatening, the entire document of official instructions to the commanding officers of the naval squadron dealt with peace, personal deportment of officers and men, economy and accounts, and friendliness "to the vessels and people of all nations"; the only mention of force is an order of the president to resist boarding, searching, and detention by the armed vessels of any other nation. No warships of any maritime power were ever ordered to a theater of probable hostilities with more pacifistic, preposterously childish, and penny-pinching instructions than those issued by the secretary of the navy on May 20, 1801, by order of the president to the commanders of the first squadron of the U. S. Navy sent to the Mediterranean. The first part of the official order reads:

The Peace establishment of the United States agreeably to a Copy of the Law, hereto annexed, authorises & directs the President to keep actually employed, a proportion of the Navy of the United States, The President anxious to promote the views of the Constituted authorities, has directed a Squad-

ron . . . to be prepared & put to sea. One great object of the present squadron is to instruct our Young Officers in nautical knowledge generally, but particularly in the Shores & Coasts where you cruise.

Notwithstanding the turbulence in the Mediterranean and the threats and belligerent actions of the Barbary States, it is evident that President Jefferson, with a war with the pirates seemingly unavoidable, would not have sent any U. S. naval vessels to the scene of strife unless he had felt compelled to do so by an act of Congress, and the mission of the fleet was primarily stated at "instruction of our young officers within the Mediterranean." The president of the United States did not reply until May 21, 1801, to the letter of the bashaw of Tripoli, which was written on May 25, 1800—an inexcusable delay for which both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, with their administrative heads, were responsible. On May 9, the flag of the United States was hoisted on the flagship of Morad Reis (or Raiz), the Tripoline admiral, as a declaration that as far as the corsair marine ranking officer was concerned, Tripoli was at war with the United States. On May 15, 1801, Nicholas C. Nissen, Danish consul at Tripoli, took over affairs of the United States at the request of U. S. Consul Cathcart, who had been told to leave the country, and on May 14 the U. S. flagstaff was chopped down at the U. S. consulate and war formally declared by Tripoli. On May 16, the port of Tripoli was closed, and when it was reopened, former U. S. Consul Cathcart sailed in the imperial polacca *Thetis*, presumably for Tunis; but because of the turbulent conditions existing there and throughout all the Barbary corsair states, Cathcart directed the vessel to sail for Valetta (Malta) and thence on to Leghorn. On May 29, the *Thetis* was boarded by a Tunisian galiot, which plundered from the vessel, officers, and passengers all she wanted (including the navigating instruments, compass, and charts), but did not seize the polacca or take captives. Cathcart, with his wife and daughter, reached Leghorn on June 2, 1801. A week after the United States flag had been humiliated at Tripoli and the consulate flagstaff

cut down and war formally declared by Tripoli (and twelve days after the Tripoline admiral had announced to his fleet of corsairs that Tripoli was at war with America), the president of the United States naively addressed a letter (May 21, 1801) to "the illustrious and honored Bey of Tripoli of Barbary, whom God preserve," which reads:

Great and Respected Friend: The assurances of friendship which our consul has given you, and of our sincere desire to cultivate peace and commerce with your subjects, are faithful expressions of our dispositions; and you will continue to find proofs of them in all those acts of respect and friendly intercourse which are due between nations standing, as we do, in the relations of peace and amity with each other. . . . We renew to you sincerely assurances of our constant friendship, and that our desire to cultivate peace and commerce with you remains firm and unabated.

We have found it expedient to detach a squadron of observation into the Mediterranean sea, to superintend the safety of our commerce there, and to

There can be no "relations of peace and amity" between a highwayman and his victim, and it is ludicrous for a nation that purchases a peace and pays tribute to maintain it to speak of "equality and reciprocity" with the blackmailing corsair state that has forced such a relationship upon a weaker, ill-advised, or timid state. At the time this letter of Thomas Jefferson's was written, the bashaw of Tripoli had been "egged on" by the hypocritical dey of Algiers and the belligerent bey of Tunis to declare war on the United States, and all the Barbary corsair powers were watching events, as all expected to benefit in cash and goods from the war. Anything that any one of the corsair Moslem powers succeeded in getting from any Christian nation was used as a gauge of what the other Barbary pirate states would demand and get if peace was to be obtained. The dey of Algiers, who guaranteed the perpetual treaty of peace between the U. S. and Tripoli on January 3, 1797, prodded the bashaw of Tripoli four years later to demand a sizable sum from the U. S. "to continue the peace" and advised him to be satisfied with nothing less than a cash payment of \$100,000 and an annual tribute of \$20,000 with, of course, periodic presents added according to desires and conditions.

Upon arrival at Leghorn, former U. S. Consul Cathcart of Tripoli wrote officially of the Tripoline naval power as follows:

The actual force of Tripoli ready to sail on the 24th of May was *first*: The Admiral an American Built Vessel, Coppered, Deep Waisted, . . . heavy Riggin, and looks at a distance like a Spaniard: She is Commanded by Peter Lisle (alias) Morad Raize an English Renegade, mounts . . . 28 Guns [18 9-pounders and 10 4-pounders]; she is manned with 200 Men.—*Second* a Swedish built Bark Ship which is fitting out at Malta, and is to carry 150 Men and 20 Guns 6 Pounds.—[*Third*] A Swedish built Brig which is fitted up in a hurry and carries 14, 4. Pounds and 120 Men. . . . *Fourth* 2 Pol-lacas mere shells of 18 Guns each, . . . 4 Pounds, and carry 100 Men each.—[*Fifth*] Two Quarter Gallies built at Malta the one Rows 28 Oars, the

exercise our seamen in nautical duties. We recommend them to your hospitality and good offices, should occasion require their resorting to your harbors. We hope their appearance will give umbrage to no Power: for, while we mean to rest the safety of our commerce on the resources of our own strength and bravery in every sea, we have yet given to this squadron in strict command to conduct themselves towards all friendly Powers with the most perfect respect and good order; it being the first object of our solicitude to cherish peace and friendship with all nations with whom it can be held on terms of equality and reciprocity.

I pray God, very great and respected friend, to have you always in his holy keeping.

other 24, carry 4 Guns each, and from 70 a 100, Men each; are Calculated to Keep under your Stern and rake you in a Calm, in a fresh breeze are of service, may easily be known by having extraordinary large lateen sails.—The whole Force of Tripoli consists of 7 Sails of Vessels carrying 106 Guns, 4, 6, & 9. pounders and 840 Men very badly equipped. . . . The Capture or sinking their Admiral is of such great importance that it will not only ensure us a permanent Peace upon our own terms but will probably effect a revolution in Tripoli favorable to our interest in the whole of the Barbary States. . . . The Admiral is a reputed Coward seldom goes near a Vessel that looks warm.

The influence of the British in Tripoli was very great. Morad Reis, the grand admiral of the fleet, was a Scot and a renegade who, when converted to the Moslem faith, had married the bashaw's daughter and assumed supreme command over all marine matters of the state. This man was a close friend of the British consul, Bryan W. McDonogh, and owned a Swedish-built vessel that sailed under British colors (covered by British Consul McDonogh), with

a French captain, and was used by the Tripoline admiral in shady transactions for his own private gain. The bashaw of Tripoli would not have declared war against the United States in May 1801 if it had not been for the influence of the two Britishers, Peter Lisle (Admiral Morad Reis) and Bryan McDonogh. It is significant that the British navy yards at Malta had built two vessels of the Tripoline naval fleet and, at the time that Tripoli declared war on the United States, were engaged in fitting out the second largest vessel owned by the corsair state to prey upon American commerce. Moreover, when two Tripoline corsairs sailed on cruises against United States shipping in the East Atlantic, they put into the British naval port of Gibraltar in June 1801 for conditioning, repairs, and supplies before sallying forth in their depredations against American ships and trade. Fortunately, they were seen by the commander of a U. S. naval squadron when it arrived July 1, 1801, and "the High Admeral of Tripoli [Morad Reis], a ship mounting 26 nine & six Pounders & 260 Men & a Brigg mounting 16 Guns 160 men" were bottled up in the harbor, with an American frigate on guard duty outside.

*Tripoli at War with the United States—Commodores Dale
and Morris in Command of U.S. Naval Squadrons in
the Mediterranean in 1801-1803*

After the dey of Algiers had received ships, armaments, and treasure from the United States (which failed to appease him, but were considered an acknowledgment by the United States of his greatly feared power), Tunis demanded its share of tribute booty—and obtained it. The bashaw of Tripoli (Yusuf Caramanli), encouraged by the weakness shown by the United States in its dealings with Algiers and Tunis, followed with arrogant and impudent demands; the reply not pleasing him, the bashaw turned his corsairs loose with definite orders to harass and capture all vessels possible that flew the hated but unprotected Stars and Stripes. Yielding to a popular demand, Jefferson, who had recently been elected president, had dispatched a squadron of four naval vessels (three frigates and a schooner, mounting 136 guns all told) to Gibraltar under Commodore Dale, but in true Jefferson fashion had weakened its possible usefulness by "democratic," pacifistic orders. Jefferson had no use for "a navy capable of aggression," for such to his "simple, democratic" mind was an instrument of imperialism and oppression.

Jefferson was in many respects a small man; he was a splendid advocate of individual liberty and the "rights of man" and was invaluable to his country as a real democrat. However, a great man as far as character, humanitarianism, and social ideals are concerned does not necessarily make a good president in either a domestic or foreign sense, and in international affairs the humble and pacifistic Jefferson was a pronounced and most unfortunate failure. He disliked a navy whose ships were built to cruise abroad and protect a nation's merchant marine and trade on the Seven Seas, and he was so economy-minded that he sanctioned the sending of the Dale squadron to the Mediterranean only when Madison, the secretary of state, proved to him that "having the ships, they might as well be put to some useful work" and that "the expense of sending them abroad would not be much larger than the cost of keeping them at home." Jefferson believed in the American Constitution to the letter and, in addition to this, had a great horror of war. He maintained that fighting was aggression—no matter who started it; that fighting even in self-defense was war; and that no naval officer or government executive, not even the president himself, had the constitutional right to commit any act that would lead the nation into war. Thereupon, Commodore Dale was sent abroad with a good squadron of three medium-sized frigates and a small

supporting light-draft schooner and with orders to protect American shipping by intimidating the pirates by his presence, but not to wage war, shoot, or even take a prisoner; yet strangely enough, with all of these limitations, the orders of the secretary of the navy required that he put up a "spirited defense."

Notwithstanding the undeclared war that had recently been fought with France by the United States under President Adams, Jefferson asserted that "the power to make war is a prerogative of Congress," and he argued that "without formal declaration, a state of war does not exist." The bashaw of Tripoli had declared war on the United States by subjecting the American representative in Tripoli to indignities, and in harmony with Turkish custom he had expressed belligerency by chopping down the flagstaff of the American consulate and making the Stars and Stripes "bite the dust." Furthermore, he had notified the U. S. consul that a state of war existed, and the United States flag had been run up to the masthead of the Tripolitan corsairs, indicating that they were at war with America and that henceforth United States commerce was fair game, with its captured ships and their cargoes prizes of war, and the officers and men taken aboard were to be either held for ransom or sold into slavery. According to Jefferson, it took two nations to make war, and he, essentially a man of peace, "would have none of it." He would follow the Christian biblical injunction to offer the other cheek for a blow if either one was struck.

The United States armed schooner *Enterprise* captured a corsair polacre "armed to the teeth with Moslem desperadoes." However, in accordance with official instructions from the pacifistic presidential commander in chief of the navy, Commodore Dale could not destroy or make a prize of the craft, he could not punish or take any of the pirates as prisoners, and he could not even take possession of the vessel's guns; he had to content himself with throwing the corsair's cannon overboard and then permitting the polacre with her crew of ruffians to sail back to Tripoli to be refitted for another pirate cruise against American merchant ships. Such actions made the American Navy the laughingstock of Europe and "despised and ridiculed by the corsairs"; also, they lowered deplorably the morale of the officers and enlisted men of the fleet. Congress could not "stomach" Jefferson's extremely pacifistic navy policy. It did not (as it should have) declare war against the North African pirate states, but gave the president express authority "to maintain a naval squadron in the Mediterranean and to seize and destroy the ships and property of the Barbary powers." Commodore Dale, disgusted and sore at heart, was relieved of his command and returned home, but still Jefferson persisted in his overcautious policy "to tie the hands" of the fleet and make it ineffective. A few pirate craft were captured, and some of the corsairs' plans were seriously interfered with, but when any United States naval commander, chafing under restricting nonsensical orders, showed signs of real naval activity, he was recalled. Politics was "in the saddle," and any patriotic American naval commander of spirit who exhibited too much aggressiveness and was too sensitive of the honor of his country's flag to suit the pacifistic Jefferson (the world's greatest advocate of appeasement and of overlooking and forgiving wrongs) was removed from his command overseas or superseded in authority by a believedly "safer" man, while some superficially plausible reason—such as seniority or "impossible" personal demands—was advanced for the change. This was handled tactfully, and the displaced commander received pleasant letters from the secretary of the navy expressing the president's appreciation of his good work, which in essence were meaningless except in a political sense, for copies of such communications, some approaching eulogy, were sent to Congress. The Dale command, which was the first U. S. naval squadron to be sent to the Mediterranean, consisted of the following four vessels:

Name of Vessel	Type	Number of Guns	Commander
PRESIDENT	Frigate	48	Commodore Richard Dale
PHILADELPHIA	Frigate	44	Capt. Samuel Barron
ESSEX	Frigate	32	Capt. William Bainbridge
ENTERPRISE	Schooner	12	Lieut. Andrew Sterett

Capt. Thomas Truxton, the hero of the U.S.S. *Constellation* (36 guns) in a five-hour battle with the much more powerful French frigate *Vengeance* (54 guns), was first appointed captain of the *President* and commodore of the squadron; but after taking up his duties on that ship, reading his instructions, and coming in contact with his officers and crew, he declined to fill the dual role of captain of a frigate and commander of a squadron. He required a competent captain to command the *President* under his orders and refused to serve unless the squadron "should be intended to act decisively against" the Barbary corsairs. Truxton did not want to sail on "a peaceful cruise" to a theater of war and objected generally to the limiting orders and the economy being expressed in fitting out and manning the fleet. On April 13, 1801, Captain Truxton, after being officially advised that "the Object of the squadron are Instructions to our young Officers & to carry into Execution the Law fixing the Peace Establishment of the U. S.," wrote the secretary of the navy: "Peace can afford no field for me on the ocean, and I much wish that some other Officer had been appointed to the command allotted for me." As Captain Truxton persisted in his refusal to accept the command of the U. S. naval squadron under the conditions existing and imposed, Capt. Richard Dale was appointed as captain of the *President* and as commodore of the squadron on April 28, 1801, but Cyrus Talbot was ordered from the frigate *United States* to serve as master commandant in the *President* under Commodore Dale and over the four lieutenants, Isaac Chauncey, John Smith, John M. Clagett, and Philemon C. Wederstrandt. Captain Dale relieved Captain Truxton in command of the *President* and the Mediterranean squadron at Hampton Roads, Va., on May 22, 1801. Captain Dale proved to be of the same mind as Captain Truxton and urged the appointment of an experienced naval captain for the *President* instead of promoting a lieutenant to be a master commandant and finally succeeded in getting Capt. James Barron (who was willing and anxious to serve) appointed to this command, thus leaving Captain Dale free to perform his duties as commodore of a squadron.

The U. S. naval squadron, destined for "about a year's cruise" and undertaken for "educational and protective services" in the Mediterranean, sailed early in June 1801 and arrived at Gibraltar July 1. (The little topsail schooner *Enterprise* beat the three larger frigates by five days on the transatlantic passage.) At the English port of call at the entrance to the Mediterranean, word was received of war existing between Tripoli and the United States, and as the "High Admiral of Tripoli," with two corsairs mounting 48 guns and carrying 420 men, was in the harbor (having arrived June 29) and was evidently being treated by the neutral British in a hospitable manner, Commodore Dale sought to converse with the British-born Tripoline admiral and learn of conditions existing and the admiral's orders and intent. Morad Reis (Peter Lisle) refused to board an American vessel or enter the American consul's office for a conference (John Gavino was U. S. consul at Gibraltar) notwithstanding that guarantees of inviolability to his person were given him; so Dale went in a small boat alongside the Tripoline flagship and talked with Lisle, who was evasive, suspicious, and much disappointed at the turn of events. Dale reported to the secretary of the navy (July 2, 1801):

He told me . . . the Bey of Tripoli was not at war with America I ask'd him the reason of Mr. Cathcart leaving Tripoli he answer'd that it was his own fault & said that Mr. Cathcart was no friend to America—I ask'd him when he was going to Tripoli, he said in two or three months; . . . I find there is no dependance to be put in what he says; . . . so fully persuaded am I and the rest of the Commanders that he intends to capture American Vessels, wherever he can find them, I think

one of the ships cannot be better employed than watch his motions, and get hold of him if possible. . . . The Admiral's ship . . . formerly belonged to Boston She will carry about 25,00 barrels of flower . . . [and] sail fast Enough to catch our Merchant Ships, and would do much damage to our trade, if he gets in the Western Ocean—which I think he intends. . . . The Brigg Sweedish built carries her Guns on the upper deck, she cannot sail fast.

The two Tripoline corsairs under the command of Admiral Morad Reis (or Raiz) had left Tripoli May 25, 1801, with the avowed intention of making depredations on the unprotected commerce of the United States and of capturing some "big vessels with valuable car-

goes" in the Atlantic. Only the timely arrival of the American squadron prevented the program from being carried forward to an end that would have been disastrous to U. S. shipping. There can be no doubt of the Tripolitan intent, and a historian tells us of these "two large, fast, and heavily armed Tripolitan cruisers lying hawk-like in wait at Gibraltar for unsuspecting Yankee ships." The corsairs, with their renegade British admiral, received a rude surprise as a squadron of real American war vessels—providentially for the United States merchant marine—hove in sight, and a relatively powerfully armed and manned fighting ship of the U. S. Navy deputized to blockade duty, we are told, "kept so merciless a watch that the corsair admiral . . . dispaired of escape, dismantled his ships and stole away in boats with his robber crews across the straits and overland to Tripoli." The Tripolitan admiral (with the British consular agent, McDonogh, subtly backing him up) was responsible for the declaring of war on the United States by the unscrupulous and erratic bashaw, for the British-born admiral ardently "promised to enrich the bashaw with the property of citizens of the United States whom he had the insolence to stile damn'd rebellious Rascals, worse than Frenchmen."

The U.S.S. *Philadelphia* (Capt. Samuel Barron) was assigned the task of watching the Tripoline corsairs at Gibraltar and of capturing them if they attempted to escape. It is significant that the American frigate could not obtain any water at Gibraltar, as it was said to be scarce, and she was compelled to go to Tetuan Bay for it; yet the Tripoline corsairs, when they put into Gibraltar, had their wants supplied and their needs taken care of during a large part of their long stay at the British port. In late July, the Tripoline admiral was informed by the British that they could no longer keep his vessels, with their large crews, supplied with provisions and water, and Morad Reis made demands on neutral shipping to supply his needs and also to get himself and men to a Barbary Coast port. Both of the Tripoline corsairs were dismantled, and their officers and crews were evidently spirited away on neutral ships. In November, the Tripoline brig was sold to the English, her crew having mutinied on August 8, following which all the vessel's armament was moved over to the flagship. A week later (August 15), an officer on the *Philadelphia*, off Gibraltar, wrote: "Out of about 500 their now remains but about 70 Men [the admiral and his principal officers among them]. the Mutineers made their Escape to the Barbeary shores, whare they will be protected by the Moors."

The war waged by Tripoli seriously affected American commerce in the Mediterranean, and Commodore Dale soon found that he had a decidedly inadequate naval force to blockade ports, search for Tripoline corsairs, and convoy American merchantmen. At the end of April 1801, eighteen United States vessels (seven ships, ten brigs, and a schooner hailing from ten different American ports) were at Barcelona alone waiting "until a ship of war arrives to protect them." With the frigate *Philadelphia* tied up watching the two corsairs of the Tripoline admiral at Gibraltar, the American squadron available for all other services in the turbulent Mediterranean and off the seething Barbary Coast consisted of only the small light-gun frigate *Essex* and the little 12-gun schooner *Enterprise* in addition to the flagship *President*. It is no wonder that Commodore Dale wrote the Navy Department on July 19, 1801, from Tunis:

I am sorry that I am under the necessity of sending Capt Bainbridge in the *Essex* to Barcelona to convoy 25 or 30 sail of American Vessels that is laying there & many more in other Ports waiting for a convoy to see them Clear of the straits, it is

to be lamented that there was not two or three more Frigates sent out at the time those was sent—to have given that protection to our Commerce which is so necessary in those seas, at the present time.

The operations of the American fleet were severely handicapped by the very frequent need of having to go off station to obtain fresh water and, at times, provisions. The water storage capacity on the ships was inadequate, and the fleet, operating far from home, was dependent on supplies sent from America. The question of an adequate fresh water supply to United States Navy ships serving in the Mediterranean was an important and serious one; yet official correspondence shows that the secretary of the navy censured officers for taking

so much fresh water aboard when leaving a United States port—and this notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining water at the British naval bases of Gibraltar and Malta and an apparent real shortage, at times, at the former port. Under the circumstances, it is significant to read a petition signed by the wardroom officers on the frigate *John Adams*, respectfully submitted to Capt. John Rodgers, U.S.N., under date of March 10, 1803, in which his lieutenants and midshipmen "have the honor to request a sufficiency of Water for supper this evening—they have been by an arbitrary order deprived of this indulgence during your absence, although the ship has not been on an allowance." After the squadron had been in the Mediterranean six weeks, Dale expressed some anxiety about conditions and said: "In five or six weeks I shall be under the necessity of proceeding to Gibraltar for provisions I hope the store ship will be sent out in time." In the meanwhile, several Tripoline corsairs were searching the seas looking for American ships, and among the recorded incidents we read: "The Brig *Alert* of Boston was chased into Barcelona by two Tripoly cruisers of 20 Guns & 100 Men each, that they followed her there and were watering."

Commodore Dale reached Tripoli on July 25, 1801, and sent a letter ashore from U.S.S. *President* to the bey. Dale expressed regret that the bey had seen fit to declare war upon the United States and cause the departure from Tripoli of U. S. Consul Cathcart and said that the bey's actions had been a direct violation of the treaty of peace and amity made between the two countries. After further reciting facts pertaining to conditions, Dale wrote: "If your Excellency has any disposition In a Just and honorable way, to make peace with the United States, you will please to let me know by sending a boat off. I give you my honor that the Boat and Crew shall be sacred." The bey of Tripoli replied that he "did not declare war against the United States, without having good reason for it," and further exchange of messages indicated that the bey had no intention of honoring the provisions of the old treaty, but that he was willing to negotiate so that the United States could purchase a new peace with Tripoli. Commodore Dale advised the bey that he had "no powers to make a new treaty," but would transmit to the president of the United States any views that the bey might care to present bearing upon the matter. On July 30, Commodore Dale, cruising between Tripoli and Tunis, dispatched the schooner *Enterprise* to Malta for water, and while on her way to that port under the command of Lieut. Andrew Sterett, the *Enterprise* had her historic encounter with the Tripolitan ship of war (corsair) named the *Tripoli*, commanded by Rais Mahomet Rous.

Lieutenant Sterett's official report to Commodore Dale dated August 6 was brief, punchy, and modest, but he referred to "the carnage on board" the *Tripoli* as "dreadful," praised the spirit and accomplishment of his men, and concluded with the words, "We have not had a man wounded, and we have sustained no material damage in our hull or rigging." In early October, the *Enterprise* was sent to the United States with important dispatches, as conditions in the straits had become very serious because of a Spanish blockade of Gibraltar. Washington made public on November 12, 1801, an account of the "naval victory" of the *Enterprise* based on the official dispatches received by the secretary of the navy, which read in part as follows:

On the 1st of August, the schooner *Enterprise*, commanded by captain Sterret, and carrying 12 six pounders and 90 men . . . fell in with a Tripolitan cruizer, being a ship of 14 six pounders, manned by 80 men. At this time the *Enterprise* bore British colours. Captain Sterret interrogated the commander of the Tripolitan on the object of his cruize. He replied that he came out to cruise after the Americans; and that he lamented that he had not come along side of some of them. Captain Sterret, on this reply, hoisted American, in the room of British colours; and discharged a volley of musquetry; which the Tripolitan returned by a partial

broadside.—This was the commencement of a hard fought action, which commenced at 9 A.M. and continued for three hours. Three times, during the action, the Tripolitan attempted to board the *Enterprise*, and was as often repulsed with great slaughter. . . . Three times, also, the Tripolitan struck her colours, and as often treacherously renewed the action, with the hope of disabling the crew of captain Sterret, which, as is usual, when the enemy struck her colours, came on deck, and exposed themselves, while they gave three cheers as a mark of victory. When for the third time, this treacherous attack was made, captain Sterret gave

orders to sink the Tripolitan, on which a scene of furious combat ensued, until the enemy cried for mercy. . . . The crew of the Tripolitan was discovered to be in the most deplorable state. Out of eighty men, 20 were killed, and 30 wounded. Among the killed were the second lieutenant and Surgeon; and among the wounded were the Captain and first lieutenant. . . . The Tripolitan was found to be in a most perilous condition, having received 18 shot between wind and water. . . . Not a single individual of the crew of the *Enterprise* was in the least degree injured. . . . Capt. Sterrett ordered the ship of the enemy to be completely dismantled. Her masts were accordingly all cut down, and her guns thrown overboard. A spar was

raised, on which was fixed, as a flag, a tattered sail; and in this condition the ship was dismissed. On the arrival of the Tripolitan ship at Tripoli, so strong was the sensations of shame and indignation excited there, that the Bey ordered the wounded captain to be mounted on a Jack Ass, and paraded thro' the streets as an object of public scorn. After which he received 500 bastinadoes. So thunder-struck were the Tripolitans at this event, and at the apprehended destruction of their whole marine force, that the sailors, then employed at Tripoli on board of cruisers that were fitting out by the government, all deserted them, and not a man could be procured to navigate them.

Commodore Dale is also authority for the statement that the bashaw of Tripoli had not bargained for real hostilities with the United States when he declared war and was much surprised that the Americans would fight. When the wreck of his once proud corsair, the *Tripoli*, limped back to port, he was amazed and "much mortified that so small a vessel [as the U. S. schooner *Enterprise*] should take one of his corsairs."

The members of the U. S. Congress passed a resolution which stated "that they entertain a high sense of the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Sterrett, and the other officers, seamen and marines, on board the schooner *Enterprise*, in the capture of a Tripolitan corsair, of fourteen guns and eighty men," and they ordered [approved February 3, 1802] the president to "present to Lieutenant Sterrett, a sword, commemorative of the aforesaid heroic action" and that "one month's pay be allowed to all the other officers, seamen and marines" who participated in the action. Lieutenant Sterrett arrived at Washington with dispatches on November 17 and on that same day received the following order from the secretary of the navy: "The Crew of the *Enterprise* must be immediately paid off and discharg'd & you will direct a proper [person] to attend the process of this business to see that Justice be done to the Crew as well as to the public." The secretary of the navy should not have used the word "justice." Returning heroes were summarily dismissed from the naval service without a single day's delay and with no acknowledgment of their splendid fight in the interest of their country, and even the belated recognition given them by Congress was only one month's pay, or an amount any man could reasonably expect to be paid him if he was "fired" from a responsible shore job without notice.

The secretary of the navy wrote on April 17, 1802, that whereas Congress on February 3 authorized the president to present a sword to Lieutenant Sterrett and directed that one month's extra pay be allowed to all the other officers, seamen, and marines who were on board the *Enterprise* when she captured the *Tripoli*, he could do nothing about the matter, as Congress did not make any specific appropriation to cover this expenditure. The secretary of the navy advised John Randolph, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of Congress, that he had no means of knowing how much a sword for Lieutenant Sterrett would cost, but that he could say that a month's pay to all the other officers and men who had been aboard the *Enterprise* during her engagement with the Tripolitan corsair would amount to \$1,519. Lieut. Andrew Sterrett was rewarded for his brilliant and courageous work with the U.S.S. *Enterprise* by seeing the command of that now famous schooner offered by the secretary of the navy to Lieut. Cyrus Talbot (who, Commodore Dale felt, was not sufficiently experienced to sail with him on the frigate *President* as acting captain). It was only because Talbot declined the appointment and resigned from the navy that Lieutenant Sterrett retained his command of the *Enterprise*; he was reappointed on January 14, 1802, when the Navy Department received Lieutenant Talbot's refusal to accept the post.

Immediately after Thomas Jefferson and his pacifistic and appeasement administration took office in early March 1801, the U. S. schooner *Enterprise* (then lying at Baltimore) was

one of the seventeen vessels of the U. S. Navy ordered to be sold in the interest of economy and to prove to the world that the United States was a peace-loving and truly democratic nation opposed to war, aggression, imperialism, and militarism in every form. Fortunately, the order of sale of this vessel was canceled before she was disposed of, as it became evident to the administration that "a small naval squadron would have to be sent on a cruise to the Mediterranean to show the Barbary States that the United States of America possessed ships of war," and competent captains advised Samuel Smith, the acting secretary of the navy, that "at least one small vessel, preferably a [topsail] schooner, should be included in the squadron." The *Enterprise* was, therefore, ordered to "rendezvous in Hampton Roads by the 1st of May and be ready to sail to the Mediterranean on the 10th of May." The little *Enterprise*, during the next few critical years, was kept more steadily in commission off the Barbary Coast than any other vessel of the U. S. Navy. While the frigates were being constantly changed from active duty to "laid up in ordinary," the *Enterprise* served in the Mediterranean squadrons under Commodores Dale, Morris, Preble, and Barron, and it was common to see the instructions read, "Squadron ordered home except the *Enterprise* which will remain on the station."

The need of smaller warships in the Mediterranean to supplement the frigates and round out a squadron to operate against the Barbary pirates was so evident that in February 1803 (act approved February 28, 1803), Congress authorized the construction (or purchase if the exigencies of the service required it) of "four vessels of war to carry not exceeding sixteen guns each; to be armed, manned and fitted out for the protection of the seamen and commerce of the United States in the Mediterranean"; also "fifteen gunboats." In March 1803, the secretary of the navy honored the *Enterprise* by specifying that the new vessels to be built for the Mediterranean service should be of "the exact dimensions of the schooner *Enterprise*" and should carry 14 6-pounders. These dimensions he stated as:

Length of gun deck	84 feet;	Beam (moulded)	22½ feet
Length of keel	60 feet;	Depth of hold	9 feet 6 inches

Later, pressure was brought to bear on the Navy Department to build the new vessels somewhat larger than originally intended, and this was recommended by men experienced on the North African coast. On April 6, 1803, the secretary of the navy wrote that there would be built "with all possible expedition, three Brigs of 16 Guns each and 1 schooner of 12 guns" and that "it is confidently expected that they will all sail in the month of August, if not before." It was intended to build these vessels at Norfolk, Va., Baltimore, Md., Philadelphia, Pa., and Portsmouth, N. H. The schooner (U.S.S. *Nautilus*) was contracted to be built at Baltimore for the price of \$23 per ton and to be completed in July. A brig (U.S.S. *Siren*) was ordered to be built at Philadelphia at a cost of \$26½ per ton, with delivery in August; but the proposals received at Norfolk, both as to cost and time to construct, were "altogether inadmissible," and the brig U.S.S. *Argus* was ordered built at Boston (launched August 21) at a price of "\$25 or less per ton." The fourth vessel, intended to be built on the Piscataqua, was most surprisingly not constructed there, as it was reported that there was "no seasoned timber to be had at that place." Attempts to get the fourth vessel built quickly in New York failed, so an order was given the Baltimore builders to duplicate the schooner *Nautilus* (copied after the *Enterprise*), and the U.S.S. *Vixen*, launched June 25, was the result. These four new small vessels (the two brigs *Siren* and *Argus* and the two schooners *Nautilus* and *Vixen*) were part of Commodore Preble's Mediterranean squadron in the autumn of 1803, the other vessels being the frigates *Constitution* (flagship) and *Philadelphia* and the schooner *Enterprise*.

Lieutenant Sterett, the first and the outstanding American naval hero in the war with the Barbary pirates, was back in the United States in May 1803, although his famous schooner remained in the Mediterranean, first under the command of Lieutenant Hull and later Lieutenant Decatur, Jr. Lieutenant Sterett does not seem to have been given the recognition by the U. S. Government that his brilliant work in the *Enterprise* warranted. On February 3, 1802,

Congress directed the president to present Lieutenant Sterett with a sword and belt commemorative of his gallant conduct in the capture on August 1, 1801, of a Tripolitan corsair, but as late as September 4, 1804, there is a record of the secretary of the navy's writing James Monroe, U. S. minister to London, asking him to buy such a sword in England. Sterett, still a lieutenant, was on unimportant shore duty at Baltimore, and it is said that he, like Commodore Preble and men such as Captain Truxton, was too aggressive as a naval officer to please the pacifistic president—Thomas Jefferson. When Lieutenant Decatur, then in command of the *Enterprise*, performed the heroic job of burning the captured U.S.S. *Philadelphia* at Tripoli, he also was given acknowledgment by a Congressional resolution and a sword, which he apparently received within a reasonable period of time. However, Lieutenant Decatur was also given a captain's commission for his Mediterranean achievement—an honor that Lieutenant Sterett fully earned, but did not receive.

Frigates, schooners, and sloops of war were badly needed to protect the United States interests and merchant marine in the Mediterranean; yet the secretary of the navy, obeying the instructions of the pacifistic and shortsighted, economy-minded chief executive, wrote an official order to Commodore Dale on December 15, 1801, which reads: "It is the command of the President of the United States that two Vessels out of the four now in the Mediterranean be immediately sent home." The United States was at war with Tripoli; the American naval squadron was having difficulty in the Mediterranean because of inadequate transport of supplies and the frequent need of the ships to leave their stations for water, provisions, and stores; a blockade of Tripoli was essential; the presence of a squadron occasionally at Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco was imperative; merchant ships requiring convoy protection were in ports—yet the commodore of the U. S. Navy in charge of operations in the Mediterranean was ordered to send certain warships back home, "so that there shall be [only] two vessels left in the Mediterranean."

Commodore Dale was relieved of the command of the U. S. naval squadron in the Mediterranean and replaced by Capt. Richard V. Morris in the spring of 1802. From the middle of the summer, Dale had been dissatisfied with conditions that affected really aggressive operations and in the late fall commenced to make excuses to get back to the United States. In early January, he wrote that he expected to be ordered home, but it was not until April 14, 1802, that he sailed the U.S.S. *President* into Hampton Roads. The *President* was laid up, and Captain Dale became inactive. On November 28, 1802, the secretary of the navy wrote Captain Dale as follows: "We shall soon send a small Squadron to the Mediterranean to relieve the one at present there, and you will again be called upon to act as the Commanding Officer on that station, . . . and it is also proper to inform you, that the situation of the Navy will not admit of your having a Captain under you on board your Ship." The parsimonious policy of the government continued, and Captain Dale would have none of it; so he resigned his commission on December 17. The resignation was promptly accepted, although in a gracious letter expressing awareness of merit and the president's wish that Dale would "enjoy as much happiness in private as you have honor in public life."

At this time, the United States needed warships and able men to command them in the Mediterranean and also had a crying need for a much more vigorous and farsighted administration in Washington. Captain Dale had cause to know that his aggressive policy to protect American interests in the Mediterranean and wage a real war against Tripoli was not popular with the executive. On August 18, 1801, referring to conditions in the Mediterranean, Dale wrote the secretary of the navy that it was greatly to be regretted that his squadron, when sent out, did not have "three more frigates," and he added that it would take "Two Frigates and two Sloops of War" just to blockade and cruise off the Tripoli coast; later, he affirmed that, in addition, "three or four good Gun Boats to carry a 24-pounder each (these Boats could be got at Algeziras)" would be needed and also one or more "good Bom Vessels." Captain Dale also criticized the acts of the British consul and agent at Tripoli (Bryan McDonogh), and the anti-American activities of this man became so devilishly pro-

nounced—after his crony, the British-born Tripolitan admiral, was bottled up by the U. S. Navy at Gibraltar—that U. S. Consul Eaton at Tunis sent an official protest to Major Perkins Magra, McDonough's superior officer, in which he said:

A certain Bryan McDonough, by birth an Irishman, Physician to the Bashaw of Tripoli in Barbary, actually charged with the affairs of his Britanic Majesty in that Regency, has for a long time pursued a system of conduct in that regency hostile to the United States of America; that he has been notoriously instrumental in stimulating that Bashaw to make war against the said United States.

Eaton referred to certain acts and policies being pursued by McDonough for "a pecuniary consideration," accusing him of causing trouble so that he could make money and of "insinuating himself as a mediator between the parties." He added: "This species of fraud is not uncommon to most of the half renegades we see here, who from motives of gain, or fugitives from justice, abandon a christian country & attach themselves to the service of these Barbary princes: In this class of Speculators Mr. McDonough holds a distinguished Character." Both the British and the French had men of this type, strategically placed in North Africa and the Barbary Coast, who consistently worked for their selfish interest and against the United States. When plans to get neutral ships to Gibraltar to take the British-born Tripoline admiral back home repeatedly failed, the British gave him and eight of his leading officers passage on a British ship sailing with troops under naval convoy to Malta, and Captain Barron of U.S.S. *Philadelphia* reported his sailing on August 19. Following this departure, U. S. Consul Gavino, at Gibraltar, reported that the Tripolitan sailors had gone away from time to time and that after the admiral's departure, only the captain of the brig and twenty men remained to take care of the two vessels of the Tripolitan fleet.

In 1801 the U. S. frigate *Boston* (Capt. Daniel McNeill) was ordered to take U. S. Minister Robert R. Livingston (and his family) to L'Orient, Havre, France, and then proceed to the Mediterranean. This cruise of the *Boston* has been branded "mysterious" by historians, and her commander was so criticized for some of his acts that he was dismissed from the service. The lack of a clearly defined and sound naval policy and also administrative incompetence are clearly evident in the executive's handling, through the secretary of the navy, of the several *Boston* episodes. Captain McNeill received his written orders on October 1, 1801, which were indefinite as to the U. S. squadron and its command in the Mediterranean, but he was told to proceed there after performing his mission to France; also, "if Tripoli should still continue in a State of Warfare with us, you will then cruise off that port, & use your utmost exertions to protect the Commerce of your Country, by affording to American Vessels all the Shelter in your Power by sinking, burning or otherwise destroying all the Barbary Vessels you may meet with, cruising with hostile dispositions towards us."

The following paragraph in McNeill's official instructions is typically Jeffersonian: "Any Prisoners you may take, you will treat with humanity & attention, and land them on the Barbary Shore. This Mode will be humane; and will tend to bring those powers back to a Sense of Justice."

The frigate *Boston* was on blockade duty off Tripoli during the period January-July 1802 and, most of the time, was the only U. S. warship engaged in this important duty. McNeill obeyed his instructions; he also co-operated with the Swedes (then at war with Tripoli) and with the U. S. consuls. In early May, the bey of Tunis was furious because McNeill had captured four Tunisian vessels which attempted to run the blockade and carry wheat, barley, oil, and other needed provisions and supplies to the Tripolines. The bey had been served formal notice of the blockade of Tripoli by U. S. Consul Eaton and the laws of neutrality set forth, but the bey, when his vessels were captured, demanded "immediate restitution" of both ships and cargoes and that the principle of "free bottoms, free goods" be honored by the United States without regard to the conditions of the blockade and the needs of war. Rumors of the affair reached the United States, and in August the secretary of the navy wrote Captain Morris, then commodore of the U. S. naval squadron in the Mediterranean) at the direction of President Jefferson:

It has been reported that about the 1st June there had been an engagement between Captain McNeill and a Tunisian Squadron. This Report, I am willing to persuade myself, is not correct. But if so unpleasant an event has happened, the Aggressor merits punishment. If the Aggression has proceeded from the Tunisian Officer, we trust, it was not by

the order of the Dey, and, in such case, we are willing to leave the proceedings in consequence of it in his own hands entirely. And if our Officer has been the Aggressor he will be proceeded against according to the Laws of our Country and every reparation will be made which Justice and Honor shall require.

Tunis, a Moslem corsair state, was doing all it could at the time—outside of an open declaration of war—to support Tripoli in its war against the United States. Tunis was positively hostile to America and a few months later expelled the U.S. consul, William Eaton. The emperor of Morocco had just shocked the Washington administration by declaring war against the United States because of Moroccan interest in Tripoli and Barbary State solidarity; yet Jefferson insisted on treating the rulers of the unscrupulous, avaricious, and lawless pirate states as if they were honorable, humane, and high-principled. Commodore Barron was told that Morocco "has declared war against the United States without the least appearance of Justice and other of the Barbary Powers [Tunis and Algiers] may be induced to do the same." The administration not only continued to tie the hands of its naval commanders with childish "humanitarian" restrictions but also to threaten them with punishment if they should be deemed to have committed an aggressive act when dealing with pirates in the defense of their country's honor.

Captain McNeill was not a letter writer, but he was a brave and capable naval officer and a strict disciplinarian who would stand no nonsense on his ship. He scandalized some people (including navy men and government officials) by sailing at an appointed time without some of his officers, who had overstayed their leave, and with some French officers and musicians aboard, who had not gone ashore when ordered to do so. The orders of the Navy Department in regard to the *Boston* were most vacillating. She was ordered home when her presence was needed in the Mediterranean, and after many contradictory instructions, she was ordered to remain in the Mediterranean; but McNeill was relieved of his command after he had sailed in her for home in the autumn of 1802. On August 9, 1802, writing the secretary of state from Tunis, Consul Eaton regretted that Captain McNeill had been ordered home without touching at Tunis, and he rightly considered such instructions and procedure as "extraordinary," as McNeill had been carrying the burden of the U. S. blockade of Tripoli practically alone for long months. Eaton always wrote in the highest terms of McNeill's capabilities, co-operation, good judgment, farsightedness, untiring energy, and sound actions and, referring to his departure from the Barbary Coast, said in an official communication:

Captain McNeill, I am informed, is gone home in disgrace, for leaving certain officers on shore, whose duty it was, but who did not choose, to be on board—for putting to sea with certain French

officers on board, who did not choose to go a shore—and for adopting measures which he believed, and which would have been if supported, useful to the interests of the United States.

Consul Eaton had cause to be disgusted with the namby-pamby handling of American warships in the Mediterranean, and he praised the activities of Captain McNeill while denouncing the smallness and incompetency of such men as Captain Murray (of the U. S. frigate *Constellation*). Eaton hit straight from the shoulder at the administration when he wrote the secretary of state criticizing the acts of the Navy Department in regard to the use of its warships and the incompetency of certain men placed in command of the few vessels sent to the Mediterranean.

Notwithstanding the war being waged with Tripoli, the secretary of the navy ordered the *Boston* home on July 13, 1802, the ship upon arrival to be "laid up in ordinary." On August 13, 1802, another letter was written countermanding earlier instructions but relieving Captain McNeill of his command and ordering him home, evidently in disgrace. The reasons given for taking McNeill's command from him were his unorthodox acts in sailing without his officers aboard, etc.; actually Jefferson was disturbed because of the reports that had reached him of McNeill's aggressiveness. The United States Navy, with a war on its hands

with the Barbary pirates, was in great need of capable naval commanders and officers; yet on October 27, 1802, Capt. Daniel McNeill was dismissed from the navy as per the following official letter addressed him by the secretary of the navy:

Under the provisions of the Statute entitled "an Act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment and for other purposes", it was made the duty of the president to reduce the Captains to the prescribed number, nine; and in the discharge of this duty he finds that he cannot retain you in commission, consistently with the principles of selection which have

been adopted.—

The task, therefore, has devolved upon me of informing you, that you are no longer considered as holding the Commission of a Captain in the Navy of the United States, and you will accordingly consider this as your dismissal from the service, under the Act above mentioned.

This treatment of a brave and capable officer, even if he was very much of an individualist, was contemptible. McNeill obeyed the orders given him and served his country well on the Barbary Coast. Under a commodore such as Truxton or Preble or unhampered by asinine instructions from the administration, he would have made a brilliant record. MacLay, in *HISTORY OF THE NAVY*, writes of McNeill: "During the War of 1812 Captain [Daniel] McNeill performed some gallant exploits in a revenue cutter, but after his eccentric career in the Mediterranean he was not again connected with the navy, although he was ever considered one of the bravest and most skillful officers of his day." Possibly the name McNeill (or McNiell) was not popular in navy circles and the combination of the U.S.S. *Boston* and Captain McNeill was too much for the navy and government to "stomach"; for in May 1777, during the War of the Revolution, the 24-gun American ship *Boston*, under the command of Capt. Hector McNiell, failed to support Capt. John Manly in the 32-gun frigate *Hancock* (after they had captured the British 28-gun frigate *Fox*) in an engagement with Sir George Collier's British squadron, consisting of the 44-gun frigate *Rainbow*, the 32-gun frigate *Flora*, and the 18-gun sloop-of-war *Victor*. Manly, in the *Hancock*, struck his flag, the *Fox* was recaptured by the British, and Captain McNiell, who was in the *Boston* some distance away, was accused of neglect of duty in "deserting" his consort. Many authorities exonerated McNiell and proclaimed that he acted, under the circumstances prevailing, with good judgment and in his country's best interest; but the country generally denounced Captain McNiell, and Congress, "obeying the dictates of popular clamor," dismissed him from the service. A quarter of a century later, another Captain McNeill had his naval commission taken from him by presidential order because he was "too aggressive."

The restrictions under which the vessels of the United States Navy were operating in the Mediterranean by administrative decrees caused Congress on February 6, 1802, to pass an act "for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers." This law required the equipment, manning, and employment of the armed vessels of the United States as might be deemed requisite "for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas." The president was ordered "to instruct the commanders of the respective public vessels, aforesaid, to subdue, seize and make prize of all vessels, goods and effects, belonging to the Bey of Tripoli, or to his subjects, and to bring or send the same into port, to be proceeded against, and distributed according to law; and also to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify." Furthermore, the law provided for the commissioning of private armed vessels (privateers or letters of marque) to wage war against Tripolitan vessels and that any Tripolitan vessel, goods or effects captured and brought into port by a duly commissioned private armed U. S. vessel "may be adjudged good prize, and thereupon shall accrue to the owners and officers, and men of the capturing vessel." Because of this new law, the American public expected that proven sea fighters, such as Capt. Thomas Truxton, would soon be in the Mediterranean to uphold the honor of the Stars and Stripes; but apparently the Jefferson administration was not keen about having aggressive fighters in command of United States squadrons or individual frigates. Captain Truxton, because of popular demand, was appointed to command the *Chesapeake* (44 guns) and a squadron, but once more he never reached the Mediterranean. Truxton had main-

tained in early 1801 that the commodore of a squadron, with the responsibility of supervising the operations of every vessel of the fleet, should not be tied down with the arduous duties of commanding as captain, navigator, and sailing master the flagship of the squadron. In February 1802, the secretary of the navy, while well knowing his views, informed Captain Truxton that he would be expected to act as captain of the *Chesapeake* as well as commodore of the squadron, to which request, after making a survey of the men assigned to his ship, Truxton replied on March 3:

The officers destined for this ship are all young and very inexperienced and though in due time may be clever they are deficient at present and the task for me on the intended service would be too severe without some aid and I have had heretofore much trouble in organizing a squadron and at the same time attending all the duty in detail on board my own Ship. Under these circumstances and

having a reputation to lose which I am very tenacious of, I should consider myself wanting in that duty which I owe to myself and to my family if I was to proceed without being placed in a situation similar to the Commander of the Squadron [Dale] now in the Mediterranean and if this cannot be done I must beg leave to quit the service.

The secretary of the navy acknowledged Truxton's letter on March 13 and stated emphatically that the request for a captain for the flagship was impossible to comply with and was denied; Truxton's resignation was promptly accepted without any request for reconsideration. Two days before the secretary wrote Truxton (March 11), he had written to Capt. Richard V. Morris at Boston appointing him to the command of the *Chesapeake* and the squadron, which, as events transpired, proved to be a most unfortunate choice. (On June 21, 1803, Morris was "suspended in the command of the squadron on the Mediterranean station" and ordered to return home "without delay"; on April 13, 1804, a court of inquiry found Morris guilty of "inactive and dilatory conduct," and on May 16, 1804, his commission as a U. S. naval officer was revoked.) The acceptance of Truxton's conditional resignation by the administration did not surprise the captain, but he deplored the inability to serve his country. Writing to the vice president from Norfolk on March 22, 1802, Truxton said:

A variety of circumstances convinced me at Washington that my appointment [forced by public clamor] was by no means congenial to the wishes of the President [Jefferson], and a little time after I came here made the fact so evident, that I at length considered my reputation deeply at stake in the hands of the present administration and brought things to a point. It was with pain & reluctance I quit the Navy but it was unavoidable. . . . Altho' I had come on to Washington in January in my way here (by appointment made by the Pres^t) to command the Squadron destined for the mediterr-

anean—in the course of conversation at dinner in the palace, the President asked me which way I was travelling—whether I was going to the northward or to the southward— This question was astonishing & the more so—when I assure you he never opened his lips to me on the subject of the Squadron or of our mediterranean Affairs. I think I can with truth say it was never intended that I should proceed on the command in question, if it could be decently avoided and at the same time the appearance kept up.

Captain Truxton was undoubtedly a victim of deplorable administration notions, prejudices, false economies, and cheap politics; he was one of the first but by no means the last patriotic, thoroughly competent, and outstanding American to be so crucified. The younger officers of the United States Navy, filled with a patriotic desire to serve their country aggressively and with honor in the presence of enemies at sea and appreciating the great worth of the experienced and brave man being lost to the navy, addressed Captain Truxton expressing "our extreme regret at the Unwelcome News of your resignation." The memorial, signed by thirteen midshipmen, further reads: "There is not one of us who did not promise himself the happiness of being again under Your immediate Command, and be assured Sir it is with reluctance we resign the expectation for ever. We still hope that you will one day fill that Important station which your Services & talents so Justly make your Own. With Sentiments of Esteem," etc.

The secretary of the navy wrote on April 1, 1802, that "the present squadron in the Mediterranean" had been ordered home and that the following vessels would constitute the relief squadron:

Name of Vessel	Type	Number of Guns	Commander
CHESAPEAKE	Frigate	44	Commodore Richard V. Morris
CONSTELLATION	Frigate	36	Capt. Alexander Murray
ADAMS	Frigate	38 (reduced to 32)	Capt. Edward Preble
ENTERPRISE	Schooner	12	Lieut. Andrew Sterett

The *Adams* was too narrow and deep for a frigate; she was oversparred, needed ballast, and drew too much water. She was very fast, but the ballast she had to carry cut down her ability to transport stores and supplies. Captain Preble reduced her armament from 38 to 32 guns, substituted lighter 12- and 9-pounders for her original heavier guns, and changed quarter-deck 9-pounders to 6-pounders. Unfortunately, Captain Preble, a splendid naval officer, was taken ill and was unable to sail on the frigate that he had reconditioned at New York, and Capt. Hugh G. Campbell was appointed to the command.

One of Commodore Dale's last acts before leaving the Mediterranean was to show firmness toward the emperor of Morocco and refuse the absurd request made by that Moorish potentate (who was extremely friendly to the bashaw of Tripoli) for the United States to grant passports and safe transport for sailors to go from Tangier to Gibraltar "for the purpose of navigating the Tripoline Ships, laying at Gibraltar, to Tripoli, with her Guns dismounted"; also for "four Vessels loaded with Wheat" to sail from Morocco to Tripoli to relieve the famine conditions brought about by the American blockade. The secretary of the navy, in a letter of instructions to Commodore Morris at Norfolk, Va., dated April 13, 1802, properly said: "We should be very much wanting in our duty, if these circumstances did not excite a precautionary vigilance with respect to the Emperor's movements. They may eventuate in an open declaration of hostilities which we ought to be seasonably prepared to meet." During the summer of 1802, the emperor of Morocco having shown hostile dispositions toward the United States, the frigates *New York* (36 guns), under the command of Capt. James Barron, and *John Adams* (32 guns—of smaller caliber), under the command of Capt. John Rodgers, were dispatched to the Mediterranean to reinforce the squadron of Commodore Morris. These frigates, commissioned in August, did not sail from Hampton Roads until October 8 and October 22, respectively, and it was not until the middle of November (or five and a half months after the order was given to put them in service) that they arrived in the Strait of Gibraltar and the entrance to the Mediterranean.

The American warships, when on blockade duty off Tripoli, kept the bashaw's sizable, or deep-sea, corsairs in harbor; small armed galleys and sail-propelled corsairs ventured out by hugging the shore, but failed to do much damage. The bottling-up of two of the best and largest Tripolitan corsairs at Gibraltar and the virtual destruction of a third by the U. S. schooner *Enterprise* had a pronounced and discouraging effect upon Tripolitan marine activity. On July 4, 1802, James L. Cathcart, former U. S. consul of Tripoli, wrote from Leghorn to the secretary of state:

The cruisers of Tripoli have been frequently at sea since the war commenced, and thence conceive the danger our merchant ships have been exposed to. From the returns of our consuls you will be informed of the extent of our commerce in this sea, which never was so valuable, as it was at the period and since the bashaw of Tripoli commenced hostilities. I have seen twenty-four sail of American vessels in this port at once last year, two-thirds of

whom were unarmed. Can the wisdom of government devise no means either to prevent the cruisers of Tripoli from putting to sea, or our merchant ships from passing up the Mediterranean unarmed and without convoy; is it not possible to prohibit them, (for their own sakes) from coming past Gibraltar unless armed sufficiently to defend themselves when three or four are together, or under convoy of some of our ships of war.

The Barbary pirates, with the natural indolence of their race, conducted operations on a seasonal basis and sought to avoid being at sea in bad weather. Through the years, a custom developed of sending corsairs out on cruises to prey upon the Christian enemies during the months of April to October inclusive, but occasionally, according to the weather, raids were

made in other months, and in 1797 an unusually inactive first four months—because of weather—resulted in more cruises being made during the last three months of the year than was average, or normal. This was due to a relatively backward spring and a placid fall. American naval activity off the Barbary Coast, guarding the straits and cruising in the Mediterranean, became seasonal also (even though the American merchant marine braved the stormy North Atlantic without regard to wind and seas for twelve months in the year); but American naval timing was usually bad because of procrastination and unwarranted delays in the United States in getting the needed war vessels to the turbulent area off the North African coast.

Commodore Dale's squadron, which should have been in the Mediterranean by March 15, arrived at Gibraltar July 1, 1801, and was extremely lucky in bottling up the admiral of Tripoli and two of that warring Barbary State's largest and best corsairs, which had reached that port two days before the Americans. Had the United States squadron arrived a week later, the Tripolitan pirates would have been through the straits and making depredations on American ships in the broad waters of the western Atlantic. As it was, the Tripolitan corsairs, with an intent to prey on United States commerce, had been at sea 36 days when they put into Gibraltar for water and supplies. Commodore Morris' squadron reached Gibraltar May 25, 1802, fully two months or more behind the time suggested by a wise and protective planned strategy; for there was always a period of necessary detention at Gibraltar, and belligerent Tripoli lay well to the east. The frigates *New York* and *John Adams*, ordered on June 2, 1802, to reinforce the inadequate Mediterranean squadron, reached Gibraltar on November 14 and 16, respectively, and actually after the corsairs of all the Barbary States had laid up for the winter. If these vessels could not have reached the Mediterranean by September, they might just as well have remained in the United States and arrived at the scene of war the following March. Commodore Preble's squadron did not arrive at Gibraltar from the United States until early September 1803 (the U.S.S. *Constitution* reached Cape St. Vincent September 4), and this was due to no fault of Preble but to bad executive planning. Commodore Barron's squadron entered Gibraltar Bay August 12, 1804, from Hampton Roads, whence it sailed early in July. It was on March 21, 1804, that the secretary of the navy ordered the frigates *President* and *Congress* (the leading vessels of the squadron) to be "prepared for sea with all practicable dispatch," and he added, "On this occasion we require the exertions of your most strenuous efforts." Official orders were given to get U. S. Navy vessels ready for sea when their actual presence was needed at a theater of war some four thousand miles away; in this case, it required over fourteen weeks to prepare the ships for sea and nearly six weeks for them to cross the Atlantic. The executive minds in Washington (and earlier in Philadelphia) were always many months behind in their planning; moreover, naval procedure, red tape, and an inefficient organization caused the required work to be performed very slowly and at great expense. A good privateer could have been built and sailed from the United States to Tripoli in the time (173 days, or 5-2/3 months) that it took between the issuing of the order to get Commodore Barron's flagship (U.S.S. *President*) ready for sea and her arrival off Tripoli on September 10, 1804.

The United States naval activities off Tripoli in May 1803 clearly indicate bad judgment on the part of the command and both incompetent and timid leadership. From the official papers bearing on the events from May 22 to May 28 inclusive, we read:

When commodore Morris arrived near the coast of Tripoli, with his squadron [May 22], a number of merchant vessels, convoyed by several gunboats, were discovered, making for Tripoli. Chase was immediately given. The gun boats escaped into Tripoli. The merchant vessels, eleven in number, loaded with wheat, were driven into Old Tripoli. Lieutenant David Porter proposed to the commodore to take the boats of the squadron, the following night, and attack these vessels, . . . but the commodore, calculating that his force would enable

him to obtain them by "negotiation," declined concurring in the proposition. . . . The next morning it was perceived that the enemy had, during the night, hauled up all the vessels at high tide, and erected extensive breast works from both sides of the stone building; and that the vessels were lying side by side, high and dry, their sterns within twenty feet of the breast work, so as to render it impossible for them to be cut out. Previously to being hauled up, the vessels were unloaded, and their cargoes (bags of wheat) with stones collected

in the neighborhood, formed the breastwork, which was on a bank, fifteen to eighteen feet high, and behind which it was perceived a great number of armed men, collected during the night, were stationed, ready to defend the vessels; and a multitude of cavalry covered the high grounds.

The boats of the squadron under the command of Lieutenant Porter were manned and moved in to attack. They reached their objectives and, while subjected to a heavy fire, set fire to all the vessels before they retired; the fleet bombarded the breastworks and the concentration of forces ashore. However, as soon as the small boats commenced their return journey to the ships, the Tripolines "came in bodies from behind their breastwork, extinguished the flames, and preserved their vessels." Lieutenant Porter, although severely wounded, proposed to renew the attempt, but Commander Morris forbade it, and the enterprise was abandoned to the disgust of the aggressive, patriotic Americans who wanted to see finished the job that they had started. The enemy losses are known to have been great, while the American casualties, killed and wounded, were fourteen, and the Tripolines had twenty times as many men actually engaged in the fighting as the Americans. The official investigation, conducted later in regard to the affair, reported: "It is to be regretted, that the proposition of lieutenant Porter to attack the vessels the first night, was not acceded to—it would have resulted, without question, in the capture or destruction of the vessels, with their valuable cargoes." We also read that on May 28 "it was decided to make an attack on the gun boats off Tripoli," but that the operations, under the direction of Commodore Morris, were conducted in a "very unskilful and awkward manner." The commodore's ship (*New York*) should have led in the attack, but Morris ordered the *John Adams* (Captain Rodgers) to the van and created a condition where the third frigate, the *Adams* (Captain Campbell), could not "fire to reach the enemy without endangering the *John Adams*, she being directly in their line of fire." The official report continues: "This extraordinary mismanagement on the part of commodore Morris drew upon him much censure."

The outstanding naval action of the Tripoline-American war in the summer of 1803 was the driving ashore of the largest of the Tripolitan corsairs (or vessels of war) and her destruction by the U.S. schooner *Enterprise* and U. S. frigate *John Adams*. The official report of this action as made by Capt. John Rodgers of the U.S.S. *John Adams* is in part as follows:

On the 22^d instant [June 1803], at 1/2 past 7 AM. Wind ENE. the Town of Tripoli bearing WSW. distant 6 or 7 leagues, observed the *Enterprise* in the SSE. with a signal flying, its signification not distinguishable, made sail, and stood toward her, At 8 ditto, spoke the *Enterprise* when Lieut Hull informed me that a large ship of the Enemy had anchored close in with the shore, at 1/2 past 8 ditto, shortened sail and prepared to Anchor with Springs on our Cable, discovering the Enemy anchored with Springs on his Cable in a deep Narrow Bay, about 7 or 8 leagues to the Eastward of the Town, in a situation advantageous to defending their Ship, at the same time observed the Gun Boats beating up to their assistance, and a vast number of Cavalry and Armed men on the Beach, At 7 Minutes before 9 AM, being in 7 fathoms Water and supposing we were within Point Blank shot of the Enemy Commenced firing which they returned, and a Constant fire was maintained for forty five Minutes, when the Enemy's fire was silenced, at which instant the Crew abandoned the Ship in the most Confused and precipitate manner, for such as her Boats could not carry, jumped overboard and swam to the shore, At this moment being in a 1/4 less 5 fathoms Water, and the Rocks appearing under our Bottom and in every direction round us, I thought it prudent to Ware and lay the Ships head

off shore, and in the meantime ordered Lieut Hull to stand as close in as Consistent with safety and amuse the Enemy on the Beach, until our Boats could be hoisted out to take possession, At 1/4 before 10 A M, Discovering one of the Enemy's Boats returning to the Ship (whilst in the act of hoisting out our Boats) tacked and renewed our fire, and in a few Minutes after had the Satisfaction to see the Enemy's colors hauled down, at the same time, firing both their Broad sides, which was accompanied by the Ships Blowing up with a Heavy explosion, which Burst the Hull to pieces and forced the Main and Mizen Masts perpendicularly into the air 150 or 160 feet, with all the Yards Shrouds Stays &c belonging to them.—This Ship was Polacre Rigged Mounting 22 Guns, the largest Cruiser belonging to Tripoli, and to appearance a very fine vessel. From the number of Persons I saw land her Crew must have consisted of more than 200 Men, and from the advantageous position she held, added to the Shoalness of Water outside of her, she ought to have annoyed us very much and have done very considerable damage, yet to the disgrace of Tripoli, we have received no injury.— all the Men which returned to the Ship in the Boat were blown up in her, and I have reason to believe her Captain was among the Number; Several Men which were wounded on the Beach, were seen to be carried off

by others, and a vast number must have been killed previous to their abandoning the ship. . . . The destruction of the before mentioned vessel, altho' awful, was one of the Grandest Spectacles I ever beheld.— After a Tremendous Explosion there ap-

peared a Huge Column of smoke, with a Pyramid of Fire darting Vertically through its Centre interspersed with Masts, Yards, Sails Rigging, different parts of the Hull &c and the vessel in an instant dashed to Atoms.

The Danish consul at Tripoli, Nicholas C. Nissen, writing on July 15, 1803, said that "the Bashaw of Tripoli is now collecting a considerable Army which he intends to March against the inhabitants of the Guerrian Mountains, who revolted about Two weeks ago and kill'd the Bashaw's Son in law, the Chief Hamadar and made them selves Masters of above 500 Camels loaded with Grain and a considerable Sum of Money" (taxes levied on the people with great severity). The Tripolitan account of the loss of the large corsair was as follows: "One large Polacca of 18 Guns was run on shore by the ignorance of the Raiz, some miles to the Eastw^d of this Port, and was blown up by themselves, to prevent her falling into the hands of the Americans, the Schooner and a Frigate having began to fire upon her." Nissen also said that no American frigate had "been seen these three weeks" off Tripoli. Commodore Morris' blockade was evidently pathetically inefficient because it was so spasmodic. Captain Rodgers left Tripoli on June 26 on orders from Commodore Morris, and at that time it was said that the Tripolines had only one corsair at sea and that "a small latteen rigged boat cruising in the Gulf of Venice." The Danish consul told a different story, for in a letter to Cathcart at Tunis, he said that all the cruisers that were at sea when the *John Adams*, *Adams*, and *Enterprise* were blockading the port "are returned" except the one destroyed on June 22; that "at this moment" (July 15, 1803), "there are four cruisers at Sea." Also, "They Sailed from this port on the 9th & 10th Instant. . . . There are some Cruisers of 8 & 10 Guns, fitting for Sea and none of your Frigates have been seen these three weeks." The four Tripolitan corsairs that went to sea on July 9 and 10 were described by Nissen as follows:

Type	Number of Guns	Commander	Type	Number of Guns	Commander
Galiot	8	Raiz Osman	Galiot	4	Raiz Aly
Galiot	6	Raiz Halifa	Galiot	2	Raiz Mohammed

Commodore Morris apparently did not keep in close touch with the Navy Department at Washington, for on May 4, 1803, it wrote him that it had heard no word from him since November 30, 1802 (a period of 156 days), and the secretary felt it necessary to advise the egoistic commodore "of the absolute necessity of writing frequently and keeping us informed of all your movements." President Jefferson and his cabinet had felt quite safe in putting the command of the Mediterranean squadron in the hands of Captain Morris, knowing full well that he was not a fighter like Captain Truxton nor as aggressive in protecting the flag and working "to the border line of limiting instructions" as Captain Dale; yet, not hearing from the command of the Mediterranean squadron for over five months was hard to explain and caused concern. Captain Morris had been ordered by the president to get in touch with U. S. ex-Consul to Tripoli James L. Cathcart, then at Leghorn, and co-operate with him in an attempt to negotiate a new treaty with the bashaw of Tripoli and put an end to the war which was so annoying to America's pacifistic executive—so much so that he was willing to pay a moderate bribe to the bashaw to end hostilities. In plain words, if the price was not too high, Jefferson was willing to buy a new peace with Tripoli and still further encourage the vicious principle of paying blackmailing tribute to each of the Barbary corsair states. How James L. Cathcart, who had just been appointed U.S. consul at Tunis, felt about the president's orders and the instructions of the State Department can be gathered from the last paragraph of his letter written to the secretary of state on July 24, 1803, as he made arrangements to go to Malta in an attempt to contact Captain Morris, who, since his arrival in the Mediterranean, had consistently ignored his official instructions and either ignored or humiliated Cathcart:

I sail tomorrow God willing upon a mission not very congenial to my feelings, but the President may depend upon my punctually obeying my instructions however mortifying to my own pride & sense of national dignity; but government are the proper & best judges of the steps necessary to be taken to promote the welfare of the community in general & I bend to imperious necessity, but not without a sigh! I long ere now expected to see Tripoli prostrate at our feet, one small effort would have establish'd our national character with that Regency for a century better than a million sterling, but for want of energy & a spirit of enterprize we bring our humiliations to their Bashaws foot stool.

Commodore Morris did not need any assistance in negotiating with the bashaw of Tripoli; at least this is what he later (in August) told Consul Cathcart. Yet in early June, Morris had been compelled to admit to the Danish consul at Tripoli that he was unacquainted with the usages (language, customs, and intrigues) of Barbary, and his actions and the general procedure that he followed from May 29 to June 10 proved his ignorance of conditions, his incompetency to handle the matter so blindly undertaken in egoism, and his gross unfitness to represent the United States in diplomacy and negotiation as well as in naval or military matters. The official papers show that on May 29, 1803, Commodore Morris addressed a letter to the Danish consul at Tripoli (N. Nissen) "soliciting" him to communicate to the bashaw of Tripoli "that he [Morris] was authorized by his government to negotiate with him" and that he was "ready to commence a treaty immediately, should he [the bashaw] be disposed for Peace." The message was promptly transmitted to the bashaw, who replied on May 31 that while he personally would not confer with the American commodore, he had given "his trusty minister Mahamed Dghies" full power to negotiate, and he closed his letter with the belligerent message: "I do not fear war—it is my trade—I understand it better than anybody." Commodore Morris took this double insult mildly and proposed that he should confer with the Tripolitan minister on board the flagship *New York*, but this Mahamed Dghies would not agree to, insisting that the meeting be held ashore. An agent of the French republic resident in Tripoli having guaranteed "the safety of the commodore's person," Morris landed and held an interview with Dghies on June 7. The following day Morris was informed that the bashaw would sell "a peace" to the United States for "two hundred thousand milled dollars and the expenses of the war." In response, Morris meekly offered a present of \$5,000 in specie "on condition of the Bashaw's agreeing to the project of a treaty of peace which had been prepared and was submitted." The Tripolitan reaction was prompt, and Morris was informed "that the business was at an end, and that he must depart immediately." From Morris' first move, the end of such negotiations could have been forecast by anyone acquainted with Barbary psychology.

An angry but not by any means a disillusioned man, Commodore Morris quitted the coast of Tripoli in his flagship *New York* on June 10 and took the *Enterprise* with him. He proceeded to Malta and from there sent a call for the *John Adams* and *Adams*, so as to get the "whole of his squadron together" in case he met a totally imaginary formidable force of combined Barbary State corsairs. In doing this foolish thing, he "raised the blockade of Tripoli," and then, instead of parading American naval might off the coasts of Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, he sailed to Messina, Naples, and Leghorn, where he met and insulted Consul Cathcart, dispatched the *John Adams* with convoy to Gibraltar, sent the *Adams* with Consul Cathcart aboard to Tunis with orders to proceed from there to Gibraltar, and ordered the *Enterprise* to call at Malta for dispatches. Commodore Morris dallied at Leghorn from August 13 to early September and, touching at Malaga on his way to Gibraltar, received there his letter of suspension from the secretary of the navy, which transferred the command of the squadron and of the frigate *New York* to Captain Rodgers and directed Captain Morris to take charge of the *Adams* and return without delay to the United States.

The removal of Captain Morris from the command of the Mediterranean squadron for "inactive and dilatory conduct" or for "indolence and want of capacity" and his dismissal from the navy were due to many reasons other than his actions at Tripoli in late May

and early June 1803 and his movements thereafter. The bill of complaints on which he was tried and censured by a naval court of inquiry included unwarranted long stays at Malta (26 days in January, 9 days in February, 21 days in May); also taking his whole squadron from Malta on February 19 to Gibraltar (via Tunis Bay) and not returning or sending any part of the squadron back to Tripoline waters until May 22; "remaining with and detaining his squadron at Gibraltar without necessity or any adequate object till too late a period in the spring of 1803"; "not proceeding with or sending any part of his squadron (after the one unsuccessful attempt in the month of January 1803) to the coast of Tripoli, till he sent Captain Rodgers from Malta with the frigate alone, on 5th of May 1803." Commodore Morris had his family with him in the Mediterranean, and the lure of certain congenial ports and domesticity was evidently greater than the prime business of the war with Tripoli, the threatening attitude of all the Barbary corsair states, and the prime interest of his country—although Morris boasted on his return to the United States that while he was in command in the Mediterranean, "there was not a citizen of the United States in those seas who either lost his property or was made a captive." The United States, it has been said, was "very fortunate as to its commerce" when Morris was in command of the Mediterranean naval squadron. The movement of vessels was greatly delayed, however, and the volume of trade detrimentally affected by lack of aggression on the Barbary Coast and inadequate convoy protection; moreover, no incidents for which Morris was responsible were "calculated to throw any degree of lustre upon our arms."

*The Loss of the U.S. Frigate PHILADELPHIA off Tripoli on
October 31, 1803—the Heroic Exploits of Decatur and
Somers with the INTREPID in Tripoli Harbor*

The United States sustained a major disaster in its war with Tripoli through the loss on October 31, 1803, by enemy capture, after grounding, of the U. S. frigate *Philadelphia* (44 guns) under the command of Capt. William Bainbridge. The American frigate was wrecked on submerged rocks in uncharted waters about four and a half miles to the eastward of the town of Tripoli while on blockade duty and giving chase to and firing upon a Tripolitan corsair. The Barbary xebec sailed well toward the shore of the course set by the *Philadelphia*, and soundings were showing from seven to ten fathoms when the water shallowed to six and a half fathoms; the helm was put hard aport, and the ship went hard upon what we now know as an extensive reef named Kalinsa, some miles eastward of Tripoli and running parallel to the coast. The reefs and shoals outside Tripoli afforded a great measure of protection to the Barbary stronghold, and knowledge of their location and of the channels between them gave the corsairs a great advantage in entering and leaving the harbor and in general maneuvering outside. The *Philadelphia*, with 307 men aboard, was drawing 18-1/2 ft. forward and 20-1/2 ft. aft and proceeding at a speed of about eight knots per hour when at 10:30 a.m., without warning, she piled up on the rocks, careened badly, and was soon found to be in water that sounded only 12 ft. forward and 17 ft. aft. Attempts to get the ship off caused the list to increase until she was on her beam ends. A fleet of gunboats from Tripoli quickly bore down on the ship when they saw that the frigate guns were useless. Two guns from the main-deck battery and three of the quarter-deck cannonades were fired at the attacking enemy, but because of the angle of the decks they had no effect. The foremast was cut away, weights moved or thrown overboard, and

improvised means tried of getting some guns into action, but all in vain. The ship was fixed and listed so that she was absolutely helpless and unable to defend herself from a constantly increasing attacking force, which, fortunately for the crew of the *Philadelphia*, was determined to destroy all the stricken frigate's masts, spars, sails, rigging, and top hamper before paying attention to the hull. When the helpless condition of the American warship became evident, the Tripolines were ordered to fight to secure live prisoners, who had ransom value, for dead men would bring them no profit and but little glory; this mercenary policy saved a great loss of life. It was officially reported later by Captain Bainbridge:

After having tried every expedient that could be thought of to contribute to our relief, and exerting ourselves to the utmost from the time of our grounding until half past four p. m. in endeavoring to get the ship afloat and at the same time in resisting the enemy, but finding all hopes of the first vain, and not being able to bring our guns to effect the latter, I called a council of officers to consult them on the subject of a further resistance or the necessity of surrendering to the enemy. Upon a deliberate consideration of our situation, it was the

unanimous opinion that it was impossible to get the ship off and that all further resistance would be but unnecessary exposing men in a situation where neither perseverance nor fortitude would be of any benefit to our country or ourselves; and it was unanimously agreed that the only thing left for us to do was to surrender to the enemy, which was accordingly done, after drowning the magazine, and destroying as many articles as possible that might be of use to the enemy.

Guns were thrown overboard together with portable articles of value, and holes were bored through the planking. The vessel had over six feet of water in her, and not a man on the *Philadelphia* dreamed that there was the remotest possibility that the ship would ever be of service again or survive for long the pounding of expected heavy seas and northerly gales. In the dusk of the evening, the *Philadelphia* struck her colors, and the Tripolines swarmed aboard and conducted the disarmed prisoners ashore in their large fleet of boats, robbing all—from the captain down to the humblest member of the crew—of everything deemed of value. The twenty-four leading officers were placed under a heavy guard in a house formerly occupied by the U.S. consul, and the balance of the crew members (283 men) were imprisoned in the castle.

Captain Bainbridge's decision to surrender was severely criticized by some people, and the remark was made that "a brave man would have blown up his ship rather than turn her over to the Infidel Corsairs." Bainbridge retorted that he did not care to have on his conscience the putting to a violent death of some three hundred brave fellow countrymen, placed under his command, to satisfy his personal pride, honor, and chagrin as a result of his misfortune. The reaction of Commodore Edward Preble to the surrender of the stranded frigate *Philadelphia* to the Tripolines is set forth in his letter to the secretary of the navy written when the U.S.S. *Constitution* was in Syracuse Harbor on December 10, 1803:

Nov. 27th. arrived off the Harbour of Malta, and sent in a Boat with an Officer on Shore, who returned with letters from Captain Bainbridge dated at Tripoly, stating the particulars of the capture of the *Philadelphia* by the Tripolines, without a man on either side having been killed or wounded; with the mortifying circumstance that she was in the Harbour of Tripoly.— This affair distresses me be-

yond description, and very much deranges my plans of operation for the present. I fear our national character will sustain an injury with the Barbarians.—Would to God, that the Officers and crew of the *Philadelphia*, had one and all, determined to prefer death to slavery; it is possible such a determination might save them from either—

The behavior of Captain Bainbridge and his officers and men of the United States Navy, sailing on the U.S.S. *Philadelphia* under a flag whose citizens had generally distinguished themselves for bravery and patriotism among the nations of the world, can be compared with that of the Moslem Tripolines who found themselves in a generally similar situation in their regency's best and biggest corsair a little over four months before (June 22, 1803). The comparison from the standpoint of intelligence, courage, and patriotism is not favorable to the United States. The Tripolines, on their corsair (also stranded near Tripoli), fought the Americans with some spirit, and when they saw that their ship was going to be captured by the enemy, they blew her up and completely destroyed her. Many of

them went to their death both in the defense of their vessel and in her destruction. The command, officers, and men on the *Philadelphia* acted very differently, and their behavior certainly did not contribute to the glory and prestige of the United States Navy and the Stars and Stripes.

James L. Cathcart, former U. S. consul to Tripoli, writing from his temporary office at Leghorn to the secretary of state on December 15, 1803, expressed the views of many Americans in regard to the surrender by Captain Bainbridge to the Tripolines of the U.S. frigate *Philadelphia* when she was apparently hopelessly aground and so badly listed as to be unable to fight her guns:

I have not a word to offer in extenuation of this fatal accident, it involves incalculable consequences & changes our position not only with Tripoli, but the whole of the Barbary States.—

How glorious it would have been to have perish'd with the Ship, but how apt are we all to prefer a precarious, nay an ignominious life of slavery to a

glorious death which would transmit our names to posterity & have establish'd a national character which time could not efface; while humanity recoils at the idea of launching so many souls into eternity, every thing great glorious & patriotic dictates the measure, & our national honor & pride demanded the sacrifice.

Commodore Edward Preble, on the U.S.S. *Constitution*, writing to the secretary of the navy from Syracuse on December 10, 1803, referred to other important phases of the war with Tripoli resulting from the accident to the *Philadelphia* and her surrender to the enemy and the error of judgment on the part of Captain Bainbridge in sending off an accompanying vessel and cruising alone in waters with which he was not acquainted:

I suspect the demands of the Bashaw [of Tripoli], since he has the *Philadelphia* and Crew in possession, will be enormous; of course, Government will feel the necessity of sending out an additional force, to supply the loss of that ship. One Ship never ought to cruise alone on the Coast of Tripoly, if it can be avoided. If two ships are in company and an accident of running on shore happens to one, the other can protect her whilst getting off—and the same protection would be wanted, in case of losing a Mast, by engaging the Batteries.

If it had not been for the capture of the *Philadelphia*, I have no doubt, but we should have had

peace with Tripoly in the Spring; but I have now no hopes of such an event— If you send me another Frigate or two, and a Frigate to relieve the *Argus* at Gibraltar, so that I can have the services of that Brig, I will so compleatly Blockade Tripoly and annoy the Coast, as to lessen the Bashaw's demands, more than double the expence of the reinforcement, and perhaps oblige him to sue for peace.

I do not believe the *Philadelphia* will ever be of service to Tripoly; I shall hazard much to destroy her—it will undoubtedly cost us many lives, but it must be done. *I am surprized she was not rendered useless, before her Colours were struck.*

It is well to note that Commodore Preble gave Captain Bainbridge of U.S.S. *Philadelphia* distinct orders in an official communication dated September 16, 1803, to cruise and take with him the smaller lighter-draft schooner U.S.S. *Vixen* (Lieut. John Smith), which he was to use for inshore work, but on September 24 Captain Bainbridge decided to cruise alone and sent the following order to Lieutenant Smith: "Sir By our parting company we shall be more likely to intercept any Tripolitan Cruisers that may be in our rout; you will therefore make the best of your way to Malta Via Lapidosa, and attend to the Orders you received from me on the 22nd inst." This departure from Commodore Preble's plans and instructions lost a fine frigate for the United States and prolonged the war with Tripoli.

Another matter that Captain Bainbridge never thought of when he surrendered the *Philadelphia* to the Tripolines was the possible use to which members of the crew of the ship, as slaves of Tripoli, might be put to strengthen that hostile Barbary corsair state in its fight against the United States. On December 13, 1803, Captain Bainbridge wrote Commodore Preble:

Our Crew [is] kept employed; the mechanics at their respective Trades, the others at various work. We had on board a smart Gang of Carpenters, who are employed in working on a new Schooner. Mr. Godby our head Carpenter . . . has received orders from the Bashaw to build a Gun Boat. . . . Tripoli will receive great advantage from their labour and

they cannot receive much worse treatment than they do, for they are only allowed bread scarcely sufficient for them to subsist on, and the *Interest* the Bashaw has in their lives [the product of their work plus ransom] will prevent him from starving them entirely.

Captain Bainbridge, in "the anguish of captivity," had some humane thoughts that in their essence were decidedly antagonistic toward the honor and well-being of the United States. One, presented in a letter to Commodore Preble on December 5, 1803, suggested that as "the greater part of our crew" members were English born, the British admiral, Lord Nelson, be encouraged to claim them as English subjects and that if his demand was enforced by the appearance of the British fleet and its threatening guns, he would get them. Commodore Preble, since his appearance in the Mediterranean, had been blocking the British attempts to impress British-born sailors serving on United States ships, and even in the claimed "interest of humanity," no loyal officer of the U.S.N. could have been expected to make any such request of the British or even acquiesce in such a plan. Later, the War of 1812 was presumably fought to put a stop to British impressment of American sailors. However, there is an interesting record that gives the world a good idea of what Britain's great naval hero thought of the action of the officers and men in the surrender of their stranded ship to the enemy, without a real fight and without destroying her. John Gavino, the U.S. consul at Gibraltar, is responsible for the statement that 140 members of the crew of the *Philadelphia* petitioned Lord Nelson to claim them as British subjects. The British admiral's answer was, "If I did anything in that business, it would be to have the rascals all hung."

Commodore Preble was incensed to hear that the crew of the *Philadelphia* was being used by the bashaw of Tripoli in performing work to strengthen the fortifications of Tripoli, in building vessels, etc. (One of the forts—mounting 7 cannon—became known as Fort American because it was built by American captives.) On January 4, 1804, Preble wrote the prime minister of the bashaw of Tripoli and the "Warrant and Petty Officers, Seamen and Marines late of the U.S. Frigate *Philadelphia*, Tripoli," on this subject, and his letter addressed the crew reads, in part, as follows:

Altho' the fortune of War has made you prisoners to the Bashaw of Tripoly, it has not made you his Slaves— Whether you will be Slaves or Not, depends on yourselves, Your determination not to work will be proper, and if the Bashaw should attempt compulsion by punishing you for a refusal, I shall retaliate on his Subjects which I now have, and which may hereafter come into my possession. If you conduct properly, you will in due time be redeemed and restored to your friends, and entitled to receive full pay from the time of your capture to your arrival in the United States. . . . But should any of you voluntarily engage your services to the Enemy, and afterwards fall into the hands of your

justly incensed Country Men you will undoubtedly suffer death agreeable to the laws of the United States in such cases made and provided. You ought not to let the threats of those, into whose hands you have unfortunately fallen, intimidate you, but obstinately persist in your rights of being treated as prisoners and not as Slaves. . . . All those Americans who suffer themselves to be compelled to work for him [the bashaw] will be considered as having alienated themselves from the United States, and of course our Governmt. will not consider itself under obligations to ransom them. Behave like Americans be firm and do not despair the time of your liberation is not far distant

The Tripoline prisoners captured by the United States proved to be liabilities rather than assets, as the bashaws of all the Barbary States cared little, if anything, for any of their people who fell into the hands of the enemy, but did value highly—at a certain price per head—all Christian prisoners whom they captured. No equitable policy of exchange of prisoners was ever adopted by any of the Moslem corsair states, for they considered a Christian captive as a slave worth from ten to fifty times as much as a Moor or even a Turk.

The secretary of the navy, in a letter dated June 6, 1804, said:

The loss of the frigate *Philadelphia* which may have operated with the Barbary Regencies to the prejudice of our national character and has subjected a number of our Fellow Citizens to the condition of slaves, requires our attention. All that a sound mind, an ardent zeal and daring valor could

achieve with the force committed to Commodore Preble, has been performed by him. His force, however, is not adequate to the accomplishment of our purpose, we therefore have put four additional vessels in commission. . . . Our forces in the Mediterranean . . . will consist of

Name	Type	Number of Guns	Name	Type	Number of Guns
PRESIDENT	Frigate	44	SIREN	Brig	16
CONSTITUTION	Frigate	44	ARGUS	Brig	16
CONSTELLATION	Frigate	36	ENTERPRISE	Schooner	12
CONGRESS	Frigate	36	VIXEN	Schooner	12
ESSEX	Frigate	32	NAUTILUS	Schooner	12

The JOHN ADAMS (frigate), with many of her guns removed, to be employed as a "transport ship."

Instead of being put under the command of Commodore Edward Preble, who had proven his ability to handle the Mediterranean situation with vigor and had gained valuable information and experience pertaining to the Barbary States, this fleet was placed in command of Capt. Samuel Barron because of stated seniority. From the very first, the United States Navy was bound with red tape, cursed by arbitrary rules of procedure such as seniority, and handicapped in usefulness to the national interest by an aping of British navy customs and traditions founded in the young republic under political and sectional influences where "pull" was more potent than demonstrated ability of a high order. Capt. Edward Preble, being deposed as commodore of the U. S. fleet in the Mediterranean, relinquished his command of the U.S.S. *Constitution* following his arrival at Malta on September 17 (and after surrendering the squadron to Commodore Barron on September 10), and he sailed for home in the frigate *John Adams* to the regret of the officers of the fleet, the U.S. consuls of the Barbary States, and an overwhelming percentage of the thinking citizens of the United States who valued naval achievements more than arbitrary seniority rules.

A court of enquiry into the loss of the *Philadelphia* was held on board the U.S. frigate *President* in the harbor of Syracuse on June 29, 1805, at which the liberated prisoners of war from the *Philadelphia* gave testimony and were cross-examined by Capt. James Barron, Capt. Hugh G. Campbell, and Capt. Stephen Decatur, Jr., the members of the court. Captain Bainbridge, in his opening statement presented at this time, said:

The usage of nations appears, that where there is no probability of successful defence and all means of escape have been tried, the flag may be struck without injuring the commander's honor— These tacit but admitted regulations are founded on principles of humanity, and a nice and delicate attention

to national and individual honor. If under such circumstances a commander's honor be preserved, how free from censure must it appear when placed in a situation without being able in the least to injure the enemy and no means whatever of extricating himself.

The U.S. Navy court of enquiry (court-martial), we read over the signatures of James Barron, President, and William Eaton, Acting Judge Advocate, having deliberated on the evidence deduced from the testimony of the witnesses heard, was "decidedly of opinion that Captain William Bainbridge acted with fortitude and conduct in the loss of his ship the U. States frigate *Philadelphia* on the 31st Oct. 1803, and that no degree of censure should attach itself to him from that event."

An interesting episode in the capture of the U.S.S. *Philadelphia* by the Tripolines was the part played by a Turkish (or Turko-Tripolitan) ketch, the *Mastico*, whose actions during the affair could have been expected to lead to an international incident between the United States and the Ottoman Empire, with which America was at peace. This vessel, described as "the *Martingana* commanded by Mustapha Rais" and as sailing "under Ottoman colors," was lying in the harbor of Tripoli when news was received that a big "Anglo American Frigate" (the *Philadelphia*) had struck on the rocks off Tripoli. Salvador Catalano, whose testimony was verified, affirmed that upon getting word of the disaster, "the said *Martingana* [*Mastico*] struck her Ottoman colors and hoisted the Tripolitan flag." His statement continues:

That also many Tripolitans at the same time armed with firelocks and Sabres embarked on board the said *Martingana* and finally slipped the Cables

by which she was anchored, Made Sail towards the Frigate; but the said *Martingana* having arrived near the Rocks of Tripoli, there came to an anchor

where she remained until the evening of the same day when they then embarked in the launch of the said *Martingana* the Same in which they had embarked from the shore together with Mustapha Rais all armed they went on board the said Anglo American Frigate and made her a Prisoner and forthwith

began to transport the Americans of the said Frigate on shore to Tripoli as Prisoners and the Said Mustapha Rais with great eagerness executed this removal of the People and he himself conducted the Americans prisoners unto the palace [castle] of the Bashaw. . . .

On December 23, 1803, the U.S.S. *Constitution* (Capt. Edward Preble), with the U.S. schooner *Enterprise*, when about nine miles off Tripoli, captured the ketch *Mastico*, then sailing under Tripolitan colors. The vessel and her papers showed twenty men aboard, and there were 2 guns mounted on deck. It was soon discovered, however, that instead of twenty persons aboard, there were sixty-seven, consisting of a Turkish master and a Turkish officer, seven Greek and four Turkish sailors, two Tripoline officers, with ten soldiers and forty-two Negroes of both sexes. The captain of the *Mastico* ran up the Turkish flag and claimed that the vessel was Turkish and was bound to Bengaza and thence to Constantinople, having taken the Negroes aboard at Tripoli to be delivered to the "Captain Pacha" at Constantinople as a present from the bashaw of Tripoli. The *Mastico* had two other cannon aboard, unmounted below decks, and a supply of muskets, pistols, swords, etc. She had no passport from any of the consuls at Tripoli, and Captain Preble took her with him pending investigation as to her real ownership. At Malta, evidence was obtained that the Tripoline officers held high rank in the army of the bashaw; that "the Tripoline soldiers belonged to the Gun boats were all of them engaged in the capture of the *Philadelphia*"; that "the captain of the vessel [*Mastico*] was on board one of the Gun boats that captured the ship and that he was among the first that boarded her and was extremely active in taking the officers out and carrying them to the Bashaw of Tripoli, as well as plundering them of their cloathing." Whereupon Preble sent the *Mastico* with a prize crew aboard to Syracuse for further examination, and on January 31, 1804, after seeing a translation of the vessel's papers, he wrote: "The captain has acted in a hostile manner towards our flag. . . . If a Tripoline he is a prize, if a Turk a Pirate."

Apparently, Preble wasted no time in using the *Mastico*, for on February 2, 1804, the vessel, fitted out as the U.S. ketch *Intrepid* (4 guns), with seventy-five men aboard and Lieut. Stephen Decatur, Jr., in command, was sent on a secret mission to board and destroy by fire the salvaged and rehabilitated, captured U. S. frigate *Philadelphia*.

When the *Philadelphia* struck her colors on October 31, 1803, the position of the ship was perilous in the extreme. After being lightened by the throwing of heavy movable weights overboard, she was hard and fast aground and "had fallen over on her port beam" at the entrance of the enemy's principal harbor, from which coast defense gunboats as well as seagoing corsairs could be expected to issue forth, take up favorable positions, and batter the helpless ship with impunity. It was also to be expected that at any time heavy winds and seas might develop and pound the ship to pieces, leaving the crew to struggle in the sea a great distance from the nearest land. But in this affair the Tripolitans had all the luck, for two days after the disaster, a strong northerly wind drove the waters of the Mediterranean against the North African coast and lifted the *Philadelphia's* stern off the reef. The Tripolitans, quick to see a great and unprecedented opportunity for salvage, applied all their energies and resources to get the ship off the rocks while the amazingly high water held. By the use of anchors and cables astern, lighters, and an army of manpower, the American frigate was got clear of the rocks and onto a shoal with soft bottom. Here the holes in the ship's bottom were plugged, and after the pumps were put in working condition, the vessel was freed of water. On November 5, 1803, she was towed to the city and anchored about a quarter of a mile from the bashaw of Tripoli's castle. As the water receded to normal, the guns, anchors, cables, shot, etc., that had been thrown overboard were located and raised by the Turks and replaced in position on the ship.

The *Philadelphia*, patriotically built for the U.S. Navy by the merchants of Philadelphia and launched into the Delaware on November 28, 1799, was a most sturdy and well-constructed vessel, for she evidently withstood well the abuse and stresses resulting from the

stranding. The bashaw of Tripoli valued his prize highly and expected to obtain a big sum by selling her to some friendly Moslem state—and this in addition to the enormous ransom that he expected to get for his three hundred American captives. Captain Preble, writing from Syracuse on June 4, 1804, said: "I am told he [the bashaw of Tripoli] demands for Peace and ransom, three millions of Dollars, this is a pretty good asking price. I presume our Government will never accede to anything extravagant, as we shall by that means hazard a war with all Barbary powers, by stimulating their avarice."

Capt. William Bainbridge, late of the *Philadelphia* and a prisoner at Tripoli, wrote Captain Preble of the U.S.S. *Constitution* and the commodore of the American naval forces in the Mediterranean, on December 5, 1803, through the Danish consul in Cypher and by using lemon juice, which, on being held to the fire, became legible. Bainbridge reported the salvage of his frigate and her location at anchor in the harbor and suggested that she be destroyed by burning by a United States raiding party, which, he affirmed, could get alongside of her in a small vessel. He again urged this method of removing the *Philadelphia* from the hands of the enemy in letters written to Preble on January 18 and February 15, 1804. Captain Preble and Lieut. Stephen Decatur, Jr., of the U. S. schooner *Enterprise* discussed the feasibility of destroying the *Philadelphia* at her moorings in Tripoli Harbor, and when the Turkish-Tripolitan armed merchant ketch *Mastico* was captured, it was felt that they could endeavor to put the plan into effect without the necessity of "chartering a merchant vessel" as suggested in Bainbridge's letter, for the *Mastico* was the type of craft the people of Tripoli were accustomed to see in their harbor. The following is the report made to President Jefferson by the secretary of the navy (Robert Smith) bearing upon the destruction of the frigate *Philadelphia*:

On the 31st January 1804 Commodore Preble lying with his Squadron in the Harbour of Syracuse, gave orders to Lieut. Charles Stewart, commanding the Brig *Siren* of 16 Guns, and to Lieutenant Stephen Decatur jr. commanding the Ketch *Intrepid* of 4 Guns & 75 Men, to proceed to Tripoli and to destroy the Frigate *Philadelphia* of 44 Guns, then lying in the harbour of Tripoli. Lieut. Decatur had orders to enter the Harbour in the night, board and set fire to the *Philadelphia* and Lieut. Stewart was ordered to take the best possible position without the Harbour to cover the retreat.—

Under these orders they proceeded immediately to the Coast of Tripoli but owing to the very heavy gales of wind that usually prevail there in the winter Season, the *Enterprise* could not be undertaken until the 16th February when Lieut. Stewart having taken the best possible position to effect the object of his Instructions, Lieut. Decatur at 7 O'clock in the night, entered the Harbour of Tripoli, boarded and took possession of the *Philadelphia*. This

Frigate at the time she was boarded had all her Guns mounted and charged, and was lying within half Gun shot of the Bashaw's Castle and of his principal Battery— Two Tripolitan Cruisers were lying within two Cable's length on the starboard quarter and several Gun Boats within half Gun Shot on the Starboard bow—and all the Batteries on shore were opened upon the Assailants. About 20 Men of the *Philadelphia* were killed, a large Boat full got off, many leapt into the water, and one Man was made prisoner. After having gained possession of the Frigate, Lieut. Decatur set fire to the Store-rooms, gun-room, Cock-pit & birth deck, and with a firmness highly honorable to him, his Officers and Men, they remained on Board until the flames had issued from the Ports of the gun Deck and the Hatchways of the Spar Deck, and they continued in the ketch along side the Frigate until the fire had communicated to her Rigging and Tops. Lieut. Decatur did not lose a Man and had but one slightly wounded.—

The Americans who boarded the *Philadelphia* were armed only with cutlasses, and they fought and obtained possession of that vessel without firing a shot, for they desired to attract no more outside attention to their exploit than was necessary. The *Intrepid* (*Mastico*) had on board, under the command of Lieut. Stephen Decatur, Jr., three other lieutenants (Lawrence, Bainbridge, and Thorn), seven midshipmen, a surgeon, a pilot, and sixty-two men, of whom eight were marines. All of the men—both officers and crew—volunteered for the hazardous service. The *Intrepid* and *Siren* returned to Syracuse on February 18, 1804. Captain Preble, in his report of the affair to the secretary of the navy, reiterated the fact that the *Philadelphia* could not have been captured and sailed out of the harbor; that her destruction was "absolutely necessary to favor my intended operations against that city" (Tripoli). He further wrote: "My orders . . . have been executed in the most gallant and officer like man-

ner by Lieut. Commt. Decatur assisted by the brave officers & crew of the little Ketch *Intrepid* under his command. Their conduct in the performance of the dangerous service assigned them, cannot be sufficiently estimated. It is beyond all praise."

Lieut. Stephen Decatur was sent a captain's commission by the secretary of the navy, with the approval of the president, "as a testimonial of our high sense of the brilliancy of this Enterprize." Congress, on February 16, 1804, by resolution, authorized the president to present a sword to Captain Decatur and voted an extra two months' pay to each of the officers and crew of the U. S. ketch *Intrepid* as a testimony of the high sense of that legislative body "of the gallantry, good conduct and services" in "destroying a Tripolitan frigate of forty-four guns." The British admiral, Lord Nelson, one of the greatest naval heroes in all history, was at this time in command of the blockading fleet before Toulon, and when he heard of the plan and the brilliant execution of the audacious and successful Decatur raid (with the complete destruction of a powerful frigate under the guns of the castle and defending land batteries and gunboats), he generously characterized it as "the most bold and daring act of the age."

Capt. Stephen Decatur (Senior) was the first captain to command the U.S.S. *Philadelphia*. He was connected with the construction of the vessel and had charge of rigging, equipping, and fitting her out; in April 1800 he took her to sea and was in charge during her earlier voyages. It is a strange coincidence that his son Lieut. Stephen Decatur, Jr., should rise to fame by the deliberate, successful, and heroic destruction of the vessel that his father had to a great degree been responsible for and had served aboard as her first commander.

The ketch *Intrepid*—which as the Turkish-Tripolitan vessel *Mastico* first came in contact with the U. S. Navy by assisting in the attack upon the helpless, stranded U. S. frigate *Philadelphia* off Tripoli and in the capture and looting of her officers and men on October 31, 1803, and which, under the Stars and Stripes, on February 16, 1804, brought undying fame to herself and her commander, Lieut. Stephen Decatur, Jr., by the heroic and hazardous, complete destruction by fire of the *Philadelphia*, then a Tripolitan frigate—ended her career dramatically as a U. S. fire and suicide ship in Tripoli Harbor on September 4, 1804. In the relative short period of ten months and four days, the ketch—as the *Mastico* and *Intrepid*—made history and sailed under the Turkish, Tripolitan, and United States flags as a merchantman, a pirate, a warship, and an *infernal*, or fire ship. The *Intrepid*, stripped of every encumbrance, was made into a floating mine with a view of sending her into the harbor and exploding her in the midst of the Tripolitan shipping which lay near the town and castle. The forward hold was filled with one hundred barrels of powder in bulk, while on the deck immediately above were placed one hundred 9-inch shells and fifty 13½-inch shells besides a quantity of shot, kentledge, and pieces of iron; slow-burning fuses were led to the magazine, so as to permit the officers and men who were to man the vessel to make good their retreat in the two fast-rowing boats when the *Intrepid* had reached her objective and started a fire aft among inflammables that would in due course transmit the fire to the explosives forward. Of the many volunteers for embarking upon this most dangerous venture, Mast. Comdt. Richard Somers of the *Nautilus* was selected for the command, with Lieutenant Wadsworth of the *Constitution* as his lieutenant. In Captain Preble's official report of the incident, we read that the *Intrepid* got under sail at 8:00 p. m. on September 4 and headed for the port. She was convoyed by the *Argus*, *Vixen*, and *Nautilus* as far as the rocks. The report continues:

On entering the harbor several shots were fired at her from the batteries. In a few minutes after, when she had apparently nearly gained the intended place of destination, she suddenly exploded, without their having previously fired a room filled with splinters and other combustibles, which were intended to create a blaze, in order to deter the enemy from boarding while the fire was communicating to the fuses which led to the magazine. The effect of

the explosion awed their batteries into profound silence with astonishment; not a gun was afterwards fired for the night. The shrieks of the inhabitants informed us that the town was thrown into the greatest terror and consternation by the explosion of the magazine and the bursting and falling of shells in all directions. [The explosion is said to have occurred at 10:00 p.m.]

Following sunrise the next morning, the U. S. fleet reconnoitered and obtained fair views of the entire harbor. Not a vestige of the *Intrepid* was to be seen, but one of the enemy's largest gunboats was missing and three others were very much shattered and damaged. Preble continues:

From these circumstances I am led to believe that these boats were detached from the enemy's flotilla to intercept the ketch, and without suspecting her to be a fire ship, the missing boat had suddenly boarded her, when the gallant Somers and heroes of his party, observing the other three boats surround-

ing them, and no prospect of escape, determined, at once, to prefer death and the destruction of the enemy to captivity and torturing slavery, put a match to the train leading directly to the magazine, which at once blew the whole into the air, and terminated their existence.

Captain Preble's surmise of what happened is based upon the definite statements by the officers in regard to their course of action should they be unable to reach their objective without being discovered and boarded. Midshipman Robert T. Spence of the U.S.S. *Constitution* and Gunboat No. 9, writing from Gibraltar on November 12, 1804, said:

We conjectured the explosion to have been premature; it has since been confirm'd by information from Tripoli. He [Captain Somers on the *Intrepid*] was within the Rocks & only ½ mile distant from the Bashaw's castle, when he was boarded by two Gun Boats 50 men each,—He might have escap'd; but he started with a determination never to let so seasonable a supply [of munitions] fall into their

Hands; & never to return alive unless he had, satisfactorily, executed his mission. He touched fire himself to match & she went up, sending 100 [?] Turks and 15 [13] Christian souls to eternity. What a Noble Death, & truly characteristic of that Noble Somers. He certainly was an extraordinary man. . . . In losing him we were deprived of one of the Navy's most valuable officers.

Midshipman Israel, described as "a gallant youth" and one of the victims of the *Intrepid* explosion, was in fact a stowaway. At the last moment, he had been sent with a message to Captain Somers from Commodore Preble and, after delivering it, had unobtrusively concealed himself aboard and become an unauthorized member of the expedition. Many an "old salt" wagged his head over the seriousness of this breach of discipline and superstitiously declared that the venture had been doomed to failure when Israel got aboard the ketch and stayed there, for his presence changed the number of the vessel's total complement from an auspicious even dozen to the unlucky thirteen.

The United States-Tripoli War in 1803-1804—the Brilliant Naval Accomplishments of the Redoubtable Commodore Edward Preble

On May 21, 1803, the secretary of the navy appointed Capt. Edward Preble, commander of the U. S. frigate *Constitution*, as commodore of a squadron of vessels to sail to the Mediterranean "as soon as it can possibly be got in a state of readiness." The secretary wrote to Preble that in determining "to commit the command of this squadron to your direction," the President has expressed "the highest degree of confidence . . . in your skill, judgment and bravery." From the first, the Preble squadron was a small one, for when formed on paper it consisted of only the two frigates *Constitution* and *Philadelphia*, the schooner *Enterprise*, then in the Mediterranean, and four small vessels that were then building—the schooners *Nautilus* and *Vixen* at Baltimore and the brigs *Siren* and *Argus* at Philadelphia and Boston, respectively. Commodore Preble reached Gibraltar in the U.S.S. *Constitution* on September 12, 1803, but on October 31 the only other frigate of his squadron was lost to him when Captain Bainbridge ran her on a submerged rock near Tripoli and surrendered her to the enemy.

From the start, Commodore Preble got the most out of his small squadron and out of each individual vessel. He protected American commerce, intimidated the emperor of Morocco, blockaded Tripoli, and did watchful cruising along the Barbary Coast. His planning and execution of vigorous attacks on Tripoli were outstanding in early American naval history. Writing of the "notable" operations "under the redoubtable Commodore Edward Preble," Capt. Dudley W. Knox, U.S.N. (in charge of Office of Naval Records and Library, Navy Department), has said:

They were conducted far from home in times when supply and communications were exceedingly difficult, not only from the then normal handicaps imposed by sail, but also because of the political turmoil in Europe incident to the great Napoleonic Wars. Preble had to depend largely upon the good will of the Neapolitan and British governments for the use of bases at Syracuse, Malta and Gibraltar and for other essential aid in the matter of supplies and equipment. Furthermore his communications were flanked by the semi-hostile states of Morocco, Algiers and Tunis, which were constantly threatening predatory action and upon which Preble had to keep up steady diplomatic pressure backed by the

influence of naval force. In the face of these and other complicated obstacles, after repeated peace negotiations failed, Commodore Preble made several attacks [on Tripoli] in force. For the first time since the creation of our new navy under the Constitution, relatively large forces were employed together in battle. Aside from the success attained against Tripoli, the effect was far reaching in creating a high morale and a spirit of the offensive among a large proportion of the officers and men of the navy. These benefits survived the Barbary wars, were largely responsible for the subsequent naval efficiency and success in the War of 1812, and became traditional.

Commodore Preble, with a naval squadron consisting of only one frigate (his flagship, the U.S.S. *Constitution*), two brigs (the *Siren* and *Argus*), and three small schooners (*Enterprise*, *Vixen*, and *Nautilus*), supplemented by six gunboats, each carrying one 24-pounder, and two bomb vessels, each fitted with a 13-inch sea-mortar (these eight small craft having been borrowed from "His Sicilian Majesty"), and the entire squadron carrying 1,060 men, made certain attempts during the period between August 3 and September 4, 1804, seriously to damage Tripoli and give the town, fortifications, marine forces, and harbor a taste of real war. Preble was badly handicapped by having in his squadron no ship of the line, no vessel designed and built to destroy land fortifications, and only one frigate—and this he had to use against the shore batteries. When attacked by Commodore Preble, Tripoli was guarded on the seaboard by twelve different forts and protected batteries, including the castle, which mounted 115 cannon; whereas the records show that in the early days of the war, when Commodore Dale with three frigates was off Tripoli, "the enemy had only guns mounted to fire a salute and those on bad carriages." The U. S. Government was advised of this situation, but because of its pacifistic attitude declined to order or sanction an attempt to reduce the town's fortifications. It is no wonder that it was later asked, "If one frigate could make the impression which we see Commodore Preble has done with 115 guns opposed to him, what might not Commodore Dale's squadron have done with three frigates against blank walls." The first or second U. S. naval squadron sent to the Mediterranean, if it had been encouraged by a more aggressive administrative policy (and the second squadron had been more ably and energetically handled), could have forced the bashaw of Tripoli to maintain peace with the United States. Commodore Preble was quite correct when he informed the secretary of the navy on January 17, 1804: "I have less force than either [the first or second squadron] with ten times the force [marine and shore batteries] to contend with. The Tripolitans by May will have 19 gunboats and unless we have boats to fight them in their own way we shall not be likely to succeed."

When Preble attacked Tripoli on August 3, 1804, in addition to the land batteries, he had to contend with five corsairs (a brig of 10 guns, two schooners of 8 guns each, and two well-armed galleys); also nineteen gunboats built for harbor defense, each mounting one or more big guns. These Tripoline vessels of war carried 1,336 men. In the first engagement—which lasted $2\frac{3}{4}$ hours—one of the American gunboats did not get into the fight, and another had its lateen yard shot away and was unable to close with the enemy; the other four boats, seconded by the U. S. brigs and schooners, captured three and sank three Tripoline

gunboats. The *Constitution* silenced the batteries on which she could bring her guns to bear, and there was said to be "much damage done to the town & batteries & many men killed." Reporting the engagement, Preble said, "I most sensibly felt the want of another frigate."

Commodore Preble's first attack on Tripoli was far more effective than he had expected it would be under the conditions existing. Captain Bainbridge, former commander of the U. S. frigate *Philadelphia*, who was a prisoner at Tripoli, described it as follows:

A number of guns in the battery were dismounted, the city considerably injured and many of the inhabitants killed. A great portion of the people and all the foreign consuls [except Nicholas C. Nissen, the Danish consul] fled from the city. . . . At the commencement of the bombardment the Bashaw surveyed the squadron from his palace windows and affected to ridicule any attempt which might be made

to injure either the batteries or the city. He promised the spectators who were on the terraces that rare sport would presently be enjoyed by observing the triumph of his boats over those of the Americans. In a few minutes, however, he became convinced of his error, and precipitately retreated with an humble and aching heart to his bomb-proof chamber.

The Barbary corsairs were famous for their reputed prowess in boarding vessels and in hand-to-hand engagements. In this sort of warfare, the Mussulmen were deemed "most formidable," but in the opening engagement at Tripoli on August 3, 1804, they were so out-fought in their own type of warfare by American seamen that "henceforth the enemy could not be induced to engage the Americans in a hand-to-hand encounter." Of the Tripoline gunboats, three were captured and three sunk, several had their decks virtually cleared of men, and the boats not captured or sunk beat an ignominious retreat. The three Tripolitan gunboats captured had forty-seven killed and twenty-six wounded officers and men aboard, and twenty-six more were captured, excluding those who jumped overboard and were drowned or swam to safety. The total known casualties on the three gunboats were seventy-three out of a counted force of ninety-six men; the total American loss was one killed (Lieut. James Decatur—killed by treachery after the Turkish commander had surrendered) and thirteen wounded (Lieut. John Trippe seriously).

The bashaw of Tripoli had cause to admit sadly that "the Americans in battle are fiercer than lions." When badly wounded Tripolitans, who had been taken prisoners, were returned to him on board of a French privateer that had been captured while attempting to run the blockade, they confirmed the great fighting prowess, courage, and valor of the Americans, but added that in treatment of prisoners they were "much kinder than Mussulmans." Capt. William Bainbridge, a prisoner, was nearly killed by a heavy shot that struck the bashaw's castle—as was the Danish consul, Nissen. Learning that many of the captured officers and crew of the *Philadelphia* had relatives on board the ships of the attacking U. S. naval squadron (Captain Bainbridge had a brother and Purser Keith Spence a son—both midshipmen under Preble), the bashaw kept all these men near him in his castle and took pains to inform Commodore Preble of this fact, hoping that the effect would be to give him personal security and divert shot to other parts of the town. However, the American prisoners did not want any personal immunity to save the skin of the bey and got word to Preble through Danish Consul Nissen urging the fleet to bombard the castle, as that was "the best means of annoying the Bashaw and bringing him to terms."

On August 7, the second attack was made on Tripoli, but due to the lack of wind the *Constitution* could not get into action. One of the gunboats taken from the Tripolines was hit and blown up by a hot shot from the enemy, with a loss of twelve men killed and two wounded. The total American casualties were reported as eighteen—fourteen killed and four wounded. The engagement lasted three hours, and it was reported that "48 shells and about 500 24-pound shots were thrown into the town & batteries & the Gun-battery nearly destroyed." The damage to the enemy was said to be "quite severe."

During the evening of August 7, the U. S. frigate *John Adams* (Captain Chauncey) reached Tripoli and contacted Commodore Preble. Under ordinary conditions, this visitation would have been most fortuitous, but strange as it may seem, the *John Adams* had left "all

her gun carriages for her gun deck, except eight, on board the *Congress* and *Constellation* a day or two previous to her sailing" and was in no physical condition to fight and help Preble and the *Constitution*. Captain Chauncey also brought letters to Captain Preble informing him that four frigates (*President*, *Congress*, *Essex*, and *Constellation*) were being sent to the Mediterranean under Commodore Barron, who was to supersede him in the command of the U. S. Navy forces in that theater of war.

The *John Adams* was supposed to have sailed from the United States in the early spring, having on board, in addition to her own crew, a full new crew for the *Enterprise* and twenty men for the *Constitution*; these men were needed by Commodore (Captain) Preble to relieve those who had been in the Mediterranean far beyond their enlisted period of time. On April 5, 1804, at Messina, the seamen on the *Enterprise* petitioned Commodore Preble as follows:

We the Crew of this Schooner actuated by a consciousness of having discharged our duty to the utmost as far as we engaged in support of the rights and independence of America, against the Enemies of that happy Nation, beg leave to solicit the favor of your attention to our rights as freemen. We, Sir, have served America six months over our time. Some of us have been two years and three Months and some more from our dearest ties; while our Wives & families left in an unprotected state, perhaps labouring under the most distressed circumstances for want of that support which they have a just claim on us, but our long absence has rendered impracticable. Can we then call ourselves Men if we do not cast our thoughts on our families, most of

whom exist in that Country that we have risked our lives to defend and protect—? Or may we expect to be impressed in a service, whose liberty and independence our fathers fought and bled to establish and defend—against tyranny & oppression?

The time has again expired that we expected would arrive and with it our discharge, but which at present we are without knowing—resting however on your goodness—we trust you will appeal to our worthy Captain for his testimony of our conduct as a means of establishing ourselves in your opinion in so much so, as to procure the favour of your compliance with the request of Your Ob^t H^{ble} Servants.

On May 26, 1804, Capt. Stephen Decatur, commander of the *Enterprise*, reported from "off Tripoli": "I am very sorry to inform you [Commodore Preble] we are very sickly, since my being on the station I have lost one man, and have had one third of the Crew sick with fever." On June 1, Commodore Preble wrote: "Directed the Ketch *Intrepid* to be fitted up as a Hospital Ship, to receive the sick from The *Enterprise* the crew of that Vessel being unhealthy, in consequence of the time of service of that vessels Crew having long since expired I ordered twelve [later stated at fourteen] of the crew to be discharged, who insisted on being released, the remainder were prevailed on to remain a few weeks longer." The secretary of the navy was so far out of touch with conditions and the temper of the seamen on U. S. naval vessels in the Mediterranean that he wrote Commodore Preble on May 31, 1804: "The *John Adams* carries out a Crew entered for two years. This Crew you must put on Board of The *Enterprise*, if you cannot re-enter the present Crew of the *Enterprise* which however it is hoped you will be able to do. You may offer to the Able Seamen 12—to the ordinary Seamen 8, and to the Boys 6 Dollars."

Commodore Preble was greatly handicapped in his operations against Tripoli by lack of proper vessels and the needed number of men. When he acquired six gunboats and two bomb vessels as a loan, these helped him materially in small craft mounting one piece of heavy ordnance each and capable of going inshore, but each bomb vessel required a crew of 40 men and each gunboat 35 men. Preble met this demand for men by engaging 16 Neapolitans or Sicilians for each of the eight boats and had to take 160 officers and men from the complement of his already undermanned squadron in order to operate the small craft; this necessitated his robbing two of his schooners and the loss of their services. On April 19, 1804, Commodore Preble wrote the secretary of the navy, saying: "If I had two more frigates, and a few Gun and Mortar Boats, I should be able most certainly to subdue him [the bashaw] directly." Preble urged the immediate building of "10 or 12 Gun and Mortar Boats" to be sent out with the frigates, and in the meanwhile he searched for what might be available in Europe. Preble sensed that prompt action against Tripoli was necessary, for he wrote: "The Bashaw is daily gaining strength—he has now [April 1804] 14 Gun-Boats—and a Gang of Carpenters from

Spain are building him several more. He is also building several new Batteries to the East and West of the Town on which he employs all the Crew of the *Philadelphia*."

The arrival of the *John Adams* at Tripoli brought Captain Preble no naval gun reinforcements, but did help the manpower shortage to a limited extent. Preble wrote: "I gave Captain Chauncey orders to remain on the station, that we might be benefited by the assistance of his boats and men, as nearly half the crew of the *Constitution*, brigs, and schooners, were taken out to man the bombs, gun boats [including the captured Tripolitan boats] and ship's boats, when prepared for an attack." Expecting Commodore Barron to arrive any moment, Preble "determined to wait a few days . . . before another attack," as he was greatly in need of frigate strength. On August 9, he wrote:

We are engaged . . . getting every thing in readiness for an attack, the moment Commodore Barron should arrive and make the signal. I cannot but regret that our naval establishment is so limited as to deprive me of the means and glory of completely

subduing the haughty tyrant of Tripoli, while in the chief command; it will, however, afford me satisfaction to give my successor all the assistance in my power.

Captain Preble was a patriotic American and very much of a man, but for the U.S. Government to withhold support from a brilliant, courageous, and resourceful naval officer and then actually change the command in the middle of a battle—for no cause whatsoever except seniority—was both stupid and without a parallel in either land or marine military operations. A British admiral, in referring to the incident, fittingly said: "America is very, very young, and her asininity in changing the command before Tripoli when the campaign was going exceedingly well was mere childishness and immaturity."

On August 9, the French consul hoisted a white flag on his flagstaff under the national colors, "which was a signal that the Bashaw was ready to treat." A boat sent ashore by Captain Preble brought back a letter advising that the bashaw "was ready to receive five hundred dollars for the ransom of each of the prisoners and terminate the war, without any consideration for peace or tribute." Preble wrote, "This is three hundred and fifty thousand dollars less than was demanded previous to the action of the third instant," which is sure proof that the Tripolines were being hurt. The offer of the bashaw for peace was promptly rejected.

At the close of 1803, an Algerian-Tunisian peace bid made the United States in the interest of Tripoli called for a payment of \$450,000, of which \$307,000 was for the ransom of prisoners, \$100,000 to buy the "peace," and \$43,000 for presents suitable to the occasion. On June 13, 1804, before Commodore Preble attacked Tripoli, he sent ashore Richard O'Brien (former U.S. consul general to Algiers and former senior consul of the U. S. to the Barbary States) under a flag of truce and, acting under orders from Washington, offered the bashaw \$40,000 for the ransom of the captain, officers, and crew of the U.S.S. *Philadelphia* and \$10,000 for the prime minister and other public officials—a total of \$50,000 as ransom money—"but not a penny to buy a peace." Preble also offered \$10,000 as a consular present when a new consul was appointed, but this payment was to cover a period of ten years, no matter how often the consul was changed. The terms were promptly and scornfully rejected by the bashaw.

On August 24, the town of Tripoli was bombarded from 2:00 a. m. until daylight. During this attack, a 36-pound ball penetrated the room where Captain Bainbridge was confined, and the former commander of the U.S.S. *Philadelphia* narrowly escaped death. In the early morning (three o'clock) of August 28, the gunboats—covered by the brigs and schooners—attacked the town, shipping, castle, and batteries, but the bomb vessels could not be used because of defects in their construction that had developed. Soon after 5:00 a. m., the *Constitution* ran in close and bombarded the fortifications for an hour, silencing the castle and two of the batteries. Upwards of 700 round shot besides grape and canister were thrown into the town and fortifications, and much damage resulted. A large Tunisian galiot was sunk, a Spanish ship injured, and the Tripoline galleys and gunboats "lost many men and were much cut." A boat from the *John Adams* was hit and sunk, with the loss of three killed and one

wounded. The bomb vessels having been repaired, another attack was made during the afternoon of September 3. The gunboats, brigs, and schooners all participated, and the *Constitution* ran in close and fired eleven broadsides into the main batteries, silencing them and causing much damage. Several of the enemy's galleys and boats were disabled, and Fort English was badly mauled. On September 4, the *Intrepid*, converted into a fire ship, or inferno, was taken into the harbor. She was discovered before she reached her destination and blown up prematurely, although she sank one and badly shattered three other enemy vessels, and the explosion caused some general damage.

On September 5, when plans were being made and the vessels conditioned for another bombardment, the weather turned bad, and as the season was far advanced and the ammunition was "reduced to a quantity not more than sufficient for three vessels to keep up the blockade," it was "deemed imprudent" by Captain Preble "to hazard the gunboats any longer on the station." The *John Adams*, *Siren*, *Nautilus*, *Enterprise*, and *Scourge* (a converted prize) took the gunboats and bomb vessels in tow and proceeded to Syracuse, leaving the *Constitution*, *Argus*, and *Vixen* to keep up the blockade. On September 10, the U. S. frigates *President* (Commodore Barron) and *Constellation* (Captain Campbell) arrived off Tripoli, and the command of the squadron was surrendered by Captain Preble to Commodore Barron. On the 12th, the *Constitution* (Captain Preble) captured two large wheat-laden ships attempting to run the blockade and get food to Tripoli, which was in a state of starvation. Following this aggressive goodbye gesture by Captain Preble, the prizes were sent to Malta by Commodore Barron under convoy of the *Constitution*, and Captain Preble notified Commodore Barron that it was his wish to return to the United States in the frigate *John Adams* (Captain Chauncey), which had been ordered home. The total United States casualties during the several attacks on the city and harbor of Tripoli by the squadron under command of Commodore Preble were fifty-four, there being thirty-two killed or reported as mortally wounded and twenty-two wounded. In addition to these casualties, thirteen men lost their lives in the explosion and destruction of the fire ship *Intrepid*.

It is significant that on August 7, 1804, four days after Commodore Preble commenced his attack on Tripoli with a pathetically weak naval squadron as far as frigates and gun power were concerned, the secretary of the navy wrote him from Washington:

Before this reaches you, you will have perceived that we have not been inattentive to your affairs in the Mediterranean. We knew that the force under your command was not adequate to carry on vigorous and effectual measures against Tripoli and watch the coast of Morocco and Tunis [he should have

added Algiers]. With a view to accomplish these important objects, and to excite among the Barbary regencies a just idea of our National character and Resources, we fitted out the armament of which you have been already advised.

The armament fitted out, referred to, consisted of the four frigates *President* (nominally classed as 44 guns, but carrying more), *Congress* (36 guns), *Constellation* (36 guns), and *Essex* (32 guns). None were new ships, all had been available for years, but, as usual, orders to send them to the Mediterranean were badly timed, and the ships arrived at the end of the fighting season off Tripoli instead of at the beginning of it. If Commodore Preble had had these four frigates in addition to the *Constitution* in April 1804, he would have reduced Tripoli and intimidated all the Barbary States in short order. The fleet given to Commodore Barron for his use in the Mediterranean in September 1804 consisted of five frigates, two brigs, and three schooners—mounting nominally 260 guns—in addition to the brig *Scourge* (*ex-Transfer*, a prize) mounting 16 6-pounders and the frigate *John Adams*, which was assigned to be employed as an armed transport ship. The ships sent to reinforce the Mediterranean squadron arrived too late for the 1804 operations against Tripoli and too late to be of help to the redoubtable Commodore Edward Preble. The Navy Department and the Jefferson administration were evidently quite willing to have Preble proceed against Tripoli with only one frigate and without supplying him with any gunboats and bomb vessels or helping him to obtain them (those Preble borrowed from the Neapolitans and Sicilians were

structurally weak and much inferior to the vessels of corresponding type that he captured from the Tripolitans), although they admitted that they well knew that the force under his command "was not adequate to carry on vigorous and effectual measures against Tripoli."

Commodore Preble soon discovered that United States interests in any of the Barbary States would be handled properly only by a patriotic, courageous, and competent American citizen. He criticized the gullibility of those who thought that any foreign consul or merchant would unselfishly, capably, and economically take care of any matters affecting the well-being of the United States, and he declared that the policy and fundamental principles underlying the operations of each Barbary corsair state required that it be always at war with some Christian nation or state that had a merchant marine. Not one of the consuls at Tripoli wanted to see the war between Tripoli and the United States terminated, for peace with one country meant that war would be declared on another—and this with the most flimsy of excuses. Therefore, the continuation of the Tripoline-American war meant that Tripoli would not commit hostile acts against their shipping; hence it was not to the interest of the country represented for a foreign consul or government agent (or even of a foreign merchant) to work to restore peace between the United States and Tripoli or any other Barbary State that was or might become hostile toward America.

The president of the United States was disturbed throughout the entire period of Captain Preble's presence in the Mediterranean, as he was fearful of "acts of aggression" notwithstanding the act of Congress that authorized war to be waged against Tripoli without gloves. The secretary of the navy wrote Commodore Preble on February 4, 1804, cautioning him against capturing the vessels of neutral nations in case they should attempt to run the blockade. The letter sent to all neutral powers was not deemed by Jefferson adequate notification of the existence of the blockade of the port of Tripoli; for no blockade was considered to be in effect unless it was complete, maintained, and effective, and if a neutral vessel (or one from an extremely friendly and unscrupulous Barbary State) attempted to run the blockade and was stopped by a United States warship, the blockade runner was not to be seized if her commander denied having "a previous knowledge of the existence of the blockade." Such a vessel was to be turned back and warned, no matter what the attitude of the command or the facts of the case might be, and only if the vessel, under the same command, should again attempt to enter the same port would Preble be justified in sending her "into port for adjudication."

When Commodore Preble entered the Mediterranean in command of his squadron, he had trouble with the Navy Department's seniority rule, and Capt. John Rodgers, at that time (September 1803) in command of the frigate *John Adams*, protested at Captain Preble's flying a commodore's pennant on the *U.S.S. Constitution*, his flagship, although Preble was in command of a squadron of United States ships of war and it was necessary that the officers commanding the vessels composing that squadron should know to whom to apply for orders and whence to receive signals. The question of "etiquette," custom, respect for seniority, etc., came close to weakening Commodore Preble in his sound and vigorous handling of Morocco in the autumn of 1803; the navy seniority rule—with the procrastination of the Navy Department, cabinet, and executive—in 1804 was in opposition to United States interests, honor, and glory in the Mediterranean and prevented Captain Preble from completing the job of reducing Tripoli.

In keeping the vessels of the navy at sea for the protection of the honor and commerce of the United States, the Navy Department was constantly harassed by lack of funds and inadequate appropriations. The war declared by Tripoli and the belligerency of the other Barbary States caused Congress to pass an act (approved March 26, 1804) "for the purpose of defraying the expenses of equipping, officering, manning and employing such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be deemed requisite by the President of the United States for protecting the commerce and seamen thereof, and for carrying on warlike operations against the regency of Tripoli, or any other of the Barbary powers which may commit hos-

tilities against the United States." For the purpose of defraying expenses, "the Mediterranean Fund" was created, which was built up by an increased duty of 21½ per cent on imports entering the country in United States-owned vessels; also, "an addition of ten per centum shall be made to the said additional duty in respect to all goods, wares and merchandise imported in ships or vessels not of the United States." The law further stipulated that these increased import duties "shall cease and be discontinued at the expiration of three months after the ratification by the President of the United States of a treaty of peace with the regency of Tripoli, unless the United States should be then at war with any other of the Barbary powers, in which case the said additional duty shall cease and be discontinued at the expiration of three months after the ratification . . . of a treaty of peace with such power." The Congressional act of March 26, 1804, also authorized the building or purchase of two more vessels of war "to carry not more than sixteen guns each" and the hiring in the Mediterranean of "as many gunboats" as might be needed to prosecute the war.

*Commodore Preble Too Aggressive and Military-minded for President
Thomas Jefferson—the Mediterranean Squadron When Reinforced
Is Placed under the Command of Commodore Barron*

Commodore Preble caused President Jefferson "great uneasiness" all the time that he was in command of the American naval forces in the Mediterranean, and this is possibly a reason why the squadron was kept so small and deplorably weak in ships and gun power during his brief period of command and why, when more frigates were dispatched to the Mediterranean theater, another commodore was sent to supersede Preble in charge of the greatly augmented squadron. Although he gave Thomas Jefferson "a great deal of concern" during the entire time that he was in command of a small and decidedly inadequate naval squadron in the Mediterranean, President Jefferson, for political reasons, could not arbitrarily recall Preble because it was clearly evident that the people of the United States were behind the courageous and active Maine captain and the country—generally sick of a "wishy-washy, scared-to-death policy of handling pirates"—was vociferously demanding action. Upon arrival in the Mediterranean, Preble had quickly given a few shocks to both the Barbary pirates and the British Navy and then set forth earnestly, without fanfare, to do his job in downright navy fashion. He did not wait to catch the pirates in their depredations, but hunted them in their lairs. He sailed to Tangier and struck terror in the heart of the emperor of Morocco, who was glad to surrender all of his American prisoners to get rid of the "strange, gruff fighting Yankee." Preble took the *Constitution* (his lone frigate) into the harbor of Tripoli and, without any preliminaries, opened fire on the well-protected forts mounting 115 big guns, manned and supported by twenty-five thousand men. Under Preble, the American Navy proved that it could be useful and effective if given a chance. Jefferson fumed and fretted, but he could do little to stop the work of a man operating in the defense of the merchant marine, with the country and Congress behind him, and Preble's courage and aggressiveness—with but a puny naval force under his command—brought the arrogant bashaw of Tripoli to his knees.

In March 1804, while Preble was waiting to get some gunboats that he was borrowing from the king of Naples (or the Neapolitan-Sicilian government) to be used in an attack on Tripoli (these vessels could be navigated in safety on the open Mediterranean only during the summer months), he called at Malta, where he found the British hurriedly condi-

tioning for sea and outfitting for war "three Tunisian frigates from 24 to 32 guns." The object of Tunisian naval activities was, Preble reported, "hinted to be the American commerce," and he wrote the secretary of the navy on March 11, 1804, advising him:

My whole Squadron consisting only of two Brigs and three Schooners, is quite inadequate to carry on the Blockade of Tripoli, & watch the coast of Morocco & Tunis; not only so, but it will be dangerous for our small Vessels to separate for the protection of our Trade, as the Tunisians may be too strong for any force that I can detach at

present. It will be politic, and for our Interest to send out a sufficient force at Once to quell these Barbarians. If I had two Frigates more here, and the Brig *Argus* [tied up on patrol work off Gibraltar], I would engage to have Peace with Tripoly on our own terms before July and to keep the Tunissians in full check.

Lieut. Andrew Sterett, whose heroic action with the little schooner *Enterprise* had won the commendation of Congress, the eulogy of the American public, and the plaudits of his fellow officers, was evidently considered "too much of a fire brand" by the Jefferson administration. Instead of being given a captain's commission and put in charge of a real fighting ship in the Mediterranean, he was officially praised while being actually humiliated and side-tracked by the Navy Department, so that he had no further opportunities to show his great worth in the service of his country. That the pacifically minded administration seriously handicapped and weakened the natural fighting power of the commands of several United States vessels of war is indicated by the episode of the U. S. brig *Siren* of 16 guns (Lieut. Charles Stewart). On March 6, 1804, this vessel encountered a Tunisian corsair cruising at sea, which refused to show her papers, permit an American boat to board her, or send a boat to the U. S. vessel of war. Lieutenant Stewart, knowing that Tunis was not technically at war with the United States (although it was acting in a decidedly hostile manner and preparing to join Tripoli as an open belligerent), was fearful of official censure from the administration if he should be deemed guilty of taking the initiative in committing an act of war; so even though the Tunisian corsair arrogantly refused to exhibit any passports in accordance with customary procedure, Stewart did not force the matter, which was in his right, but "ate humble pie" and let the corsair proceed unmolested. When Commodore Preble heard of the incident, he was naturally chagrined, and when he reported it to the secretary of the navy, he did not hesitate to express his personal views:

The force was so nearly equal, that Captain Stewart did not think proper to attempt to enforce the right of being satisfied, as she hailed from Tunis. Had I met with her I certainly should not have suffered her to pass without asserting the right our Treaty gives us of examining passports, as Tripoline vessels often visit Tunis and wear

similar Colours to the Tunisian vessels. You may rely with confidence that I shall do all in my power to protect our Commerce and punish those who infringe on our rights. I hope I shall not be accused of a want of Prudence in the measures I adopt.

It is humiliating to read that after the little 12-gun U.S. schooner *Enterprise* had decisively beaten a large Tripoline corsair in a pitched battle, the much larger and more powerfully armed U.S. brig *Siren*, carrying a third more guns (and of at least fifty per cent more destructive fighting power) than the *Enterprise*, should have hesitated to enforce the rights of the United States, by arms if necessary, merely because "the force was so nearly equal." This was not the spirit of Lieutenant Sterett, Captain Preble, Captain Truxton, or other U.S. naval heroes; but it seemingly does provide an excuse and was an attempt to please the administration. Captain Preble, in reporting the incident, served notice on Washington that he disapproved of such molycoddle methods and intended to act to make all the powers in the Mediterranean respect the American flag and the United States Navy.

On March 13, 1804, Commodore Preble personally came in contact with the arrogant Tunisians, and his experience in the British harbor of Malta (with three well-armed and manned Tunisian frigates in port), he reported to the secretary of the navy as follows:

A Boat from the Tunissian Admiral came along side with three Officers, and in a haughty imperious tone, demanded that I should turn all our Prisoners up for his inspection to enable him to

judge if there were any Tunissians among them. I replied to him that I had released the only one of his nation that had fallen into my hands among the Tripolines; this was not satisfactory, and as

I did not think the request or the manner in which it was made very decent or proper on their part, I refused to gratify them or degrade ourselves by a compliance, they then moved off but observed that it would not be long before they should have plenty of us. . . . The Tunissians have more Naval force than I can watch with sufficient attention to prevent them from injuring our Commerce, and at the same time carry on the Siege of Tripoly. I

beg you to pardon my solicitation that additional force may be sent out with all possible expedition. I feel extremely desirous of serving my Country— Give me the means and I will do it, by rendering the purchase of Peace or payment of Tribute totally unnecessary in this Eastern World. In the mean time every thing shall be done that our little Squadron is competent to, and I hope more than can be reasonably expected from it.

With only one frigate and five small brigs and schooners, Commodore Preble waged war valiantly against the Tripolitans, and his aggressiveness held the Tunisians in check after they had prepared their fleet (with British help) to war on the Americans. In the winter of 1803-1804, Preble urged that the United States support the cause of the deposed and rightful ruler of Tripoli and thus split the forces of Tripoli and promote civil war. He wanted to "take Derne and Bengaza, to deprive the Tripoline corsairs of a rendezvous there and the [reigning] Bashaw [who was a usurper] of the revenues of that Beylic." A year before (General) William Eaton's march from Alexandria to Derne, Commodore Preble wrote the secretary of the navy:

If I had a vessel to spare, I would send to Alexandria to bring down the Bashaw of Tripoly's Brother and put him in possession of Derne and Bengaza immediately, from thence he could march to Tripoly and with our assistance take it; as all the Arabs of the country are in his favour. I am

in hopes the arrival of some additional force to our little squadron will enable me to do this before the season is so far advanced as to dry up the springs and prevent the march of troops from Egypt to Bengaza & Tripoly.

Preble also sensed the importance of the United States's contacting and cultivating the Turkish sultan at Constantinople if permanent peace was desired with the Turkish-conquered and dominated Barbary States; for Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers were part of the Ottoman Empire and under the jurisdiction of the Grand Seignior. In early March 1804, Preble wrote: "Would it not be for the interest of our country to have a Minister Plenipotentiary or an Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte? Such a character might influence the Grand Signior to guarantee our treaties with the Barbary powers, and they would then never dare to infringe them." Britain was wise to this situation and capitalized it to the full. While the United States ignored the sultan of Turkey and halfheartedly gave a measure of encouragement to the rightful ruler of Tripoli, British diplomats at Constantinople influenced the sultan to declare the usurper to the throne the rightful ruler of Tripoli and command all Moslems to obey and support him. British agent-adventurers in Tripoli encouraged the usurping bashaw (Yusuf Caramanli) to make war on the United States, and British diplomats at Constantinople made him secure on his throne and caused religious edicts to be broadcast in North Africa and the Mediterranean that operated to kill the chances of the rightful ruler, Hamet Caramanli, ever to regain the throne of Tripoli.

Commodore Preble, throughout his entire period of service in the Mediterranean, was conscious of the ridiculous inadequacy of the naval force put under his command as compared with the fleet that the United States possessed and, if inclined to do so, could have commissioned and utilized for its protection, prestige, and honor in the Mediterranean. He denounced "false economy" and urged the adoption of a practical system of protection to United States merchant shipping, with the elimination of the great time losses incurred when vessels waited in ports for months for a ship of war to convoy them. He urged the building of gunboats and bomb vessels to attack the harbor installations, forts, and protective shipping of the enemy and, while waiting for such craft, borrowed some from the king of Naples to save a year's time. With only one warship (the U. S. frigate *Constitution*) capable of bombarding a shore battery or fighting any heavily armed ship, Preble had to wage war on Tripoli and blockade its coast, watch and be prepared for aggressive moves by any of the other Barbary States, seek to intimidate Tunis, and at the same time protect American commerce in the Mediterranean. In early 1804, he wrote:

Our commerce in the Mediterranean is immensely valuable, and daily increasing; and should the war continue between the European Powers, we may engross nearly the whole business by keeping up a respectable force, to protect our vessels. I hope we never shall consent to pay Tripoly for Peace or Tribute; and should Tunis make war that we never shall have Peace with them but on the

same terms. If we are now too economical with our naval force, it will only lead to greater expenses in future. I only want the means to bring them to a proper sense of their situation, and it shall be done; but if a sufficient force is not sent out immediately the consequences may be serious, as it regards our commerce.

Contrary to the attitude of the British in the Tripolitan war against the United States, Napoleon earnestly and openly deprecated the hostile policy of Tripoli and sought to influence the bashaw to liberate American captives and restore peace between the regency and the United States. We read in official documents of the first consul's "generous and friendly interference" with the rulers of Tripoli in the interest of the Americans and of humanity. In order to obtain the small boats needed to attack Tripoli, Comander Preble had to write to Robert R. Livingston, U.S. minister to France, asking him to intercede with the French (Napoleon) to influence the Neapolitan and Sicilian government (the king of Naples) "to loan or hire us what Guns & Mortar Boats we stand in need of, we paying for such as might be lost and making good the damages and to furnish us with ammunition." In this same letter, Preble stated his determination to bring the Barbary States to terms by force of arms (if given a reasonable measure of support by the administration) and forcefully added, "I had rather spend my life in these seas than ever purchase peace, or pay tribute to the Barbary States."

Preble, with his usual forthright honesty and patriotic ardor, "stepped on the toes" of the secretary of state when he called attention to the need at the Mediterranean ports of real consuls who were Americans and capable of looking out for their country's interests. Preble found that the "consul of the United States for Sicily" was not even a resident of the island, but lived at Leghorn. U.S. vice consuls at the Sicilian ports were described as "wretched" and, we are told, could not "speak a word of English" and had "no respectability attached to them." These men "purchased their offices" at "from 270 to 500 dollars each," and Preble said: "They are of no service, and disgrace the uniform of our navy by wearing it. Indeed they . . . are the laughing stocks of their own country men as well as foreigners." Preble naturally wanted to see at Mediterranean ports U.S. consuls who were men of character and had influence to help U.S. shipmasters and merchants and also to establish themselves in such a manner that the navy "should at all times have every facility in procuring whatever we may want for our operations against the Barbary powers."

Captain Preble's introduction to the Mediterranean well illustrates the nature of the New Englander and won for him the respect and loyalty of the officers and men in his squadron. Maclay well describes the incident as follows:

One dark night, while the flagship was in the Straits of Gibraltar, a large ship suddenly loomed up off the beam and was soon made out to be a heavy man of war. After exchanging several hails, in which neither commander would reveal the name of his ship, but insisted on knowing the name of the other, Captain Preble hailed rather sharply:

"I now hail you for the last time. If you do not answer I'll fire a shot into you."

To which the stranger replied, "If you do, I'll return a broadside."

"I should like to catch you at that! I now hail for an answer. What ship is that?"

"This is his Britannic Majesty's 84-gun ship of

the line *Donegal*, Sir Richard Strachan. Send a boat on board."

To this Captain Preble replied, "This is the United States 44-gun ship *Constitution*, Captain Edward Preble, and I'll be d—d if I send a boat on board any ship! Blow your matches, boys!"

As Captain Preble doubted the truth of the stranger's hail, he told him that he would lie alongside him until the morning revealed his identity; upon which the stranger sent a boat aboard the *Constitution* to explain that it was the English 32-gun frigate *Maidstone* and that the American had got alongside of her so unexpectedly that they gave a fictitious name in order to gain time for getting to quarters.

As a boy of fourteen, Commodore Edward Preble had lived through the British naval bombardment of the unprotected Maine town of Falmouth in October 1775. This was a bap-

tism of fire that he did not forget, and as soon as he was old enough, he fought in the War of the Revolution as a midshipman and a lieutenant in the Massachusetts State Navy. Preble was a strict disciplinarian, was quick and expressive in his views, had excellent judgment, and was prompt and accurate in diagnosis and reaching decisions. At first, he was not popular with his subordinates; as a Maine man, he was considered somewhat of an outlander, or "Down Easter," and far too strict and exacting. But Preble was the soul of honor and as just as he was severe. Quickly, on his own ship (*U.S.S. Constitution*) and then throughout his squadron, there developed a great respect and deep regard for this courageous and most competent—if exacting—commander. By the time he commenced attacking Tripoli, Preble had won and enjoyed the warm and loyal affection of his men, who generally felt proud and honored to serve under him.

Tobias Lear, who had relieved Richard O'Brien as U.S. consul general at Algiers, appreciated Preble's masterly work as a naval commander, executive, and patriotic, practical, and farsighted representative of the United States in the Mediterranean—as did O'Brien, U.S. Consul William Eaton at Tunis, and former U.S. Consul James L. Cathcart of Tripoli (with office at Leghorn). On March 23, 1804, when Preble's plans to attack Tripoli were developing and quarrelsome Tunis was being kept from joining with Tripoli in a war against the Americans, Consul Lear wrote Commander Preble:

To tell you . . . what I think of your conduct since you have been in this sea, would appear too much like flattery. I hope and trust you will find our country ready to pay the tribute due to your talents, your patriotism and your activity. Ardent as I know you would be to gather laurels in your profession, yet, I am equally certain that the love of your country would never permit you to sacrifice her peace and interest, when they can be preserved with honor & propriety.

As soon as Thomas Jefferson took over the office of president, the United States Navy was virtually scuttled, or junked. Of thirty ships on the Navy List in March 1801, seventeen were ordered sold, and of the thirteen vessels to be retained by the government, only six were to be kept in actual service. Tripoli had declared war on the United States in February (before Jefferson became the nation's chief executive in early March), and if the ships that it was decided to retain had been commissioned and the majority of them sent to the Mediterranean in the spring or early summer of 1801, supported by a few small schooners and brigs such as the *U.S.S. Enterprise* (whose order for sale was later canceled) and led by the proper sort of commander operating under orders appropriate for a nation at war and determined to root out piracy, the United States could have cleared up the "depraved and humiliating Barbary corsair mess" before autumn—and this with honor and to the lasting glory of the United States, of all Christian nations, and of civilization and humanity. The thirteen U.S. war vessels that were retained by the government in March 1801 for possible service, all described as frigates, made a rather impressive fleet and consisted of the real frigates *United States, Constitution, President, Chesapeake, Philadelphia, New York, Constellation, Congress, Essex, and Boston*; also the powerfully armed and fast *John Adams, Adams, and General Greene*, which have been described as both frigates and corvettes. It is unfortunate that this naval force was not put to use in the national interest. Jefferson's notions in regard to aggression, humanity, democracy, and economy not only proved very impracticable, expensive, and humiliating but also caused the hostility of the Barbary corsairs to continue until the summer of 1805. Peace, with honor and without the purchase of it or the payment of either tribute or ransom money, could have been forced upon each of the states and real peace treaties written under the muzzles of American cannon in the summer of 1801; incidentally, this sort of peace was the only kind that the unscrupulous and belligerent Barbary corsairs could either understand or honor.

Commodore Preble was handicapped in his operations against Tripoli in 1804 by having under his command an inadequate naval force, which included only one frigate (*U.S.S. Constitution*) out of the large number available and five small secondary craft. The six gunboats and two bomb vessels borrowed (or leased) from the Neapolitan-Sicilian government

were neither well designed nor built—although evidently the best obtainable by the Americans in the Mediterranean area. Preble said that they were “constructed for the defense of harbors, . . . are flat-bottomed and heavy, and do not sail or row tolerably well; they were never intended to go to sea, and I find cannot be navigated with safety unless assisted by tow-ropes from larger and better sailing vessels, nor even then in very bad weather.” The gunboats of the Tripolines were much superior vessels, and the three captured by the American naval forces in the engagement of August 3, 1804, were found to be better built and armed and much better adapted for operations at Tripoli than the boats accompanying the U.S. squadron that had been secured from Sicily. On September 5, Preble’s attacks on Tripoli had to be terminated for the season because of bad and “unusually threatening” weather, and the guns, mortars, and shells had to be taken out of the gunboats and bomb vessels, as “it was feared that they would be swamped.” The shortage of ammunition was also an important influencing factor. Preble’s bombardment of Tripoli was extremely effective when his vessels had American-made shells to use, but transatlantic transport was not well planned by the Navy Department, and the American squadron became dependent for munitions and supplies on what it could acquire at friendly Mediterranean ports. Shells purchased at Messina proved to be of inferior quality. Captain Bainbridge (a prisoner in the castle and in a good position to observe) said that of forty-eight shells thrown on August 7, only one exploded. Captain Preble afterwards discovered that “many of the bombs had had lead poured into the fuses” and that this “was supposed to have been done by French agents in Sicily, as the bombs were originally purchased to resist an expected French invasion.”

It was a grave strategic error of the U.S. Government to change the command of the American naval fleet in Mediterranean waters in the midst of operations against Tripoli, which were proceeding well under the efficient, resourceful, and courageous command of Commodore Preble. The Navy Department should have supplied him with ships and all needed floating equipment, men, and munitions, and if the executive administration had supported him in reasonable fashion and given him the tools to work with, as and when they were needed, Preble would have cleaned up the entire Barbary corsair situation as well as forced Tripoli to its knees in the one summer campaign of 1804. The absurdity of the deified seniority system of the U.S. Navy was evidenced in the supplanting of Captain Preble by Capt. Samuel Barron in what was virtually the middle of a battle. The newly appointed commodore did not actually arrive on the scene of war until it was too late in the season to bring his much-needed squadron of frigates into action at Tripoli; but dispatches announcing his superseding of Preble in command as well as the coming of strong naval reinforcements reached the attacking squadron several weeks earlier and operated “to tie the hands” of an aggressive and brilliant naval commander at a time when the suitable season for action against the city, harbor, and fortifications of Tripoli was rapidly passing. By the time that the next season for operations against Tripoli came around (the spring and early summer of 1805), Commodore Barron was too ill to command the fleet, and Capt. John Rodgers of the 36-gun frigate *Congress* took charge. At this time, Captain Preble was back in the United States, but even if he had remained in the Mediterranean, evidently the command of the squadron would still have been transferred from Barron to Rodgers, as both men were senior to Preble in the U.S. Navy List.

Alden and Westcott, in *THE UNITED STATES NAVY*, comment on the fact that Commodore Preble, while attacking Tripoli in August 1804, was informed that he was being relieved of his command by Commodore Samuel Barron solely because of seniority, and they write:

The question of seniority and the place on the navy list at this time, as often before and since, caused many a heartache, impairing naval efficiency. The change in command occasioned much public criticism. It was indeed unfortunate, for Preble stood head and shoulders above the other commodores in the Mediterranean, those who had pre-

ceded and those who followed him. Barron accomplished next to nothing in the winter of 1804-05. He was suffering at the time from ill health so that it was necessary for him to turn over the command in May 1805 to Commodore John Rodgers. . . . When Yusuf Caramelli reduced the price of ransom for Bainbridge and the other

prisoners from \$200,000 to \$60,000 and struck out the demand for tribute and further presents, a treaty was quickly agreed to [Tobias Lear and Captain Rodgers represented the U.S.A.]. Disappointment was expressed by younger naval officers [and generally by the American people] that this money should have been paid, but the treaty was much

more favorable than any secured hitherto by the European powers. The Tripolitan war, whatever may be said of its mistakes and irregularities, . . . struck a blow at sanctioned Mediterranean piracy, an evil that leading nations of Europe had tolerated. In consequence, it increased American prestige in Europe.

*Blackmailing by the Barbary States Continues as Algiers and Tunis
Increase Their Naval Forces and Prepare for War—Comparison
of the Corsair Fleets with the United States Mediterranean
Naval Squadron during the Critical Years 1801-1805*

One of the most outrageous practices adopted in the payment of tribute to the Barbary pirates was the sending of a good part of the agreed-upon tribute and of "presents" (often given under pressure and in response to threats) in the form of war equipment, supplies, and munitions. The United States furnished Algiers with several vessels of war and all of the Turkish Barbary States with materials necessary for the building, fitting-out, and operation of their fleets. These vessels, built in America or with materials supplied by the United States, including much of the shot and powder put in their magazines, were used by the Barbary Moslem corsairs in their depredations upon Christian nations, with the enslaving of thousands of captives, and American-built and equipped vessels in Barbary pirate hands were a constant threat in the Mediterranean to American commerce. In addition to the complete armed vessels of war supplied the Barbary powers (one of which, the *Crescent*, was a powerful frigate), the United States furnished them with masts, yards, oak timbers, oak and pine planking, pitch, tar and resin, cordage, guns, shot, shells and powder, and all the materials needed to build, equip, and operate ships of war. The Barbary States of themselves could neither build nor arm a corsair fleet, as they had no suitable natural resources in North Africa and were absolutely dependent upon Christian nations for the very implements of war that they used against them. Spain, Britain, and France, working in competition and with thoughts only of selfish nationalistic ends, built up the pirate fleets and militaristic power of the Barbary States, but in the closing decade of the eighteenth and the first years of the nineteenth centuries, none of these countries and no other maritime power supplied the Barbary pirates with ships and the necessary materials for the building and equipping of ships and with armaments and munitions of war as did the young republic of the New World.

Ignoring international morals, incompetent United States agents and representatives—with no practical knowledge and evidently unacquainted with economics—promised the rulers of the Barbary corsair states the most expensive materials (some of them physically impossible to produce) in an attempt to substitute goods for cash payments. Aside from the evil practice of supplying an unprincipled belligerent and, in fact, an enemy with implements of war, the value placed on American imports into the Barbary States was not set on the basis of cost to the producer plus the expense of delivery or on any fair market price but arbitrarily fixed by the grasping, unscrupulous recipients. It is no wonder that all the Barbary States demanded tribute and presents from the United States in goods (materials for building, repairing, and equipping ships, naval stores, armaments, and munitions) rather than in cash. Tunis and Tripoli demanded newly built armed corsairs, such as America had furnished Al-

giers, and were prepared to wage war with the little known country of the New World in order to get them. Algiers, the strongest of the Barbary States, received the greatest amount of peace payments, tribute, and presents from the United States. The following letter, typical of Moslem corsair psychology, was sent by the dey of Algiers to President Thomas Jefferson dated October 14, 1803:

This letter of Mustapha Pascha dey of Algiers

To The Great of the Govt. of The Divan of America.—

If you are my friends and wish to remain so and wish to preserve your Treaty with me you will send to me 10 Guns Brass 24 pounders with Carriages &c. and also 5 Brass Guns 18 pounders with Carriages &c.—Guns long for Batteries. I request you will not forget our friendship I have spoken to your Consul on the subject and he is not inclinable to write although I consider him as Equal to one of yr. divan—and therefore request for

our friendship and our treaty That you will not write me evasive to my demand—as any favour demanded on your part I shall comply therewith. whether your demand is great or small—

this letter by order of Mustapha Pascha dey of Algiers & with his great Seal. The 26th of The Moon of Grimad Alahar 1218—Corresponding with The 14th of October 1803—

Certified to be The substance or translation of the deys letter wrote in Moorish—O'Brien

NB The dey further requires 60 Thsd. Bricks for furnaces

U.S. Consul O'Brien, in transmitting the dey's letter to Washington, advised the secretary of state that he understood the Dean (Dane), Swede, Dutch, and Spanish consuls had "acquired to The deys demands on the business of The Guns their amount is to be deducted out of the Annuities of Powder & Cables prices no doubt $\frac{1}{4}$ th or $\frac{1}{3}$ d less then The Value of The Guns." Furthermore, O'Brien forwarded to the department the draft of a suggested reply to the dey's letter, which stated that the United States did not have and did not make brass guns; that it was the desire of the government "to preserve the friendship of your highness, agreeable to the treaty we made with your Regency," but that persistent "extra demands" could not be countenanced. O'Brien deals with the unscrupulous treatment on the part of the Algerines in regard to the payment (?) for three corsairs built in the United States at their request and to their order (a 22-gun brig and two schooners mounting 18 and 14 guns, respectively, which were in addition to a new 34-gun frigate sent to them as a present), and the letter states that after persistent expressions "of our patience and friendship you wounded our feelings by obliging our Public Ship [U.S.S. *George Washington*] to go on your affairs to Constantinople." Continuing, we read (in O'Brien's draft):

We Cannot help reminding your Highness of yr. guarantee of our treaty with Tripoli—That your Highness of great influence with The states of Barbary should admit The Pascha of tripoli to infringe Said treaty, and do away yr. gaurentee, and in defiance thereof declare war against The U States, and your highness make no Effort to have your gaurentee respected. The same time any Passport issued by yr. Highness on any occasion is respected by The Said Pascha. of tripoli—add to this yr. demand for Passports. for Sending the crews of tripoline corsairs to tripoli. yr. admitting the corsairs of tripoli to Bring american Vessels and crews into your ports. and granting The corsairs of tripoli Supplies—and also insisting on sending cargoes to tripoli. The said port being in a state of Blockade—add to this your demand for 5—or 6 of yr. supposed subjects captured in a tripoline corsair—We cannot avoid calling These Circumstances of The infringement of the treaty

to The recollection and consideration of yr. highness—not doubting but you will Perceive that you have thus Voilated the treaty on your part. whereas on ours for all the articles sent on The Annuities you have given or allowed for said articles the prices you thought proper—and on which we have been The suffered— add to This that we have stipulated to pay to The amount of 12 Thsd. Sequins in money or Stores and if you do not take The stores at The prices they cost, you will accept of The cash—this is The light of equity in which we view or consider The treaty Stipulation— But beyond its limits, we give consular presents. Ben-nial presents Extra & Extraordinary presents—therefore we wish to keep to The treaty on terms of equity & Justice. but we have too great a regard to our Honor & dignity Then to condescend and acquise to all The Unjust and Extra demands of your Highness.

However, the substance of Capt. Richard O'Brien's letter was evidently not sent to the avaricious and unscrupulous dey of Algiers, for the official Washington files show that on June 9, 1804, the secretary of state wrote the secretary of the navy as follows:

I have the [dis]honor to inform you that the President has determined to send to the Dey of Algiers ten brass twenty four pounders, and five brass eighteen pounders, with Carriages and the necessary apparatus complete. They are to be long guns fit for batteries. He also wishes the Cargo of the Ship *Sally*, lost off St. Lucar, be repeated and another Cargo to be shipped to the Dey to consist of plank and timber of good quality, of

small spars for topmasts, top gallant masts, steering sail-booms, and stuff for handles of rammers, sponges and ladles for cannon of different calibers, from 48 to 6 pounders. . . . The Cannon can be cast at Foxalls furnace out of some brass belonging to the public. It is desirable that the above should be collected and forwarded as soon as is practicable.

The secretary of state addressed Tobias Lear, the new U.S. consul general at Algiers (with supervisory authority over all American representatives in the other Barbary States), at about the same time, referring to "the negotiation of a peace" with Tripoli, approving a ransom of \$500 per prisoner, and urging the avoidance of "provocations to war, much less a commencement of it," with the other Barbary powers. "Prudence" is emphasized and such motives and acts "as may have the best effect upon the preservation of peace," which, in fact, did not exist. The executive and diplomatic branches of the administration were constantly handicapping, hamstringing, and humiliating the military, as competent naval commanders sought to protect the interests of the United States and uphold its dignity and honor in relation to the unprincipled and diabolical Moslem Barbary pirate states.

When Commodore Preble arrived in the Mediterranean, Algiers had quite a formidable fleet of corsairs, four of which, mounting 88 guns, had been built in the United States. At the close of 1803, the Algerine list of war vessels, each mounting 14 or more guns, in addition to a 48-gun frigate building (carrying 18-pounders for her main battery), was as follows:

Type	Built	Number of Guns	Type	Built	Number of Guns	Type	Built	Number of Guns
Frigate	Algiers	44	Xebec	Algiers	30	Xebec	Algiers	20
Frigate	Portugal (captured)	44	Xebec	Algiers	26	Schooner	U. S. A.	18
Frigate	U. S. A.	34	Polacre	Greece	26	Polacre	Greece	18
Xebec	Algiers	34	Brig	U. S. A.	22	Schooner	U. S. A.	14

These vessels, it was said, "carry ten men to a gun," and one Turkish soldier for each mounted gun on a corsair was put on board as a leader of the men in boarding. In addition to the above-stated fleet, there were 50 gun and mortar boats mounting 24- and 18-pounders, armed galleys, some with lateen sails, and sweeps (galiots), two vessels of merchant type mounting 4 guns each, many small harbor craft, and the merchant marine was said to consist of "150 sail of lateen sail coasters from 25 to 30 tons." The Algerian deep-sea corsair fleet was stated as "13 sail" mounting 378 cannon and carrying 3,800 men, and with the harbor and shore defense gunboats and bomb vessels, the total marine force was set at 65 vessels mounting 460 guns and carrying over 5,800 men.

In May 1804, the Tunisians had rapidly nearing completion a 42-gun frigate mounting 28 18-pounders on her gun deck and 14 9-pounders on her quarter-deck and had newly placed in commission a frigate carrying 36 guns that was built at Port Farina in 1802-1803. Other vessels of the Tunisian naval force were two new xebecs (built in Spain), each mounting 34 guns, and one French-built xebec of 32 guns (recently coppered at Malta). In addition, the deep-sea corsair fleet included nine xebecs and polacres mounting from 24 to 30 guns each, ten carrying from 12 to 16 guns each, and ten mounting from 6 to 10 guns each. These thirty-four seagoing corsairs mounted 640 guns and carried about 6,400 men. This marine force was fortified in defense by forty galleys carrying one or two big guns and from 30 to 50 men each. The total Tunisian navy was stated as "seventy-four sail in all" mounting 700 cannon and carrying 8,000 men.

The marine force of Tripoli was not as large or as threatening as that of Algiers or Tunis. Soon after the bey declared war on the United States, the Tripolitan deep-sea fleet

consisted of five vessels of from 14 to 28 guns, totaling 98 guns and 670 men, and the total force was stated at "7 sail with 106 guns and 840 men." In January 1802, the Tripolitan naval fleet was reported as a 28-gun ship and a 16-gun brig bottled up by the Americans at Gibraltar, a 20-gun ship being fitted out at Smyrna, and the following vessels at Tripoli:

Type	Number of Guns	Type	Number of Guns	Type	Number of Guns
Ship	18	Ship	16	Galley	4
Ship	16	Polacre	14	Galley	4

There were also three gunboats, each fitted with one 24-pounder, for harbor defense. The total was stated as "9 vessels mounting 138 guns excluding gunboats built and building," but only six of the vessels (carrying 72 guns) were available for the defense of Tripoli. During the autumn of 1802, it was reported that the bey of Tripoli purchased from the British at Algiers a fine 16-gun cruiser, and at about the same time it was said that Napoleon made a present of a beautiful new 18-gun cruiser to "his good friend the Bashaw of Tripoli." In addition to bottling up at Gibraltar the Tripolitan flagship (American-built) and a Swedish-built corsair brig (which made 44 of the enemy's marine guns impotent), the United States naval forces destroyed, incapacitated, or weakened several other Tripoline vessels of war. On August 1, 1801, the U.S. schooner *Enterprise* captured the *Tripoli* (a 14-gun corsair), and on June 22, 1803, the *Enterprise* and *John Adams* destroyed a 22-gun polacre, said to have been the largest and most powerful Tripoline war vessel in commission at that time. At the end of 1803, the Tripoline war fleet available for service was stated as follows:

Type	Number of Guns	Type	Number of Guns	Type	Number of Guns
Brig (new)	14	Galiot	8	Galley	6
Schooner (new)	12	Galiot	6	Galley	4
Xebec	12	Galiot	4	Galley	4
Xebec (polacre)	10	Galley	6	Galley	4

The galleys had "lateen sails and carried from 50 to 60 men," and this fleet totaled "12 sail, mounting 90 guns and carrying 1,000 men." With a squadron of American warships in the Mediterranean, the bashaw of Tripoli came to the conclusion that his "big cruisers" could not outfight United States naval vessels at sea, and with his principal city and harbor blockaded, he developed the policy of building small light-draft gunboats (each carrying one or more big cannon) for defense and of using small corsairs that could hug the shore and dodge the larger blockading vessels when entering or leaving port.

It is significant that when Commodore Preble attacked Tripoli in August 1804, he reported the enemy naval force on hand to protect the city as only five seagoing corsairs, but these had been reinforced by nineteen gunboats (sixteen of which were new and both well designed and built—evidently under the direction and with the assistance of free Spanish artisans and foreign slaves). Preble gave the gun power of the three largest seagoing corsairs in the harbor of Tripoli as "a brig of 10 guns and two schooners, each with 8 guns." These vessels originally mounted 14, 12, and 10 guns each, and the reduction from 36 to 26 guns for the trio is significant. With two galleys mounting 4 to 6 guns, the total seagoing corsair fleet at Tripoli, according to Captain Preble, mounted only 36 guns and carried 500 men. However, the fleet of gunboats was large, modern, and more formidable and added 19 big guns, supported by "smaller cannon," and some 820 men to the defending marine force. Preble said that these Tripolitan gunboats were each manned with from 36 to 50 men, and contemporary authorities tell us that Tripoli was handicapped from the day it declared war on the United States by a lack of competent sailors. It would seem that Tripoli could have obtained seagoing corsairs from its Christian and Moslem friends more easily than it could get

sailors to man them properly. In the spring of 1801, it was said that the Tripolitans had seven sail (corsairs) carrying 840 men, and it was added, "They have more vessels but have not people to man them." The maximum number of Tripolitan sailors and marine fighters was probably around one thousand, and the war with the United States reduced this force greatly in quality notwithstanding Moslem reinforcements. When the American naval squadron attacked Tripoli, about thirteen hundred of the large defending force manned the five corsair vessels and nineteen gunboats in the harbor; but after an encounter with the Christian forces on the first day of the battle, the Moslems refused to come to grips or engage in any further hand-to-hand fighting with the Americans.

A comparison of the naval forces of each of the three Turkish Barbary States of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli with the small United States naval squadron with which Commodore Preble attacked Tripoli in 1804 and kept all the other three Moslem corsair states at bay is of interest:

Turkish Barbary Corsair State	Seagoing Vessels			Total Marine Force		
	Number	Guns	Men	Number of Vessels	Guns	Men
Algiers, 1803-1804	13	378	3,800	65	460	5,800
Tunis, 1804-1805	34	640	6,400	74	700	8,000
Tripoli—A	7	106	840	9	108	900
B	9	138	1,100	12	142	1,200
C	12	90	1,000	18	98	1,250
Defense fleet, 1804.....	5	36	500	24	65	1,300

The aggregate marine fighting force of these three Barbary corsair states (during the period as set forth) available for depredations on deep-sea commerce was about 55 sail mounting 1,100 guns and carrying 11,000 men, and the total force available for both attack and defense was about 166 vessels mounting 1,270 guns and carrying 15,400 men. Against this numerically formidable marine force under the three Barbary States that were part of the Ottoman Empire (and that were receiving subtle encouragement and support steadily from Britain and intermittently from France), Commodore Preble's entire United States naval squadron (excluding an improvised prize, the *Scourge*, which was not used) consisted of one lone frigate (*Constitution*), two brigs (*Siren* and *Argus*), and three schooners (*Enterprise*, *Vixen*, and *Nautilus*) totaling 114 guns. This force was fortified through Preble's initiative by the borrowing of six gunboats and two bomb vessels (each mounting one gun) from the Neapolitans and Sicilians, making the total naval power available under Preble's direction in the entire Mediterranean theater of war only 122 guns. The commodore reported the total number of men under his command as 1,060. The three Ottoman Barbary corsair states of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers had 10-1/2 times as many guns mounted on 12 times as many vessels and had 14-1/2 times as many men to man these vessels and guns as had Commodore Preble after he had augmented his squadron by eight borrowed Italian-owned gunboats and bombards.

As against a force of one frigate and five small deep-sea vessels of war that comprised Commodore Preble's United States naval squadron in the Mediterranean, Commodore Barron, who succeeded him in command in September 1804, had a fleet of five frigates and the same five small secondary craft (augmented by a 10-gun sloop, the *Hornet*, bought at Malta). The Barron squadron mounted 270 guns, but its fighting power as compared with that of Preble's squadron was far greater than the numerical difference in guns (which was 2.4 to 1). Barron's five frigates mounted 192 guns as against 44 guns for Preble's lone frigate (4.4 times as many), and the guns on vessels of this type were of larger caliber and more powerful and destructive than those mounted on the smaller brigs and schooners. Commodore Barron brought to the Mediterranean (in addition to the corvette, or transport, *John Adams*) four frigates mounting 148 guns to reinforce the Preble squadron, and in the summer of 1805, the Mediterranean fleet (then under the command of Commodore Rodgers) was further aug-

mented as an attacking force by the American-built bombards *Vengeance* and *Spitfire* and nine powerful seaworthy gunboats. (All these eleven small vessels had sailed across the Atlantic, without escort, under their own canvas.)

The first United States squadron sent to the Mediterranean, which reached Gibraltar July 1, 1801, and was under the command of Commodore Richard Dale, consisted of three frigates (*President*, *Philadelphia*, and *Essex*) mounting 120 guns collectively and a "sloop of war" of 12 guns (the schooner *Enterprise*), a total of 132 guns (and 164 guns if we include the frigate *Boston*, which was first sent to Havre, France, with the U. S. minister, Robert R. Livingston, and then went to the Mediterranean and blockaded the Tripolitan coast for many months). This naval squadron was much more impressive as an attacking force and of much greater gun and bombarding power than the squadron of United States ships of war (totaling 114 guns—of which only 44 were frigate guns) that was under the command of Commodore Preble when he attacked Tripoli in August 1804.

If Commodore Preble had been given in 1803 or 1804 the vessels placed under the command of Barron and Rodgers a year later, he would have reduced Tripoli in a few days' time, forced a treaty on the bey under the muzzles of his guns, and within a month thereafter taken all the threats, belligerency, and nonsense out of the rulers of all the Barbary States. If left alone and given naval and executive support, Preble would have freed the American prisoners at Tripoli without the payment of a cent of ransom money, direct or indirect; he would have put a stop for all time to the paying of tribute by the United States to any Barbary power and would have made secure and thoroughly protected from all corsair raids American commerce in the Mediterranean and connecting waters. Preble would also have forced the European maritime nations to have a proper respect for the Stars and Stripes, and if his aggressive policy—founded on justice, courage, and common sense—had been followed consistently and fearlessly by the United States and been backed up by a real navy, it is quite possible that American independence would have been fully achieved, with honor, without the necessity of fighting the War of 1812.

*Peace with Tripoli in the Spring of 1805 Follows Commodore Preble's
Attacks of 1804—the Greatly Augmented U.S. Naval Squadron
Forces a Belligerent Tunis in August 1805 to Sign a
Dictated Peace under the Muzzles of Its Guns*

When Commodore Samuel Barron arrived in the Mediterranean in the autumn of 1804, he was in command of the largest and strongest naval force that had ever been assembled as a fleet or squadron under the flag of the United States, and Commodore Rodgers inherited this powerful fleet when he succeeded Barron in command on May 22, 1805. In addition to five splendid frigates carrying 192 guns, five brigs and schooners carrying 68 guns, and the sloop *Hornet* of 10 guns (purchased and altered at Malta)—a total of eleven sail mounting 270 guns—the U. S. Mediterranean naval force in 1805 was augmented by American-built gunboats and bombards which not only had been built especially for service in the Mediterranean but also were of such a seaworthy design and construction that they were sent across the stormy Atlantic under their own sail, separately and without escort. This auxiliary U. S. A.-built fleet of small craft designed for bombarding the fortifications of the Barbary States consisted of two bomb vessels, or bombards (the *Vengeance*, Lieutenant Lewis, and the *Spitfire*, Lieutenant McNiell), and ten gunboats. Eight of the gunboats, although sailing

separately, arrived at Gibraltar within forty-eight hours of one another. Gunboat No. 6 (commanded by Lieut. James Lawrence—afterwards the hero of the *Hornet-Peacock* fight) encountered the British frigate *Lapwing* near the Azores, and Captain Upton of the Royal Navy thought the American craft was a raft with a number of shipwrecked men aboard; when off Cadiz, this same U. S. gunboat was boarded by a boat from the British fleet under Admiral Collingwood, and three of her men were impressed into the British Navy (against their wills and the vigorous protest of Lieutenant Lawrence). Only one of the gunboats (No. 7, Lieutenant Ogelvie) did not succeed in crossing the Atlantic; this vessel sailed from New York May 14, 1805, but, springing her mast, returned for repairs. Sailing again on June 20, she "went missing."

When James L. Cathcart was U. S. consul at Tripoli and William Eaton held a similar position at Tunis, they had called official attention to the fact that Yusuf Caramanli, the reigning bashaw of Tripoli, had usurped the throne of his brother Hamet and held his children as hostages. It was felt that the rightful ruler, who had the support of a large part of the populace, would be a strong ally of the Americans in the war against the bey and regency of Tripoli. This information, given to Commodore Morris, was handled badly by that incompetent egoist, but Commodore Preble did all he could to remedy the situation and capitalize the existence of the rightful bashaw of Tripoli in the interest of the United States. William Eaton, sailing with Commodore Barron's fleet as a special agent of the Navy Department and the U. S. Government, persuaded the rightful bashaw (Hamet) of Tripoli to raise an army to attack Tripoli from the land in co-operation with the American naval squadron. Eaton, who had commanded troops in the army of the Revolution during the war with Britain, volunteered his services as leader of the land forces and late in November 1804 went to Alexandria in the U.S. armed brig *Argus*, where Hamet Caramanli claimed to have assembled an "army of thirty thousand men." Eaton found this supposed "army" to be a mere rabble of "unarmed and destitute adventurers who swarmed to a standard that gave promise of pillage and plunder." He selected a force of 1,200 men from Hamet's numerically impressive army and whipped a motley conglomeration of Arabs and freebooters from a mob into a body showing at least some degree of military discipline. In the early spring of 1805, Eaton, assisted by a lieutenant (O'Bannon) of the marines and two midshipmen (Mann and Danielson), marched his "army" across the desert of Barca to the outskirts of Derne, the capital of the richest province in Tripoli. With remarkable ability, resourcefulness, courage, and force of will, Eaton and his three supporting American officers virtually "drove" their army ahead through the Libyan desert. The planning, execution, and timing made the performance an outstanding achievement in the face of tremendous difficulties and an environment of chaos and destitution. Connections between the land and naval forces were established as per schedule, and a body of marines, with a field piece, arms, ammunition, and supplies, was landed from the *Argus*, *Nautilus*, and *Hornet*. A joint naval and land attack was made on Derne on April 27, 1805, and after a spirited cannonading, the place was taken by storm. For the first time in history, the Stars and Stripes floated over a fortress of the Old World. The casualties of the attacking force were light, there being only fourteen reported as killed or wounded, and among the latter was (General) William Eaton.

Hamet Caramanli showed a disposition, throughout the campaign and his contact and negotiations with U. S. officials, to have America finance him in the civil war and do all the work with blood and treasure in winning the crown for him. After Derne, Hamet urged that he be given arms, munitions, and money so that he could continue his land campaign and attack Tripoli. These requests were denied by Commodore Samuel Barron on the ground that "the deposed bashaw was now in possession of half the regency and if he had the influence over the people which he professed to have, he could easily conquer the remaining half without further augmentation of his forces." Eaton was confident that if given a moderate measure of support by the ailing Commodore Barron (after the American soldier and ex-consul had led in the capture of Derne), he could have greatly augmented his land force, brought real fight-

ing Tripolitans to the banner of Hamet, the former bashaw, and, with the co-operation of the United States fleet, successfully challenged the reigning and usurping bashaw and put the deposed Hamet—friendly to the United States—on the throne of Tripoli. However, the administration at Washington demanded peace and, it was said, had sent Tobias Lear with Commodore Barron into the Mediterranean theater of war "expressly for the purpose of negotiating peace." Both Barron and Lear opposed the plans of Eaton, and at this crucial time Commodore Preble was greatly needed in the Mediterranean to complete his aggressive campaign with a reasonably adequate naval force and co-operate ashore with Gen. William Eaton, who had proved himself as competent, resourceful, and courageous in a military sense as he was able and patriotic when serving his country in a diplomatic and economic post as a foreign consul. The drive on Tripoli collapsed when the offensive became a negotiating "peace project" under Barron and Lear instead of an aggressive campaign at arms in the spirit of Preble and Eaton. Lear was jealous of Eaton, and Barron of Preble; Barron was an ill man who should not have been at sea, not to mention his being given the command of a naval squadron. Eaton's splendid march through the Libyan desert and the capture of Derne actually operated to hasten the negotiations for peace on the part of both the Tripolitans and the authorized representatives of the United States acting under instructions from President Jefferson and the secretary of state.

The appearance of the powerful United States fleet in the Mediterranean, the loss of Derne, and a general knowledge of the greatly increasing and devastating power of the Americans, with much uneasiness on the part of the ruling potentate in regard to a civil war (even though he received the moral support of the beys of the other Barbary States and the sultan of the Moslem empire), caused Bashaw Yusuf Caramanli again to seek terms for peace with the United States. On June 3, 1805, with his ideas of blackmail payments sadly deflated, the bashaw made a treaty in order to avoid a coming further bombardment of Tripoli by Commodore Rodgers (who was supplied with adequate ships and reliable shells for the task). By this treaty of peace, the bey and regency of Tripoli relinquished all claims to tribute in the future, and the crew of the U. S. frigate *Philadelphia*, which had been in captivity about nineteen months, was ransomed by a payment of \$60,000 (about \$200 per head). All prisoners held by both sides were exchanged, but captured Tripolines were deemed of no value; whereas all Christian prisoners were considered by the Barbary States as slaves and valuable property, and to acquire them for ransom was the prime *raison d'être* of their corsairs.

The exiled Bashaw Hamet did not develop the popularity and strength that were promised, and as the United States declined to finance further his attempt to regain the throne, which would have caused a severe civil war in Tripoli, the terms of peace, it has been authoritatively said, "were undoubtedly the best that could be expected under the circumstances." This is evidently true if "the circumstances" referred to include the feelings, expressed desires, and orders of the pacifistic-minded Jefferson administration in Washington. However, if a Truxton or a Preble had been given a fleet such as that which appeared under the command of Barron in the Mediterranean in the fall of 1804 (and was available for service against Tripoli or any other hostile Barbary State in the spring and summer of 1805 under the direction of Rodgers) and had received complete and capable support, with the prompt delivery of supplies, equipment, etc., and direct official instructions to clean up the situation, the peace would have been promptly "won"—not negotiated—and the terms dictated by a courageous, aggressive American commodore (1) with unconditional surrender and the "throwing down of arms" by any of the belligerent Barbary States and (2) without the payment of a single penny of ransom for any liberated American (or other Christian) captive. The naval weakness of the United States in the early 1790's and the pacific and wrong-headed humanitarian motives of the Jefferson administration in the early 1800's (coupled with bad executive planning and timing throughout the entire period) permitted the Barbary pirate evil to continue to live and thrive for a further period of some twenty years. It was not until the United States had

fought the War of 1812 with Britain—and thereby completed the War of the Revolution and reaffirmed its independence on land and sea—that the menace of the Barbary corsairs was completely overcome.

In reality, peace could not be "bought" from the Barbary States, and only a powerful naval squadron in the Mediterranean could prevent the constant blackmailing of any Christian maritime nation—with the paying of tribute and the giving of "presents" on demand—and the occasional corsair raiding of commerce, with the enslaving of captured officers and crews. The amount of tribute demanded by the several Barbary corsair states of Christian nations varied in inverse ratio to the size and strength of such nations' navies. Britain, as Mistress of the Seas, did not have to pay any tribute to any Barbary State, but she made it a practice to purchase friendship by the paying of small sums and capitalized this purchased good will of the Moslem pirates by encouraging them to use their corsairs in depredations against the commerce of competing maritime nations. The British used the Barbary States for their selfish commercial ends, and when Britain influenced the sultan of the Moslem empire to ally himself with it and wage war upon Napoleon, British authority throughout the Barbary Moslem states greatly increased, and the subtle belligerency of the British toward American commercial marine interests was quickly felt in all the corsair states. Only the presence of an American squadron under Commodore Dale prevented a real war with Morocco. The prestige of the United States in the Mediterranean weakened when the incompetent and indecisive Commodore Morris was in command, but Commodore Preble, with a weak squadron, proved that a fighting heart was of even more importance than mere tools in the waging of war. This aggressive, resourceful commander, with only one frigate and small craft, did all the naval fighting that caused Tripoli to sue for peace before the bombardment threatened by his successor, with a greatly augmented force, commenced in early June 1805. Britishers had encouraged the bashaw of Tripoli to declare war on the United States, a renegade Britisher was admiral of the Tripolitan navy, and two-faced British agents, working deceitfully and with impunity all the time for Britannia and for their selfish gain, created discord and made a good deal of money for themselves while doing it. Maclay, in *HISTORY OF THE NAVY*, says:

While the Americans were engaged in the bombardment of Tripoli, the bey of Tunis took the opportunity to manifest his hostility toward the United States. This ruler, like the other potentates of Barbary, undoubtedly was encouraged in these unfriendly acts by agents of the British Government, for the American commercial marine had by this time grown to such proportions as to prove a dangerous rival to Great Britain. These agents had given the bey such assurances of the insignificance of the United States that he had come to regard the Americans as being only too anxious

to maintain peace with the "terrible" regencies of Barbary, and he supposed a little expression of his wrath at a time when this "unimportant nation" of the New World was struggling with his neighbor would conduce to his good. Accordingly he told Mr. Davis the [temporary] American consul at Tunis [William Eaton having been removed] that unless the Tunisian corsair that had been captured while attempting to run the blockade by the [American] squadron before Tripoli was returned, he would declare war.

With Commodore Preble out of the Mediterranean and with his successor showing no signs of Preble's genius, Britain concluded that the unadulterated Jefferson policy of pacifism was once more in effect and planned to capitalize the condition—while it lasted—to Britain's own advantage. The success of the American Navy in the Mediterranean under the brilliant and aggressive Commodore Preble did not "sit well" with the British. For years, England had been surreptitiously encouraging the corsair states, not only in their depredations but also to make war on the United States. British diplomacy was responsible for a declaration of war on the United States made by Tripoli and also for the declared belligerency of another Barbary despot—the bey of Tunis. However, the unscrupulous bashaw of Tunis chose the wrong time to stage his act of bravado. With Tripoli humbled, this warring Barbary corsair state, with its unprincipled bey and regency, was handled promptly and with vigor by the Mediterranean squadron of the United States Navy, Capt. Samuel Barron having been succeeded by

Capt. John Rodgers as commodore. On August 1, 1805, the American fleet consisting of thirteen vessels of war—more impressive in number, appearance, and spirit than in actual gun power—appeared off Tunis, and, with guns primed and ready for action, Commodore Rodgers gave the astonished Moslem corsair ruler thirty-six hours to accept stipulated peace terms. The bey, incensed at the British for their very evident bad advice and the persistent handing to him of false information regarding America, quickly accepted the terms arbitrarily offered. There were no negotiations, and the bey, with a formidable and hostile fleet overshadowing him, would not take any chances in waiting thirty-six hours.

The procedure used by Rodgers in typical Preble fashion (under the muzzles of numerous big cannon) was the only way to "negotiate" a peace with the unprincipled corsair rulers. The result, it was said, "astonished the representatives of the different European powers residing there"; for "no other nation has ever negotiated with the present bey on such honorable terms." However, in May 1799 (or six and a third years earlier), Portugal had shown the Christian world how to make peace with the Moslem pirate states, for a single Portuguese ship of the line (the *Alphonso*; 64 guns) arrived at Tripoli to put a stop to that state's belligerent acts affecting Portuguese shipping. No diplomatic notes were exchanged, with associated long drawn-out negotiations, but the *Alphonso* went into action, "took the Tripoline *Admiral* & burn'd another Cruiser of 18 Guns." The commander of the Portuguese battleship (a Scot—Commodore Donald Campbell) was at Tripoli only two weeks (May 6-20), but in that time he terrified the Tripolines and left after dictating a treaty of peace "as favorable [for Portugal] in every respect as the existing Treaty with Great Britain."

It is only fair to the United States Navy and to the heroic Commander Preble and his men to say that Tripoli in May 1799, when visited by the *Alphonso*, was virtually unprotected, with only a few antiquated guns; but this Portuguese incident stimulated the bey to build modern fortifications and erect powerful batteries to defend his capital. When the American squadron bombarded the town in the summer of 1804, Tripoli was defended with 115 well-mounted large-caliber cannon in shore batteries and, including its protective marine force, had a total of 134 heavy and 66 light guns as well as an army of defense stated as 25,000 men. The Tripolitans had fifty per cent more guns, three times as many heavy guns, and twenty-five times as many men as the entire United States squadron under the command of Commodore Preble, whose devastating attacks on the city, harbor, fortifications, and shipping in the late operating season of 1804 led to the bey of Tripoli's earnestly seeking peace in early 1805—prior to the planned resumption of hostilities by "the dare-devil Americans" when the weather became favorable for naval action. Maclay says:

The young republic, by means of its navy, threw off the ignoble yoke of the piratical states of Barbary, and frustrated the intrigues of Great Britain against the development of our commerce in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic. . . . The

four years of active service in the Mediterranean proved of great benefit to the infant navy of the United States. The officers and men acquired that practical training and discipline which active service alone can give.

The actions of the United States Navy in the Mediterranean prior to Preble's belligerent moves against Tangier and Tripoli in 1803 both pleased and amused Britain. When Preble called the bluff of the masquerading British frigate *Maidstone* and sighted his guns on her, the grins left the faces of the self-satisfied British, and his attitude—protective and retaliatory—toward their time-honored policy of impressment annoyed them greatly. After the incidents at Morocco, Tripoli, and finally Tunis, British respect for the American Navy and the Barbary pirates' fear of it were sufficiently great so that until the War of 1812—a period of about seven years—the combination of British money, encouragement, and influence and Moslem corsairs' rapacious cupidity was not strong enough to cause further serious molestation of the American merchant fleet in the Mediterranean.

*The Sequel and Final Phases in 1815 of United States
Hostilities with the Barbary Corsair States*

Britain was not happy as a result of United States subjugation of the Moslem Barbary pirate states in 1804-1805; it resented the American demonstration and effective utilization of naval power under Commodore Preble in 1804 and of the impressive squadron under Commodore Rodgers that capitalized on Preble's brilliant work and dictated treaties of peace with Tripoli and Tunis in 1805. Britain's universal policy in utilizing the Barbary corsairs for its own selfish ends received a sharp blow in 1805 when its greatest maritime commercial rival in the Mediterranean trade—the young American republic—forced peace under the guns of its navy upon the Moslem Barbary pirate states; henceforth American commerce was free from corsair depredations, to which the various other rivals of Britain in marine carrying trade were (at its instigation or with its approval) occasionally subjected and constantly exposed. In publicly endorsing the policy and acts of the Barbary pirates in the interest and for the glory of the British Empire, Lord Sheffield had definitely singled out the growing commerce of the United States in the Mediterranean for destruction by the pirates, stating that "the Americans can not protect themselves, . . . they can not pretend to a navy." Under President Washington, the United States was impecunious, had no navy, and was divided in sentiment as to the need of one. During Adams' administration, the country had a respectable little navy that was capable of giving a good account of itself—but no money. Jefferson was a "no navy" man; he pulled the purse strings tight and preached brotherly love with all peoples—even unscrupulous and lawless pirates. Yet, it was during his terms of office that popular opinion compelled Congress to act to use the remnants of the surviving Adams navy, fortified by certain new small craft, to eradicate the Barbary pirate menace to American peaceful commerce in the Mediterranean and connecting waters. The British policy of securing a monopoly of the Mediterranean carrying trade—at that time the most important in the world—was referred to and denounced even by Britain's most enlightened men and humanitarians. Historian Smollet wrote: "The existence of Algiers and other predatory states which entirely subsist upon piracy and rapine, petty states of barbarous ruffians, maintained, as it were, in the midst of powerful nations, which they insult with impunity, and of which they exact an annual contribution, is a flagrant reproach upon Christendom; a reproach the greater, as it is founded upon a low, selfish, illiberal maxim of policy."

Britain, with its powerful navy, could have cleaned up the Barbary pirates within a month had it honestly wanted to do so, but it elected to use them selfishly and support them. As a result of the American-Barbary wars in the first few years of the nineteenth century, the United States subdued and secured privileges from the Barbary States that were denied to European marine powers, and in a short time the Yankee skipper was driving the British and all other competitors from much of the highly valued Mediterranean trade. This situation did not "sit well" with the British; they bided their time while harboring and increasing their resentment, and the War of 1812 finally gave them the opportunity that they had been not only looking for but also seeking to develop in order to "drive the Yankee upstarts from the seas." During the war with Britain (1812-1815), which was primarily a seamen's war, the United States needed all its energies to continue its struggle for absolute independence on the high seas and, as the Britishers rightly conjectured, was unable to look after its commercial interests in the Mediterranean. Maclay says:

Immediately upon the declaration of war, British emissaries informed the Barbary States that the United States as a maritime nation would be swept from the face of the earth, that its commerce would be annihilated, and that England would consent to peace only upon the stipulation that the United

States forever afterward should build no ship of war heavier than a frigate. Stimulated by this assurance, and smarting under the punishment the United States had given them in 1805, the Barbary States assumed a hostile attitude.

It is to the lasting disgrace of the United States that annual tribute had been paid to Algiers since 1795 and that President Jefferson (or Adams before him) had not sent a fleet over to the Barbary States—as soon as such vessels could be built, equipped, and manned—to subjugate the Moslem corsair states and tear out, “root and branch,” for all time every sign or phase of serfdom or subservience. In the summer of 1800, the dey of Algiers, in demanding that the U.S.S. *George Washington* be sent to Constantinople in his service under the Algerine flag, had frankly expressed the Moslem Barbary corsair viewpoint when he declared to U.S. Consul O'Brien and Captain Bainbridge, U.S.N., “You pay me tribute, by which you become my slaves.”

When the war started between Britain, “the proud and undisputed Mistress of the Seas,” with a Royal Navy of a thousand ships mounting 28,000 guns, and the young American republic, whose fleet of seventeen naval vessels mounting fewer than 450 guns was puny in comparison, it would seem that the British claim that the little American fleet would be destroyed in six months' time was warranted by a consideration of the facts. When a British agent informed the dey of Algiers that “the American flag would be swept from the seas, the contemptible navy of the United States annihilated and its maritime arsenals reduced to a heap of ruins,” the dey thought the statement logical, believed it, and set his wits to work to bleed further or pick a quarrel with the United States. His first pre-emptory demand of the American consul, Tobias Lear, was for a payment of tribute to the amount of \$27,000 which he had the audacity to claim was owing him, as he said that the Americans from the date of the signing of the first treaty, seventeen years before, had measured time by the sun, whereas Mussulmans reckoned it by the moon and that, as a result, the United States had cheated him during the years of money that was justly his due. Because of the war with Britain, Consul Lear acceded to the dey's extortion. Acting under the proddings of the British, the dey next objected to the quality of the supplies and marine stores that the United States was sending to him as tribute payments and, for an official complaint, finally settled on the cargo of the American ship *Alleghany*, which he branded as of inferior quality and generally unsatisfactory. On July 25, 1812, he declared that Consul Lear must leave Algiers and “depart in the *Alleghany* as he would not have a consul in his regency who did not cause everything to be brought exactly as he had ordered.” It is significant and suggestive of how Britain worked to destroy the naval and commercial marine power of the United States—stooping to employ pirates and thugs to assist in the destruction—to note that at about the time the American ship *Alleghany's* tribute cargo was rejected as inferior and unsuitable by the dey of Algiers, two large British ships, laden with powder, shot, cables, anchors, marine equipment, repair materials, and naval stores, arrived at Algiers under the escort of a vessel of the Royal Navy. These cargoes, said to have been “sufficient to equip the entire Algerian fleet,” were sent to the dey as “a present from the British Government.”

Algerine corsairs were turned loose to prey upon American merchant ships, but fortunately the war with Britain had forced United States vessels to seek harbors of safety, and only one American merchantman (the brig *Edwin* of Salem, Mass., Capt. George Smith) was captured. This small vessel was taken on August 25, 1812, while sailing westbound in the western Mediterranean, and her captain, officers, and crew—ten persons in all—were “sold into slavery.” Another Algerine corsair took an American (Pollard—a Virginian) from a Spanish vessel and “held him in bondage.” With the small American Navy engaged in a death struggle with the powerful British fleet, the United States Government, actuated by humanitarianism, sent an agent secretly to Spain to act in behalf of relatives and friends of the captives, and a ransom of \$3,000 was offered for each of them. This the dey scornfully rejected, and he boasted that he would greatly increase the number of his American slaves before considering any propositions for their ransom and liberation.

On the assurances of British agents that the American Navy was being exterminated and would never again be powerful enough to cause any trouble or concern in the Mediterranean, Tripoli and Tunis, glad to get a measure of revenge for their humiliation by the United States fleets in 1804-1805, permitted the British to regain possession of four prizes that had been captured by the American privateer *Abellino* and sent in harmony with established rules of war into Barbary "neutral" ports.

In the War of 1812, the British did not drive the Stars and Stripes completely from the Seven Seas or thoroughly destroy (sink or capture)—as they claimed they would—the vessels of the United States Navy. At the close of the struggle, the American Navy consisted of sixty-four vessels mounting more than 1,500 guns, which represented four times as many bottoms and three and a third times as many mounted guns as those in the navy when the war was started by the British to exterminate American naval power and cripple for all time its merchant marine and ocean commerce.

On February 23, 1815, five days after the peace treaty of the United States with England had been proclaimed, President James Madison recommended that war be declared against Algiers. Two naval squadrons were ordered detailed for service in the Mediterranean. The first to get away, sailing May 20, known as the New York squadron, was under the command of Capt. Stephen Decatur (a hero, under Preble, at Tripoli in 1804) and consisted of the following ten vessels mounting 210 guns:

Name of Vessel	Type	Number of Guns	Commander
GUERRIÈRE	Frigate	44	Capt. Stephen Decatur
MACEDONIAN	Frigate	38	Capt. Jacob Jones
CONSTELLATION	Frigate	36	Capt. Charles Gordon
ÉPERVIER	Sloop of war	18	Mast. Comdt. John Downes
ONTARIO	Sloop of war	18	Mast. Comdt. Jesse D. Elliott
FIREFLY	Brig	12	Lieut. George W. Rodgers
FLAMBEAU	Brig	12	Lieut. John B. Nicholson
SPARK	Brig	12	Lieutenant Gamble
SPITFIRE	Schooner	10	Lieut. A. J. Dallas
TORCH	Schooner	10	Lieut. Wolcott Chauncey

The *Firefly*, when a few days out, sprung her masts during a heavy gale, returned to port for repairs, and joined the second squadron destined for the Mediterranean. This had been assembled at Boston and was under the command of Capt. William Bainbridge, who, because of seniority, became commodore of the combined U. S. naval squadrons when they reached the Mediterranean. The vessels of the second squadron, which reached Gibraltar in September 1815 (excluding the *Firefly* of the first, or New York, squadron, which crossed the Atlantic with the second squadron), were nine in number, mounting 237 guns, as follows:

Name of Vessel	Type	Number of Guns	Name of Vessel	Type	Number of Guns	Name of Vessel	Type	Number of Guns
INDEPENDENCE	Ship of the line	74	ERIE	Sloop of war	18	SARANAC	Brig	16
UNITED STATES	Frigate	44	BOXER	Brig	16	ENTERPRISE	Schooner	12
CONGRESS	Frigate	36	CHIPPEWA	Brig	16	LYNX	Sloop	5

The combined two squadrons sent to the Mediterranean totaled nineteen sail and mounted 447 guns. Shortly afterwards, the 44-gun frigate *Java* (Capt. Oliver Hazard Perry) joined the fleet, which would have made the United States Mediterranean naval forces consist of twenty vessels mounting 491 guns if the heroic little 18-gun sloop-of-war *Épervier*—sent back to the United States in July with ten prisoners liberated by Algiers—had not gone missing. It is believed that the *Épervier* was lost in a severe hurricane, which caused the foundering of several British merchantmen.

After the impressive American Mediterranean fleet had finally accomplished its mission—conspicuously, with honor—and most of the vessels had started for home, the U. S. ship-of-the-line *Washington* was dispatched to the Mediterranean in the summer of 1816 as flagship of a Mediterranean squadron, under the command of Commodore Isaac Chauncey, that consisted of the following five vessels mounting 190 guns: *Washington* (74 guns), *United States* (44 guns), *Constellation* (36 guns), *Erie* (18 guns), and the *Ontario* (18 guns)—a ship of the line, two frigates, and two sloops of war. The difference in the power of the U. S. naval squadrons that Madison sent to the Mediterranean in 1815, just at the close of the hard war fought with Britain, and the relatively weak squadron (handicapped by senseless orders) that Jefferson sent to the same waters during the wars with the Barbary pirates in 1801-1805 is significant. Preble's squadron mounting 118 guns (but with only one frigate), which did such heroic work in 1804, was puny compared with the later squadrons of Decatur, Bainbridge, or Chauncey.

It was the second United States naval squadron, under the command of Capt. Stephen Decatur (consisting of three frigates, two sloops of war, two brigs, and two schooners—a total of nine vessels mounting 198 guns), that, arriving first in the Mediterranean, shouldered the entire responsibility of subduing the Barbary States and of dictating terms of peace, and its task was no light one. The Algerine Navy alone consisted of five frigates, six sloops of war, and one schooner—a fleet of twelve well-equipped and manned seagoing war vessels mounting 360 guns—and totaled three more vessels and 162 (82 per cent) more guns than the nine vessels of Decatur's squadron that had reached the Mediterranean. This Algerine corsair fleet was commanded by Admiral Rais Hammida, known as "the terror of the Mediterranean," a real fighter and a courageous, capable leader with an enviable record for naval prowess.

On June 17, the *Guerrière*, *Constellation*, and *Épervier* contacted the enemy off Cape Gata, and the Algerine flagship *Mashouda* was taken by the *Guerrière* after Admiral Rais Hammida had been killed. In this engagement, one of the *Guerrière's* main-deck guns burst when fired, shattering the spar deck above and killing three men and wounding seventeen (more casualties than she suffered from enemy fire, which totaled fourteen men—four of them killed). The honor of the capture of the big Algerine frigate went to the little American brig *Épervier* (Master Commandant Downes), which was handled most skillfully and with rare courage. Getting close in "under the frigate's cabin ports," the brig "poured in nine broadsides which compelled the enemy, after a running action of twenty-five minutes, to surrender." The *Mashouda* was badly cut up by gunfire, but casualties on the captured ship were not great; out of a complement of 436 men, 30 were killed or seriously wounded, and 406 were taken prisoners. The *Mashouda*, with a prize crew aboard, was sent under the escort of the U. S. frigate *Macedonian* to Cartagena. On June 19, the Algerian 22-gun brig *Estido* was sighted and chased by some of the smaller vessels of the U. S. squadron. The *Estido*, navigating in shoal waters in an attempt to escape the destructive fire of the Americans, ran ashore, and many of the crew took to the boats, one of which was sunk by gunfire. The *Estido* was captured, refloated, and also sent to Cartagena as a prize. Of her original crew of 180 men, 83 were taken prisoners, 23 were found dead on her decks, and many were killed and drowned in their attempts to get ashore.

Captain Decatur, being unable to find and come to grips with the remainder of the Algerine fleet (evidently disorganized following its admiral's death and the capture of the flagship), boldly sailed for Algiers, where he arrived on June 28. Algiers was a very strongly fortified city. The harbor itself was defended by heavy batteries mounting 220 guns, the town by walls of immense thickness mounting heavy guns, and the formidable ancient citadel of the deys, located some five hundred feet above sea level, dominated the city, harbor, and environs. It was authoritatively said that "over five hundred pieces of ordnance bore upon the maritime approaches of the place." In the LIFE OF LORD EXMOUTH, we read that Britain's great admiral, Lord Nelson, in a conversation with Captain Brisbane, had asserted that

twenty-five ships of the line would be necessary to reduce Algiers, and we read that following the visit of Decatur's squadron to Algiers, when the British got into trouble with the Barbary States, the lords of the admiralty considered "five ships of the line, five frigates, four bomb ketches and five gun brigs" inadequate and "too small a force to send against the citadel of Algiers."

Captain Decatur was probably not posted on the views of Britain's great naval hero and of the British Admiralty; nevertheless, on the morning of June 29, the *Guerrière* approached the harbor with a white flag at the fore and the Swedish colors at the main—a signal expressing a desire of the commander to confer with the Swedish consul. About noon, Norderling, the Swedish consul, and the Algerian captain of the port boarded the American frigate and were advised of the capture of the *Mashouda* and *Estido* and the death of Admiral Rais Hammida—news that was confirmed by captured Algerine officers who were aboard the *Guerrière*. Captain Decatur was invited ashore to negotiate a new peace treaty, but he declined to go. He sent a letter from President Madison to the dey, in which the only conditions of peace were set forth as (1) the absolute relinquishment of all claim to tribute in the future and (2) the freeing of American commerce from molestation by Algerian corsairs. Captain Decatur insisted that any conversation bearing upon the matter be held on board the *Guerrière* and that if the Algerines wanted peace, it would be necessary for them to act at once. At a conference held the next day (June 30) between Captain Decatur and the captain of the port of Algiers (who had been granted full powers by the dey to negotiate), Decatur demanded that all Americans in the possession of Algiers be liberated without ransom and that all their effects (or the equivalent in money) be returned to them; that Christians escaping to American vessels should not be returned; that \$10,000 should be paid in cash as damages to the owners of the captured Salem brig *Edwin*; and that in the future the relations between Algiers and the United States be precisely the same as those between Christian and civilized nations. The Algerine captain of the port asserted that the present dey of Algiers (known as "Omar the Terrible") had not declared war on the United States and was not responsible or accountable for the belligerent acts of a predecessor in office (Hadji Ali—known as "The Tiger"). He asked for a truce so that he could lay the American terms for peace before the dey, but this Decatur declined to grant, declaring: "The American prisoners must be sent aboard this ship at once and if any vessels of your squadron appear before the treaty is signed by the dey and returned to me they will be captured or destroyed."

The Algerines lost no time in signing the peace treaty and bringing the liberated prisoners aboard the *Guerrière*, and it is well that they did so. The Americans had been beat to quarters and were about to capture an Algerine ship of war "filled with Turkish soldiers from Tunis," which was trying to make port when Decatur's terms were agreed to in full and the signed document placed in the American naval commander's hands. In a few hours' time, an American naval squadron had forced a peace upon the most powerful of the Barbary corsair states. Maclay, referring to the event, says:

In less than sixteen days from the time the squadron arrived on the scene of trouble [Mediterranean waters] a more advantageous treaty than had ever been made with a foreign power had been signed by the dey, and all the demands of the American Government were complied with. After signing the treaty, the dey's prime minister re-

proachfully said to the British consul: "You told us that the Americans would be swept from the seas in six months by your navy, and now they make war upon us with some of your own vessels which they have taken." The vessels referred to were the *Macedonian*, the *Épervier* and the (new) *Guerrière*.

Having settled with Algiers, Captain Decatur, without waiting for Captain Bainbridge's squadron to reinforce him, gave his attention to the other belligerent Barbary corsair states. On July 26, a United States naval squadron anchored before Tunis, and Captain Decatur sent word ashore informing the bey that only twelve hours would be allowed him to pay \$46,000 for permitting the British cruiser *Lyra* to seize the American privateer *Abellino's* prizes in Tunisian neutral waters. Mordecai M. Noah, the U. S. consul at Tunis, who conveyed to the bey the terms of a treaty dictated by Captain Decatur, described the interview as follows:

"Tell your admiral to come and see me," said the Bey.

"He declines coming, Your Highness, until these disputes are settled, which are best done on board the ship."

"But this is not treating me with becoming dignity. Hammuda Pasha, of blessed memory, commanded them [Commodore Morris and his men] to land and wait at the palace until he was pleased to receive them."

"Very likely, Your Highness, but that was twenty years ago."

After a pause the Bey exclaimed: "I know this admiral; he is the same one who, in the war of Sidi Jusef, of Trabis, burned the frigate [*Philadelphia*]."

"The same."

"Hum! Why do they send wild young men to treat for peace with old powers? Then, you Ameri-

cans do not speak the truth. You went to war with England, a nation with a great fleet, and said you took her frigates in equal fight. Honest people always speak the truth."

"Well, sir, and that was true. Do you see that tall ship in the bay flying a blue flag? It is the *Guerrière*, taken from the British. That one near the small island, the *Macedonian*, was also captured by Decatur on equal terms. The sloop near Cape Carthage, the *Peacock*, was also taken in battle."

The Bey laid down the telescope, reposed on his cushions, and, with a small tortoise-shell comb set with diamonds, combed his beard. A small vessel got under way and came near the batteries; a pinnace with a few men rowed toward the harbor, and a man dressed in the garb of a sailor was taking soundings.

The bey of Tunis, impressed by American naval power and with Decatur's record of courage and energy, decided to accept the offered terms of peace. It is reported that after paying the money demanded, a brother of the prime minister turned angrily upon the British consul and said: "You see, Sir, what Tunis is obliged to pay for your insolence. You should feel ashamed of the disgrace you have brought upon us. I ask you if you think it just, first to violate our neutrality and then to leave us to be destroyed or pay for your aggressions."

Ten days after the appearance of the United States naval squadron at Tunis, it dropped anchor off Tripoli, and Captain Decatur, on August 5, promptly declared to the bashaw the object of his visit and set forth his terms. He demanded (1) payment in full for the value of the two prizes of the American privateer *Abellino* seized by the British cruiser *Paulina* in Tripoline waters (tentatively estimated at \$30,000); (2) a salute of 31 guns from the bashaw's castle to the flag of the American consulate; and (3) final peace terms to be negotiated on board the *Guerrière*. The bashaw bullied, objected, and threatened; he made an impressive show of his army of "twenty thousand Arabs," manned his batteries, and talked of war to the death. But the achievements of Decatur at Algiers and Tunis were too much for him to overlook, and the exploits against Tripolitans of Preble, Decatur, and Sterett and of all the fighting Americans could not be forgotten. Decatur's rapid (and very visible) preparations for action caused the bashaw quickly to change his attitude, for he had no desire to see the bombardment of 1804 resumed. The governor of Tripoli was sent on board the *Guerrière* with full powers to negotiate a peace, and the terms of the treaty were dictated by Captain Decatur on his own ship. The value of the prizes, set at \$25,000 by the American consul, was accepted by Decatur, but only with the understanding that the Tripolines should agree to liberate all of the ten Christians then held as slaves. Mackenzie, in his *LIFE OF DECATUR*, says: "Two of these were Danish youths, countrymen of the worthy Mr. Nissen who [as resident Danish consul] had been so indefatigable in exercising kind offices toward the officers of the *Philadelphia* while they were captives in Tripoli. The others were Sicilians, being a gentleman with his wife and children who had been captured together" (and Sicilians had assisted Commodore Preble in his attack on Tripoli in 1804 by renting and helping to man eight small gunboats and bomb vessels).

Having apparently cleaned up the Barbary pirates and made treaties of peace with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, Captain Decatur sent the squadron to Gibraltar to make contact with Captain Bainbridge's squadron, while he detoured to land the liberated Sicilians in their own country. While the *Guerrière* was beating down the Spanish coast from Cartagena to Cape de Gata on her way to Gibraltar alone, she came in contact with seven Algerine war vessels (four frigates and three sloops of war). Fearing that the treacherous Moslems—with

the odds so tremendously in their favor—might be tempted to renew hostilities notwithstanding a recently signed treaty of peace, Decatur cleared his ship for action and, addressing the crew, said: "Those fellows are approaching us in a threatening manner. We have whipped them into a treaty and if the treaty is to be broken let them break it. Be careful of yourselves. Let any man fire without orders at the peril of his life. But let them fire first if they will, and we'll take the whole of them." The crew was sent to its battle stations, and Decatur continued on his course. The Algerine corsairs passed close to the *Guerrière*, and the commodore of the squadron hailed, "Where are you going?" Decatur promptly replied, "Where it pleases me."

On October 6, 1815, the two U. S. naval squadrons were at Gibraltar under the command of Captain Bainbridge, who, as senior officer, became the commodore of the fleet. The American warships made an impressive show, and the British were chagrined to see the *Independence*, a 74-gun ship of the line (for they had boasted that they would "never permit the United States to build a warship bigger than a frigate"), and also to find such ships as the *Guerrière*, *Macedonian*, *Boxer*, *Erie*, and *Ontario* in the fleet, to have seen the *Épervier*, and to hear of the *Java*, *Peacock*, etc.—all names long associated with British naval supremacy but now borne by vessels flying American colors. Britain was mortified at the brilliant naval coup of the United States in the Mediterranean, and its agents promptly set to work seeking to nullify Captain Decatur's courageous and unprecedented acts. Not only Britain but also other Christian nations were chagrined at the accomplishments of the Americans, and the many European consuls at Algiers, by their attitude and comments, caused the dey, on reflection, to regret that he had submitted to the unusual conditions set forth in his treaty with the United States and deeply resent the manner in which it had been forced on him. Gradually, the dey developed the belief that "it was disgraceful to the Faithful to humble themselves before Christian dogs," and when approached by British diplomats for an explanation of his surprising conduct with the Americans, he showed his teeth and snarled and did it so effectively that he actually intimidated the British. Lord Exmouth, with a British squadron behind him consisting of six ships of the line, two frigates, three sloops of war, a bomb ship, and several armed and well-manned transports, was bluffed into paying nearly \$400,000 for the liberation of twelve thousand Neapolitan and Sardinian captives. We are told that the dey of Algiers, encouraged by this "diplomatic victory" over the British Lord Exmouth, became bolder and unfriendly toward the Americans. He waxed indignant because an Algerine brig that had been captured during the period of hostilities on the coast of Spain, within the three-mile limit, had been turned over to the Spanish authorities, and when U. S. Consul William Shaler called at the palace to deliver to him a copy of the Decatur treaty, "ratified by the Senate of the United States," the dey pretended surprise that such procedure had been deemed necessary and maintained that it was evident that the treaty was in fact "unsatisfactory to the United States Government." Treating Shaler with rudeness, the dey abruptly terminated the conference and stated that he was satisfied that the Americans were unworthy of his conferring with them. The next day, a further audience was refused the U. S. consul, and the copy of the ratified treaty was returned to Shaler by the vizier, with such insulting expressions that the American consul hauled down the Stars and Stripes and went on board the U.S.S. *Java*, which had brought the Senate-ratified copy of the Decatur treaty to Algiers.

Anticipating some trouble with the dey of Algiers as a result of the reaction to Decatur's visit of June 30, 1815, and the profitable victory of words over the proud British (who were exceedingly subtle or lacked courage during the negotiations), a small but well-balanced U. S. naval squadron was near at hand and on April 8, 1816, took up position to attack the Algerine war vessels at the Mole. This squadron consisted of the frigate *United States* of 44 guns (Capt. John Shaw), the frigate *Java* of 44 guns (Capt. Oliver H. Perry), the frigate *Constellation* of 36 guns (Capt. Charles Gordon), the sloop-of-war *Erie* of 18 guns (Mast. Comdt. William Crane), and the sloop-of-war *Ontario* of 18 guns (Mast. Comdt. John Downes)—a total of five vessels (three of which were frigates) mounting 160 guns all told.

The American squadron lost no time in taking battle positions and making arrangements for a night attack on the city. No attempt was made to negotiate with the dey, as it was known that the only language that he could clearly understand was the speaking of guns manned by determined and courageous men. Maclay, in *HISTORY OF THE NAVY*, says:

All the boats in the squadron, with twelve hundred volunteers, were divided into two flotillas, one of which was to attack the water battery and spike the guns while the other was to carry the land batteries. Ladders were prepared for scaling the

walls, and cutlasses and boarding-spikes were sharpened. Captain Gordon [of the *Constellation*] was to command the expedition and Captain Perry [of the *Java*] to be second in command.

The preparations for the attack, made as secretly as possible, were of necessity so extensive that the commander of a French frigate became suspicious and, noting the studied position of each vessel of the American squadron, snooped around sufficiently to get a good idea of what was brewing. In an endeavor to curry favor, he hustled ashore and informed the dey of developments and what to expect. The dey, with memories of Decatur and Preble and well knowing that he had "wild Americans" (who did with ease "the most impossible things") and not slow-moving, conservative, and orthodox Englishmen to deal with, instead of promptly preparing for defense and robbing the attacking force of the great advantage of surprise, became much alarmed, quickly sent word to the American squadron to prevent hostilities, and gave renewed expressions of his friendship for the United States. Captain Shaw (of U.S.S. *United States*) saw to it that the thoroughly frightened and subdued dey of Algiers was brought to terms and both acknowledged and again signed the Decatur treaty that had been ratified by the Senate of the United States. The American naval squadron appeared at Tunis on June 18, as the bey, prompted by British agents, had expressed dissatisfaction with the conditions of his treaty with the United States as dictated by Captain Decatur and signed under the muzzles of naval guns. When similar threatening guns again pointed at him, the bey of Tunis "ran to cover," retracted all his warlike utterances, pleaded misunderstandings, cast off foreign influences that were anti-American, and pledged his undying friendship for the United States. The firm and vigorous methods of Decatur and Shaw in 1815-1816 prevented costly campaigns against all the Barbary pirate states and put an end to their menace as far as United States commerce and the payments of tribute for peace and protection were concerned. A further curb on the Barbary corsairs resulted about this time when a British expedition moved against them, but the British did not fare so well, for they lost seven hundred men killed and wounded. However, it was the United States which in 1804-1805 showed the Christian maritime nations how to proceed against the Moslem Barbary pirates and in 1815 (confirmed in 1816) how to eradicate them as a destructive influence affecting international ocean commerce and civilization.

